

Political Science 365
Contemporary International Politics
Mondays 3:30 to 5:50

Professor Volgy
Fall, 2007

Office Hours: 11-12:30 Monday, Tuesday and by appointment
Email: volgy@email.arizona.edu

SYLLABUS

GOALS:

Although the course title indicates that this course is about contemporary international politics, that title should not lead you to think that the course is only about today's current events. While current events will be used to illustrate the general trends in the course, the major goal here is to develop our abilities to think critically about international politics through the development of a number of important, **general principles** of international politics, through which we can understand both "contemporary" and future international politics.

Please note as well that this course satisfies the Study Area requirement of "individuals, Societies and Institutions...affording students an opportunity to examine systematically individual and collective behavior, and to explore the basic concepts and theories used in analyses of personal, social, cultural, political, economic, philosophical, religious and scientific issues. As a result, students should come to understand more clearly issues of self-identity, social difference and social status, the role of science in society, and the effects of major institutions on individual experiences."

APPROACHES TO THIS COURSE:

There are two general approaches used for understanding the contents of this course. One is traditional: trying to focus on the subject by virtue of the common readings, class discussions and class lectures (occasional). The second approach will have us utilize these materials in a more concrete way by applying them to more specific situations. This second approach is based on a method called **role playing** and it involves a **simulation** component.

Role playing will involve the following steps:

- Each student is asked to choose a specific "role" to play. On the basis of these choices, students will be placed into groups (usually countries) and into specific roles within these groups.
- Each group in the class will be asked to do some research on the group, and to present the research in writing.
- Groups will be asked to play out their roles in two fundamental ways. First, as we move through the course, and each group develops expertise about itself, members of the group will be called upon in class to blend their expertise with the generalizations we are discussing during a particular week. For example, when we discuss nationalism, we may ask the French group to respond to the question of how French nationalism affects French foreign policy. Second, we will have an actual **simulation**, starting on Week 12. During the simulation, students will be asked to step into the

shoes of their real-life counterparts. A set of simulation rules is available on the web page (<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/issp/simrules.html>) and we will discuss these assignments and the nature of the simulation more thoroughly as we progress through the course.

GRADES:

Grades will be based on the following:

Exams: there will be a midterm (around the eight week of class) and a final exam. Together they will be worth 50% of the course grade;

Role performance and simulation: the combination of your research, written presentation, and role performance in class and in the simulation will be worth 40% of the course grade;

Class participation: the quality of your class participation will be worth 10% of the course grade. In order to assist you with your class participation, the weekly course focus on the syllabus includes a number of questions to think about in the context of the readings. You should be ready to discuss your answers to those questions in class.

EXPECTATIONS:

Examination policy: There will be two exams in the course and their times and dates are listed in the syllabus. Therefore, it is assumed that you will plan your schedule accordingly, and will take these exams when they are scheduled. If you cannot, for any reason, attend the midterm or the final, you must notify me at least one week **prior** to the exam. I will not give make-up exams unless your failure to take the exam involved an extremely unusual hardship or unavoidable circumstance.

Attendance policy: I consider discussion in this class, and the occasional lectures you will hear to be a crucial component of this course. Furthermore, the parts of the class focusing on role playing and simulation are essential to your grade. Just as importantly, this course meets only once a week; this means that missing one class means missing a substantial amount of the content of this course. Missing class will mean that it will be virtually impossible for you to do well in the course. Therefore it is assumed that you will come to every class, **and your attendance during the simulation and role playing is mandatory**. While attendance is generally on the honor system, I reserve the right to take attendance on occasion.

Simulation involvement: Every person in this course will be assigned a role, and will be part of a group. Both the preparation for the simulation and the simulation itself will require you to work with others in collaboration. That is also how international politics and foreign policies are developed and conducted. Sometimes, however, this leads some students to think that they can slack off and let the other members of the group take up the extra work. **Warning: it won't work.** You will be doing a tremendous disservice to yourself, to other members of the group, and ultimately, it will be reflected in your grade. In this class you will have to work with others; learn to depend on others, and allow them to depend on you as well.

Withdrawal policy: Technically, the university allows students a number of weeks before they can no longer withdraw from a course. Unfortunately, in this class, due to the large waiting list for the course, it is a luxury that we do not have. Furthermore, since you will be working with a group, withdrawal at a later date will cause no amount

of grief for the rest of your group. Therefore, I will not allow withdrawals from the course after **September 8th**, unless there is a very unusual circumstance.

Plagiarism: There is nothing worse at a university than the theft of one's work. Plagiarism comes in many forms, including paying for a paper one didn't write, copying someone else's work, failing to appropriately cite the work or ideas of another. All of these actions are punished strongly, including failing the course, and the possibility of expulsion from the University. Given these risks, (irrespective of the ethical issues involved), and the likelihood that one will get caught, it doesn't make sense to plagiarize. University policy on plagiarism and other codes of conduct issues can be found at: <http://studpubs.web.arizona.edu/policies/cacaint.htm>

Other issues: I hope I don't need to remind you of this, but just in case, it is expected that we treat each other with respect and dignity. This includes not coming to class late and interrupting others; turning off cell phones before arriving to class, etc. University policies regarding these issues can be found at: <http://policy.web.arizona.edu/~policy/threaten.shtml>. On another note: if you need assistance or looking for support with special needs, they can be located at either the S.A.L.T center (<http://www.salt.arizona.edu/>) or at the Disability Resources center (<http://drc.arizona.edu/>).

Calendar of Readings and Assignments:

Reading Materials:

M. K. Cusimano, *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda (3rd Edition)*.

Note: in addition, there are required readings, placed on electronic reserve. These readings are indicated by ® next to the reading assignment. They can be found on my web page, at <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/POL365.html>. You can click on the sub-page called required readings and the required reading and the assignment should appear in alphabetical order. Additionally, there are some other materials of value for you, and especially related to the simulation, at: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/issp02.html>. Links to useful Internet sources are at: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/issp/resources.html>.

I strongly suggest as well (but will not require) that you get a subscription to the *New York Times* (alternatively, you can access it electronically at www.nytimes.com), for free. This syllabus, along with some other materials can be found on my web page at: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/POL365.html>.

Note also that for each week's assignment, there are one or more questions for you to think about as you read the assigned readings and think about the topic. Please be prepared to discuss these questions in class.

DATE	TOPIC and READINGS
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<i>Week 1</i>	
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(Aug 20)	<u><i>Introduction to Course.</i></u> (Another Brick in the Wall/Pink Floyd) ¹
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¹Yes, each topic is introduced by a piece of music relevant to the topic; You may need to assess its relevance and at the end of the course I'm open to musical alternatives with which to torture new students next semester.

Week 2

(August 27) **Introduction to approaches, nature of international politics.** ((Political Science/Randy Newman)

READINGS: Cusimano, Chapter 1

Methods of Control: Some Vital Concepts (Power/Temptations)

Questions: 1) What is power (see appendix 1A through 1C)?
 2) Which is the most powerful nation today? The second most powerful?
 3) Which is the least powerful nation today?

READINGS: Walt, 2005. "Taming American Power." *Foreign Affairs*®
 (see also appendix 1A-1C in syllabus).

 NOTE: Monday September 3rd is Labor Day...no class

Week 3

(Sept 10) **The Impact of Domestic Factors on International Politics.** (For What Its Worth/Buffalo Springfield)

Questions: 1) See the scenario and question in appendix 2.
 2) How would you have expected Syrian foreign policy to change after the death of Hafiz al-Assad? How much does it matter for Russian foreign policy that Putin replaced Yeltsin in Russia?

READINGS: Thompson 2006 "China's Leadership Gap." *Foreign Affairs* ®
 Siegman, 2000. "Being Hafiz al-Assad," *Foreign Affairs* ®

Formulating Foreign Policy: How Decisions Are Made. (Peace, Love and Understanding/Elvis Costello)

Questions: 1) What did the U.S. decide to do about the Cuban Missile Crisis? Why?
 2) If George W. Bush had been president in 1962, would he have made the same decision?

READINGS: Allison, 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *APSR* ®
 Maynes, 2000. "Bottom Up Foreign Policy" *Foreign Policy*®

Week 4

(Sept 17) **Formulating Foreign Policy (continued).** (We Didn't Start the Fire/Billy Joel)

Defense Policy: A Special Case of Decision Making. (99 Red Balloons/Nena)

Questions: 1) Do nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous? Why?
 2) How would you go about making sure that your opponent doesn't use nuclear weapons?

READINGS: Cusimano, Chapter 9
 Lewis, 1999. "National Missile Defense...." *Foreign Policy*®

“A Survey of Defense Technology” *The Economist* (1995) ®
 Johnston, 1995/96. “China’s New Old Thinking...” *International Security* ®

Week 5

(Sept 24) **Defense Policy (continued).** (War/Bruce Springsteen)

READINGS (current events):

Keller, “The Thinkable.” *New York Times*®

Allison, 2004. “How to Stop Nuclear Terror.” *Foreign Affairs*®

Rosen, Stephen 2006 “After Proliferation: What to Do if More States Go Nuclear.” *Foreign Affairs*

Waltz, 2004.” More May be Better.” In *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.*

Other Inputs: The Salience of Nationalism and Ideology. (Miss

Sarajevo/Bono)

Questions: 1) What is nationalism? How does it differ from ideology?
 2) How important are nationalism and ideology for Mexico? Russia? France? How do you know?

READINGS: Leiken, Robert 2005. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” *Foreign Affairs*®

Etzioni, 1992/93. “The Evils of Self Determination,” *Foreign Policy*®

Murphy, 2001. “What the Third World Wants,” in P. F. Diehl, *The Politics of Global Governance* ®

Barber, 1992. “Jihad Vs. McWorld,” *Atlantic Monthly* ®

Week 6

(Oct 1) **The Technological Environment of International Politics.** (Mr. Roboto/Styx)

Questions: 1) What are the key technological questions facing us today?
 2) Why are they so difficult to address?

READINGS: Klare, 1996. “Redefining Security,” *Current History* ®

Cusimano, Chapters 8,11

Gelbspan, 1997. “A Global Warning,” *The American Prospect.* ®

Browne, 2004. “Beyond Kyoto.” *Foreign Affairs.* ®

A World of Penetrated States: New and Changing Actors. (Lawyers,

Guns and Money/Warren Zevon)

Question: 1) What is the difference between penetration and influence? Can you identify examples of each? (See charts)

READINGS: Cusimano, Chapter 7;

Cusimano, Chapters 2; 6

“Dangerous Activities,” *The Economist*, May 11, 2002.®

Naim, 2002. “Five Wars of Globalization.” *Foreign Policy* ®

(optional) Mallaby, 2004. "NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor." *Foreign Policy*®

Week 7

(Oct 8) **A World of Penetrated States: Terrorism in International Politics.**

(Ma Petite Terroriste/Mint) (If I had a rocket launcher/Bruce Cockburn)

Question: 1) Is international terrorism a problem for your group? Why? Is there an effective way you can address this issue? (The US State Department web site for terrorism can be accessed at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>)

READINGS: Cusimano, Chapter 5

Riedel, 2007. "Al Qaeda Strikes Back." *Foreign Affairs* ®

Lal, 2005. "South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks,"

®

Discussion of Midterm Exam

Week 8

(Oct. 15) **Midterm Exam** (Don't Ask Me Why/Billy Joel)

Introduction to International Structures: Organizations as Actors, Tools, and Structures. (Peace Train/Cat Stevens)

READINGS: Cusimano, Chapter 13

Keohane, 1998. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* ®

Forman and Segaar, 2006. "New Coalition for Global Governance..." *Global Governance* ®

Week 9

(Oct 22) ***Debriefing the midterm exam***

International Organizations: Actors, Structures, Tools (the UN web page can be found at: <http://www.un.org/>). (Bomb Iran/Vince Vance)

Questions: 1) What's wrong with the UN? What's right with the UN?

2) Did the UN fail in Bosnia? in Iraq? in Sudan? Why?

READINGS: Cusimano, Chapter 12

Bird, 2001. "The IMF and Developing Countries," in P.F. Diehl, *The Politics of Global Governance* (2001)®

The Commission on Global Governance, "Reforming the United Nations,"® (optional)

NOTE: **Research presentations due**

Week 10

(Oct 29) **International Law as a Structure for Action** (for an example, click on the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia at <http://www.un.org/icty/>). (Bilko/Peter Gabriel)

Questions: 1) What is law? Using your definition, is there such a thing as international law? How do you know?

READINGS: Ratner, 1998. "International Law: The Trial of Global Norms." *Foreign Policy*®***

Alliances as Structures and Constraints/Global Architectures. (The Power/Snap!)

Questions: What is meant by bipolarity? What is meant by multipolarity? What's a hegemon? How do you know when you see one? What is the major disagreement between Kagan and Maynes? Why? On what major issue do they agree?

READINGS: Kagan, 1998. "The Benevolent Empire" *Foreign Policy* ®
Maynes, 1998. "The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America," *Foreign Policy* (98) ®
Krauthammer, 2002/03. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." *The National Interest* ®

Week 11

(Nov 5) **Alliance as Structures (continued).** (One/Three Dog Night)

READINGS: Volgy and Bailin, 2002. "Creeping Incrementalism," in *International Politics and State Strength*®

Crisis Behavior. (Let Me Die in My Footsteps/Bob Dylan)

Questions: 1) Have you ever had a crisis in your life? Why did you think of it as a "crisis"? What's a crisis?

READINGS: Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision-making," ®

NOTE: November 12 is Veteran's day...no class

Week 12

(Nov. 19) **Negotiations and Bargaining.** (Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood/Joe Cocker)

Questions: 1) How appropriate is the analogy of poker for the process of bargaining? Where does it fit, and where doesn't it?

2) Look carefully at the Sichertman piece on "Next Steps..." Who are the key players bargaining in the Middle East? Who has most to lose? Least?

READINGS: Morgenstern, "Cold War as Cold Poker," ®
Sichertman, "Next Steps in the Middle East"®

Introduction of Groups and Discussion of Simulation Rules.

(Everybody Wants to Rule the World/Tears for Fears)

READINGS: Frank and Weisband, Chapters 7 and 8

Week 13

(Nov 26)

Simulation

Week 14

(Dec 3)

Simulation concludes

Discussion of final exam. (I Ka Barra—Your Work/Habib Koite)

Individual and group evaluations due December 5th; additionally, bibliographic materials for each group are also due by start of class (December 3rd).

FINAL EXAM: December 12th (Wednesday) 2-4PM

APPENDIX 1A

POWER RANKINGS

RANK	Military Spending	Armed Forces	GNP	GNP per capita(wealth)	Top Exporters²
1	United States	China	United States	Luxembourg	Germany
2	China	United States	Japan	Switzerland	United States
3	Russia	Russia	China	Norway	China
4	France	India	Germany	Denmark	Japan
5	Japan	North Korea	France	United States	France
6	UK	Turkey	UK	Singapore	Netherlands
7	Germany	South Korea	Italy	Japan	Italy
8	Italy	Vietnam	Brazil	Iceland	Britain
9	Saudi Arabia	Pakistan	Russia	Brunei	Canada
10	South Korea	Iran	Canada	Germany	Belgium
11	Brazil	France	Spain	Austria	Hong Kong
12	Taiwan	Ukraine	South Korea	Sweden	South Korea
13	India	Egypt	Mexico	Belgium	Mexico
14	Israel	Italy	India	France	Russia
15	Australia	Taiwan	Australia	Netherlands	Taiwan

² Merchandise exports, in US Dollars (source: WTO)

Appendix 1B:**Summary Table** (<http://www.isis-online.org/>)
(Institute for Science and International Security)

Production and Status of Military Stocks of Fissile Material, end of 1999 (in tonnes)*

	<u>Plutonium</u>	<u>Weapon- Grade Uranium Equivalent</u>	Status
United States	100	635	production halted
Russia	130	970	production halted
United Kingdom	7.6	15	production halted, but could purchase HEU from USA
France	5	24	production halted
China	4	20	production believed halted
Subtotal	247	1,664	
Israel	0.51	?	production continues
India	0.310	small quantity	production continues
Pakistan	0.005	0.690	production likely accelerated in 1998
North Korea	0.03- 0.04	--	production frozen ???
South Africa	--	0.4**	production halted; nuclear weapons program dismantled in the early 1990s and stocks converted to civil use
Subtotal	0.86	1.09	
<hr/>			
Total (rounded)	248	1,665	

*Uncertainties associated with the estimates in this table can be found on the corresponding page for each country.

**Highly enriched uranium--not converted to weapon-grade uranium equivalent. In addition, all of the HEU has been placed under IAEA safeguards. South Africa joined the NPT as a non-weapons state following the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.

Appendix 1C: American Power Moves Beyond the Mere Superpower
The New York Times, Week in Review, April 27, 2003

By GREGG EASTERBROOK



Stealth drones, G.P.S.-guided smart munitions that hit precisely where aimed; antitank bombs that guide themselves; space-relayed data links that allow individual squad leaders to know exactly where American and opposition forces are during battle — the United States military rolled out all this advanced technology, and more, in its lightning conquest of Iraq. No other military is even close to the United States. The American military is now the strongest the world has ever known, both in absolute terms and relative to other nations; stronger than the Wehrmacht in 1940, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power. For years to come, no other nation is likely even to try to rival American might.

Which means: the global arms race is over, with the United States the undisputed heavyweight champion. Other nations are not even trying to match American armed force, because they are so far behind they have no chance of catching up. The great-powers arms race, in progress for centuries, has ended with the rest of the world conceding triumph to the United States.

Now only a nuclear state, like, perhaps, North Korea, has any military leverage against the winner.

Paradoxically, the runaway American victory in the conventional arms race might inspire a new round of proliferation of atomic weapons. With no hope of matching the United States plane for plane, more countries may seek atomic weapons to gain deterrence.

North Korea might have been moved last week to declare that it has an atomic bomb by the knowledge that it has no hope of resisting American conventional power. If it becomes generally believed that possession of even a few nuclear munitions is enough to render North Korea immune from American military force, other nations — Iran is an obvious next candidate — may place renewed emphasis on building them.

For the extent of American military superiority has become almost impossible to overstate. The United States sent five of its nine supercarrier battle groups to the region for the Iraq assault. A tenth Nimitz-class supercarrier is under construction. No other nation possesses so much as one supercarrier, let alone nine battle groups ringed by cruisers and guarded by nuclear submarines.

Russia has one modern aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, but it has about half the tonnage of an American supercarrier, and has such a poor record that it rarely leaves port. The former Soviet navy did preliminary work on a supercarrier, but abandoned the project in 1992. Britain and France have a few small aircraft carriers. China decided against building one last year.

Any attempt to build a fleet that threatens the Pentagon's would be pointless, after all, because if another nation fielded a threatening vessel, American attack submarines would simply sink it in the first five minutes of any conflict. (The new Seawolf-class nuclear-powered submarine is essentially the futuristic supersub of "The Hunt for Red October" made real.) Knowing this, all other nations have conceded the seas to the United States, a reason American forces can sail anywhere without interference. The naval arms race — a principal aspect of great-power politics for centuries — is over.

United States air power is undisputed as well, with more advanced fighters and bombers than those of all other nations combined. The United States possesses three stealth aircraft (the B-1 and B-2 bombers and the F-117 fighter) with two more (the F-22 and F-35 fighters) developed and awaiting production funds. No other nation even has a stealth aircraft on the drawing board. A few nations have small numbers of heavy bombers; the United States has entire wings of heavy bombers.

No other nation maintains an aerial tanker fleet similar to that of the United States; owing to tankers, American bombers can operate anywhere in the world. No other nation has anything like the American AWACS plane, which provides exceptionally detailed radar images of the sky above battles, or the newer JSTARS plane, which provides exceptionally detailed radar images of the ground.

No other nation has air-to-air missiles or air-to-ground smart munitions of the accuracy, or numbers, of the United States. This month, for example, in the second attempt to kill Saddam Hussein, just 12 minutes passed between when a B-1 received the target coordinates and when the bomber released four smart bombs aimed to land just 50 feet and a few seconds apart. All four hit where they were supposed to.

American aerial might is so great that adversaries don't even try to fly. Serbia kept its planes on the ground during the Kosovo conflict of 1999; in recent fighting in Iraq, not a single Iraqi fighter rose to oppose United States aircraft. The governments of the world now know that if they try to launch a fighter against American air power, their planes will be blown to smithereens before they finish retracting their landing gear. The aerial arms race, a central facet of the last 50 years, is over.

The American lead in ground forces is not uncontested — China has a large standing army — but is large enough that the ground arms race might end, too. The United States now possesses about 9,000 M1 Abrams tanks, by far the world's strongest armored force. The Abrams cannon and fire-control system is so extraordinarily accurate that in combat gunners rarely require more than one shot to destroy an enemy tank. No other nation is currently building or planning a comparable tank force. Other governments know this would be pointless, since even if they had advanced tanks, the United States would destroy them from the air.

The American lead in electronics is also huge. Much of the "designating" of targets in the recent Iraq assault was done by advanced electronics on drones like the Global Hawk, which flies at 60,000 feet, far beyond the range of anti-aircraft weapons. So sophisticated are the sensors and data links that make Global Hawk work that it might take a decade for another nation to field a similar drone — and by then, the United States is likely to have leapfrogged ahead to something better.

As The New York Times Magazine reported last Sunday, the United States is working on unmanned, remote-piloted drone fighter planes that will be both relatively low-cost and extremely hard to shoot down, and small drone attack helicopters that will precede troops into battle. No other nation is even close to the electronics and data-management technology of these prospective weapons. The Pentagon will have a monopoly on advanced combat drones for years.

An electronics arms race may continue in some fashion because electronics are cheaper than ships or planes. But the United States holds such an imposing lead that it is unlikely to be lapped for a long time.

Further, the United States holds an overwhelming lead in military use of space. Not only does the Pentagon command more and better reconnaissance satellites than all the rest of the world combined, American forces have begun using space-relayed data in a significant way. Space "assets" will eventually be understood to have been critical to the lightning conquest of Iraq, and the American lead in this will only grow, since the Air Force now has the second-largest space budget in the world, after NASA's.

This huge military lead is partly because of money. Last year American military spending exceeded that of all other NATO states, Russia, China, Japan, Iraq and North Korea combined, according to the Center for Defense Information, a nonpartisan research group that studies global security. This is another area where all other nations must concede to the United States, for no other government can afford to try to catch up.

The runaway advantage has been called by some excessive, yet it yields a positive benefit. Annual global military spending, stated in current dollars, peaked in 1985, at \$1.3 trillion, and has been declining since, to \$840 billion in 2002. That's a drop of almost half a trillion dollars in the amount the world spent each year on arms. Other nations accept that the arms race is over.

The United States military reinforces its pre-eminence by going into combat. Rightly or wrongly, the United States fights often; each fight becomes a learning opportunity for troops and a test of technology. No other military currently has the real-world experience of the United States.

There is also the high quality — in education and motivation — of its personnel. This lead has grown as the United States has integrated women into most combat roles, doubling the talent base on which recruiters can draw.

The American edge does not render its forces invincible: the expensive Apache attack helicopter, for example, fared poorly against routine small-arms fire in Iraq. More important, overwhelming power hardly insures that the United States will get its way in world affairs. Force is just one aspect of international relations, while experience has shown that military power can solve only military problems, not political ones.

North Korea now stares into the barrel of the strongest military ever assembled, and yet may be able to defy the United States, owing to nuclear deterrence. As the global arms race ends with the United States so far ahead no other nation even tries to be America's rival, the result may be a world in which Washington has historically unparalleled power, but often cannot use it.

Gregg Easterbrook is a senior editor of The New Republic and a contributing editor of The Atlantic Monthly.

APPENDIX 2**NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS**

You have been appointed by the president of the United States to the National Security Council. This is our third meeting. Today, I have convened this meeting at the request of the President in order for us to make a recommendation to him with respect to a new, major problem facing us. Consider the following information brought to us last night:

According to our intelligence sources, Russian nuclear submarines, armed with thermonuclear weapons, have been detected off the shores of the following areas:

San Diego;
San Francisco;
Miami;
New York;
Boston.

In all five cases, the submarines are within 150 nautical miles of our continental shores. Apparently, all submarines were moved into their present locations over the last forty eight hours.

The CIA, using both our capabilities, and secure Russian sources, has confirmed the placement of the submarines this morning. We also have confirmation of the missile capabilities on the submarines. This is a close proximity to our continental shores, and we are not aware of a single previous instance, even during the Cold War, of any prior attempts by Russia or the former Soviet Union to attempt this pattern of deployment this close to our shores.

Thus, the situation has become a serious national security problem, and perhaps as well, a serious national security threat.

We have a request from the President for an immediate set of recommendations to him on an appropriate course of action to take.

Before we can recommend an appropriate course of action, we will need to decide what are Russian **intentions**. In other words, **why** would the Russians take this course of action? Our response to this issue will critically affect our recommendations.

I need you to answer this **why** question at our next meeting. Consider the situation carefully! Our national security is at stake!

APPENDIX 3 ROLE CHOICES

Below, please indicate your top three preferences, in the order of your preference, by circling the assignment you would most desire, and add the numbers 1,2,3 next to the circle to indicate your preference ordering, to the groups of your choice.

Name(print full name)_____

United States

Russian Federation

Peoples Republic of China

Japan

Germany

France

United Kingdom

Ukraine

Hungary

Israel

Syria

Iran

Iraq

Palestinian Authority

Pakistan

India

Secretary General, United Nations

If you have a "burning desire" to play another country, indicate here your preference, along with a brief reason for your interest: _____

APPENDIX 4

ROLE ASSIGNMENTS

Name of group _____

Simulation role	Student's name	Phone number	E-mail
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

APPENDIX 5 ROLE RESEARCH RESPONSIBILITIES

First Assignment: (due September 7th)

The first assignment for each group is to divide the group into available roles for each nation. The chief decision-maker will have overall responsibility for the group (As part of the first assignment, the chief decision-maker in each group is responsible for turning in the sheet that is contained in Appendix 4. Please e-mail this information to me at: volgy@email.arizona.edu. Each member of the group should keep the information as well with respect to who plays which role and their respective phone numbers.).

Second Assignment:

The second assignment is to learn as much about your group as possible by the end of the sixth week of class. At a minimum, you will want to answer the following questions:

1. What seem to be the major foreign policy goals, interests, objectives of your group (be specific)? Why? Are there any particular domestic problems in your nation with strong implications for your foreign policy objectives and interests?
2. Which other nations and groups seem to be your most important “friends,” “enemies”? Why?
3. To what extent do the five domestic variables (which we will discuss in class) affect the foreign policies of your country? To what extent do these domestic variables help in understanding the manner in which domestic problems in your nation are/or are not having an effect on your foreign policy objectives and interests?
4. What range of resources do you have available to you to help pursue your foreign policy objectives, including military and economic capabilities (make sure you answer this question in the context of your answers to question 1)? How dependent are you on resources outside of your country?
5. How important is ideology to your group? How about nationalism?
6. How actively are you involved with regional or global organizations and alliances? Why?

To do the research necessary to answer these questions, it is strongly advised that you work as a group and divide responsibility for the research, coordinate the effort, and pool the research each of you will pursue. In cases of groups where your research may be highly interdependent (e.g., Bosnia and Serbia, etc.), for the purposes of the research only, it is permissible for these groups to work with each other and share information during the research phase. (CAUTION: each member of the group will be held responsible for the overall group project.)

In doing your research, you will want to consult several sources, including, but not limited to the following:

- **Current events sources:**

check through at least one of the following sources, for at least the last three years for your country: New York Times Index; Keesing's Contemporary Archives; Facts on File; FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service). There are current events sources for several of your nations as well on the Internet, and links are available for many on them on my web page for this course. You can also see your nation's involvement in the UN and (indirectly perspectives of your nation's decision makers on international relations through the General Debates of the Plenary Session of the United Nation's General Assembly (<http://www.un.org/ga/20special/ga54/IndexE.htm>).

- **National resources:** a good world almanac of the most recent vintage. Further information is available as well from the annual volumes of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, SIPRI, publications of the World Bank and IMF, and the UN Yearbook of International Statistics.
- **General foreign policy analysis:** see these journals for articles regarding your country's foreign policy: Foreign Policy; Foreign Affairs.
- **Faculty resources:** there are a number of faculty who have expertise in your area, both in the political science department, and in other departments on campus. You may wish to chat with them. **Caution:** don't go unprepared! If you want their help, have very specific question ready to ask of them.
- **Some additional quality internet sites:**
 - WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources (<http://www.etown.edu/vl/>)
 - MSU Global Access (<http://www.msuglobalaccess.net>)
 - Internet for Diplomats (<http://internetfordiplomats.com>)
 - International Relations and Security Network (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch>)
 - Diplomaticnet (<http://www.diplomaticnet.com>)
- **Look on the web page for this class. It links to several salient resources** (the locator is <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/issp/issp.html>. Look for Internet Reference Sources.

Third Assignment: (due October 22nd)

As a **group**, you are required to write a position paper, no longer than 20 pages in length, covering the questions noted above. This research paper will function both to give you a strong insight into your group, and as an intelligence source for the other groups about you. The paper must be done in WORD, and submitted on a disk, which then will be made available on my web page for all the other groups to read, comment on, and discuss in class. The research paper is due on the 9th week of class.

CAUTION: keep a list of references, in a separate WORD file. These you will need to turn in at the end of the semester. They will have to reflect the full array of references you used in compiling the paper, and any other references you had used in addition before starting the simulation. The references are due at on the last day of classes (one set of references from each group)

APPENDIX 6 ROLE EVALUATION: INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENTS

Evaluate your own participation in your group. How helpful were you to others in the group? How much did you personally contribute to the group's performance?

Evaluate each one of the other members of your group separately, using the same questions which you used to evaluate yourself.

On the basis of these evaluations, assign a letter grade to yourself, and to each other member of the group.

(This assignment is **due December 5th**)

APPENDIX 7**GROUP EVALUATIONS**

Each group is asked to provide a final evaluation of its own group. This is your last opportunity to explain, justify, and rationalize your group's behavior in the simulation.

Instead of rehashing all you did in the simulation, you should focus on the following:

- 1) How realistically did your group behave? What criteria are you using to justify your "realism"?
- 2) If you did not behave realistically at critical times, discuss how you could have changed your behavior to make it more realistic?
- 3) What decision-making processes did you use to decide what you were going to do?
- 4) How did you use your knowledge of alliance systems to guide your activities?
- 5) How did you take care to integrate considerations of domestic variables with your foreign policy behavior?

Caution and critical: This assignment is not meant to rehash what you did in the simulation. Instead, it is designed to give you another opportunity to show how you've understood the principles we covered in the course, and how you can apply them to current events, either by showing how you used them, or how you failed to use them in the simulation, but now understand how you could have done so. In that sense, this is a crucial, thinking exercise.

(Note: these evaluations will be **due December 7th**. Before turning in the evaluation, all members of the group who worked on the evaluation must sign on the first page.)