Mary Mary, Au Contraire: Reply to Raffman*
George Graham,
Terence Horgan,
Diana
Raffman (in press) emphasizes a useful and important distinction that deserves
heed in discussions of phenomenal consciousness: the distinction between what it’s like to see red and how red things look. (Two alternative
locutions that also can express the latter idea, we take it, are ‘what red
looks like’ and ‘what red is like’.) Raffman plausibly argues that this
distinction should be incorporated into theories of phenomenal consciousness,
including materialist theories—in particular, into the materialist theory we
focused on in Graham and Horgan (2000), Michael Tye’s PANIC theory. She also
argues that incorporation of the distinction into Tye’s theory provides the basis
for plausible reply on Tye’s behalf to our ‘Mary Mary’ version of the knowledge
argument against materialism. We agree that Tye would do well to incorporate
the distinction, as would advocates of other theories phenomenal consciousness.
But in our view, doing so ultimately does not help fend off the Mary-Mary
argument.
Raffman
argues that knowing what it’s like to see
red is a derivative matter, involving introspective attention to one’s experience of seeing red. She suggests
that the more fundamental state is knowing how red things look. She writes:
What I want to suggest…is that we
view Mary’s new knowledge as deriving almost entirely from her perceptual
representations…. That is to say, we ought to view her new knowledge as deriving
not from introspection or from higher-order consciousness, but from perception
or phenomenal consciousness. I will say that the primary object of Mary’s
learning is not what it’s like to see red,
but rather how red things look…. Mary
learns how red things look whether or not she introspects…. How red things look is learned by
perceiving; what it’s like to see (look
at) red is learned by introspecting…. I submit that there is a robust sense
in which any organism that visually represents red and can recognize red things
by looking at them knows how red
things look; and any organism that
visually represents red29 and can discriminate red29 from
other shades of red by looking at
them knows how red29 things look—whether
or not it is capable of introspection.[1]
We are prepared to grant everything that Raffman says in this
passage—not only for the sake of argument, in the present dialectical context,
but also because it all seems correct. (At any rate, we grant everything she
says insofar as the organisms she is talking about all are supposed to have
visual red-experiences that are phenomenally like those of normal humans.)
We would add
this. Learning how red things look,
and thereby knowing how red things
look, evidently are not a matter of learning-that or knowing-that. After
all, certain creatures—including severely cognitively impaired humans—could
learn how red things look, and thereby could know how red things look, even if
they are not capable of beliefs proper
to the propositional attitudes of learning- and knowing-that. Nor are such learning and knowing merely a matter of learning-how or knowing-how—say, learning how, and thereby knowing how, to discriminate red
things from non-red things. Rather, they are a matter of acquaintance with how red things look. Learning how red things look
is becoming acquainted with how they
look, and knowing how red things look is being
acquainted with how they look. (The word ‘know’ clearly has an acquaintance-use
in English, as in ‘Having met your sister but not your brother, I know her but
not him’. The same is true of ‘learn’, as in ‘I have learned her face well’.) The
associated knowing-that state, expressible linguistically for example by way of
an indexical statement like ‘Ah, red things look like this’, is derivative from the more basic acquaintance-state—viz., the
state of visual acquaintance with how red things look.[2]
We would
also add this. The most fundamental kinds of states insofar as color
phenomenology is concerned are experiences
of what red things look like. Although one can know what red things look like—in the sense of being acquainted with
this look—even when is not currently experiencing the look of red things, this
acquaintance-state is itself grounded in such experience-states. Likewise, learning what red things look like—in
the sense of becoming acquainted with this look—is constituted by first experiencing this look. This may
be put by saying that if you are to know what red things look like—in the sense
of being acquainted with this look—you need to have had your red channel
actively turned on by (or have had your red-green channel actively
differentially tuned for red by) visual exposure to red things.
Acquaintance-capture of what red things look like is only available in the first
person.
But even
with all of these points granted and taken on board by a suitably elaborated
version of Tye’s theory of phenomenal consciousness (the elaborated theory, as we will henceforth call it), our Mary-Mary
version of the knowledge argument still can be deployed against the elaborated
theory, and is no less telling than it was before. The modified argument should
now be primarily directed at two aspects of the elaborated theory: (1) its
account of states like experiencing how
red things look, and (2) its account of the phenomenal concepts that that
are deployed in, and whose possession depends upon, having such experiences.
Briefly stated, the reasoning goes as follows.[3]
Recall that Mary Mary is the daughter
of
When Mary Mary contemplates a
post-monochromatic mental life for herself, what changes can she reasonably
respect? She expects to undergo certain visually generated PANIC states she has
never undergone before, states that supposedly constitute experiences of how
red things look. Since she thoroughly understands the
functional-representational role of these states, she expects them to play such
a role in herself. In particular, she expects to acquire, on the basis of these
PANIC states, certain new discriminatory and recognitional capacities vis-à-vis
colors—those very capacities whose implementation by the PANIC states
supposedly constitutes a person’s possession of the relevant phenomenal
concepts.
But should Mary-Mary, while still in
her monochromatic situation and still an ardent believer in the elaborated
theory, expect to be surprised by how
red things look? Should
she have good reason to expect
novel or unanticipated delight at how red things look, over and above any anticipated delight she might expect to arise
purely from the acquisition of the new discriminatory and recognitional
capacities themselves? No, she should not. To make this clear, let us consider in
turn (1) the state-type experiencing how
red things look (a PANIC property, according to the elaborated theory), and
(2) the cognitive capacities whose implementation by such PANIC states
constitute (according to the elaborated theory) possession of the relevant
phenomenal concepts.
First, the elaborated theory says
that the state-type experiencing how red things
look is identical to a certain PANIC property. What is psychologically
significant about this property is just the functional/representational role it
plays in human cognitive economy—something that Mary Mary thoroughly
understands already, by virtue of her scientific omniscience. Its
functional/representational role involves the various behavioral,
discriminatory, recognitional, and classificatory capacities that the PANIC
state subserves—including the capacities whose implementation by this state
constitutes (according to the elaborated theory) the deployment of phenomenal
redness-concepts, both predicative and indexical. Mary Mary also thoroughly
understands how this PANIC property is neurophysically implemented in normal
color-perceivers, and thus how it will be neurophysically implemented in
herself once she leaves her monochromatic environment. No expected surprises,
then, with respect to the nature of the PANIC property itself, the one that
supposedly constitutes experiencing what red things are like.
Second, what is psychologically
significant about the relevant phenomenal concepts
(given the elaborated theory)—the indexical and predicative redness-concepts—is
that they are capacity-based
concepts. I.e., these concepts are constituted by discriminatory/recognitional
capacities, implemented by redness-representing PANIC states, vis-à-vis red
things, vis-à-vis the property of redness, and (derivatively, via introspective
application) vis-à-vis redness-representing PANIC states themselves. But Mary
Mary already understands these capacities thoroughly, including how redness-representing
PANIC states subserve them, even though she does not yet possess the capacities
herself (because she has not yet instantiated the PANIC states). No expected
surprises here either, with respect to the nature of the phenomenal
color-concepts that she does not yet possess.
So Mary Mary, as a True Believer in the elaborated
theory, evidently has no good theoretical reason to expect surprise or
unanticipated delight upon being released from her monochromatic situation. After
all, she thinks she understands well the nature of the state experiencing how red things look, even
though she has not yet undergone this state: it is a specific PANIC property,
and her theoretical knowledge about it is exhaustive. She also thinks she
understands well the nature of phenomenal color-concepts that are deployed when
the state experiencing how red things
look is instantiated, even though she does not yet possess these concepts:
they are capacity-based concepts whose possession is a matter of the relevant
PANIC property (which she thoroughly understands) implementing the relevant
discriminatory-recognitional capacities (which she thoroughly understands) vis-à-vis
the relevant physical property that she believes is identical with redness. She
expects to undergo such PANIC states when she leaves her monochrome
environment, and she expects these states to implement capacities of visual
discrimination and classification that she does not now possess. None of this
should surprise her, or cause her unanticipated delight beyond whatever
moderate delight she anticipates merely from possessing and exercising the
newly acquired capacities themselves.[4]
And there is nothing else to expect, based on her scientific omniscience and
her acceptance of the elaborated theory
But surely she will be surprised and delighted, upon beginning to experience how red
things look. What will surprise and delight her when she undergoes this
experiential state—or should—is precisely how
red things look. She had no rational grounds for expecting this amazing and delightful
look-property to be visually presented to her, the actual look of red things
that she is now experiencing. So the elaborated theory should now strike her as
quite mistaken, because it evidently leaves out visual experiences in which
this remarkable look-property, apparently instantiated by certain external objects,
is visually presented.
Two points should be stressed about
this version of the Mary Mary argument that we have here directed against the
elaborated theory. First, the new argument makes no appeal to introspection, or
to what it’s like to see red; rather,
it focuses instead on what red looks like. The argument thereby respects Raffman’s
contention that “in its use of phenomenal concepts, introspection piggybacks on
perception” (p. 10). Second, the current version of the Mary Mary argument
potentially poses a challenge not only to materialist theories of phenomenal
consciousness (with the elaborated version of Tye’s theory as a representative
sample), but also to materialist theories of color itself. If external physical
objects really have the color properties that visual experience presents them
as having, then the rational appropriateness of Mary Mary’s surprise and
delight, upon undergoing visual presentations of these properties, provides
grounds to doubt whether such properties themselves
can be incorporated into materialist ontology. (This in turn provides grounds
to doubt whether external objects really do instantiate color-properties at
all. We take it that eliminativism about colors is a credible theoretical
option, even though eliminativism about color-presenting experiences is not.)
Toward the end of her paper, Raffman
argues that even under the revised or elaborated theory,
what Mary Mary learns when she leaves her monochrome environment is
sufficiently nontrivial that it is rational for Mary Mary to be surprised. She
offers three considerations in defense of this claim. We want to address these.
She writes:
First,…learning how red things look
consists in forming certain mental representations. In particular, if acquiring
a (recognitional/discriminatory) capacity
does not involve forming a new representation, then learning how red things
look does not consist merely in acquiring a new capacity. (15)
But the trouble is that, according to the elaborated theory, although
learning how red things look does consist in forming certain new mental
representations, such representations are identical to states (viz., PANIC
states) whose constitutive functional/representational role and whose neurophysical
implementation are already thoroughly understood by Mary Mary; their constitutive
role primarily involves subserving
the relevant recognitional/discriminatory capacity. It is hard to find anything
here to be rationally surprised about. Raffman continues:
Second, before her release and
medical procedure, Mary is unable to form the representations in question; so
they are genuinely new. (15)
But the trouble is that undergoing new representational
states that she could not previously undergo is nothing unexpected, and is not
what Mary Mary finds so surprising and delightful. Her surprise and delight,
rather, are about what red things look
like. Raffman further continues:
Third, these representations are
fundamentally perceptual
representations: they are perceptual experiences (PANIC states) and perceptual,
i.e., phenomenal, concepts. Thus they make available new perceptual modes of
presentation of a physical property (a certain reflectance triple, according to
Tye) of which Mary already has exhaustive physical-theoretical knowledge.
Knowing red under perceptual modes of presentation—knowing how red things
look—seems nontrivially different from knowing it under a physical-theoretical
mode of presentation. (15)
But again, the trouble is what allegedly constitutes knowing red under perceptual modes of presentation, according
to the elaborated theory. All this amounts to, under that theory, is undergoing
certain internal states (PANIC states) whose functional role and physical
implementation are thoroughly understood in advance by Mary Mary, and whose
functional role primarily is a matter of subserving certain visual
recognitional/discriminatory capacities. Since Mary Mary completely understands
in advance everything that supposedly constitutes knowing red under perceptual
modes of presentation, her acceptance of the elaborated theory leaves her with
no rational basis to be delighted or unexpectedly surprised when she first
learns what red things look like. But clearly these reactions are rationally appropriate—a fact that
therefore strongly challenges the elaborated theory itself.
In closing
we note the following: Perhaps there is a
temptation to confuse whether Mary Mary would be surprised on release with
whether she has good reason to be surprised if the elaborated theory she holds
is true, i.e. whether surprise would be rationally appropriate given that Tye’s
theory plus Raffman’s refinement is correct. But it is of course important to
distinguish being surprised from its being rationally appropriate to be
surprised. To illustrate the distinction: One of us had a colleague who saw the
movie The Crying Game twice. The movie contains, for unfamiliar viewers,
a surprise. A character early depicted in the film as a sexually desired woman,
turns out (when his genitalia are nakedly exposed) to be a man. When the
colleague was asked why he saw the movie twice, he jokingly quipped, “I like
being surprised”.
The joke, of
course, is that the same surprise should not occur twice. Surprise somehow might
occur twice, but its second occurrence is rationally inappropriate. Having known
that the “woman” is a man, having been, as it were, “acquainted” with the
actor’s sexual anatomy, this should not be a surprise on second viewing. Good
reason for being surprised has evaporated.
Tye’s theory
might predict or tell Mary Mary that were she to be released from her monochromatic
chambers, novel color experiences would happen to her. It might tell her that
since she has never yet instantiated the turning on of her red channels, novel
visual experiences will transpire. Tye himself might even urge her to enjoy
such experiences and to relish them.
But this
does not mean that it would be rational for her to be surprised—if Tye’s elaborated
PANIC theory is true. It does not mean that she has good reason to expect intense
delight. Presumably, Mary Mary has already been told (by the theory and
associated science) about the constitutive functional role of those experiences,
and about how states with this functional role will be physically instantiated.
She already has their nature descriptively hand. Her situation is rather like
this. Person A has seen The Crying Game. Person A tells person B, who
has not seen the movie, that a surprise occurs, and what it is. Person A says,
“I don’t want to disconnect you from the movie experience. You have yet to be
in the neural states that subserve seeing the movie for yourself. Have your
cinematic relish. Enjoy it.” Enjoy? Perhaps. But not because of unanticipated
surprise.
The Elaborated PANIC theorist cannot
have it both ways. Mary Mary cannot be so informed as to know everything that
Tye’s theory tells her about color experiences, everything that Raffman’s
distinction adds to that theory, and everything that completed physical science
says about such experiences, and so uninformed about being acquainted with color
– about knowing how red things look -- that she will be rationally surprised on
having a red color experience.
*This
is a thoroughly co-authored paper; the order of authorship is alphabetical. We
thank the editor for inviting this reply.
[1] Raffman (in press), 12-13. All
subsequent quotations are also from Raffman (in press).
[2] Likewise, learning what it is like
to see red is a matter of becoming
introspectively acquainted with the state of seeing red, and knowing what it’s like to see red is a
matter of being introspectively acquainted with that state. Thus, the
associated introspective knowing-that state, expressible linguistically for
example by way of an indexical statement like ‘Ah, seeing red things is like this’, is doubly derivative. It is
derivative from the higher-order, introspectively directed, state of being
acquainted with what it is like to see red, which it turn is derivative from
the first-order state of being acquainted with how red things look.
[3] We will adapt, in compressed form
and with appropriate modifications, material from pp. 70-72 of Graham and
Horgan (2000).
[4] As we noted on pp. 81-82 of Graham
and Horgan (2000), Mary Mary can rationally expect the possibility of certain
kinds of moderate surprise upon being
released from her monochrome situation, but not the extreme kind of surprise
that actually lies in store for her. As we said:
For instance, she can expect that if
her initial post-release experiences are of bare color patches, without any
collateral visual or non-visual information, then she might be surprised when
she subsequently finds out how her newly acquired phenomenal concepts match us
with which objective colors. None of this pre-release knowledge, however,
provides Mary Mary with any apparent reason to expect the additional and
extreme surprise, the unanticipated delight, or the utter amazement that like
in store for her (81-82).
See also notes 8 and 9, in which we argued that Tye’s own
discussion of how one can lack knowledge of a fact without lacking knowledge of
any corresponding FACT, by way of an analogy involving an item of knowledge
expressible by an essentially indexical use of the first-person pronoun, is
directly applicable only to the moderate, rationally expectable, kind of
potential surprise.