POST-REALISM

THE RHETORICAL TURN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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THE GENDER OF RHETORIC, REASON, AND REALISM

This chapter argues that moving beyond realism—to post-realism—requires moving beyond the gender-blindness of conventional accounts.[1] My argument weaves together areas of inquiry that are usually treated in isolation. Intellectual developments associated with the rise of systematic inquiry in ancient Greece—marked by the shift from rhetoric to philosophy and its foundational dichotomies of reason over affect, mind over body—comprise one area of inquiry. Another is the study of historical-political developments—the shift to centralized authority and its dichotomies of public over private, civilized over "other"—within which Western science and political theory "emerged." A third area of inquiry is feminist scholarship that identifies Western philosophy and science as masculinist (privileging that which is associated with maleness over that which is associated with femaleness) and androcentric (taking male ways of being and knowing—as constituted under conditions of gender hierarchy—as the putatively human norm). A final area encompasses feminist critiques of state formation as institutionalizing and legitimating gender (and other) hierarchies and, specifically, as "naturalizing" the dichotomy of male-female "difference" that has excluded women (and others associated with the feminine) from intellectual and political power.

These areas of inquiry have generated extensive literatures that are complex and often controversial. My objective in this paper is less to explicate these literatures than to draw linkages between them.[2] It is these linkages that expose the centrality of gender in states and ideologies (in political and intellectual developments) and, therefore, the importance of feminist perspectives in refiguring realism. The core of my argument is that, historically, the following were mutually constituted (interdependent) processes: the institutionalization and natural-

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ization of sexual difference and gender hierarchy in state making, the dichotomizing pursuit of transcendent reason in Western philosophy, and the articulation of androcentric realism in Western political theory. Moreover, this mutuality is not "simply" a conceptual linkage (e.g., between symbolic constructions of masculinity, rationality, power, and sovereignty) but a historical, empirical, and "structural" linkage that is visible through a feminist lens on state making and its ideological productions. Therefore, attempts to rethink realism must also engage a rethinking of gender relations and state orders.[3]

I first consider the importance of examining gender and of focusing on early, rather than modern, state formation. I then turn to the significance of specifically Athenian state making and tell a gender-sensitive story of rhetoric, reason, and realism in the Athenian context. Implications of this story for refiguring realism are considered in the final section.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER

I focus on gender because this is where realism is most exclusionary. It must be underscored that gender is not only about women: it is about masculinity and femininity as a dichotomy that structures the identities, discursive practices, and material conditions of *all* men and women. Neither is feminism limited to documenting women's exclusion from and/or trivialization within malestream accounts. While analyses that "add women" and privilege their ways of knowing and being are valuable as "corrective" contributions, the transformative power of feminist critiques lies in understanding gender as a theoretical category, not only an empirical marker.[4]

From this perspective, gender and its effects are pervasive (in our ways of being and ways of knowing) and their exclusion from theoretical projects renders such projects structurally biased and therefore systemically flawed. In particular, feminists argue that the oppositional terms of male-female and masculine-feminine are not symmetrical but, like other Western dichotomies, the first term is accorded primacy and dominance.[5] As a consequence, characteristics identified closely with hegemonic masculinity (e.g., reason, agency, autonomy, freedom, transcendence) are privileged over those associated with femininity (e.g., emotion, passivity, interdependence, necessity, contingency). Finally, feminists locate masculinism at the "roots of Western epistemology, even Western culture itself" and argue that

"the fundamental dichotomies" between subject-object, rational-irrational, culture-nature, and reason-emotion are all derived from the basic male/masculine-female/feminine "hierarchy that is central to patriarchal thought and society."[6]

Feminists are thus arguing that gender hierarchy is not coincidental to but in a significant sense constitutive of Western philosophy's objectivist metaphysics and its corollary expressions of instrumental reason, binary logic, and positivist science. Insofar as objectivist metaphysics marks the turning point from rhetoric to reason, this paper focuses on the institutionalization of that metaphysics, the hierarchical dichotomies it constituted, and their effects on the theory and practice of realism.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EARLY STATE MAKING

I focus on early state making because this is where "the human story" took a decisive turn marked by profound "intellectual" and "political" transformations. In terms of belief systems, state making involved new questions about the nature of "man," his relationships to "others," and his relationship to the known world. Historically this meant the displacement of "fatalistic" world views wherein the natural order and social order are unified and individual "will," "human agency," and sovereign subject(ivitie)s were not intelligible constructs.

> So long as the world was one in which no agentic imperative was thinkable, human beings resigned themselves to fatalism and saw the world through a prism of magical thinking in which capricious forces might, at best, be placated or tricked . . . .[7]

State making then marked a shift to awareness of human efficacy and a new story of reflective and responsible subjects who "take action" and acquire some measure of "control" over their reality.

In terms of socio-political organization, states were formed "against" existing social orders; they marked a shift from corporate, kin-based communities to the *institutionalization* of centralized authority, gender and other stratification (based on the exploitation of reproductive and productive labor), organized warfare, and justificatory ideologies. Resistance to early centralization was widespread and long lasting but did not prevent states from becoming the dominant form of social organization.[8] Key to this transition was the positive

feedback loop that amplified centralized political (and ideological) authority:

> There are multiple roads to statehood . . . .[but] once a society begins to evolve more centralized and more permanent authority structures, the political realm itself becomes an increasingly powerful determinant of change . . . . feed[ing] back to all the sociocultural features to make them fit more closely in its overall pattern.[9]

The point here is that coercive power alone tells us little about state making: the centralization of political authority requires not only economic and military power but also the centralization of ideological authority. Hence, culture and ideology are key to ensuring the "success" of states (both in terms of legitimating hierarchical rule and effectively reproducing justificatory ideologies) as states manipulate symbols, discursive practices, and ideological productions to mask their coercive power and effectuate indirect rule. In short, successful state making requires making states—and their oppressive dynamics—seem natural and even desirable.

Gender relations are central to these processes because state making marks the institutionalization of patriarchal relations that oppress women "as a group" even as they codify differences and competition *among* women. To the considerable extent that state making *depends on* the reproductive and productive labor of women, ideologies that de-politicize gender hierarchy are inextricable from the politics and discursive practices of centralized authority.[10] With state formation then, the exploitation of women and their exclusion from "public" authority and status is enforced by the power of the state and the *reproduction* of gender hierarchy is enabled by centralized "authorization" of particular masculinist ideologies.

In early states these revolutionary transformations have not yet been "naturalized," which is one effect of their institutionalization. Thus, an examination of early states reveals gender hierarchy, its attendant essentializing of dichotomized "gender difference," and the exclusion of women from political and ideological authority as historically contingent social constructions. More important, it exposes these constructions as not coincidental to but constitutive elements of consolidating and reproducing state systems.

In other words, states *depend* on the subordination of women (and others) and their exclusion from political and ideological authority.

Women cannot simply be included—as refiguring post-realism requires—without dramatically reconfiguring state orders. Conversely, as today's realities force a rethinking of states, the latter must include a rethinking of gender.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ATHENIAN CONTEXT

I focus on the Athenian context because this is where the realist narrative, which is also the scientific narrative, begins. It marks the turn from rhetoric to philosophy and realism; from skepticism to the Western codification of a binary metaphysics (mind-body, subject-object, culture-nature) and a binary politics (public-private, insider-outsider, civilized-Other).

The inadequacy of international relations theories of the state[11] is exacerbated by neglect of the Athenian *polis*: not only because modern states replicate many of its features, but because Athenian texts established constructions of authority, identity, politics, security, and public-private spheres that profoundly shaped and continue to discipline Western political theory and practice. This is not to equate Greek city-states with modern European states or to deny the systemic effects, for example, of religious traditions, individualism, and industrialization on the context of modern state formation. It is to suggest that greater attention to early state making generally, and the Athenian *polis* specifically, would expand our understanding of modern states, with implications for refiguring realism.

The realist narrative constructs Thucydides as "the first writer in the realist tradition as well as the founding father of the international relations discipline."[12] Subsequent realists have (selectively) drawn on his work as well as other ancient and classical sources of philosophy. Thucydides was able to "begin" the tradition of realism in part because he wrote during the "beginning" of the Western tradition of centralized authority (state making). While we honor his insights on the nature of war, we pay little attention to the context of state making within which he wrote and which shaped his thinking. By examining the work of the first realist *in context*, we are able to see it not only as "political theory" but historically and in relation to linguistic, sociocultural, and economic developments.

Not coincidentally, this context included the "beginning" of systematic inquiry: the development of philosophy as objectivist metaphysics. By embracing the linguistic turn, post-realists chal-

lenge objectivist claims, which are especially prominent in neorealism.[13] Insofar as refiguring realism entails moving beyond objectivism, we do so more effectively by situating the latter not only in relation to the revival of science in the modern era but the early institutionalization of this metaphysics in ancient Greece and in the context of state making. As G. E. R. Lloyd argues in regard to the emergence of states and science in Greece, "political experience" and "speculative thought" appear to be not just analogous developments but "two aspects [two stories?] of the same development."[14]

Thus, examining realism in its earliest context informs our understanding of both state making processes and the epistemological "roots" of realism. The former is relevant to theorizing states and making sense of transformations in today's "real world" and the latter is relevant to constructing a post-realism that fully addresses critiques of positivism. Moreover, the *interaction* of these dimensions is particularly clear in the Athenian context, an insight we would do well to highlight in analyzing today's turbulent context.

Because of the availability of materials and scholarly interest in ancient and classical Greece, we know a great deal about this interaction and, especially, the gender dynamics of the transition to rationalist philosophy and to political authority based on elite male citizenship. Ancient and classical texts suggest how female-identified principles (matrilineal kinship, maternal potency, women's sexuality) were domesticated in the transition to patriarchal states. In Cantarella's words,

> ... history of the female condition in antiquity ... allows identification
> of the moment when a practice of discrimination of centuries' duration
> was rationalized and presented for the first time as necessary,
> inevitable, and eternal. It was during the centuries of the Greek *polis*
> that the assertion of the "difference" between men and women was cod-
> ified.[15]

Thus, an examination of Athenian state making reveals essentialized sex difference as historically contingent but constitutively central to the Western tradition of political and ideological authority. Again, masculine agency and activities in the public sphere *depended* on a feminized and denigrated but nonetheless essential private sphere.

THE ATHENIAN STORY THROUGH A GENDERED LENS

Expanding agricultural, commercial, and military activities marked the economic and political environment of Greek state formation, with attendant population pressure, land hunger, and recurring debt crises.[16] In the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E., the increasing wealth of a middle class and impoverishment of non-propertied citizens and small farmers led to demands for land redistribution and debt cancellation. The Athenian "answer" to political and economic turbulence was to further erode aristocratic kinship as the basis of social organization in favor of citizenship based on the property claims of individual households.[17]

The patriarchal *oikos* became the primary socioeconomic and political unit, upon which the state depended, and which the state protected to ensure an economically stable and substantial middle class based in household production. This simultaneously instituted and promoted a model of household "families"[18] that was distinguished from a public/political sphere. Propertied men acquired status, authority, and resources as patriarchal heads-of-households and as participants in the newly prestigious public sphere. This was at the expense of women, who lost a variety of status, authority, and resource claims by being identified exclusively as biological and social reproducers in the now subordinated "private" sphere.

Political and economic changes both shaped and were shaped by the intellectual turbulence of the times. In the fifth century B.C.E., Herodotus, "father of history," and Thucydides "father of realism," wrote secular narratives depicting, respectively, the Persian and Pelopponesian wars. But Herodotus' history went beyond military matters to describe the immense variety of customs and social organization in the known world. The issue of cultural relativism raised by knowledge of "other" societies was an important source of Greek reflection on the relationship between particulars and universals. Similarly, in recounting the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides sought more than a record of military engagements. He examined the significance of specific events in order to understand the nature of war and power relations more generally (though he excludes domestic power relations[19]). These historians were only two of the ancient thinkers struggling with the question of how to distinguish the particular and contingent from the universal and unchanging. While they asked the question in terms of historical events and their underlying causes,

others asked the question in terms of "natural events" and how to understand change and permanence.

The itinerant sophists pursued this question in regard to the meaning of politics. They explored the separation of nature or *physis* (the realm of necessity and unchanging laws) from convention or *nomos* (the realm of the particular as distinctively political). To be a successful—that is, persuasive—speaker in the assembly and law courts required knowing the conventions—necessarily particular to each *polis*—and applying them appropriately. In this sense, the sophists were relativists; they "denied the possibility of absolute and immutable knowledge," advancing instead a "consensualist theory of truth."[20] Rhetoric here refers to "the different ways of achieving assent in different, particular audiences."[21]

The sophistic belief that "man is the measure of all things" supported democratic rather than oligarchic politics in the sense that qualities deemed necessary for political participation could be learned rather than inherited.[22] In promoting democracy, sophistic instruction focused on the "process of verbal communication between men and between groups of men which made the democracy workable."[23] To sophists, the absence of universals implied that arguments must be settled not by a process of calculation based upon foundational axioms, but by "the giving of *good reasons* to one's audience, particular reasons as to why they should, in that situation, assent to one's claims."[24]

But the Athenian "answer" we inherited, in response to this intellectual turbulence, rejected the sophistic, rhetorical tradition in favor of a foundational philosophy that informed realist political theory. Plato was hostile to the new forms of sophistic instruction and critical of existing political arrangements. Rather than democratic political community engaged in rhetorical debates, Plato sought reforms promoting "disinterested philosophical dialectic."[25] Political leadership was not to be entrusted to an assembly of corrupt speakers but to "philosopher-kings" who ruled by reason alone and were not distracted by private needs, desires, or emotional attachments. Platonic philosophy ostensibly excluded rhetoric and sophistic methods, positing instead "another world of intellectual objects, the Forms, accessible to reason alone and not to the senses."[26]

What is striking about this depiction is the extent to which Plato's denouncement of rhetoric and celebration of reason was politically motivated. The "answer" he developed was dramatically shaped by

the preferences (desires) he had, in the context of intellectual and political turbulence in which he lived and thought. Through our Enlightenment filters we tend to separate philosophy and politics, but they were not separate in Plato's time (and are not separate in ours). Plato sought foundations that would ensure the certainty of absolute truth, thus resisting skepticism, and the stability of the political order, thus resisting tyranny, anarchy, and/or radical democracy. His masculinist philosophy and political theory was intended to displace rhetoric and presumably avoid the problematic sociopolitical issues raised by the latter's relativism. Of course, rhetorical dimensions of communication were not eliminated but continued to shape discursive practices. Plato masked his own use of rhetoric by casting his "answers" as starkly distinguished from and definitively superior to the competing—primarily sophistic—formulations. In Winton and Garnsey's words, "The conflict between rhetoric and philosophy was resolved by the creation of a society whose basis is philosophy, in which rhetoric can have no role."[27]

By examining Western philosophy in the context of state making and its ideological transformations, the political dimensions of that philosophy come into focus. We are reminded that intellectual questions were not pursued independent of political questions but shaped by them. Plato's "answer" claimed universality but was particular; it was one among others and has come to look like the "rational" and "most accurate" answer because it successfully constituted itself as such. It did so in part by claiming that "real knowledge" was attainable because man could discern the systematic correspondence of thought to "unchanging subject-matter."[28] What marked man—as philosopher and political agent—was the uniqueness of his abstract reasoning, his capacity for *transcending the material world of necessity and contingency: the world of women, "Others," and nature.* In short, public sphere activities (politics!) simultaneously *depended upon* private sphere activities and defined "rational man" and "political actor" as *the exclusion* of that which is associated with the feminine. Henceforth, women qua "woman" were not only denied access to public sphere activities but were condemned to inferiority by immutable association with qualities that *contradicted* rational thought and political action—the most valuable ways of being and doing in the new "Western tradition."

DISCUSSION

I have argued that reason and realism displaced sophistic rhetoric and became the Western "answer" to the political and intellectual turbulence of Athenian state making. This answer tells a particular story from a particular vantage point. By claiming universality, however, it denies its particularity and by claiming to be realistic, it denies "other" vantage points and alternative stories. Specifically, it excludes the power relations of gender from all constructions of politics. Women, private sphere activities, *and private sphere morality* are categorically separated from a conception of politics that is applied internally as well as externally.

In the context of European state making, modern realists adopted this particular story and reproduced its erasures. In Christine Sylvester's words, "international relations theorists [came] to accept unquestioningly the stories pretheorists told about the separability in space and in morality of public and private spheres."[29]

In the sixteenth century, Machiavelli drew upon ancient Greek writings as he analyzed events in Italy, where conflicts among city-states were not dissimilar to those of the Hellenic world. His public sphere was an exclusively male domain of power politics. This contrasted starkly with the private sphere of feminine softness and sentimentality. The latter was less a haven than a source of danger and limitation, ever threatening to man's pursuit of *virtu*. In Wendy Brown's words, "*Fortuna* and female power not only conspire to undo men but are also the very things man is acting against, in an effort to master, control or escape."[30]

Hobbes was also familiar with ancient political theory and his political philosophy was also formed in a turbulent context. His radical nominalism was at odds with Athenian perspectives but it served him well in rendering women and private sphere activities invisible. His depiction of the state of nature became the discipline's model of pre-state and inter-state anarchy and provided the central problematique of international relations. But it is a model fixated on male behavior in a context of perpetual conflict in which all societal ordering is erased. Hobbes' abstract man "is a creature who is self-possessed and radically solitary . . . whose relations with others are either contractual or unavoidably violent."[31]

What realists, ancient and modern, share is a story of the world that presupposes exclusively male behavior and vantage point. This

bias frames the discipline in particular (and partial) ways, including: an understanding of "human" nature as atomistic, autonomous, and power-seeking; the state of nature as anarchic (categorically asocial conditions preceding or outside of the rational ordering of states); the patriarchal state as primary, as legitimate defender of the collective's security and as pursuing national interests through instrumental reason; the public sphere/politics as objective, rational, freedom-seeking, and realistic, thus, definitively separate from private sphere attachment, affect, necessity, and moral principles; and the security dilemma as the relentless pursuit of power politics as the "only" rational strategy in a context of perpetual competition and conflict. In this story, there are "men" but no mothers, states but no prior social orders, reason and power but no emotional engagement, public politics but no private power relations, governments but no households, and state security but no global society. Gender and its power relations are invisible.

A feminist post-realism takes history and context more seriously, asks where the women (and Others) are, and sees relations where realism sees oppositional dichotomies, and interdependence where realism sees autonomy. It tells a different story of anarchy, sovereign individuals, states, public and private spheres, politics, and security.

From a feminist perspective, the lack of society and socialization in the state of nature (or under conditions of anarchy) is a less than coherent and manifestly ahistorical story. Individual humans are biologically incapable of surviving in the absence of social relations and cooperation. To deny this fundamental fact, and the primacy of cooperation it entails, is to tell a profoundly unrealistic story of human life. An irreducible basis of nurturance ought to be the most obvious "given" of the human condition—and would more likely be the story told if mothers were the author(itie)s. To insist on this nurturance is not, however, to deny conflict but to situate conflict in the larger context of actually existing cooperative social relations and simultaneously in a discursive context: a world of meanings, arguments, and arguers. Thus, it looks for interactions between conflict and consensus, and between material necessity and rhetorical practice. It also shifts our understanding of what is "natural" (read inevitable and not, therefore, political), which permits us to see the denial of this cooperation as a politically motivated interpretation. Finally, it prompts us to change the international relations question from: "How is cooperation possible?" to "How is cooperation manifested in specific contexts, including that of international politics?"

The latter question invites a historical, not mythical, story of state making. Quite simply, states did not emerge out of chaos or anarchy but out of other forms of social organization (however unstable and elusive those forms may appear during turbulent periods). Failure to take those other forms seriously impoverishes not only our understanding of states and state making but also our knowledge of alternatives to states as we know them—knowledge perhaps especially important in the current context of state transformations. The historical story of state making reminds us that centralization was resisted and the success of states was neither natural, immutable, nor necessarily "good."

From a feminist post-realist perspective, states mark the institutionalization and legitimation of social hierarchies in which the autonomy and social adulthood of women "as a group" was sacrificed in favor of group survival based on male-defined needs and dominated by elite men. To ignore the oppressive consequences of state making is to deny the reality of most of the state's "subjects." It is to exclude from political analysis the power required to impose, legitimize, and reproduce systemic inequalities. It is also to accept acritically the state's legitimating claim that it represents the will of the entire society.[32]

Through a feminist lens, the state is gendered and its gender is masculine. The maleness of the state is due in large part to the conventional dichotomy of private and public and the construction of the public sphere and politics as exclusively masculine. In the realist story, women and the activities of the private sphere are outside of politics and must be prevented from contaminating the public sphere, which is a domain of free, rational agents. As abstractions, women are primarily excluded by associating them with the denigrated private sphere and denying them the rationality that marks "man" as the highest animal. Concretely, women have been (and continue to be) excluded from political power by limiting citizenship to those who are property owners and/or who perform military duty. Even when formal barriers are removed, patterns of gender hierarchy prevent women's *de facto* equality in political power.

As the editors of this volume point out, for realists, the public sphere is autonomous and politics are paramount. There is an important linkage here: the atomistic conception of "unrelated" men, the autonomy of the public sphere, and the sovereignty of states are conceptually and structurally interdependent. They all presuppose the categorical exclusion of private sphere (and other contextual) realities: nurturance, socialization, emotional commitments, normative rules, embodied reproduction, and socially necessary labor. They all privilege the idea of (male) agents who are unconstrained by private moralities or personal attachments and who employ instrumental reason to pursue power. Why? Because "That's the way it [read human nature/Plato, the nature of politics/Aristotle, the security dilemma/Thucydides] is." The linkage exposed here is discursively drawn in the context of establishing and legitimating particular forms of "human" (read ruling) agency: "rational man," "political agent," and "state sovereignty" are mutually constituted in the process of centralizing hierarchical authority in Western state forms.

The public-private dichotomy structures external as well as internal relations.[33] Because the public/state is masculine and categorically separate from the private sphere, international relations treats the latter as irrelevant: the discipline is definitively about relations between, not within, states; and private sphere activities (domestic in both senses) are excluded from analyses. Because reason and political order are masculine, their absence in inter-state relations renders anarchy feminine (in the sense of disorder, uncertainty, and uncontrollable passions): principles of justice, fairness, and progress that characterize civil society are deemed inappropriate and even dangerous where rule by brute force prevails.[34] Finally, because the dichotomy is so naturalized in Western thought, its extensive effects are taken for granted and we rarely consider how it reproduces and reinforces oppositional separations at the expense of recognizing interdependence.

The identification of human agency with male reason and the latter's construction as antithetical to "woman" was a condition of defining sovereign rational man and establishing his distance from "Others," including "outsiders." This exclusionary definition is key to both the construction of philosophy and political theory. The oppositional lens featured in objectivist and realist accounts magnifies and legitimizes self-other, us-them, aggressive-passive, insider-outsider, and protector-protected dichotomies.[35]

Here the question of "who we are" is resolved in a particular way. Reasoning man was the highest form of life and specifically required the *polis* for his realization.[36] By insisting on and legitimating the particular political order of the *polis*, the Greeks denied the possibility of political solidarity with those outside of this order as well as with the disenfranchised within it. Read through this lens, the security

dilemma becomes a "given" and the state becomes the "answer" for providing security.[37]

But feminists and Others ask, "Whose security is achieved by the state system?" Insofar as states are predicated upon unequal distribution of material and authoritative resources internally and violence or its threat externally,[38] they reproduce and even legitimate structural violence and the insecurity this poses for the majority of the planet.[39] Thus, while Western philosophy and political theory were innovative, cultivating a spirit of greater control over man's world and articulating a concept of abstract equality, they in fact were and remain powerful legitimators and reproducers of reason and rule by the numerically few.

Although realism has never represented an accurate "story of the world" (no story can make that claim), the representation it reifies has concrete effects. On one hand, the mind-body dichotomy at the core of Western philosophy constitutes ways of knowing that privilege a disembodied and disembedded reason. The cost of pursuing certainty over ambiguity is a tendency toward ahistorical, decontextual, and acritical accounts. Through this lens, the interaction of multiple realities is masked and the attraction of short-term oversimplifications is magnified. On the other hand, the public-private dichotomy at the core of political theory constitutes ways of doing that privilege the identities and activities of some at the expense of others. The cost of identifying politics exclusively with the public sphere is a tendency toward elite and instrumentalist accounts. Through this lens—exemplified in realist accounts—the reality of socially necessary labor and how symbolic and material power are reproduced is obscured.

Through an objectivist and realist lens that takes "sovereign rational man," competition, gender dichotomy, and social hierarchies as "naturally given," a variety of questions cannot be asked and critical challenges cannot be raised. Against objectivism, the embedded and embodied reality of concepts and practices is obscured. Against "realism," normative questions appear irrelevant or pointless, multiple realities are rendered invisible, and alternative visions appear necessarily utopian. In both, the actual direction of dependencies is inverted. We "forget" that abstractions require a material medium, that the pursuit of reason requires an emotional commitment, that elites are sustained by the production activities of non-elites, and that public sphere activities rely on effective domestic maintenance and

reproduction. We "forget" that all views are from somewhere particular and contingent and no single view from everywhere is possible.

Gender is at work here because the exclusion of "the feminine" is foundational to realist constructions of rational man, political agency, and state sovereignty. Historically, realism flourished during periods of turbulence, articulated by those seeking stability, certainty, and (their corollary:) increased control/domination. Realism is now being challenged in the midst of the political turbulence of changing states and the intellectual turbulence of changing epistemologies that we identify as post-modernity. Shifting gender relations were key to earlier transformations, as they are in the present context. Today's nationalist struggles, critical social movements, religious fundamentalisms, democratic mobilizations, peace initiatives, human rights, ecological attitudes, welfare-state crises, development policies, and restructured labor forces cannot be realistically analyzed without attending to gender. And today's multiple and fluid identities, contradictions between public and private moralities, post-positivist epistemologies, critiques of rationalism, realism, and humanism, and post-realist pursuit of rhetorical strategies cannot be adequately addressed without attending to gender. In Philip Windsor's words, "Contemporary history and contemporary philosophical undertakings mean that any reconciliation of the public and the private, the intellectual and the emotional, the considerations of morality with those of contingency, depend crucially on a re-examination of Western values and schemata—not least as they are determined by the relations between women and men."[40]

International relations discourse has conventionally been derived from what some men have done, what questions they asked, and what answers they generated, having consulted exclusively with each other. As a consequence, international relations theories —including neorealism, liberal-institutionalism, structuralism, and postmodernism—fail to take seriously both how gender affects our knowledge claims about international "reality" and how international processes have gender-differentiated effects.[41] Advocates of a post-realism seek a "radical inclusiveness" that acknowledges realist insights and moves beyond them to generate more adequate languages for today's realities. From a feminist perspective, post-realism must also move beyond the masculinism pervading international relations discourse and practice. Ultimately, this involves challenging not only patriarchal but related racist, capitalist, heterosexist, imperialist, and nationalist oppressions that underpin the world "as we currently reproduce it."

In short, post-realism must move beyond the discourse of objectivist dichotomies *and* the social relations of structural violence constituted by the historical state system. The ideological legitimation of state orders replaced the complexity and relativism of sophistic rhetoric with the ostensible certainty of reason and the competitive social relations of realism. A new rhetoric, or post-realism, must address the challenge of moving beyond Western philosophy's construction of reason and gender hierarchy at the core of states and Western political theory.

Notes

1. I am echoing Sandra Whitworth's demand (*Feminism and International Relations* [London: Macmillan, 1994], x) that IR theorists—including post-realists—move beyond pseudo-inclusion: "Numerous anthologies are including a feminist chapter, but most of the work that appears throughout the rest of those anthologies seems unfamiliar with, and unaffected by, feminist scholarship."

2. Only authors specifically referred to are cited in this chapter. For references to work underpinning this argument see my "An Archeology of Domination: Historicizing Gender and Class in Early Western State Formation," (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1988); "Introduction" and "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?" in *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

3. Changes in states are recognized as contemporary political transformations that IR theorists must address. Changes in gender relations (e.g., shifting divisions of labor, reproductive rights and technologies, feminization of poverty, welfare state crises, etc.) are also important contemporary issues but remain invisible in conventional—gender-blind—accounts.

4. On the sex-gender distinction and feminist theory, see, for example, Linda Nicholson, ed., *Feminism/Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott, eds., *Feminists Theorize the Political* (New York: Routledge, 1992); C. T. Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

5. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Richard Ashley, "Living on Borderlines," in *International/Intertextual Relations*, ed. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989).

6. Susan J. Hekman, *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1990), 68. On feminist critiques of rationalism and science, see also Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds., *A Mind of One's Own* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1993).

7. Jean B. Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 13-14.

8. Michael Michael, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

9. Ronald Cohen, "Introduction," in *Origins of the State*, eds. Ronald Cohen and Elman R. Service (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978), 8.

10. Feminist critiques of state making are extensive; the following is a brief summary of relevant points. Male groups cannot reproduce themselves without controlling the sexual reproduction of women (to ensure biological reproduction within the group) and the socialization of children (to ensure culturally appropriate values and loyalties to the group). Jill Vickers ("At His Mother's Knee: Sex/Gender and the Construction of National Identities," in *Women and Men*, ed. G. H. Nemiroff [Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1990], 483) argued that the patriarchal organization of sex/gender is one (but not the only) way that men (who lack a materially "certain" blood tie) "construct enduring forms of social organization, group cohesion and identity." In Zillah Eisenstein's words, patriarchy "expresses the struggle to control women's options in order to keep their role as childbearers and rearers primary" (*The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism* [Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981], 16). To the extent that women are excluded from defining group interests and compelled to comply with male-defined needs, their autonomy is limited. So excluded, women are at the same time denied the status of social adulthood (read political agency, sovereign subjectivity) attached to group decision makers. In effect, the continuity of the group is secured by limiting the autonomy, equality, and authority of the group's physical and social reproducers and reproduction—conventionally ignored as private sphere activity—"is revealed as the most political activity" (Vickers, "At His Mother's Knee," 482).

11. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987).

12. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 34.

13. Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225-86.

14. G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 249.

15. Eva Cantarella, *Pandora's Daughters* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 179. Similarly, in regard to the insider-outsider dichotomy of orientalism that is conventionally associated with modernity, Shiraz Dossa ("Political Philosophy and Orientalism: The Classical Origins of a Discourse," *Alternatives* 12, no. 3 [1987]: 343) identifies ancient political philosophy, especially that of Plato and Aristotle, as the "moment" that "spawned and fixed the idea of the Orient as negation."

16. Michael Grant, *The Rise of the Greeks*, chap. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988).

17. The lawmaker Solon set up wealth, not birth, as the qualification for citizenship and his inheritance laws freed household property from clan, i.e., kin-based, control. Cleisthenes' secular reforms (ca. 508 B.C.E.) established the principle of location, not clan, which registered citizens on the basis of affiliation with a *deme*, the local community (whether ancient or newly created).

18. That is, the "family" as we think of it does not exist prior to but is constituted by state formation processes that alter political and re/productive structures, marking a shift from kinship as a principle of societal organization to kinship as household co-residence of immediate "blood" relations.

19. Rebecca Grant, "The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations Theory," in *Gender and International Relations*, eds. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

20. Richard Harvey Brown, "Theories of Rhetoric and the Rhetorics of Theory," *Social Research* 50 (spring 1983): 135.

21. John Shotter, "Rhetoric and the Recovery of Civil Society," *Economy and Society* 18, no. 2 (May 1989): 155.

22. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason*, 244n. 73; R. I. Winton and Peter Garnsey, II, "Political Theory," in *The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal*, ed. M. I. Finley (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 41.

23. Eric A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), 156.

24. Shotter, "Rhetoric," 155 (emphasis in original).

25. Winton and Garnsey, "Political Theory," 42.

26. Bernard Williams, "Philosophy," in *The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal*, ed. M. I. Finley (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 209.

27. Winton and Garnsey, "Political Theory," 47.

28. Williams, "Philosophy," 231-32.

29. Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 83.

30. Wendy Brown, *Manhood and Politics* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), 89.

31. Christine Di Stefano, *Configurations of Masculinity* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 104.

32. See Grant, "Sources of Gender Bias," 14-17.

33. V. Spike Peterson, "The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism," in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. L. Neack, P. J. Haney, and J. A. K. Hey (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, forthcoming), 12-18.

34. Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, "The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory," *Alternatives* 16, no. 1 (1991): 67-106.

35. The latter are institutionalized in protection rackets: creating a threat and then charging for protection against it. Charles Tilly argued that nation-states engage in such rackets by creating a system of mutually threatening centralized governments and charging citizens taxes and military service to support effective defense of state boundaries. See "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Feminists have similarly identified marriage as a protection racket: under conditions of systemic male violence, women are forced to seek protection—from generalized male violence—by disadvantageous marriages to particular men. See Anne Sisson Runyan, "Gender Relations and the Politics of Protection," *Peace Review* 2 (fall 1990): 28-31. Of course, it is not a coincidence that marriage rackets are a feature of states. And the insidiousness of all protection rackets is that the need for protection is "real" though seeking it effectively reproduces the threatening system (Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States").

36. Winton and Garnsey, "Political Theory"; M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

37. Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," *Millennium* 17, no. 2 (1988): 227-62.

38. Ashley, "Untying."

39. Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States"; Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17 (1992): 95-133.

40. Philip Windsor, "Women and International Relations: What's the Problem?" *Millennium* 17, no. 3 (1988): 453.

41. On feminist IR, see, for example, Grant and Newland, *Gender and International Relations*; J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory*; Peterson, *Gendered States*; V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, *Global Gender Issues* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993); Marysia Zalweski and Jane Parpart, eds., *Feminism, Maculinity and Power in IR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, forthcoming).