Taiwan (Republic of China)

Cara Damolin – Chief Decision-Maker

Kevin Tran – Ambassador/Advisor

 

Foreign Policy interests and objectives

When Nationalist party leader Chiang Kai-shek and his followers left mainland China in 1949 after the Communist Chinese rose to power, Taiwan began to transform itself into an astonishing and unexpected proponent of democracy and capitalism.  At present, Taiwan ranks fourteenth among the world’s leading exporting countries.  Amidst the accolades of prosperity, relative freedom, and democracy, however, loom the ever-present threat of forced take-over by mainland China due to its refusal to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation and perhaps more importantly, the lack of international recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty and international status.  As a result, the highly sensitive questions of Taiwan’s existence as a sovereign nation and its impending international status remain topics of rigorous debate.  How can the Taiwanese people and its newly elected pro-democratic government establish their sovereignty and recognition?  How can Taiwan gain the ability to function independently of China and establish its own foreign policy goals, interests and objectives surrounded by national conflict and the worldwide lack of support?

            It is no secret that China claims Taiwan as its own.  Even after the election of Taiwan’s new leader Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in May of 2000, no truce between the governments of Taipei and Beijing has been documented and its likelihood is unpredictable.  Beijing still holds fast to the “one-China” policy or unification of Taiwan and China, while Taipei’s new government still hopes and struggles for sovereignty.  The DPP has long advocated Taiwan’s independence from China, but earlier this year Taipei was sternly warned about their quest for independence. In the “People’s Daily”, China’s flagship newspaper, almost immediately after Mr. Chen’s election these words were published: “matters of sovereignty are not for negotiation,” and that indefinite delay in progress by Taiwan toward unity may be grounds for military action (by China).  During the elections, only four heads of state out of thirty countries receiving financial support from Taiwan attended the ceremonies.  This lack of support can be directly correlated to China’s relative international power and its campaign to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and they are succeeding. Since the odds of China becoming a superpower this century are very high, the recognition of Taiwan to nation status is unlikely to take place soon, if ever. 

Even the U.S. acknowledges China’s power by not sending any senior American officials to Taipei.  Nevertheless, the United States has an unwritten agreement to defend Taiwan should China attack (presuming this would be in the American interest).  The U.S. also actively sells arms to Taiwan.  The U.S. has made it clear, however, that it does not wish to be drawn into a Sino-American war.  On the other hand, the U.S. acknowledges Beijing’s claim that there will be a single China in the future and therefore, does not officially grant formal recognition of Taipei.  It is just such ambiguous, quasi-politics that block Taiwan’s assent to nation and international status.  These strange policies, however, have not yet led to war.  

The reasons for success are that these arrangements between China, Taiwan and the United States have been of great financial benefit to all concerned.  Firstly, all three countries engage in a lucrative amount of trade and secondly, the U.S. has actively sought the permission of Beijing in most matters regarding Taiwan (except arms sells).  Furthermore, the hope is that the profits gained by China will promote growth-oriented leadership in China.  But how long can these complex and delicate networks of policies last?   China’s repeated and recent threats of military force point to an angry, irredentism-minded Beijing indicating inevitable conflict in the region.  Further complicating Taipei’s quest for freedom and democracy is the growing national problem of organized crime, which is turning out to be Mr. Chen’s strongest mandate.  Political analysts say that the Taiwanese electorate is especially concerned with the cleaning up of corruption in politics, the apparent ties between local Nationalist politicians and organized crime and the fact that Mr. Chen faces a legislature dominated by Nationalists.  So why would Taiwan still enthusiastically pursue independence?  Why even establish foreign policy, objectives and goals?

            Taiwanese, Chinese and American intellectuals as well as some politicians from all three countries believe that the new century is the beginning of the collapse of the old order of government and the reconstructing of the new.  The overriding fact is that Taiwan’s domestic problem takes precedence over its foreign policy.  Obviously because of its geographical location, Taiwan’s main political concern is how to maintain its relative independence from China while continuing to assuage the mainland’s ruling regime.  This one factor has been the determining element in Taiwan’s foreign policy making.  It has consistently been in a reactive position – reacting to the China’s actions – rather than in an active decision-making position.  Taiwan is also bound by the traditional Asiatic-type traits of conformity and formalities.  Additionally, China questions the reason that the United States would be so eager to “voice liberal critiques of authoritarian states with which U.S. trade is fruitful.”  In view of the fact that China does not recognize nor practice democracy, nor does its government think in a universal manner, whether the explanation for U. S. involvement be universal or Realpolitik (practical politics) or the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, China is not likely to allow such Western political concepts impact its decision making.  All of the pressure does not lie only within Taiwan’s boundaries.  Now that China and the United States have agreed upon a monumental trade accord and China is now a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the terms of China’s involvement are seen as committing China to economic reforms and broader international ties.

            Since China’s admission to the WTO this year (2000) and its new trade accord with the U.S., no sweeping changes in ideology and politics have been realized.  Change comes about with great difficulty and sacrifice.  China has managed to achieve relative success as a communist nation and hopes to gain even more power internationally through international investors.  China is aggressively opening their economy to the outside world while still pursuing a totally closed political system at home, which includes the eventual absorption of Taiwan.  Political and economic experts alike say it is not clear how long China can maintain this odd juxtaposition.  “Many experts in and outside of China, as well as President Clinton, have predicted that the opening of the economy required for entry into the World Trade Organization would ultimately push China to liberalize in non-economic spheres as well – promoting, for example, more freedom of the press and a more even-handed legal system.”  This seems highly unlikely in light of China’s actions in the recent past. 

In the months preceding the talks between Beijing and Washington, D.C. in 1997 and 1998, Beijing was routinely releasing imprisoned dissents, holding fewer political trials and even appeared to tolerate the development of a democratic party in Mainland China.  As recently as November of 1999, even as Chinese president Jiang Zemin and President Clinton spoke via telephone on the terms of Chinese/American trade, Chinese courts were sentencing pro-democracy activists to long prison terms without legal representation, and reverting to the old-style Maoist propaganda campaign to aid them in retaining the power and order of the Communist Party.  Such contradictory actions make trust between Taipei and Beijing a moot point at best.  According to He Qinglian, a Shenzhen author and economist, “The economic dimension of China has been transformed to allow for market forces and private property.  But the other dimensions - politics and ideology - have changed very little.  The political system has changed only as much as demanded by economic change.  And in ideology, there’s been very little change at all.” Any hopes for the adoption of a “one country, two equal political entities” policy according to the wishes of Taipei seem to be naïve if not plain wishful thinking.  Yet Taiwan remains steadfast in its quest for sovereignty and international recognition looking first to the internationally recognized methods of acquiring sovereignty.

            In international law, sovereignty is acquired through one of seven methods.  Firstly, China cites the law of accretion as a tool in its claim to Taiwan.  Accretion is defined as the force of nature acting to change the geographic frontier of a state.  China lays claim to Taiwan by the principle of  “reverse accretion”, claiming that mainland China and Taiwan were once connected by a land bridge that eventually became submerged as a result of rising sea levels.  Taiwan retorts that international law concedes changes in sovereignty due to natural geological changes.  Furthermore, no evidence of a land bridge exists.  Secondly, is the principle of adjudication, which is granted by an internationally recognized authority such as the International Court of Justice (which China does not acknowledge), legally acceptable?  This method, however, is usually employed in cases where the territory in dispute is not inhabited.  Taiwan is quick to point out that this does not apply, since its island is indeed inhabited, the will of the people must be taken into account.  Thirdly, China has attempted to use the term “retrocession” created from the legal term cession to describe its possession of Taiwan.  The law of Cession is the peaceful transfer of power and territory from one state to another.  The transfer of Taiwan (formerly known as Formosa and the Pescadores) from China to Japan in 1895 was a cession.  Taiwan cites the fact that in principle cession does not apply here because no formal transfer of territory has ever occurred.  Fourthly is the method of acquisition of sovereignty through discovery or prior occupation.  According to Taiwanese legal experts, this method cannot apply since Taiwan was a Japanese colony during the first half of the twentieth century and not occupied by Chinese.  Fifthly, China has attempted to use the argument of prescription to thwart Taiwan’s pursuit of sovereignty.  Defined legally, “prescription is the manner of acquiring property by a long, hones, and uninterrupted possession or use during the time required by law.  For prescription to apply, the state with title to the territory must acquiesce to the action of the other state.” In other words, since Japan did not protest the takeover of its territory, its silence was considered acquiescence to the prescription.  This method is considered awkward since no formal time frame has been established and after 1952 there was no legal owner of Taiwan.  The sixth method is that of conquest or forced and armed acquisition.  The strongest argument against conquest is its general unacceptable nature in the international realm and in international relations.  Lastly is the most desirable method of attainment – self-determination – the method by which the inhabitants of a territory decide on the form of government that they shall have, “without reference to any other authority, especially one to which it has been subject.”  Without debate, this is viewed internationally as the most acceptable and desirable method of acquisition of sovereignty.  The obvious paradox here is that since the administration and presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the United States tends ideologically to favor and endorse the political self-determination of peoples.  Yet, the U.S. concedes the Chinese position of unification. The U.S. has never made a commitment to support separatism, which would most assuredly lead to war thereby insuring unjust terms for the Taiwanese.  What exactly creates a difference between the Taiwanese and the Chinese in the minds of the Taiwanese?

            For the citizenry of Taiwan, the main concern about unification is economics.  Historically, non-liberal governments have difficulty remaining in power in countries with incomes over $6,000 per capita and since the average income of Taiwanese is considerably higher than that of Chinese citizens, the concept of unification for Taiwanese means a drastic change in the standard of life and the loss of freedom.  Like Hong Kong, Taiwan has economic, political and cultural success, which is envied by many in China.  The reasons for such success are the pluralistic, more liberal and individualistic styles of authority in Taiwan along with other social indicators such as higher education and higher health levels.  "The contrast with official attitudes in north China is sharp.  …The main problem lies in old political pretensions among Chinese intellectuals, especially those who received education in the northern capital.”  Yet recent indicators point to a slowly dividing attitude amongst mainlanders, but mainlanders still hold fast to the argument that Taiwan is Chinese.

            As a result of China’s diplomatically isolationist tactics and the U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan’s foreign policy making has been forced to be shortsighted considering only short-term interests.  In essence, this has brought Taiwan diplomacy to a halt.  To reverse the stifling effects of Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, the newly elected DPP has proposed a Foreign Policy for the 21st century in which Taiwan’s role in what is termed, the “new internationalism” is defined.  In November of 1999, the candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) set forth several initiatives outlining and articulating Taiwan’s new role and national interests in an increasingly global political economy.  In his platform, Mr. Chen defined Taiwan as a willing and able member of the international community and “loyal supporter of the world order” supporting human rights, protecting the environment, upholding peace, providing humanitarian aid, advocating security and sustaining prosperity.  By actively participating in international activities and focusing on establishing sustainable long-term friendships rather than the issue of sovereignty, Mr. Chen and the DPP stated that Taiwan would no longer passively subject itself to the whims of the super powers.  Besides, with the advent of the information-communication revolution and globalization, the foundation of sovereignty is changing in theory and in practice. 

According to author Maryann K. Cusimano in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, “… sovereignty is not an absolute right because starvation and wanton killing are ‘everybody’s business’.” For this reason, the DPP has outlined a comprehensive plan to gain entrance into the new international world order, citing membership in non-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and the WTO.  Additionally, the DPP plans to implement a six-part diplomacy, which includes what they have defined as Democratic, neighborhood, civilian, humanitarian, and environmental diplomacy.  Finally, Taiwan has delineated a plan for foreign policy which no longer is centered around cross-strait politics, but addresses the accessed needs for meaningful and long-lasting relationships with the United States, Northeastern Asia, Europe, and even Africa and Latin America as well as with its nearest neighbor, China. 

Their new foreign policy also includes verbiage concerning foreign aid.  The establishment of advanced bilateral and multilateral relationships with all regions of the world, based on the principle of economic reciprocity, cultural exchange to aid understanding, technological cooperation and humanitarian efforts is the plan for the future for Taiwan.  The people of Taiwan and its government hope to transform the challenges of the new century into opportunities to attain their main foreign policy objective, to gain entrance into the new international economic order, and to contribute to the new world order in a broader international space.

Allies and enemies

            When Taiwan, or the Republic of China, lost their representation in the United Nations in 1971, they subsequently lost their membership in other important international organizations as well.  As a result, most of Taiwan’s formal diplomatic ties with other nations dissolved.  Seeing that opening, or in most cases re-opening, formal political relationships with other nations would be difficult, Taiwan instead began to strengthen their cultural and, in particularly, their economic relationships. 

            Since the end of the Cold War, tensions between Taiwan and the Mainland have somewhat eased to a point.  There has been more frequent and diplomatic communication between the two sides.  Also, the island’s relation with other powerful nations, such as the United States, has become more clearly defined. 

 

I.  Relations with the People’s Republic of China

            Since the mid-1900’s, relations between the two governments have wavered between intense conflict and cordial cooperation.  After having been forced off the Mainland in 1949 by Mao Tse-tungs’s communist forces, the Nationalist government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan.  For a long period after that, the Nationalists were intent on reclaiming Mainland China and ousting Mao’s communist rule.  But because of the hesitant support of other powerful nations, such as the United States, and the growing power and international influence of the People’s Republic, it became clearer to Taiwan that taking back Mainland China would be extremely difficult.  That being the case, Taiwan’s objective shifted towards independence from the Mainland.  The People’s Republic government was, and still is, strongly opposed to that alternative. 

            In response to Taiwan’s desire for independence, the People’s Republic has hindered Taiwan from garnering support from the international community.  Beginning with Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations and taking their seat as representative of China, the People’s Republic continued to have Taiwan expelled from other important international organizations.  Up until today, the People’s Republic has successfully kept Taiwan from regaining its membership in these organizations.   

            Another tactic of the People’s Republic in retaliation to independence movements in Taiwan has been to influence political events on the island.  In 1995 and 1996, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait.  The tests were in response to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s trip to the United States, where he gained global media exposure and promoted Taiwan’s independence.  Lee also proposed that Taiwan be readmitted into the United Nations.  His actions extremely angered the government in Beijing, who hence conducted the missile tests as a show of force.  Subsequent tests in 1996 were conducted to influence Taiwan’s first direct presidential election. 

            Fearing that Beijing’s actions could be the start of an immense global conflict, the United States stepped-in, sending aircraft carriers and other military forces into the region.  Eventually, the standoff subsided, and both sides returned to peaceful negotiations.  As a result of this event, the United States was forced to re-examine its policy towards China and Taiwan, and led towards the development of more defined policies.

 

 

II.  Relations with the United States

            Between the outbreak of the Korean War and the end of the Vietnam War, the United States had an imposing presence in the Taiwan region.  The United States was Taiwan’s most important ally.  The United States showed strong support for the island nation, protecting it from invasion by communist forces, while at the same time using it for strategic military purposes.  After having pulled-out of the Vietnam War, the United States government no longer wanted to be deeply involved with any other conflicts in East Asia.  Consequently, United States military forces withdrew from the Taiwan island region, and reduced its relations with them.

            Up until the events in 1995 and 1996, the United States refused to take a side in the conflict.  They supported the two sides addressing their problems through peaceful negotiations.  With the breakout of events during those two years, the United States reconsidered its policies towards both sides.  Their support seemed to lean more toward the Taiwanese government, but encouraged both sides not to invoke another violent conflict and to continue peaceful diplomatic relations with each other. 

 

III.  Current relations

            Today, the governments of Taipei and Beijing have continued diplomatic negotiations with each other, even though the amount of communication has decreased over the past couple months.  Relations with the United States have remained positive.  While Taiwan has few formal diplomatic relations with other nations around the world, they have many informal relations – mainly through economic ties.  And while Taiwan has yet to be readmitted into the United Nations, they have become members of other international and regional organizations, mainly economic in nature. 

            With many strong trade and economic relations with other countries including the United States, and few conflicts with others, Taiwan has more allies than enemies.  The People’s Republic of China is an ally in the sense that there are stable economic and trade relations and cultural exchanges between the two.  But with Beijing’s efforts to prevent Taiwan’s involvement in international forums and desire for unification, and Taiwan’s consideration of independence, there is considerable potential for violent conflict between the strait.

 

Impact of Domestic Variables on Foreign Policy

            The five domestic variables, as outlined during second week of class, play an important role in the formation of Taiwan’s foreign policies.  In examining their foreign policy structures - how they were formed, and why - it can be seen where the variables come into effect.

            Last May, a newly elected president came into power in Taiwan.  A position of power that had long been dominated by the Kuomintang Party had finally been replaced by someone from the opposition.  Chen Shui-ban comes from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.  His election provoked anger in the People’s Republic of China, and fear in the United States and other countries.  The values, beliefs, and experiences that Mr. Chen brought with him to the presidency were perceived to be detrimental to the current foreign policies of the country.  His doctrine of pro-independence and sovereignty were believed to be extremist, so countries braced themselves for the worst.  There were rumors of an all-out missile attack by China, military forces defecting to the Mainland, and possible civil unrest.

            Regardless, none of this has happened.  While Mr. Chen does come into office with contrasting views from the Kuomintang Party, his allegiance to the role of President has constrained his behavior.  In an interview with Business Week a few months after his election, Mr. Chen stated: “We must promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.  This is not only my top priority, it is a moral obligation.”  Being from the Democratic Progressive Party, Mr. Chen nevertheless has chosen to uphold many of the policies and procedures that have been followed by previous leaders.

            Mr. Chen’s public approval rating at the time of his election was seventy percent.  If Mr. Chen had disregarded the role constraints, and pushed Taiwan into war with China by demanding independence, it definitely would have divided the people and he would consequently have lost their confidence in his power.

Although being affiliated with the Democratic Progressive Party, Mr. Chen has appointed many members of the opposition party into cabinet positions.  He appointed Tang Fei, previous Defense Minister, former air force general, and strong supporter of the Kuomintang Party, to the position of Prime Minister.  Though this, he pleased the majority party, reassured the people, and sent a message to China.  The legislature is still dominated by the Kuomintang.  It was through democracy that allowed a member of a non-ruling party to be elected president.  Taiwan has stated their democracy as the rationalization for not allowing the communist Chinese government to gain control over them.  They will not accept domination by a government that would eliminate their rights and freedoms.

But how can Taiwan, a tiny island compared to the landmass of China, continually hold up against the Chinese government?  One reason is that Taiwan promotes democracy, which draws support from other democracies such as the United States.  China’s move to forcefully take over Taiwan would not be well accepted by the international community.  Another reason is Taiwan’s strong economy, their available resources, and their stable economic relations with other countries.  If China were to begin a missile attack, Taiwan does have the resources available to withstand them.

In analyzing and comparing Taiwan’s foreign and domestic politics, it can be seen how much of a role the five domestic variables play in the structure of their foreign policies.  Given the idiosyncratic variables of the elected decision-maker, the role variables have prevented that decision-maker from igniting conflicts.  And because Taiwan exercises a democratic government, they are less likely to resolve their conflicts through warfare.  Taiwan has enjoyed much more economic prosperity in comparison to its neighbor, and with the resources available to them, Taiwan has the authority to stand up against a bigger presence.        

 

 

Military and Economic Resources

Primarily designed to deter Chinese aggression, the Taiwan military has undergone extensive modernization in the recent past.   Its military branches include the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coastal Patrol and Defense Command, Armed Forces Reserve Command, and Combined Service Forces.  Taiwan has over six and a half million men available for service, with approximately five million fit and capable of military service.  Over two hundred thousand men reach the military age of nineteen annually and are eligible for service.  Taiwan’s total military force is composed of approximately 400,000.  Half of the force is part of the army, while the navy and airforce each have 60,000 – 70,000. 

During the 1998-1999 fiscal year, the Taiwan government spent $8.042 billion on military expenditures, which equals 2.8% of the country’s GDP.  Although Taiwan has maintained a strong military force, the island is still dependent on other nations to build its arsenal.  Taiwan purchases weapons and equipment from the United States, France, Germany, and elsewhere, and is reported to be the world’s number one purchaser of arms in dollar amounts.

The Taiwanese army is undergoing extensive development to advance its combat effectiveness, with an emphasis on airborne invasion limitation, rapid reaction capabilities, and special force operations.  It has an extensive battle tank force and is acquiring state of the art army helicopters.  In an attempt to improve mobility and fire power, the army has been collecting short and medium-range air defense missiles.  Recently, Taiwan purchased $1.3 billion in arms from the United States, with missile sales of $150 million included.  The acquisition included 200 supersonic AIM-120 C advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, 71 Harpoon air-to-ship missiles, 146 self-propelled howitzers, 79 M2 machine guns and other various ground equipment was acquired to improve and advance ground defense.  The missiles will enable a pilot to aim and fire numerous missiles simultaneously at multiple targets. 

Due to the recent arms race in East Asia, Taiwan will be capable of competing on a more sophisticated and even playing field.  The purchase also included advanced communications equipment, which will provide secure tactical voice and data communications for all of its military divisions.  However, as a condition the agreement, the missiles will stay in the United States until China acquired similar arms from Russia. 

Taiwan’s airforce consists of 400 aircraft, including 150 US-built F-16 A/B MLU-models, 60 French-built Mirage 2000-5’s, over 100 Taiwan-built Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF), older Northrop F-5E/F fighters, and other miscellaneous support aircraft.  The recently acquired US missiles will eventually be fitted to the F-16 fighters to protect and defend Taiwan airspace. 

In addition, Taiwan’s navy has undergone extensive modernization.  It has recently purchased Lafayette-class frigates from France, Knox-class frigates from the United States, and has begun production of Perry-class frigates in Taiwan.  The navy’s arsenal also includes small surface ships and over a dozen older, World War II-era Gearing-class destroyers.  In contrast with the Chinese, Taiwan does lack sophisticated submarine capabilities.  With only four submarines, two older World War II Guppy-class and two diesel-powered Dutch-built Zwaardvis-class submarines, a Chinese blockade against the island would be difficult for Taiwan to counter.  

            Taiwan plays an essential and strategic role along the Pacific Rim.  The Taiwan Strait provides a major sea-lane, which transports forty percent of world trade, from South Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia in Southeast Asia.   Taiwan’s control of the strait remains extremely important to free trade in the area.  However, China’s “creeping expansion” in the South China Sea has infringed on the freedom of the seas in East China.  The Chinese have built airstrips and large military structures on islands around the seas that allow Chinese navy and airforce easy access to sea-borne commerce.  If Taiwan is seized, East Asian trade would be controlled completely by China and put trade nations, such as Japan, Korea, United States, in a precarious position.  Chinese control could have very deleterious effects on the flow of international trade in the region.

            Taiwan is dependent on many other trade nations to ensure not only the island’s safety and security, but peace and stability in the region as well.  Although Taiwan does not pose a military threat to China, Chinese officials have repeatedly refused to renounce the use of force towards Taiwan.  Since Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996, China has repeatedly threatened Taiwan through an extensive collection of arms aimed at the island.  Also, reports of increasing Chinese military build-up have been used in an attempt to intimidate Taiwan.

            The island believes that the United States needs to maintain a prominent military presence in East Asia and assist Taiwan’s military expansion programs to provide military consistency and readiness between the nations.  Furthermore, Taiwan would like to be included in the proposed East Asia Theater Missile Defense System being planned by Japan and the United States.  Taiwanese officials believe the country should receive advanced PAC-3 type Patriot missile defenses, advanced destroyers, submarines, and any other Anti Submarine Warfare as soon as possible.  If any of these requests are not met, Taiwan fears that any region conflict has the potential to begin a full-scale war.  With Chinese threat ever increasing, the region is too unstable to take any chances.

            Whether the United States or any other nation chooses to increase Taiwan’s missile shield, Taiwan is very comfortable with its existing “silicon shield.”  If China seeks a military solution to the Taiwan problem, Taiwan believes that it will provide some defense for the island.  As the third largest producer of information technology hardware, any threatening Chinese military action towards the island would cut the world off from a variety of silicon-based products, such as computers and networking systems.

On a worldwide trade scale, losses would be of mammoth proportions.  Trillions of dollars from Japanese, American, and European nations would be lost and serve as a lethal hit against many U.S. companies, who are reliant on Taiwan factories to manufacture services and components for the silicon industry.  Although China has successfully limited Taiwan’s diplomatic prominence in world affairs, Taiwan has risen to become the main source of hardware for the digital economy.  While the United States and Japan have not openly defended Taiwan within the international circuit, the two countries' information technology economies are dependent on Taiwan exports and would protect the supply.

             According to the CIA World Factbook, “Taiwan has a dynamic capitalist economy with gradually decreasing guidance of investment and foreign trade by government authorities.”  In 1999, Taiwan’s GDP real growth rate was 5.5%, with purchasing power parity at $15,000 per capita.  The service industry composes the largest sector of GDP (64%), industry makes up 33%, and agriculture contributes 3% to the island’s GDP.  As one of the largest exporters in the world, Taiwan exported $121.6 billion worth of commodities, such as electronics, electric and machinery equipment, metals, textiles, and chemicals.  The United States is Taiwan’s largest export partner, with 26% of goods being sent to the U.S.  Other export countries include Hong Kong, Europe, Japan, and Singapore.  Taiwan is confident in its ability to compete as an international trade and export contender.

Nationalism

In Mainland China, the traditional definition of nationalism has been synonymous to collectivism and authoritarianism.  These values have long been the center of dignity and pride for China and the basis for Beijing’s stance on unification.  Super-patriots and practically all mainland elites, whether in government or not, agree that Taiwan is Chinese.  Besides, over nine tenths of China’s population are descendents of the Hans, as are the Taiwanese.  But Taiwan’s successes have factored into the equation by broadening the definition of nationalism to include indicators like prosperity and security bearing equal weight and warranting equal consideration. Dr. Lynn T. White III, a world renowned German social scientist and political economist, theorized that ”the ultimate end, e.g. an ethnicity, does not exhaust the analytic criteria for judging the ethics of a policy.  What is (morally) right must also be defined by net benefits, responsible results.” 

Even so, a consensus on political and identity ideologies has been hard to attain.  According to carefully conducted surveys in Taiwan, only one-fifth of its people wants total independence either immediately or later, while only one-twentieth wants independence as soon as possible.  Additionally, another one-fifth wants an indefinitely long continuance of the current situation of uncommitted but practical autonomy.  Still another fifth wants the status quo and unification with China later, preferably after China has become more pluralistic.  The most popular option is to maintain the status quo and postpone any decisions about Chinese or Taiwanese identity.  This gained as much as two-fifths support in 1995 and 1996.  For Taiwan, the unifying factors in terms of nationalism and ideology are the territory they occupy, their economic prosperity and stability, their quest for international and nation status and their quest for freedom and democracy.  Still hindered by the relentless obstructions of Communist China, the implementation of effective and meaningful foreign policy has been a major difficulty for Taiwan.

 

Participation in regional and global organizations and alliances

As a free, democratic and de facto independent country, Taiwan deserves to be fully recognized in the international community.  However, Taiwan has yet to be recognized as a full and equal member of the international community.  China continues to block its membership into large international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations, having veto power over Taiwan’s admission.  In addition, China threatens force if Taiwan furthers its goal of democracy and peaceful coexistence. 

            Taiwan has retained membership in less important and not overly political international bodies, such as the Asian Development Bank.  In 1981, Taiwan rejoined the International Olympic Committee, and was forced to take the name of “Taipei, China.”  Although Taiwan is humiliated by its title, its representation illustrates the country’s flexible diplomacy and prevented Taiwan from being excluded from any more important world organizations.  Taiwan is also involved to more than 900 international organizations and holds representation in several hundred international meetings yearly.  In the early 1990’s Taiwan applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  Once again, Taiwan was unable to separate from China, and was admitted as “Taiwan/Republic of China.”

            Due to the exclusion of Taiwan on the international level, the country has been forced to establish alliances from scratch and develop foreign policy in line with its national ideals.  The country has never been welcome to participate in global organizations, forcing it to put it’s focus on “non-governmental” organizations and build off the successful economic empire it has created in the recent past.  In order to enter into more international organizations, Taiwan continues to emphasize economic issues in negotiation rather than state a political agenda and avoid the politicization of Taiwan-China dispute.

            For the past 10 years, Taiwan has continually tried to join the United Nations, stating that the international body would assist in the resolution of conflict between itself and China.  In September 2000, Vice Foreign Minister Wu Tzu-dan explained, “Since the United Nations is dedicated to resolving international disputes, it should admit the island and let China face the reality of Taiwan’s existence.”

            Government officials feel that Taiwan has earned the right to be represented in the international community as a full and equal member.  With defined territory, a population of 23 million people, and an effective and efficient government, Taiwan fulfills all of the requirements necessary to become a member of the international organization.  Taiwan also appeals to the ideals of the United Nations.  The country’s democratic progress and independence are largely due to self-determination and has become one of the most prosperous countries in East Asia. United States Representative Sherrod Brown (D-OH) included, “The people of Taiwan have proved freedom and democracy are not just American ideals, they are universal principles that apply to every individual, to every community, to every nation.”

In July 2000, the United States House of Representatives issued a resolution to more actively support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations.  Representative Bob Schaffer (R-CO) maintained, “Taiwan has made enormous strides toward becoming a full democracy.  Undeterred by China’s threats, the Taiwanese voters elected pro-independence party candidates, ending more than half a century of Nationalist rule.  The election returns the government back to the people.”  However, the United States is still weary to fully endorse Taiwan, due to unstable trade relations with China.  Eager to trade with China and further open relations between the United States and China, the Clinton Administration has been reluctant to commit to Taiwan’s cause and injure unstable friendships.   

Although Taiwan has been excluded from many international organizations, it continues to exercise its right and obligations to contribute to world peace and development.  As the leading investor in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the region’s peace, stability, and development of friendships with these countries are Taiwan’s chief priorities for international alliances.  Establishing relationships with Asian and South Pacific countries that have remained ambivalent to Taiwan remains an important goal towards securing support.

 Taiwan also needs to reinforce relationships with key players in the region, with the U.S. and Japan being the top priority.   Furthering communications and strengthening ties with the U.S., Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Europe, and Russia are the most important Taiwan alliances.  By strengthening ties with such influential world bodies away from China’s influence, Taiwan feels that they may increase their opportunity to participate and be taken seriously on a world scale

With the rise of “non-governmental” organizations and the increasingly important international civil society, the international diplomatic arena has seen new emphasis in economy, environmental protection, human rights, and trade.  Taiwan will support and assist private organizations to join international NGO’s such as those in favor of environmental concern, medical care, culture, and other areas of interest.  Taiwan’s investment in such NGO’s will create a more pluralistic and well-rounded foreign policy, which will have a lasting future impact.

Taiwan has gained international sympathy and support for its efforts to participate in international organizations, but they have yet to see results of their efforts in more important bodies.  Taiwan may soon become a member of the World Trade Organization, which would be an important venue for Taiwan’s global participation.  However, if the UN won’t recognize Taiwan, most countries have trouble taking it seriously, regardless of the country’s economic and trade capabilities.