With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy

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Much theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to the study of democratic consolidation. Most of this literature, however, ignores international influences on the consolidation process. This lack investigation is especially troublesome given assertions by policymakers that outside assistance, including membership in international organizations, can support the consolidation process. I develop and test a theory of how membership in regional organizations can influence the process of democratic consolidation. I contend that regional IOs are not an outside entity forcing their preferences upon new democratic regimes, but that regional IOs are used by young democratic regimes to consolidate reforms through multiple causal mechanisms. I discuss both the demand for regional organizations as well as supply-side factors. I test the argument using event history analysis to analyze a sample of democracies from 1950 to 1992. I find that the joining of certain regional organizations is associated with increased longevity for new democracies.

After the euphoria of the third wave of democratization began to subside, both scholars and democratic reformers turned to the next task: guaranteeing democracy’s survival (Huntington 1991). This would be a daunting task, including (re)building institutions grounded in democratic practice and (re)legitimizing democracy for elites and masses within the state. Most importantly, it meant overcoming opposition to new institutions by groups which could halt reform or return the regime to authoritarian rule. Although a variety of factors are hypothesized to influence democratic consolidation, both the international and regional contexts are often overlooked.

In this article, I develop and test a general theory of how membership in regional international organizations (IOs) can influence the process of democratic consolidation.1 My contention is that regional IOs are used by young democratic regimes to consolidate reforms by multiple mechanisms. IOs serve as a commitment device to bind elites (both those in favor and against new institutions) to reform. This commitment arises from the political and economic costs incurred by joining IOs and failing to abide by these agreements. In addition, IOs can be used by elites to bribe groups who may turn against the regime, by offering a direct transfer of resources or expanding the range of resources which can be used as side-payments to opponents.

This theoretical and empirical investigation is important to international relations theorists, comparative politics scholars, and policymakers. For international relations, I highlight the importance of international institutions in influencing outcomes, especially at the domestic level. In the realm of comparative politics, I show that factors external to the nation-state can have a significant (although not determining) impact on the process of democratic consolidation. Finally, given the recent interest

1 I define regional organizations as formal institutional bodies with nation-states as decision-making members. I address the exact types of IOs included in this analysis below.


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from policymakers in utilizing IOs to preserve democracy, this study provides important findings concerning the circumstances under which these organizations will assist in solidifying democracy.

I begin by discussing the nature of the consolidation problem and the dynamics of domestic politics which can threaten young democracies. Next, I outline how international institutions can assist in the consolidation of democracy with discussions of both the demand for regional organizations as well as the supply-side arguments. Finally, I test the argument using event history analysis to analyze a sample of democracies from 1950 to 1992. I find that joining certain regional organizations is associated with increased longevity for new democracies.

The Nature of the Consolidation Problem

What factors contribute to the duration of democracy? Can young democracies overcome challenges to their nascent institutions posed by anti-democratic forces which previously benefited from authoritarianism? For democracy to become consolidated, it must overcome these short-term challenges, often labeled negative consolidation (Pridham 1995, 169). Empirically, the survival rate of democracies in their infancy is quite low: one-third of all new democracies fail within five years (Power and Gasiorowski 1997).

A key factor explaining this political vulnerability is the change in the structure of domestic institutions. By their very nature, institutions have distributional consequences, and as old institutions are cast aside and new institutions are formed, new “winners” and “losers” arise (Przeworski 1991). As Valenzuela notes, distributional squabbles flowing from institutional change are the essence of the consolidation process: “while democratic consolidation is basically about the elimination of formal and informal institutions that are inimical to democracy, it takes the form of a struggle between actors who benefit—or think they could benefit at a certain point—from those institutions’ existence, and those who do not” (1992, 71). Both winners and losers can pose a threat to democracy.

Losers, Incentives, and New Political Institutions

Distributional losers often pose the most visible threat to nascent democracies. Unhappy with their new status, losers focus only on their short-term deprivations rather than the prospect of future gains under a democratic sys-

stem. Any group may fall into this category but the military and business elites often stand out as potential spoilers in the consolidation effort.

The military can provide the largest roadblock to democratic consolidation, especially if they were an integral part of the previous authoritarian government (Aguero 1995). There are generally two dynamics which lead the military to move against a nascent democracy. First, if the military feels its interests are threatened during a time when institutions are contested, it is likely to move against its opponents at home (Dassel 1998). Moreover, the military may feel that society has become too polarized and that strong central leadership is necessary to protect “the state” (Huntington 1968, 194–196). In these cases, democratization suffers a clear setback even when power is returned to an elected government as the political fabric of a society suffers and the probability of recurrent coups increase (Londregan and Poole 1990).

The second dynamic which can lead the military to move against a new democratic regime arises when the regime attempts to establish civilian supremacy over the military. Post-transitional governments are placed in a difficult position vis-à-vis the military: although it is widely recognized that democracy requires civilian supremacy over the military, this can prove a difficult task since the regime must simultaneously try to keep the military loyal to the new democratic institutions.

The military, however, does not usually act alone. Other societal groups may collude and even pressure the military for action against a democratic regime. Concerns of business elites can trigger such an intervention (Whitehead 1989, 84). The lack of protection for property rights, fear of losing favorable treatment within government institutions, or excessive regulation can spur economic elites to withhold support from a regime, even actively work against it. While economic elites may not possess the resources to directly overthrow the regime, they can sow the seeds of discord which could undermine consolidation of the system or ally with a group which does possess the power to depose the government (Aguero 1995).

Because transitional political institutions are new and fragile, the costs of altering them are lower than if the institutions were highly entrenched (North 1990). This lower cost translates into a lower risk for elites who perceive themselves as “distributional losers” under the reformed institutions. It is important to remember that military or economic elites do not necessarily “lose” before they move against the system. A perception that they may suffer losses under the new government will be enough to spur them to action.
Winners and the Threat to Democracy

Winners can attempt to undermine political institutions by canceling elections, suspending reform, or even cracking down on potential anti-regime forces. Why would winners take this action, especially if they are winning in the short term? The explanation arises out of a perceived lack of credible commitment from the winners to the new institutions. If groups within the state do not feel democratic reform is sincere, they will not support new political institutions which can force elites in control to reverse democratic reform.

There are two main sources of political credibility problems for newly democratic states. The first difficulty is information-related. Regimes can and do begin reform which they have no intention of completing since there are benefits that accrue to those who make economic reforms (Frye 1997). Given that the regime is new, external and internal actors have little information about the true type of government in power. This uncertainty over the intentions of the new government can limit the benefits of reform for those who are sincere. Earnest reformers would benefit from sending a credible signal to distinguish themselves from fraudulent reformers.

The second source of credibility problems lies in the new regimes’ lack of reputation for self-restraint and honoring commitments (Linz 1978). New regimes have no track record of enacting reform and thus foster fewer expectations that commitments will be credible. Compounding this problem is that the winners cast existing institutions aside during many transitions, giving a negative reputation to those in power (Whitehead 1989, 78). Since winners’ past behavior consisted of gutting domestic institutions, their ability to signal commitments will be limited. This is especially true of attempts to signal credible reform through domestic/internal mechanisms. One way to enhance the credibility of such a commitment would be to raise the costs of reneging on reforms and to have the commitment monitored by an external agent.

If societal elites do not believe reform to be sincere, they are unlikely to lend support to the new government. This lack of support can lead to reactions on the part of the regime which undermine the new democracy: “[I]f each political sector concludes that the democratic commitment of the other is lukewarm, this will reduce the motivation of all, and so perpetuate the condition of fragility” (Whitehead 1989, 94). The winners perceive that the new institutions are under attack, and this lack of respect for the governing elite’s authority can lead winners to reverse the democratization process, citing the need to pursue further reform. Haggard and Kaufman allude to this dynamic when they argue “the fact that so many leaders in new democracies have acted autocratically in crisis situations implies that such behavior cannot be explained simply in terms of personal ambition or lack of concern for democratic institutions” (1995, 8). Domestic elites need to be reassured that liberalization is credible. Leaders would benefit from a way to guarantee their commitment to reform and/or a credible signal that they are serious about reform. Regional organizations can play this role.

Regional Organizations: Binding Winners and Losers through Commitments

Regional IOs can assist reformers in making a credible commitment to political reform when their own domestic options for credible commitments are limited. These causal mechanisms function when the state is a member of an organization and especially when a state joins a regional IO. Why are these external commitments potentially more credible than domestic acts? First, IOs signal a commitment to reform by setting in place mechanisms to increase the cost of anti-regime behavior. This increased cost arises from conditionality imposed by the organization on members. Any reversal of reform can bring sanctions, even expulsion, from the organization. This conditionality is a credible signal to internal and external actors that the regime is serious about reform, especially since a third party controls monitoring and enforcement. In addition, the costs associated with membership (fulfilling the initial conditions as well as traditional costs of membership) lend credibility to the commitment. Finally, membership in regional IOs can create unique audience costs for nascent democracies.

Membership in some IOs is sometimes conditional upon domestic liberalization. The European Union (EU) requires all members to be liberal, free market democracies, as does the Council of Europe (Whitehead 1993). This phenomenon is not limited to Europe: the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) also contains a clause in its founding treaty which requires members to have a democratic polity (Dominguez 1998). In addition, the terms conditions and conditionality apply to democracy requirements by an IO or any terms of joining an organization. Although many of my condition and enforcement examples will center on political requirements, the argument also applies to economic agreements to liberalize.
the Organization of American States (OAS) now conditions membership on democracy (Hakim 1993).³

International organizations have been noted for their ability to constrain the actions of member states. Specifically, it argued that joining IOs is a credible way to lock-in policies or reforms to guard against future policy reversals (Goldstein 1998, 143–144). These same principles and mechanisms are at work here—because the IOs serve as an external enforcement agent, the credibility of the commitment is enhanced. In addition, the high costs imposed by these organizations (e.g., sanctions or expulsion) create a clear incentive to work within the rules of the system. This cost serves as a potential deterrent to winners who would undermine liberal reform and thus is the key source of credibility for domestic reformers. This external constraint can guard against backsliding arising from time-inconsistent preferences of leaders or changes in state leadership (political parties or individuals). This delegation "is a tactic used by governments to 'lock-in' and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-vis nondemocratic political threats" (Moravcsik 2000, 220).

Membership conditionality costs and external monitoring, however, are not the only sources of credibility enhancement for winners who join these institutions. Joining an IO can entail financially costly measures which enhance the action’s credibility. Fulfilling the initial condition of membership can require substantial policy changes and financial outlays. In this view, membership in many IOs requires either the creation of additional bureaucracy, membership dues (to fulfill the IO’s budget obligations), even economic or monetary reform. For example, upon joining the EU, Spain was forced to implement a value added tax (VAT), which required a large restructuring of the domestic tax system (Pridham 1995, 181). Such costs can be a clear signal of the state’s commitment to the organization and its conditions.⁴

Moreover, conditions imposed by IOs often require specific policies which may ease tensions among competing groups. For example, the EU requires a commitment to respect property rights and compensation for property taken by the state. Whitehead argues this has "offered critical external guarantees to the business and property-tied classes of southern Europe" (1996b, 271). For Spanish economic elites, a potential roadblock to the consolidation of democracy, the various stipulations of the EC "provided guarantees and reassurances to those who faced the post-authoritarian future with apprehension" (Powell 1996, 297).

Even if the conditionality policy of the IO is unclear or there is a possibility of nonenforcement by the organization itself, reneging on international agreements bring reputation and audience costs on the regime. Making international agreements places a state’s relatively new reputation on the line. Any reversal or abrogation of their obligations of a treaty, even if it does not bring sanction from the organization, creates reputation costs for the state. As important as the international audience costs are domestic audience costs which leaders incur when they renege on international agreements. These domestic audience costs can lead to a loss of face for new leaders, which can have electoral ramifications (Fearon 1994, 581).

These audience costs are uniquely high in post-transitional settings and flow from the fact that these young democracies are attempting to establish a reputation as upstanding members of the international community. In this setting, the domestic political audience is likely to be attuned to these issues since association with a highly democratic IO is an early chance to break with the vestiges of an authoritarian past (Pridham 1994, 26–27). As Pridham discusses, there is a symbolic element to regime transitions and membership in an IO: "There is an evident link ... between recasting the national self-image and opening the way for consolidating democracy" (1995, 177). Losing this membership risks a backlash from elite and mass publics who would blame regime leaders for ruining their opportunity at international acceptance.

These same incentive structures can deter distributional losers as well. Any military junta or economic elite group allied with the military would think twice before embarking on a policy that would cost their economy valuable international links. Because the conditions are monitored and enforced by third parties, the threat of punishment gains credibility and becomes "an external anchor against retrogression to authoritarianism" (Huntington 1991, 87–88).

One example of this exact scenario was played out in April 1996 in Paraguay. While attempting to replace a powerful military general early that year, Paraguayan president Juan Carlos Wasmosy found himself the target of a potential coup. The general, Lino Oviedo, not only

³Conditionality is not a black and white issue as some IOs are vague as to their conditions of membership. For example, although the NATO pre-amble contains references to democracy, one of its founding members was one of Europe’s most infamous dictatorships (Portugal), and military coups never resulted in pressure to end authoritarian rule in member states (Greece and Turkey).

⁴The creation of additional bureaucracy can bring benefits to a government. This is a private benefit to the winners who distribute jobs accordingly, but it also creates groups with a vested interest in remaining a member of the IO.
refused to resign as requested by Wasmosy, but called for Wasmosy to step down and threatened to foment popular unrest in Paraguay (Valenzuela 1997). Immediately a host of international actors condemned the act, led by MERCOSUR ministers from neighboring states. The crises ended with Oviedo stepping down and being exiled. Observers have noted the importance of MERCOSUR in enforcing its democracy condition: “But for MERCOSUR, Paraguay would this year almost certainly have gone back to military rule, setting a dangerous precedent for Latin America” (Economist 1996, S4; see also Dominguez 1998).

IOs can also provide positive incentives to support young democratic institutions and governments. They can provide direct material resources to groups or help create credible side-payments in the form of new policies which would otherwise be difficult to enact or guarantee. While new democracies frequently employ these domestic side-payments after a democratic transition, there are two potential problems with such policies. First, a regime may not possess the requisite resources to effectively bribe the groups in question. Regimes emerging from transitions are usually not flush with excess resources to distribute to groups (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Second, because of a new democracies’ diminished capacity to make credible commitments, it is difficult for those in power to commit to any particular policy course as a side-payment. The previously discussed commitment problems that plague a new regime’s liberal reforms can hinder their ability to make internal side-payments as well.

Some organizations such as the European Union and NATO provide direct resource allocations to states. These resources can be used to mollify groups which threaten the regime. One example is the EU’s policy towards Greece after its accession in 1981. The rural sector of Greek society was traditionally susceptible to the call of authoritarian movements (Tsingos 1996). To complete the consolidation of democracy, the government needed to garner the support of this segment of society. EC development assistance was used to improve the quality of life for the agricultural sector and “facilitate the full and managed incorporation of the countryside’s rural population into the new democratic regime” (Tsingos 1996, 341).

IOs can also provide a credible commitment to certain policies which benefit disaffected groups such as the military. Regional IOs, especially military alliances, can provide assistance in the area of civil-military relations. One example of this dynamic is Spain’s membership in NATO. Spain became a NATO member in 1982 and its membership was solidified after a national referendum called in 1986. The timing of the accession to NATO is no accident—during the previous year Spanish military forces attempted a coup against the young democratic regime. Joining NATO was seen as a way to divert the military’s attention away from internal Spanish politics (Priftam 1995, 199). Moreover, NATO membership provided the military itself with access to more resources than had previously been available, helping to redirect the Spanish military attention away from domestic politics (Aguero 1995, 162).

Of course, not all IOs will serve these purposes adequately. To this point, we have only examined the demand for international institutions in the post-transitional context. IOs may lack both the resources and the political will to serve as an external sustainer of democracy.

### Regional IO’s: The Supply-Side Argument

Part of the credibility gained by winners in post-transitional settings arises from the fact that a third party becomes the monitoring and enforcement mechanism. Of course, given that the outside party is an organization composed of sovereign states with their own set of interests, there is potential for the supply of enforcement to be problematic. This section discusses which organizations will be more likely to supply the means to credibly signal domestic groups that democratic reforms are credible and that reneging on those commitments will be costly.

To serve as a force for democratic consolidation, an IO must have at least three characteristics. First, the political will to set conditions on membership in the first place. Since conditions on IO membership or assistance are important to signaling a credible commitment to democracy, existing IO members must agree amongst themselves to implement conditions. This requires substantial agreement among current members which may not exist in all organizations.

Second, the IO must possess the political will to enforce the conditions once the nascent democracy is admitted. Members face a potential problem with such arrangements since such enforcement can be costly to the existing members. These costs may be especially high in the case of third-party enforcement and monitoring (North 1990, 58). This points to the third and related characteristic, the means to enforce political conditions.

Monetary costs do exist where bribes are concerned. Any time these mechanisms are involved, as in the case of Greece, a substantial monetary outlay can occur. Political will becomes important especially when it involves direct cost to states. Enforcement costs also include opportunity costs—if an IO confronts a condition violator, they
can suspend that state’s membership or expel the state in question. Member states will no longer enjoy free trade, economic policy coordination, or military support from the offending regime.

Despite these potential roadblocks to enforcement, the hypothesis I put forth is that the higher the “democratic density” of an IO, the more likely liberalization requirements will exist and be enforced. That is, taking member states as the unit of analysis, the higher the average level of democracy within a regional IO, the more likely the organization will be to serve this role of external guarantor. Note that this measure does not refer to the level of democracy within the organizational structure or procedures. Rather, the higher the “democraticness” of each state, averaged within the organization, the more likely the organization will be to set and enforce conditions.\(^5\)

There are several reasons why highly democratic IOs are more likely to set and enforce conditions in order to assist in the consolidation of democracy. First, “democratic density” functions as a proxy for commonality of interests within the organization. This is not to say that IOs composed of only democracies are completely harmonious, but compared to a mixed-regime IO, however, the range of shared interests will be larger (cf. Gartzke 1998). One of these shared interests is likely to be democracy promotion. Although common interests are no guarantee that regional IO will promote democracy, this should bode well for the setting and enforcement of political conditionality.

Second, the more democratic an IO, the lower the probability that member states will openly shirk in enforcing conditions. One important argument highlighted in the democratic peace literature as well as the recent rationalist causes of war literature, is that democracies are more transparent, especially to one another (Schultz 1999). This transparency means that states would have a more difficult time cheating on enforcement. If a state is deciding whether to help enforce a conditionality clause (e.g., by suspending free trade or imposing sanctions), it is easier to witness the behavior of fellow democratic members than autocratic members. Thus, a member state can ensure that other states do not cheat by working with the offending state outside the organization. If a member state anticipates this type of cheating, it will be less likely to push for enforcement against the rule violator. Among democracies, this lower risk of cheating will raise the probability of enforcement.

Third, just as nascent democracies face high audience costs for reneging on their international agreements, so do democratic member states of IOs. The same logic applies here: leaders in democracies face costs if they do not carry out the terms of their agreements. Brett Leeds (1999, 998) has shown that democracies are more likely to keep their agreements because of audience costs as well as low policymaking flexibility. Since leaders in democratic countries face electoral incentives to keep their agreements, more homogenously democratic IOs will be more likely to enforce conditionality.

Empirically, IOs do inflict punishment on those who break conditions of agreements. For example, the EU suspended the Greek association agreement in 1967 after a military coup (Whitehead 1993, 154). Turkey has been continually frustrated by the EU’s refusal of admission, which has come of the grounds of that state’s questionable record of democracy (Whitehead 1993, 159–161). The OAS threatened Guatemala with punishment after a threatened coup by its president (Cameron 1998).

Finally, on the issue of means, highly democratic IOs are more likely to posses the resources to bribe domestic actors and pay the cost of enforcement. Although the democracy and development link is still controversial, the empirical fact remains that democracies are more affluent than their nondemocratic counterparts (Londregan and Poole 1996). In addition, because of their larger aggregate wealth, they can more easily absorb the opportunity costs of punishing a condition violator.

There is a demand-side issue to consider as well. These highly democratic organizations are more likely to be tapped by democratizing states, since these regional IOs will provide the clearest signal of intent. Joining an IO made up of semi-democracies and autocracies does little to assuage political and economic forces that there is little risk of reversal in the future.

Two notes are necessary on the nature of the organizations included in this analysis. As a first examination of this question, I limit the sample to regional IOs. Regional organizations are those whose membership consists of geographically proximate states.\(^6\) I limit the sample for several reasons. First, regional organizations are the most common type of IOs in the world system (Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers 1986, 143). Examining the most common type of organization has clear advantages in terms of statistical inference. Second, much of the literature on the international influences on democratization

\(^5\)From this point forward, any reference to “democratic” IOs should be understood as the aggregate level of democracy among the members rather than a trait of the organizational structure.

\(^6\)A handful of the organizations included in this study have members that are “extra-regional”, but these are cases where the U.S. or Canada is a member of an otherwise “European” institution (e.g., NATO). Nye (1987, 8) defines these organizations as “quasi-regional.”
concentrates on regional organizations versus global organizations (cf. Pridham 1994). This is a result of comparative politics scholars focus on regions in the study of democratization. Given these considerations, I concur with Whitehead that “the importance of such international dimensions of democratization seems much clearer at this regional level than at the world-wide level of analysis” (1996a, 395).

Finally, from a theoretical perspective, one expects the causal processes hypothesized above to function more readily in regional organizations. Because regional IOs tend to operate with small numbers and with higher levels of interaction than global organizations, processes such as political conditionality with monitoring and enforcement are much more likely in regional organizations (Nye 1987). In addition, by their very nature, global institutions rarely maintain no conditions on membership and do not require any change in domestic policy. For these reasons, I limit the initial sample to regional IOs.7

The second note on the types of organizations deals with international and regional financial institutions (IFIs) which are not included in this analysis. Although there is tremendous speculation and debate over the impact of these organizations (such as the IMF, World Bank, and various regional development banks) on democratization, little systematic research exists on this topic (for an exception, see Haggard and Kaufman 1992). My justification for the exclusion of these types of institutions two fold. First, IFIs are likely to influence democratic stability through different causal processes. Membership in IFIs is rarely conditional on anything other than paying the costs associated with membership. The assistance given by IFIs, however, is conditioned (e.g., conditions on structural adjustment loans). It is this conditionality that is sometimes associated with democratization, yet the conditions of adjustment loans are almost always economic in nature. These conditions often attempt to spur additional economic liberalization or economic stability in the target state. These conditions could lead to political problems in the target state, but this is a second-order effect of the conditionality. This is important since an empirical test of this IFI-democratization proposition would differ from the one undertaken here and would need to reflect the multi-stage processes linking economic liberalization to democratic consolidation.

Second, a similar problem arises in that IFI activity could merely be an intervening variable for economic crises. If IFI activity correlates with economic crises, one may find a relationship between IFI’s and consolidation, yet one would need to disentangle the influence of economic crises from that of IFI policies. This is essential since economic crises can have clear independent effects on consolidation. Again, this would require a very different empirical test from that undertaken here. For these reasons, I have excluded IFIs from the initial results.

These practical and theoretical issues concerning non-regional IOs and IFIs aside, I do rerun the following analyses including membership in several non-regional organizations (e.g., the United Nations) and IFIs (e.g., the World Bank and regional development banks). Their inclusion should weaken the results, since these organizations influence consolidation in different ways. By adding IOs which may or may not influence the process of consolidation to the data, the observed relationship should be weaker.

**Testing the Argument**

If the preceding theory is correct, membership and/or accession to democratic regional IOs should increase the chances for democratic consolidation. To test this argument, this section will build and estimate several models of democratic consolidation. The expectation is that membership in and especially joining a regional institution with a high “democratic density” will be positively associated with the consolidation of democracy. Since much of the value of a regional IO comes from their signaling of credible commitments to domestic and international actors, joining a highly democratic IO should have an independent effect.

**Measuring Democratic Consolidation**

Because agreement on definitions of democracy and democratic consolidation are quite rare, I have chosen to use multiple sources to operationalize this concept. To model the timing of democratic breakdown, I utilize two measures of democratic change. The basic setup of my data is a panel design where the unit of analysis is the country-year. Most states of the world system are included in the data, which range from 1950 to 1992.8

In the following models, the dependent variable is the length of time a regime persists as a democracy,

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7Regional IOs create various levels of membership—observers, associates, and full members—each carrying unique obligations and benefits. I include associate memberships in these analyses and discuss this issue below.

8The Polity data excludes some states which the Correlates of War project considers members of the international system. Those states are excluded here as well since these states tend to have small populations (less than 500,000).
labeled $DTIME_{it}$. This measures the number of years since a transition to democracy until democratic breakdown (both defined below). The counter would stop and the variable would be missing until another democratic transition occurs.\(^9\) $DTIME_{it}$ also takes on a nonmissing value if the state begins its time in the sample as a democracy. Although the issue of left-censoring is important to keep in mind, $DTIME_{it}$ begins at 1 for all democratic states entering the sample in 1950 or upon their independence. If a breakdown does not occur for the remainder of the observation period the observation is right-censored.

Two data sets are used to measure democracy and transitions.\(^10\) The first is computed using the Polity98 (Marshall 1999) data set. Using this single measure of democracy, scholars set “cut-points” for labeling the regime type. Any regime at or above the cut off (here, a value of +6) is labeled a democracy, while any regime at or below the lower bound (here, −6), is labeled an autocracy. Any time a state passes these thresholds, a transition is coded.

As a second source of regime type data, I utilize Gasiorowski’s (1996) Political Regime Change data set. Gasiorowski codes transitions for the developing world (Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Asia) from 1815 to 1992.\(^11\) He distinguishes among four regime types: authoritarian, semi-democratic, democratic, and transitional.\(^12\) I code a state as undergoing a democratic transition if any of the following movements occur: transitional to democratic, semi-democratic to democratic, autocratic to democratic, and autocratic to semi-democratic. A democratic breakdown occurs and the $DTIME_{it}$ counter reverts to missing if a transition from democracy to autocracy occurs. If a transition from democracy to semi-democracy occurs, the counter stops, but is immediately restarted at 1 since, according to the Gasiorowski coding criteria, these regimes still contain many democratic traits.\(^13\)

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\(^9\)All autocracies are thus excluded from the analysis. Since the question under consideration is what makes democracies last, autocracies can be excluded without biasing the results.

\(^10\)Technically there are two separate dependent variables—one for the Gasiorowski data, one for the Polity98 data.

\(^11\)Note that Gasiorowski excludes Europe and North America, resulting in a lower number of observations.

\(^12\)For Gasiorowski, “transitional” does not necessarily imply democratic transition. It is applied to any regime in which “top government officials…engineer a change from one…regime type to another” (1996, 472).

\(^13\)Some may object to my characterization of democratic “endurance” as “consolidation,” yet while democratic endurance may not equate directly with consolidation, it is a necessary condition.

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**Modeling Regime Duration**

To test whether regional IOs are associated with democratic consolidation, I estimate the following model:

$$DTIME_{it} = \alpha_0 + b_1 \text{IOScore}_{i,t-1} + b_2 \Delta \text{IOScore}_{i,t-1} + b_3 \text{pcGDP}_{i,t} + b_4 \Delta \text{pcGDP}_{i,t} + b_5 \text{Contagion}_{i,t} + b_6 \text{PBDown}_{i,t} + b_7 \text{RegConflict}_{i,t} + b_8 \text{IntVio}_{i,t-1} + b_9 \text{Prez}_{i,t} + b_{10} \text{StableD}_{i,t} + b_{11} \text{Indep}_{i,t} + \mu_{it}$$

(1)

The model is estimated using event history analysis. Each model will tell us the effect of each independent variable (covariate) on the probability (hazard rate) that democracy will fail in state $i$ at time $t$. Recall that the model will be estimated using two different dependent variables based on the two data sets of regime transition.

The first independent variable, $\text{IOScore}_{i,t-1}$, is the measure of the democratic density of the most democratic IO of which state $i$ is a member in year $t-1$. This variable is computed by first coding the memberships of all regional organizations listed in Banks and Mueller (various years).\(^14\) Next, the average level of democracy in the IO is computed using each member Polity98 democracy score.\(^15\) $\text{IOScore}_{i,t}$ is a yearly average of the democracy scores for the members of each IO (excluding that state’s own democracy score). For states with multiple memberships, the highest value is used.

The next independent variable, $\text{DIOScore}_{i,t-1}$, is computed to isolate the effects of joining a democratic international organization. As previously discussed, the signaling value of joining a highly democratic IO is important to domestic and international economic, as well as domestic political interests. This variable is the simple, one-year difference of $\text{IOScore}_{i,t-1}$. If a state joins a new IO which is more democratic than any previous IO, the value of $\Delta \text{IOScore}_{i,t-1}$ will be positive. Including this change variable as well as the level variable will allow a comparison of the effects of joining a democratic IO versus the overall level of “democratic-ness” in the IO.\(^16\)

The next two independent variables tap the economic context of the regime. The first variable $\text{pcGDP}_{i,t}$ measures the per capita GDP levels (in thousands) of

\(^14\)Banks and Mueller describe which IOs are restricted in their discussion of each organization’s membership. The list of organizations used in the primary analyses is found in the appendix.

\(^15\)I add 10 to each state’s democracy score, so that a state which never a member of an IO has a score of 0.

\(^16\)Change in the level of democracy could represent a change in the level of democracy of the IO. Thus, $\Delta \text{IOScore}_{i,t-1}$ can be positive because of democratization in other member states rather than a new membership for the state. While this is a concern, the Contagion variable will help control for this influence.
each state at time \( t \). A large body of literature has developed around the hypothesis that higher income countries are more likely to be democracies. One of the most recent contributions to this debate holds that it is not the level of income that causes democracy, but rather higher income preserves democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). The second economic variable, \( \Delta pcGDP_{it} \), measures the change in per capita GDP (in hundreds) over a one year interval, \( t-1 \) to \( t \). This variable controls for growth rates in a state, which are often found to affect the likelihood of anti-regime activities (Londregan and Poole 1990).

The variable \( \text{Contagion}_{it} \) controls for possible diffusion effects from other established democracies. Although the causal mechanism may vary, several theories hold that the presence of democracies or democratic transitions is likely to encourage democracy in other countries (O’Loughlin et al. 1998). Here, \( \text{Contagion}_{it} \) is a variable representing the percentage of states contiguous to state \( i \) which are democratic (this will vary depending on the data set used).

\( \text{PBDown}_{it} \) is the next independent variable and equals 1 if the state has undergone a democratic reversal (according to each particular data set) since the beginning of the observation period; otherwise the variable is coded as 0. Once a breakdown occurs the remainder of observation years for that state are coded as 1. Some scholars argue that a past experience with democracy in a state should bode well for new democracies since civil society and democratic norms have a head start in these states (Linz and Stepan 1996). Przeworski and colleagues (1996) contend, however, that past democracy implies a past democratic breakdown. While a history of democratic practice may exist, the state also has a history of ending democracy.

Two variables are coded to measure the effect of external and internal conflict. Thompson (1996) has argued that for democracy to flourish, a stable and peaceful military environment must exist. To control for regional conflict, including war, use of military force, and the threat of military force, \( \text{RegConflict}_{it} \) measures the total number of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) in state \( i \)'s region in year \( t \) (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). \(^{18}\)

In addition to external conflict, I control for internal conflict in the form of domestic unrest by introducing the variable \( \text{IntViolence}_{it-1} \) into the model. Taken from Banks (1994), this variable is coded 1 if state \( i \) suffers from any anti-government riots, strikes, riots, guerilla insurgencies, or assassination attempts on major government officials in year \( t-1 \).\(^{19}\)

The next independent variable is \( \text{Prez}_{it} \), coded as a 1 if a state has a presidential or mixed system, and 0 otherwise.\(^{20}\) One hypothesis in the democratization literature is that parliamentary democracies are more stable than presidential systems, since presidential systems can produce all-or-nothing outcomes (Linz 1990) and potential for immobilism (Przeworski et al. 1996).

Recall that both democracies which existed at the beginning of the observation period and recently democratized states are included in the sample for this model. Given the theory presented earlier the regional IO-consolidation link should be stronger for newly democratized states. Excluding stable democracies from the investigation, however, risks inducing selection bias (since they are at some risk of failure). To distinguish stable democracies from new democratic polities, I code a variable, \( \text{StableD}_{it} \) which equals 1 if the state began its tenure in the analysis as a democracy.\(^{21}\)

It is also important to control for how long each country has existed as an independent nation-state, since young states may have little opportunity to develop stable institutions of any kind. To control for these influences, I code a continuous variable, \( \text{Indep}_{it} \), which counts the number of years since state \( i \)'s political independence (Small and Singer 1994). For states independent before 1950, the count begins in 1815. Finally, \( \mu_{it} \) is a stochastic error term.

**Results**

Table 1 presents the estimates of the model, given each measure of the dependent variable. It is important to note that the interpretation of the Cox and Weibull event

\(^{18}\)Both of these economic variables are taken from Summers et al. (1995) and supplemented with data from Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000, footnote 61).

\(^{19}\)Banks (1994) provides a description of his coding criteria for each type of event for the data set. I have lagged this term to avoid endogeneity, since violence may be the result of a breakdown of democracy.

\(^{20}\)Data are taken from Alvarez et al. (1996) and updated from the CIA Factbook (1999) to include new democracies formed after 1990 (the end of Alvarez et al.’s coding period).

\(^{21}\)This also includes a handful of newly independent states which began as democracies. Although these states may be different from the “stable” democracies which this variable is designed to control for, the independence control variable should adequately account for these states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cox Models</th>
<th>Weibull Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOSCoreit-1</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.98)</td>
<td>(-1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIOSScoreit-1</td>
<td>-0.62*</td>
<td>-0.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.35)</td>
<td>(-2.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDPit</td>
<td>-0.69**</td>
<td>-0.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.15)</td>
<td>(-2.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DpcGDPit</td>
<td>-0.47**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.30)</td>
<td>(-0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagionit</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.02)</td>
<td>(-0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDownit</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflictit</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.87)</td>
<td>(-0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntViolenceit-1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(-0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prezit</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.93)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StableDit</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.75)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indepit</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1552  805  1552  805
(Countries) 76  52  76  52
Log Likelihood -77.99 -174.97 -52.09 -80.65
Chi-square 45.47** 25.68** 46.95** 27.43**

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using clustered standard errors.
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; two-tailed tests.

Note that Cox Models do not include a constant. It is absorbed into the baseline hazard.

history models is slightly different than traditional
regression models. A key difference is in the interpretation of the effects of individual coefficients on the dependent variable. A negatively signed coefficient estimate means that the hazard rate of experiencing democratic breakdown is proportionally lower. Conversely, a positive coefficient signifies an increase in the hazard rate and means a shorter duration for the polity. I utilize both Cox estimation and a Weibull parameterization as a robustness check. Each provides advantages in estimation: the Cox model allows flexibility in specifying the underlying hazard rate, but because of the large number of ties (democracies ending at the same age), the Weibull model provides an important check.22

The first variable of interest, IOSCoreit-1, is not statistically significant in any of the estimates. While the variable takes on the predicted sign (membership in more democratic IOs lowers the rate of failure for democracies), because the variable is not significant, one can conclude that membership in an IO with higher levels of democracy does not appear to be systematically associated with longer-lasting democratic regimes.

The effect of joining a highly democratic IO is assessed by turning to the second independent variable,
### Table 2  Change in the Baseline Hazard Rate based on the Cox estimates in Table 1 (columns 1 and 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in variables</th>
<th>Percent change in baseline hazard (Polity98)</th>
<th>Percent change in baseline hazard (Gasiorowski)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in ΔIOScore_{it-1} by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>-63.6</td>
<td>-45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in pcGDP by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>-95.1</td>
<td>-88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease in pcGDP from median to 25th percentile</td>
<td>+103.9</td>
<td>+66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in ΔpcGDP by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>-95.1</td>
<td>-41.8*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Model estimate is not statistically significant.

ΔIOScore_{it-1}. These results present a stronger case for the influence of democratic regional IOs as all estimates of this coefficient are negative and highly statistically significant. This indicates that an increase in the level of democracy of an organization of which state i is a member is associated with a decreased risk of democratic breakdown. To gauge the importance of this variable, Table 2 presents the percent change in the baseline rate if the value of this independent variable is varied (based on the Cox estimates). Note that joining an IO whose aggregate level of democracy is one standard deviation above the average increase results in a 64 percent drop in the hazard rate for a democracy for the Polity98 data. Likewise, for the Gasiorowski coding, the same membership decreases the hazard rate by over 45 percent.

These estimates largely confirm my fundamental argument: certain regional IOs can assist in the consolidation of democracy and this influence is strongest when states join these organizations. While the discussion of each causal mechanism provided illustrative case material to this end, this cross-national statistical examination provides more systematic evidence on the veracity of these ideas. Although these estimates show the importance of one set of external factors, I make no claim that these variables are determining or even the most important in terms of democratic consolidation, only that they are significant factors in that process. Domestic political and economic factors are clearly important as well.

The estimates of the economy-related independent variables, pcGDP_{it} and ΔpcGDP_{it} are both statistically significant and in the expected direction in six of the eight cases. Consistent with the political development literature previously discussed, higher levels of per capita GDP are related with longer-lasting democracies. This result is yet another piece of evidence in support of Londregan and Poole (1996) as well as Przeworski et al. (1996), that income levels do as much to stabilize existing democracies as it does to create new democracies. Change in the levels of wealth in a state, (ΔpcGDP_{it}), is consistently negative across the two measures, but varies in statistical significance. For the Polity98 coding, this variable is statistically significant, but for the Gasiorowski measure, the estimates are negative, but are not significant. These results accord with prior literature on the growth and survival of democracy. Regimes which can increase growth face a higher chance of survival, while those who suffer economic downturns are vulnerable to democratic breakdown (Gasiorowski 1995).

Table 2 shows the percentage changes in the baseline hazard rate given variation in levels of per capita GDP. An increase of one standard deviation from the mean results in an almost 95 percent decrease in the hazard rate in the Polity estimates and a corresponding 88 percent decrease in the Gasiorowski estimates. Likewise, a decline in per capita income from the median to the 25th percentile results in over a 100 percent increase in the hazard rate for the Polity data and a 66 percent increase in the Gasiorowski data.

Many of the remaining control variables take on the predicted sign, but do not achieve statistical significance, especially across data sets. The Contagion_{it} variable is of the expected sign across all models, but is never statistically significant.23 Turning to the measures of conflict, neither external nor internal conflicts seem to have a systematic effect on regime duration. The estimates of the coefficients for RegConflict_{it} is negative in all models, but never statistically significant. The estimates of IntViolence_{it-1} also never achieve statistical significance, and the signs of the coefficients also change depending on the data set. Thus, it is difficult to draw conclusions from these estimates.24

Despite these occasional inconsistent results and the limited sample of Gasiorowski, those estimates are an 23Recalculating this variable to count the number of democracies in state i's region yields very similar results for the key independent variables, but the new Contagion_{it} variable is significant in all but the Polity98-Weibull model.
24Replacing RegConflict_{it} with a variable which measures only violent disputes within a region (on this distinction, see Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) makes no difference in the results.
important guard against the influence of Europe and North America. When dealing with such issues as international organizations and democratic consolidation, many will wonder if the results are driven by the EU or by Europe in general. Since the main independent variables of interest are of consistent sign and significance using the Gasiorowski data, this is less of a concern. Thus, this data set provides a robustness check of the models against bias from the Western democracies.

Finally, one should also note the estimate of the duration dependence parameter in the Weibull models (the \( \alpha \) term). In the case of the Polity98 data—the estimate of \( \alpha \) is not statistically significant, indicating no duration dependence in the data. For the Gasiorowski data, however, \( \alpha \) is greater than 1 and significant, indicating an increasing hazard rate over time. Thus, for Gasiorowski’s sample of developing states, time itself does not increase the propensity for democratic stability.\(^{25}\)

### Further Statistical Considerations

As previously discussed, only regional IOs are included in the previous statistical analysis. There are strong theoretical reasons to expect these organizations to uniquely provide credible commitment devices to leaders in new democracies and the preceding tests provided support for this hypothesis. As a robustness check, I do reestimate each model, including non-regional IOs as well as membership in IFIs. If regional IOs uniquely serve the tasks suggested here, the observable implication is that the statistical results should weaken with their inclusion. This is precisely the case. In replicating all four models in Table 1\(^{26}\), replacing I\(OScore_{it-1} \) and \( \Delta I\OScore_{it-1} \) with variables which include the I\(OScore \) of non-regional organizations, the estimate of \( \Delta I\OScore_{it-1} \) becomes statistically insignificant (at the p < .05 level) in three of the four cases (the estimate always remains negative).\(^{27}\) Thus, regional IOs seem to empirically provide the clearest association with the consolidation of democracy, although this should not be taken as a final test for the impact of non-regional organizations.

Another possibility is that my hypothesis concerning the homogeneity of democracy within the regional IO is incorrect. A counter-hypothesis is that any IO, not just highly democratic ones, can carry out the causal mecha-

\(^{25}\)On the interpretation of this term, see Beck (1998); Bennett (1999); and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997).

\(^{26}\)These estimates, and all discussed in this section, are available from the author.

\(^{27}\)In the fourth case, the Cox estimates of the Polity98 data, \( DI\OScore_{it-1} \) is statistically significant.

nisms outlined in my theory. To test for this possibility, I add a term, labeled \( \text{NIO}_{it-1} \) to the model. This measures the number of regional IOs to which state \( i \) is a member. In all models, this term is not statistically significant at the p < .05 level. More importantly, the significance and magnitude of \( \Delta I\OScore_{it-1} \) does not change. The same is true when \( \text{NIO}_{it-1} \) is added to the model. This variable never achieves statistical significance and the estimates of the remaining terms are highly similar.\(^{28}\)

In order to further assess the robustness of the results, I add region-specific fixed effects to test whether there are systematic differences in the probabilities for transitions across each region.\(^{29}\) I introduce a dummy variable for each region (as defined above), to account for factors which may be important only in certain geographic regions that are not included in the model, yet may be correlated with membership in regional IOs. The key independent variable of interest, \( \Delta I\OScore_{it-1} \) remains statistically significant for all four models.

A final issue is of both statistical and theoretical importance. It is possible that there is a selection process among states trying to join democratic regional organizations. That is, only states where democracy is consolidated (or likely to consolidate) are allowed in these organizations. The implication is that the causal theory is somewhat backwards or that there is another variable which taps the propensity for consolidation that drives the results. While this process may occur, statistical tests and research design precautions make this less likely.

First, included in the computation of \( I\OScore_{it-1} \) and \( \Delta I\OScore_{it-1} \) are the associate memberships for each state. Some organizations will admit members to associate status immediately after transition or they will sign association agreements with these states. Although this is not full membership in the organization, association brings significant benefits and thus the possibility for the causal process to work in a similar fashion. For example, the previous case of Greece and the EU involved suspension of an association agreement rather than EU membership (Greece did not gain full membership in the EU until 1981). Thus, the selection process may occur from moving from associate to full membership, but the influence of the organization will still exist given a state’s associate status. This influence would be captured by the model.

\(^{28}\)I reestimate the model including a term for military organizations, since an ally may wish to influence the regime choice of a partner (Reiter 2001). This term is not statistically significant and does not change the other results.

\(^{29}\)I utilize region as the unit of analysis since this is the common practice in studies of democratization. See O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986).
and is an assurance that the causal arrow points from IO membership to consolidation.

Second, if the selection argument is correct, one observable implication is that there should be signs of endogeneity in the model. If states must show democratic stability before becoming members of IOs (association agreements notwithstanding), one should find that the length of time a state remains a democracy should positively predict increases in ΔIOScore_{t-1}. This, however, is not the case. If one reverses the independent variable of interest with the current dependent variable (for both data sets), ΔTIME_{it} is not significantly related (at the p < .05 level) to ΔIOScore_{t-1}. In fact, the estimates for both data sets are negative, indicating that the longer a state remains a democracy, the less likely they are to join highly democratic regional IOs. Although the selection argument is important, it does not appear to be driving these results.

Conclusion

This article has outlined a theory linking international organizations with the successful consolidation of democracy. While the policymaking community has clearly established such a link in their policy rhetoric, little theoretical or empirical work establishes this important association. Before IOs undertake a wholesale strategy to integrate new democracies, it is important to understand the causal mechanisms by which these organizations might consolidate nascent democracies. I have outlined such mechanisms and provided the first empirical evaluation of the link between IOs and democratic consolidation.

The empirical tests were generally supportive of the theory as outlined. Of course, the statistical tests do not discriminate between the various mechanisms (e.g., bribing versus credible commitments), but this task is best left to multiple case studies (see Pevehouse 2000). One clear policy implication of this work, however, is the importance of enforcing conditions on regional IO membership. Given the importance of signaling credible commitments to reform, it is essential that regional IOs hold up their end of the “bargain.” If domestic actors perceive that conditions will not be enforced, the influence of the IO will be minimal.

These findings are also important for international relations theory. Primarily, this research speaks to the issue of when and how international institutions matter. Recently, institutional theorists have called for more empirical research to outline “well-delineated causal mechanisms” to explain the impact of international institutions, especially in reference to domestic political processes (Martin and Simmons 1998, 749, 757). By showing how IOs can influence the democratization process, this work elucidates some of the possible ways in which regional institutions interact with domestic politics to influence outcomes. Moreover, it delineates circumstances under which domestic elites may turn to regional organizations to bolster domestic institutions.

Regional organizations are no guarantee of success for new democracies. This article has shown how membership in and joining an IO with many democratic members can assist in lengthening the longevity of democratic regimes. Although there are clearly many factors which are important for the consolidation of democracy, I have shown that the external dimension of international or regional politics should not be given short shrift. While domestic factors may still hold a privileged position in theories of democracy, international and regional factors can, at times, be equally important.

References


30 These models were estimated using OLS with panel corrected standard errors (correlated across panels) as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). All other variables in Model 1 (except IOScore_{t-1}) are included.
## Appendix 1 International Organizations Included in the Primary Analyses, 1950–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC (Arab Cooperation Council)</td>
<td>1989–1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Pact</td>
<td>1969–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>1952–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)</td>
<td>1989–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)</td>
<td>1967–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council)</td>
<td>1966–1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux Union</td>
<td>1950–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation)</td>
<td>1992–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACM (Central American Common Market)</td>
<td>1961–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market)</td>
<td>1966–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States)</td>
<td>1992–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC (Central American Democratic Community)</td>
<td>1962–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO (West African Economic Community)</td>
<td>1959–1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEAC (Economic Community of Central African States)</td>
<td>1984–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI (Central European Initiative)</td>
<td>1989–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)</td>
<td>1955–1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lakes)</td>
<td>1976–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILSS (Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel)</td>
<td>1973–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)</td>
<td>1991–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo Plan</td>
<td>1951–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)</td>
<td>1993–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>1950–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Entente</td>
<td>1959–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EACM (East African Common Market)</td>
<td>1967–1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization)</td>
<td>1965–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)</td>
<td>1975–1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA (European Free Trade Association)</td>
<td>1960–1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAPTA (Eastern and South African PTA)</td>
<td>1981–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (European Union)</td>
<td>1958–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)</td>
<td>1981–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development)</td>
<td>1986–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC (Indian Ocean Commission)</td>
<td>1962–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAES (Latin American Economic System)</td>
<td>1975–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAIA (Latin American Integration Association)</td>
<td>1961–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb Union</td>
<td>1989–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
<td>1973–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market)</td>
<td>1991–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Council</td>
<td>1953–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)</td>
<td>1968–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS (Organization of American States)</td>
<td>1951–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU (Organization of African Unity)</td>
<td>1963–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODECA (Organization of Central American States)/SICA (Central American Integration System)</td>
<td>1951–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean)</td>
<td>1969–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)</td>
<td>1985–1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC (Southern African Development Community)</td>
<td>1980–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization)</td>
<td>1955–1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC (South Pacific Commission)</td>
<td>1950–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF (South Pacific Forum)</td>
<td>1971–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC (Central African Customs and Economic Union)</td>
<td>1961–1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU (Western European Union)</td>
<td>1955–1992</td>
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