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NATIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

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*T*here has been a growing propensity among states to associate together in international governmental organizations, or IGOs, for a variety of purposes. Why do states join IGOs, and what are the consequences for states of membership in IGOs? In this analysis, an explanation is sought, drawing on the theory of functionalism espoused by David Mitrany and others, taking into account the number of years a state has had sovereignty, level of technology, extent of party competition, and overall power. For Third World states, membership in IGOs is associated with enhanced economic performance. An increasing number of IGOs in the system appears to lessen the states' mean proneness to war. Functionalist predictions are upheld. But functionalism needs to be supplemented both for comprehensive explanations and as a prescription for the future. Already there are so many IGOs that it is difficult for states to control them, which could make them progressively irrelevant or even jeopardize their existence.

*T*he global political system now contains more than 1,000 international governmental organizations (IGOs) of one type or another, and states are deeply entangled in this expanding web. Denmark heads the list by belonging to 164 IGOs; 19 states are members of 100 or more, and the mean number of memberships held by member states of the Group of 77, the Third World Caucus, is over 61. The entanglement of states and international governmental organizations has rapidly increased. The United Nations and its related agencies, the European communities, the Organization of American States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are well known, but states have joined together and created a great many more formal institutional structures than those prominent examples. This study describes the growing web of IGOs, analyzes the propensity of states to join them, and assesses the broad consequences of a state's total IGO memberships for its economic performance and conflict behavior. It then

raises questions about the implications for international relations of a continuation of the multiplying entanglement between states and IGOs, particularly in light of the apparent resistance to this trend evidenced by the U.S. and British withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Functionalism as an Explanation

The theory of "functionalism," developed by David Mitrany (1933, 1966) and his followers, remains virtually the only corpus of scholarship about IGOs that offers general explanations of why states create and join such organizations, and what the consequences of this would be. Mitrany and others also saw their version of functionalism as a prescription to guide the development of the global political system. Because their version of functionalism is the only theoretical persuasion available to guide this analysis, it will be the point of departure.

Functionalism maintains that states create and join international governmental organizations because of two broad historical tendencies that date from the nineteenth century: the extension and deepening of political participation within states, and the continual advance of technology. Functionalism argues that mass participation in political life will inexorably increase, that general populations everywhere are primarily interested in increasing their own standard of living, and that mass participation will make economic welfare the dominant concern of governments. Functionalism also argues that technology offers immense possibilities for improving living standards, but that international cooperation is essential to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by technology; states are simply too small. In the perspective of functionalism, IGOs are the consequence of political pressures and technological opportunities.

Functionalism would expect and prefer that the membership and mandates of an IGO be determined by the problem at issue; the overwhelming majority of IGOs would and should have limited memberships and specific mandates. The point of establishing an IGO, according to functionalism, is to facilitate international cooperation with respect to a specific technical issue, not to establish a general political authority with broad scope and domain.

Functionalism postulates that entanglement in a web of IGOs will make states less bellicose. Given the pressures to join IGOs, and the economic benefits presumably gained from membership and participation in them, states would be loathe to jeopardize these benefits by escalating interstate disagreements to violent conflicts that would inevitably destroy IGOs. Moreover, the increased opportunities for communication that IGOs provide should make it easier for states to avoid or settle disagreements before they reach the stage of violent conflict. States ought to have an incentive to reach agreement because, presumably, they have a common interest in economic expansion.

To what extent do the international governmental organizations in the contemporary global political system and the interaction between them and their member states conform to these functionalist tenets? How adequate is functionalism as an overall explanation for the pervasiveness of IGOs? Does membership in IGOs affect the performance and behavior of states in the way functionalism suggests? This analysis examines the validity of functionalist tenets and assesses the extent to which functionalism must be supplemented for a full comprehension of the phenomenon of IGOs. It also raises questions about the adequacy of functionalism as a prescriptive guide to

the future development of the global political system.

The Universe of IGOs

As a first stage in the analysis, it is necessary to describe the web of international governmental organizations as it currently exists. The basic source for information about the number and characteristics of IGOs is the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, which is published periodically by the Union of International Associations (UIA) in Brussels.[1] The data used in this analysis are derived from the nineteenth edition, which was published in 1981 (UIA, 1981).

Starting with the nineteenth edition, the *Yearbook* divides the organizations that are included into two major categories and four subcategories. The number of IGOs included in each subcategory in the 1981 *Yearbook* are:[2]

I. Conventional International Bodies
A. Federations of International
Organizations   1
B. Universal Membership Organizations   31
C. Inter-Continental Organizations   48
D. Regionally Delimited Organizations 264

II. Other International Bodies
E. Emanations and Semi-Autonomous
Bodies   405
F. Organizations of Special Form   287
G. Internationally Oriented National
Bodies   39
H. Inactive or Dissolved Bodies   26
Total   1101

In addition, seven organizations listed in the *Yearbook* had been proposed, but were not yet in existence in 1981. Including these, 1108 IGOs are listed in the *Yearbook*, 1,075 of which were active in 1981.

The only IGO included in subcategory A is the United Nations. The United Nations' specialized agencies and other similar agencies comprise subcategory B. The International Exhibition Bureau and the International Olive Oil Council are examples of the type of organization included in subcategory C. The European communities are the most prominent of the organizations included in subcategory D.

The 344 organizations included in subcategories A through D are indisputably IGOs. The 731 organizations included in subcategories E through G have a more ambiguous status. Subcategory E includes such organizations as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which, though it is a creation of the United Nations, has a larger budget, staff, and program than most of the organizations listed in subcategories C and D. It also includes some bodies, such as the U.N.'s Joint Inspection Unit, that because of their small size or apparent lack of autonomy are more questionable cases. Organizations such as the Integrated Global Services System and the Joint Nordic Organization for Lappish Culture and Reindeer Husbandry are included in subcategory F. The first is an offshoot of UNESCO and the second of the Nordic Council, but both are more than sub-organs, and in their characteristics resemble many of the organizations included in subcategories C and D. Subcategory G includes many of the joint ventures set up by the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), as well as such bodies as the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation.

Because the distinctions between active IGOs included in subcategories B through G seem blurred, because in the aggregate the IGOs listed in the *Yearbook* as "conventional international bodies" and those listed as "other international bodies" have similar broad characteristics, and because information that is not available for all organizations is in general, proportionately equally available for those in both major categories, this analysis will usually treat IGOs collectively, without reference to the two categories. If those 344 organizations included in subcategories A

through D alone were regarded as true IGOs, as those who favor strict criteria might prefer, the generalizations developed here using the larger universe of organizations about why states join IGOs and the consequences of membership would apply, though the numbers would obviously be smaller. How many "real" IGOs there are in the global political system is obviously a matter of definition; "reasonable" definitions yield numbers that are larger than 344 but less than 1,075.

True to the prediction and preference of functionalism, the overwhelming majority of the IGOs that are included in the data set and could be classified according to their function and membership have specific mandates and limited memberships: 96.8% have functionally defined specific mandates, and 80.6% limit their membership according to one or another criteria. Of the total, 54.1% have mandates related to economic matters, and 56.4% limit their membership according to geographic criteria.

The Dynamic Evolution of the Web of IGOs

The preceding description provides an initial guide to the nature of the web of IGOs, but it is necessary to go beyond this. A sense of the dynamic processes involved in the creation of the web of IGOs can be gained from an analysis of the past, and trends from the past can be projected to foreshow likely developments if these trends continued unabated.

The analysis can be structured conveniently according to four periods. The first period starts in 1815, the year the Napoleonic Wars ended and the first IGO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, was created. It ends in 1914 with the outbreak of World War I. The second period starts in 1915 and ends in 1939, with the outbreak of World War II. The third period begins in 1940 and ends in 1959. This is the period of World War II and the construction of the postwar international order. The final period starts in 1960 and ends in 1981, the last year for which data were available for inclusion in this analysis.

The rationale for breaking the post–World War II period in 1960 is that 17 states, the largest number ever, gained independence in 1960. By 1960, it was clear that colonialism was doomed and the nation-state system would be extended to the entire globe. As of 1959 there were 90 independent states in the global political system, 69 of which had been in existence in 1945 when the postwar period began. Between 1960 and 1981, 70 more would be added. Starting in 1960, decolonization fundamentally altered the global political system, at least in terms of the number of independent states included within it. The emergence of the new states led to an explosion in the membership of those IGOs that had come into existence before 1960 and—as will be seen—in the number of IGOs.

With the use of this periodization, several trends become apparent. Before examining these trends, however, it is important to emphasize that most IGOs are relatively recent creations. Of the 880 IGOs for which the date of founding is available, 94.1% were established after 1939, and 70.3% were established from 1960 through 1981. This pace of multiplication is astounding, and showed no sign of slowing. Indeed, more than 40% additional organizations were created in the decade of the 1970s ($n=354$) than were created in the 1960s ($n=250$).

The first notable trend is that progressively relatively fewer IGOs met the Union of International Associations criteria for being "conventional international bodies"; that is, for inclusion in the first four subcategories in the *Yearbook*. Sixty-five percent ($n=13$) met these criteria in the period 1815-1914, 59.4% ($n=19$) in the period 1915-1939, 47.1%

($n=98$) in the period 1940–1959), and 31.8% ($n=199$) in the period 1960–1981. By far the largest share of the increase in other international bodies was accounted for by IGOs in subcategories E and F, which tend to be organizations that owe their existence to decisions of organizations already existing.

Stating the trend in another way, with the passage of time IGOs created more and more offshoots. The obvious advantage of this practice is that often all that is required to create a new IGO is a majority vote, not a new treaty that would require signature and ratification to take effect. Governments of states may also believe that it will be easier for them to keep track of IGOs that are offshoots of other IGOs than those that are totally disconnected from any existing structure. Whatever the reason, a large portion of the increase of IGOs since 1960 has been in the UIA category "other international bodies." The pace of creation of IGOs in the UIA category "conventional international bodies" reached a peak in the 1960s when 110 were established; only 86 were created in the period 1970–1981.

A second notable trend is the significant difference between the distribution of types of membership criteria for the international governmental organizations that were founded prior to 1940 and for those that were founded starting that year. The proportion of IGOs founded before 1940 that have no criteria in their constitutions limiting membership to particular political, geographic, economic, or cultural groups of states is much higher than it is for IGOs founded later.

This does not mean that in the years since World War II began states have not formed a large number of IGOs with potentially universal membership. Twenty-five such organizations were founded prior to 1940, and 143 starting that year. The absolute number for the post–World War II era is impressively high. What it does mean is that after

World War II began, limited-membership IGOs multiplied much more rapidly than those with potentially universal memberships. Starting in 1940, more than 80% of the IGOs that have been founded and were still in existence in 1981 limited their membership according to some criterion. In total, 682 limited-membership organizations were established during this period, and the real number is undoubtedly higher, since the UIA does not have founding dates for all IGOs. Geography has always been the criterion most frequently used for limiting membership, and this continues to be the case.

This trend should be interpreted in light of the fact that the sovereign states of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were much more homogeneous than they are in the late twentieth century. A universal-membership organization formed in the earlier years had a much less diverse membership then than it does now or would have if it were formed in the present period.

That the relative proportion of IGOs that could have universal membership should fall off is logical. It would not be surprising if there were some upper limit on the number of universal membership IGOs that could be included in a global political system, even though this limit might be flexible over time.

Another factor is that as decolonization proceeded in the post–World War II period, and the number of sovereign states grew at an explosive rate, the opportunities for creating limited-membership IGOs also expanded rapidly. Organizations could be created both among new states and among new and old states. International bodies could make possible the continuation and extension of activities that were organized within the framework of a single sovereignty in the colonial era.

A consequence of the trend favoring limited-membership IGOs in the post–World War II period is that organizations

established from 1940 on tend to have significantly smaller numbers of members than those established prior to this date. The mean number of member states of IGOs in the latter category is 42.9, while that of those in the former category is 20.4.

To explore further the trend of an increasing proportion of limited-membership IGOs, it is useful to categorize states in order to see the extent to which different types of states have formed exclusive IGOs. A threefold categorization based on broad political and economic alignments divides states among those that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),[3] those that are members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO),[4] and those that do not belong to either of these organizations, a group that for this reason is called "Other."

These three categories are mutually exclusive and roughy place states into the groupings that are used in conventional political analyses. The members of OECD are those that are customarily referred to as the "West," and the members of WTO are those that are usually referred to as the "Soviet bloc" or group. The residual category of "Other" includes those states that are referred to as the Third World.[5]

Of the 563 IGOs for which membership information is available, 103 were comprised exclusively of states that were members of OECD; 28 exclusively of states that were members of WTO; and 178 exclusively of other states. Most of the Western IGOs were the basic agencies and offshoots of: the OECD, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European communities, and the Nordic Council. Beyond the Warsaw Treaty Organization itself, the 28 Soviet-group IGOs were primarily derivatives of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[6] CMEA includes three non-European states, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam, that for most purposes of this analysis are included in the "Other" category. In 1981 there were 38 IGOs comprised exclusively of CMEA members; these included the 28 comprised exclusively of WTO members.

The IGOs that were comprised exclusively of states in the category "Other" were less likely to be derivatives of other organizations than those comprised exclusively of OECD and WTO states. Of the IGOs comprised only of states in the category "Other," 58.6% were in the UIA category of "conventional international bodies," while only 47.1% of the OECD-only IGOs and 42.9% of the WTO-only IGOs were in this category. The economically more advanced Western and Soviet-group states have been refining their existing relationships through establishing additional organizations, albeit often subsidiary ones, while Third World states have been establishing relatively more new relationships and consequently more new primary organizations.

Since 1960, more IGOs comprised exclusively of states in the category "Other" have been established than IGOs of any other type. In the 1960s and 1970s, they accounted for about 40% of the IGOs formed in each decade. During the 1970s, these states began to create substantial numbers of IGOs in the UIA category "other international bodies"; they created 39 of these and 35 "conventional international bodies." By the 1970s, Western states were creating more than three UIA secondary-category IGOs for every one primary-category IGO that they established.

IGOs comprised solely of states in the category "Other" offer the greatest potential for growth in the near future. In 1981, only slightly more than one such organization existed for each state in this category, while there were more than three WTO-only IGOs and more than four OECD-only IGOs for each state in those categories. States in the category

Table 1. Distribution by Function of IGOs Comprised Exclusively of
Members of Particular Political-Economic Groups Established from 1960 through 1981
(in percentages)

Function	Group[a]		
	OECD	WTO	Other
General	4.5	0	3.8
Economic	47.0	96.0	73.7
Social	47.0	4.0	18.8
Security	1.5	0	3.8
	100.0	100.0	100.1
No. of cases	66	25	133

Chi Square = 29.28
Cramer's Phi = .26
Sig. = .00

[a]OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation; WTO = Warsaw Treaty Organization.

"Other" could expand considerably the number of "conventional international bodies" among themselves, and they could increase the ratio between IGOs of this type and "other international bodies," moving toward the level established by the Western states. The evidence of the 1960s and the 1970s is that states in the "Other" category are moving in these directions.

There were also 104 IGOs in existence in 1981 that were comprised of states from both the OECD and "Other" groupings; they did not include any members from the WTO group. Thirty-one of these organizations were established in the 1960s, in the immediate aftermath of decolonization, and 22 in the 1970s. Many of these organizations could be regarded as providing elements of the framework of the world market economy.

The third notable trend is a tendency toward greater differentiation and variety in the mandates of the IGOs that have been established since 1939. While this trend is not as pronounced as the other two, it nevertheless is important. In the 1940s and 1950s, an unprecedentedly large number of organizations that were established—28, or 13.5% of the total— had mandates dealing with security. Starting in the 1960s, progressively larger numbers of newly formed IGOs had mandates in the social field. This expansion of the numbers of IGOs with mandates to deal with social issues was most marked among OECD-only IGOs, although the "Other" group also moved to establish relatively more IGOs with social mandates. The record of the Soviet group is somewhat different. Only one of the 28 WTO-only IGOs has a mandate to deal with social issues; it was established in the 1970s. The Warsaw Treaty Organization's mandate is security; the remaining 26 (92.9%) of the WTO-only IGOs have economic mandates. Table 1 shows the distribution by function of the IGOs that were established starting in 1960 and were comprised exclusively of members of one or another group.

The growing differentiation of IGOs reflects a widely observed tendency toward specialization in political institutions. Security organizations were so relatively prominent in the 1940s and

1950s because the post–World War II political order was being created. This order has been relatively stable since those years, as is reflected in the fact that only 3.1% ($n=19$) of the IGOs established in the period starting in 1960 have security mandates. The increasing focus on social issues mirrors the focus on such issues that developed within states, particularly the advanced industrial Western countries, in the 1960s.

With their overwhelming concentration on economic issues, WTO-only IGOs stand apart from the general trend. Beyond the basic security commitment of the Warsaw Teaty, the Soviet-group states appear to have been almost inexorably drawn into economic cooperation, but they either have little desire or little necessity for institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation in other areas. The CMEA-only organizations are also heavily concentrated in the economic area (92.1%, $n=35$).

In sum, the web of IGOs in existence in 1981 was dense and complex. Although functionalist tenets accurately describe the broad characteristics of the web and its dynamic evolution, one must go beyond functionalism for a more detailed description and for a fuller understanding of the growth of the web. The basic dynamic forces in the global political system—the urge to create a new order in the aftermath of a destructive war and decolonization—had a strong impact on the processes and course of institution building, as one would expect. IGOs are, after all, instruments of states, and states are likely to follow policies in this sphere that are similar and related to those that they follow in other spheres. The evolution of the web of IGOs also reflects an internal development within states: the greater attention paid by governments to social issues. An important exception to this trend, however, is the paucity of WTO-only IGOs directed toward social issues.

The Propensity of States to Join IGOs

The analysis so far has indicated that states belong to varying numbers of international governmental organizations. Now that the web of IGOs has been described, this varying propensity of states to join these organizations can be analyzed in detail. Functionalist tenets again provide the point of departure.

To give an indication of the varying propensity of states to be members of IGOs, Table 2 lists the 26 states that held the highest number of IGO memberships in 1981. For each state, it gives both the total number of full and associate memberships in all categories of IGOs, and the number of full memberships in "conventional international bodies." Denmark's leading the list is explained by the fact that its unique position as a member of both the European communities and the Nordic Council gives it an unusual opportunity to belong to a large number of "other international bodies."

Fourteen of the 26 states, including all of those in the top 10, are from Western Europe; 3 are from Eastern Europe and 3 from Asia and the Middle East; 2 are from North America and 2 from Latin America; and 1 is from Africa and 1 from Oceania. These membership data reflect the fact that the IGO web is most dense and complex in Western Europe, where it began with the creation of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine in 1815. What is most impressive about this list of 26 states and the participation of states in IGOs more generally, however, is the extent to which the web has become global. Even Vanuatu, which just gained independence in 1981, held 11 IGO memberships that year, 4 of which were in "conventional international bodies." Joining IGOs has become among the first actions that governments take as soon as sovereignty is gained.

Functionalism argues that states will be

Table 2. States with the Highest Number of IGO Memberships

Rank Order	State	Full and Associate Memberships in All Categories of IGOs	Full Memberships in UIA[a] Principal Category IGOs
1	Denmark	164	91
2	France	155	95
3	Norway	154	86
4	Sweden	153	87
5	United Kingdom	140	83
6	Finland	139	78
7	Federal Republic of Germany	135	83
8	The Netherlands	131	82
9	Belgium	127	77
10	Italy	124	72
11	United States	122	67
12	Spain	113	76
13	Canada	110	69
14	Japan	106	63
15	Iceland	105	54
16.5	Australia	104	67
16.5	Soviet Union	104	67
18	India	102	61
19	Brazil	100	60
20	Poland	99	69
21	Algeria	96	57
22.5	Austria	95	62
22.5	Yugoslavia	95	58
25	Egypt	94	60
25	Mexico	94	56
25	Swizerland	94	65

[a]UIA = Union of International Associations.

propelled to join IGOs because popular pressures to increase living standards will lead their governments to engage in international collaboration to take advantage of the opportunities that technology offers to respond constructively to these pressures. Following this argument, one would expect that states with more opportunities for popular pressures to be expressed and at higher levels of technological development would belong to a relatively greater number of IGOs. The extent of party competition is an appropriate indicator for the first variable, and per capita gross national product (GNP) is an appropriate indicator for the second. For this analysis, Freedom House's fourfold classification of states in 1980 as (1) multiparty, (2) dominant-party, (3) one-party, and (4) no-party (Gastil, 1981) is used to indicate the extent of party competition. The per capita GNP figures used are those for 1980 published by the World Bank in its *World Bank Atlas 1982* (IBRD, 1982a).

True to the functionalist argument, party competition and per capita GNP do predict IGO memberships.[7] An ordinary least squares regression with these two independent variables produces an equation with $R^2 = .29$ ($n=160$, sig. = .00). The functionalist argument is supported, but less than 30% of the variance is explained, which leads to a quest for further factors that might influence the propensity of states to belong to IGOs.

Since the phenomenon of decolonization proved so important in the growth of the web of IGOs, it could also be an important factor in explaining the propensity of states to belong to IGOs. At the most basic level, the longer a state has had sovereignty the more opportunities it would have had to join IGOs. Since more than 90% of the IGOs in the global political system were established after World War II, it seems appropriate to assume that the exact order of states coming to independence in the nineteenth century or early twentieth century, or even earlier, would have little bearing on their propensity to belong to IGOs in the late twentieth century. Thus years of sovereignty—or of membership in the global political system—are measured starting in 1945. Since the data used in the analysis are for 1981, this independent variable has values from 0 to 37, 0 being for territories that did not have sovereignty in 1981, and 37 being for states that gained sovereignty in 1945 or earlier.

Traditional thought about world politics has always accorded special status to great powers. Given their presumed propensity to be extensively involved in world politics, one would expect greater powers to have more IGO memberships than lesser powers. GNP is the most convenient single indicator of power. The GNP figures used here are also taken from the *World Bank Atlas, 1982*.

Adding date of entry into the global political system and power to the two independent variables used previously sharply improves the explanatory power of the ordinary least squares equation. With the four variables included, the equation is:

IGO Memberships = 36.29 + 1.43 System Years
                  (5.33)   (.14)

+ .002 Per Capita GNP
  (.00)

− 4.43 Party Competition + .00002 GNP
  (1.34)   (.00)

$R^2 = .61$; standard error of estimate = 1961; and level of significance = .00. (The partial coefficients are unstandardized; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)

This equation explains more than 60% of the variance.[8] The relationships are shown in Figure 1.

The four independent variables are listed in the equation and shown in Figure 1 in the order they were selected in a stepwise regression procedure. Years in the global political system is the most powerful predictor. An ordinary least squares regression equation with it as the sole independent variable yields $R^2 = .46$, larger than the R^2 of the equation utilizing the two independent variables suggested by functionalist tenets.

The effects of the four independent variables in the regression equation can be understood more clearly by interpreting the coefficients in terms of the measurement of the independent variables. According to the equation, each additional year a state has been in the global political system increases its total number of IGO memberships by 1.4; each additional 100 dollars in per capita GNP increases the total by 1.8; each step toward a multi-party system increases the total by 4.4; and, each additional 10 billion dollars in GNP increases the total by 1.6. Since the measure for party competition is ordinal, it is possible to obtain a better estimate of the effects of differ-

Figure 1. Factors Influencing the Propensity of States to Join IGOs
(N=160)

Table 3. Propensity of States Belonging to Particular Political-Economic Groups To Join IGOs (in percentages)

Relationship of Actual to Predicted IGO Memberships	Categories of States		
	Members of OECD	Members of WTO	Other
Underachievers	16.7	0.0	17.0
Normal Achievers	50.0	100.0	72.1
Overachievers	33.3	0.0	10.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of cases	24	7	129

Chi Square = 11.988
Cramer's Phi = .194
Sig. = .017

ing degrees of competition by creating dummy variables. When this is done, it is clear that the largest difference is between those states that have multi-party systems and the others, but that there is also a fairly important difference between states that have a one-party system and those that do not have any parties.

The regression equation can be used to establish a "predicted" number of IGOs to which a state would be expected to belong on the basis of its characteristics according to the four independent variables. To give some examples, using the predicted values resulting from the regression equation, Denmark would be expected to be a member of 109 IGOs rather than the 164 to which it actually belongs; the United States a member of 145 rather than 122; Ethiopia a member of 71 rather than 46; and Algeria a member of 55 rather than 96.

It is instructive to examine the characteristics of the "outlying" states; those that belong to a total number of IGOs that is more than a standard deviation either above or below the predicted number. Those in the former category can be regarded as "overachievers," and those in the latter as "underachievers." Table 3 shows the relationship between the three categories of states that were used pre-

viously in this analysis and the predicted and actual membership in IGOs. Not surprisingly, the members of the OECD are more likely to be overachievers than are the members of the Soviet group or the "Other" category. The bulk of the OECD members are in Western Europe where the IGO web is most dense. Stating the relationships shown in Table 3 in a different manner, the mean actual number of IGO memberships of OECD members ($n=24$) was 116, while the predicted mean number was 106. The mean actual and predicted numbers of IGO memberships for members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization ($n=7$) were respectively 88 and 86, and for "Other" states ($n=129$), 59 and 61.

That there appear to be pronounced relationships between the type of economic system a state has and its propensity to belong to IGOs is more worthy of note. Table 4 shows the relationships. The categorization of states as having capitalist, state capitalist, mixed capitalist, mixed socialist, and socialist economies is taken from Freedom House's assessment as of 1980 (Gastil, 1981). Table 4 shows that states with mixed capitalist economies are particularly likely to be overachievers. This group includes not only Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Nor-

Table 4. Propensity of States with Various Economic Systems to Join IGOs
(in percentages)

Relationship of Actual to Predicted IGO Memberships	Type of Economic System				
	Capitalist	State Capitalist	Mixed Capitalist	Mixed Socialist	Socialist
Underachiever	16.7	16.7	6.2	5.9	28.0
Normal achiever	75.0	69.0	43.8	88.2	64.0
Overachiever	8.3	14.3	50.0	5.9	8.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of cases	60	42	16	17	25

Chi Square = 19.690
Cramer's Phi = .2791
Sig. = .012

way, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, but also Senegal and Tunisia. This tendency fits with the technocratic, planning undertones in functionalism.

Beyond these eight states and France and Italy, which have state capitalist economies, the overachievers are, like Senegal and Tunisia, developing countries. They include five countries with capitalist economies (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Niger, and Upper Volta), four with state capitalist economies (Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Bangladesh), one with a mixed socialist economy (Sudan), and two with socialist economies (Algeria and Tanzania). These developing countries have in common relatively activist foreign policies.

Table 4 also reveals a slight tendency for states with socialist economies to be underachievers. An examination of the other characteristics of the seven states in this category—Afghanistan, Albania, Ethiopia, Laos, Mongolia, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic of China—suggest that political factors may be as important as the type of economic system.

Again, functionalism has provided the first step toward understanding the propensity of states to belong to international governmental organizations, but as in the task of describing the web IGOs, it needs to be supplemented with more traditional explanations of international politics.

IGO Memberships and the Performance and Behavior of States

Does belonging to international governmental organizations make a difference to the economic performance and conflict behavior of states, as functionalist tenets asserted that it would? Establishing causality definitively with respect to such complex issues is beyond the scope of this analysis, yet it is possible and worthwhile to examine the question and reach some tentative judgments about the extent to which expectations based on functionalist tenets have been met.

The essential tenets of functionalism with respect to the performance and behavior of states are simply the assertions that joining IGOs would enable states to improve their economic welfare, and that entanglement in a web of IGOs would tend to make states less bellicose. There is ample evidence relevant to these assertions. Their merits can be examined by exploring the association between the number of IGO memberships held by states and their economic performance and conflict behavior. The absence of an association would lead to a presumption

against the validity of functionalist expectations. Although finding an association would not establish causality along the lines posited by functionalist tenets, it would create a favorable disposition toward the validity of these tenets.

Since, according to functionalism, states join international governmental organizations primarily in the expectation of obtaining economic benefits, it is appropriate to begin an analysis by examining whether or not better economic performance is associated with IGO membership. Economic performance can be and is measured in a variety of ways that are linked, but are not perfectly correlated. The ultimate goal driving the functionalist theoretical structure is increased individual economic welfare. The measures used here—growth in gross domestic product (GDP), manufacturing, and exports and imports, and improvements in terms of trade—are related to that goal, because they could make possible improvements in individual welfare. They are, at the same time, aggregate phenomena on which IGO participation could have a more direct and immediate impact than individual welfare.

The test used in the analysis will simply be to see if larger total numbers of IGO memberships are associated with higher rates of growth in GDP, in the manufacturing sector, and in exports and imports, as well as with better terms of trade. To posit that they should be is the baldest statement of functionalist tenets; putting the matter so starkly facilitates testing these tenets. The data used are from the World Bank's *World Development Report, 1982* (IBRD, 1982b). These and other available data could sustain more sophisticated analyses, but the crude tests used here can give adequate first approximation answers.

For the purposes of this analysis, the relative rank order of states according to the number of IGOs to which they belonged is assumed to have remained

relatively constant during the years from 1960 through 1981. The only measure of IGO membership is that for 1981, it is assumed that the rank order pertaining in that year was not very different in the preceding 20 years. The statistical tables in the several editions of the UIA *Yearbook* support this assumption. Thus if a state belonged to a large number of IGOs in 1981, it most probably belonged to a relatively large number throughout the period.

With respect to the member countries of the OECD and WTO, the data show no association between number of IGO memberships and economic performance. States in both categories belonged to a relatively large number of IGOs. Compared to the universe of states and territories in the global political system, all OECD and WTO members were relatively affluent. For these states, factors other than the relative number of IGO memberships appear to have been the predominant determinants of economic performance in the two decades starting in 1960; the relative number of IGO memberships seems not to have made much difference.

For states in the category "Other," in contrast, the number of IGO memberships is associated with all measures of economic performance used in this analysis: growth in exports and imports, and improvement in terms of trade. The last factor is measured by the index number for the terms of trade in 1980, an index which used 1975 as the base. Table 5 shows the results of ordinary least squares regression equations measuring the association between the total number of IGO memberships that a state held and the various measures of economic growth. The associations are significant, and the range of variables covered is impressive. Both GDP growth in the 1970s and manufacturing growth in the 1970s are also significantly correlated with the years that a state has been in the global political system, and adding this

Table 5. Association Between Total Number of IGO Memberships and Various Measures of Economic Performance: States in the Category "Other" (n=129)

Measure of Economic Performance		OLS Regression Equation[a]	R^2	Standard Error of Estimate	Level of Significance
GDP Growth, 1960s	=	− 1.219 + .072 IGOs (.706) (.011)	.25	2.93	.000
GDP Growth, 1970s	=	− 1.788 + .078 IGOs (.663) (.010)	.31	2.76	.000
Manufacturing Growth, 1960s	=	− 1.849 + .071 IGOs (.835) (.013)	.19	3.47	.000
Manufacturing Growth, 1970s	=	− 2.911 + .094 IGOs (1.004) (.016)	.22	4.17	.004
Export Growth, 1960s	=	− 2.293 + .113 IGOs (2.005) (.031)	.09	8.32	.001
Export Growth, 1970s	=	− 1.819 + .053 IGOs (1.250) (.020)	.04	4.42	.007
Import Growth, 1960s	=	− 1.281 + .079 IGOs (.970) (.015)	.18	4.03	.000
Import Growth, 1970s	=	− 3.231 + .104 IGOs (1.553) (.024)	.12	6.45	.000
Terms of Trade, 1980	=	−31.402 + 1.581 IGOs (10.268) (.161)	.43	42.67	.003

[a]Coefficients are unstandardized; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

variable to the ordinary least squares regression equations increases the R^2 in each case from .31 to .39 with respect to GDP growth in the 1970s, and from .19 to .22 with respect to manufacturing growth in the 1960s. In each case, however, more of the variance is explained by IGO memberships.

Given the predominance of IGOs with economic mandates and the fact that on the average 67.0% of the organizations to which states in the category "Other" (n=129) belonged were of this type—the average percentages for OECD (n=24) and WTO states (n=7) were respectively 65.7 and 77.7—extensive IGO membership implies extensive participation in an international political economy. The more IGOs a developing country belonged to, the more opportunities it would have to articulate its economic interests and to make efforts to defend

these interests. It would also have more potential sources for economic and technical assistance.

Analyzing the coefficients in the equations in terms of the way in which the dependent variables were measured illustrates the indicated effects of IGO memberships. GDP growth is measured in average annual percentage rates during the two decades, the 1960s and 1970s. For states in the category "Other," during the 1960s the lowest average annual rate of growth was −2.0%, the highest was 24.4%, and the mean was 2.4%. During the 1970s the lowest rate was −9.2%, the highest was 12.1%, and the mean was 2.1%. The coefficients in the two ordinary least squares regression equations indicate that membership in an additional 10 IGOs is associated with an increment of more than .7% average annual increase in GDP during each of the decades.

Table 6. Mean Values for Various Measures of Economic Performance
for States in the Category "Other" Belonging to Fewer or More than the
Predicted Number of IGOs

Measure of Economic Performance	States Belonging to Fewer than Predicted Number of IGOs	States Belonging to More than Predicted Number of IGOs	% Difference Between Means
GDP Growth 1960s	2.5	3.7	51.7
GDP Growth 1970s	2.2	3.3	46.2
Manufacturing Growth 1960s	2.1	2.6	25.4
Manufacturing Growth 1970s	2.0	3.4	68.0
Export Growth 1960s	3.2	5.6	174.6
Export Growth 1970s	0.9	1.9	121.1
Import Growth 1960s	3.0	3.8	28.2
Import Growth 1970s	2.3	3.5	57.0
Terms of Trade 1980	49.2	76.5	55.5
No. of cases	65	57	

Viewed in this way, IGO membership had the greatest consequences for growth of exports during the 1960s and growth of imports during the 1970s.

States in the category "Other"—and indeed in the other two categories as well —as a group performed less well according to virtually all measures in the 1970s than they did in the 1960s. The differences in the associations between IGO memberships and most of the measures of economic performance suggest that in the difficult years of the 1970s, belonging to more IGOs was even more beneficial for developing countries than it was in the palmier years of the 1960s.

Another way of trying to assess the relationship of memberships in IGOs is to compare the economic performance for those states in the "Others" category belonging to more than the number of organizations predicted by the regression equation developed in the preceding section with those belonging to fewer than the predicted number. Table 6 gives the mean value for the same variables that were included in Table 5. In all cases the mean value is higher for those states that belonged to more than the predicted number of IGOs. This confirms the

impression gained from Table 5 that the economic performance of states in the "Other" category was positively associated with the number of IGOs to which they belonged.

Demonstrating this association, of course, does not prove that belonging to more IGOs caused better economic performance. It could well be that particular economic strategies resulted in both better economic performance and relatively more IGO memberships. For example, pursuit of an outward-looking development strategy that emphasized production for and competition in the world market could be the underlying explanation for both phenomena. Unraveling the thread of ultimate causality, however, is exceedingly difficult: governments of states could be attracted to such strategies because of their extensive participation in international governmental organizations. Whether or not IGO memberships caused better economic performance, the strong association indicates that at a minimum they facilitated this.

This analysis of economic performance thus partially supports functionalist tenets, but not for the group of states with which functionalist prescriptions original-

ly were most concerned: advanced industrial states. The findings indicate that if functionalist expectations about economic performance were valid, they may be more so for earlier rather than later stages of industrialization. They could also indicate that the marginal benefits of additional IGO memberships may decline, or that there may be a threshold beyond which further benefits do not accrue.

If these crude analyses regarding the economic performance of states give credence to at least a qualified version of functionalist tenets, what about the conflict behavior of states? The expectation based on functionalism would be that the more states became entangled in a web of international governmental organizations, the less inclined they would be to engage in interstate violence.

The measure of each state's inclination to engage in violence used here is the number of international—both interstate and colonial—wars in which the state has engaged since World War II, divided by the number of years that it has been independent during this period (Small and Singer, 1982, pp. 82–99). The result can be regarded as an index of proneness to war during the post–World War II period. The reasonableness of exploring the validity of functionalist tenets by examining the association between this index number and the total number of IGO memberships held by a state in 1981 again rests on the assumption that the rank order of states according to their IGO memberships has remained relatively constant over time: that those states that belonged to relatively more IGOs in 1981 also belonged to more earlier in the post–World War II period.

Testing the relationship in a bivariate manner reveals no association between the relative total number of IGO memberships held by a state and its proneness to war; belonging to a greater number of IGOs does not make a state less war

prone. Nor is any association discernable if states are divided into the three categories of OECD members, WTO members, and "Other." Perhaps, however, this test is inappropriate.

It could be argued that functionalist expectations about conflict behavior should be applied to the system as a whole, not to the individual states that comprise it. Phrased in system rather than state-level terms, the argument would be that the more IGOs there were in the international system, the greater the opportunities would be for conflict resolution. The data support such an interpretation. From 1815 through 1914 the mean level of the proneness to war of the 46 states in the international system was .05; for the 65 states in the system during the interwar period it was .03; and for the 156 states in the system during the post–World War II period it was .02. These numbers reflect the fact that the period since World War II—when the number of international governmental organizations has rapidly multiplied and attained its present high level—has been relatively peaceful compared to other periods of modern era (Jacobson, 1984, pp. 190–192, 198–199). International governmental organizations, however, have clearly been only one of several factors, including the awesome destructiveness of modern weapons and bipolarity, that may have contributed to this relative peacefulness, and they may well not have been the most important one. The only broadly supported conclusion of this analysis may be the obvious one that now and in the near future IGOs by themselves cannot be counted on to eliminate violence from the global political system.

In sum, as functionalist tenets suggested, some states at least appear to gain economic benefits from participation in IGOs. The consequences of this participation for the conflict behavior of states, however, are more opaque; international war has not been eliminated, but IGOs

belongs, as it does, what must the situation be like for countries that belong to proportionately more IGOs and have much smaller bureaucracies?

In most countries a relatively small number of bureaucrats along with a few delegates are charged with the responsibility of overseeing the work of and formulating policies for some 60 international governmental organizations. The impossibility of doing these tasks well in such circumstances is obvious. When the majority of states in an IGO are in such a position, the control of the direction of the organization can easily drift to the secretariat or to a minority of activist delegates who can muster majority support. States, and particularly those that provide the greatest financial support, can easily lose control. The United States and other Western countries allege that this has happened in UNESCO, and the U.S. and British withdrawal from UNESCO is a result of deep disagreement with the policies of the organization. Whatever the wisdom of the U.S. and U.K. decisions in this particular instance, there is a general problem. Somehow the multiplying entanglement of states and IGOs will have to take account of administrative realities and possibilities.

Functionalist theory expresses a preference for international governmental organizations becoming relatively autonomous from the states that comprise them. Functionalist theory sees such relatively autonomous IGOs gradually guiding states. UNESCO, which became relatively autonomous, could demonstrate the unreality of this vision. Given the fact of national control over resources, IGOs are at some risk when they ignore the preferences of the most powerful states. To do so may make them irrelevant to contemporary affairs, or, more seriously, could jeopardize their existence.

It is clear that creative ideas that go beyond functionalism are needed to guide the future evolution of the web of international governmental organizations. Such ideas will have to take into account and build on the empirical evidence presented here. Ways need to be discovered for effectively, constructively, and reliably engaging states in the web of IGOs that is continually being woven even more densely.

Notes

1. The *Yearbook* contains information about both international governmental and international non-governmental organizations. The first edition of the *Yearbook* was published in 1909, and the most recent in 1983. The information contained in the *Yearbook* comes from responses to a questionnaire sent to the secretariats of international organizations by the Union of International Associations. The amount of information contained in the *Yearbook* about each IGO thus varies. There is a headquarters address for virtually all the IGOs that are listed, the date of founding for almost 80%, the member states for some 50%, the size of the staff for 12%, and the size of the budget for less than 3%.

2. Curiously, the numbers in the summary statistics included in the nineteenth edition do not correspond with the number of organizations that are actually listed. There are more IGOs listed in subcategories D through F of the *Yearbook*, and fewer in categories C and G, than the summary statistics indicate. In addition, some organizations that have been inactive or are dissolved are included in categories B through G of the listing, and as mentioned in the text, these categories also include some IGOs that had been proposed but were not yet in

existence in 1981. These latter organizations have been placed in a separate category, I, in the data set.

3. The members of the OECD are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

4. The members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for the purposes of this analysis are Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Byelorussia and the Ukraine are not formally members of WTO, but they are members of several IGOs, and since they are part of the Soviet Union, which is a member of WTO, it seems appropriate to include them in this category.

5. It includes the 121 states that were members of the Group of 77 in 1981, and 50 other states and territories. Some of the 50 were not independent, but they nevertheless belonged to various IGOs, and thus should not be excluded from analyses. Were they independent, they probably would join the Group of 77, as indeed some of them have done after gaining independence in the years since 1981. The 50 also includes some small European sovereignties and other states such as Israel, Taiwan, and South Africa that are difficult to classify. All of these states need to be included in some group, and the latter group of states that are difficult to classify resembles the states in the "Other" category with respect to economic characteristics more than it resembles those in the OECD or WTO categories. The categories are used in the descriptions that follow, so that the inclusion of any particular state is not necessary: when IGOs composed exclusively of "Other" states are described, these bodies in fact seldom include those states that are difficult to classify.

6. The members of CMEA are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Vietnam.

7. In this analysis, the term "IGO memberships" is defined as including both full and associate memberships in organizations in both of UIA's categories. States' IGO membership using this

inclusive definition correlate almost perfectly the total arrived at using various narrower definitions. The generalizations derived from analyses using the most inclusive definition would also be valid if a more restrictive definition were preferred.

8. Using states' full memberships only in IGOs included in the UIA category of conventional international organizations as the dependent variable yields a very similar equation. The ordinary least squares equation is:

Full IGO membership in the UIA principal

category $= 18.66 + .67$ System Years
$\qquad$ (3.33) (.09)

$+ .001$ GNP per capita
(.00)

$- 2.58$ Party Competition $+ .000009$ GNP
(.84) $\qquad\qquad$ (.00)

$R^2 = .62$; standard error of estimate $= 12.26$; level of significance $= .00$.

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