Dichotomies, Debates, and New Thinking Spaces
Spike Peterson

Reality, it seems, is not what it used to be in International Relations.

We confront a world of complementary, conflictual, and contradictory systems of differential power: there is no simple or “essential” relationship among an ever expanding global capitalism, turbulent centralization and decentralization of states, hierarchies of gender, class and race/ethnic oppression, and the threatened biosphere upon which all else ultimately depends. These interlocking systems of power develop differentially (they are not reducible to each other) yet inextricably (they are mutually constituted through historical process). In this turbulent context, International Relations theory is contested terrain. As an exploration of that terrain, this paper considers the discipline’s dichotomies, debates, and how gender-sensitive work opens new thinking spaces. In particular, I argue that the latter is crucial for adequate International Relations (IR) theorizing of power/politics, states, and globalization.

Diehard Dichotomies and Reasons Why

The dominant strand of IR theory, Realism, requires little elaboration for the audience of this journal. Typically, both Realism and NeoRealism are distinguished from alternative theoretical approaches by reference to their focus on states (understood as unitary, rational, and self-interested actors) and power politics (understood as the inescapable struggle for national security under conditions of inter-state anarchy). This vantage point is informed (historically and conceptually) by liberal and positivist commitments that assume a separation of politics, as power relations, from economics, as market/exchange relations. In most Realist accounts, the latter has been secondary to a focus on power politics as (however reluctantly) the sine qua non of inter-state relations.

This tendency to separate the state’s power politics from economic relations is exacerbated by other dynamics. First, the climate of super-power hostility during which Realism flourished, lent itself to a narrative of power-hungry states, competing in a deadly game where national security was aptly measured in terms of diplomatic and, especially, military power. In the Cold War scenario, economics were subordinate to the definitive power politics and military capabilities of states locked in an adversarial mode.

Second, although Realists identify states as the principal units of analysis, they have failed to adequately theorize (or historicize) this key construct. It seems likely that a richer account of states would expose the fallacy of categorically separating political and economic power, and compel an acknowledgment and analysis of their interaction. As a corollary, ahistorical Realism masked, even as it fueled, Eurocentric (and androcentric) bias in IR’s understanding of states and the inter-state system.

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1 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Reintroduction to International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Press, 1994).

2 Sandra Whitworth, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions (London: Macmillan, 1994). 

Third, liberal characterizations of states and capitalism posit contrasting “pictures” of the agents and power of each. Promoted by images of “self-regulating markets” and “invisible hands,” we tend to think of capitalism in abstract terms—as a disembodied framework or “system,” a set of rules or principles that can be invoked to explain economic decision-making. When imagined in abstract terms, capitalism’s power is rendered invisible; it appears to be “agentless,” to lack institutional structures or particular ideological commitments. In this picture, power is understood as threat, coercion appears irrelevant, and questions of legitimacy and accountability are inappropriate.

In contrast, the state’s power is easy to picture (if not to theorize). We readily imagine the state’s agents (public officials, police, military), its institutional structures (Congress, bureaucracies, courts, schools), and its ideological claims (to provide socially necessary order and security). Here, power is embodied in the state’s monopoly of legitimate force, and questions of legitimacy and accountability appear unavoidable.

On the one hand, this contrast between capitalism and states is appropriate to the extent that the states and market forces exercise different forms of power and authority, as well as to the extent that the state’s agents and institutional structures do appear more visible in our everyday lives, and that states do claim to provide (public) goods and to be accountable to their citizens. On the other hand, the contrast is false because capitalism, like all operationalized systems, involves embodied agents (capital owners, bankers, managers), institutional structures (the stock exchange, transnational corporations, the International Monetary Fund), power dynamics (inequalities, constrained choices), and ideological commitments (accumulation, competition, individualism). When left unrecognized, Capitalism’s power is unbridled, unaccountable, and always dangerous. It seems that ideological mystification and everyday practice combine to make the power of market forces less apparent—though no less potent—than the power and authority of states.

These points suggest how the dichotomy of politics-economics is encouraged and they provide context for the discussion later in this paper insofar as the power relations effectuated by positivist dichotomies and patriarchal systems also remain invisible until their agents, structures, and ideological commitments are pointed out.

Disciplinary Debates and Contemporary Dilemmas

The conventional story of IR theory holds that the discipline has “developed” through phases marked by discipline-defining debates, the first of which purportedly engaged post-war realists against liberal, peace-smitten idealists. Cast in a litany of hierarchical oppositions (real-ideal, reason-emotion, hard-soft, objective-subjective), it is no surprise that the hard-core Realists won this round.

The second debate is conventionally understood as pitting Traditionalism’s emphasis on historical methods against behaviorism’s claim to more scientific methodology. Though the “hard,” objectivist side won this round as well, world events and conceptual developments since the late 1960s have expanded the terrain of IR theory and posed challenges to both behavioralist and Realist accounts. Viotti, Kauppi,4 and Banks5 characterize “Pluralist” theories of IR as those that recognize the importance of non-state actors, deny the state as a unitary and rational actor, and extend the agenda of IR to include economic and new dynamics. A new appreciation of psychological perception, decision-making processes, interdependence, international political economy, regimes, transnational identifications, and activities marked the emergence of Pluralist theories.

As a third “paradigm” in IR theory (labeled “Globalism” by Viotti and Kauppi and “Structuralism” by Banks) assumes a global context and a critique of domination as starting points, historical analysis as a key method and economic factors as crucial (not secondary) to explanation. In common with Pluralists, Globalists/Structuralists (Neo-Marxists, dependency theorists, world-system analysts) reject the ahistorical and mono-dimensional orientation of Realists, deny that states are unitary and primary actors, recognize that politics and economics are inextricable, recognize that non-state identities and transnational activities are important, and that the study of IR must be dynamic across levels of analysis.

These newer paradigms are attentive to history and context, address greater complexity, and resist the dichotomization of politics and economics. In a comprehensive overview of IR theory, Steve Smith notes six problems with the “inter-paradigm debate” as a self-image of IR theory.6 Primarily, he argues that: the divisions of the three are oversimplified; the triad reflects a particular (limited) “view of what IR theory consists of”, the implication of actual “debate” is misleading, absence of actual engagement, characterization of this as “debate” works to marginalize, not acknowledge dissident voices; the triad characterization “hides the extent to which most international theory is realist,” and while the triad framing appears to suggest that “these are three accounts of the same world” (in which case, Realism is set up to “win”), it raises the question of incommensurability if the “three paradigms each see a different world” (in which case, “alternatives to realism can be...[trivialized] as dealing with peripheral issues”). Students are, therefore, tempted to “pick and mix,” selecting from each paradigm to suit their interests, “without realizing that [based on incompatible assumptions] the three cannot simply be added together.”

More fundamental questions are posed if one considers the epistemological and ontological bases of IR theory within IR’s third debate. In Yosef Lapid’s words:

“The demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative behavioral science recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to reexamine the ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations of their scientific endeavors. The ‘third debate’ in the field of international relations parallels this intellectual ferment and constitutes a still maturing disciplinary effort to reconsider theoretical  
options in a ‘post-positivist’ era.”7

In his compelling and comprehensive treatment of the philosophical bases of IR theorizing, Jim George argues that “analytical progress inherent in this disciplinary narrative [of developmental debates/stages] is largely illusory,” given the dominance of orthodox

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works that have “ultimately closed off our capacity to ask more profound questions.” Instead of responding to the challenges posed by cumulative epistemological critiques, IR “remains fundamentally incarcerated in the positivist–Realist framework” of earlier decades. Hence, on the one hand, the apparent multiplicity of theoretical approaches (suggested by references to debates and multiple paradigms) masks the continued dominance of Realism/Neo-Realism and its marginalization of alternative viewpoints. On the other hand, empiricist-positivist commitments are not only alive and well in IR, but critiques of positivism (which have irrevocably altered the philosophical bases of other social disciplines) have received only superficial treatment by virtually all, but the marginalized “dissidents” in IR.

The Dichotomizing Problems of Positivism

As a description of IR theorizing, these comments highlighted the resilience of positivist commitments and the revitalization of state-centric power politics through the ascendency of Neo-Realism. Yet even this inhospitable environment has not entirely silenced critical voices. In the 1980s, two figures of particular importance were Richard Ashley and Robert Cox.

Ashley’s “Political Realism and Human Interests” drew upon Habermas’s typology of knowledge-constitutive interests to argue that post-war Realism had privileged only the particular cognitive interest in technical knowledge (the instrumental rationality of empirical-analytical/positivist science). This was at the expense of practical or emancipatory interests, which could potentially find expression in earlier Traditionalist (more historical and interpretivist) versions of Realism. In “The Poverty of Neorealism,” he extended this analysis, arguing that what emerges from Neo-Realism

"is a positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse, negates or trivializes the significance of variety across time and place, subordinates all practice to an interest in control, bows to the ideal of a social power beyond responsibility, and thereby deprives political interaction of those practical capacities which make social learning and creative change possible." 11

In subsequent works (1987; 1988; 1989; 1990), Ashley draws increasingly on Foucaultian and post-modern insights, bringing them critically to bear on the very “foundations”--power politics, sovereign states, and the anarchy problematiq--of IR. In short, Ashley exposes the unself-consciousness of Realists, their failure to recognize the interaction of subject (theorist) and object (world politics); that is, their failure to acknowledge the role of (technical, instrumental, positivist) theory in (re)producing the world which they claim is simply “out there.” While mainstream scholars have yet to adequately address his extended critiques, a small army of closet dissidents have been empowered by the boldness and brilliance of his work. The poverty of IR theory would be considerably greater without his exciting (though often exasperating!) contributions.

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13 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," published initially in 1981 (reprinted in 1986), parallels Ashley’s critique in accusing post-War realism of lapsing into (positivist, ahistorical, conservative) “problem-solving” theory, which tends to reproduce the world “as it finds it.”
14 Cox introduces the useful and now familiar distinction between “problem-solving” and (historical, dynamic) “critical” theory, whose purpose is not simply to reproduce the world, but to investigate how the prevailing order came about. Emphasizing that “(theory) is always for someone and for some purpose,” Cox reminds us that theory is always and necessarily situated. Therefore, while absolute value neutrality is not possible, “rigor in the development of concepts and in the appraisal of evidence” remained objective for Cox.
15 In “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations” (1983) and Production, Power, and World Order (1987), Cox further develops Gramscian themes and their implications for IR. Specifically, he argues that Realism is incapable of dealing with new configurations of world order; remaining positivist, it lacks an adequate conceptualization of change and of the unity of the subjective-objective. In contrast to Realism, Cox’s discussion of historical structures (the reciprocal interaction of social forces, forms of state and world orders) promotes an awareness of, and agency within, the processes of change. Moreover, under conditions of increasing global interdependence, emancipatory transformations are possible (though not inevitable). Informed by Gramscian insights, hegemony is not simply a matter of power politics, but a more complex inter-weaving of consent and coercion. This construction expands our understanding of power, giving it “a wider applicability to relations of dominance and subordination” and forcing our attention to socio-cultural as well as political and economic forms.
16 In more recent publications (1989; 1991; 1994) and in his important work through the United Nations University (MUNS), Cox has continued to develop critical theory based on dynamic relationships between production (as “both a social process and a power relationship,” state forms, and world order). IR theory in general and contemporary critical work on the global political economy in particular, have benefited tremendously from Cox’s pioneering work and sophisticated contemporary analyses.

What the preceding suggests is that a plurality of theoretical approaches are available in IR. In particular, Ashley offers a well-developed epistemological alternative, while Cox provides a well-developed critical (emancipatory) alternative to orthodoxy theory. Yet, all alternatives to Realism are effectively marginalized by the dominance of the latter’s positivist epistemological and ontological commitments. In short, Realism

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14 (Cox, p. 207-210).
15 (Cox, p. 207).
16 Ibid, Postscript p. 247.
trivializes contending theories by maintaining a closed system of ontological assumptions regarding the nature of reality. It insists on a world "out there," an objective "reality" that is independent of (subjective) theorizing. Moreover, and purportedly in contrast to the rational capacity and progressivist desires of theorists, the world "out there" is an anarchical realm of inevitable risk, danger, and threat. In George's words,

"Realist...constructs its explanatory agenda upon one variant or another of a "spectator" theory of knowledge, in which knowledge of the real world is gleaned via a realm of external facts (e.g., of inter-state anarchy) that impose themselves upon the individual scholar-statesman, who is then constrained by the analytic/policy "art of the possible.""21

With this orientation dominating the study of world politics, it is no surprise that philosophical critiques are silenced (by privileged claims to "know" the one true "reality") and emancipatory critiques are dismissed (by claims that such idealism is unrealizable/unrealistic). With this orientation, Realists are unable to see, acknowledge, and critically reflect upon the power relations of their knowledge claims. Without such critical reflection, positivism's agents ("scientific" authorities, "experts," academics, publishers), its institutional structures (scientific laboratories, research institutes, schools), and its ideological commitments (instrumental reason, reductionism, binary logic) remain invisible.

In the remainder of this essay, I choose to move beyond the (non-)debates of mainstream IR theory and explore the newer thinking spaces of feminist IR. My purpose here is two-fold: to render visible the agents, institutions, and ideological commitments of the system of power known as gender hierarchy (masculinism or patriarchy), and to illustrate the "workings" of a theoretical discourse that is self-conscious of its philosophical (epistemological/ontological) and emancipatory commitments. In the process, I hope to suggest how gender is central to both contemporary global transformations and the development of IR theory capable of addressing those transformations. As in my other work, I am arguing that gender hierarchy is a constitutive, not coincidental, element of the inter-state system and the global capitalist economy. On this view, gender relations must be examined to adequately apprehend how the world actually works, how "reality" is—every day and over decades—constructed, reproduced, and transformed.

Beyond Dichotomies to Relational Constructs

Feminist scholarship is extensive, diverse, and typically inter-disciplinary. Initially, feminists sought to "correct" the gender-bias of knowledge claims by "adding women" to models and conceptual frameworks characterized as androcentric (assuming male experience as the norm for human experience). Across the disciplines, feminist studies revealed the exclusion of actual women and/or the trivialization of that, which was associated with the feminine. Because knowledge of humans must be grounded on human experience, feminists (and other marginalized groups) argue that claims based exclusively on elite male experience distort our understanding of social reality. Moreover, because masculinity and femininity—and men's and women's lives—are mutu-

21 Terrell Carter, Gender is not a synonym for woman. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1996)
Jonasdottir, 1988). For the most part, conventional accounts identify power, in its direct expression, with coercion or violence and, in less direct expressions, with the capacity to control or influence the behavior of others. Of course, political scientists discipline their examination of power by focusing on its manifestation in the public sphere, and rely on the dichotomy of public-private to distinguish their object of inquiry from personal, familial, household relations (and for some, from economic relations). In IR, by contrast, the dichotomy of domestic-international disciplines the examination of power. Denying that politics in the classical sense can obtain under conditions of anarchy, they focus on “power politics” understood as the threatened or actual use of military force (which for some includes the economic capacities upon which military capacity depends).

For those critical of dichotomous modes of thought, the categorical separation of public and private spheres, domestic and international “levels,” and direct and indirect violence are incoherent—and for many, dangerously so. On one hand, the structure of dichotomies promotes “patterns of thought and action that are static (unable to acknowledge or address change), stunted (unable to envision alternatives), and dangerously oversimplified (unable to accommodate the complexities of social reality).”28 On the other hand, the positivist dichotomy of subject-object promotes a stance of non-responsibility on the part of investigators (subjects) who are encouraged to believe that their thoughts/actions do not affect (much less constitute) the world “as it is.” Yet, Realists must acknowledge that, whether examined through a conventional (falsificationist) lens or one informed by post-modernist commitments, power politics can be seen to produce—rather than simply control or alleviate—the undesirable practices of violence and war.

Drawing on extensive, multi-faceted interrogations of the public-private divide, feminists argue that when power is understood through a conventional dichotomizing lens, significant expressions of power—and specifically, the systemic relations of gender domination—are overlooked. For example, political science’s focus on public sphere activities has precluded its study of power manifested within intimate relations and within the family/household. Such power relations include not only domestic violence, but also the naturalization (depoliticization) of inequalities promoted by conventional family forms (heterosexual, male-as-breadwinner, etc.) that reproduce gender (and racialized) identities, a gendered (and racialized) division of labor, and render alternative forms of intimacy and social reproduction “abnormal”—even criminal.

In IR, preoccupation with the power politics of inter-state conflict has precluded the study of that power in relation to structures of indirect violence, which transcend political and territorial boundaries (e.g., Pettman, 1996). IR’s tendency to dichotomize politics and economics is encouraged by this failure to recognize and address the indirect violence wrought by systems of economic inequality in which gender is a major factor. Its narrow definition of security forestalls questions of “whose security?” and “at what expense to alternative forms of social organization?” (e.g., Tickner, 1992). In sum, feminists argue that power/policies cannot be adequately theorized—nor relations of domination transformed—until direct and indirect violence (like public and private spheres, domestic politics and inter-state anarchy) are understood in terms of relations, not dichotomy—locations as continuums (or points on a map) that are best understood in the context of their interconnections.

b. Feminist critiques of state-making29

As many have noted, mainstream theory and self-consciousness in IR is markedly ahistorical. This weakness is nowhere more telling than in IR theories of the state, which at best note the emergence of a state system in Europe, following an even less well-defined period called feudalism. While Thucydides is often heralded as IR’s founding father and “the first writer in the realist tradition,”26 the context he wrote in—early (rather than modern) state-making—is rarely investigated for insights on contemporary states and the historical intersection of objectivist metaphysics, state-making, and Realist political theory.27 While political theorists acknowledge the canonical importance of Athenian texts, IR theorists tend to ignore how these texts established constructions of authority, identity, politics, security, and public-private spheres that continue to discipline the theory/practice of world politics, especially in regard to Realist narratives.

What particularly drops out of sight in an ahistorical picture of states is the institutionalization of domination relations associated with early state-making. It is here—after widespread and lasting resistance to centralization—that the “human story” took a decisive turn, marked by the effective centralization of political authority and accumulation processes, military consolidation, a hierarchical division of labor by gender, age, and “class,” the reconfiguration of individual and collective identities appropriate to that division of labor, and ideological legitimation of these transformations. The point here is that coercive power alone tells us little about state-making, as cultural and ideological dimensions are crucial to the success and especially the reproduction of state systems.

State authorities manipulate symbols, discursive practices, and ideological productions to mask their coercive power and effectuate indirect rule: to ensure power over ways of knowing as well as ways of being. Recent work on the state emphasizes large-scale historical change,30 the location of states at the intersection of domestic and transnational relations,31 state-making as dialectical and open-ended, and interdisciplinary approaches.32 In addition to conventional political/statist and economic/capitalist perspectives, scholars are exploring how identity formation, cultural forms, and ideological manipulations shape states internally and in the context of global dynamics.

Feminists draw upon this research, while challenging its androcentric (and often Eurocentric) commitments. They theorize the historical development of the patriarchal household, and the separation of public and private spheres as dimensions of state-making and its accumulation dynamics, eventually within a world economy. As the basic socio-economic unit defined by the state, the patriarchal household marks citizenship claims and facilitates labor mobilization, resource extraction, conscription for military and public works service, regulation of property (including women), and legal control more generally. But it also marks the site where intimate and sexual relations are expressed, physical and emotional needs are met, and culturally appropriate personal and collective identities are formed. It is where we learn to be who we are and to believe in what we are taught.

In conventional accounts, the division of public (government) and private (family/household market) spheres is associated with state-making and, specifically, with the separation of the government and its power relations from ostensibly apolitical activities in the private sphere. However, the “public patriarchy” of the state is exposed by feminist research: the state intervenes in private sphere dynamics in part to impose centralized authority over birth rate patterns, property transmission, and reproduction of appropriately socialized family members, workers, and citizens. The means include laws circumscribing sexual behavior, control of women’s reproductive rights, and the promotion (through state policies, public media, and educational systems) of gender, ethnic and race identifications, heterosexism, and particular family forms.

The state’s ideological promotion of hegemonic masculine identities in the household extends into the labor market, placing women in low-wage, low-profile “servicing” jobs. Moreover, states often promote a “family wage” model that elevates men’s earnings, treats women’s work as supplemental, and denies the extent of female-headed households (currently estimated at 30% worldwide). In the context of global restructuring, privatization and liberalization (which tend to weaken public programs and their delivery of social benefits) are feminist issues because poverty is a feminist issue. And these are citizenship (political identity) issues because in contemporary states the well-being of individuals is linked to citizenship claims that mark who is inside (and outside) of the state’s responsibility for protecting rights and providing welfare.

State militarism produces and is produced by gendered identities and divisions of violence manifested both internally and externally. While men are socialized (in the family as well as in the military) to be aggressive, competitive, protectors of the nation, and even life-takers, women are socialized to be passive, supportive, in need of protection, and life-giving. Moreover, the costs of militarism are not just direct violence, but (gendered and global) structural violence entailed by loss of social services (to military spending), increased prostitution (as a corollary of military bases and impoverished local populations), distorted labor markets (to suit military priorities), environmental degradation (from military actions), and long term demands on women who care for those disabled—emotionally and physically—by formal and informal wars.


prerequisites to the reproduction of domination ideologies. But the ensemble of linkages is not static. In particular, the household is a focal point not only of collaboration and reproduction, but also of resistance and transformation. Thus, gender dynamics have upward, downward, and lateral effects on topics of IR concern.

Whereas conventional accounts have typically ignored "women's work" and naturalized gendered divisions of labor and power, interwoven developments in recent decades have heightened the visibility of gender politics. Women's liberation movements and the research they generated, exposed the limitations and masculinist bias of traditional accounts. When global restructuring altered state economic policies, household and informal sector activities became visible as crucial dimensions of social reproduction (e.g., Bakker, 1994). New social movements have challenged conventional accounts of identity, power, and community; gender and race/ethnicity are salient here as long as (household-based) identification processes shape divisions of labor, inter-group conflicts, political strategies, and legitimation dynamics.

In short, families/households have always been definitive sites of power. While patriarchs, states, and capitalists have consistently controlled the greater part of that power, women (and subordinated others more generally) have not only colluded in, but also resisted and reconfigured relations of domination. In the present context, we cannot afford simplistic accounts that fail to acknowledge, much less theorize how systems of power—masculinism, racism, statism, capitalism—interact in dynamic, complementary, and even contradictory ways.

Conclusion

For the greater part of its history, the terrain of IR theory has been dominated by positivist commitments. Dichotomies have structured and limited the questions asked and how answers were sought. In spite of disciplinary debates, there has been little "progress" beyond these constraining dichotomies and their unfortunate, even oppressive effects.

In spite of its dominance, positivist-Realism has been profoundly challenged, as much by "world events" as by intellectual developments. The dichotomy of politics-economics has been subverted by the force of global capital relations, which have profoundly altered (not eliminated) state-centric power. Critical theorists have exposed the limitations of positivist, ahistorical IR theory and many voices have articulated alternative ways of knowing. In particular, recent theorists urge us to reflect not only upon the interaction of politics and economics, but also—and just as importantly upon how these are constituted by socio-cultural dynamics conventionally excluded from IR inquiry.

I believe that both philosophical and emancipatory critiques of positivist-Realism are now well-developed, coherent, and compelling. Of course, these extend beyond the examples of Ashley, Cox, and feminism noted in this essay. Until mainstream IR theorists take these critiques seriously, I fear that the discipline will remain not only "backward" philosophically, but also "oppressive" politically. In any event, IR theory circumscribed by positivist dichotomies—and especially the "foundational" dichotomy of masculine over feminine—cannot possibly generate "realistic" theories, addressing the complex and dynamic world(s) in which we now live.