REPLIES TO PAPERS
Terry
Horgan
Jaegwon Kim argues that one should distinguish
naturalism from materialism, and that both should be construed as ontological rather than epistemological.
I agree, on both counts. Although I have sometimes tended to slur together
materialism and naturalism in of my writings (as is done in much recent
philosophy), I do think that it is important to distinguish them. It is a
serious philosophical task to get clearer about how each position is best
articulated, and about ways that one could embrace naturalism without embracing materialism. British emergentism, for
example, seems reasonably classified as a position that is naturalist but not
materialist (and evidently the British emergentists themselves construed their
view this way). Here are two key tenets of British emergentism, both of which
seem to disqualify the view from being a form of materialism without thereby
disqualifying it as a form of naturalism:
(E.1) There are emergent properties in nature, in the following sense: although (i)
these properties are supervenient on certain other properties, the relevant
supervenience facts are ontologically sui generis (and
hence are unexplainable).
(E.2) Emergent properties are fundamental force-generating properties,
in this sense: they produce additional fundamental forces that affect the
distribution of matter, above and beyond the fundamental forces posited in
physics.
A position worth of the label
“materialism,” it seems to me, should preclude both of these emergentist
theses. My notion of superdupervenience is intended as a condition that any
version of materialism should
satisfy, and is supposed to be incompatible with theses (E.1) and (E.2).
Although sometimes, as in Horgan and Timmons (1992) and Horgan (1994), the
condition is articulated in terms of the need for supervenience to be
explainable “in a naturalistically acceptable way” (thereby slurring the
naturalism/materialism distinction), what I had in mind was that supervenience
relations must be explainable in a materialistically
acceptable way. This was how I formulated the requirement in Horgan (1993), the
paper in which the term ‘superdupervenience’ was explicitly introduced.[1]
I have
always thought of this explainability requirement as fundamentally ontological,
rather than as epistemological. The idea is that the relevant supervenience
relations are not brute modal facts—not
brute inter-level laws of nature (as the emergentists thought, in the case of
the properties they considered emergent), and not brute synthetic necessary
truths (as Moore evidently construed the status of natural/moral supervenience
relations)—but instead are facts that obtain because of some “materialistically
kosher” sufficient reason. I take
this to mean that such supervenience facts are in principle explainable in a materialistically acceptable way. The
kind of in-principle explainability I have in mind could turn out to be forever
beyond the reach of human cognition: the explanations might exist in principle,
and yet humans might be “cognitively closed” to them. (Colin
McGinn, as I understand him, holds this view about the relation between
consciousness and its physical basis; cf. McGinn 1991, 1993.)
Kim wonders
whether the purpose of the superdupervenience constraint would be better served
by replacing the requirement that supervenience relations be materialistically explainable—my own proposed condition
that a metaphysical position should satisfy in order to be a version of
materialism—with the alternative requirement (as per the principles Kim
formulates as (T*) and (T**)) that supervenience relations be “naturalistically
accessible.” I would resist such a replacement, because conditions (T*) and
(T**) appear to be consistent with theses (E.1) and (E.2) of emergentism, whereas
the desired constraint on materialism is supposed to preclude both theses.
Kim asks,
“Why should an explanation of the
entailment (N ® Pain) make
Pain naturalistically “kosher” (as Horgan says), whereas the entailment itself
cannot?” First, I again emphasize that the key issue, insofar as my invocation
of superdupervenience is concerned, is what it takes to make the N-to-Pain
relation materialistically kosher.
Second, Kim is here using the word ‘entailment’ in a coarse-grained way that
applies to a range of necessitation relations. Third, some kinds of putative
necessitation relations would not be materialistically kosher, notably (i)
ontologically brute inter-level nomically necessary connections (as posited by
emergentists, for instance, for the case of neural properties vis-à-vis mental
properties), and (ii) ontologically brute, synthetic, metaphysically necessary
connections (as posited by
Is the
contention that mental properties and other special-science properties are
superdupervenient on physical properties a “reductionist” position, and is it
thereby at odds with my own frequent espousal of “nonreductive materialism”?
Kim’s discussion suggests that that he thinks the answer to both questions is
‘Yes’. My own answer is that it all depends on how one employs the word ‘reduction’,
a term of art whose metaphorical connotations allow a range of different but
legitimate alternative uses. In one important sense, reductionism asserts that
each natural-kind property posited in the special sciences is at least nomically coextensive with some
natural-kind property posited in physics, and often also asserts that the
ontological basis for such an inter-theoretic “bridge law” is that the
special-science property is identical to
its physical “correlate.” Reductionism in this sense is what Fodor attacked in
his influential paper “Special Sciences,” and also is what various philosophers
(myself included) mean to repudiate in advocating what
we call “nonreductive materialism.”
In another
important sense, however, reductionism is a view denying both key tenets (E.1)
and (E.2) of emergentism. This kind of reductionism asserts that although there
may well be special-science natural-kind properties that are distinct from (and
are not nomically coextensive with) physical natural-kind properties, nevertheless
such properties are always resultant
rather than emergent—i.e., their supervenience on certain physical properties
is explainable rather than metaphysically sui generis, and consequently these
properties also are not fundamental force-generating properties. In this
anti-emergentist sense of ‘reductionism’, a materialist metaphysics that
embraces the superdupervenience of mental properties and other special-science
natural-kind properties certainly counts as a reductionist position. Thus, the
view I call “nonreductive materialism” is certainly reductive in this sense.
Jessica Wilson puts heavy metaphysical weight on
the idea of a fundamental force, as
important for characterizing materialism. I am very sympathetic with this idea.
I came to appreciate its importance by reading McLaughlin (1992), and
thereafter I began to invoke fundamental forces myself. In Horgan (1993), I
characterized the causal completeness of the physical this way: all fundamental
causal forces are physical forces, and the laws of physics are never violated
(p. 560). And it seems to me that one of emergentism’s two key tenets is also
best formulated in terms of forces, as the claim that emergent properties are
fundamental force-generating properties. (See (E.1) above, and the lesson from
emergentism labeled (L.1) in Horgan 1993, p. 560)
As I said
in Horgan (1993) p. 560, I take it that if inter-level supervenience relations
are indeed robustly explainable in a materialistically acceptable way, then the
supervenient properties thus explainable are not causally basic, in the sense
of being fundamental force-generating properties. Given this very plausible
assumption, together with the empirically well-justified assumption that the
set F of fundamental forces in nature includes only physical forces that come
into play at or below the level of atomic organization, the superdupervenience
requirement—“Horgan’s constraint,” as Wilson calls it—evidently entails the
principle that Wilson calls “Physicalism”:
Physicalism
(same-subject necessitation): For every property P and Q: If Q
same-subject necessitates P, every causal power bestowed by P is identical with
a causal power bestowed by Q that is grounded only in the fundamental forces in
F.
But
contrary to
Olga
Markic maintains that nonreductive materialism is an unstable position, and
that stability can only be achieved via its transformation into one or another
position such as eliminativism, preservative irrealism, reductive materialism,
epiphenomenalism, or emergentism. She contends that the instability of
nonreductive materialism comes to light given my own claim that any version of
materialism that is metaphysically realist about mentality requires
physical-to-mental superdupervenience. Her argument, as I understand it, goes
as follows. Either the superdupervenience requirement is statisfied for
mentality, or not. If it is satisfied then reductive
materialism obtains; mental properties are resultant, rather than emergent. But
if it is not satisfied, then the only available options are irrealist versions
of materialism (e.g., eliminativism or preservative irrealism) or
non-materialist views (e.g., epiphenomenalism or emergentism).
In reply, I again emphasize the two
above-mentioned ways of employing the word ‘reduction’. The position that I
call nonreductive materialism claims that mental properties are distinct from,
and are multiply realizable by, physical natural-kind properties; it also
embraces physical-to-mental superdupervenience. This view is nonreductive in
the sense that it embraces mental properties as real and yet denies that mental
properties are identical to (or are nomically coextensive with) physical
natural-kind properties. In another sense it is reductive: it construes mental
properties as resultant, rather than emergent. I see no instability in this
position; but one needs to keep clearly in mind that the term ‘nonreductive’
has the first sense when the label ‘nonreductive materialism’ is employed.
Markic discusses my causal
compatibilism concerning mental causation vis-à-vis physical causation, and she
speculates that it may be connected to the “preservative irrealism” about
intentional mental properties that I recommend as a serious philosophical
option in Horgan (1993, 1994). But these two themes in my work are not directly
connected. Causal compatibilism is my favored approach to the causal exclusion
problem; this problem arises for any materialist position that is realist about
mental properties but denies that mental properties are identical to physical
properties. Preservative irrealism about mental intentionality, on the other
hand, is a position that I have argued is worth taking seriously in light of
the real possibility that putative mental intentional properties might turn out
not to be superdupervenient on the physical.
If one does embrace preservative
irrealism about mental intentionality, does this mean that one must eschew the
causal efficacy of the intentional aspects of mentality? Not necessarily,
because the relevant causal claims might still turn out to be true. Here is a
place where my work on contextual semantics, and on truth as indirect
correspondence, can come into contact with my work in philosophy of mind. These
interconnections are explored in Horgan (1994).
In any
case, I have never been willing to fully embrace preservative irrealism about
mental intentionality, even though I do think the view deserves serious
consideration. Lately I have substantially backed away from this position,
partly because (i) I am a realist about the phenomenal
aspects of mentality, and (ii) I now hold that mental intentional properties
are, by their very nature, phenomenal; cf. Horgan and Tienson (in press).
John Tienson argues against the claim that the
problem of causal exclusion in philosophy of mind is a special case of a
general problem about causal exclusion for special-science properties—a claim
made by various philosophers, myself included. Tienson
maintains, roughly, (1) that causal relations typically “go through” certain
macro-properties that are resultant supervenient properties (rather than
excluding such properties), and (2) that the natural-kind properties posited in
the special sciences typically are such resultant, causally potent,
macro-properties.[2]
Perhaps he is right about this; I currently am unsure what to think about it.
My lingering worry is this: Isn’t it prima facie plausible to argue, in the
spirit of causal-exclusionary reasoning, that all the “real causal work” in
nature is done (often collectively) by physical microparticles instantiating
fundamental force-generating properties, and that resultant properties
instantiated by complex wholes thereby are epiphenomenal?
But suppose
that this worry can be satisfactorily handled, and that there is no genuine
exclusion problem for resultant macro-properties. As Tienson himself points
out, there would still be an exclusion problem in philosophy of mind insofar as
mental properties fail to be resultant properties (i.e., fail to be explainable
in lower-level terms). I have reluctantly come to believe that mental
properties in general may well be emergent rather than resultant, in the sense
of thesis (E.1) above. This is because, like a number of philosophers (including
Kim and Tienson), I see no credible prospects for explaining the supervenience
of the phenomenal aspects of mentality in a materialistically acceptable way;
moreover, Tienson and I have argued (Horgan and Tienson, in press) that the
phenomenal and intentional aspects of mentality are so thoroughly intertwined
that virtually all consciously accessible mental states (including occurrent
beliefs and desires) have constitutive phenomenal character—which would mean
that the infamous problem of the “explanatory gap” arises for consciously
accessible mental states in general.
This would
also mean that there is indeed a problem of causal exclusion for mental
properties in general, even if Tienson is right that there is no exclusion
problem for resultant properties. Three versions of emergentism about mental
properties can now be distinguished, each of which deals differently with the
exclusion issue:
Classical emergentism: Mental properties are emergent,
and they are fundamental force-generating properties.
Epiphenomenal emergentism: Mental properties are emergent,
and they are causally inefficacious.
Compatibilist emergentism: Mental properties are emergent and are
causally efficacious, but they are not fundamental force-generating properties.
Classical
emergentism seems very unlikely to be true, given the steadily mounting
empirical evidence that the only fundamental force-generating properties in
nature are physical properties instantiated at or below the atomic level. So,
if mental properties are indeed emergent rather than resultant, then evidently
they can only be causally efficacious if some version of causal compatibilism
is true. I think my own recommended version, in Horgan (2001) and the other
papers cited therein, can be smoothly grafted onto
emergentism to yield a credible form of compatibilist emergentism.
Seven Walter discusses my two papers
(one collaborative with George Graham) on the theme of
I
have always worried that
What is the
connection between the Mary-Mary argument and the problem of the explanatory
gap? I think that the argument provides one specific way of appreciating this
problem—one specific route to the realization that the supervenience of
phenomenal properties on physical properties does not seem to be susceptible to
materialistically acceptable explanation. For those who already believe this,
perhaps the argument does nothing terribly novel philosophically. But against
those who think that the problem of the explanatory gap can be evaded, e.g., by
some version of the “mode of presentation response,” I think the Mary-Mary
argument is a dialectically effective way of bringing to light the apparent
inadequacy of their approach. Such accounts evidently fail to come adequately
to terms with the intrinsic phenomenal character of experience—what “what it’s
like” is really like.
Alex Byrne argues that a variant of
But
whatever exactly the ineffability of Mary’s new belief consists in, it seems to
me appropriate to describe her new epistemic situation in Russellian
terminology: her newly acquired, ineffable, belief is a belief by acquaintance about the bead’s
color—that is, the belief deploys a color-concept that is grounded in an
experiential-acquaintance relation between Mary and the property blue. Call this
a direct-acquaintance concept. It
also seems plausible that when she conceives the property blue under this
direct-acquaintance concept, she is conceiving it essentially, as it is in
itself. And of course, when one conceives the property blue in this way, one
conceives it otherwise than as physical. Furthermore, the following
principle seems hard to deny: If conceiving blue under this concept is a matter
of both (i) conceiving it essentially, as it is in itself, and (ii) conceiving
it otherwise than as physical, then the property so conceived is otherwise than physical—i.e., it is a
nonphysical property. Hence, blue is a nonphysical property; and by a parallel
argument, blue is not a superdupervenient property either. (Compare
Horgan and Tienson 2001). The property blue may or may not really get
instantiated by material objects; but whether it does or not, the argument just
rehearsed leads to the conclusion that this property—whose essence is presented
to us directly in experience—is not a physical property or a superdupervenient
property. I find this argument quite plausible, although its conclusion is very
jarring.
I turn now
to papers discussing the approach to language/world and thought/world relations
that I call “contextual semantics.” As I often do in articulating and defending
this approach, I will adopt Putnam’s capitalization convention to refer to
denizens of the mind-independent, discourse-independent, world. Also, I will
follow my recently adopted practice of using the phrase ‘correct affirmability’
rather than ‘correct assertibility’. The reason for this change in terminology
is that thoughts have truth-evaluable content no less than statements do;
affirming can happen either in thought or in language, whereas asserting is a
speech act.
Maria Reicher maintains that contextual
semantics, with its appeal to the notion of truth as indirect correspondence,
ultimately amounts to a paraphrase strategy, contrary to my own intentions—and
hence that contextual semantics does not really succeed in the goal of showing
how ontological commitment to entities like symphonies and corporations can be
avoided even if statements positing these putative entities cannot be
systematically paraphrased into statements not positing them. She sets forth a
four-premise argument whose conclusion is this:
If s is a meaningful assertive sentence,
then it must be possible in principle to give a formulation of the
assertibility norms of s in terms of
direct correspondence.
Three of the four premises, she
says, should not be a matter of debate. With respect to the statement
“Beethoven’s fifth symphony has four movements” (statement (2) in her paper),
she formulates as follows two of the premises that she considers
nontendentious:
If we
cannot reach...an ultimate paraphrase, then we never know what has to be the
case in order for (2) to be true; and if it were [in principle] impossible to
reach such an ultimate paraphrase, then (2) would not be a meaningful sentence.
(p. 9)
I would deny both of these claims.
When I advert to “semantic standards” (or “semantic norms”) that govern various
kinds of discourse (e.g., symphony discourse) and only require indirect
correspondence rather than direct correspondence, the semantic standards I have
in mind do not take the form of tractably formulable, cognitively surveyable,
truth conditions that are expressed in language that only quantifies over
ENTITIES that are REAL. I deny that in general, there are such truth
conditions—or need to be. (This denial is part of my rejection of the
paraphrase strategy as the only legitimate way of avoiding ontological
commitment to OBJECTS and PROPERTIES answering to the relevant singular and
general terms.) So I also deny that we must know
such truth conditions in order to understand the meanings of our terms and
concepts, or in order to employ them competently. What we need, rather, for
understanding of meaning and for semantic competence, is to be able to apply
the terms and concepts in a way that reasonably reflects semantic correctness
reasonably well, to the extent that available evidence allows us to do so. (We
need to be reasonably good at tracking epistemically
warranted affirmability in the first instance, and thereby at tracking semantically correct affirmability
insofar as our evidence does not mislead us or come up short.) We are reasonably good at this, even though
typically the contextually operative semantic standards are such that the set
of “possible worlds” in which a given statement is true (under those standards)
cannot be specified by any compact, cognitively surveyable, formula that itself
is governed by direct-correspondence semantic standards. This kind of tracking
competence is largely constitutive of
both (i) understanding the meaning of statements like (2), and (ii) knowing
what has to be the case in order for such statements to be true.
I
might add that I am strongly inclined to believe that the lack of tractable,
cognitively surveyable, formulability is something that holds not just with
respect to putative direct-correspondence truth-conditions for specific
statements, but also for semantic normativity in general. I doubt that the
kinds of contextually operative semantic standards that typically govern our
thought and discourse are tractably specifiable and cognitively surveyable in any format, let alone in the format of
direct-correspondence truth conditions. And I think that the same is probably
also true for other kinds of normative standards that philosophers tend to
focus on—notably, moral standards and epistemic standards. Again, such
formulability is not needed. Rather, what is needed is that human judgments and
judgment-tendencies should accurately reflect those standards, modulo available
evidence and information. And again, I do not believe that this semantic
competence requires, by any means, that the standards themselves should be
formulable in a tractable and cognitively surveyable way.
There
is a connection between these claims about normativity and the general
conception of cognition set forth and defended in Horgan and Tienson (1996).
Tienson and I argue that human cognition is too complex and too subtle to
conform to programmable, algorithmic, rules over mental representations—and
thus that the computational paradigm in cognitive science is inadequate.
Briefly, the connection I see is this: just as human cognitive
state-transitions cannot be systematized by exceptionless algorithmic rules,
likewise various kinds of normativity (semantic, epistemic, moral)
cannot be systematized by exceptionless general rules. Non-algorithmic
cognitive processing can conform to particularistic normative standards.
Tadeusz Szubka argues, contrary to what
I have maintained, that “the only gap between truth conceived as properly
idealized warranted assertibility and truth construed as correct assertibility
is terminological, not substantial” (p. 15). His case for this claim depends
partly on the contention that although many who advocate some kind of epistemic
account of truth have repudiated THE WORLD with its OBJECTS and PROPERTIES and
RELATIONS, one can consistently embrace an epistemic construal of truth without
embracing this kind of global metaphysical irrealism. This may well be right.
And, insofar as epistemic reductionists are willing to concede the point, my
dispute with them is certainly narrower than is my dispute with those “package
deal metaphysical irrealists” (as I call them) who think of epistemic
reductionism as intimately intertwined with global metaphysical irrealism. I am
a metaphysical realist, and I want a construal of truth that comports with
metaphysical realism.
Nonetheless,
I do think there are gaps between semantically correct affirmability and
idealized warranted affirmability. First, there is a conceptual gap, which can
be expressed via what Crispin Wright (1992) calls the “Euthyphro contrast”:
even to the extent that truth (i.e., semantically correct affirmability) coincides with ideal warranted
affirmability, this is not because the latter constitutes the former, but rather because an epistemically ideal
situation would eliminate the usual ways of being misled, mistaken, or
misinformed about what is true. Truth is the key constitutive goal behind normative standards for epistemic warrant,
and as such is conceptually prior to warrant or to any idealization of warrant.
Second,
there is an instantiation gap, for various actual and possible cases. For
example, two competing theoretical accounts about the realm of the ultra-small
might be equally well warranted by all relevant epistemic standards, and might
remain so even in the ideal limit of human inquiry—and yet (as all the parties
to the discussion might themselves agree), there will still be an objective
fact of the matter about which account (if either) is actually true. Another
example is from Putnam, who now thinks it a mistake to construe truth purely
epistemically: the claim “There is a group of stars outside our light cone
(i.e., in some region such that a signal from any such region would have to
travel faster than the speed of light to reach us) arranged as the vertices of
a regular 100-gon.” Although such a claim might be true, there is no way we
could know it to be true—even in the ideal limit of human inquiry; cf. Putnam
(1995).
I believe
that there is something importantly right in pragmatist and verificationist
approaches to truth, even though I think these approaches err in attempting to
reduce semantic correctness to some form of epistemic correctness. Contextual
semantics seeks to retain what is right, while eschewing epistemic
reductionism. One key idea is that epistemic warrant is keyed to semantic
correctness in such a way that one can tell a lot about the latter by attending
to the former. Warranted affirmability of the statement “Beethoven’s fifth
symphony has four movements,” for instance, has very little to do with the
question whether there are such mind-independently real ENTITIES as SYMPHONIES.
This fact about epistemic warrant strongly suggests that the semantic
correctness of this statement, as it is employed in typical contexts, is a kind
of indirect correspondence that does not involve such ENTITIES; for, otherwise
the epistemic standards that we actually employ vis-à-vis such statements would
be far too lax to be epistemically appropriate, given the statements’ semantic
content.
Another
key theme of contextual semantics, also reflecting something importantly right
in pragmatism and verificationism, is that standards for epistemic warrant and
for semantic correctness are intimately interconnected with one another, and
very likely are learned simultaneously. To a large extent, mastery of meaning
is a matter of having mastered suitable epistemic standards of confirmation and
disconfirmation for various statements. But again, this only reflects the fact
that in general, the contextually operative warrant standards for statements in
a given mode of discourse are appropriate,
relative to the contextually operative semantic standards for such statements.
The interconnectedness does not, by any means, show
that truth is reducible to some version of epistemic warrant.
Those who
advocate epistemic reductionism about truth bear the burden of proof, when
their view is compared to mine. Although epistemic theories have been around a
long time whereas contextual semantics has not, this sociological fact does not,
by itself, shift the burden of proof back to me.
Michael Lynch sympathizes with my general
approach to truth, and like me is dubious about epistemic reductionism. He also
claims to believe, as I do, in a mind-independent, discourse-independent,
world. But he has doubts both about my version of metaphysical realism that
posits OBJECTS with PROPERTIES and RELATIONS, and about my contention that
there is a limit-case use of terms and concepts under which truth is direct
correspondence (rather than indirect correspondence). The centerpiece of his
paper is an argument that if contextual semantics is correct, then no statement
is ever semantically correct under maximally strict, direct-correspondence,
semantic standards. I will address that argument below, after first commenting
on several other matters.
Because of
my emphasis on implicit, contextually variable, parameters that govern semantic
correctness, Lynch classifies me as a “pluralist” about truth. He mentions this
potential problem for pluralist accounts:
Barring an
account of how various ascriptions of semantic correctness are unified,
pluralist theories of truth would seem to imply that truth is equivocal. This
would be unfortunate. (p. 7)
In reply, let me stress the
following feature of my view about concepts governed by contextually variable
semantic parameters: when parameter-settings alter from one context to another,
the result is fine-grained, inter-contextual differences in concept (and in
meaning) that are identity-preserving.
Adapting Derrida’s terminology, I use the word “diffèrance” for this kind of
identity-preserving semantic variation. Diffèrance is a much more subtle
semantic difference than ordinary equivocation, because the latter involves non-identical concepts and meanings.
Trans-contextual diffèrance is a feature of the notion of truth, as well. For
instance, in many metalinguistic contexts (although not necessarily all), the
contextually operative semantic standards governing the truth concept work in
tandem with those governing terms and concepts expressed in the object
language, in such a way that instances of schema T are themselves semantically
correct. Since these fine-grained, trans-contextual, semantic differences in
the contextually proper use of the truth-predicate are identity-preserving differences in the meaning of ‘true’, they do
not make truth equivocal.
Concerning
my contention that there can be limit-case, direct-correspondence, uses of
terms and concepts, Lynch raises this worry:
It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the TRUTHS hold a privileged place in
Horgan’s scheme. Generally speaking, it is a norm of any rational discourse
that one should have beliefs about reality and not merely about appearance.
That is, were one forced to choose, one should (all other things being equal)
choose to believe in what is real rather than what merely appears to be real.
(p. 10)
But although the appearance/reality
distinction perhaps could be pressed
into service to mark the distinction between what is true under limit-case
semantic standards and what is true under non-limit-case standards but is not
true under limit-case standards, I would urge that in most contexts, the semantic parameters governing the terms
‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ do not work this way at all. Statements that are true under contextually operative semantic
standards fall on the reality side of the divide, not the appearance side.
Limit-case truths are not privileged in terms of what is worthy of belief,
although they are privileged ontologically.
Concerning
the putative ontological benefits of contextual semantics, Lynch raises the
following objection, phrased in terms of what Jackson (1998) calls “location
problems” (i.e., problems of finding a place in the mind-independent physical
world for items to which our beliefs appear to be ontologically committed):
While CS
allows us to avoid location problems, it gives rise to a very similar set of
problems concerning whether any of our ordinary statements express FACTS about
the WORLD. Call these re-location problems....
We must consider, among other questions:
Are
symphonies OBJECTS (i.e., mind-independent entities)?
Are there
any nonmaterial OBJECTS?
Are
symphonies nonmaterial?
And so
on.... This apparently undermines the main motivation for adopting CS. If CS
was meant to allow a realist to avoid the frustrations of the location project,
then the fact that CS causes extremely similar problems indicates that CS has
gained us less ground than we thought.” (pp. 10-11).
I certainly acknowledge that we
face such “relocation problems” within my general approach to semantics and
ontology. Indeed, addressing such questions is a central task for metaphysics,
as I see it. But in my view, this hardly means that CS has gained us less
ground than we thought—much less that the main motivation for adopting CS has
been undermined. On the contrary: within my approach, there is a crucial third option concerning the ontological
status of entities posited in our discourse, beyond the options of either (i)
locating them as ENTITIES in THE WORLD, or (ii) repudiating them and rejecting
statements that posit them as false—viz., (iii) claiming that statements
positing them are true under indirect-correspondence semantic standards but
false under direct-correspondence standards. One key theoretical motivation for
CS is the introduction of this third option into metaphysics.
Lynch
objects that a central claim of CS cannot be stated under limit-case semantic
standards, viz.,
(1*) Statement (1) is true,
where statement
(1) is “Mozart composed 27 piano concertos.” He is right that (1*) is not true
under limit-case semantic standards; rather, it is true under metalinguistic
semantic standards that are assertorically consistent with those that typically
operate at the object-language level to govern statements like (1*). But from
my point of view this is not a problem, for two reasons. First, I do not
require or expect that serious theorizing, in science or in philosophy, need
always take place within discourse that is governed by maximally strict semantic
standards. This is no less true for theorizing about how our language and
concepts work than for any other theorizing. (I do acknowledge that the
ontological foundations of contextual semantics need to be secure, in order
that the whole approach not implode on itself. See
Horgan and Potrc (in press), which addresses questions posed by Tienson (in
press) about the ontological foundations of contextual semantics.) Second, one
contextually permissible way to employ the truth predicate, which is especially
useful in articulating contextual semantics, is to use it relativistically rather than categorically, thereby disengaging
one’s metalinguistic discourse from specific object-language semantic
standards. For example, the following claim is correct under this relativized
usage of ‘true’: Statement (1) is true under
the semantic standards that normally govern concerto-talk.
Let me turn
now to Lynch’s argument that if CS is correct, then no statement is ever
semantically correct under maximally strict semantic standards. To begin with,
I myself have not much used the capitalized words ‘TRUE’ and ‘FACT’. I have
mainly used the capitalization convention with words like ‘object’, ‘property’,
and ‘world’. When one ascends to the metalinguistic level, one needs to keep
two distinct issues separated conceptually, and it is useful to have notational
devices in play that enforce this separation (and thereby avoid confusion). The
first issue is whether a given object-level statement is true (semantically
correct) when it is employed under maximally strict semantic standards. One limit-case use of ‘true’ would be to
claim that this is so. (This usage need not be one in which the metalanguage itself is governed by limit-case
semantic standards.) A second issue is whether a putatively mind-independently
real PROPERTY expressed by the predicate ‘is true’ is instantiated by a given
object-level statement (which would require that the instantiating statement
itself be an OBJECT). Another
limit-case use of ‘true’ would be to predicate the putative property TRUTH.
(This usage need not necessarily be limited to cases where the semantic
standards at work in the object language are limit-case object-language semantic standards.) The capitalization
convention, as applied to ‘is true’ and to ‘truth’, signals the second kind of
limit-case usage. But it will be helpful to have a separate explicit notation
to signal the first kind of usage too. So, let ‘truelim’ indicate
truth under limit-case object-language
semantic standards—a notation that leaves open the
question whether truth in general, or truthlim in particular, is a
PROPERTY.
Using
this notation, Lynch’s reductio ad absurdum argument evidently goes as follows.
Take a statement “S” that is supposedly truelim, and consider this
statement:
(a) “S” is truelim
Since we ourselves determine a
statement’s operative semantic standards in context, whether statement (a) is
truelim is a mind-dependent matter. Hence,
(b) ““S” is truelim” is not truelim
Furthermore, it is a priori that
(c) If “S” says that S, then “S” is truelim
iff S.
From (b) and (c) plus the fact that
“S” says that S, it follows that
(d) “S” is not truelim.
I
have several things to say about this argument. First, the fact that it is up
to us whether or not the statement “S” is governed, in context, by limit-case
semantic standards does not sanction the inference from (a) to (b). For, it is
not up to us whether or not “S” is semantically correct under these limit-case semantic standards; rather, this
depends upon whether or not “S” directly
expresses how things are with the INSTANTIATION of PROPERTIES and RELATIONS by
OBJECTS.
Second,
I deny that instances of (c) are invariably true (and hence I also deny that
(c) is an a priori truth). Suppose, for instance, that one employs the
statement “Mozart composed 27 piano concertos” under semantic standards that
typically govern concerto-talk, while also employing the truth-predicate to
express semantic correctness under limit-case object-language semantic
standards. (The subscript ‘lim’ on ‘true’ makes this latter usage explicit.) In
this “mixed” mode of discourse, the truth predicate is being employed in a
manner that is not assertorically consistent with the semantic standards
operative in the object language, and hence the relevant instance of principle
(c) does not obtain. Although it is
the case that
Mozart
composed 27 piano concertos,
it is not the case that
“Mozart
composed 27 piano concertos” is truelim.
Third,
although I reject Lynch’s own reasoning in support of (b), as explained above,
I do allow that (b) may be correct even so. For, perhaps there are no such
entities as STATEMENTS, and/or perhaps there is no such property as TRUTH in
general or TRUTHlim in particular. If not, then the metalinguistic
statement (a) is not true under limit-case metalinguistic
semantic standards, even though the statement “S” is indeed true under
limit-case object-language semantic
standards.
Fourth, although I deny that instances of (c) are
always correct (and hence I deny that (c) is a priori), I do concede that (c)
is correct when the contextually operative semantic standards for
object-language discourse are limit-case semantic standards.
All this
brings me to my fifth and main point about the argument. Even if claim (b) is
correct (as it is if there are no such OBJECTS as STATEMENTS, and/or there is
no such PROPERTY as TRUTHlim), and even if claim (c) is correct (as
it is if the statement “S” is being employed under limit-case object-language
semantic standards), Lynch’s overall argument fails anyway. For, the inference
from (b), (c), and the fact that “S” says that S to the conclusion (d) is
invalid. The problem is that this inference involves replacing statement (a) by
the statement “S” within statement (b). This “level-dropping” substitution
within the scope of the sentential context “___is not truelim” is
invalid, because the original statement within that sentential context can be
richer in the range of objects and properties it posits than is the statement
that replaces it, and these additional posits of the original statement may not
be OBJECTS or PROPERTIES although the statement replacing it is itself truelim.
Specifically, statement (a) posits a statement
(viz., the statement “S”) and a property
(viz., the property truthlim), and there may not be any such OBJECT
or any such PROPERTY even if statement “S” is truelim.
Matjaz Potrc points out an apparent tension
between certain claims I want to make concerning contextual semantics on one
hand, and ontology on the other hand. He argues that these claims, rightly
understood, are not really in tension at all. I concur.
As Potrc
points out (and as I remarked above in my comments on Maria Reicher’s paper), I
have become increasingly attracted to “particularism” about semantic normativity.
That is, I believe that the contextually semantic standards that typically
govern most uses of concepts and terms are probably too complex and subtle to
be fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles; also, I have
doubts about the extent to which they can even be partially systematized by
“soft” general principles containing ceteris paribus clauses. On the other
hand, I have also articulated and endorsed the “nonarbitrariness of
composition” as a fundamental methodological principle that demands honoring in
serious ontological theorizing. I find it at work in Van Inwagen (1990); and it
is invoked, for example, in Horgan and Potrc (2000) as part of the argument for
the position there called “ontological blobjectivism.”
I agree
with Potrc that there is not a genuine conflict between this methodological
principle and my particularism about semantic normativity. The nonarbitrariness
of composition holds sway when we are doing serious ontology, asking what
OBJECTS and PROPERTIES there are. At the semantical level, it governs the
proper use of object-talk as governed by
direct-correspondence semantic standards. But this principle need not, and
generally does not, hold sway insofar as one is employing language and thought
under various kinds of indirect-correspondence
semantic standards—where one’s posits are only aspects of “regional ontology”
rather than “ultimate ontology.”
Turning now
to metaethics, Josep Corbi raises
several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have
articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.” He also
challenges one of our main anti-descriptivist arguments, the one we direct
against Michael Smith’s metaethical rationalism. His remarks prompt some points
of clarification, both about nondescriptivist cognitivism and about our
critique of Smith.
Timmons and
I characterize descriptive content as
“way-the-world-might-be” content. We maintain that “base case” beliefs—roughly,
those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest
kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative belief is an is-commitment with respect to a core
descriptive content, and an evaluative belief is an ought-commitment with respect to a core descriptive content. Core
descriptive contents are those descriptive contents expressible by
(nonevaluative) atomic sentences. Concerning the notion of a core descriptive
content, Corbi says:
Core
descriptive contents are not, despite appearances to the contrary, descriptive.
For descriptive contents have essentially to do with a representation of “the
world as being a certain way” and
thereby they already have a certain direction of fit; while core descriptive
contents are merely concerned with “a way-the-world-might-be content” because they are meant to be neutral with regard
to the direction of fit. (p. 3)
But when we
said that a descriptive content is a “way-the-world-might-be” content, the point of the modal word ‘might’ was merely
to acknowledge that the world might not in fact be the way the given
descriptive content says. This is a “non-success” use of the word
‘descriptive’. Under this usage, for example, the statement “Al Gore is U.S
President in 2002” has descriptive content, even though it is not true—and
hence does not describe how things actually
are. Descriptive content certainly has objective truth conditions.
Corbi questions our remark that in
the case of base-case is-commitment states but not in the case of base-case
ought-commitment states, the belief’s declarative content “coincides with its
core descriptive content.” But we think our remark should be noncontroversial
when understood as we intended it. Consider these two belief-attributions:
(a) Carme believes that she is studying
hard.
(b) Carme believes that she ought to be studying
hardl.
The logical
form of (b), as we construe it, is made more perspicuous this way:
(b*) Carme believes
that it ought to be that she is studying hard.
Both of the
beliefs attributed by these statements have the same core content, viz., the
content expressed by the ‘that’-clause ‘that Carme is studying hard’. Statement
(a) reveals what we meant by saying that in the case of a base-case descriptive
belief, the belief’s declarative content coincides with its core descriptive
content; the point is that both contents are expressed by the statement’s
‘that’-clause. Likewise, statement (b*) reveals what we mean by saying that in
the case of a base-case evaluative belief, the belief’s declarative content
does not coincide with its core
descriptive content; here the point is that the belief’s declarative content is
expressed by the ‘that’-clause appended to the word ‘believes’, whereas the
belief’s core descriptive content is expressed by the distinct ‘that’-clause
appended to the words ‘it ought to be’
Although Timmons and I are
nondescriptivists about moral beliefs, we contend that descriptivists have
reason to embrace our overall framework for belief. A descriptivist seeking to
accommodate metaethical internalism could maintain, for example, that the belief
expressed by statement (b*) is both an ought-commitment with respect to the
core content that Carme is studying hard,
and an is-commitment with respect to the putatively descriptive declarative
content that it ought to be that Carme is
studying hard. But Corbi objects that our framework rules out this kind of
descriptivism, by virtue of a statement of ours that he quotes, viz.,
“Evaluative beliefs differ essentially from descriptive beliefs in the
following respect: the core descriptive content of an evaluative belief does
not coincide with its core declarative content.” Corbi takes us to be
presupposing here that metaethical descriptivism is false. But the quoted
statement was meant to be neutral about metaethical descriptivism; it can be
rephrased by replacing the word ‘descriptive’ by the word ‘non-evaluative’,
prior to the second occurrence of ‘beliefs’. (In the quoted sentence, we
briefly adopted a common alternative use of ‘descriptive’ that unfortunately
can cause confusion in the context of discussions of descriptivism vs.
nondescriptivism—a use in which ‘descriptive’ essentially just means
‘non-evaluative’.)
Corbi takes us to hold that a
benchmark difference between descriptive and non-descriptive content is that in
the case of the former, rational agents can achieve convergence—an idea that
Crispin Wright (1992) calls the “cognitive command” constraint. But this is not
our view. Rather, for us the key distinguishing feature of descriptive content
(as opposed to nondescriptive content) is this: for the former (but not the
latter), the operative semantic standards are what we call tight. By this we mean that the semantic standards, together with
how things are with respect to the PROPERTIES
and RELATIONS instantiated by OBJECTS, jointly conspire to determinately
fix correct-affirmability and correct-deniability status (i.e., truth or
falsity) for a given declarative content. We actually agree with Corbi that in
general, a requirement of rational convergence cannot even be satisfied by
those discourses that are paradigmatically presented as descriptive.
This last point leads directly from
Corbi’s discussion of our nondescriptivist cognitivism into his critical
remarks about our argument against Michael Smith’s version of descriptivism.
Corbi objects that our argument presupposes that rational convergence is a
demarcating constraint on descriptive content. But this is a misunderstanding;
as just explained, we do not accept such a constraint.
Our argument against Smith does
indeed appeal to a certain kind of hypothetically possible non-convergence,
between those on earth and those on “Moral Twin Earth.” But our use of this
divergence-scenario against Smith appeals not to a putative
convergence-constraint on descriptive content, but rather to the specific kinds
of truth conditions that Smith himself proposes for moral claims. Smith holds,
roughly, that something is good iff any rational person would desire it. The
trouble is that far too little will count as good, according to this account,
because of the ever-present possibility of the relevant kind of
desire-divergence between different rational agents (as illustrated by our case
of Earthlings and Twin Earthlings, and also by the example of Putnam and
Nozick).
Smith
holds that statement (T1), “Normative reasons require convergence in the
desires of fully rational agents,” is a conceptual truth. Timmons and I granted
this claim (at least for argument’s sake), but argued that the statement’s
being a conceptual truth (if indeed it is) does not help Smith; for, the
relevant sense of ‘rational’ would be a morally thick one incorporating certain
specific moral standards, whereas what Smith needs in order for his rationalist
account of morals to work is that there be rational convergence of desires
under a morally thin notion of
rationality. So our principal argument against Smith is not harmed if one calls
(T1) into question (as Corbi does). Also, when Timmons and I granted for the
sake of argument that (T1) is a conceptual truth (when ‘rational’ is construed
in a morally thick way), we were not buying into anything like Wright’s
cognitive-command constraint. Rather, the source of the alleged conceptual
truth here, according to Smith, is much more local: it is the alleged
constitutive content of the specific notion of a normative reason.
Stephen
Barker maintains that nondescriptivist cognitivism, as Timmons and I
articulate it, is incoherent because it conflates two senses of ‘content’
which, when clearly articulated, reveal inconsistencies in our position. He misconstues our position, but in an instructive way.
We reject the Semantic Assumption,
which asserts that all genuinely cognitive content is descriptive content
(i.e., way-the-world-might-be content). Consider the sentences that Barker labels (1)-(4):
(1) Bertie will mail the parcel.
(2) Bertie ought to mail the parcel.
(3) Jane believes that Bertie will mail the
parcel.
(4) Jane believes that Bertie ought to mail
the parcel.
We claim
that the overall declarative content of (2), and of the belief attributed by
(4), is not descriptive. So we also reject the assumption that Barker calls Orthodoxy, which asserts that a belief
state is always a relation between a believer (speaker) and a proposition (or
sentence, or whatever) such that what is believed is something having overall
descriptive content.
Barker, focusing on our rejection of
Orthodoxy, takes us to be embracing
a thesis he calls Content Identity,
which asserts two things: first, that the overall declarative content of
sentence (1) and of the belief attributed by sentence (3) is an is-commitment
with respect to the core content {Bertie mails the parcel}; and second, that
the overall declarative content of sentence (2) and of the belief attributed by
sentence (4) is an ought-commitment with respect to this same core content.
Here is a key passage from Barker, revealing his rationale for this reading us
this way:
H/T claim that they are overthrowing the orthodox conception of
belief: Orthodoxy. To explain the
belief attributions (3) and (4)...H/T cannot merely affirm that there are
different kinds of belief states, which can take the same kinds of objects,
they need rather to show that there are belief states that take different kinds of objects. So H/T must
explain what these two sorts of belief-objects are meant to be and to provide
evidence that there are two such types of object. H/T purport to be explaining
what they mean by different kinds of belief-objects through their content
identity claims, Content Identity....
This seems to be the assurance H/T supply themselves with that objects of
belief can come in two forms, one form somehow representational and the other
somehow nonrepresentational. And this they take to furnish themselves with the
means of denying Orthodoxy. But Content Identity is an instance of
flagrant content/state conflation. Declarative contents are meant to be contents. But now they are being equated
with states. (pp. 8-9)
I have several things to say about
this construal of our position, and about the rationale motivating the
interpretation. First, it is certainly a mistaken
interpretation. Timmons and I never explicitly equated declarative contents
with is-commitment states or ought-commitement states, and we never intended to
do so. We entirely agree with Barker that this would be a flagrant conflation
between what he calls “content qua semantic object of a contentful
psychological state,” and “content qua the state itself that possesses such
content” (p. 6). We also agree that adopting Content Identity would make the resulting position untenable, and
perhaps outright incoherent. One reason (among others) why we should reject Content Identity, as Barker rightly
points out, is that we ourselves say that ought-commitments are suspended in the case of logically
complex beliefs with embedded normative contents, which strongly suggests that
ought-commitments “are features of force and should not then be equated with
declarative content” (p. 11).
But second, the underlying
philosophical demand that motivates Barker’s interpretation is an important and
legitimate one (even though it causes him to misconstrue our position). In
order for the H/T framework to be viable, it needs to be incorporatable within
a more complete theoretical treatment of belief-states that credibly explains
their ontological structure. This
will have to be a theoretical treatment that repudiates Orthodoxy and offers some alternative positive account of the
ontological structure of at least some
belief-states—viz., beliefs whose overall declarative content is not
descriptive.
Third, I acknowledge that no such
positive account of the ontological structure of belief-states was provided, in
Horgan and Timmons (2000). To that extent, the framework for belief we
described was incomplete in an important respect. And I acknowledge that unless
a credible positive account of the requisite kind can be given, our framework
will not be tenable.
Fourth, I do think that the
requisite treatment of the ontology of belief-states can be provided. One
approach, for instance, would be to adapt the proposal in Fodor (1968) that the
objects of the propositional attitudes are sentences in the “language of
thought”; the class of eligible mentalese sentences could then include ones
with non-descriptive content. (I do not much like Fodor’s
proposal, however; cf. Horgan 1992). I myself am inclined instead to
favor an approach to the ontological structure of belief-states, and to the
logical form of belief-attributions, proposed by Quine in Word and Object. After canvassing various alternative construals of
belief-objects, Quine wrote:
A final
alternative that I find as appealing as any is simply to dispense with the
objects of the propositional attitudes. We can...formulate the propositional
attitudes with the help of the notations of intensional abstraction...but just
cease to view these notations as singular terms referring to objects. This
means viewing ‘Tom believes [
He also
proposed generalizing this treatment to cover “de re” belief-constructions. He
later called the envisioned propositional attitude operators “attitudinatives”
(Quine 1970, pp. 32-33). In Horgan (1989) I elaborated and defended Quine’s
proposal, with particular attention to explaining how the meaning of a Quineian
attitudinative construction is dependent upon the meanings of its components.
Barker observes that Timmons and I
adopt a “dispositionalist” treatment of beliefs whose overall declarative
content is logically complex. As we said in our paper:
The
essential feature of any given logically complex commitment-type is its
distinctive constitutive inferential role
in an agent’s cognitive economy (insofar as the agent is rational), a role
involving the relevant core descriptive contents.... So, for example, consider
the belief that either Jeeves mailed the
parcel or Bertie ought to mail the parcel.... The embedded moral
constituent, Bertie ought to mail the
parcel, is in the offing in the sense that the complex commitment-state in
question, together with the belief that Jeeves did not mail the parcel,
inferentially yields (at least for the minimally rational agent) an
ought-commitment with respect to Bertie’s mailing the parcel. (Horgan and Timmons 2000, pp. 136-7).
Barker
raises a legitimate concern about how such an inferentialist approach is
supposed to handle beliefs like the belief that George ought not to be
President. This prompts a revision in our position. Timmons and I now would
propose a non-inferentialist construal of minimimally complex negative
beliefs—that is, beliefs of the logical type ~F and the logical type Ought(~F), where F is a core descriptive
content (and hence is expressible as an atomic sentence). Briefly, the idea is
that such negative beliefs, like their affirmative counterparts, should be
construed as commitment states with a direct
constitutive psychological role in cognitive economy (rather than a
constitutive inferential role). There
are two direct, noninferential, kinds of is-commitment with respect to a core
descriptive content and likewise two direct kinds of
ought-commitment—affirmative and negative.[4]
With this improvement incorporated into our position, I think the treatment of
embedding in section VII.2 of our paper otherwise goes through as before,
mutatis mutandis.
Danilo
Suster raises worries both about the general metaphilosophical approach I
advocate with respect to philosophical inquiry about philosophically important
concepts, and about the application of this approach to the issue of freedom
and determinism. Let me begin with some clarificatory remarks, as a prelude to
addressing some of his specific objections.
First, the key principles of the
general metaphilosophical position that George Graham and I call “Southern
Fundamentalism” are not really intended primarily as methodological strictures, but rather as ideological hypotheses of
a very general and abstract sort. Whenever some specific concept is being
investigated, a specific case needs to be made for the claim that the given
concept falls toward the “austere” end of the spectrum of competing hypotheses
about its ideological workings; likewise, a specific case needs to be made that
any ideological “ideological-opulence tendencies” associated with the concept
can be respectfully explained away as involving some kind of subtle, natural,
mistake rather than some egregious blunder.
Second, Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy
treats general claims involving philosophically interesting concepts as ideological hypotheses. (Examples are
the hypothesis that knowledge is analysable as justified true belief, and the
hypothesis that built into the concept of freedom is the incompatibility of
freedom and determinism.) Among the most important kinds of data, vis-a-vis
these hypotheses, are people’s intuitive judgments and judgment-tendencies
concerning the proper application of a given concept with respect to specific concrete scenarios. Although people also sometimes
have intuitive judgments or judgment-tendencies about the truth or falsity of
the ideological hypotheses themselves, and although these latter intuitions are
data too, they are especially defeasible because often they are good candidates
to be respectfully explained away.
Third, the
principle of austerity—the claim that philosophically interesting concepts
generally are austere rather than opulent (one key tenet of Southern
Fundamentalism)—needs to be properly understood. The idea is this: among
the competing ideological hypotheses each
of which does reasonably well at accommodating relevant data about the workings
of the relevant concept(s), the correct ideological hypothesis generally
will be comparatively more austere than the other competing hypothesis (or
hypotheses). Ideological hypotheses that do badly at accommodating the relevant
data—including data about people’s intuitive judgments about how to apply the
concept(s) in specific concrete scenarios—usually are non-starters, even if
these hypotheses construe the concept(s) as highly austere.
Let me turn now to Suster’s
objections. He questions the principle of austerity, by focusing on the concept
of knowledge and Gettier cases:
Take now
the philosophically interesting case of knowledge. Suppose it is discovered that some justified
true beliefs do not pass the Gettier test. Should we then conclude that these
beliefs do not count as knowledge? According to the principle of austerity the
proper conclusion is that meeting the extra condition is not a genuine
prerequisite for knowledge (p. 2).
Not so,
because any credible ideological hypothesis about the concept of knowledge
needs to do well at accommodating people’s intuitive judgments about how to
apply the concept of knowledge in concrete cases—specifically, in Gettier
cases. The principle of austerity only says this: among competing ideological hypotheses that accommodate such judgments,
the correct one normally will be more austere than the competing one(s). (For
example, the correct one will be a hypothesis according to which I really do
know that I have hands, even though my evidence for this is consistent with the
possibility that I am a brain in a vat.)
We come now to the issue of freedom
and determinism. I contend that people’s intuitive judgments about how to apply
the notion of freedom in various concrete scenarios constitute one important
kind of data in support of compatibilism. Suster counters that the
incompatibilists have their own favorite stock of concrete examples, and that
people’s intuitions about how to describe these
examples constitute evidence for incompatibilism. He cites van Inwagen’s
Martian scenario (‘M’) as an example.
I grant that an agent in scenario
(‘M’) would not really act or choose freely; at any rate, this is my own
intuitive judgment about the case too. But it seems to me that this fact does
not count against my argument for compatibilism at all. For, I take it that our
ordinary attributions of freedom to ourselves and others implicitly presuppose that such a scenario does not
obtain vis-a-vis the persons of whom the attribution is made. And this
presupposition is certainly justified, and indeed is surely true—even though it
is defeasible.[5]
By
contrast, the putative presupposition of radical causal indeterminism in the
etiology of human actions and choices—which the opulent conception of freedom
claims is built into our ordinary attributions of freedom—is not well justified
at all. So if this presupposition is really in effect, then our ordinary
evidential standards for freedom attributions are sorely lax, and our intuitive
judgments about concrete cases become highly suspect because they are so sorely
lacking in adequate justification. This result counts heavily against
incompatibilism.
Suster questions my favored
contextualist approach to freedom attributions, according to which (i) these
attributions are compatible with determinism under the semantic standards that
normally govern the notion of freedom, but (ii) the attributions become
incompatible with determinism under maximally strict semantic standards that
tend to come into play when the problem of freedom and determinism is posed
explicitly. His objection, as I understand it, is that my contextualist account
is not relevantly analogous to familiar contextualist treatments of knowledge attributions.
He points out that these latter accounts often say that the way the standards
get raised contextually in the case of knowledge—for instance, by explicitly
posing the possibility that one is a brain in vat—is a matter of enlarging the range of relevant
possibilities to be considered: under the raised standards, I do not know
that I have hands unless my evidence precludes the possibility that I am a
brain in a vat. He objects that my own contextualist treatment of freedom
attributions does not work this way: it does not treat the raising of semantic
standards as a matter of enlarging the range of relevant possibilities.
But although Suster is surely right
about the disanalogy, I do not see it as a problem for my treatment. On the
contrary: in the case of freedom attributions, it appears that raising the
contextually operative semantic standards is a matter of shrinking the range of relevant possibilities—specifically, the
range of circumstantially similar possible worlds that are relevant to the question
whether the agent could have done
otherwise. Under the semantic standards that govern freedom attributions in
ordinary contexts, the compatibilist claims, this “accessibility” relation
includes possible worlds in which either (a) the agent’s past is somewhat
different from the actual-world past, or (b) the prevailing laws of nature are
violated in certain ways prior to the agent’s choice or action (e.g., violated
in a way that David Lewis, in his treatment of counterfactual conditionals,
calls a “minor divergence miracle”; cf. Lewis 1979). Under maximally strict
semantic standards, on the other hand, the range of relevant possibilities is diminished: the accessibility relation
now holds fixed both (i) the agent’s entire past right up until the moment of
choice or action, and (ii) the prevailing laws of nature.
Timothy
Williamson sets forth a critique of transvaluationism, my position on
vagueness. His objections persuade me that my prior writings on vagueness do
not yet provide a sufficiently clear, sufficiently coherent, formulation of the
view. Lately I have been working on a new articulation, specificially with an
eye to addressing Williamson’s worries. Here I will provide a very brief
synopsis of how I now propose to package the key ideas.
Before doing so, let me acknowledge
a mistake I made in discussing iterated supervaluationism. Williamson quotes an
argument I gave that was intended to show that iterated supervaluationism
cannot avoid the logical incoherence that I maintain is endemic to vagueness.
In Horgan (1998) I claimed that logical incoherence is manifested by the fact
that an iterated supervaluationist is committed to affirming the statement
[B(0) & ~B(1)] v
[[B(1) & ~B(2)] v ...
v [B(1017) v ~B(1017)]
and yet under
forced-march querying would be forced to say, of each respective disjunct, that
it is not true. (‘Bn’ abbreviates ‘A man with n hairs
on his head is bald’.) But as Williamson rightly points out, there is nothing
immediately incoherent about this at all, given the semantics of supervaluationism;
for, as he says, it is a familiar supervaluationist phenomenon to have a
supertrue disjunction with no supertrue disjunct. So my reasoning was in error.
(I do still believe that iterated supervaluationism is best construed as an
implementation of transvaluationism rather than an alternative to it, but on
different grounds: briefly, this construal best explains why the iterated
supervaluationist is compelled to avoid pronouncing on the semantic status of
each successive statement in a sorites sequence.)
Let me now briefly summarize how I
propose to articulate the key claims of transvaluationism. First, vagueness
essentially involves boundarylessness. Second, to say that vagueness exhibits
boundarylessness is to say that for a suitable sorites sequence for a given
vague term, each of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) initially there
are true statements (with each predecessor of any true statement being true),
(2) later there are false statements (with each successor of a false statement
being false), and (3) there is no determinate fact of the matter about the
transition from true statements to false statements. Third, satisfaction of
condition (3) is a matter of the semantic governance
of vague discourse by these two mutually unsatisfiable semantic-status
principles:
The Individualistic
Same-Status Principle: Each item in the sorites sequence has the same
status (e.g., truth, falsity, neither true nor false) as its immediate
neighbors.
The Collectivistic
Status-Indeterminacy Principle: No determinate overall assignment
of statuses to the items in the sequence is correct.
Fourth,
such semantic governance requires that these two status-principles must be adequately respected in assertoric practice
(even though the status-principles are not mutually satisfiable). Fifth,
semantically appropriate assertoric practice is itself a matter of conformity
with certain mutually obeyable practice
standards, in particular the following two prohibitory ones:
The Individualistic
Status-Attribution Prohibition: Never attribute a specific status
to an item in a sorites sequence and also attribute a different, incompatible,
status to its immediate neighbor.
The Collectivistic
Status-Attribution Prohibition: Never affirm a determinate
overall assignment of statuses to the items in a sorites sequence.
In short,
although condition (3) of boundarylessness must actually be satisfied by vague discourse, its
satisfaction consists in semantic governance
by two mutually un-satisfiable
semantic-status principles. This governance is a matter of the way the
semantic-status principles undergird mutually
obeyable assertoric-practice standards, notably the two prohibitory ones
just stated. Vague discourse that obeys these practice-standards thereby respects the semantic-status principles
as well as possible—and well enough.
Obeying the
practice-standards requires one, on occasion, simply to refuse to answer
certain sets of perfectly meaningful questions—such as a set of questions about
the semantic statuses of the successive statements in a sorites sequence. One
must adopt this non-responsive “zen attitude” (a phrase suggested by Matjz Potrč)
even though no unknown facts are
involved, such as sharp but unknowable boundaries. Herein is manifested, in
practice, the underlying logical incoherence of vagueness.
The ideas just set forth concerning
vague discourse also apply, mutatis mutandis, to vague thought-content. (Now
the relevant practice-standards concern affirmatory practice in thought, rather than in language.)
However, when we ask whether there could be such a phenomenon as ontological vagueness—that is, vague
OBJECTS and/or vague PROPERTIES and RELATIONS—the situation is very different.
Vague ENTITIES would have to exhibit an ontological form of
boundarylessness—and in particular, would have to satisfy the condition that
there is “no determinate fact of the matter” about transitions in a sorites
sequence. But what could constitute
the satisfaction of this condition, in the case of ontological vagueness? Here
I see no intelligible analogue of the key idea I appeal to in the case of vague
language and thought—viz., the idea of affirmatory practice being semantically
governed by mutually unsatisfiable semantic status-standards. Rather, evidently
the putative vague ENTITIES would have to directly satisfy both the
individualistic same-status principle and the collectivistic status-indeterminacy
principle. Since this is impossible, so is ontological vagueness.
Winfried
Loeffler focuses on some epistemological work of David Henderson and myself. He expresses sympathy with our approach in Henderson
and Horgan (2000), but urges us to further clarify the notions of “robust
reliability” and “epistemically relevant possible world” that figure in
Henderson and Horgan (2001). We are working on further elaboration and
clarification in a book now in progress. I will offer a few tentative
clarificatory remarks here, with an eye toward addressing Loeffler’s specific
concerns about how to understand our examples of sample-biased inductive
belief-forming processes that are de facto reliable but are not robustly
reliable.[6]
Henderson and I maintain that a
belief’s being objectively justified is not merely a matter of its having been
produced by a belief-forming process that in
fact happens to reliably produce true beliefs (even though such reliability
is indeed one important dimension of objective justification). Another
important dimension is robustness of
reliability, which we gloss as “reliability across a very wide range of
epistemically relevant possible worlds.” I am currently inclined to relativize
the notion of an epistemically relevant possible world, to a cognitive agent at
a time. These worlds are the ones that are consistent
with the occurrence of the agent’s actual prior and present experiences—that
is, the agent’s experiences prior to, and concurrent with, the occurrence of
the belief itself.[7]
(Such a world can be consistent with the occurrence
of these experiences without being consistent with their intentional content—for example, a world in which the agent is
radically experientially deceived by a Cartesian demon.)
We claim that a belief can sometimes
have substantial objective justification even though the belief-forming process
that produced it is not actually reliable—i.e., is not reliable in the possible
world that happens to be actual. An example would be a
brain-in-vat duplicate of yourself, whose transducer-internal belief-forming
processes match your own. We also claim that a belief can sometimes be
significantly deficient in objective
justification even though it is produced by a belief-forming process that in
fact happens to be reliable. This can happen, for instance, for a cognitive
agent with these two attributes: (i) the agent forms inductive beliefs via
inductive belief-forming mechanisms that are grossly inattentive to matters of
sample bias, but (ii) the agent happens to occupy a possible world that is
exceptionally homogenous in the very respects about which the agent is disposed
to reason via hasty generalization. (Not only have the few cats the agent has
encountered been stupid, but virtually all cats are stupid; not only have the few
Frenchmen the agent has encountered been surly, but almost all Frenchmen are
surly; etc.) The reason why the agent’s inductive beliefs are seriously
deficient in their objective-justification status, even though they are
produced by inductive belief-forming processes that fortuitously happen to be
reliable, is that these processes are not robustly
reliable—that is, there are epistemically relevant possible worlds that are not
homogenous in the way the agent’s actual world happens to be, and in these worlds
the same belief-forming processes are not
reliable.
Loeffler’s main concern, as I
understand it, is that the homogeneity or non-homogeneity of a cognitive
agent’s actual world ought to be something that can manifest itself in
potential differences in the agent’s experiences—in the appearances. He writes:
This
example is not convincing. It is incoherent to suppose that two possible worlds
could differ in the way that it presupposes. The homogeneity or otherwise of
the population cannot be thought of simply as making a difference to the world an sich; it must surely in the end affect
appearance as well. As samples become larger, the differences between a
homogenous and heterogeneous population become apparent: otherwise we are
unable to distinguish between homogeneous and heterogeneous populations at all.
As soon as we check a sufficient number of objects, the appearance of the world
will differ as well. (p. 7)
It is true
enough that in possible worlds in which the agent is not radically
experientially deceived (as opposed to worlds in which, for instance, the agent
is deceived by a Cartesian demon or is a brain in a vat), normally there are potential experiences available to the
agent that would reflect the homogeneity or nonhomogeneity of the agent’s world.
But under my current proposal, these merely potential experiences are not
directly germane to delimiting the class of epistemically relevant possible
worlds, relative to a specific cognitive agent at the specific time when a
given belief arises in the agent as the result of a sample-biased
belief-forming process. For, again: the epistemically relevant possible worlds,
relative to the agent at the time, are the ones consistent with the occurrence
of the agent’s actual experiences
prior to, and concurrent with, the occurrence of belief itself.
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[1] In Horgan (1993) I also explicitly distinguished the philosophical question of what constitutes a broadly materialistic worldview from the philosophical question of what constitutes a broadly naturalistic worldview, and I remarked that it is also an important philosophical question how (if at all) metaphysical naturalism might differ from materialism. See note 2 on p. 556, and the statement in the text to which this note is appended.
[2] Tienson’s position on this matter is somewhat similar in spirit to Kim’s recent argument (Kim 1998, pp. 80-87) that the exclusion problem does not generalize to special sciences across the board. Kim maintains that micro-based macro-properties typically have their own causal powers. He claims that the exclusion problem really arises not for properties of wholes vis-a-vis properties of their parts, but rather for higher-order properties instantiated by an individual vis-a-vis lower-order properties instantiated by that same individual.
[3] Here I am glossing over the fact that the new experience underlying Mary’s new belief is an experience of a specific shade of blue—just as Byrne glosses over this fact in his discussion. For present purposes, then, I am ignoring the question of what it takes to acquire the generic concept BLUE, over and above experiencing this single specific shade of blue. Also, the ineffability I am talking about—and that Byrne too is talking about, I take it—is supposed to attach to a concept that involves the generic color blue, rather than to a concept that involves just a single specific shade of blue.
[4] Of course, all four kinds of belief can combine with other beliefs to generate new beliefs (for a rational agent). In this sense, even these four minimally complex kinds of belief have a constitutive inferential aspect. But the point is that this aspect does not exhaust their constitutive role in psychological economy.
[5] It should be noted that van Inwagen himself deploys scenario (‘M’) against “paradigm case arguments,” which contend that freedom-attributions cannot be mistaken for the kinds of concrete cases that serve as paradigms for the teaching of the meaning of the word ‘free’. I grant that (‘M’) effectively refutes such arguments. But although there is some similarity between paradigm-case reasoning and my own argument for incompatibilism, there is this crucial difference: my argument does not assume that satisfying the paradigmatic evidential conditions for freedom-attribution is automatically sufficient for genuine freedom. Scenario (‘M’) shows that this assumption is mistaken.
[6] My remarks will be tentative because they may not survive ongoing give-and-take between Henderson and myself. As I write, the two of us have not yet settled into joint reflective equilibrium on this matter.
[7] Does this mean that the notion of robustness of reliability also becomes relativized to a cognitive agent at a time? Not necessarily. Perhaps this notion should be characterized in something like the following way: A belief-forming process P is robustly reliable, for creatures of kind K (e.g., humans), just in case: for any temporally extended course of experience E that could be instantiated by creatures of kind K, P is reliable in a very wide range of the possible worlds that are epistemically relevant relative to E. (One might want to put further restrictions on the kinds of temporally extended courses of experience that are cited in the definition—e.g., that they have coherent intentional content, that they include experience as of being an embodied agent within a perceived ambient environment, and the like.)