Which States Are Next: Seeking Entrance to the Club of Major Powers.

Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, J. Patrick Rhamey, Ryan G. Baird and Keith A. Grant*

Prepared for the seminar on *Beyond American Hegemony: Rising Powers, Status and the World Order* (Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, October 22-23, 2010).

* Volgy and Rhamey are at the University of Arizona; Corbetta is at University of Alabama, Birmingham; Grant is at Bucknell; Baird is at the Warfare Analysis Center (Dahlgren, Virginia).

This is a draft of work in progress; please do not cite without permission of the authors.

In August 2010, China officially surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy.[1] The milestone event had been long anticipated and passed without much fanfare in either economic or political circles. One consequence of this event that went largely unnoticed relates to the significance it holds for the two countries' competition for status at the global and regional level. Particularly over the last four decades, their trajectories in this regard have presented an interesting paradox. As an economic powerhouse, Japan has been considered a global power by the rest of the international community and by other major powers as well. Yet, within East Asia, Japan has not been attributed regional power status by its own neighbors (Cline et al. 2010). Alternatively, for several decades East Asian states have considered China to be the most relevant regional power, while the rest of the international community has struggled to attribute her global major power status. China's slow but steady ascendance from regional to global major power and Japan's failure to achieve regional power status while being a global power lead to several challenging questions about the relationship between regional and global major power status. This effort focuses on one such question: In an era of shifting major power hierarchy, which regional players are the most likely to be attributed global power status next?

We begin with the premise that status in international politics matters, and that there exists a variety of *status* clubs[2] to which states may seek admission. Our purpose is to explore whether the current most powerful members of the club of regional powers (India and Brazil) with aspirations to join the most prestigious club of major powers, will likely do so in the foreseeable future. Whether these states can seek to change their status and move from one club to the other, and the manner in which such a change would occur, should have substantial consequences for the study and practice of international politics.

[1] Tabuchi, Hiroko. "China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy." *New York Times*, August 15, 2010.

[2] There are numerous ways of conceptualizing these clubs and their membership: in addition to clubs of major powers and regional powers, there is overlapping membership in the global power club (Thompson, 2010), the elite power club (Morton and Starr 2001), the nuclear powers club, the P5 Club, the rising powers club, the OECD club, and the BRIC club.

The Status of Research on (Major Power) Status

The salience of status attribution, status competition, and the theoretical and empirical utility of status for explaining a wide variety of international political phenomena have waxed and waned in the theories and models of international relations (IR) scholars. The status of major powers has been of particular interest, yet scholarly attention to their status—separate from their capabilities—appears to have followed a similar, cyclical pattern over the last five decades. The salience of major powers and their status was recognized as early as the Melian debates (Thucydides 1951:331), resuscitated more systematically in the 1960s and especially by Galtung's (1964) classic work on the subject, and followed by a short explosion of scholarship (e.g., East 1972; Gilpin 1981; Midlarski 1975; Wallace 1971; 1973). However, status considerations receded again as theoretical conceptualizations and empirical models narrowed their foci on the more measurable observations involved with the changing capabilities between major powers.

Yet, over the decades, the salience of major power *status* has stubbornly persisted in significance across empirical conflict models: most contain the finding that the "status" of being a major power, *in addition* to its military or economic capabilities, shows a significant relationship to the dependent variable in question. Major power *status* is a significant predictor in alliance formation, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and crisis intervention, alliance memberships and multilateralism.[3] These findings are based typically on an empirical identification of major power status created by the Correlates of War (COW) project. COW creates a dummy variable that measures whether or not a state has major power status on the basis of experts' perceptions about states attributing to other states the *status* of being a major power (Singer 1988).

[3] For a short summary of the range of empirical findings connecting the status of major powers with varied forms of conflicts and interactions in international politics, see Corbetta et al. 2008.

As with much of the field's analytical reassessments following the end of the Cold War, there has been a reemergence of studies focusing on status attribution, status seeking, and status competition between major powers (Deng 2008; Larson and Shevchenko 2003; 2010; Mercer 1995; 1996; Nayar and Paul 2003; Volgy and Mayhall 1995; Wohlforth 2009; Wohlforth and Kang 2009). Some of these works have been driven by dissatisfaction with the empirical limitations of the COW measure. Others have been motivated by the recognition that the field lacks an adequate theoretical framework for understanding status, especially in comparison with sociology or social psychology. Increasingly, social identity theory (SIT)—probing the social constructivist dimension of being a major power—has been utilized as the theoretical foundation for exploring status attribution as well as its consequences.[4]

Our work (Corbetta 2006; Corbetta et al. 2008; Grant et al. 2010; Volgy et al. 2010a) has relied on the integration of SIT and materialist explanations to create a conceptualization and measurement of status for major powers and regional powers. We have delineated membership within two status clubs: the club of major powers since 1950 (Volgy et al. 2010b) and the club of regional powers since the end of the Cold War (Cline et al. 2010). Within these clubs we have explored conceptual and empirical differentiation across status types: status consistent powers and status inconsistent powers (status underachievers and status overachievers) and suggested likely consequences of such differences in status among the powers (Volgy et al. 2010c). Our theoretical and empirical framework has allowed us to probe (1) variation within the major power hierarchy since 1950; (2) variation in behavior even within the exclusive club of major powers;[5] and (3) to create a methodology with which to identify empirical conditions about how such a club may expand

[4] Examples include Mercer 1995; Hymans 2002; Larson and Shevchenko 2003, 2010; and Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998).
[5] An important motivation behind our research agenda has been the desire to reconcile observed variations in behavior among the major power states with prevailing expectations that all great powers behave in a highly similar manner (Grant et al 2010).

or narrow in the future. Below, we discuss the salience of status, summarize our definition and operationalization of major power status and membership in the club of major powers, suggest likely differences across status types in terms of their engagement with international politics, propose a set of conditions that the strongest of regional powers would need to meet in order to be able to enter the major power club, apply these criteria to India and Brazil, and suggest some consequences for international politics.

Why Status?

Why focus on status and status inconsistencies[6] rather than simply on the capabilities, strength, or material bases controlled by major powers? As we noted above, there is substantial evidence exhibited in empirical models of conflict that the "status" of major powers matters—in addition to their capabilities—for analyses of international crises, MIDs, interstate wars, multilateral cooperation, international agreements, and regime formation. We summarize below the theoretical reasons we believe are the source of these documented empirical relationships.[7]

Much of the extant literature has treated the process of status attribution as a unidirectional process through which an unspecified number of members of the international community recognize that a restricted number of states occupy a special position in the international system. This process of attribution is believed to depend largely on the possession of material capabilities. We argue, instead, that the process of major power status attribution is bidirectional and three-pronged. It is bi-directional because status is not likely conferred on some states without those states also seeking

[6] It is not a sound theoretical strategy to focus on a single explanation of international phenomena; we do not suggest such a strategy. Our focus on status considerations assumes that they constitute part of a package of critical explanations; our effort is to highlight their salience since the focus on status has been understated in the literature.

[7] Although, as we note below, we disagree with previous measures used to identify what constitutes major power "status".

major power status.[8] It is three-pronged because it depends on the convergence of three forms of attribution: (a) self-ascription; (2) attribution by the international community as a whole; and (3) attribution by existing major power states.

Self-ascription, or the seeking of status should be salient for states since the attribution of major power *status* by states to a handful of others provides a form of soft power with which status recipients can complement their material capabilities. Acceptance by others as being a major power creates legitimacy for a wide variety of foreign policy pursuits, making it less costly either to intervene in conflicts or to seek to create mechanisms of cooperation. The reputation associated with major power status strengthens the credibility of both threats and commitments, increasing the likelihood that great powers will achieve their favorite cooperative and conflictual goals in international politics.

However, with great power status come great responsibilities. When the community of states attributes major power status to a few of their own, such attribution is indicative of community expectations that these very strong and determined states will exercise leadership on a variety of issues and conflicts central to international or regional politics. Recipients are expected to be involved in international affairs, as others accept their involvement as legitimate, and may even ask for assistance. French involvement in simmering disputes among and within Francophone African countries, Kyrgyz requests for Russian assistance with its domestic conflicts, Central Asian acquiescence to Russia and China in developing a network of organizations for cooperation and coordination in post-Soviet space, or U.S. involvement in Colombia's war on narcotraffickers are but a few of such examples of expectations and receptivity toward those considered as major powers

[8] Quantitative studies on great powers have not focused on self-attribution but there is an extensive body of case-studies indicating that country leaders are consistently concerned with major power status, its acquisition, and its retention. For a recent example, see the various contributions in Volgy et al. 2010.

assisting in the development of regional order.[9] This status-based receptivity to major power activity is similar to the Weberian notion of status as a soft power that confers privileges to certain states (Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998:7-8; Nayar and Paul 2003).

Status-based soft power in the arsenal of major powers should be consequential in creating added influence and motivation to pursue policies and interests outside their immediate neighborhoods. Major power foreign policies constitute to a large extent a self-fulfilling prophecy. An expansive foreign policy is a pre-requisite for the attribution of status by the rest of the international community and by other major powers (Levy 1983). However, once status has been ascribed, the range and scope of commitments that come with it force major power states to further expand their role and prevent them from disengaging from international politics—a "tragedy" of great power politics somewhat different from that described by Mearsheimer (2001). According to our own definition and measures, the only two states that have managed to keep the scope of their policies relatively narrow while flirting with major status—Germany and Japan—have had to revise their posture considerably after achieving entrance into the club (Volgy et al. 2010b).

While major powers are by far the strongest actors in international politics, *relative* to the other states, there is also evidence to suggest that their *structural strength* has been diminishing. Relative strength is about the strength of one state versus another; structural strength is the strength a major power state possesses with which to effectuate the course of global affairs (Strange 1989), or for a regional power to create order and some semblance of governance within its region. Thus, it is plausible that while the relative strength of a major power may increase substantially *compared* to other major powers, creating unipolarity in the international system, the structural strength of all

[9] And unsurprisingly, generating substantial criticism from the community of states when intervention destabilizes a region (e.g., US involvement in Central America in the 1980; or more recently French involvement in Rwanda and Burundi in Africa and US involvement with Iraq in 2003).

major powers may be diminishing. In fact, there is evidence that the diminution of structural strength—given the growth of new actors, increased interdependencies, and the growth in system complexity—has resulted in declining structural strength among *all* major powers (Volgy and Bailin 2003), including those whose relative strength appears to have increased (U.S., China) after the Cold War.

While status attribution has always been important for major powers, in the context of declining structural strength, it may be even more salient when structural strength is decreasing. To the extent that other states look at great powers for leadership and guidance in the face of crises and collective action problems, high status may reduce some of the material costs of efforts to structure order and/or institutional development necessary for global governance. Consequently, major powers may engage in the quest for additional status if they feel that the status attributed to them fails to match the status they "deserve", or create maintenance strategies if they are in jeopardy of losing the status they have had. For instance, we suspect that in no small part have status issues motivated both Russia and China to develop new governance mechanisms for the conduct of relations in Central Asia after the Cold War and the success of these attempts was made far more likely by the status attributed to them by other states in the region. Seen in this context, the aspirations of India and Brazil to become major powers and to be attributed the corresponding status is not just of symbolic value for these states: it is likely embedded in strategies among their policy makers to increase the influence of their states in the pursuit of vital regional and global interests.

To the extent that major power status is valued domestically,[10] foreign policy makers also gain from status attribution by receiving added support from domestic constituencies and key political elites for being active, influential, and important major players in global politics. Conversely, the domestic

[10] The value of major power status may vary with regime type and elite recruitment patterns (Wohlforth and Kang 2009).

value placed on such international status may require policy makers to seek to maintain or increase their state's status, or run the risk of being removed from office.[11] In democratic systems, the acquisition and preservation of major power status may represent one "public good"—not unlike national security—that policy-makers provide for their large winning coalitions. In non-democratic systems, the policies associated with achieving or preserving major power status may produce privatized "externalities" that policy-makers dole out to their narrow coalition of supporters (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).[12]Thus, status should matter, and as structural strength declines, status may matter even more.

Defining Major Powers and Their Status

We cannot address the question of regional power ascent to the major power club without first defining what is meant by a major power and its status. Given the microscopic attention to these states in the literature, there is amazingly little agreement about what constitutes a major power. There is, however, virtual consensus within large-N empirical studies about how to *measure* major power status—the overwhelming reliance on the status designation developed by the COW project.[13] In our work, we begin with and slightly modify Levy's (1983) classic definition. A state has ***major power*** status if it has a) the *opportunity* to act as one through unusual capabilities with which to pursue its interests in interstate relations; b) demonstrates its *willingness* to act as one by using those capabilities to pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its own

[11] Note Labour's claim to keeping the UK's major power status before the recent national elections, and the temporary bounce it received during the campaign ("Hero, villain or victim of the global age?" The Economist February 27, 2010:63). For the importance of major power status considerations in Indian domestic politics, see Nayar and Paul (2003); for France, see Badie (2010).

[12] According to selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), in democratic systems with large winning coalitions, leaders depend on the provision of public goods to their supporters for their political survival; when voters care about the country's reputation, leaders can claim credit for achieving or preserving major power status as a measure of their performance. In non-democratic systems, where leaders' survival depends on the provision of private goods to members of a small winning coalitions, policies associated with major power behavior give leaders the opportunity to distribute high-visibility posts and material "gifts" to their supporters. Thus, major power status should be of utility for policy-makers in both democratic and less democratic systems.

[13] http://www.correlatesofwar.org/

region and seeks to influence the course of international affairs *relatively independent* of other major powers; and c) is attributed an unusual amount of *status* by policy makers of other states within the international community. If a state meets minimal empirical thresholds on all these dimensions, then we designate it as belonging to the status club of major powers.

For a state to be considered a member of the major power club, we require the attribution of a very high level of status along with the opportunity and willingness to act as a major power. Further, for theoretical reasons, we opt for focusing on one of the three mechanisms by which status attribution may occur: community attribution rather than self-ascription or in-group attribution. While each of these three mechanisms deserve substantial attention, community attribution comes closest to the "soft power" considerations we consider salient in the context of declining structural strength and is therefore of most immediate interest to our concerns.[14]

The attribution of major power status by the community of states is based on a number of factors, including perceptual judgments about whether a state looks and acts as a major power, and the extent to which these judgments may be influenced by very strong states that may wish to constrain the status granted to states with which they are in conflict (or to enhance status for like-minded states).[15] The attribution of major power status may not mirror well the capabilities and actions of states that have the opportunity and perhaps the willingness to act as major powers. The extent to which being a major power corresponds to receiving major power status should vary with these perceptions and constraints. [16]

[14] These processes are not mutually exclusive, and may be highly interdependent. Without self-attribution, there is little likelihood of either community or in-group attribution. In-group attribution generally correlates with community attribution, but may vary with the number of poles and the extent of polarization between them.

[15] For instance, the U.S. pressured states to increase the status of its allies (West Germany, Israel, etc.) and to minimize the status of communist states during the height of the Cold War.

[16] Some are attributed major power status when they are no longer (a halo effect); some are denied their status while becoming a great power (latency effect). Historically, Italy's major power status attribution actually "covered some

Since some states receive status consistent with their capabilities and behavior while others do not, we differentiate between types of status: assuming a threshold above which a state would be considered a major power, ***status inconsistency*** occurs either when major power status attribution is not in synch with the capabilities and/or the foreign policy pursuits of the state in question, or, if states are inconsistent in awarding status to a major power. We suggest three types of status conditions for major powers: ***status consistent*** major powers (status attribution parallels major power capabilities and behavior), status inconsistent ***underachievers*** lacking the status proportional to their capabilities and behavior, and status inconsistent ***overachievers*** who are attributed more status than their capabilities and/or behavior would warrant.

Status Consistent Versus Status Inconsistent Powers

If status matters then how much and what type of status a major power has should matter as well. Status consistent powers should have the most legitimacy and influence; they should be able to engage in a range of activities (from cooperative to conflictual) that would be far more costly for status inconsistent major powers or for those who fall outside of the major power club altogether. Given their strength and receptivity to their actions, status consistent major powers are likely to (1) pursue their objectives with higher expectation of success, (2) run lower risks of failure externally, and (3) risk fewer domestic political consequences for their foreign policy pursuits.

Wolforth (2009) proposes that when states experience status inconsistency they will seek to resolve it, and such resolution will be manifested through status competition with other states "whose portfolios of capabilities are not only close but also mismatched (2009: 40)." We agree and suggest that status underachievers—given their muscular portfolios but unmatched status

stupendous weaknesses" (Kennedy 1987: 206); Austria-Hungary's status attribution dwarfed its capabilities well prior to its disintegration (Sylvan et al. 1998).

attribution—will seek to resolve uncertainty around their status by competing more aggressively than overachievers to create larger roles and more status for themselves in global affairs. However, lacking the soft power of full status attribution, they will be less likely to be as aggressive as states endowed with full major power status.

Status overachievers have full status attribution but lack either some of the opportunity and/or willingness to match fully the position accorded to them by the global community. Given this type of mismatch between status and capabilities, we expect that overachievers would be less likely to risk exposing weakness beneath their status attribution and to engage in international affairs less aggressively than underachievers.[17] Yet, overachievers must be vigilant not to lose the status attributed to them. The quest to keep status can be pursued with fewer risks by engaging in architectures of cooperation: creating, sustaining, and participating in networks of intergovernmental organizations consistent with social creativity and social mobility strategies to status enhancement (Larson and Shevchenko, 2010).

Identifying Membership in the Major Power Club

Previously (Corbetta et al. 2008; Grant et al. 2009; Volgy et al. 2010b) we had identified measures corresponding to the definitions for major power opportunity, willingness, and community-based major power status attribution. Unusual opportunity is measured by military size and military reach, as well as the size of a state's economy and its economic reach beyond the

[17] The overachiever category includes both states with increasing (China) and declining capabilities (Russia). Policy makers operating in the realm of potential losses (consistent with prospect theory) may take more risks than those who are gaining. Those risks, however, would be most likely taken in their own regions where there may be potential, direct security threats or challenges to their regional leadership role (e.g., Russian confrontation with Georgia).

region.[18] We consider opportunity and willingness to be "unusual" if a state is situated at least one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of the aforementioned measures. Willingness to act as a major power is measured by unusually high levels of both cooperative and conflictual activity globally.[19] Willingness, however, cannot depend exclusively on a state's "volume" of foreign policy activity. The ability to chart an independent foreign policy path also matters. Independence in foreign policy orientation is measured by matching foreign policy portfolios to the lead major power (U.S.) and requiring low thresholds of conformance with U.S. leadership.[20]

Measuring community status attribution is problematic, especially when such attribution is based in large part on the perceptions of policy makers, perceptions for which there is neither direct nor systematic measurement available. However, we assume that such perceptions should have behavioral consequences and should be manifested in actions that reflect symbolically when states view others as major powers worthy of their attention. Thus, we measure major power status by an unusually high level (two standard deviations above the mean) of embassies sent to the major power in a given year, and a corresponding number of state visits sent to its capital.[21]

Applying these measures and the standard deviation criteria as thresholds to the 1951-2005 period (in five-year aggregates), we were able to establish sets of observations above the threshold where states are status consistent major powers, underachievers, overachievers, or, below which states are not considered to be members of the major power club. Status consistent major powers are

[18] Military size is measured by military spending, military reach is spending divided by the size of the armed forces; economic capacity is represented by the size of the economy (GDP) while economic reach is trade divided by global trade.

[19] We use events data, from COBDAB (Azar 1980), WEIS (Goldstein 1991), and IDEA (Bond et al. 2003, King and Lowe 2003), and apply to them the Goldstein scale, separating into dimensions of conflict and cooperation.

[20] See Volgy et al. (2010a, and especially Chapter 1) for specific details about the definition of "unusual" capabilities, reach, activities and about the measurement procedures.

[21] Diplomatic contacts data are from COW's diplomatic exchange data (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/), and DIPCON DATA (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/data.html). State visits are extracted from the three events data sources noted above.

those that demonstrate opportunity to be one by consistently crossing the threshold on all four capability measures, demonstrate unusual willingness to act by crossing the one standard deviation threshold on both cooperation and conflict outside their regions, and are attributed full status by crossing the thresholds on both diplomatic contacts and state visits. Status inconsistent underachieving major powers meet criteria on both opportunity and willingness but lack consistency on status attribution. Status inconsistent overachievers cross thresholds on both status measures while they fail to do so consistently across measures of opportunity and willingness.

The delineation of major power status resulting from our efforts differs from the COW designation in a number of respects. First, our measure is grounded on observable data and does not rely on the assessment of experts as found in COW (Singer 1988). Second, our measure allows us to differentiate between status consistent and status inconsistent powers, showing more variation in club membership across time than shown by COW. Finally, we are able to eliminate some of the most glaring anomalies in the COW designations.[22] Our results are displayed in the Appendix.[23]

Consequences for Variation in Major Power Status

Differences in the status attribution portfolios of major powers should be manifested both in major power conflict and cooperative behaviors. We offer three hypotheses regarding conflict engagement that underscore differences among major powers, depending on their status attribution designation. First, and most obvious, we expect that status consistent major powers, equipped with substantial capabilities, the willingness to act as major powers, and having been accorded substantial status, are the ones most likely to intervene in ongoing interstate conflicts compared to both status

22 COW for instance designates the PRC as a major power starting in 1950; yet measures of capabilities and status attribution indicate that it barely registered as even a regional contender until well after the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s (Grant et al. 2010).

[23] Previously, we developed procedures with which to establish substantial face validity for the data generated (Corbetta et al. 2008).

inconsistent major powers and other states. Second, we expect status *underachieving* major powers to intervene substantially in ongoing interstate conflicts, but lacking full status attribution and hence having more limited capabilities to engage successfully, they are less likely to do so then status consistent powers. Third, we expect status *overachieving* major powers, equipped with full status attribution but lacking the full material capabilities to match their status, to be less willing to participate in ongoing interstate conflicts.[24]

Table 1: Logit Models of Major Power Status and MID Joining, 1950—2001.

Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
All Major Powers	.83***		
	(.231)		
Status Consistent Major Powers		1.34***	1.34***
		(.332)	(.333)
Status Inconsistent Major Powers		.59**	
		(.200)	
Status Inconsistent Overachievers			.61
			(.340)
Status Inconsistent Underachievers			.58***
			(.224)
In (Capabilities)	.33***	.32***	.32**
	(.048)	(.048)	(.048)
Constant	1.33***	1.25***	1.25***
	(.369)	(.372)	(.375)
N	6,441	6,441	6,441
Chi 2	493.88***	738.81***	770.96***

These predictions are tested using data on states joining ongoing militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)[25] for the 1950-2001 period (Table 1). Three logit models are used: Model 1 consists of a standard, baseline model of control variables typically used it the empirical literature when

[24] We have defined major power status partly on the basis of unusually high conflict and cooperative behavior. Lest one suspect that the logit models in Table 1 are endogenous, recall that the scale we have used to assess unusually high conflict and cooperative behavior is derived from annually aggregated events data, different from data bases measuring individual instances of intervention in MIDS. We found low correlations between conflict events and the occurrence of MIDs.
[25] COW MIDs data, at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID310.html; see Ghosn et al. 2004.

assessing the effects of independent variables for either MIDs involvement or MIDs participation,[26] including capabilities, contiguity, regime type, peace years, and GDP/capita. We substitute our measure of major power status for the COW designation in Model 1, and in Models 2 and 3 differentiate further between types of status attribution. The relationships hold as expected, even as the capabilities of states are separately estimated in the models. Status overachieving, status underachieving and status consistent major powers demonstrate significantly different patterns of involvement with ongoing militarized interstate disputes, consistent with our predictions.

While status overachieving major powers are understandably less involved in ongoing interstate conflicts, they are not unengaged from international affairs. In fact, quite the contrary: it is not likely that they can keep the status that they have been attributed without substantial, ongoing presence and exhibition of major power leadership. Their engagement, however, may take different forms from the behavior of status consistent and underachieving major powers. We expect to find evidence of such engagement partly in the realm of structured international cooperation, where states are less dependent on overwhelming material capabilities for the pursuit of their objectives. Status overachieving major powers should be the ones most likely to be engaged in intergovernmental organizations: participating in them, helping to create them, and helping to maintain them.

Some evidence suggests that since the end of the Cold War, status overachieving major powers have been in the forefront in creating inter-regional formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) and articulating visions of global FIGOs (although the creation of viable global organizations requires substantial capabilities that they may not possess). Russia and China, two status overachieving major powers, have been in the lead in the creation of inter-regional structures in

[26] In a separate test, we also estimated these models using MIDs initiation as the dependent variable; the results were similar to MID intervention. Results are available from the authors.

former Soviet space and Central Asia since the end of the Cold War (Volgy et al. 2009). Russian policy makers have also articulated the need for creating new global security arrangements to replace those created during the Cold War (Larson and Shevchenko 2010).

Recent analysis of post-Cold War organizational creation[27] suggests the following pattern for overachieving major powers: when *inter-regional* FIGO creation occurs after 1989, they are the ones leading the effort. Typically—since they lack substantial capabilities compared to other major powers—the effort is not undertaken alone, without the partnership of at least one other overachieving major power or a regional power that is highly salient to the geopolitical space in question. The long term viability of these efforts, given limited resources with which to nurture and stabilize these organizations, is somewhat questionable: while FIGOs created by overachieving major powers tend to outlive those without any major power involvement, they are less likely to endure than those created by underachieving or status consistent major powers. .

Crossing Thresholds: When Will India and Brazil enter the Major Power Club?

One of the advantages of our definition and measurement of major power status is that it moves us beyond a binary view of the concept, allowing us to assess gaps within the hierarchy of major powers and non-major powers in a more fine-grained fashion. As Appendix A indicates, the status club of major powers is not constant in terms of membership, and neither is variation in members' status consistency. It is plausible that one or more states outside the club will seek and attain membership in the future (and/or some of the present powers to lose their membership). We assume that the states most likely to seek entrance and to gain community-based status attribution to

[27] For analysis of FIGOs, and the appropriate database, see Volgy et al. 2009.

major power status are those that are presently the strongest members of the regional power club, and have demonstrated an explicit and substantial interest in becoming major powers. [28]

We pursued the following tasks in order to assess the prospects of increasing membership in the major power club: using cluster analysis based on capabilities, primary interactions between states, and cultural/linguistic similarity, we have identified eleven different regions in post-Cold War international relations; then we estimated, based on a regional version of our approach to identifying major powers, whether or not there exist one or more regional powers in those regions; and finally we ranked regional powers on their capabilities to determine which are the strongest (Cline et al. 2010).

As Appendix B indicates, apart from the global powers that are also regional powers, embedded in eleven regions are five regional powers: Australia in Oceania, Brazil in South America, India in South Asia, Nigeria in East Africa, and the Republic of South Africa in the Southern African region. The five members of the regional powers club are all status consistent regional powers, awarded with high status both inside the region and globally. Two of the club members qualify as the strongest of the strong, with economic capabilities and military potential that dwarfs those of the other members. These are Brazil and India, members of the BRIC group, with avowed aspirations for a global role in international affairs. The other members of the regional power club lag far behind in the capabilities and activity needed to successfully seek membership in the club of major powers.[29] Therefore we focus on Brazil and India as the two most likely to seek and receive major power club status.

[28] The leap from regional to the global major power status club should be shorter and easier for states that have already emerged as major powers within their respective regions.

[29] In terms of military capabilities, Brazil and India overwhelm South African or Nigerian capabilities, and they do as well in terms of the size of their respective economies. Australia is the only regional power that demonstrates substantial capabilities for inter-regional activity, but not ones that can approximate those of India and Brazil.

We present two sets of data with which to estimate the likelihood of Brazil and/or India gaining entry into the major power club in the forseeable future, and if so, under what conditions. First we assess where they are now by comparing their status, capabilities, and foreign policy behavior with those states that have most recently emerged into the club after 1989: China, with growing capabilities, but as an overachieving major power; Japan with shifting status attribution between status consistency and status inconsistency; and Germany, which emerges briefly into the major power club but only for one of the three post-Cold War periods (see Appendix A).

Second, we present a number of alternative scenarios with which to make judgments about when/if, and under what conditions Brazil and India are likely to enter the club. The scenarios attempt to forecast when these states are likely to cross the major power thresholds on opportunity, willingness, and status attribution, given various assumptions regarding a) their historical progress over the last decade; b) the degree of political extraction capabilities of their governments; and c) what major powers may or may not do to counter such movements by the aspirants. In this sense we reinforce the overlap between community-based, in-group based, and self-attribution based dynamics associated with the development of major power status. Historical progress and government extraction capabilities address the opportunity and willingness dimension of our major power definition. The response of major powers who may oppose new entry into the club speaks to the dynamic of in-group status attribution.

Before moving further, we assess whether or not Brazil and India demonstrate one of the requirements for membership in the major power status club: relative independence in foreign policy orientation from the lead, major power (U.S.). Figure 1 illustrates the similarity in foreign policy portfolios between these two states and the U.S. (for 1990 through 2007), using the IDEA data base to generate conflict and cooperation activity (scaled for intensity, using the Goldstein's (1991) conflict/

cooperation scale) for all three states toward other states. The range on the scale of similarity is from 1 (perfect similarity) to -1 (complete dissimilarity). Major powers typically range between +.6 and -.8. Both Brazil and India range around 0 on the scale, indicating little similarity between their foreign policy portfolios and that of the U.S., satisfying the independence criterion for major powers.



Where are they now?

We first compare trends in capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status attribution for Brazil and India since the end of the Cold War, with the three states that emerged into the major power club after 1989 (China, Japan, and Germany). We also compare Brazilian and Indian capabilities to the standard deviation thresholds that aspiring powers need to cross for major power status during this time period. Comparisons on military spending and reach are presented in Figures 2a and 2b. While both Brazil and India have increased their military spending in the last decade, they are substantially below the major power threshold on this measure. The measure of military reach shows an even larger gap between these aspirants and the threshold for major power membership. By comparison, China, over the last two decades doubles her efforts on both measures.







Figure 3 indicates capabilities regarding economic reach, measured by trade as a function of global trade. We do not show statistics on GDP size since both Brazil and India have been above the

one standard deviation threshold on GDP size for over the last two decades. Despite the large and growing size of their economies, neither Brazil nor India appear to be moving towards the economic reach threshold crossed by all major powers, including status inconsistent ones.



Figure 4A: Cooperative Activity for Brazil and India, Compared to China, Japan, and Germany, 1991-2007.



Figure 4B: Conflict Activity for Brazil and India, Compared with China, Japan, and Germany, 1991-2007.

Figures 4A and 4B present trends in the volume and intensity of global cooperative and conflictual activity engaged by Brazil and India. As the figures illustrate, while both are very active in their respective regions and meta-regions (Latin America and Asia respectively), neither demonstrate

levels of cooperative and/or conflictual engagement outside of their regions above the major power thresholds.[30]



Figures 5A and 5B present trends for the status attribution measures. The pattern for diplomatic contacts received (Figure 5B) by these two aspirant states shows a substantial movement on the part of India toward the volume of contacts received by Japan and Germany. Brazil's numbers lag far behind, nowhere near the threshold, but are at least moving in that direction toward the end of the time series. The state visits measure, however, does not show any substantial movement by Brazil towards the designated threshold. This is not the case for India, which receives substantially more state visits in the second time frame, and catches up with Germany in the last period, although it still fails to reach the

[30] While India appears in the graph to reach the threshold on cooperation during the 2000-2007 period, as Figure 6 notes, much of that activity is confined to its meta-region and not globally.

designated state visit threshold. Given the combination of the two status measures, it appears that India is progressing toward high status attribution at the end of the time series.

Figure 6: A Comparison of Threshold Entry requirements for Brazil and India, Compared with New Major Powers, 2000-2007 Timeframe.

STATE	Capabilities				Foreign Policy*		Status**		Consistency***
	GDP	EcReach	MilSp	MilReach	Coop	Conflict	Dipcon	Visits	
Brazil	+								NIC
India	+				+*		+		NIC
China	+	+			+	+*	+	+	SIO
Japan	+	+		+	+		+		SIU
Germany	+	+			+*	+*	+		NIC****

* The asterisk indicates that the one sd threshold is met or surpassed but not for extra-regional interactions. ** Status attribution measures at two standard deviations from mean of all states. *** Options: SC = Status consistent; SIO = Status inconsistent/overachiever; SIU = Status inconsistent/underachiever; NIC = not in major power status club. **** As Appendix A notes, Germany qualified as a member of the club only during one of the three post-Cold War timeframes, and in this period (2000-2007), it slips out as its foreign policy activity is primarily within its region.

Figure 6 integrates these data and provides a comparative positioning of Brazil and India for the most recent time frame (2000-2007), given the requirements of crossing opportunity, willingness, and status attribution thresholds. As the figure illustrates, clearly neither is a member of the club, albeit some progress has been made by India toward meeting club membership requirements.

Seeking Entrance Into The Club

What are the prospects that Brazil and India will enter the club of major powers, and if so, under what type of status attribution conditions? We create three scenarios in response to this question based on varying assumptions regarding Brazilian and Indian capacities to accelerate their capabilities and activities, and the response of major powers to their efforts. The first scenario we propose is the *baseline/frozen status quo model*. In this scenario we estimate prospects of entry

based on a) the *forecasted* increase in their capabilities, willingness, and status attribution using a regression[31] on existing data since 1991, b) their average levels of political extraction[32] from society by their governments over the last decade, with c) all other states and major powers frozen at their present levels.

The second scenario we label the *accelerated status quo model*. In this scenario, Brazil and India's values are scaled by their *maximum* political extraction performance in the historical values since 1991, while all other countries—including major powers—remain frozen in time.

The third scenario we label the *minimally contested accelerated model*. In this scenario, Brazil and India are also performing at their maximum political extraction, but now the major powers in the club are performing at values on their historical data since 1991. Thus, this scenario contains a minimal response on the part of major powers to accelerated status seeking by Brazil and India.[33]

The political extraction variable offers a "value added" measure for states: variation on the measure provides us an indirect method for assessing the ability of domestic political regimes to increase their activities and capabilities, and to receive a corresponding increase in status attribution. Thus, in the baseline scenario we assume that political extraction is at its "normal" rate. In the accelerated status quo model, we focus on the top end of the political extraction range, using the

[31] Forecasting was done using only a simple time counter as an independent variable; based on the data from 1991-2007, a predicted value was generated for each your through 2050.

[32] We assume that there is a range of political extraction available to governments, more or less based on regime type. We have preliminarily tested this notion, using Arbetmann and Kugler's (1995) political extraction measure (updated by Arbetman and Kugler), and found that the extraction capabilities of non-democracies fluctuated on a wider range than democracies, but most states, and especially those in and near the major power club, had a relative stable range of extraction capabilities. We are grateful to Jacek Kugler for sharing the most recent data base.

[33] We created additional scenarios of stronger major power responses, but as Figure 9 below demonstrates, these are not necessary.

difference between the maximum political extraction and the mean to scale the slope of Brazil and India's forecasted values on capabilities, activity and status attribution.[34]

Figure 7: Projections for Brazil and India, <u>Baseline/Status Quo Scenario</u>.

	Milex	Milreach	GDP	Econreach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	Position*
Brazil									
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+						NIC
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC
India									
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC
2041-45			+	+	+		+	+	NIC
2046-50	**+**		**+**	**+**	**+**		**+**	**+**	**SIO**

* NIC = not in status club; SIO = Status overachieving major power

In all three scenarios we assume that the condition of relative foreign policy independence vis-à-vis the leading global state (the U.S.) will not have changed appreciably in the near future (Figure 1). We also assume for all scenarios that the immediate conditions in their regional relationships will not deteriorate significantly,[35] allowing these states to continue to focus a substantial part of their attention to global politics.

All three projections are based on extremely conservative scenarios regarding how states presently in the club would respond to Brazilian and Indian aspirations. In two of the three scenarios,

[34] The difference between India's mean and highest point of political extraction is 18%; we increase by 18% India's capabilities and activity in the accelerated model.

[35] It may be optimistic to forward this assumption for India, given the flurry of Chinese activity in South Asia, and the brewing conflicts between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, but regarding especially the latter, it appears that Indian policy makers are recognizing the explosive potential in Kashmir and are seeking conflict mediation inside the territory. Of course all bets are off if the Pakistani government falls to another coup and/or if insurgent elements destabilize further the domestic security conditions inside Pakistan.

the profiles of major powers are frozen in time; in the third, they simply continue on the path they are presently pursuing. These constitute the best case conditions under which Brazil and India would succeed in entering the club.[36]

Figure 8: Projections for Brazil and India, Status Quo Accelerated Scenario.

TIME	Milex	Milreach	GDP	Econreach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	Position*
			Brazil						
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+						NIC
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC
			India						
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC
2041-45	**+**		**+**	**+**	**+**		**+**	**+**	**SIO**
2046-50	**+**		**+**	**+**	**+**		**+**	**+**	**SIO**

* NIC = not in status club; SIO = Status overachieving major power

Note that the projections we make are linear in nature. We do so based on a vast body of theoretical and empirical studies suggesting that states' relative growth in material capabilities and foreign policy behavior occurs rather linearly over time (e.g., Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Lemke 2000). Two of the three recent members of the club (China and Japan) demonstrated such linear changes as they entered the club. Germany did not; the sudden integration of the two Germanies hardly constitutes a linear event. However, Germany is the only case after 1989 that

[36] These projections also assume that none of the existing powers leave the club during this timeframe, an assumption that is more directly addressed in the conclusions.

enters and then slips out of the major power club. Below we will suggest conditions under which such linear patterns may change and trends accelerated or muffled, and especially for India.

The results of the three scenarios are summarized in Figures 7 through 9.[37] None of the three scenarios create conditions that would allow Brazil to emerge into the status club of major powers over the next four decades. Regardless of the scenario utilized, Brazil is not expected to cross the threshold on state visits received, and appears to resemble a major power only on the economic capabilities dimension. This outcome appears to be the case even when it is operating at the high end of its political extraction capacity.

The projections appear somewhat more promising for India, although the picture sketched by alternative scenarios presents dynamics that suggest substantial frustration for Indian policy makers if they are expecting entrance soon to the major power club. In the baseline scenario (Figure 7) India does not emerge into the major power status club until the very end of the time series. Even if India operates at the highest range of its political extraction capability while the major powers are frozen in time (second scenario, Figure 8), it gains only a half-decade, emerging into the club around 2041 as an overachieving status inconsistent major power. The third scenario (Figure 9) suggests that the minimal gains in the second scenario are wiped out completely if existing major powers respond by simply continuing the trends they have demonstrated historically regarding their capabilities and activities, and even without increasing their political extraction capabilities, while India is operating at the top of its historical level of political extraction. Only efforts at accelerated capacity generation and accelerated global involvement substantially above and beyond what India has been able to demonstrate historically could change this picture.

[37] The actual projection models and the data utilizing them are available from the authors on request.

Figure 9: Projections for Brazil and India, Minimally Contested Accelerated Scenario.

TIME	Milex	Milreach	GDP	Econreach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	Position
Brazil									
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+	+			+		NIC
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC
India									
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC
2041-45			+	+			+	+	NIC
2046-50			+	+			+	+	NIC

The three scenarios are based on various assumptions regarding changes endogenous to Brazil and India, and thresholds that are driven exogenously, depending on whether or not major powers respond to status seeking on the part of these states. We have not created scenarios where other exogenous stimuli compel Indian decision-makers especially to ramp up their capabilities and activities. India is particularly vulnerable to such changes given its rivalry with a somewhat unstable nuclear Pakistan in its immediate region, and competition with China that ranges from ongoing border issues to active Chinese involvement in South Asia.[38]

With respect to the first issue, one can create myriad scenarios around increased loss of control by Pakistani authorities over insurgent groups in Pakistan, which in turn creates substantial security threats both in India and in Indian occupied Kashmir. These types of security threats would likely be met by substantial increases in Indian capabilities and a ramping up of its regional and

[38] States embedded in rivalries may emerge faster into the club, stimulated by the need to respond to myriad security issues. However, rivalries may also limit capabilities and focus to the region, anchoring the state to its regional, rather than global environment.

global involvement in security affairs. Those changes to its capabilities and activity could bring it closer to achieving major power status than in the forecasted models.[39]

Increased competition with China could result in similar changes to its capabilities and activities, including strategies of social creativity (Larsen and Shevchenko 2010) in seeking alternative structures of cooperation and security mechanisms, and alternative coalitional politics, including closer relationships with Japan, the U.S., and the EU. We assume, however, that these strategies require two conditions that may not now be present for India: broad domestic support for such foreign policy restructuring and a foreign policy infrastructure that has the resources, skills, and experience with which to navigate the treacherous waters involved with such complex foreign policy changes.[40]

Consequences for International Politics

Implicit in our effort is the assumption that increasing the size of the major powers club is not necessarily a zero sum game. While gaining membership in the club should increase the soft power of a state, how it behaves with the additional legitimacy that is created by its membership depends in significant part on whether or not it is status consistent, underachieving, or overachieving. It appears that foreign policy makers recognize as much and may see granting club membership to an overachieving major power as preferable to extensive and potentially dangerous status seeking on the part of states that are denied membership. When potential major powers with realistic aspirations make a concerted push for status, it may be preferable for other states to attribute such status sooner

[39] Substantial conflicts between India and Pakistan are integrated in our historical data used to forecast, including their 1999 conflict. The events we describe here, however, would yield security concerns above and beyond those historical events over the last decade, and especially if Pakistan begins to destabilize.

[40] Brazilian efforts to substantially expand it foreign involvement in Africa have floundered over the inability of its foreign affairs bureaucracy to carry out this ambitious policy (Seabra, 2010). Limited Indian experience outside of its region and outside of formal IGOs may reduce its ability to execute such complex foreign policy changes.

rather than later. The behavior of overachieving major powers satisfied with their status is more predictable and preferable to the volatile actions of dissatisfied revisionist states.

The case of China is illustrative. As a new, but overachieving major power in the club, it has taken an extremely conservative approach to contesting the global order and its role in it as long as other states provide it with major power status. Likewise, the Russian/USSR shift from underachieving to overachieving major power has led to reduced direct conflict with other major powers outside its own region, and presently, it is attempting to seek accommodation with both established Western[41] and rising Chinese power. It is difficult to imagine an equally benign scenario had Russia been excluded from the major power club after 1991.

India's accession to the club of major powers suggests challenges reminiscent of Chinese entrance. India has already reached the threshold of substantial status but without the complement of qualifying capabilities and activities. It continues to face substantial challenges within its own region and inter-regionally from East Asia. Continuing recognition to it as a major player in international affairs may minimize its need to develop the type of status seeking strategy that would generate more challenges to global governance. Where it does differ from China is in the strong linear growth of Chinese capabilities and activities. And in this sense, major power strategies of attributing status to aspiring powers may be insufficient without extraordinary steps being taken by aspiring states not only to dramatically increase their capabilities and reach, but also their commitment to engagement in global affairs. Without such steps, the conferral of high status attribution and resulting soft power will not be enough to guarantee a place in the club. Note the Chinese case once more: even with the

[41] Despite support for Iran, following the latest round of UN sanctions, Russian authorities cancelled a substantial contract to provide sophisticated air defense systems to Iran (Lyubov Pronina, "Russia Cancels $800 million Air Defense Contract with Iran," Bloomberg, October 7, 2010).

growth of its extensive capabilities, the weakness in its military reach is still evident, as is its substantial reluctance to exercise leadership in global affairs.

In the absence of sudden, unexpected, monumental events that may change the linear course of these projections—for example, a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan or some population-related humanitarian crisis—it appears that membership in the major power club is not likely to increase in the next few decades, despite explicit efforts by both India (Basrur 2010) and Brazil (Herz 2010) to seek entrance to it. The task appears even more difficult for Brazil as it lags far behind India and the existing great powers on a variety of indicators.

Historically, Brazil and India differ in self-ascription, a difference that may indicate that ascent to major power status may be valued somewhat differently in the two countries. Discussions about status in the international arena have emerged in the public discourse of both countries, and Indian and Brazilian policy-makers have made no secret of harboring major power ambitions. However, these discussions in Brazil solidified only during the last decade (Herz 2010). Indian officials have proclaimed intentions toward major power status for a substantially longer period, and the goal of joining the major power club has been especially stimulated recently by dramatic economic growth. Some Indian policy-makers already see India as having completed the transition from regional to global power (Basrur 2010). If in fact such a transition will take several decades to take place, we will likely observe considerable frustration in both India's behavior and rhetoric.

Given the limited prospects for Brazil and India, a word is in order about the potential shrinking—rather than growth—of the major power club. Germany, for one, has flirted with club membership in the post-Cold War period, and as Appendix A suggests, has moved in and then out, as it expanded and then contracted its activities outside of the European region. As of this writing, it

is also seeking to reduce the size of its military, and flirts with cutbacks that could reduce its status to a regional power.

Japan is an entirely different case. Its bona fides as a regional power are lacking status attribution from East Asian states; its legitimacy in the region is primarily based on the size of its economy, economic reach, and status as a major global power. As its economy has shrunk, its 1% commitment of its GDP to military spending is looking less strong than during the booming years. Its political system appears fragile, and its foreign policy deferential to Chinese assertiveness[42] even in its immediate neighborhood. Whether or not Japan loses its major power status in the near future depends on a broad variety of domestic and external factors, but unlike Germany, its policy makers will not be able to fall back on its status as a recognized regional power in East Asia. Perhaps the more salient question for international politics is not the growth of the major power club but the possibility of its shrinkage, and the consequences such exits hold as states struggle to keep the status they have.[43]

Thus, we envision a future where the two states that seek membership into the club of major powers are not likely to meet their aspirations, and there may be two or more states that may be in jeopardy of losing their major power status. The consequences produced for international politics as a result of attempts by these states to seek the status they wish to have, or to maintain the status presently granted to them, may depend in large part on the strategies they develop (Larson and Shevchenko 2010) for their status pursuits. No less important, however, will be the recognition by

[42] Andrew Jacobs, "China Softens Tone in Japan Dispute," *New York Times*, September 28,2010.

[43] Japan and Germany are not the only states in potential jeopardy; the trajectories for the UK and France, especially on global foreign policy activity and economic reach (and possibly major reductions in military capabilities) could signal exits from the club in the future. Nor can we ignore the precarious positioning of Russia: its membership is heavily dependent on its ability to maintain its economic capacity and to be able to transfer resources into military capacity, as it struggles to expand its activities beyond its own geopolitical space. Its membership could be in jeopardy depending fluctuations in the global price of oil and gas.

extant major powers and the global community of states that managing these transitions through creative conferral of status to these states could delay or reduce status competition and the effects of such competition on international relations.

There are substantial theoretical implications for whether or not the major power club will grow or shrink in the near future. Structural theorists for instance, emphasize the size of the club as well as the distribution of capabilities within it as a predictor of competition, conflict, alliance formation, etc. (Waltz 1979). Should current major power aspirants gain membership in the club over the next few decades, the number of major powers would grow to nine. At no point in recent times has the club been so large, and is well beyond the number of major powers that structural theories generally associate with multipolarity.

It is unclear from these theories if such a large club leads to extreme forms of the international politics pathologies typically associated with multipolarity. It is not farfetched to suggest that given the traditional association between large numbers of major powers, uncertainty, and conflict, such a system will be replete with opportunities for competition, misperceptions, unstable coalitions, tension and, potentially war. Managing relations between members of the club could fall to the strongest in the group, but if Thompson's (2010) perspective is accurate, the increasing disjuncture between U.S. military and economic capabilities, coupled with a growing list of its foreign policy failures, may ill equip it to do so. Yet if it does seek to do so, it may produce counterbalancing dynamics, and not just of the "soft balancing" type.

Structural theories are less helpful in specifying conditions under which—short of major power wars or fundamental systemic disturbances—the club of major powers shrinks, and the likely consequences of such changes for international politics. A focus on major power status attribution, including self-attribution, in-group attribution, and status strategies (Larson and Shevchenko 2010)

of both the states in danger of falling out of the club and the states in the club interested in minimizing the effects of loss of status, may be vital in explaining alternative consequences for international politics.

Structural theories of international politics estimate the size of the major power club on the basis of capabilities alone. A focus on status considerations moves beyond capabilities, and since status does not depend only on material power, keeping the focus on it suggests that the type of competition that is usually attributed to multipolarity may take non-traditional forms and does not need to result in high levels of major power conflict. The changes in conflict and cooperation resulting from a larger club, for instance, will depend in part on whether new members enter the club as overachievers or underachievers. Likewise, it may be possible to manage transitions out of the club with creative status maintenance strategies. As these states jockey for status, seeking more of it or avoiding exit from the club, status competition may take place in the context of global and regional organizations and in issue-areas that are usually outside of the concerns of structural theories. The focus on status and status inconsistency in particular generates predictions for the future that differ substantially from traditional structural perspectives. The approach invites a broader reinterpretation of "standard" expectations about major powers, the size of the major power club, and international politics.

References

Arbetman, Marina and Jacek Kugler. 1995. "The Politics of Inflation: An Empirical Assessment of the Emerging Market Economies," in Willett, Burdekin, Sweeney, and Wihlborg, *Establishing Monetary Stability in Emerging Market Economies.*

Azar, Edward E. 1980. "The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project." Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(1):143–52.

Badie, Bertrand. 2010. "French Power Seeking and Overachievement." In Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and Baird, *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave.

Basrur, Rajesh. 2010. "India: A Major Power in the Making." In Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and Baird, eds. *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave.

Bond, Doug, Joe Bond, Churl Oh, J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Lewis Taylor. 2003. "Integrated data for events analysis: An event typology for automated events data development." *Journal of Peace Research* 40:733–745.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cline, Kirssa, Patrick Rhamey, Alexis Henshaw, Alicia Seziak, Aakriti Tandon, and Thomas J. Volgy. 2010. "Identifying Regional Powers and Their Status," in Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and Baird, *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*.

Corbetta, Renato. "Status and Capabilities: The 'Power' of Major Power States." Presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 31-September 3, 2006.

Corbetta, Renato, Thomas J. Volgy, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird. 2008. "So Who Gets into the Club? The Attribution of Major Power Status in International Politics." Presented at the Workshop #8 of the European Consortium for Political Research's Joint Sessions, Rennes (France), April 11-16, and the Peace Science Society (International)'s 42nd North American Conference, Claremont, CA, October 24-26.

Deng, Yong. 2008. *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

East, Maurice A. 1972. "Status Discrepancy and Violence in the International System: An Empirical Analysis," in James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice A. East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics: Essays in Honor of Harold and Margaret Sprout.* New York: The Free Press.

Forman, Shepard, and Derk Segaar. 2006. "New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism." *Global Governance* 12: 2005-226.

Galtung, Johann. 1964. "A Structural Theory of Aggression." *Journal of Peace Research* 1:95-119.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer and Stuart A. Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(2):133–154.

Goldstein, Joshua. 1991. "A conflict-cooperation scale for WEIS events data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36:369–385.

Grant, Keith A., Ryan G. Baird, Renato Corbetta, and Thomas J. Volgy. 2010. "Status Matters: Exploring Variations in Major Power Status Attribution." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 17-20.

Herz, Monica. 2010. "Brazil: Major Power in the Making?" In Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and Baird, eds., *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave.

Hymans, Jaques E. C. 2002. "Applying Social Identity Theory to the Study of International Politics: A Caution and an Agenda." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 24-27.

King, Gary and Will Lowe. 2003. "An Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design." *International Organization* 57:617–642.

Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke. 2000. "The Power Transition Research Program", in Midlarski, M., ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. AnnArbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. 2003. "Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy." *International Organization* 57: 77-109.

Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. 2010. Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," *International Security* 34:63-95.

Levy, Jack S. 1983. *War in the Modern Great Power System*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Mercer, Jonathan. 1995. "Anarchy and Identity." *International Organization* 49:229-252.

Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

Midlarski, Manus. 1975. *On War: Political Violence in the International System*. New York: Free Press.

Morton, Jeffrey S., and Harvey Starr. 2001. "Uncertainty, Change and War: Power Fluctuations and War in the Modern Elite Power System." *Journal of Peace Research* 38:49-66.

Nayar, Baldev Raj, and T.V. Paul. 2003. *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Organski, A.F.K. amd Jacek Kluger. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rhamey, J. Patrick, Kirssa Cline, Sverre Bodung, Alexis Henshaw, Beau James, Chansuk Kang, Alesia Sedziaka, Aakriti Tandon, and Thomas J. Volgy. 2010. "Diplomatic Contact Database (DIPCON), v1.1." Online: www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/

Seabra, Pedro. 2010. “ECOWAS and the Brazilian Foothold in Asia.” IPRIS Viewpoints (September).

Singer, David J. 1988. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985.” *International Interactions* 14: 115–32.

Strange, Susan. 1989. “Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire.” In Czempiel, Ernst Otto, and James N. Rosenau (eds), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Sylvan, David, Corinne Graff and Elisabetta Pugliese. 1998. “Status and Prestige in International Relations.” Presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference, Vienna, Austria, September 16-19.

Thompson, William R. 2010. "The United States as Global Leader, Global Power, and Status Consistent Power?" In Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and Baird, eds. *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave.

Thucydides. 1951. *Complete Writings: The Peloponnesian Wars*. New York: Modern Library. [Trans. Richard Crawley, adapted by Suresh Bald, Willamette University.]

Volgy, Thomas J., and Alison Bailin. 2003. *International Politics and State Streng*th. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Volgy, Thomas J., Zlatko Sabic, Petra Roter, and Andrea Gerlak. 2009. *Mapping the New World Order*. Wiley.

Volgy, Thomas J., Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird. 2010a. *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan (forthcoming).

Volgy, Thomas J., Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird. 2010b. “Major Power Status Attribution: Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” in Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and Baird, *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International: Global and Regional Perspectives*.

Volgy, Thomas J., Elizabeth Fausett, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird. 2010c. “Searching for Status in all the Right Places?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Standing Group on International Relations, Stockholm (September).

Volgy, Thomas J., and Stacey Mayhall. 1995. “Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change.” *International Studies Quarterly* 39:67-84.

Wallace, Michael D. 1971. “Power, Status, and International War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 1:23–35.

Wallace, Michael D. 1973 “Status, Formal Organization and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War, 1820-1964,” in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wohlforth, William C. 2009. "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War." *World Politics* 61: 28-57.

Wohlforth, William and David C. Kang. 2009. "Hypotheses on Status Competition." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3-6.

APPENDIX A: Major Power Measures and Status Consistency, Five Year Intervals, 1951-2005.[44]

STATE/Time Frame	Capabilities				Foreign Policy[45]		Status[46]		Consistency[47]
	GDP	EcReach	MilSp	MilReach	Coop	Conflict	Dipcon	Visits	
US									
1951-55	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1956-60	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1961-65	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1966-70	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1971-75	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1976-80	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1981-85	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1986-90	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
2001-2005	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
USSR/RUSSIA									
1951-55	+		+		+	+		+	SIU
1956-60	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1961-65	+		+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1966-70	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1971-75	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1976-80	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1981-85	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	SIO
1986-90	+		+		+	+	+	+	SIO
1991-95	+				+	+*	+	+	SIO
1996-2000	+				+		+	+	SIO
2001-2005	+				+		+	+	SIO
UK									
1951-55	+	+			+		+		ns
1956-60	+	+			+	+*	+		ns

[44] Table is from Volgy et al. 2010b:33-35.

[45] Asterisk (*) indicates that the one sd threshold is met or surpassed but not for extra-regional interactions.

[46] Status attribution measures at two standard deviations from mean of all states.

[47] SC = Status consistent; SIO = Status inconsistent/overachiever; SIU = Status inconsistent/underachiever; ns= no major power status.

1961-65	+	+		+	+	+*	+		SIU
1966-70	+	+		+	+		+		SIU
1971-75	+	+			+		+		ns
1976-80	+	+		+	+		+		SIU
1981-85	+	+	+	+	+		+		SIU
1986-90	+	+	+	+	+		+		SIU
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+		+		SIU
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
2001-2005	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		SIU
FRANCE									
1951-55		+			+	+	+		SIU
1956-60		+			+	+	+		SIU
1961-65	+	+			+		+		ns
1966-70	+	+		+	+	+*	+		SIU
1971-75	+	+					+	+	SIO
1976-80	+	+			+		+	+	SIO
1981-85	+	+			+		+	+	SIO
1986-90	+	+			+		+	+	SIO
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
2001-2005	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		SIU
GERMANY									
1951-55	+				+*				ns
1956-60	+	+							ns
1961-65	+	+		+	+*				ns
1966-70	+	+		+	+*				ns
1971-75	+	+							ns
1976-80	+	+		+			+		ns
1981-85	+	+					+		ns
1986-90	+	+					+		ns
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+*		+		ns
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+*	+	+		SIU
2001-2005	+	+			+*	+*	+		ns
CHINA									
1951-55	+					+*			ns
1956-60	+								ns
1961-65	+		+			+			ns
1966-70	+		+			+			ns
1971-75	+		+						ns
1976-80	+		+			+*			ns
1981-85	+								ns
1986-90	+						+		ns
1991-95	+	+			+	+*	+	+	SIO
1996-2000	+	+			+	+*	+	+	SIO
2001-2005	+	+			+	+*	+	+	SIO
JAPAN									
1950-55									ns
1956-60	+								ns
1961-65	+	+							ns

1966-70	+	+								ns
1971-75	+	+								ns
1976-80	+	+								ns
1981-85	+	+						+		ns
1986-90	+	+		+				+		ns
1991-95	+	+		+		+	+*	+	+	SIO
1996-2000	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	SC
2001-2005	+	+		+		+		+		SIU

APPENDIX B: Regions and Regional Powers, 1985-2005.[48]

East Africa	South Africa	West Africa	North/Central America	South America	East Asia	South Asia	Europe		Maghreb	Middle East	Oceania
Djibouti	Angola	Burkina Faso	Antigua	Argentina	Brunei	Afghanistan	Albania	Malta	Algeria	Bahrain	***Australia**
Eritrea	Botswana	Benin	Bahamas	Bolivia	Cambodia	Bangladesh	Andorra	Moldova	Tunisia	Egypt	Fiji
Ethiopia	Burundi	Cape Verde	Barbados	***Brazil**	****China**	Bhutan	Armenia	Monaco	Morocco	Iran	Kiribati
Somalia	Comoros	Cote d'Ivoire	Belize	Chile	Indonesia	***India**	Austria	Netherlands		Iraq	Marshall Islands
Sudan	Congo	CAF	Canada	Paraguay	****Japan**	Maldives	Belarus	Norway		Israel	Micronesia
Yemen	DR Congo	Chad	Colombia	Uruguay	Laos	Nepal	Belgium	Poland		Jordan	Nauru
	Kenya	Gambia	Costa Rica		Malaysia	Pakistan	Bosnia	Portugal		Kuwait	New Zealand
	Lesotho	Ghana	Dominica		Myanmar	Sri Lanka	Bulgaria	Romania		Lebanon	Papua New Guinea
	Madagascar	Guinea	Dominican Rep.		Palau		Croatia	**Russia		Oman	Solomon Islands
	Malawi	Guinea-Bissau	Ecuador		Philippines		Cyprus	San Marino		Qatar	Tonga
	Mauritius	Liberia	El Salvador		North Korea		Czech Rep.	Serbia		Saudi Arabia	Tuvalu
	Mozambique	Libya	Grenada		South Korea		Denmark	Slovakia		Syria	Vanuatu
	Namibia	Mauritania	Guatemala		Singapore		Estonia	Slovenia		U.A.E.	Samoa
	Rwanda	Mali	Guyana		Taiwan		Finland	Spain			
	Seychelles	***Nigeria**	Haiti		Thailand		****France**	Sweden			
	***South Africa**	Senegal	Honduras		Vietnam		Georgia	Turkey			
	Swaziland	Sierra Leone	Jamaica				****Germany**	****UK**			
	Tanzania	Togo	Mexico				Greece	Ukraine			
	Zambia		Nicaragua				Hungary				
	Zimbabwe		Panama				Iceland				
			Peru				Ireland				
			St. Kitts				Italy				
			St. Lucia				Latvia				
			St. Vincent				Liechtenstein				
			Trinidad				Lithuania				
			****United States**				Luxembourg				
			Venezuela				Macedonia				

* Denotes regional power
** Denotes global power that is also regional power

[48] Data retrieved from, and methodology elaborated in Cline et al. 2010.