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# Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology

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The intent of this article is to expand our understanding of the “zone of peace” that appears to surround democracies by proposing several explanations derived from psychological theories. These explanations, in contrast to those considered conventionally, explicitly incorporate leaders, leaders’ perceptions, and their leadership styles. The first builds on social identity theory and focuses on leaders’ images and beliefs about the enemy. The second examines leaders’ responsiveness to normative and institutional constraints and the effect this sensitivity exerts on their leadership style, suggesting how the latter can shape governments’ security strategies. The explanations embed research on the democratic peace into the theoretical context of decision making and encompass autocratic as well as democratic political systems in the process.

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Two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant (1795) forecast an expansion in republican governance that would mark the advent of an age of democratic revolution. The recent “wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1992) has fueled speculation that the “zone of peace” (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993) Kant envisioned as resulting from such a development is emerging, and, as a result, war will diminish. In support of these ideas, research has repeatedly shown that democratic governments do not wage war against each other; indeed, this regularity is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1989:270).

Currently the scholarly community has riveted its attention on efforts to explain this previously unappreciated linkage between democracy and peace (see, e.g., Lake, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994; Ray, 1995). At issue is finding an explanation that accounts for both pieces of the puzzle that Russett (1993) has labeled “the democratic peace.” Why is it that democracies are no less prone to war and violent conflicts than states with other types of political

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systems, yet rarely, if ever, fight other democracies? "There is little doubt about the existence of the democratic peace; on this the historical record has been manifestly clear. What is not yet settled is *why* democratic states behave in this curious way" (Dixon, 1994:15).

The purpose of this article is to expand the horizons of scholars engaged in this type of empirical investigation by demonstrating how convincing explanations can be constructed using concepts from political psychology. We shall do so by indicating why the lack of attention to factors from political psychology may have led scholars to overlook how important psychological theories are in providing a satisfactory account of the relationship between democracy and peace.

### **Tracing the Causes of the Democratic Peace**

The recent surge of empirical research on the democratic peace not only has focused on the characteristics of democratic regimes in understanding their peaceful relations with one another, but has explored the effects of a relatively large set of potential explanatory factors. Table 1 summarizes the variables these investigations have postulated to influence democratic governments' external decisions regarding war.<sup>1</sup> In this table we have clustered the potential explanatory factors by unit of analysis.

Although collectively these studies have given weight to both international and domestic influences on democratic states' interactions, they assign greater importance to variation in government structure and the norms associated with such open institutions than to international factors. The researchers argue that democratic norms and institutions play a large role in keeping democracies peaceful with one another. Indeed, recent studies have begun to explore which of these two, democratic norms *or* democratic institutions, is more potent in explaining why democracies do not fight one another (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993). But one property of this cumulation of studies is striking: this wave of research neglects sources of explanation that lie within the people involved in making policy decisions.

#### *The Relevance of Policymakers in Current Explanations*

This absence is of particular concern since most explanations of the democratic peace at some point acknowledge that the officials involved make the critical decisions regarding war and peace. Even though researchers stress that the "high politics" of national security is managed by leaders located at the top of their countries' foreign policy bureaucracies, students of the democratic peace rarely directly investigate these leaders' perceptions or beliefs. Rather, they customarily assume that leaders of democratic nations share similar perceptions of the structures of other countries and similar conceptions of the limitations on their own behavior as scholars and analysts do, contending that "it is common knowledge whether a given state is a liberal democracy" (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992:156). Russett (1993:31) summarizes the implicit assumption behind this approach by observing that "if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-

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<sup>1</sup> Although all the variables in Table 1 were proposed as explanatory factors, many were used in the research reported here as tests to eliminate potentially confounding factors that might explain away the democratic peace.

TABLE 1. Factors Postulated as Contributing to the Democratic Peace

<i>Contributing Factor</i>	<i>Study</i>
<i>Systemic Factors</i>	
International law and norms	Maoz and Russett (1993); Raymond (1994)
Mediators present in system	Dixon (1993, 1994); Raymond (1994)
Number of democracies in dispute	Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1995)
Number of democracies in system	Maoz and Abdolali (1989); Parker (1994); Russett (1995); Starr (1991, 1995)
Presence of hegemon	Bremer (1993)
Power status	Bremer (1992, 1993); Dixon (1993); Morgan and Campbell (1991); Ostrom and Job (1986); Raymond (1994); Russett (1989); Weede (1984, 1992)
Power shifts	Ray (1995); Schweller (1992)
Trade interdependence	Dixon (1984); Dixon and Moon (1993); Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett (1995)
<i>External Factors</i>	
Absence of territorial conflict	Weede (1984, 1992)
Disputants in common alliance	Bremer (1992); Dixon (1993, 1994); Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Raymond (1995); Siverson and Emmons (1991)
Disputants members of same international organizations	Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1995)
Geographic distance	Bremer (1992, 1993); Dixon (1993, 1994); Gleditsch (1995); Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Raymond (1994); Rummel (1983); Small and Singer (1976); Weede (1984, 1992)
History of cooperation	Dixon (1994); Ostrom and Job (1986); Small and Singer (1976)
Relative military capabilities	Bremer (1992); Maoz and Russett (1993)
Treaty ties	Raymond (1995)
<i>Societal Factors</i>	
Costs of conflict	Dixon (1993); Ostrom and Job (1986)
Economic prosperity	Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Russett (1989, 1990)
Electoral pressure	Ostrom and Job (1986); Russett (1989)
Independent domestic media	Van Belle (1995)
Internal stability	Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan and Bickers (1992); Russett (1989)
Level of economic development	Bremer (1992, 1993); Dixon (1993, 1994); Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Merritt and Zinnes (1991)
Norms/expectations of political culture	Dixon (1993, 1994); Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan and Schwebach (1992); Ray (1995); Rummel (1979, 1983); Russett (1993)
Mass political participation	Ember, Ember, and Russett (1992); Lake (1992)
Mobilized public opinion	Mintz and Geva (1993); Ostrom and Job (1986); Risse-Kappen (1991); Russett (1990, 1993)
<i>Governmental Factors</i>	
Divided authority/separation of power	Lake (1992); Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992)
Institutional constraints	Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992); Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992); Russett (1993)
Limited government	Manicas (1989); Rummel (1979, 1983); Weart (1994)
Political competition	Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992)
Regularized elections	Babst (1972); Morgan and Campbell (1991); Morgan and Schwebach (1992); Ray (1993, 1995); Small and Singer (1976)

serving elite." Leaders and constituents who share democratic norms, this reasoning avers, "have less incentives to initiate an attack on other democracies" (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz, 1993:219). In effect, "democracies recognize one another and refuse to fight on that basis" (Owen, 1994:96).

While it may be safe to assume that leaders and constituents who share democratic norms will be more tolerant of others who do so also, less certain is whether democratic leaders do, indeed, perceive another country as a democracy or whether they believe that they know how specific leaders of other democratic countries will act and, therefore, whether they can count on these leaders to resolve disputes peacefully. It is an empirical question whether or not leaders of democracies embrace the same values and perceive each other to be ideologically committed to the liberal prohibition against the use of force to settle disputes and on these bases decide not to go to war.

Similarly, explanations centering around institutional constraints assume that democratic leaders have a need to enlist widespread support before engaging in large-scale violence which, in turn, slows down and reduces the likelihood of such decisions. Leaders of democracies, advocates of the institutional explanation posit, perceive each other as being so constrained and "expect, in conflicts with other democracies, time for processes of international conflict resolution to operate" (Russett, 1993:40). It is reasonable to expect institutions to impose constraints on a leader's capacity to initiate war against another democracy regardless of his or her preferences. Institutions pose hurdles (sometimes road blocks) which a democratic leader bent on war must transcend, but they do not necessarily preclude that choice—as the nine covert operations by the United States against freely elected governments in the 1980s and the 86 instances of military intervention between and among free and partly free governments between 1974 and 1988 suggest (Kegley and Hermann, 1995a, 1995b). At issue is whether or not such perceptions of constraint really are influential barriers to leaders deciding against initiating wars.

For both the normative and institutional explanations, whether or not leaders have the presumed perceptions is an empirical question that needs to be tested. But, in fact, very little of the research reported in Table 1 directly examines such phenomena. Instead, the studies assess factors dealing with leadership and constituencies by reference to institutional indicators that are easily operationalized (such as the presence of an uncensored press, the regularity of elections, the length of an administration's time in office). Few of these researchers explore the perceptions of those involved in making the decisions to see if policymakers actually respond to the alleged restraints. Indeed, they come dangerously close to reifying democratic states as unitary actors with motives and images similar to particular types of people (for example, democratic states resemble individual players using tit-for-tat strategies [Axelrod, 1984]). It seems unwise to accept axiomatically, without evidence, the propositions that in democracies liberal norms become part of the "images that a state transmits to its external environment" (Maoz and Russett, 1993:625) and that institutional constraints are mutually perceived without first demonstrating that leaders do, in fact, respect these democratic norms and the prohibition of war initiation that democratic institutions foster. A compelling explanation cannot treat the decider exogenously.

In studying decisions to go to war, we need to take seriously, not neglect, the argument made by the pioneers in the scientific study of decision making (e.g., Sprout and Sprout, 1957; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962; Brecher, 1972) that:

Factors external to the actor can become determinants only as they affect the mind, the heart, and the will of the decision-maker. A human decision to act in a specific

way . . . necessarily represents the last link in the chain of antecedents of any act of policy. A . . . set of conditions [influencing policy-making procedures], for instance, can affect the behavior of a nation only as specific persons perceive and interpret these conditions. (Wolfers, 1962:42)

As Gochman (1993:68) has argued, "If we are to develop models that are to account for whether and why disputes are prolonged or expand or escalate or terminate, these models are going to have to incorporate the 'rules' by which decision makers process information and choose among alternatives." Indeed, knowledge about leaders' perceptions may help to clarify the currently rather inconclusive results in attempts to differentiate between the cultural and the institutional explanations of the democratic peace (see Chan, 1993; Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz, 1993; Morgan, 1993; Hagan, 1994) by suggesting what it is about the setting that influences the decision to refrain from waging war. Or, such information could provide insights into the conditions affecting when leaders' decisions are shaped by one or the other of these influences. Literature from political psychology would propose that when we take into account what happens within the decision-making process in democracies—particularly, how leaders' cognitions and leadership styles can shape their choices—institutional and cultural obstacles may not always restrain what decisions are reached, making the nexus between democracy and peace more complex and nuanced than is conventionally pictured.

#### *The Influence of Leaders in Crisis Situations*

Our proposal to look inside the "black box" is reinforced by the organizational and bureaucratic politics literatures (e.g., Hermann, 1972; George, 1980; Lebow, 1981; 't Hart, 1990) that indicate leaders and leadership are highly influential during crisis situations such as those that typically culminate in decisions to go to war. This research shows that during crises there is a strong tendency for authority to contract to the highest levels of government. Those with ultimate responsibility for the decision dominate the choice process. As power concentrates in the hands of leaders and their closest advisers, often organized in ad hoc decision-making groups, decisions are less likely to be affected by bureaucratic compromise or by the preferences of mass publics and special interests except as these are important to the leadership (Jensen, 1981; Hampson, 1988). The institutional and normative restraints usually operative in a democracy diminish, increasing leaders' decision latitude and encouraging them to act in terms of their perceptions of the national interest and their images of public preferences (Cohen, 1973). Moreover, leaders typically find their approval ratings climb when they respond to crises boldly (see Van Belle, 1995). Hence, in situations that potentially serve as preludes to war, what leaders are like becomes very important, as do their perceptions of the nature of the crisis. Indeed, given the degree of support that this proposition has garnered, it—like the proposition that democratic governments do not wage war against one another—has gained the status of an empirical law in the study of foreign policy decision making.

The inference to be extracted here is that it is the leader—his or her ways of processing information, beliefs about the world, personal needs—who may make a critical difference in the decision to initiate war. As even a cursory reading of diplomatic history will attest, leaders' personal characteristics can reinforce or downplay the effect of formal governmental institutions or cultural norms in crises (Kissinger, 1994). At these times, leaders are freed from the usual constraints on their choices. Even in a democracy, when international crises erupt and the security interests of the country are threatened, leaders are given more control. The

public's access to and control over policy recedes. As Merritt and Zinnes (1991:227) observe, "The frequency with which democratic countries unleash foreign-policy actions before consulting popular representatives, and sometimes even after deliberately misleading them, makes us question the extent to which the foreign-policy process of democracies differs from that of autocracies." Under conditions of crisis the differences between democracies and autocracies narrow, even if in the former system leaders must fear that their constituents may remove them from office for making an unpopular decision. In both types of governments, external threats put leaders into a situation that allows them to choose more freely, and characteristically they only suffer domestically if they fail to act decisively. As a consequence, when a serious conflict erupts, the perceptions and characteristics of leaders become influential in choices concerning whether or not armed force will be employed, the mode of force (overt or covert) that will be used, and the nature of the target (democratic or nondemocratic) (see, e.g., Forsythe, 1992; Kegley and Hermann, 1995a). To grasp the origins of the democratic peace, these observations suggest that researchers cannot afford to ignore who the leaders are and what they are like.

In what follows, we propose two alternative explanations of the democratic peace that are derived from psychological theories. These explanations explicitly incorporate leaders, leaders' perceptions, and their leadership styles. The first builds on social identity theory and focuses on leaders' images and beliefs about the enemy. The second examines leaders' responsiveness to normative and institutional constraints and the effect this sensitivity exerts on their leadership style, suggesting how the latter can shape governments' security strategies. The discussion of each alternative explanation contains within it an agenda for future research.

### **The Impact of Leaders' Images and Beliefs About the Enemy**

Images and beliefs about the enemy and considerations of social identity have become increasingly important to that political-psychological research seeking to understand why people engage in conflict and go to war. Burton (1969), Doob (1970), Kelman (1986), Montville (1989), Saunders (1987), and Volkan (1985) have argued that images of the enemy cause leaders and citizens to insulate themselves from that adversary and to ascribe negative attributes to such a group, culture, or nation. These "others" can do no right and are motivated to make "our" lives more difficult. As Caspary (1993:422) notes, we have "the contrasting images of the loved and trusted ingroup and the despised and feared outgroup." To break down this stereotyped view of the other, these researchers have brought together equal-status members of opposing parties in conflict-resolution encounters. Through communication and social interaction, their studies have demonstrated that negotiation is generally more feasible and effective when disputants have begun to humanize the enemy and to perceive that some among the opposite party share similar views about resolving the conflict. These researchers provide us with information about how people begin to expand their definitions of who belongs in "their group" (or ingroup) and to reconsider the demonized nature of the enemy (or outgroup).

Perceptions of who is part of one's ingroup and who is not become important in understanding the democratic peace because research on this phenomenon operates from an implicit assumption about the nature of ingroup and outgroup interaction. The "separate peace" concept common to this discourse captures this assumption (see, e.g., Parker, 1994). It argues that leaders and people in democratic political systems view other democracies as being like them and, therefore, as part of their own group and their political identity. Political systems that are not

democratic are viewed more suspiciously and often are pejoratively classified as an outgroup with a set of derogatory attributes that differentiate them from the community of democratic states.

In summarizing the literature on group loyalty, Druckman (1994) observes that individuals generally engage in an implicit scaling of groups in their environment. In building their own identity, people are more acceptant of those who are familiar and similar and distance themselves from those who are dissimilar and less familiar. Such a classificatory scheme can become a self-fulfilling prophecy as individuals identify with a group and increase their interaction with those like them, in turn reinforcing their perceived differences from the other groups and reducing their subsequent cooperation and interaction with these others. Moreover, it becomes easier to stereotype both those in one's own group and those in the "other" groups—ascribing to one's own group positive attributes and to the other groups negative attributes. Those in the ingroup can be trusted because they are similar; those in the outgroups are distrusted because they are different and hostile.

This literature suggests that leaders and citizens of democracies probably include in their notion of ingroup peoples in other countries who live under and favor democratic principles. These other democratic leaders and peoples are similar and understandable. In effect, the perceived affinity and affiliation within a coalescing ingroup is prone to widen to include those who subscribe to similar norms and institutions, even though the members do not know these other people. This elasticity in the definition of one's own group has also been found in the experimental laboratory in studies of social identity. By merely dividing subjects into groups based on whether they under- or over-estimate a pattern of dots or whether they favor modern versus traditional art, for example, researchers (cf. Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Messick and Mackie, 1989) have found members of the groups will bias future choices in favor of their group even when these choices lead to less than an optimal result for that group. People promote their own group and its values and interests almost regardless of the circumstances. More important, this research reveals that these notions of social identity develop easily even when people do not know and cannot see the others who are part of their group. Just by being designated as like these others appears to be enough to lead to identification with them.

As this discussion suggests, explanations for this bias for one's own perceived kind center around notions of social identity (see Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987; Insko et al., 1988). By ethnocentrically perceiving one's own group in positive terms, members enhance their own sense of self-worth. Self-esteem is further increased by the belief that one's own group is "better" than another group. Thus, members' self-identity becomes tied to the reference group and to ensuring its importance and worth compared to other groups. Members' views of themselves become threatened by information that calls into question their group's identity and values. As a result, people learn to defend those groups that are important to their definitions of themselves and to differentiate between whom in their environment they should support or avoid. Moreover, if members' identification with the group is strong, they are likely to hold similar perceptions of those outside their group and argue for similar strategies in dealing with these others.

#### *An Alternative Explanation Based on Social Identity Theory*

This line of research posits an alternative explanation for the democratic peace. Nonaggression within the liberal democratic community may result from the fact that these leaders and publics identify countries that classify themselves as democracies as part of their ingroup and, therefore, as worthy of protection and support



rather than competition and conflict. Conversely, it is those governments that are not democratic that cannot be trusted and with whom it is unwise to negotiate to resolve conflicts. Because autocracies' political cultures do not share similar norms, values, and perceptions of the world, they are always potentially threatening. As Volkan (1985) argues, these distinctions automatically divide the world into friends and enemies. He suggests that governments need friends and enemies to justify their own worth and to enhance their status and importance. Such distinctions predispose leaders to react to others according to these classifications. Mintz and Geva (1993) have recently found support for this explanation in an experimental simulation of a foreign policy crisis. The subjects (American students and nonstudent adults as well as Israeli students) were particularly sensitive to whether the adversary was a democracy or a nondemocracy. They were more likely to approve the use of force against a nondemocratic than a democratic adversary and to see the use of force against "one of their kind" as a foreign policy failure. This propensity is also evident in the tendency for democracies to form alliances with one another at a greater frequency than probability theory or geopolitical imperatives would suggest (Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Maoz and Russett, 1992; Dixon, 1994).

Such a perspective on the origins of the democratic peace would also posit that we should find autocracies going to war less with other autocracies. Wars should be fought between states with *different types of political systems* because these are the outgroups and "not like us." Those in nondemocratic governments are likely to perceive their own way of life threatened by those prescribing democratic norms and/or market economies. Leaders of nondemocratic governments respond to the psychological need to support political systems like their own, too. Wars are more easily justified against those who are different.

In fact, data on the democratic peace that include information about the number of democracies and nondemocracies in the world across time lend support to this explanation (see, e.g., Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Maoz and Russett, 1992). At issue is "whether the distribution of conflict dyads over regime types is different from what might be expected given the distribution of regime types in the population of states" (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989:24). Table 2 displays these data for large-scale wars.<sup>2</sup> Maoz and Abdolali (1989:32) note the parallels between democracies and autocracies. Autocracies, too, "are disproportionately unlikely to engage in disputes with other autocracies, but are disproportionately more likely to engage in disputes against both democracies and anocracies" (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989:32).<sup>3</sup> Wars between countries with different regime types are more likely than expected by chance, while wars among countries with similar regime types are less likely than expected by chance.

#### *Making the Explanation More Nuanced: Some Hypotheses*

Discourse on the democratic peace generally assumes that all democracies are similar and that all autocracies are similar. Yet, the literature on regime types and war-proneness suggests this is not the case (see, e.g., Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Bremer, 1993; Hagan, 1994; Raymond, 1994, 1995).

<sup>2</sup> War is defined in these data as a use of force that resulted in "a minimum of one thousand battle-related fatalities and, for each participant, at least one hundred such fatalities or commitment of at least one thousand troops" (Russett, 1993:144; see also Gochman and Maoz, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> The data in Table 2 are taken from tables presented in Maoz and Abdolali (1989) and Maoz and Russett (1992). The coefficients reported in Table 2, however, were calculated based on our reorganization of these researchers' data. The data presented here do not include the dyads involving "anocracies" that were reported in these studies. Because anocracies are defined in that research as having characteristics of *both* democracies and autocracies, we have excluded them from our analysis.

TABLE 2. Ingroup-Outgroup Distinctions and War

<i>Study</i>		<i>Type of Dyad</i>		
		<i>Democracy– Democracy</i>	<i>Democracy– Autocracy</i>	<i>Autocracy– Autocracy</i>
Maoz and Abdolali (1989): 1816–1976 <sup>a</sup>				
War	Expected	29.88	67.73	41.50
Dyad	Observed	0.00	92.00	34.00
	Obs./Exp. <sup>b</sup>	(+)0.00	(+)1.29	(+)0.67
	No. of Dyads	24,489	55,682	34,154
	Prop. All Dyads	0.09	0.20	0.13
$X^2 = 39.93^{**}$ ; $m_b = 1.00^c$				
Maoz and Russett (1992): All Dyads as Baseline—1946–1986 <sup>d</sup>				
War	Expected	5.81	18.26	14.94
Dyad	Observed	0.00	38.00	12.00
	Obs./Exp.	(+)0.00	(+)2.08	(+)0.80
	No. of Dyads	17,876	59,491	48,339
	Prop. All Dyads	0.07	0.22	0.18
$X^2 = 27.73^{**}$ ; $m_b = 1.00$				
Maoz and Russett (1992): "Politically Relevant" Dyads as Baseline—1946–1986 <sup>e</sup>				
War	Expected	4.30	8.90	6.10
Dyad	Observed	0.00	14.00	6.00
	Obs./Exp.	(+)0.00	(+)1.57	(+)0.98
	No. of Dyads	3,878	8,109	5,579
	Prop. of Dyads	0.13	0.28	0.19
$X^2 = 7.22^*$ ; $m_b = 1.00$				

\* $p < .01$ ; \*\* $p < .001$

<sup>a</sup>The Correlates of War militarized interstate dispute data set (see Gochman and Maoz, 1984) provided the information on wars listed here; the classification of type of political system is based on the Polity I data set (Gurr, 1974, 1978); there were 332 wars in this data set.

<sup>b</sup>(+) indicates that the proportion of observed to expected frequencies is consistent with the ingroup/outgroup hypothesis; (–) indicates that the proportion of observed to expected frequencies is inconsistent with the ingroup/outgroup hypothesis.

<sup>c</sup>This statistic is a "chi-square measure of association given a directional hypothesis" (see Maoz and Abdolali, 1989:16).

<sup>d</sup>The Correlates of War militarized interstate dispute data set (see Gochman and Maoz, 1984) provided the information on wars listed here; the classification of type of political system is based on the Polity II data set (Gurr, Jagers, and Moore, 1989); there were 83 wars in this data set.

<sup>e</sup>"Politically relevant" dyads are those dyads in which the members are directly or indirectly contiguous or where at least one member is a major power. These are dyads where there is a high probability of conflict (see Bremer, 1992); there were 32 wars in this data set.

Democracies can be differentiated into those that are presidential and those that are parliamentary, as well as into those that are stable and unstable, well established and not well established, internally coherent and less coherent, more and less developed, and more and less constrained. A multidimensional concept, democracy can vary across a diverse range of possible configurations (e.g., Weart, 1994). Autocracies comprise an even more amorphous group. They can be distinguished

by structure into monarchies, single-party states, military regimes, and authoritarian and totalitarian governments with personalistic rule, as well as by ideology (e.g., communism, fascism), religious orientation (e.g., Muslim states), degree of stability, and level of development.

Such differentiations become important perceptually as leaders envisage the international political terrain and define friends and enemies. Policymakers act on their views of other states, and these views determine whether or not democratic governments will respond to other states on the basis of their form of government: "If its peer states do not believe [a foreign government] is a liberal democracy, they will not treat it as one" (Owen, 1994:96). Leaders may expand or contract the definition of their ingroup depending on the issues they consider to be salient to themselves, their governments, or their countries at any point in time.

Consider the following illustration. In comparing and contrasting the Fashoda Crisis between Great Britain and France and the crisis leading up to the Spanish-American War (both occurring in 1898), Ray (1995) observes that American policymakers dismissed Spain as a "monarchy, i.e., by traditional American criteria, not a democracy" (Owen, 1993:19) and went to war while the British Liberal leader at the time cautioned that Britain and France should settle their differences since "most Liberals regarded the Entente with France as the natural result of democratic impulses" (Russett, 1993:8). Even though the Spanish government could be classified as a democracy at that moment in history—indeed, as a coherent democracy by Gurr and his colleagues (1989) in the Polity II data set—American leaders did not *perceive* it was a democracy. They perceived Spain was an autocracy and, perhaps more important, an autocracy that was preventing another country—Cuba—from becoming democratic. On the other hand, the alliance ties between France and Britain enhanced the sense of ingroup in the view of the British leadership as they dealt with the Fashoda Crisis. "The way historians choose to classify a regime evidently matters less than whether one side itself perceives the other's leaders and public as [an] 'ingroup'" (Weart, 1994:310).

In line with Chan's (1993:208, 211) proposal, the ingroup/outgroup explanation advanced here pushes research on the democratic peace toward being more "context-sensitive" and toward "a concern for the *processes* that generate events." It suggests the need for comparative case analyses to estimate how the states involved in a dispute were perceived similar to what Owen (1994) and Weart (1994) have done in exploring the anomalous cases across history in which democracies have appeared to fight other democracies but where the definitions of both democracy and war are in dispute. To what extent do the actors conceive the objects of their attention as part of a directed dyad and emphasize the character of the target in their decision making? Such perceptions of the attributes of other governments may do more to determine leaders' postures than objective criteria do. These perceptions may become increasingly important as the media and the information highway bring peoples and countries in closer contact. Governments can be framed in certain ways and subtle differences can be highlighted more easily than when regime labels were the only data available (Van Belle, 1995).

Simulation studies of international relations (see Druckman, 1994) indicate that those in leadership roles are able to make subtle distinctions among other governments and respond to these other governments according to their perceptions of the degree to which these others are like or different from them. The distinctions that are made take several forms. Salient to a leader's definition of the situation is whether the other government is viewed as complying with the values and norms that fit the leader's conception of a "good group member," or whether the other leaders are perceived as permitting and condoning behavior that is not faithful to "our community's" values and norms. Are these other governments seen as advo-

cating steps that enhance their similarity to what the leader perceives are the characteristics of "his" group, or are they challenging or renouncing these characteristics? Are they demonstrating loyalty to what the leader believes makes the ingroup important, or are they pushing to redefine or elaborate the nature of the ingroup? Answering these questions in one way includes the other governments in the leader's "own group," whereas answering them in the opposite way makes it highly likely that the leader will view these others suspiciously and as an outgroup should their behavior continue. As we noted earlier, war is more likely with those perceived in the outgroup. Hence, at times, governments can be classified institutionally and culturally as democracies or autocracies and, yet, not be perceived as such by leaders. Much like the wagon masters on the American frontier who circled their wagons when they believed attack was imminent, those viewed as inside the circle were caringly protected and supported while those perceived to be outside were kept at a distance and fought.

### **Leadership Style and Decision-Making Practices**

A second potential explanation for the democratic peace growing out of research in political psychology focuses on the degree to which leaders are responsive to the constraints in their political environments and the impact such responsiveness may have on their leadership style. This explanation takes into consideration the types of leaders likely to come to power in democracies and autocracies, how constrained they are likely to perceive themselves to be by domestic political factors, and, as a result of such perceptions, the strategies that they are likely to choose in dealing with conflict.

#### *Responsiveness to Constraint*

In reaction to the historical debate about whether leaders are born with certain leadership propensities or rise in response to the challenges of their times, researchers have uncovered ample instances of individuals who fall into both categories. This result permits meaningful typification. In the study of political leadership and foreign policy decision making, the more familiar categorizations based on this distinction are crusader vs. pragmatist (e.g., Stoessinger, 1979), ideologue vs. opportunist (e.g., Ziller et al., 1977), directive vs. consultative (e.g., Bass and Valenzi, 1974), task-oriented vs. relations-oriented (e.g., Fiedler, 1967), and transformational vs. transactional (e.g., Burns, 1978). Regardless of theoretical purpose, these typologies rest on the assumption that the behavior of one of these types of leaders is guided by a set of ideas, a cause, a problem to be solved, or an ideology. The behavior of the other type arises out of the nature of the leadership context or setting in which the leader finds him or herself. As Snyder (1987:202) has observed, the one type is more ideologically driven; the other is more situationally responsive. The differences between these two leadership styles appear to result from the leaders' images of themselves and their perceptions of where their behavior is validated (cf. Hermann, 1993).

The more ideologically driven leaders—the crusaders, the ideologues, those who are directive, task-oriented, or transformational in focus—interpret the environment through a lens that is structured by their attitudes, beliefs, and motives. Such leaders act on the basis of a set of personal standards and seek out leadership positions where these standards generally are reinforced. Because they selectively perceive information from the environment, these leaders have difficulty changing their attitudes and beliefs. Moreover, they choose associates who define issues as

they do and who generally share their ideology. Such leaders value loyalty and often move to shape norms and institutions to facilitate achieving their personal goals.

Leaders who are more responsive to the context—the pragmatists, the opportunists, and those who are consultative, relations-oriented, or transactional in focus—perceive themselves as flexible and empathic. They seek to tailor their behavior to fit the demands of the situation, to ascertain where others stand with regard to an issue, and to estimate how other governments are likely to act before making a decision. In effect, the self-image of these leaders is defined by the expectations of others. To become acceptable to the leader, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, and motives must receive external validation from others. These more responsive leaders seek to create and maintain extensive information-gathering networks to facilitate the orchestration of their policy initiatives. They recruit associates who have access to those constituencies on whom their political support depends.

An argument can be made—and there is research to support it (Hermann, 1979, 1983b, 1984; Ziller et al., 1977)—that the norms and procedures democratic peace researchers describe as characteristic of a democracy facilitate the selection of leaders who are more, rather than less, responsive to popular pressure. Such a position builds from Wright's (1942:847–848) proposition that democracies “tend to give leadership to personalities of a conciliatory type” while “autocrats tend to be aggressive types of personality.” And it adheres to Dixon's (1994) statement that it is the political elites in democracies whose behavior is most regulated by bounded competition and the need to build contingent consensus. Such political elites, “always vulnerable to the dissensions of internal oppositions” (Wright, 1942:843), are inclined to act in accordance with democratic norms. Consensus building and compromise are the preferred strategies of the more responsive leader, as are the use of persuasion and a concern for listening to constituents. Both electoral politics and the institutional constraints that define democracy reward leaders who pay close attention to what their various constituents want and attempt to win their approval by representing their interests.

Research on the foreign policy behavior of governments led by more responsive leaders (e.g., Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Hermann and Hermann, 1989) indicates that these leaders are constrained by the specific domestic setting in which they find themselves and, accordingly, tend to take smaller, incremental steps toward their goals. They are less likely to engage in conflict than their more ideologically driven counterparts, and are averse to committing their country's resources to bellicose activities unless the choice enjoys the support of the public. These leaders are predisposed to seek support for their international decisions. Interested in consensus building and multilateral approaches to foreign policy, they are most comfortable working within the range of permissible choices that their constituents authorize. They are not high risk takers—only if they can mobilize the constituents they perceive are needed to authorize conflict will they move forward. Such support is less likely to materialize for conflict with another democracy than for conflict with a government that challenges a democracy's “way of doing things.” Indeed, responsive leaders are less likely to pursue extreme policies of any kind (neither confrontation and war nor peace initiatives and disarmament proposals) unless pushed to do so. They are more likely to be led to war than to lobby for its initiation.

In sum, we are proposing that a constant push emanates from democratic culture and institutions for the election of leaders who respect and respond to democratic values (see Winter, 1987; Dye and Zeigler, 1992). When more responsive leaders are selected, usually they not only are more attuned to public opinion but also are inclined to empower people to help shape policy and to concentrate their attention on building coalitions through bargaining and compromise. As a

result, such leaders are more constrained than their ideologically driven counterparts; they perceive themselves obligated to represent their constituents' views and preferences for policies toward other nations and to adhere to liberal principles both at home and abroad.

Although more responsive leaders are normally elected in democracies (and more ideologically driven in autocracies), it is not surprising that the relationship is less than monotonic. Exceptions to a strong positive correlation surface when responsive leaders come to power in closed systems (e.g., Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union with his concern for "a consensus style of leadership" [Simes, 1984:86]) and when ideologically driven leaders come to power in open systems (e.g., Ronald Reagan in the United States with his focus on confronting communism [Kegley and Hermann, 1995a]). History is replete with such exceptions. Some evidence speaks to the strength of the relationship between leadership style and government structure. Correlations between regime type and leaders' scores on a measure of responsiveness to political constraint<sup>4</sup> for a total of 110 heads of state in office between 1959 and 1987 average .56 (gamma) across several studies (see, e.g., Hermann, 1984; Hermann and Hermann, 1989).

Equally relevant to the arguments being developed here is the influence that leaders' perceptions of constraint can have on the crisis behavior of both democracies and autocracies. We will propose in what follows that perception of constraint interacts with type of political system and type of leader to foster different strategies for dealing with conflict. Table 3 outlines what is postulated. It posits the different perceptions of constraint that responsive and ideologically driven leaders are likely to embrace, depending on whether they head a democracy or an autocracy, as well as the various strategies that these perceptions will probably prescribe. The discussion will focus first on responsive leaders and their perceptions and strategies; then we will probe the perceptions and strategies of ideologically driven leaders.

#### *Responsive Leaders*

Morgan and Campbell (1991) report that 17 percent of the highly constrained polities in the international system between 1816 and 1976 could also be classified as autocracies and 3 percent of those with few constraints could be classified as democracies. Constraint was not limited to democracies nor lack of constraint to autocracies; thus, it would not surprise us if leaders' perceptions of the constraints under which they have to govern also differ by regime type. As Chan (1993:209) has proposed, we are interested in leaders' perceptions of constraint and "how their choice *interacts* with (that is, both being motivated by and having a consequence for) pertinent contextual factors."

The data on responsive leaders reported above suggest that such leaders will be more open to perceiving the constraints in any situation. They are intent on monitoring how relevant constituencies view their behavior. The particular constituencies these leaders pay attention to, however, will differ depending on whether the leader heads a democracy or an autocracy. As postulated in Table 3, the more responsive leader in a democracy will expect his or her freedom of action to be constrained; after all, that is what democracy is all about—compromise, consensus, sharing of power, the consent of the governed. These leaders will perceive that there is a need to ensure support for critical decisions like going to

<sup>4</sup> Leaders' responsiveness to political constraint was measured by a personality assessment-at-a-distance technique that content analyzes what leaders say either in speeches or in interviews. For a description of the particular coding system, see the discussion of conceptual complexity in Hermann (1983a, 1984, 1987) and Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, and Walker (1991).

TABLE 3. Effect of Type of Leader and Political System on Strategies for Dealing with Conflict

<i>Type of Leader</i>	<i>Type of Political System</i>	
	<i>Democracy</i>	<i>Autocracy</i>
<i>Responsive</i>		
Perception of Constraint	Perceives behavior to be constrained; checks preferences of a range of constituencies interested in current issue before acting	Perceives leadership is constrained by preferences of elites who can affect continuation in office
Strategy for Dealing with Conflict	Responds to positions of relevant constituencies	Engages in external conflict <i>only</i> when important elites support decision
Orientation	Moderate	Pragmatist
<i>Ideologically Driven</i>		
Perception of Constraint	Perceives constraint is something to be overcome; frustrated by limitations on power	Perceives others share view of world and current issues as well as support what leader wants to do
Strategy for Dealing with Conflict	Approves increased use of secrecy/covert activity and of diversionary actions	Engages in <i>both</i> highly conflictual and cooperative actions <i>depending</i> on leader's perception of the nature of the target and his/her view of world
Orientation	Militant	Radical

war among specific bureaucracies, in the legislature (or parliament), with salient interest groups, and in public opinion. Although responsive leaders in autocracies will not be as concerned with the range of domestic groups that interests their counterparts in democracies, they will monitor, as hypothesized in Table 3, those elites who have some control over whether or not they stay in office. These elites set parameters around what responsive leaders of autocracies can do. In effect, responsive leaders in autocracies pay close attention to the preferences of *certain* people.

When responsive leaders in democracies react in crisis situations, they are likely to urge actions on their government that are context-sensitive. Foreign policy decisions will reflect leaders' perceptions about what the public and relevant political groups define as permissible as well as their images of the attributes of the actor with whom they are in conflict. Thus, if public opinion, the legislature, potent interest groups, and the media call for the country to "rally 'round the flag," interventionism, and even war, could be the result (see, e.g., Hughes, 1978; Luard, 1986; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Ray, 1995). Likewise, these constituencies can discourage policymakers from considering foreign intervention because criticism and opposition predictably will climb as casualties and costs mount and conflict drags on (see, e.g., Mueller, 1973). As Maoz and Russett (1993) suggest, the time involved in ascertaining where important constituents stand and in building a consensus on what to do can afford opportunities for international bargaining. One highly responsive leader in democratic Japan was noted to "tap his way across a stone bridge to be sure it was safe" before acting in crisis situations (Destler, Fukui, and Sato, 1979:40). Thus, when responsive leaders of democracies choose conflict, it is

likely to be at a lower, and less risky, level unless there is a broad consensus in the country that war is preferred. Such instances are more likely targeted toward those other leaders and governments already perceived as adversaries or as acting contrary to important democratic norms and values.

In contrast, responsive leaders heading autocracies are likely to select actions in crisis situations that will receive approval from those powerful elites who can affect how long they hold their positions. These responsive leaders arrive at their decisions by building a consensus among the interests of those they perceive to be the influential others. In effect, they create a "cartelized" political system in which "coalitions are formed by logrolling among these concentrated interests" (Snyder, 1991:31). Leonid Brezhnev's leadership illustrates this process. He was moved to intervene in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when increased pressure from the KGB, the military, the Ukrainian party bureaucracy, and those in charge of ideological issues began swaying important Politburo members toward intervention (Valenta, 1979). Each feared the consequences of the reforms being proposed as part of the Prague Spring, perceiving that a member of their bloc was challenging communist norms, values, and interests. Moreover, Brezhnev pursued détente with the West but only after offering "an arms buildup to the military, Third World expansion to the orthodox ideologues, and . . . technological transfer to the cultural and technical intelligentsia" (Snyder, 1991:46). Although détente appeared cooperative in tone, the logrolling it took to put this policy into place fostered continuing competition between communism and democracy around the world. Because responsive leaders of autocracies perceive that their job depends on keeping their coalition in place, their behavior in crisis is likely to be guided by the interests of the coalition members. Snyder (1991) argues that expansion is one result of such leadership settings. This conclusion is supported by the evidence that nondemocracies from 1816 to 1976 that were constrained by some form of political competition or sharing of power had a "higher overall proportion of their disputes escalate to war than even unconstrained nondemocracies" (Morgan and Schwebach, 1992:315). Thus, the fact that the responsive leader of an autocracy perceives constraint encourages deference to the special interests around him and, in turn, acceptance of their pressure for interventionary behavior abroad. When such events occur, it is likely that the nature of the target will depend on the interests of those guiding the leader.

#### *Ideologically Driven Leaders*

Unlike their responsive counterparts, the ideologically driven leaders face crises with a particular perspective or set of policy priorities. Constraints are things to be overcome, not accepted; they are obstacles in the way but not insurmountable. For the ideologically driven leader in a democracy, the continuous badgering of constituents and perceived lack of control over policy often result in frustration. The record shows that such leaders are prone to energetically try various maneuvers to pull policymaking totally under their direction. To illustrate the point, we note the tendency for some American presidents to bring more and more of the executive bureaucracies' foreign policy tasks into the White House as they move through their term in office. They believe that, as a consequence of this process, they will know more about what is happening in foreign policy and can exercise greater control over it (see, e.g., Hermann, 1988; Hermann and Preston, 1994; Kissinger, 1994). In contrast, ideologically driven leaders in autocracies tend to surround themselves with people who share their views about the international arena and who, above all else, are loyal. They often "select out" of the decision-making process people who develop independent power bases or push different ideas. Constraints



are viewed as residing in elites who can challenge their authority and preferences. And these "disloyal" elites are dispensable.

Ideologically driven leaders in democratic societies have several ways of overcoming constraints in foreign policy. They can either increase their use of secret (or covert) activity or their use of diversionary behavior. When to employ each of these strategies appears to depend on the target of the action and the general climate of public opinion. Forsythe (1992), Sørensen (1992), and Van Evera (1992) argue that democratic leaders are predisposed to confront other democracies through covert actions because by going underground they can avoid the strong normative and institutional constraints against attacking another member of the liberal democratic community. Such restraints are "strong enough to forestall open military action, but not strong enough to prevent a secret operation or to stop it except belatedly" (Russett, 1993:124). These researchers propose that democratic leaders often feel justified in their covert behavior because they perceive the targets to be wavering in their commitment to democracy. Studies by Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz (1993), Kegley and Hermann (1995a), and Morgan and Bickers (1992) suggest that ideologically driven democratic leaders will engage in covert behavior when the prevailing public mood at all levels is resistant to their policy preferences at the moment. Diversionary tactics (scapegoating, "bashing" the enemy), intended to divert public attention from the domestic to the foreign policy arena, appear more likely to succeed against traditional adversaries or those the leader can depict as currently engaged in threatening behavior. These targets are often autocracies that are perceived as an appropriate outgroup for a democracy. Morgan and Bickers (1991:36) report that such aggressive diversionary behavior tends to occur in the United States when "the leadership of a government is faced with decreased support among members of its ruling coalition" but has general support among the mass public (see, also, Ostrom and Job, 1986). Using these two tactics in tandem, a democratic government headed by an ideologically driven leader can exhibit less *overt* conflict behavior toward democracies but more toward autocracies. Such leaders are much more likely to choose these two tactics if the crisis at hand threatens their personal foreign policy agenda (Gochman, 1993).

The ideologically driven leader of a nondemocratic government is the least likely of the four types of leaders to feel constrained by domestic political pressures. Such leaders, truly authors of their state's foreign policies, are free to reinterpret or redesign situations. Rather than viewing themselves without control, the cause or problem they are interested in solving defines what is important in foreign policy. "Arab nationalism," "ethnic cleansing," "a pure race" necessitate identifying permanent friends and enemies and determining whom the leader will treat with cooperative or with conflictual behavior. Economic decline, military security, and internal famine can also shape such leaders' views of their external priorities and postures toward other actors. Data from Morgan and Schwebach (1992) instructively show that relatively unconstrained nondemocracies between 1816 and 1976 with leaders who were (1) selected, *not* elected, (2) had few restrictions on their authority, and (3) little political competition escalated their conflicts indiscriminately with both democracies and other nondemocracies. Hence, who is chosen as a target is more a result of the principles of the leader than the nature of the political system that the leader either governs or perceives as a threat.

#### *Some Hypotheses Concerning the Interaction of Leadership Style and Political System*

The previous discussion highlights the causal importance of what Hagan (1993, 1994) and Vasquez (1987, 1993) refer to as "leader orientation" to world affairs. By orientation they mean "the core beliefs and interests *shared* by the regime's leaders" (Hagan, 1994:29). As used here, orientation is similar to an operational

code (see, e.g., George, 1969, 1979; Winter et al., 1991) or national role conception (see, e.g., Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987) for the leadership of a government. Vasquez (1993) argues that a hardline orientation is a "domestic prerequisite" to war. Hardliners are moved to military confrontation as a result of their willingness to take risks, hold intense hostility toward certain adversaries, see the world in zero-sum terms, and have a preference for power politics. Often the hardline orientation is contrasted with that of the accommodationist. Hagan (1993, 1994) has elaborated these two orientations to world affairs into four that facilitate differentiating some of the nuances among leaders that we have alluded to above. These orientations are assessed by making judgments concerning "leaders' beliefs about the severity of foreign threats and the appropriate strategies for responding to them" (Hagan, 1993:215). The four are:

1. *Moderate or Acquiescent Orientation.* The world is not a threatening place. Thus, conflicts are seen as context-specific and are reacted to on a case-by-case basis. Leaders recognize that their state, like many others, has to deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and call for flexibility of response. Moreover, there are perceived to be international arenas for co-operation with other states.
2. *Pragmatic Orientation.* The world is perceived as conflict-prone, but because other nations are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility is possible in one's response. The leadership, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing its state's interests.
3. *Militant Orientation.* While the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, it is bounded by "certain established international norms" (Hagan, 1993:216). Even so, adversaries are perceived as inherently threatening and confrontation is viewed to be ongoing as the leadership works to limit the threat and enhance its capabilities and relative position.
4. *Radical Orientation.* For leaders with this orientation, international politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as "evil" and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others. Such leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries. As a result, they are likely to exhibit a foreign policy that takes the offensive and is highly aggressive and assertive.

Whereas the typology based on leadership style and kind of political system elaborated in Table 3 proposes how leaders are likely to deal with perceptions of domestic political constraints, these four orientations to world affairs suggest the divergent ways such leaders will evaluate the expected utility of policy options in the international system. The moderate and pragmatic orientations are more likely concomitants of leaders with responsive leadership styles. These individuals are highly sensitive to the cues in their environments that suggest who is important to achieving one's goals or furthering one's interests. In contrast, the militant and radical orientations are suggestive of how ideologically driven leaders are likely to define the world. They know what they want and are intent on using both the domestic and international settings to further their aims. Moreover, there is a parallel between the orientations to world affairs and the four types of leaders generated by the interaction of responsiveness to constraint and regime type. Leaders with both the moderate and militant orientations perceive that the international system is guided by a set of norms that those studying the democratic

peace have argued typify democracies. Leaders with the pragmatic and radical orientations view the international arena as a threatening anarchical environment and confront these perceived threats on their own terms and in a mode normally considered more characteristic of autocracies.

Although in each instance we are describing “ideal types,” with many leaders probably shading between types, by overlaying these orientations onto the cells in Table 3 we gain analytic leverage in predicting the actors most likely to escalate conflicts into war as well as the tactics they are likely to use and whose positions will be reflected in the decision-making process. In effect, this taxonomy suggests how leaders will respond to the domestic and international pressures that arise in what Putnam (1988) has called the “two-level game” of international diplomacy. When decisions involve going to war, the taxonomy poses a set of propositions regarding the tradeoff between domestic and international pressures in leaders’ behavior, which we advance for subsequent examination:

- (1) Ideologically driven leaders are more likely to escalate to war; those in democratic systems with militant orientations will be more subtle in how they engage in violence, so it is less visible both domestically and internationally; those in autocratic systems with radical orientations will seek attention and advocate the need for change by coercive means.
- (2) Responsive leaders are more likely to stop short of the use of force, although those in autocratic systems with pragmatic orientations will escalate to war if it is only possible to maintain their ruling coalition by such a decision.
- (3) Responsive leaders of democratic systems with moderate orientations will be inclined to initiate war if all parts of the society—public opinion, legislative leaders, the media, relevant interest groups—coalesce around such a choice.
- (4) In both democracies and nondemocracies, responsive leaders will operate from orientations that reflect their more reactive nature and their perception of constraint both domestically and internationally—they are “pushed” by events and opposition to action.
- (5) Ideologically driven leaders, again in both democracies and nondemocracies, will operate from orientations that exhibit their proactive nature and their willingness to “test” the limits of the system both domestically and internationally, playing one off against the other.

Hagan (1994:199–201), in describing the orientations, provides some historical examples of each type of leader that reinforce the above hypotheses. Chamberlain’s behavior in the Munich Crisis is suggestive of a responsive democratic leader with a moderate orientation; Brezhnev’s policies on détente and the invasion of Czechoslovakia reflect the reactions of a responsive leader of a nondemocracy with a pragmatic orientation; Reagan’s Iran-Contra Affair indicates how his ideologically driven, militant orientation toward communism affected a democratic state’s behavior; and Hitler’s Nazi Germany poses an example of a leader of an autocratic state who had a radical orientation and a highly aggressive and assertive foreign policy. In testing these propositions, both in case studies and with aggregate data, it will be instructive to explore whether (1) leaders are capable of modifying their orientations depending on the kinds of circumstances that prompt the necessity for choice, or (2) leaders must change in order for a particular government to change its external policy posture. We note a dramatic change in the orientations of German military policy from Bismarck to Wilhelm II to the Weimar Republic

to Hitler as the types of both leaders and regimes changed. But would we observe a similar kind of change in a responsive leader who becomes convinced the nation's survival is threatened or in an ideologically driven leader who learns to admire and respect the leadership of his or her adversary or perceives the increased salience of particular domestic interest groups? Future research will need to explore the conditions under which the generally responsive leader may become more ideological and the usually ideologically driven leader may become more responsive and, in turn, a change in orientation is possible.

### Future Directions

We have argued that learning about the people involved in national security decisions can contribute to understanding the primary puzzle posed by the democratic peace—*why* democracies' relations are so pacific. How leaders define who are enemies and friends, their perceptions of the constraints under which they must operate, and their different views of the expected utilities of possible choices under such constraints give meaning to how governments are likely to respond to crises that could escalate to war. While type of political system undoubtedly plays a role in specifying limiting conditions on foreign action, the foregoing argument is predicated on the premise that such restraints must be perceived and accepted to be effective. We have proposed that social identity theory and that on leadership style provide us with ways of strengthening our ability to prognosticate which leaders are likely to engage in escalation of conflict as well as the targets they are likely to choose. In the process we have recommended broadening the scope of existing investigation, along the lines proposed by Hagan (1994) and Maoz (1989), to explanations that encompass autocratic as well as democratic political systems. And we have followed Chan's (1993:209) urging that we "embed these inquiries in a broader theoretical context of decision-making" (see also Morgan, 1993).

To the extent that these observations are not bound by time and place for their validity, they prescribe that future studies of the roots of the democratic peace treat these political-psychological processes endogenously. Whereas scholars have made a case for building explanations for the democratic peace parsimoniously by treating the leaders who make decisions exogenously, there is widespread consensus that the resulting explanations are not yet compelling. We believe that researchers may more meaningfully uncover the reasons for democracies' peaceful interactions with one another if they include in the explanatory equation the psychological forces that shape leaders' decisions. In effect, we need to confront the unassailable fact that it is leaders who make the final decisions about war and peace. In accounting for why governments go to war, we need to consider, alongside the impact of the institutional and cultural attributes of political systems, how leaders perceive, interpret, and respond to developments in their domestic environments and to other actors in their international environments. Our purpose here is to suggest some initial steps for exploring how psychological factors may combine with structural and normative ones to foster peace between and among different polities.

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