Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions

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The original studies of “competitive authoritarianism” and “hegemonic authoritarianism” inspected the occurrence of hybrid regimes during the 1990s but stopped short of testing their propensity for democratic change. This article assesses the causal effects of hybrid regimes, and the post–cold war period itself, on regime breakdown and democratization. Using a dataset of 158 regimes from 1975 to 2004, and a discrete measure for transitions to electoral democracy, I find that competitive authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power but are significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy: vigorous electoral contestation does not independently subvert authoritarianism, yet it bodes well for democratic prospects once incumbents are overthrown.

In the wake of the cold war authoritarian rulers increasingly adopted the forms of democracy even as they resisted substantive democratization. By 2001 “electoral authoritarianism” had become the modal form of nondemocracy; autocrats allowing some form of multiparty elections outnumbered those who did not by more than two to one (Schedler 2002, 47). As Larry Diamond observed, these hybrid regimes were not completely new. Much earlier authoritarian regimes in Mexico, Senegal, and Taiwan had permitted the opposition to contest elections, although many more regimes had excluded their challengers from such competition (Diamond 2002, 23–24). In the 1990s rulers were fusing plebiscitarianism and authoritarianism at an astounding rate, in the process defying expectations that they would soon adopt genuine democracy. To apprehend this trend, comparativists developed a new conceptual apparatus of authoritarian typologies. “Fully closed” authoritarian regimes were distinguished from their electoral counterparts, while the latter group was further disaggregated into “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” and “competitive authoritarian” (Diamond 2002, 29–32; Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). These subtypes enabled students to reconsider authoritarianism as a repertoire of political practices much broader than simple repression.

Pioneering works explored how hybrid regimes emerged and functioned, refraining from long-term prognoses except to observe that a variety of trajectories were likely. Martha Brill Olcott and Marina Ottaway noted that what they dubbed “semi-authoritarianism” could decay into fully closed authoritarianism, advance into full-blown democracy, or persist in its present form (1999). Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way likewise observed that competitive authoritarian regimes confounded the telos of earlier democratization studies:

Although some hybrid regimes (Mexico, Senegal, Taiwan) underwent democratic transitions in the 1990s, others (Azerbaijan, Belarus) moved in a distinctly authoritarian direction. Still others either remained stable or moved in multiple directions (Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Zambia,

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I am grateful to Catherine Boone, Valerie Bunce, Terrence Chapman, Larry Diamond, Thad Dunning, Marc Morjé Howard, Stathis Kalyvas, Steven Levitsky, Staffan Lindberg, Matthew Longo, Eric McDaniel, Patrick McDonald, Philip Roessler, Andreas Schedler, Benjamin Smith, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. I also thank Rachel Sternfeld, for research assistance, Barbara Geddes, for sharing her original dataset on authoritarian breakdown, and the staff of Freedom House, for providing early lists of electoral democracies. Previous versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, the Junior Faculty Workshop at the University of Texas, and the Comparative Politics Workshop at Yale University.

1 This initial focus on regime origins was reflected in the title of one leading work, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002), and the subtitle of a peer monograph, “The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism” (Ottaway 2003).


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ISSN 0092-5853

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As these researchers began examining variations in regime outcomes over time, their studies probed among hybrid regimes, rather than contrasting them with nonelectoral authoritarian cases (Levitsky and Way 2006, forthcoming; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2006). A fresh cohort of social scientists soon began writing on the dynamics of hybrid regimes, including the question of whether electoral contestation increased the likelihood of democratization (Hadenius and Teorell 2006, 2007; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006, 2007). After illumining the political “gray zone,” comparative studies could consider what today’s regimes portended for the millions of people living under them (Carothers 2002).

The present study joins research on contemporary authoritarianism and its implications for long-standing questions of regime change and democratization. I attempt to discern broad trends. Accordingly, this article encompasses a wider swath of nondemocracies and a larger time period than initially pursued in the hybrid regimes literature. Rather than combing through the subset of competitive and hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes I compare cases from these categories with exclusionary, nonelectoral regimes. I also look at patterns of regime politics from 1989 and earlier, in addition to cases from the post–cold war era. This panorama of electoral and nonelectoral authoritarianism, during and after the cold war, enables me to test claims that are often treated as given—namely that the new authoritarian regimes are distinct from their fully closed counterparts and that the end of the cold war exerted a profound influence on regimes worldwide (Huntington 1991; Shin 1994).

My approach differs from recent works in the field by operationalizing the primary explanatory variables and outcomes in discrete categories that comport with the prevailing concepts of comparative democratization scholarship. For example, rather than assessing regime change as a shift in Polity or Freedom House scores, I measure changes from authoritarianism to democracy based on Freedom House’s underutilized listing of electoral democracies. Similarly, for authoritarian types, I code regimes based on their electoral competitiveness and whether they exhibit the basic characteristics of electoral authoritarianism and its two subcategories (competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic electoral authoritarianism, henceforth “hegemonic authoritarianism”). I then deploy a dataset covering 158 regimes during the period 1975–2004 (for a total of 2,132 regime-years). The regression analyses thereby cumulate upon published large-n and small-n research, matching the numerical analysis with the theoretical insights of the qualitative literature.

The results show hybrid regimes have better prospects for democratization than fully closed regimes. None of the new authoritarian types significantly raised the chance of the regime losing power. However, competitive authoritarian regimes, where the opposition had fared at least moderately well in presidential or parliamentary polls, were more likely than other regimes to be succeeded by electoral democracies. The data also indicate that both hybrid and closed regimes have been less durable and more prone to democratization during the post–cold war era than in prior years. Predicted probability estimates show the magnitude of these effects has been substantial, with competitive authoritarian regimes of the post-1989 period emerging as the strongest candidates for democratization.

Before presenting the findings and their implications, I first relate this study to existing literature and discuss how I operationalized the main explanatory and dependent variables. My treatment of the cross-national statistical research on authoritarian subtypes begins with the seminal studies of hybrid regimes and then addresses the influential work of Barbara Geddes (1991a, 1991b, 2003). Geddes’s tripartite typology predates the categories of electoral and competitive authoritarianism and provides an alternative taxonomy of the nondemocratic spectrum. Subsequent scholars have evaluated the effect of elections and legislatures on authoritarian regimes, an area Geddes did not initially address. Based on these works I propose four hypotheses regarding electoral, competitive, and hegemonic authoritarianism and their effects on the major outcomes of regime breakdown and democratic transition. In the subsequent logistic regression tests, Geddes’s main regime types retain their explanatory weight for authoritarian breakdown, but they do not account for variations in democratic transitions. By contrast, the newer regime types are salient only in the second batch of results, where competitive authoritarianism evinces a significant positive effect on the likelihood the successor regime will be an electoral democracy.

**Authoritarianism in the 1990s: New Regimes and Old Debates**

When political change swept through Eastern Europe in 1989–90, the nascent postcommunist democracies capped a 15-year wave of democratization that had circled
the globe (Huntington 1991). The Soviet Union’s demise soon yielded more new democracies, as well as over a dozen other regimes with noticeable autocratic countercurrents (McFaul 2002, 227). Hence a surge of democratization at the turn of the decade imparted an ambiguous legacy, with states from Central Asia to sub-Saharan Africa seemingly more pluralistic than their predecessors but far short of electoral democracy.

From 1990 to 1994 the global number of electoral democracies as tallied by Freedom House rose 50% (from 76 to 114; Freedom House 2008). These democracies were identified by Freedom House for meeting the minimalist standard adopted by political scientists.1 The criteria for being counted as an electoral democracy are

1. a competitive multiparty political system;
2. universal adult suffrage for all citizens;
3. regularly contested elections under a secure and secret ballot and the absence of massive, outcome-changing fraud;
4. significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and open campaigning (Puddington 2007, 3).

During the second half of the 1990s the count of electoral democracies nearly leveled off, with the number hovering around 120 for the past decade (Figure 1).

As democratization hit a plateau new authoritarian regimes arose. The third wave subsided, electoral authoritarianism spread, and hybrid regimes became the modal form of government in the developing world. By the end of the 1990s political scientists were beginning to consider these governments in their own terms, not as incomplete democratization but as new and resilient forms of authoritarianism. Right as earlier approaches to democratic transitions were accused of obsolescence, comparativists seized upon hybrid regimes as a pressing empirical and analytic problem for post–cold war politics (Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002).

Levitsky and Way coined the term “competitive authoritarianism” for cases in which elections were the
principal means for acquiring power but where “incum-
bents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate elec-
toral results” (2002, 53). They linked their regime type to the conditions of the post–cold war period: “Western liberalism’s triumph and the Soviet collapse under-
mined the legitimacy of alternative regime models and created strong incentives for peripheral states to adopt formal democratic institutions” (2002, 61). Indeed many of the former Soviet states that did not become competi-
tive democracies epitomized the problem of competitive authoritarianism:

The post-Cold War world has been marked by the proliferation of hybrid political regimes. In different ways, and to varying degrees, poli-
tics across much of Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe), postcommunist Eurasia (Albania, Croatia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine), Asia (Malaysia, Taiwan), and Latin America (Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru) com-
bined democratic rules with authoritarian govern-
ance during the 1990s. . . . (2002, 51)

For Larry Diamond, it was the proliferation of hybrid regimes, not their simple emergence, which made these cases novel. “Hybrid regimes (combining democratic and authoritarian elements) are not new,” he remarked. “Even in the 1960s and 1970s, there existed multiparty, electoral, but undemocratic regimes” (2002, 23–24). The contem-
porary period differed, though, because nondemocratic regimes tended not to ban their opponents outright but instead corral them through other methods.

Similarly, Andreas Schedler observed that the prac-
tice of combining elections and non-
democratic rule had a long history, but noted that electoral authoritarianism (identified by the presence of multiparty elections, re-
gardless of competitiveness) had grown more common during the late twentieth century:

Since the early days of the “third wave” of global democratization, it has been clear that transitions from authoritarian rule can lead anywhere. Over the past quarter-century, many have led to the establishment of some form of democracy. But many others have not. They have given birth to new forms of authoritarianism that do not fit into our classic categories of one-party, military, or personal dictatorship. (2002, 36)

In sum, the electoralist bent of hybrid regimes merited at-
tention because it departed from the traditional means by which autocrats had held power. The foundational stud-
ies of hybrid regimes thus outlined a scholarly agenda that recognized the particular nature of electoral author-
itarianism and that suggested post–cold war politics had generated these regimes at a pace and in ways distinct from earlier periods.

Scholars of the new authoritarian subtypes sought to map out the universe of nondemocratic cases while re-
erving judgment on the future trajectory these regimes might take. The primary aim was identifying and classify-
ing authoritarian regimes, rather than assessing their like-
lihood for democratization. Toward this end Diamond in-
cluded a comprehensive table placing nearly all regimes of the world under one of six mutually exclusive and collect-
ively exhaustive headings: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritar-
ian, hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and politically closed authoritarian (2002, 30–31). The competitive and hegemonic electoral authoritarian categories clarified the distinction between cases in Levitsky and Way’s type and those regimes that would fit Schedler’s broader category but fell short of the competitive standard (2002, 25). Competitive and hegemonic authoritarianism could be distinguished by the strength of the opposition’s chal-
lenge to incumbents:

One defining feature of competitive authoritarian regimes is significant parliamentary opposi-
tion. In regimes where elections are largely an au-
thoritarian facade, the ruling or dominant party wins almost all the seats: repeatedly over 95 per-
cent in Singapore, about 80 percent in Egypt in 2000 and Mauritania in 2001, 89 percent in Tanzania in 2000, and repeatedly over 80 percent in Tunisia during the 1990s. (Diamond 2002, 29, 32)

Hence a salient feature of competitive authoritarian regimes was that the rulers faced stiff electoral chal-
lengers, despite the opposition contesting a lopsided po-
itical arena.

Even as the new studies of authoritarianism refrained from speculating about the dynamic properties of their regimes, work by Diamond, Schedler, Levitsky and Way, and others implicitly spoke to an older debate about the effects of elections and other pseudo-democratic insti-
tutions on regime change. After regime-initiated elec-
tions in the Philippines (1986), Chile (1989), Poland (1989), and Nicaragua (1990) produced opposition vic-
tories, Samuel Huntington remarked that “liberalized
Recent Findings and Remaining Questions

Barbara Geddes’s study of authoritarian breakdown, introduced as a conference paper and subsequently expanded in a monograph on research methods, distilled decades of scholarship on nondemocratic regimes and set a new baseline for cross-national studies of regime change (Geddes 1999a, 1999b, 2003). Intentionally developing a set of regime subtypes that matched the extant literature, Geddes eschewed a numerical range of authoritarianism in favor of categories that more accurately reflected the contrasts among different regimes: “Because I consider the most important differences among authoritarian regimes to be qualitative, I create a typology for ‘measuring’ regimes rather than a scale or index. Typologies are theoretical constructs used when variables can only be measured nominally. . . . To be useful, they have to capture differences that are essential to the argument being made” (2003, 50–51). Those differences primarily concerned the interests and power bases of regime rulers, whether they originated in the country’s military (whence they could return after the regime ended), a party (upon which they depended for influence), or a personal clique. Geddes thus developed a tripartite typology of military, personalist, and single-party regimes, with various mixed types for regimes that spanned more than one category. A set of coding rules enabled Geddes and her research team to classify 167 regimes from 92 countries in these categories (for discussion of these coding decisions, see Geddes 1999a, 17–22).

The outcome of interest was the “breakdown” of an authoritarian regime, identified by the replacement of incumbent rulers by an alternative set of elites. Consistent with Geddes’s game theoretic elaboration of elites’ interests, military regimes tended to have the shortest duration (average lifespan: 8.5 years), single-party leaders were least likely to relinquish power (22.7 years), and personalist leaders lasted longer than military ones but not as long as single-party rulers (15.0 years; Geddes 1999b, 37). In logit regressions and survival analysis that controlled for levels of economic development, region, and age, military regimes were the most likely to lose power in a given year, personal regimes the second most likely, and party regimes the least likely (Geddes 1999a, 38; Geddes 2003, 78). The approach developed by Geddes has been widely employed in subsequent studies of regime change (Kinne 2005; Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Smith 2005; cf. Lai and Slater 2006).

One of the most ambitious successors to Geddes’s project has been Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell’s cross-national study of regime change. In a working paper and subsequent article, Hadenius and Teorell report on a
new dataset that includes cases, variables, and outcomes not addressed by Geddes. Notably, their data encompass monarchies and democracies, as well as autocracies. In all, they have five main regime types: monarchy, military, no-party, one-party, and multiparty, as well as hybrids that fall between categories (2006, 8). Combining these five subtypes with their coding of democracies, Hadenius and Teorell track both intra-authoritarian regime shifts—for example, a change from no-party to multiparty authoritarianism—and extra-authoritarian transitions, from authoritarianism to democracy. The approach offers a substantial advance in our understanding of transitions not only from authoritarian regimes, but also within them. But its application in the accompanying statistical analysis elides the distinction between these kinds of change.

Hadenius and Teorell code intraregime periods of varying authoritarianism as distinct regimes and in some cases this has the effect of fragmenting one regime into several. For example, whereas Geddes accords with most area specialists in coding Mexico under the PRI as one regime from 1929 to 2000, Hadenius and Teorell identify two different cases: a dominant party regime (1960–87) and a multiparty regime (1988–98) (2006, 27–28). Likewise, most comparativists consider the dictatorial rule of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines one regime that lasted from Marcos’s declaration of martial law in 1972 until his ouster following the “snap election” of 1986. For Hadenius and Teorell, the Marcos regime is counted three ways before its collapse: as a residual “other” (1972–77), as a dominant party regime (1978–83), and as a multiparty regime (1984–86) (2006, 28, 30–31).

This coding decision departs from the conventional concepts of the comparative politics literature and undermines the reliability of Hadenius and Teorell’s measures. The PRI in Mexico and Marcos in the Philippines did not lose power multiple times; they each lost power once. Yet Hadenius and Teorell include these subperiods as separate regimes in their survival analysis and test of democratization (2006, 16, 21). By counting intra-authoritarian modulations as distinct instances of breakdown, Hadenius and Teorell risk biasing their results and overstating the potential for change. Mexico’s democratization was not the conclusion of a 10-year-old multiparty authoritarianism, but the climax of a decades-old ruling party that had become more competitive in its final years. It is thus premature to conclude: “all other possible determinants of democratization being equal—limited multiparty systems are more likely to democratize” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 154). In order to recognize intra-authoritarian regime variations, comparative analysis must account for shifts within authoritarianism without obscuring the fundamental identification of regimes by Geddes. Two other recent works have approached the impact of regime competitiveness for both breakdown and democratization.

Using an original dataset on elections in sub-Saharan Africa, Staffan Lindberg argues that elections do not merely ratify preceding democratic development but actually facilitate democratization independently (2006, 3). Over time, Lindberg contends, elections have a self-reinforcing effect that embeds and consolidates democratic practices in previously authoritarian settings: “My analysis of more than two hundred third-wave elections in Africa shows that an uninterrupted series of competitive elections imbues society with certain democratic qualities. Repeated elections—regardless of their relative freeness or fairness—appear to have a positive impact on human freedom and democratic values” (2007, 139). He reaches this conclusion by tracking “improvement in democratic qualities” as measured by changes in Freedom House civil liberties scores for the relevant countries (2006, 18–19). Yet Lindberg leaves unexplored the relationship of these shifts in democratic quality for the arguably more monumental change from an electoral authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy. The resulting implications are unclear; repeated elections may be accompanied by a flourishing of civil society, but we cannot be confident they spur regime change.

Finally, in a cross-national analysis of competitive authoritarianism, Marc Morjé Howard and Philip Roessler found that what they termed “liberalizing electoral outcomes” were most likely when the opposition coordinated around a single candidate and challenged a nonincumbent in the elections (2006, 375–76). The authors thus capture the importance of strategy for contesting competitive authoritarian regimes, illustrating their quantitative findings with the example of Kenya’s break from single-party rule in 2002 (Howard and Roessler 2006, 378–79). Howard and Roessler’s study marks one of the first attempts to carefully apply Levitsky and Way’s competitive authoritarian subtype to the dynamic question of how regimes become more politically open and pluralist. Like Hadenius and Teorell, they combine Polity and Freedom House data to measure their dependent variable. An electoral outcome counts as “liberalizing” the regime if in that year “the Polity score increased by three

5A secondary problem involves their measure of democracy based on a regime’s average numerical score from the Freedom House and Polity data (Hadenius and Teorell 2006). That measurement may miss the discrete shift from authoritarianism to democracy that accompanies many transitions. To give two illustrative examples, Hadenius and Teorell’s Polity/Freedom House threshold records Nicaragua and Romania becoming democracies in 1995, whereas observers conventionally date Nicaragua’s transition to 1990 and Romania’s to 1992.
or more points and the Freedom House political rights score decreased by one point or more” (Howard and Roessler 2006, 370). This approach measures the significant shift from competitive authoritarianism toward electoral democracy while leaving open the issue of how such a regime change fits in the full spectrum of democratization: “An important question that will have to be left for future research is what explains transitions from more closed regimes to competitive authoritarian regimes, such that elections become competitive and the opposition has a greater opportunity to contribute to political liberalization through strategic electoral coalitions” (2006, 375, fn. 26). In tandem with that question, one should also consider the prospect that some regimes may transition from closed authoritarianism to electoral democracy without lingering in the zone of competitive authoritarianism. In order to pursue such analysis, comparativists must set competitive authoritarian regimes alongside their hegemonic electoral and fully closed counterparts.

### Deriving Hypotheses for the Newest Authoritarian Subtypes

Based on the preceding overview, the latest quantitative studies of elections and regime tend to support Huntington’s idea that liberalized authoritarian regimes are more likely than closed regimes to experience democratization. These arguments can be translated into testable propositions. We should expect that electoral and competitive authoritarianism increase the likelihood of regime breakdown and democratic transition. Therefore, based on the prior works I derive four hypotheses regarding the likely impact of hybrid regimes on the collapse of authoritarianism and its replacement by electoral democracy. They are follows:

**H₁**: The holding of multiparty elections under authoritarian circumstances provides an additional venue for mobilizing opposition and challenging incumbents, thereby making electoral authoritarian regimes more prone to regime breakdown than their nonelectoral counterparts.

**H₂**: When the opposition is better able to compete against incumbents and electoral contestation rises—a situation of competitive authoritarianism—the regime will be more likely to break down.

**H₃**: Because the holding of elections under authoritarian circumstances primes opposition parties for electoral participation, electoral authoritarian regimes will be more likely than their exclusionary counterparts to experience a democratic transition.

**H₄**: Following the prior hypothesis, the relatively higher levels of contestation enjoyed by opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes further increase the likelihood that the regime’s successor will be an electoral democracy.

Before presenting logistic regression results on these hypotheses, I next discuss how I measured and operationalized the relevant variables.

### Measuring Hybrid Regimes and Transitions from Authoritarianism

The foregoing studies produced valuable findings for our understanding of what variables undermine authoritarianism and generate democracy. Geddes distinguished among different forms of authoritarianism, showing a ruler’s base of power affected the likelihood of regime collapse. However, she did not address the dependent variable of democratization, an outcome approached directly by the study of Hadenius and Teorell. Those authors suggested that authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections were more prone to breakdown and democratization. In a similar vein, Lindberg argued that repeated elections improved the quality of democracy in a given regime, as shown by an increase in the exercise of civil liberties. These projects had limitations too. On the one hand, Hadenius and Teorell’s measures of intraregime change may underestimate the durability of multiparty authoritarian regimes. On the other, Lindberg’s work does not assess the discrete shift from authoritarianism to democracy, instead placing the quality of democracy on a continuum. At that point, Howard and Roessler capture the transition from competitive authoritarianism to electoral democracy, showing that contested elections tended to facilitate such shifts.

I integrate these gains in knowledge, compensate for some of the limitations in prior works, and submit their implications to additional observation. Toward this end I have taken advantage of available measurements rather than constructing new ones (Snyder 2006, 227). Specifically, I update and expand the regime data of Geddes, provide a measure for a dependent variable of transitions to electoral democracy, and introduce categorical variables for electoral, competitive, and hegemonic authoritarianism. I also add new control variables for political liberalization and the post–cold war period. The dataset covers a total of 158 regimes and 2,132 regime-years. With
nominal variables for authoritarian subtypes and democratization, the subsequent tests can comprehensively and reliably assess the effect of hybrid regimes on breakdown and democratization. Addressing the main variables employed, I begin with the two outcomes of interest.

**Dependent Variables: Regime Breakdown and Democratic Transition**

Following Geddes, the dependent variable of regime breakdown is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in a year in which the incumbent rulers are ousted from power, whether through revolution, coup, electoral defeat, or other means. Significant positive coefficients mean the variable in question is associated with an increased likelihood of regime breakdown.

Regime-years of breakdown signal the end of the current regime but do not provide information on what kind of regime was established next. For example, Nicaragua 1979, when the Somoza dictatorship was followed by the Sandinista regime, is coded as a year of breakdown. So is Mexico 2000, when opposition victory at the polls ended the PRI’s rule. As Geddes noted in her original study, authoritarian regimes are often replaced by new authoritarian regimes (1999a, 19). The breakdown variable does not distinguish between the establishment of democracy and the start of another authoritarian regime. A second dependent variable, introduced for this study, accounts for the nature of the successor regime.

Whereas Geddes treated authoritarian breakdown with a dichotomous coding of regime maintenance and collapse, she refrained from creating a dependent variable for democratization. The prevailing method for doing so typically involves using Freedom House or Polity data and then identifying a numerical threshold or cutoff point at which a regime is said to have democratized. This is the tactic of Hadenius and Teorell, and the codings they reach largely comport with general understandings in the field about which regimes have democratized. Yet there is another source of data and another approach comparativists could adopt. Rather than trying to infer a dichotomous distinction from ordinal data, one may instead turn to the qualitative codings of electoral democracies that are available. Specifically, comparativists may utilize the list of electoral democracies, composed annually by Freedom House since 1989, from which observers track global trends in democratization.

In this study the dependent variable for successor regime type takes the value of 1 if three out of four years after regime breakdown (as coded by Geddes) are coded as electoral democracy, as identified by Freedom House. The available list of electoral democracies begins in 1989. To measure the dependent variable in the prior period, 1975–88, I consulted the relevant country reports in Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World*. (There were 12 such cases: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Spain, Peru, Honduras, Argentina, Turkey, El Salvador, Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, and the Philippines.) This measure distinguishes between regimes that lost power only to be followed by further authoritarianism (e.g., Nicaragua 1979, Haiti 1986) from those that lost power and were succeeded by a sustained period of, at least minimally, democratic rule (Nicaragua 1990, Haiti 1994).

The coding of democratic successor regimes aims to identify the bulk of cases driving the global trend depicted earlier (in Figure 1). Regime-years coded as democratic transitions constitute a pool of cases that approximate the conventional set of democratization during the period 1975–2004. (As with breakdown, positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of democratic transition.) Table 1 lists the countries in which authoritarian regimes that lost power during 1975–2004 were succeeded by electoral democracies.

**Regime Variables: Hybrid Regimes**

Diamond, Schedler, Levitsky, and Way specified the features of hybrid regimes, but did not establish the full universe of such cases over the time period in question. In the spirit of not throwing the baby out with the bath water, I introduced measures for these subtypes while 6Lindberg (2006) and Howard and Roessler (2006) also use numerical measures for their dependent variables.

6 Observers have noted diminutions of democracy in the form of “illiberal democracies,” “delegative democracies,” and other variants (Collier and Levitsky 1997; O’Donnell 1994; Zakaria 1997). Yet the field has retained the categorical distinction between democracies and nondemocracies. The procedural definition of democracy—manifest through the rotation of top elites from competing groups—remains standard for judging whether or not a government is democratic (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 51).

6 One omission from the set is newly independent democratic states that were not previously coded as authoritarian regimes. The main instance of this phenomenon was the Baltic states that emerged from the USSR: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For purposes of the democratic transition variable, I treated Russia as the relevant successor polity of the Soviet Union. In addition, microstates, with populations of less than one million, are not included in the regimes dataset and not classified in this study.
Table 1  Authoritarian Regimes Succeeded by Electoral Democracy (1975–2004)

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Notes: Freedom House’s published list of electoral democracies was used for years from 1989 to 2008. Earlier transitions to democracy (denoted by an *) were coded based on country reports in the annual Freedom in the World, and the following secondary sources: O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986b); Huntington (1991); Linz and Stepan (1996); and Nohlen (2005). Microstates, with a population of less than one million, were not included. The full listing of regimes is available from the author.
Further, Freedom House and Polity scores fail to capture the discrete changes that taxonomically partition the hybrid regimes. Accordingly, I instead drew on the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions and constructed dummy variables for the presence of limited multiparty elections and the competitiveness of those polls (Beck et al. 2001).

The latest version of DPI covers the years 1975 to 2006 and includes 7-point indices of legislative and executive electoral competitiveness: 1 = no legislature, 2 = unelected legislature/executive, 3 = elected legislature/executive, one candidate/post, 4 = one party, multiple candidates, 5 = multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats, 6 = multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats, 7 = largest party got less than 75% (Keefer 2002). Because they measure the legislatures and offices filled by election these scores are typically assigned the year subsequent to voting. Thus they have a built-in one-year lag. The DPI data on multipartyism cut across Geddes's regime types and are not endogenous to the outcomes of breakdown or continuity. They provided the operational tools for testing the hybrid regime types.

Electoral Authoritarianism

Electoral authoritarianism is the foil of electoral democracy: a system in which elections are held but incumbents systematically manipulate the voting (Schedler 2002, 37–38). For a nondemocratic regime to be considered electoral authoritarian, some form of multiparty or factional polling must be allowed. Otherwise it belongs in the category of fully closed authoritarianism. Regime-years that measured 1–4 in the DPI index were coded as fully closed authoritarian; regime-years with a score of 5–7 were coded as electoral authoritarian (the combined category encompassing competitive and hegemonic regimes).

Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarianism

The standard for competitive authoritarianism is higher than for simple electoral authoritarianism: “Although incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes may routinely manipulate formal democratic rules, they are unable to eliminate them or reduce them to a mere facade.” These regimes must exhibit a “meaningful” level of contestation. Levitsky and Way explicitly excluded regimes like Egypt and Uzbekistan, where rulers enjoyed hegemonic electoral dominance (2002, 53–54).

Regime-years coded as electoral authoritarianism were further disaggregated based on the level of competition reported in the DPI. Electoral authoritarian regime-years that scored a 7 on one of the indices of legislative and executive electoral competitiveness were identified as competitive authoritarian. The remainder of electoral authoritarian regimes, with scores no greater than 5 or 6 on the same measures, were considered hegemonic authoritarian regimes.9

The two sets of categories—fully closed authoritarian versus electoral authoritarian and fully closed authoritarian versus competitive authoritarian and hegemonic authoritarian—offer a distinct and complementary typology to the prior regime divisions of Geddes. The hybrid regime variables function as independent and cumulative variables beyond the types based on military, personal, and single-party rule.10

Regime Variables: Geddes’s Subtypes

The dataset on authoritarian breakdown developed by Geddes originally covered the years 1946–96. It omitted authoritarian Soviet successor states (e.g., Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) and other regimes emerging after 1990 because their inclusion, as relatively new regimes, could have biased the conclusions (Geddes 1999a, 17). With nearly a decade of additional economic and political data now available, I updated Geddes’s data and included regimes that began in the 1990s. I also added monarchies.

For each regime-year, a regime is coded as one of Geddes’s regime types (or as a monarchy). The seven regime types (military, military-personalist, personalist, single-party hybrid, single-party, military/personalist/single-party, monarchy) are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. (Personalist regimes are omitted from the regression analysis. Coefficients for the other six regime type variables should be interpreted as the likelihood of breakdown relative to personalist regimes.) Regimes are

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9Monarchies in which the chief executive does not contest elections were coded as hegemonic authoritarian, including those cases in which regime-years received a score of 5–7. On elections under monarchies, see Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002).

10Accordingly the study addresses two institutional dimensions of authoritarianism: variations in the profile of the ruling elite as operationalized by Geddes and differences in the occurrence and competitiveness of elections as highlighted in the “hybrid regimes” literature.
classified in one of the categories based on a series of coding questions, most of which relate to the background and operations of the ruling elite. The following list provides illustrative examples of these classifications:

- Military regime—Thailand, 1976–88
- Military-personal—Chile, 1973–89
- Personalist regime—The Philippines, 1972–86
- Single-party hybrid—North Korea, 1948–
- Single-party—Malaysia, 1957–
- Personal/Military/Single-party—Indonesia, 1967–98
- Monarchy—Iran, 1953–79

**Regime Variables: Prior Liberalization**

A final political variable addresses the question of liberalization in authoritarian regimes. Comparativists have argued that the relaxing of restrictions on civil liberties presages the end of authoritarian rule and bodes well for future democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 7; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15). Because an expansion in opportunities for political expression is not captured by the DPI measures of electoral competition, this factor merits distinct treatment.

I incorporated a lagged variable to assess whether liberalization affected the likelihood of regime breakdown and democratization. For each regime-year a dummy variable, “prior liberalization,” reflected the prior year’s civil liberties score (as reported by Freedom House on a 1–7 scale). Regime-years that had received a score of 5–7 (basic parameters of Freedom House’s “not free” category) were coded as un-liberalized. Those regime-years with a lower, better rating on civil liberties (1–4) were coded as liberalized. In the current data, 411 regime-years (19.3%) fell in the set showing liberalization, i.e., a score of 4 or better on civil liberties one year prior. Because these codings come from the previous year of the regime’s existence they are not endogenous to regime change, nor do they reflect decisions by Freedom House analysts in the wake of a regime’s collapse.

**Time Variables: Post–Cold War Period and Regime Duration**

As addressed above, the initial theories of hybrid regimes tied their emergence and proliferation to the particular geopolitical and ideological context of the post–cold war era. These claims are well accepted in the case study literature on democratization, but comparativists seldom test them in a systematic manner (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Huntington 1991). To evaluate whether the end of the cold war exerted a causal impact on the stability of authoritarian regimes and the likelihood of democratic transition, I include a post-1989 dummy variable: regime-years from 1975 to 1989 receive a score of zero; subsequent years are scored as one.

Regarding the potential effects of age on regime change (during and after the cold war), I reproduced Geddes’s variables—age, age squared, and age cubed—that enable the logistic regression to test for curvilinear effects of time, including theories that the hazard rate declines after a ruler’s initial years in power (Bienen and van de Walle 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

**Additional Control Variables: Economic Development and Region**

Consistent with Geddes’s approach and conventions in the field, I include control variables for wealth and economic growth. The first is measured as the natural log of GDP per capita, while the second records the change in GDP per capita over the prior two years. These variables address a country’s development level and the government’s economic performance (Boix and Stokes 2003; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000).

I began collecting this data from the latest Penn World Tables 6.2 (2006). However, a number of regimes relevant for this study lack economic data and would thus be dropped from the regression tests. Governments not reporting economic data are not randomly distributed. In this dataset they tended to fall at the “fully closed” end of the authoritarian spectrum: the Penn World Tables lacked economic data for such regimes as Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Libya, Myanmar,
and the Soviet Union. This gap among some of the most relevant regimes for the questions of this article reinforces the missing data problem Kristian Gleditsch identified:

The processes or mechanisms that induce missing data often make certain types of cases more likely not to be observed than others. . . . Researchers often ignore missing data problems and proceed by . . . working with the sample that remains after omitting each case or row of the data matrix with missing observations. . . . However, when the attrition due to missing data is not random, simply going with the available data when faced with missing data can lead researchers astray. (Gleditsch 2002, 713)

To ameliorate the potential biases of this problem, Gleditsch used relevant regional data, the existing Penn data, and information from alternative sources to provide GDP and population figures for all the countries listed.13

In the present study economic control variables constitute a small portion of the battery of explanatory factors, yet closed regimes like the Soviet Union, Myanmar, and Libya make up an important segment of the universe of cases. The problem of dropping fully closed regimes was substantial and Gleditsch’s treatment has gained wide currency in the field (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, 617–18; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 545; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003, 377). I used Gleditsch’s “Expanded Trade and GDP Data” to fill in missing data.

The final control variables are regional dummies. To capture more precisely whether particular countries or regimes had unusual properties, I utilized the cluster function in Stata to produce robust standard errors based around regime. Thus, the logistic regression relaxes the assumption that, for example, the events of regime maintenance in Egypt in 1980 and 2000 are completely independent. This technique reduced the need for regional control variables. Although Geddes originally placed all countries in one of eight regional categories, I included two regional dummies, for theoretical reasons. The first was for Middle East and North African cases, based on the field’s renewed consideration of Middle East exceptionalism (Herb 2005; Posusney 2004; Ross 2001; Stepan and Robertson 2003). I also tested the regional significance of Central and Eastern Europe, because of those cases’ common experience emerging from communism (Bunce 2003; Linz and Stepan 1996; McFaul 2002).14

**Effects of Hybrid Regimes on Breakdown**

To test the first pair of hypotheses I ran logistic regressions on the full set of 158 regimes (2,132 regime-years). In these tests the dependent variable is coded as 1 when the regime experienced breakdown in a given year. For interpreting the results, negative coefficients indicate durability and positive coefficients signal a greater likelihood of regime collapse. After first running a pared-down model with only the control variables, I introduced Geddes’s regime types and the prior liberalization variable (Model 2), followed by the broad electoral authoritarian category (Model 3), and separate hegemonic and competitive authoritarianism categories (Model 4). Sample size refers to regime-years. As noted above, standard errors are robust and clustered around regime.

In the results of Table 2 (below), Geddes’s regime subtypes retain their salience: single-party regimes and, to a lesser extent, monarchies appear to be significantly more durable than other types. Military regimes are consistently more likely to lose power. Also significant are variables for the post–cold war period and prior liberalization. Both variables are significant throughout all the models in which they are included. Prior liberalization is strongly linked to an increased likelihood of regime breakdown. A Freedom House civil liberties score of 4 or better proves to be as strong a bellwether of regime change as the institutional profiles of Geddes’s subtypes. By contrast, the newer hybrid regime categories show small negative coefficients, suggesting a decreased chance of regime breakdown, but the robust standard errors are too high to reject the null hypothesis. Electoral authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism show no significant impact on the outcome; Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported.

The significance of control variables for per capita GDP, economic growth, and Central and Eastern Europe remains consistent across the four models, strengthening the overall impression that nonelectoral variables are exerting the greatest influence on the maintenance or collapse of the regimes in question. To further interpret these findings, one might consider the empirical source of these data patterns. The essential reason that competitive and

---


14I also tested for interactions effects about the Central and Eastern European cases, the post–cold war period, and the hybrid regime types. None of the interaction variables emerged as significant.
TABLE 2 Tests of Hybrid Regimes on Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable = End of Regime</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral authoritarian</td>
<td>−.261</td>
<td></td>
<td>−.431</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−.163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military regime</td>
<td>1.209***</td>
<td>1.147**</td>
<td>1.141**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party hybrid</td>
<td>−.036</td>
<td>−.069</td>
<td>−.070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-party</td>
<td>−.832**</td>
<td>−.837**</td>
<td>−.811**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal/military/single-party</td>
<td>−.467</td>
<td>−.370</td>
<td>−.332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>−1.051</td>
<td>−1.136*</td>
<td>−1.111*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior liberalization</td>
<td>1.101***</td>
<td>1.196***</td>
<td>1.177***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP$_{ln}$</td>
<td>−.209*</td>
<td>−.382**</td>
<td>−.345**</td>
<td>−.350**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged GDP/capita growth</td>
<td>−.035**</td>
<td>−.037**</td>
<td>−.037**</td>
<td>−.037**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>−.512</td>
<td>−.005</td>
<td>−.007</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>.684***</td>
<td>1.081***</td>
<td>1.047***</td>
<td>1.039***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of regime</td>
<td>−.009</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age$^2$</td>
<td>−.0007</td>
<td>−.008</td>
<td>−.001</td>
<td>−.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age$^3$</td>
<td>.00001</td>
<td>.00009</td>
<td>.00001</td>
<td>.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–cold war</td>
<td>.565*</td>
<td>.423*</td>
<td>.521*</td>
<td>.514*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.367</td>
<td>−.968</td>
<td>−1.232</td>
<td>−1.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2132</td>
<td>2132</td>
<td>2132</td>
<td>2132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>−407.565</td>
<td>−382.749</td>
<td>−382.261</td>
<td>−381.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p ≤ .001; ***p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10. Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

electoral authoritarian regimes are not strongly associated with breakdown (or prolonged regime maintenance) is their diversity in terms of longevity. Many of these hybrid regimes, such as Malaysia and Zimbabwe, have resiliently endured the third wave; others, like the Dominican Republic and the Philippines, were overthrown during the same period. By contrast, repeated tests have shown a strong trend of durability among single-party regimes.
and an equally strong tendency toward breakdown in military dictatorships.

Based on these results, if one were interested in forecasting the durability of today’s dictatorships, the most important regime distinctions would be the variance among military, single-party, and personalist regimes (the omitted category), as well as between liberalized regimes and those with much tighter controls on free expression and association. By contrast, electoral authoritarian regimes, whether competitive or hegemonic, exhibit no substantial differences in their propensity for regime breakdown. These characteristics shift when we turn to the question of what type of government will emerge after a regime falls.

Tests of Hybrid Regimes on Democratic Transitions

Table 3 presents results from four tests using the same explanatory variables from Table 2 but changing the dependent variable to transitions to electoral democracy. For these tests I restricted the sample to those regime-years in which breakdown occurred. There were 107 instances of regime breakdown, 54 of which were followed by electoral democracies. To recall the dependent variable, a 1 in a given year means that the regime experienced breakdown and was followed by three years of electoral democracy, as identified by Freedom House, within the next four years. (Refer back to Table 1 for the resulting set of transitions.)

Among the controls, per capita GDP, the Middle East dummy variable, and the post–cold war period were highly significant. Regimes with higher GDP per capita and regimes operating after 1989 were much likelier to be succeeded by democracy than their counterparts. Location in the Middle East significantly reduced the chance of democratic transition, relative to those of regimes in other regions. These results accord with what scholars of democratization and Middle Eastern politics have previously explored in great depth (Boix 2003; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Herb 2005; Lipset 1959; Posusney 2004). The significance of certain regime variables charts new terrain.

Turning first to the regime variables from Geddes’s original project, only the single-party type evinced any significant effect on the likelihood of democratic transitions, and even that correlation weakened in the expanded models. Otherwise, there were no significant differences among the military, personalist, and mixed regimes in their tendency to be followed by non-democracies or democracies. Although the coefficients for these variables mainly went in the same direction as they had in the preceding tests of regime breakdown, their standard errors were sufficiently large that the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

A different relationship emerged in the hybrid regime categories. Whereas neither electoral nor competitive authoritarianism carried a significant impact on the collapse of authoritarian rule, these categories performed more strongly at predicting the emergence of electoral democracy after regimes had fallen. In Model 3 the broad category of electoral authoritarianism (without regard to competitiveness) fell just short of significance at the .10 level. The underlying dynamics come into focus in Model 4. Once the hegemonic and competitive variants of electoral authoritarianism were disaggregated, competitive authoritarianism emerged as a strong predictor of democratic transitions. Although the data did not support Hypothesis 3, they strongly affirmed Hypothesis 4.

Predicted probabilities show that the effect of competitive authoritarianism on subsequent democracy is not only statistically significant, but it also carries substantial magnitude. During the 1975–89 period the predicted probability of a typical personalist authoritarian regime being succeeded by electoral democracy was 26.1% for “fully closed” regimes and 62.5% for competitive authoritarian regimes. The starting likelihood becomes much higher after the cold war, but it too increases among competitive authoritarian regimes. For 1990–2004 the predicted probability of democratization in fully closed regimes was 78.2%, rising to 94.4% in cases of competitive authoritarianism.

Theoretical Interpretation

The statistical results on breakdown seemed to track with the heterogeneity of durable and fragile electoral authoritarian regimes. What are the empirics beneath the patterns of democratic transitions? To begin with Geddes’s regime types, the sources of rulers’ authority and the nature of their coalitions are poor predictors of what kind of government will follow their withdrawal from power. Military leaders may pass power to elected presidents: Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey. They may also be succeeded by elites no less authoritarian than themselves, as occurred in the late 1970s in Chad and Ghana. It appears that the same diversity characterizes personalist and single-party regimes. Against that backdrop, the distinct posttransition legacy of competitive authoritarianism is striking.
### Table 3 Tests of Hybrid Regimes on Democratic Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable = Shift to Electoral Democracy</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral authoritarian</td>
<td>1.129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic authoritarian</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>1.067</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>(.916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive authoritarian</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>.929</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td>.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military regime</td>
<td>−1.641</td>
<td>−1.797</td>
<td>−1.508</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic authoritarian</td>
<td>−.163</td>
<td>−.916</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party hybrid</td>
<td>.024∗</td>
<td>.869</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>(1.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic authoritarian</td>
<td>−1.723*</td>
<td>−1.465</td>
<td>−1.440</td>
<td>(1.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>−.257</td>
<td>(3.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>−1.785</td>
<td>−.597</td>
<td>−.658</td>
<td>(1.827)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personalist</td>
<td>−1.01</td>
<td>−.022</td>
<td>−.012</td>
<td>(3.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal/military/single-party</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>−.257</td>
<td>(3.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>−1.785</td>
<td>−.597</td>
<td>−.658</td>
<td>(1.827)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior liberalization</td>
<td>.307∗</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>−.061</td>
<td>(.634)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP$_{ln}$</td>
<td>1.765***</td>
<td>1.839***</td>
<td>1.710***</td>
<td>1.882***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged GDP/capita growth</td>
<td>−.006</td>
<td>−.022</td>
<td>−.012</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>−5.840***</td>
<td>−5.400***</td>
<td>−5.535**</td>
<td>−6.230**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>1.630</td>
<td>(1.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of regime</td>
<td>−.072</td>
<td>−.107</td>
<td>−.051</td>
<td>(.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age$^2$</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age$^3$</td>
<td>−.000008</td>
<td>−.00004</td>
<td>−.00002</td>
<td>(−.00006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–cold war</td>
<td>2.410***</td>
<td>2.763***</td>
<td>2.469**</td>
<td>2.566**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−45.792</td>
<td>−41.777</td>
<td>−40.358</td>
<td>−37.692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p ≤ .001; ***p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .10. Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Among regimes that have lost power, competitive authoritarian regimes are significantly linked to the replacement of authoritarianism with electoral democracy. In fact, half of the 54 transitions to electoral democracy occurred in regimes classified as competitive authoritarian. These results illuminate Hadenius and Teorell's

15Transitions from “fully closed” regimes to democracy constituted 41% of the transition cases and were clustered under two regime
problematic interpretation of relatively short-lived multiparty autocracies. Such regimes are likely to be followed by electoral democracy. Yet, as demonstrated in the prior battery of tests on regime breakdown, although that electoral stage may precede democratization, it does not propel that shift. Rather, the internal cohesion of the ruling elite—varying, as it does, on the institutional profile of that leadership—remains a stronger determinant of whether competitive authoritarianism will be a momentary phase or a lasting practice.

These findings also reinforce the importance of contextual political and historical factors that are often treated in qualitative discussions but less often incorporated into statistical work. Comparativists have long speculated about the propitious effect that improvements in civil liberties have on processes of democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Prior liberalization of an authoritarian regime, operationalized at the threshold of a 4 or better score on the Freedom House civil liberties scale, was strongly tied to the removal of incumbents from power. Although the liberalization variable was not significantly correlated with the dependent variable of democratic transitions, its salience in the regime breakdown model suggests it deserves attention in future cross-national research. So too, the variable of “post–cold war period” merits deeper consideration than it typically receives in quantitative work. Regimes of the post-1989 era proved to be both more vulnerable to breakdown and more prone to democratic transition. These effects extended beyond the cases of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union. Considering current trends in global democratization, it remains to be seen whether this effect will extend into future years (Diamond 2008).

In summary, the above results show how electoralist regime categories complement the explanatory power of earlier authoritarian subtypes. Geddes’s regime types retained their explanatory power in accounting for regime breakdown, but they were not effective at capturing variance in democratic transitions. Electoral and, more specifically, competitive authoritarianism evinced no significant effect on regime breakdown, yet they substantially improved the likelihood an authoritarian regime would be followed by electoral democracy. These initial results suggest that the regime type of competitive authoritarianism provides both descriptive utility for politics within the grey zone of hybrid regimes and analytic value for understanding the long-term (posttransition) legacies of elections under authoritarian constraints. The data also call for closer examination of the causal processes that propel these trends: why is competitive authoritarianism propitious for the instauration of electoral democracy? A full answer to this must await further study, but a provisional interpretation may be ventured.

I derived the foregoing hypotheses from literature that underlined the institutional variations between electoral and nonelectoral authoritarian regimes. Yet only the fourth hypothesis was supported; in cases where the opposition posed a reasonable electoral challenge, that situation of competitiveness portended a higher likelihood of democratization after regime breakdown. The hybrid regimes literature has often been treated apart from its forerunner in the “old authoritarianism,” but this finding suggests a resonance between Levitsky and Way’s category and seminal works on democratic transitions and polyarchy. Years ago Dankwart Rustow posited that democracy began in nationally unified polities that experienced a “long and inconclusive struggle,” “a hot family feud” (1970, 352, 355). Writing in the same period, Robert Dahl argued that governments were more likely to become democratic as the opposition gained in strength and inclusion outweighed repression as a political tactic (1971, 16). The burgeoning opposition movements of today’s competitive authoritarian regimes may display the kind of incipient pluralism that Rustow and Dahl deemed a boon to the establishment of democracy. Seen in this light, systematic testing of competitive authoritarianism and regime change carries an implicit confirmation of earlier scholarship.

**Conclusion**

Over a decade ago David Collier and Steven Levitsky cautioned that “if research on democratization degenerates into a competition to see who can come up with the next famous concept, the comparative study of regimes will be in serious trouble” (1997, 451). The subfield studying hybrid regimes arguably faces the same perils. Research on authoritarianism has helped students to understand the spectrum of current regimes based on their institutional profile, rather than their lack of democracy. To ensure that similar explanatory advances continue, comparativists should judiciously evaluate extant hypotheses before replacing them with new suppositions.

In this spirit, the present article has attempted to match statistical data with the main theoretical concepts of the new hybrid regimes. The resulting tests on 158 regimes over 30 years help to evaluate the effects of electoral, hegemonic, and competitive authoritarianism on
regime breakdown and transitions to electoral democracy. As it happened, the main markers of electoral authoritarianism showed no substantial effect on the breakdown or maintenance of those regimes. Yet, in an intriguing turn for politics beyond the grey zone, competitive authoritarianism significantly increased the likelihood a successor government would be an electoral democracy. Elections have not provided oppositionists an independent mechanism for ousting incumbents, but where the opposition is able to perform strongly, competitive elections augur well for chances the successor regime will meet the minimum standard for democratic governance.

These findings signal fresh opportunities for embedding hybrid regimes in older theories of democratization and its portents. The relationship between competitive authoritarianism and transitions to electoral democracy carries echoes from the works of Rustow and Dahl, which emphasized diminishing power disparities between incumbents and their challengers. In that regard, the strongest contribution of scholars studying hybrid regimes may lie in cross-national research that recalls and systematically tests the propositions of an earlier generation.

References


