abstract

This paper draws on the 'new wars' literature and global political economy research to explore how feminists and other critical analysts might investigate linkages between, and the gendering of, licit and illicit informal activities in relation to transnational financing of new wars. The paper considers the interdependence (co-constitution) of reproductive, productive and virtual economies, and aims to illuminate the intersection of race, gender, and economic inequalities (within and among states) as structural features of neoliberal globalization. Finally, the paper develops an analytical framing of coping, combat and criminal informal economies, which overlap and interact but entail distinctive sets of actors, motivations, and activities. A brief description of each economy is followed by suggesting how it is gendered and how this might inform feminist theory/practice in relation to war.

keywords

global political economy; shadow economies; illicit international political economy; new wars; gendered conflicts; gendered economies; informalization
Feminists have long been curious about and, for many good reasons, critical of ‘war’ (Enloe, 2004). But what exactly is ‘war’? This question has plagued international relations (IR) scholarship and affords no easy answers. An emerging literature argues that conventional IR paradigms are inadequate for analysing war in today’s increasingly globalized context. Hence, my starting point in this paper is that conditions of warfare are being transformed and we need new thinking to address the phenomena of ‘new wars.’ The latter is a term coined by Mary Kaldor, who argues that the dominant modality of warfare today is not that of earlier wars; it is distinctive in terms of goals, methods, and financing (2001: 6). A key point is that neoliberal globalization has profoundly altered the ability of states to regulate economic and political activities more generally, and the conduct of war more specifically.

To contextualize this point, I briefly summarize how Kaldor distinguishes earlier from new wars. Each has gendered implications. First, the goals of warfare have shifted from territorially based geopolitical objectives, typically legitimated by ‘political’ ideologies, to objectives framed as ‘identity politics’ – claims to power that are based on a particular and exclusivist identity that is relatively delinked from state-centric interests. Second and related, the methods of warfare have shifted from more vertically organized (state-based) units appropriate for gaining and securing physical territories, to more horizontally organized and decentralized units attempting to control populations through sowing ‘fear and hatred’ and the literal expulsion of ‘others’. This translates into dramatic increases in human rights violations and civilian casualties.

Third, the financing of war has shifted from state-centric to decentralized and external resources. More specifically, the globalized economy and deregulation involve structural changes that fuel unemployment, expand the shadow or informal economy, decrease the state’s tax revenues, and facilitate transnational flows of licit and illicit resources. In short, globalization erodes the autonomy of the state and its ability to regulate activities and control violence. When conflicts emerge they tend to assume the form of exclusivist identity politics, fueled by information and communication technologies (ICTs) that enhance the mobilization of identity politics and enable more decentralized licit and illicit activities. The effects are devastating for democratic processes and the pursuit of a global cosmopolitan project.

If war has indeed changed, as Kaldor and others argue, this has implications for feminist analysis and activism. My paper does not attempt to address the many and complex issues raised. Rather, I draw on the new wars literature and global political economy research to explore a specific inquiry: How might feminist and other critical analysts investigate linkages between, and the gendering of, licit and illicit informal activities in relation to transnational financing of new wars?
I begin by situating informalization and financialization in the context of neoliberal globalization. This draws from my recent book, *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies* (2003), which attempts to demonstrate the interdependence (co-constitution) of the three (reproductive, productive, and virtual) economies and to advance critical theory by illuminating the intersection of race, gender, and economic inequalities (within and among states) as structural features of neoliberal globalization. The next section provides an overview of informalization. This abbreviated presentation necessarily favours major trends and patterns over the complexity of lived processes. I hope nonetheless that revealing key features of globalization can provide a 'platform' from which to examine the political economy of conflicts and explore (gendered) informalization in relation to (gendered) wars and their financing.

I then turn to recent work on illicit informal activities in relation to transnational criminal networks and their implications for the study of new wars. For the most part, this literature lacks any attention to gender. I draw, however, on its insights to develop an analytical framing of ‘coping,’ ‘combat’ and ‘criminal’ informal economies in new war contexts. While these economies overlap and interact, they entail distinctive sets of actors, motivations, and activities. A brief description of each economy is followed by suggesting how it is gendered. Finally, a short conclusion considers ‘what is to be done’.

A critical project

*A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy* moves beyond a narrow definition of economics to develop an alternative analytical framing of reproductive, productive, and virtual economies (RPV). I argue that a more expansive ‘RPV framing’ is necessary to address major trends due to neoliberal globalization. The first is explosive growth in financial markets that shapes business decision-making and public policy-making. The second is dramatic growth in informal and flexible work arrangements that shape income-generation and family well-being. The third involves the extremely uneven effects of globalization, manifested starkly in growing inequalities of ethnicity/race, gender, class and nation.

While these trends are widely recognized, they are rarely analysed in relation. Such relational analysis is especially lacking in studies of war. In contrast, the RPV framing provides a way to see licit and illicit informal activities, global production, and capital movements as interacting and gendered dimensions of global dynamics. It is especially helpful for illuminating how informal activities are connected to transnational financial flows, including the circulation of funds for war. It is also crucial for exploring how neoliberal globalization exacerbates structural hierarchies, with implications for fueling conflicts and
wars. Critics tend to focus on one or another of these hierarchies, or at best 'add' one to another; theoretical attention to hierarchies as a structural feature of globalization, and especially their intersections, remains underdeveloped.8

As a contribution to intersectional analysis, I deploy gender analytically, arguing that devalourization of the feminine (coded into masculinist/modernist dichotomies as hierarchical) pervades language and culture, with systemic effects on how we normalize (naturalize, depoliticize) the devaluation of feminized qualities, knowledge, objects, bodies, identities, and activities. In short, and notwithstanding romanticism, feminization constitutes devalourization. The productive insight here is that diverse hierarchies are linked and ideologically 'naturalized' insofar as whatever is stigmatized in each hierarchy is characterized as feminine. I understand this insight as key both to advancing intersectional analysis and 'bridging' the cultural (symbolic, discursive) versus economic (material, structural) chasm that ostensibly divides positivist and post–positivist/post-structuralist/post-modernist orientations.9

While the RPV framing is more specific to rethinking globalization, a second analytical innovation, 'triad analytics', is applicable to social relations more generally. The triad posits identities (subjectivity, self-formation, desires), meaning systems (symbols, discourse, ideologies), and social practices/institutions (actions, social structures) as co-constituting dimensions of social reality. In particular, this framing insists that social practices and conceptual habits are equally inextricable from emotional/affective/psychoanalytical dimensions, processes of sexual-, identity- and subject-formation, and the complex politics – especially 'identity politics' – these involve.

the RPV framing in operation

Most familiar is the productive economy, which focuses on prominent shifts in production, as both cause and effect of global restructuring. The first general shift – in employment and in trade – is from primary production and manufacturing to services and especially, informational services. The second shift is toward greater flexibility in production processes. Worldwide, flexibilization is feminized by reference to both degraded conditions of employment and women being sought as employees; flexibilization is racialized and geopolitically differentiated by reference to concentrations of flexibilized jobs (among the urban lower-class, migrants, and semi-peripheral countries). Trade liberalization and structural adjustment policies (SAPs) illustrate, and also complicate, these patterns.10

The reproductive economy is typically the most neglected in conventional accounts that remain preoccupied with waged/commodified labour, formal market exchange, and public sphere activities. This economy involves essential

'both to a positive political vision, embracing tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy, and to a more legalistic respect for certain overriding universal principles which should guide political communities at various levels, including the global level' (2001: 115–116).

5 For argumentation, empirical data and extensive citations in support of claims made in this paper regarding global political economy (GPE) see Peterson (2003, 2005).

6 I refer to 'economies' in a Foucauldian sense: as mutually constituted (therefore coexisting and interactive) systemic sites through and across which power operates. These sites include socio-cultural processes of self-formation and cultural socialization that underpin identities and their political implications. The subjective, conceptual, and cultural dimensions of these sites are understood as inextricable from (mutually constituted by) material conditions, social practices, and institutional structures.

7 A fourth trend involves globalization's dependence on ICTs specific to the late twentieth century. I argue elsewhere (Peterson, 2003, 2006) that the unprecedented
social reproduction and informal economic activities (the latter merge with flexibilization). I include it in my analytical framing because the productive and virtual economies depend on it in non-trivial ways (e.g., to produce appropriately socialized workers and desiring consumers; to provide socially necessary but not socialized welfare and caretaking) and the extent and value of its informal feminized labour is both staggering in scale and increasing worldwide. This growth and its ambiguous relationship to the formal economy raise important theoretical and practical/political issues (see below). Shifting public–private boundaries reveal both the significance of social reproduction for economic analysis and the impact of global restructuring on social reproduction and especially, gender relations.11

The virtual economy is the least familiar to non-economists yet crucial to analysing globalization. I include it in my framing to acknowledge and address the vastly expanded role of symbolic (non-material) goods – money, information, signs – in today's global political economy. This economy has grown in significance as information and communication technologies have compressed time–space, enabled the shift from material-intensive to knowledge-intensive industries, facilitated the expansion of services and the exchange of intangibles, and fueled tremendous growth in financial market transactions. I distinguish three variations (or 'modes') of the virtual economy: global finance (by reference to the history, operation, and implications of transnational capital movements), the informational economy (by reference to the cognitive/informational/knowledge component of commodities), and the aesthetized consumerism of an 'economy of signs' (by reference to the production and consumption less of material or knowledge content than ephemeral tastes, desires, fashion, and style).

quandaries of informalization

Defining informal activities is controversial, but at a minimum we can distinguish them from ‘formal’ activities that are the focus of conventional economic accounts, where not only exchanges of money but also labour regulation and regulatory institutions are presupposed (e.g., waged labour, industrialized production, corporate business). In contrast, informal activities range from domestic/socially necessary and voluntary 'work,' where cash is rarely exchanged and 'regulatory authorities' are absent (e.g., childrearing, housekeeping, neighbourhood projects) to secondary, 'shadow' and 'irregular' activities where some form of enterprise and payment is expected but regulation is either difficult to enforce or intentionally avoided/evaded (e.g., baby sitting, petty trade, home-based production, street vending, sex work, drug dealing, and arms trading).

In spite of definitional controversies, the literature does agree on several points. First, informal activities are extremely heterogeneous. They span a wide range of
activities and blur conventional boundaries separating public and private, licit and illicit (within and outside of conventional legal boundaries), production and reproduction, politics and economics, national and international. This heterogeneity complicates the already significant challenge of identifying and measuring what by definition escapes documentation and in practice involves hard-to-quantify activities and effects.

Second, global restructuring has dramatically increased the volume, value, extent, and socio-political significance of informal sector activities. The ‘shadow’ or underground economy was conservatively estimated to be $9 trillion in 1999, or approximately one-fourth of the world’s gross domestic product for that year (The Economist, 1999: 59). And these figures do not include domestic/socially necessary labour which was estimated to be $11 trillion in 1995 (UNDP, 1995). More recent measures indicate that informal activities constitute more than one-half of all economic output and equal 75 per cent of the gross domestic product of some countries. Hence, informalization matters economically, and may, as some argue, constitute the (gendered and racialized) underpinning of today’s global economy.

In an additional and inextricable sense, informalization matters politically because it poses quandaries of documentation, measurement, and policy-making priorities. Societies lose when informal activities evade tax collection, decrease public revenues, and enable corruption; when unreliable accounts of work and production generate misguided policies; when unregulated work practices pose safety, health, and environmental risks; when criminal activities thwart collective interests in law and order; and especially, when illicit gains are used to fund conflict and wars.

Given the issues at stake, informalization is rapidly gaining attention. Liberal economists praise its entrepreneurial dynamism, especially in developing and transitional economies. Global political economy scholars ponder its financial effects, denounce its criminal aspects, and investigate its role in funding conflicts. Critics argue that informalization favours capital over labour and, more generally, that avoidance of regulations is directly and indirectly bad for wages, workers, the environment, and long-term prospects for societal and global well-being. Feminists expose both the role of informalization in devaluing women’s labour and its increasing salience as a household survival strategy. Post-colonial feminists reveal how patterns of race and gender shape what informal work is available (e.g., caring labour, food provisioning, personal services), where informalization is concentrated (e.g., poor- and working-class families worldwide, migrant labour in rural agriculture and in global cities), and who is most likely to be available for and willing to undertake informal activities (i.e., women, migrants, and economically marginalized populations). In sum, we know that informal activities are increasing worldwide, increasingly matter economically and politically, and tend to exacerbate gender, race and economic...
inequalities. But we lack adequate tools for analysing informalization, especially in relation to war economies and transnational financial flows.

**emerging research on the illicit international political economy and conditions of war**

Informalization poses tremendous challenges for reliable assessment and analysis. Somewhat ironically, and due to militarized globalization, data regarding informal activities are becoming relatively more available in contexts of conflict and war. An emerging literature facilitates research in two ways. First, it suggests new questions and concerns regarding linkages between informalization and its social and economic effects (e.g., linking illicit trade in drugs or arms with military strategies and outcomes). Second, it provides crucial empirical data regarding informal activities: Who are the key players (e.g., traffickers, conflict entrepreneurs)? What are the motivations for, practices of, and profits generated by informal activities (e.g., from family survival to business gains, street vending to transnational smuggling)? How are these activities enabled and/or constrained by national and transnational policies and laws (e.g., regulating flows of information, people, arms, or currencies)?

Patterns of resource distribution are key to both ‘causes’ of conflict (e.g., fuelling resentments and militarizing demands for redistribution) and capacities for sustaining conflict (e.g., supplying and financing militarized activities). Insofar as new wars are intra- rather than inter-national, the acquisition of resources is not simply a matter of governmental authorization and its presumably ‘legal’ funding. Many combatants finance their activities through informal sectors, licit and illicit, and especially partnerships with armed groups, arms suppliers, organized crime, corporate suppliers, and corrupt governments. Hence, analysts are attempting to track licit and illicit economic activities and resource flows to make better sense of the causes, conduct, and consequences of conflicts, and to more effectively identify regulatory and legal policies that will promote societal well-being.

The emerging literature foregrounds what Andreas (2004: 641) calls the ‘illicit international political economy’ (IIEP), which for the most part involves informal activities (also Friman and Andreas, 1999). Previously neglected by IPE scholars, the importance of IIEP is glaringly obvious when we consider clandestine sales of military materials and especially the global proliferation of small arms and light weapons: these are widely available, cheap, easy to transport and use, and horrifically destructive. In particular, and perversely, these weapons encourage indiscriminate ‘slaughters’ that catastrophically escalate conflicts. But in addition to clandestine provision of war-making materials, the expansion of illicit activities – trafficking in drugs, sex workers, migrants, dirty money, black
market goods — provides necessary financing for war resources. These markets defy territorial boundaries and state-based legal regimes; they are increasingly regional and even global; and deregulation amplifies opportunities for laundering 'dirty' money.

In sum, the emerging literature argues for closer attention to (1) informal, 'shadow' or underground economies because they provide supplies and financing for conflict activities (Boutwell and Klare, 1999; Le Billon et al., 2002; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003; Jung, 2003); (2) the blurring of licit–illicit boundaries insofar as criminal, corporate, and corrupt governmental interests converge (Ruggiero, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Naylor, 2002); (3) legal issues as national security interests shift from war-fighting to crime-fighting (Andreas and Price, 2001; Andreas, 2003); and (4) regional and systemic conditions that shape local conflicts and longer-term prospects for social stability (Le Billon et al., 2002; Pugh et al., 2004).

This literature also substantiates Kaldor’s claim that neoliberal policies guiding economic globalization are having deleterious, indeed disastrous, political effects in the form of exacerbating corruption, criminality, and militarized conflict. In brief, both informalization and transnational financial flows increase as the centralized power, regulatory capacity and public accountability of states is eroded in favour of unaccountable decentralized markets, international agencies and private interest networks. In conflict zones there are powerful incentives for seeking, and multiple opportunities for securing, resources and profits through both licit and illicit informal activities and unregulated financial transfers. States weakened by neoliberal policies and/or protracted conflicts are less able — and sometimes insufficiently motivated — to impose and maintain law and order, even when peace is proclaimed. Without effective public control and authority, post-conflict reconstruction may be continually undermined by established and effective networks of private — and often illicit — resource provision. In short, this disturbing trend reveals a convergence in studies of international political economy and international security that warrants much closer attention.12

**coping, combat and criminal informal economies**

In this paper, however, I turn to more specific insights regarding war economies. From the literature on ILPE, and especially Pugh et al. (2004), three subgroupings of informalization can be identified as operating in many of today’s war zones. These coping, combat and criminal economies13 are overlapping and interdependent, but it is worth distinguishing for each sub-group what motivates the agents, who these agents tend to be, and what the primary activities are. Here, I offer only general characterizations of each economy as they might operate in various conflict zones and begin to suggest how they are gendered and what this might mean for feminist analyses of war.

12 This point is made from a variety of perspectives. See for example Kaldor (2001), Pugh et al. (2004), Naim (2003), Jung (2003).

13 The Pugh et al. volume refers to ‘combat, shadow and coping economies’ (2004: 8). For my research purposes I have modified the terms. I use ‘criminal’
First, ‘coping economies’ emerge that facilitate individual survival and the social reproduction of families and households. Agents are primarily motivated by survival needs as conflict conditions undermine social stability, erode the formal economy, and disrupt traditional livelihoods. Agents may include individuals, families/households, kin networks, neighbourhood communities, or social solidarity groups. As economic conditions deteriorate, coping strategies rely increasingly on informal and often illicit activities. These may include dealing in black market goods; ‘selling’ organs for transplant; engaging in sex work and debt bondage; and participating in potentially lucrative but high-risk criminal activities. Agents in this economy presumably have a greater stake in ending conflicts than perpetuating them, as they are structurally the most vulnerable when conditions are unstable and do not command sufficient resources to prosper from societal disruption. This will depend, however, on post-conflict conditions, including the actual level of security and the availability of resources and employment through the ‘regular’/formal economy.

The coping economy is the most obviously feminized. It is primarily women who are assigned, and assume, responsibility for sustaining families, households, kinship networks, and even neighbourhoods. A global increase in female-headed households exacerbates the pressures on women to generate coping strategies, especially when unemployment increases, public services decline, and/or war destroys basic infrastructure and traditional labour patterns. Devalorization of the feminine translates here into disregarding the burdens on women; devaluing ‘women’s work’ and feminized skills; objectifying women’s bodies; marrying daughters at an early age; underplaying the insecurity of females within and outside of the home; neglecting women’s healthcare and reproductive issues; decreasing ‘space’ for women in ‘public’; and prioritizing male desires, consumption, education, and employment. The heightened masculinization of war zones may also deepen patriarchal attitudes, with varying effects. While women may have a particular stake in ending conflicts, they are rarely recognized as important players or included in political negotiations. And post-conflict plans typically pay minimal attention to meeting the essential needs — emotional and material — of families and households in the aftermath of war and its violence.

Second, ‘combat economies’ emerge that directly supply and fund fighters and insurgent activities. Agents are primarily motivated by military objectives and include armed groups and their political supporters, as well as ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ who facilitate acquisition of war resources. Activities blur traditional licit–illicit boundaries as combatants in civil wars turn to a variety of sources, some of which are more accessible insofar as central authority and regulatory institutions are weakened. Movement of supplies and financial arrangements are typically transnational and implicate larger regional linkages. Insofar as operations are clandestine they often involve organized crime networks. Activities may include looting, theft, kidnapping, smuggling and other
black market activities, private fund raising, aid manipulation, expropriation of natural resources, and economic blockages of dissenting areas. In support of military objectives, geographical areas and/or natural resources controlled by opponents may be targeted to cripple their economic power. In the combat economy, agents may resist peace if they anticipate a loss of status and/or power, or seek peace if they anticipate post-conflict benefits, including alternative livelihoods.

The combat economy is the most apparently masculinized, although this generalization obscures the complexity of wartime conditions and how they disrupt traditional gendered identities and divisions of labour. It remains the case that in most conflicts the majority of combatants are men, and increasingly, young boys. These agents engage not only in direct combat but also in support of funding, supplying and otherwise enabling military objectives. As feminist studies of nationalism document, idealized womanhood symbolizes the cultural values of particularist identities; as identity politics assume greater importance, women are increasingly forced to conform to rigid (masculinist/patriarchal) expectations in regard to their appearance and behaviour. Failing – or being perceived as unwilling – to do so places them at considerable risk. Conforming to their socialization, and especially in militarized contexts, men are more likely to participate in, rather than protest, the often harsh disciplining of ‘their’ women. Devalourization of the feminine translates here into discriminating against insufficiently masculine men; objectifying, abusing, raping, assaulting and killing women and (feminized) civilians; using women as ‘sexual decoys’ (Eisenstein, 2007); abducting women and girls for ransom; trafficking in women and children; and prioritizing masculinized identities, practices and objectives as putatively necessary for military success. The stake that combatants have in ending conflict depends critically on how they perceive the likelihood of their group being victorious, or at least sharing an acceptable portion of post-conflict resources and power. In new wars, the interaction of identity politics and militarized masculinities deepens combatants’ resistance to negotiations that promise less than complete victory, thus exacerbating the difficulty of achieving a sustainable peace.

Third, ‘criminal economies’ emerge that directly and indirectly supply and fund conflict activities. Agents are primarily motivated by profit-seeking, opportunities which are enhanced in conflict zones as regulatory mechanisms break down or are suspended, and centralized control is weakened by war, fractured by political divisions, and/or disabled by extensive corruption. Agents may include petty criminals, conflict entrepreneurs, war profiteers, traffickers, money launderers, and those who produce and/or transport trafficked goods. Obviously, the agents of this and the combat economy may overlap, especially as conflict continues and profit-making parallels or displaces military objectives – whether for personal gain or in pursuit of a solidarity
group's political agenda. Agents are also likely to overlap with the coping economy as individuals and households pursue, or feel forced to engage in, illicit activities as a survival strategy. Activities in this economy fall outside of state regulation and documentation and may include smuggling, trafficking, predatory lending, aid manipulation, natural resource expropriation, fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering. This economy also tends to be transnational and involve larger regional activities in support of smuggling, trafficking, and supplying arms. Given its illicit status, financial arrangements involve money laundering and banking activities outside of the country. Agents may resist peace if it represents loss of income, or seek peace if they will benefit from long-term investment and legitimate businesses. However, in the absence of strong central authority and reliable law enforcement, 'there are few incentives for entrepreneurs to make the shift toward longer-term productive activities' (Goodhand, 2004: 65).

This economy is more obviously extensive and complex, especially in terms of financing that involves transnational circuits of illicit goods, fraudulent accounting, and money laundering. Its agents may be variously gendered, depending on the activities involved and where individuals are positioned in the operation of networks. The profit-making motive driving this economy reveals how inseparable the three economies are: coping and combat economies require access to cash or credit as part of securing other resources; they accomplish these by participating in formal and informal markets that are powerfully shaped by capital flows. One might argue that the depersonalized, competitive and objectifying/commodifying dynamics of profit-seeking are themselves masculinist. In this sense, one can draw analogies with the masculinization of 'formal' production, public sphere activities, military institutions, and organized crime. At the same time (as noted earlier), informalization profoundly disrupts the boundaries between production and reproduction, public and private, licit and illicit. In light of this complexity, to specify the gender of this – or any informal economy – is a complicated endeavour, and unlikely to be productive without reference to contextual specifics. Finally, how and to what extent agents in the criminal economy are invested in prolonging – rather than concluding – new wars will depend on multiple factors and can only be determined through empirical investigation of particular cases.

**a short conclusion**

In this paper, I have attempted to offer a schematic mapping of informalization as a prominent feature of neoliberal globalization and to suggest how this development shapes, and is shaped by, deregulation and transnational financial flows. A review of the emerging literature on IIPE reveals the extensive scale and troubling nature of criminal activities. I have also suggested how the growth of
informalization, criminality and financialization articulates with 'new wars.' Specifying how coping, combat and criminal informal economies are gendered confirms that gender is pervasive, and suggests the challenge feminists confront in analysing and responding to new wars. It also, and more productively, prefigures 'what is to be done'. For example, taking social reproduction much more seriously, enabling greater autonomy for women, ensuring better security for all feminized 'others', including marginalized voices in peace negotiations, and decreasing the virulence of dominant masculinities.

Most of these 'recommendations' are familiar to feminists and other critics of war. In this sense, too little has changed. I hope, however, that this paper has generated greater awareness of new wars and how these complicate 'what is to be done'. Examples of the latter include: addressing cultural representation and historical grievances that underlie conflicts; acknowledging emotional investments in identity politics; decreasing structural inequalities wrought by neoliberal globalization; exposing the excesses of corporate capitalism and its effects on democracy; decrying exclusivist politics; promoting cosmopolitanism as Kaldor construes it; reducing the demand side of illicit flows; providing viable alternatives to profiting from war; building horizontal and vertical cooperation to regulate activities; strengthening legitimate institutions for controlling violence; restructuring transnational aid, trade, and financial arrangements to minimize illicit activities; and recognizing the necessity of community building at the global level.

This paper drew on three areas of scholarship that are rarely merged: global economy research on increased informal sector activities; studies of illicit activities as these shape the conduct of new wars; and gender-sensitive research on informalization in relation to family/household activities that also shape the resolution — or continuation — of conflict conditions. Not least, by considering these literatures in relation our analyses of war are less likely to produce policies that are out-dated, contradictory or counter-productive. Rather, we can better appreciate how gender pervades identities, ideologies and practices; how this gendering shapes and is shaped by conflicts and war; and how we individually and collectively might generate more equitable and effective strategies for engendering sustainable peace.

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