Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism
Terry
Horgan and Mark Timmons
Is
conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly
understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These
are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual
relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We
will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible
with metaphysical realism.
Metaphysical
realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that is
independent of our thought and discourse (including our schemes of concepts)
about such a world. Hilary Putnam, a former proponent of metaphysical realism,
later gave it up largely because of the alleged phenomenon that he himself has
given the label ‘conceptual relativity’. One of the key ideas of conceptual
relativity is that certain concepts—including such fundamental concepts as
object, entity, and existence—have a multiplicity of different and incompatible
uses (Putnam 1987, p. 19; 1988, pp. 110-14). According to Putnam, once we
recognize the phenomenon of conceptual relativity we must reject metaphysical
realism:
The suggestion . . . is that what is
(by commonsense standards) the same situation can be described in many
different ways, depending on how we use the words. The situation does not
itself legislate how words like “object,” “entity,” and “exist” must be used.
What is wrong with the notion of objects existing “independently” of conceptual
schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions
apart from conceptual choices.” (Putnam 1988, p. 114)
Putnam’s intriguing reasoning in
this passage is difficult to evaluate directly, because conceptual relativity
is philosophically perplexing and in general is not well understood.[1] In
this paper we propose a construal of conceptual relativity that clarifies it
considerably and explains how it is possible despite its initial air of
paradox. We then draw upon this construal to explain why, contrary to Putnam
and others, conceptual relativity does not conflict with metaphysical realism,
but in fact comports well with it. Our paper has two main parts.
In
part I we dwell on the phenomenon itself. We explain why conceptual relativity
is so puzzling—indeed, why it initially appears impossible. We identify three interrelated assumptions
lying behind this apparent impossibility—assumptions about concepts, meanings,
and affirmatory conflict—and we argue that in order to make sense of conceptual
relativity, all three must be rejected. We then set forth an account of
relativity-susceptible concepts and meanings that explains how conceptual
relativity is possible and why it is actual—an account that eschews the three
problematic assumptions.
In
part II, we turn to the issue of the compatibility of conceptual relativity and
metaphysical realism. Our main task here is to explain how the two can be
reconciled. In doing so, we sketch a general account of truth that in
previous writings we have called “contextual semantics.” We argue that the
framework provided by contextual semantics smoothly accommodates the phenomenon
of conceptual relativity (as explicated in part I), while at the same time
allowing this kind of relativity to be combined with metaphysical realism.
I.
UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY
1. Why conceptual relativity
seems impossible
Putnam
uses the expression ‘conceptual relativity’ for a property of intentional
notions including truth, reference, and meaning. He says that conceptual
relativity “is a property which has only emerged as central in the twentieth
century, and its very existence is still most often ignored, if not actually
denied” (Putnam 1988, p 110). In fact, there is an air of paradox surrounding
the various illustrations of this alleged phenomenon. Consider, for instance,
one of Putnam’s illustrations of conceptual relativity—the well-known example
of Carnap and the Polish logician (Putnam 1987, pp. 18-20).
In
this scenario (slightly modified), Carnap and the Polish logician are presented
with a number of objects (say, books lying on a table) and each of them is
asked how many objects there are on the table. Carnap, employing the ordinary
concept of object, reports that there are exactly three objects on the table:
O1, O2, and O3. By contrast the Polish logician, who accepts a particular
mereology of objects according to which for every two particulars there is an
object that is their “mereological sum,” counts the objects on the table and
reports that there are exactly seven: O1, O2, O3, O1+O2, O1+O3, O2+O3, and
O1+O2+O3.
This case
seems to be one in which we have conflicting but equally correct
judgments about the number of objects on the table. We might express this
combination of ideas in terms of two principles:
Principle
of affimatory conflict. There is a genuine conflict in what Carnap and the
Polish logician are respectively affirming about how many objects there are:
Carnap’s claim that there are exactly three objects on the table conflicts with
the Polish logician’s claim that there are exactly seven.
Principle
of mutual correctness. Both
Carnap and the Polish logician are correct in their respective claims about how
many objects there are on the table, because each of them is making a claim
which, relative to a specific way of using the concept of object, is true.[2]
It seems to us that Putnam is
pointing to a genuine, and important, phenomenon. In a significant sense,
Carnap’s way of counting objects and the Polish logician’s way are in conflict;
they are not just talking past one another. And yet, given the principles for
counting that they each are employing, they are both making claims that are
correct.
But
although the phenomenon in question seems real, on reflection it is also quite
puzzling because, initially anyway, these principles appear to be mutually
incompatible. Here are two complementary arguments that make the point.[3]
The
argument from affirmatory conflict. According to the first principle, there
is a genuine conflict between the claims of Carnap and the Polish logician
about how many objects there are. Now in order for there to be genuine conflict
in this case, Carnap and the Polish logician must be employing the same concept
of object and using the associated term with the same meaning. Otherwise, there
is no genuine conflict between their respective claims; they are just talking
past one another. But if they are employing the same concept of object and so
using the term ‘object’ with the same meaning, then their conflict must consist
in the mutual inconsistency of their respective claims about how many
objects are on the table. But if the two claims are inconsistent, then they
cannot both be correct! And this means that the other key ingredient in the
phenomenon of conceptual relativity—the principle of mutual correctness—is
false. In this way, reflection on one side of the phenomenon of conceptual
relativity leads to the denial of the other.
The
argument from mutual correctness. We get a similar result if we begin with
the principle of mutual correctness, according to which Carnap and the Polish
logician, given their uses of the concept of object, are both correct in their
respective claims about the number of objects on the table. If each of their
claims is correct, then those claims cannot be inconsistent with one another.
Furthermore, if the respective claims are not mutually inconsistent—if, that
is, when Carnap says there are exactly three objects on the table his claim
does not contradict the Polish logician’s claim that there are exactly
seven—then they must be employing different concepts of object and using the
term ‘object’ with different meanings. But if they are employing different
concepts of object and using the term ‘object’ with different meanings, then
their claims are really not in conflict after all! Thus, if Carnap and the
Polish logician are both correct in their respective claims, then they are just
talking past one another—contrary to the principle of affirmatory conflict.
Again, reflection on one of the key ingredients involved in conceptual
relativity (this time the principle of mutual correctness) leads, by a series
of seemingly plausible steps, to the denial of the other ingredient.
Thus, we
arrive at the apparent conclusion that conceptual relativity, understood as
involving the two principles in question, is impossible.
2. Questionable assumptions
As we have
said, we do think that conceptual relativity is a genuine phenomenon, and thus
should be accounted for. Also, the phenomenon does indeed involve the features
described by the principles of affirmatory conflict and mutual correctness. So
something must be wrong with the reasoning that leads to the rejection of this
phenomenon. When confronted with a philosophical puzzle of this sort, the thing
to do is to look for one or more underlying assumptions—ones that, while
perhaps common and initially plausible, should be challenged. What are they?
In
connection with the identity of concepts and meanings, there is a pair of
related assumptions that we question. Both involve semantic standards that
govern the correct employment of concepts and words—that is, standards that
determine the conditions under which statements employing the words, and
judgments employing the concepts those words express, are true. Regarding
concepts, the assumption involved is this:
I1 If the semantic standards governing
the correct employment of concept C1, as employed by person P1
at time t1, differ from the semantic standards governing the correct
employment of concept C2, as employed by person P2 at
time t2, then C1 ¹ C2.
That is, any difference between two
persons with respect to the semantic standards governing their respective usage
of certain concepts is sufficient to make it the case that they thereby are
employing non-identical concepts. (Likewise for one person’s usage at
two different times.) Here is a parallel assumption, with respect to words and
their meanings:
I2 If the semantic standards for the
correct employment of word W, as it is used by person P1 at time t1,
differ from the semantic standards for the correct employment of W, as it is
used by person P2 at time t2, then the meaning of W as
used by P1 at t1 ¹ the meaning of W as used by P2 at t2.
That is, any difference between two
persons with respect to the semantic standards governing their respective usage
of a certain word is sufficient to make it the case they thereby are employing
that word with non-identical meanings. (Likewise for one person’s usage
at two different times.) We dub the view of concepts and meanings captured by I1
and I2 the invariantist view. The idea is that the semantic
standards that govern concepts and words cannot vary from one usage to another,
insofar as the same concept of word-meaning is employed in both usages:
any difference in governing semantic standards reflects a distinct concept or
word-meaning. Concepts and word-meanings never preserve their self-identity
under changes of the semantic standards that govern them.
But, in
addition to these assumptions, the pair of arguments challenging conceptual
relativity rests on a certain conception of genuine affirmatory conflict,
namely:
DI All cases of genuine affirmatory
conflict—cases in which what person P1 affirms at time t1
conflicts with what person P2 affirms at time t2—involve
straightforward inconsistency between what P1 and P2 are
thinking or saying.
Call this the direct-inconsistency
conception of affirmatory conflict.
If indeed
conceptual relativity is a genuine phenomenon—as we contend it is—then these various
assumptions will have to be rejected. In order to make sense of conceptual
relativity, one needs to explain how the members of the following list of ideas
can be mutually compatible:
1. Persons
P1 and P2 are making conflicting claims. [Principle of affimatory
conflict]
2. So they must be employing the same
concept of object and using the term ‘object’ with the same meaning.
3. But they are also making claims that are
mutually correct. [Principle of mutual correctness]
4. So
their claims cannot be flatly inconsistent.
The gist of the puzzle is to
explain how all four of these claims can be correct. Doing so should also
thereby explain why and how it is that although Carnap’s statement and the
Polish logician’s statement do indeed conflict semantically, nevertheless this
conflict between them is not a theoretically weighty one, but rather is
“no big deal”—as they themselves might well both acknowledge.
Executing
this explanatory project requires accomplishing three interrelated tasks.
First, we must replace the invariantist view of concepts and meanings with what
we will call a variantist conception. The key idea is that the semantic
standards that govern certain concepts can vary from one usage to another even
though the same concept is employed on both occasions—and even though the word
expressing it has the same meaning on both occasions. Such semantic differences
in correct usage are identity-preserving differences in concepts and
meanings. The task is to explain why and how it is that some concepts and
meanings actually do conform to this variantist conception.[4]
Second,
we must harness the account of identity-preserving semantic differences in
order to explain the principle of mutual correctness. The task is to explain
why it is that Carnap and the Polish logician, despite the fact that they are
employing a single concept of object and using the term ‘object’ with a single
meaning, are both correct in their respective claims about how many objects are
on the table.
Third, we
also must harness the account of identity-preserving semantic differences to
explain the principle of affirmatory conflict. The task is to explain why it is
that the respective claims of Carnap and the Polish logician, despite the fact
that they are both correct, nevertheless do conflict with one another in some
fairly robust way. Such an explanation must repudiate the third assumption
identified above—the direct-inconsistency conception of affirmatory
conflict—and must replace it with an alternative conception. This alternative must
identify a tension-relation R that obtains between Carnap’s claim and the
Polish logician’s claim, and that exhibits these two features: (i) R is
compatible with the mutual correctness of the two claims, and yet (ii) R still
has enough bite, qua tension-relation, to count as a genuine form of
affirmatory conflict (albeit conflict that is, in an important sense,
“no big deal”).
Accomplishing
all three tasks will provide an explanation of how items 1-4 can all be true,
and thus how conceptual relativity is possible. Let us now proceed to the first
task.
3. The variantist view of
concepts and meanings
Entities of
various sorts certainly can change in some ways—can alter through time—without
thereby losing their identity. Persons, for instance, change as they grow
older, and yet they retain their self-identity all the while. They undergo
identity-preserving changes, and the differences between a person at one moment
in time and that same person at another moment of time are identity-preserving
differences.
The
claim we want to make, by way of rejecting the invariantist view as expressed
in theses I1 and I2, is this: whatever exactly concepts
and meanings are, they are subject to certain kinds of identity-preserving
differences in correct usage. One and the same concept can be used by two
persons (or by one person, at different times) in ways that are governed by
somewhat different semantic standards, while still being the same
concept. Likewise, one and the same word can be used in two ways involving
somewhat different semantic standards, while still possessing the same meaning
under both uses. A concept or word as used by one person can differ somewhat in
its semantically proper employment from its proper employment as used by
another person (or by the same person at a different time), and yet it is the same
concept or word anyway: the differences are identity-preserving. Adapting a
useful philosophical term from Derrida, we will say that an identity-preserving
difference in two uses of a given concept, or in the meaning of a given word,
is a diffèrance in concepts (or in meaning).[5]
Let
us consider some examples. Putnam himself has noted the diachronic version of
the phenomenon we are calling diffèrance in concepts and meaning—although he
does not call it by this name, and he does not link it directly to conceptual
relativity (as we will do presently). One of his examples features the concept
of momentum in physics:
In
Newtonian physics the term momentum was defined as “mass times
velocity.” (Imagine, if you like, that the term was originally equated with
this definens by the decision of a convention of Newtonian physicists.)
It quickly became apparent that momentum was a conserved quantity.... But with
the acceptance of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity a difficulty
appeared. Einstein...showed that the principle of Special Relativity would be
violated if momentum were exactly equal to (rest) mass times velocity.
What to do?... Can there be a quantity with the properties that (1) it is
conserved in elastic collisions, (2) it is closer and closer to “mass times
velocity” as the speed becomes small, and (3) its direction is the direction of
motion of the particle? Einstein showed that there is such a quantity,
and he (and everyone else) concluded that that quantity is what momentum is.
The statement that momentum is exactly equal to mass times velocity was
revised. But this is the statement that was originally a “definition”!
And it was reasonable to revise this statement; for why should the statement
that momentum is conserved not have at least as great a right to be preserved
as the statement “momentum is mass times velocity” when a conflict is
discovered?... When the statements in our network of belief have to be
modified, we have “trade-offs” to make; and what the best trade-off is in a
given context cannot be determined by consulting the traditional “definitions”
of terms. (Putnam 1988, pp. 9-10).
According
to Putnam, then, the term ‘momentum’ and its associated concept has undergone,
over time, an identity-preserving change. In this example and others like it,
the meaning of at least some terms, and the nature of their associated
concepts, depends to some extent upon a certain network of background beliefs;
when those change sufficiently, the concept and meaning change in certain ways.
But the difference between the concept and meaning at an earlier stage, and the
concept and meaning at a later stage, is an identity-preserving difference—a
diffèrance. As Putnam remarks about this phenomenon:
If this
seems strange, it is because we are not used to thinking of meanings as being
historic entities in the sense in which persons or nations are historic
entities.... There are practices which help us decide when there is enough
continuity through change to justify saying that the same person still exists.
In the same way, we treat “momentum” as referring to the same quantity that it
always referred to, and there are practices which help us decide that there is
enough continuity through change to justify doing this. Meanings have an
identity through time but no essence. (Putnam 1988, p. 11)
Turn
next to synchronic cases of diffèrance (which will be particularly important
for purposes of understanding conceptual relativity). Here a given concept, and
the meaning of a term expressing the concept, both have a certain structural
feature: viz., possessing one or more implicit semantic aspects or dimensions
that are subject to contextual variation across different uses of the term or
concept. We will call such an aspect a contextually variable parameter;
it is what David Lewis (1979/1983) called a component of the “score in the
language game.” Consider, for example, competing uses of the term ‘flat’, with
respect (e.g.) to whether or not a particular sidewalk is flat. Lewis has this
to say, concerning Peter Unger’s views about flatness:
Peter Unger
has argued that hardly anything is flat. Take something you claim is flat; he
will find something else and get you to agree that it is even flatter. You
think that the pavement is flat—but how can you deny that your desk is flatter?
But flat is an absolute term: it is inconsistent to say that something
is flatter than something that is flat. Having agreed that your desk is flatter
than the pavement, you must concede that the pavement is not flat after all.
Perhaps you now claim that your desk is flat; but doubtless Unger can think of
something that you will agree is even flatter than your desk. And so it goes.
Some might dispute Unger’s premise that “flat” is an absolute term, but...I
think he is right.... The right response to Unger, I suggest, is that he is
changing the score on you. When he says that the desk is flatter than the
pavement, what he says is acceptable only under raised standards of precision.
Under the original standards the bumps on the pavement were too small to be
relevant either to the question whether the pavement is flat or to the question
whether the pavement is flatter than the desk. (Lewis 1983, pp. 245-6)
We claim, with Lewis, that the
semantically correct use of the notion of flatness depends upon certain
implicit, contextually operative, standards of precision—standards that can
permissibly vary somewhat from one usage to another. The standards of precision
that govern a particular use constitute the specific current setting of what
may be called the precision parameter for flatness. As the passage from
Lewis makes clear, this parameter is contextually variable: it can take on
different specific settings in particular contexts. This contextual variability
is semantically built into the single concept flatness, and into the
meaning of the term ‘flat’. What you mean when you use ‘flat’ in such a way
that the sidewalk counts as flat is somewhat different from what Unger means
when he uses ‘flat’ in such a way that it doesn’t; likewise, mutatis mutandis,
for the nature of the concept of flatness as employed by you, as distinct from
its nature as employed by Unger. But these differences in meaning, and in
concept, are identity-preserving differences. There is a diffèrance in
meaning, and in concept, between yourself and Unger.
In
light of these observations we propose to replace the invariantist view of
concepts and meanings with what we will call the variantist conception,
which recognizes the phenomenon of identity-preserving differences. Thus, we
replace I1 with:
V1 The semantic standards for the correct
employment of C1, as C1 is employed by person P1
at time t1, may differ in certain permissible ways from the semantic
standards for the correct employment of concept C2, as C2
is employed by person P2 at time t2, while C1
= C2. When this occurs we have diffèrance in concepts.
And a similar principle about the
meanings of words replaces I2:
V2 The semantic standards for the correct
employment of word W, as it is used by person P1 at time t1,
may differ in certain permissible ways from the semantic standards for the
correct employment of W, as it is used by person P2 at time t2,
and yet the meaning of P1’s word W = the meaning of P2’s
word W. When this occurs we have a diffèrance in meanings.
Two
potential sources of diffèrance in concepts and meanings have been mentioned in
this section. One source, manifested in diachronic cases of diffèrance like
Putnam’s example of momentum, is the fact that the synchronic nature of a
concept or a word-meaning at a particular moment in history depends partly upon
certain background beliefs prevalent at that time; concepts and meanings can
change through time, when the pertinent background beliefs change in certain
ways. A second source of diffèrance, which can be manifested synchronically in
cases like competing uses of the term ‘flat’, is the fact that such terms, and
the concepts they express, are semantically governed by implicit, contextually
variable, parameters. This second form of diffèrance, we will suggest, is at
the heart of conceptual relativity.
4. Mutual correctness
The
next task we face is to harness the synchronic form of diffèrance in order to
explain the mutual-correctness aspect of conceptual relativity. Return to the
case of Carnap and the Polish logician. Our suggestion is that the concept of
object bears a structural similarity to concepts like flat; and likewise for
the meanings of the respective terms expressing these concepts. That is, the
concept of object is semantically governed by an implicit, contextually
variable, parameter—in this case a parameter that affects matters of counting
and mereology. We will call it the mereology parameter. The idea is that
on different occasions of use the setting of this mereology parameter may vary.[6] In
the case at hand, Carnap employs the concept of object in a way that is
semantically governed by one particular setting of the mereology parameter,
while the Polish logician employs the same concept in a way that is
semantically governed by another, somewhat different, setting of the same
mereology parameter. Given the mereological parameter-setting that governs
Carnap’s usage, he correctly judges that there are exactly three objects on the
table. Given the different mereological parameter-setting that governs the
Polish logician’s usage, she correctly judges that there are exactly seven
objects on the table. Each is right, as each respectively is employing the
concept of object. Although the concept as employed by Carnap does differ
from the concept as employed by the Polish logician (since the mereology
parameter has different settings in the two cases), it is the same
concept nonetheless; likewise, mutatis mutandis, for the meaning of the term
‘object’ as employed by Carnap and by the Polish logician respectively. We have
here a diffèrance in concept and in meaning—that is, an identity-preserving
difference.
5.
Why content should not be relativized
So far we
have completed two of the three tasks that need to be accomplished in order to
explain conceptual relativity: articulating a variantist conception of concepts
and meanings, and harnessing it to explain the principle of mutual correctness.
The third task remains: to develop an account of affirmatory conflict that avoids
the idea that all such conflict involves direct inconsistency, and yet
identifies a form of semantic tension that is robust enough to deserve the
label ‘conflict’ anyway. In order to see more clearly what must be done in
order to accomplish this third task, let us now consider a tempting but
mistaken way of elaborating our variantist treatment of relativity-susceptible
concepts and terms. This approach will run afoul of the principle of
affirmatory conflict. Seeing why a given path leads to a dead end can help
reveal the right path.
Consider
what we call the relativized content view of relativity-susceptible
concepts and terms. As applied to the example of Carnap and the Polish
logician, it involves three main ingredients. First, it embraces the variantist
idea that Carnap and the Polish logician are using the same concept of
object—one that allows for a diffèrance in their respective uses of that
concept. Second, it also embraces the contention that the source of this
diffèrance is the fact that the concept of object is semantically governed, in
various different contexts, by specific settings of a contextually variable
mereology parameter. Both of these ingredients are taken from the account we
ourselves offered above. But now comes a third ingredient: viz., the contention
that both Carnap and the Polish logician are making claims whose full content
is more than what is explicitly expressed by their words, and is really an
implicit relativity claim—a claim to the effect that the explicit content
obtains relative to a specific setting of the mereology parameter. If one were
to spell it out, making such implicit aspects of content explicit, Carnap would
be saying: There are exactly three objects on the table, relative to such
and such mereological principles for ‘object’, while the Polish logician
would be saying: There are exactly seven objects on the table, relative to
so and so mereological principles for ‘object’.
The
problem, of course, is this: relativizing content in this way is obviously at
odds with the phenomenon of conceptual relativity because the statements being
expressed, even if they are both correct, do not involve genuine affirmatory
conflict at all. Intuitively, this problem is something like a use/mention
conflation. What is actually going on in the Carnap-Polish logician example is
that each of these parties is using a certain conceptual scheme, a
certain way of “carving” the world into objects. But according to the
relativized-content view, in effect what each is doing is mentioning
(implicitly) a certain way of carving, and then asserting that there are
thus-and-such many objects relative to that way of carving. Both of these
relativity claims are correct, all right, but they do not really conflict in
any interesting way at all. Instead, their apparent conflict is entirely a
surface phenomenon, one that dissolves entirely when one makes explicit the
full content of the two respective relativity claims. Indeed, once the content
of the respective relativity claims is made explicit, both Carnap and the
Polish logician could perfectly well affirm both statements.[7]
But Carnap
and the Polish logician are not making relativity claims; implicit reference to
a setting of the mereology parameter is not a component of the content of what
either of them is saying. Rather, both Carnap and the Polish logician are
speaking and judging categorically, from within respective semantic
stances in which they are employing the notion of object in a way that is
semantically governed by a specific parameter-setting. On our view, the content
of what Carnap is saying is properly expressed this way: There are exactly
three objects on the table, while the content of what the Polish logician
is saying is properly expressed this way: There are exactly seven objects on
the table. Both statements are categorical, and thus neither of them is an
implicit relativity claim. Although the respective statements are semantically governed
by different settings of the mereology parameter, and although each statement
is correct under the particular parameter-setting that governs it in context,
neither statement is implicitly about its own governing
parameter-setting.
6. Affirmatory conflict
The
relativized content view is an instructive failure, with respect to the task of
explaining the kind of affirmatory conflict that Carnap’s claim and the Polish
logician’s bear to one another. The reason why there is no real affirmatory
conflict, under this approach, is that it allows for a way of reformulating
what each party is supposedly claiming—a way of making each party’s respective
relativity-claim fully explicit—such that Carnap and the Polish logician each
can happily affirm both statements (as reformulated) and thus can
happily affirm the conjunction of the two statements.
This lesson
helps triangulate the kind of affirmatory conflict we seek to understand. A
crucial feature of it should be this: there is no way to reformulate the
respective claims of person P1 at time t1 and person P2
at time t2 such that a single person at a single time could
correctly affirm both statements (as reformulated) and thus could correctly
affirm their conjunction. As we will put it, the two statements are not correctly
co-affirmable.[8]
One way
that two statements can fail to be correctly co-affirmable, of course, is for
them to be directly inconsistent with one another. But, given our above account
of synchronic diffèrance, this is not the only way. Another way arises from the
fact that the various permissible settings for contextually variable semantic
parameters are mutually exclusionary; i.e., for a single person P at a
single time t, no more than one parameter-setting for a given concept or word
can semantically govern correct usage, by P at t, of that concept or word. So,
suppose that two statements S1 and S2 both contain a
common word W that is semantically governed by a contextually variable
parameter p; suppose
also that person P1 affirms S1 at time t1
under a setting ap of p, and that person P2
affirms S2 at time t2 under a distinct setting bp of p. The relevant form of
affirmatory conflict, obtaining between P1’s affirmation of S1
at t1 and P2’s affirmation of S2 at t2,
is this:
(1) There
is at least one circumstance C such that
(a) in C, S1
is true under ap and S2
is false under ap, and
(b) in C, S2
is true under bp and S1
is false under bp, and
(2) there
is no circumstance C* such that either
(a) in C*,
S1 and S2 are both true under ap, or
(b) in C*,
S1 and S2 are both true under bp.
Under these conditions, statements
S1 and S2 are not correctly co-affirmable—even
though they are not directly inconsistent with one another.[9]
The
affirmatory conflict at work in cases of conceptual relativity, we suggest,
occurs when two claims made by two different persons (or by one person at two
different times) exhibit the features just described. The two statements fail
to be correctly co-affirmable, and this failure stems from the fact that they
are respectively semantically governed by mutually exclusionary settings of
some contextually variable semantic parameter. The respective claims of Carnap
and the Polish logician fail to be correctly co-affirmable for just that
reason; and this feature constitutes their affirmatory conflict with one
another.[10]
We can
express this kind of affirmatory conflict by coining a philosophical term
(again, in the spirit of Derrida); let us say that the respective claims of
Carnap and the Polish logician are inconsistant, even though they are
not directly inconsistent. The two parties are not just “talking past one
another” by using two non-identical concepts and employing the term ‘object’
with two non-identical meanings, and they also are not just directly
contradicting one another either. They are doing something in between,
something that emerges as a genuine possibility once we recognize (i) that
there can be diffèrance in concepts and meanings, (ii) that the source of
synchronic diffèrance is contextually variable semantic parameters, and (iii)
that such diffèrance is the basis for conceptual relativity. This in-between
relation in their respective claims is one under which both claims are correct
despite conflicting with one another in the sense of not being mutually
co-affirmable. Although the semantic conflict is genuine, it is also “no big
deal” insofar as both parties are speaking and judging correctly under the
semantic parameter-settings that govern their respective use of the notion of
object. This distinctive semantic-conflict relation is what we are calling
inconsistance.
This
completes the three tasks that needed accomplishing in order to secure the
mutual compatibility of items 1-4 in section I.2, thereby explaining conceptual
relativity. To summarize: The first task was to explain why and how it is that
some concepts and meanings conform to the variantist conception. We did so by
identifying two forms of diffèrance—the diachronic version illustrated by
Putnam’s example of momentum, and the synchronic version illustrated by Lewis’s
treatment of the concept of flatness—and by highlighting the respective sources
of identity-preserving difference for both kinds of case. In synchronic cases,
the source is implicit, contextually variable, semantic parameters.
The second
task was to harness this source of synchronic diffèrance in order to explain
the principle of mutual correctness. This we did by pointing out that although
Carnap and the Polish logician are employing a single concept of object, and
are using the term ‘object’ with a single meaning, nevertheless their
respective uses are semantically governed by different settings of the implicit
mereology-parameter. Each of their respective claims is true under the specific
setting of the mereology parameter that governs the claim.
The third
task was to harness the source of synchronic diffèrance in order to explain the
principle of affirmatory conflict. This we did by pointing out that the
respective settings of the mereology parameter that respectively govern
Carnap’s statement and the Polish logician’s statement are mutually
exclusionary, and that there is no single setting of the mereology parameter
under which both statements are true at once. Thus, the two statements are not
mutually co-affirmable, and this constitutes their affirmatory conflict.
Although the two statements are not inconsistent, they are indeed inconsistant.
II.
Combining Conceptual Relativity with Metaphysical Realism
We
turn now to the question of the relation between conceptual relativity and
metaphysical realism. We will draw upon our account in Section I to argue that
these two theses are compatible, and in fact comport well with one another.
Doing so will require specific attention to the concept of truth.
1.
Conceptual relativity, direct correspondence, and the denial of
metaphysical realism
Metaphysical
realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent,
world—a world containing mind-independent, discourse-independent, objects that
instantiate mind-independent, discourse-independent, properties and relations.
Hereafter, it will be useful to adopt Putnam’s capitalization convention to
order to speak of this putative world and these putative objects, properties,
and relations; this makes unambiguously clear when we mean to be talking about
the kinds of entities whose existence the metaphysical irrealist denies. (More
below on how to construe the capitalization convention, given what will be said
about truth.)
Conceptual
relativity is often thought to be incompatible with metaphysical realism. An
initially plausible line of reasoning, leading from conceptual relativity to
the denial of metaphysical realism, goes as follows. According to conceptual
relativity, there are various incompatible ways of “carving” reality—e.g.,
incompatible forms of mereology, yielding incompatible ways of counting
objects, each of which is equally right. But if there is really a WORLD of
OBJECTS that instantiate various PROPERTIES and RELATIONS, then it couldn’t be
that these incompatible ways of “carving” are all correct; for, the only correct
way of carving would be the one that corresponds to how THE WORLD is in
itself—that is, the carving that picks out the genuine, mind-independently
real, OBJECTS, and that employs predicates expressing the genuine,
mind-independently real, PROPERTIES and RELATIONS. Thus, if conceptual
relativity obtains, then metaphysical realism is false. So, given that
conceptual relativity does obtain, metaphysical realism is false.
This
line of reasoning assumes the following direct-correspondence conception
of what truth would have to be, given metaphysical realism.
DC If metaphysical realism is correct, then truth
must be a matter of straightforward, direct, correspondence between the
content of language and thought, on one hand, and how things are with THE WORLD
on the other hand.
Under the direct-correspondence
conception of truth, an atomic statement ‘Fa’, for instance, is true iff there
exists some OBJECT O and some PROPERTY P such that (i) ‘a’ denotes O, (ii) ‘F’
expresses P, and (iii) O INSTANTIATES P. An existential statement ‘($x)Fx’ will be true iff there
exists some OBJECT O and some PROPERTY P such that (i) ‘F’ expresses P, and
(ii) O INSTANTIATES P. And so forth for logically more complex statements, in
accordance with the recursion clauses in a Tarski-style truth characterization.
It
has very often been supposed that the direct-correspondence conception of truth
is mandatory for metaphysical realism. Indeed, some philosophers (notably
Dummett and Putnam) actually build this assumption into their characterization
of metaphysical realism—something we are not doing here.[11]
And once one conjoins the direct-correspondence conception with metaphysical
realism, then this package deal does appear incompatible with conceptual
relativity. With respect to Carnap and the Polish logician, for example, the
package-deal view would entail that they cannot both be right in how
they count objects, because at most only one of their competing
mereology/counting schemes generates the truth about such matters—in
particular, the truth about how many OBJECTS are on a given table at a given
moment.
2. Truth as indirect correspondence
But
the metaphysical realist need not—and should not, we maintain—acquiesce
in the direct-correspondence conception of truth. Rather, the realist can—and
should—construe truth as correspondence of a more generic kind—a genus that has
various species. Direct correspondence is one species but there are also
various other kinds of truth-constituting correspondence.
In
a number of prior writings, we have articulated and defended a general approach
to truth that incorporates this idea; we call it contextual semantics.[12]
Here we will briefly sketch some central themes of contextual semantics in
enough detail to serve our purpose of explaining how conceptual relativity can
mesh with metaphysical realism.
One
fundamental claim of contextual semantics is this: although truth is
correspondence between content (in language or thought) and the WORLD, often
our language and thought work in such a way that the relevant kind of
correspondence is indirect rather than direct—so that that there need
not be any OBJECTS that answer to the singular terms or the quantifiers in a
given statement, or PROPERTIES that answer to the predicates. Take, for
instance, this statement:
Beethoven’s
fifth symphony has four movements.
Its truth does not require that
there be some genuine OBJECT answering to the term ‘Beethoven’s fifth
symphony’, and also instantiating a genuine PROPERTY expressed by the predicate
‘has four movements’. Rather, the relevant correspondence-relation is less
direct than this. Especially germane is the behavior by Beethoven that we would
call “composing his fifth symphony.” But a considerably wider range of
goings-on is relevant too: in particular, Beethoven’s earlier behavior in
virtue of which his later behavior counts as composing his fifth
symphony; and also a broad range of human practices (including the use of
handwritten or printed scores to guide orchestral performances) in virtue of
which such behavior by Beethoven counts as “composing a symphony” in the first
place.
Another
fundamental claim of contextual semantics, intimately connected to the notion
of indirect correspondence, is that truth is semantically correct
affirmability under contextually operative semantic standards. Likewise,
falsity is semantically correct deniability, under such standards. The relevant
notion of semantic correctness has nothing to do with matters of etiquette; a
statement can be semantically correct, in the relevant sense, even if it would
be impolite, impolitic, or otherwise inappropriate to utter it. Semantic
correctness is also distinct from epistemic warrant: a statement can be
epistemically warranted but semantically incorrect, and can be semantically
correct but epistemically unwarranted.
(Suppose that Beethoven engaged in behavior correctly describable as
“composing his tenth symphony,” and that no traces of this fact exist—perhaps
because he burned his score and sketchbooks and never mentioned the project to
anyone. Then the statement ‘Beethoven composed only nine symphonies’ is semantically
incorrect despite being epistemically warranted.)[13]
Contextual
semantics also stresses that semantic standards vary somewhat from one
sociolinguistic context to another. In the limit case, the applicable standards
require direct referential linkages connecting a statement’s basic
subsentential constituents to OBJECTS and PROPERTIES. In this limit case, truth
(i.e., semantically correct affirmability) is direct correspondence. But the
contextually operative standards also can work in such a way that the requisite
goings-on in the world need not involve OBJECTS or PROPERTIES answering to the
statement’s basic subsentential constituents. In such cases, truth is indirect
correspondence.
Limit-case
semantic standards frequently come into operation in philosophical contexts
where ontological issues are under discussion. It is plausible that they also
are operative in various scientific contexts, for instance in discussions in
physics about the subatomic constituents of matter.[14]
But for typical uses of numerous kinds of non-scientific discourse—including
discourses in which statements like “Beethoven’s fifth symphony has four
movements” would naturally occur—it is plausible that the contextually
operative semantic standards are not limit-case standards. Thus, for statements
in such discourses, truth (i.e., semantically correct affirmability) typically
is indirect correspondence.
3. The compatibility of
metaphysical realism and conceptual relativity
We
maintain that contextual semantics is a plausible and theoretically attractive
approach to truth; elsewhere we have set forth various arguments in support of
it (as well as articulating it more fully).[15]
Our present objective is to explain why metaphysical realism and conceptual
relativity can be naturally, and simultaneously, accommodated within the
framework of contextual semantics. This means, of course, that metaphysical
realism and conceptual relativity are entirely compatible with one another.[16]
So
consider, first, metaphysical realism—which asserts that there is a WORLD
containing OBJECTS instantiating various PROPERTIES and RELATIONS. Contextual
semantics comports well with this thesis. For one thing, contextual semantics
is perfectly consistent with it. Moreover, in contexts where language
and thought are governed by limit-case semantic standards, truth is a matter of
direct correspondence between language/thought content on one hand, and
how things are with these OBJECTS and their PROPERTIES and RELATIONS on the
other hand. Under direct-correspondence standards conceptual relativity cannot
be operative.
Even
under limit-case semantic standards of course, one must still be employing
certain specific concepts in certain specific ways: one must be thinking and
judging with those specific concepts, and from within those
context-specific semantic standards. In this mundane sense, one’s judgments and
assertions are still relative to a specific “conceptual scheme.” But it is just
a non sequitur to infer from this kind of conceptual-scheme relativity
that metaphysical realism is false.[17]
For, when one is employing concepts under limit-case semantic standards, one
purports to be carving THE WORLD at its mind-independently real joints; one’s
judgments and statements are true iff they directly reflect how things are with
OBJECTS, in terms of the PROPERTIES and RELATIONS they instantiate.
Now
consider conceptual relativity, as explicated in part I above. Contextual
semantics comports well with this thesis too. The key point is this: insofar as
the contextually operative semantic standards governing the correct usage of a
person’s concepts and words only require indirect correspondence rather than
direct correspondence, the items to which one’s judgments and statements are
“ontologically committed” by Quinean standards need not be mind-independently
real; they need not be OBJECTS. Thus, for example, different contextually
specific semantic standards governing the notion of object could involve
different, mutually incompatible, mereology parameters—say, Carnap’s on one
hand, and the Polish logician’s on the other. As long as Carnap and the Polish
logician are not both employing limit-case, direct-correspondence, semantic
standards, there is no reason why they cannot each be employing the notion of
object in such a way that under the respectively operative settings of the
mereology parameter, each of them is counting objects correctly. In
short: contextually variable semantic standards often work in such a way that
truth—that is, semantic correctness under contextually operative standards—is
indirect correspondence rather than direct correspondence; and conceptual
relativity is accommodated by the range of different potential forms of
indirect correspondence, involving different settings of contextually variable
semantic parameters.[18]
Although
our principal example of conceptual relativity has been Putnam’s case of Carnap
and the Polish logician—which on our account involves different settings of an
implicit mereology-parameter governing the notion of object—we emphasize that
the phenomenon of conceptual relativity extends well beyond matters of counting
and part/whole relations. It also covers, for example, entire domains of
entities that count as legitimate posits under various kinds of non-limit-case
semantic standards. Plausible examples include (inter alia) nations,
universities, symphonies, and numbers. Under contextual semantics, there need
not be genuine OBJECTS answering to thought and talk that carries Quinean
ontological commitment to such entities; and we doubt that there are such
OBJECTS. Thus, an ontologically minded philosopher might claim that nations
do not exist, whereas someone employing nation-talk under more typical
contextually operative semantic standards would claim that of course
nations exist. Both claims could well be correct, we maintain, given the
differing contextually-operative semantic standards that govern their
respective uses of the nation-notion. Thus, matters of existence and
non-existence are subject to conceptual relativity too.[19]
4.
Ontology in light of conceptual relativity
Given
contextual semantics, numerous entities to which our language and thought
carries Quineian “ontological commitments” might turn out to be only
mind-dependently, discourse-dependently, real, in this sense: although statements
positing such entities are true under various sorts of indirect-correspondence
semantic standards that often are contextually operative, such statements are
not true under limit-case, direct-correspondence, standards. This means that
questions of ontology, about what OBJECTS there are and what PROPERTIES and
RELATIONS they instantiate, are methodologically subtle, within the framework
of contextual semantics. In inquiring into them, one needs to attend carefully
to whether language and thought are, or are not, being employed under
limit-case semantic standards—and also to questions about what sorts of items
are, or are not, appropriate to posit when one is speaking and judging under those
standards. In principle, however, there is no clear reason why such matters
should not be open to human theoretical investigation—including scientifically
informed investigation.[20]
One
can, if one so chooses, deliberately undertake serious ontological
inquiry—thereby employing discourse governed by limit-case semantic standards—to
ask questions about what EXISTS. (The capitalization convention is a device for
overtly signaling that one is employing direct-correspondence standards.) In
this rarified form of thought and discourse, conceptual relativity no longer
holds sway. Thus, if Carnap and the Polish logician both were to deliberately
shift into direct-correspondence discourse, and also both were to persist in
their respective claims about the number of objects, then their dispute would
thereby become a “big deal” ontologically. For, although Carnap and the Polish
logician can both be right about how many objects are on the table when at
least one of them is speaking and judging under indirect-correspondence
semantic standards, nevertheless if they intend their dispute to be a genuine metaphysical
conflict about how many OBJECTS are on the table, then they cannot both be
correct.[21],[22]
REFERENCES
Horgan,
T. (1986a). “Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology,” Nous
Horgan, T. (1986b). “Truth and
Ontology,” Philosophical Papers 15: 1-21.
Horgan, T.
(1991). “Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics,” Erkenntnis
34: 297-322.
Horgan,
T. (1995a). Critical Study of C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity, Nous
29: 127-38.
Horgan,
T. (1995b). “Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness,” Southern
Journal Philosophy 33: Spindel Conference Supplement, 97-125.
Horgan,
T. (1996). “The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 66: 891-97.
Horgan,
T. (1998). “Actualism, Quantification, and Compositional Semantics,” Philosophical
Perspectives 12: 503-9.
Horgan,
T. (2001). “Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect
Correspondence,” in M. Lynch, ed., The Nature of Truth: Classic and
Contemporary Perspectives.
Horgan,
T. and Potrc, M. (2000). “Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.” Facta
Philosophica 2: 249-70.
Horgan,
T. and Timmons, M. (1993). “Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and
Meta-Semantic Irrealism,” Philosophical Issues 4: 180-203.
Lewis, D.
(1979). “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic
8: 339-59. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Volume 1.
Lynch, M.
(1998). Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity.
Putnam, H.
(1983). “Vagueness and Alternative Logic,” in his Philosophical Papers,
Volume 3: Realism and Reason.
Putnam, H.
(1987). The Many Faces of Realism.
Putnam, H.
(1988). Representation and Reality.
Timmons, M.
1999. Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism.
Van
Inwagen, P. (this volume). “The Number of Things.”
[1] See Lynch
(1998) for an illuminating attempt to make sense of conceptual relativity
which, because of space considerations, we are not able to consider in this
paper. But see note 7 below for an indication of why we think Lynch’s view does
not really handle the phenomenon of conceptual relativity.
[2] For
expository convenience, we have formulated these two principles in a way that
makes them specifically about just the one case of Carnap and the Polish
logician. But such principles can also be formulated more abstractly, to apply
to cases of conceptual relativity in general. Of course, it need not always be
the case that each of the persons in affirmatory conflict is actually making a true
statement (relative to the given person’s own way of using
relativity-susceptible concepts); for, the affirmed statement might happen to
be false even relative to the speaker’s own way of using the relevant concepts.
[3] See also
Van Inwagen (this volume), who also argues that conceptual relativity is not
really possible.
[4] The
account we offer will not constitute a full theory of concepts and meanings, by
any means. Rather, it potentially could be incorporated into various
alternative general theories.
[5] It is
important to distinguish the phenomenon of diffèrance in concepts from what
Putnam (1981, p. 116-19) calls difference in conception (even though the
distinction is somewhat fuzzy). The latter is a matter of different beliefs
about a given subject matter, not differences in concepts and in meaning.
Diffèrance, on the other hand, does involve differences in concepts and in
meaning—albeit identity-preserving ones.
[6] Different settings of the mereology parameter do not appear to conform to any simple ordering, however; in this respect the mereology parameter differs from the precision parameter for flatness.
[7] These
remarks are further supported by reflecting on the attempt to accommodate the
phenomenon of conceptual relativity in Lynch (1998), pp. 91-3. Lynch appears to
accept a version of what we are calling the relativized content view (although
the text is not completely unambiguous about this), and in order to make sense
of the principle of affirmatory conflict, he claims that the statements made by
Carnap and the Polish logician are in conflict in the sense that “if these
propositions were relative to the same scheme, they would be inconsistent”
(p. 93). But this sort of conflict is merely counterfactual; it does not
constitute or explain the actual affirmatory conflict that is present in
the claims that are actually made by Carnap and Polish logician. Yet once one
embraces a relativized content view about the claims in question, one seems
forced to make a move like Lynch’s in trying (unsuccessfully) to accommodate
the idea that there is genuine affirmatory conflict in the actual claims being
made in the Carnap-Polish logician case.
[8] It is
crucial to this kind of affirmatory conflict that the two statements are not
reformulable in a way that allows for correct co-affirmability by one person at
one time. Suppose, for instance, that Jones correctly says “I am over 6 feet
tall” and Smith correctly says “I am not over six feet tall.” Neither of them
can correctly affirm the conjunctive sentence “I am over 6 feet tall and I am
not over 6 feet tall.” However, each of them has a way of reformulating the
other’s statement that will make the two statements co-affirmable under
reformulation. (Jones, for instance, can correctly say “I am over 6 feet tall
and Smith is not over 6 feet tall.”) So Jones’ and Smith’s respective claims
about their own heights, both of which employ the indexical term ‘I’, are not
in affirmatory conflict.
[9] Nor are
they direct contraries of one another either—that is, statements that
can be mutually false but cannot be mutually true. Being direct contraries is a
form of content-conflict which—like being directly contradictory—runs afoul of
the principle of mutual correctness.
[10] Objection:
Although
you say that the respective claims of Carnap and the Polish logician are not
co-affirmable, you yourselves affirm the principle of mutual correctness; i.e.,
you yourselves affirm that Carnap and the Polish logician are both correct in
their respective claims. But to affirm that they are both correct is to affirm
what each of them is saying! So there is a way of correctly co-affirming their
claims after all—which shows that there is no genuine affirmatory conflict
between them.
Reply: The principle of mutual
correctness employs the term ‘correct’—and also the word ‘true’—in a relativistic
way: the principle asserts that both Carnap and the Polish logician are making
a claim which, relative to a specific way of using the concept of object,
is true. When one employs the notion of truth in this relativistic way
vis-a-vis a statement S, one does not thereby categorically affirm that
S is true—and hence one does not commit oneself to S itself. Thus, in affirming
the principle of mutual correctness one does not thereby co-affirm Carnap’s
claim and the Polish logician’s claim. Cf. note 19 below.
[11] In Putnam
(1982, p. 272), for instance, metaphysical realism is characterized as a view
that assumes the following:
1. A world
consisting of a definite totality of discourse-independent properties and
objects
2. ‘Strong
bivalence’, i.e., that an object either determinately has or determinately
lacks any property P that may significantly be predicated of that object
3. The
correspondence theory of truth in a strong sense of ‘correspondence’, i.e., a
predicate corresponds to a unique set of objects, and a statement corresponds
to a unique state of affairs, involving the properties and objects mentioned in
(1), and is true if that state of affairs obtains and false if it does not
obtain. (p. 272)
Putnam ascribes to Michael Dummett
the same three-part characterization of metaphysical realism. We ourselves are
taking metaphysical realism to comprise only the thesis of mind-independent,
discourse-independent, OBJECTS, PROPERTIES, and RELATIONS—which Putnam
articulates as claim (1) of the package-deal view that he himself calls
metaphysical realism. Presently we will reject claim (3), Putnam’s formulation
of the direct-correspondence conception of truth. We also deny that claim (2)
should be built into the very definition of metaphysical realism (although we
remain officially neutral about this claim), because metaphysical realists
disagree among themselves about whether there are, or can be, vague
OBJECTS or PROPERTIES—and if so, whether or not they obey the principle of
strong bivalence.
[12] See Horgan
(1986a, 1986b, 1991, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1998, 2001), Horgan and Potrc (2000),
Horgan and Timmons (1993), and Timmons
(1999). Originally Horgan called the view “language-game semantics” and later
called it “psychologistic semantics,” before Horgan and Timmons decided on the
current name. The overall framework includes theses not only about truth and
falsity per se, but also about meaning, ontology, thought, and knowledge.
[13] Although
contextual semantics denies that truth can be construed epistemically—say, as
epistemically warranted affirmability, or as some kind of idealization of
epistemically warranted affirmability—nevertheless contextual semantics does
posit an intimate connection between semantic standards for correct
affirmability on one hand, and epistemic standards for warranted affirmability
on the other hand. By and large, the epistemic standards we actually employ in
assessing the epistemic warrant-status of various statements are appropriate to
the contextually operative semantic standards governing semantically
correct affirmability. This explains why, for example, one need not concern
oneself about the ontological status of musical works of art in order to be
well warranted in affirming the statement that Beethoven’s fifth symphony
contains four movments (given the plausible assumption that this statement, as
ordinarily employed, is governed by indirect-correspondence semantic
standards).
[14] Although this
is initially plausible, there also are considerations that count against it,
having to do with conceptual problems that threaten the possibility of
ontological vagueness. See Horgan and Potrc (2000).
[15] See the
texts cited in note 12.
[16] Pendlebury
(1986) shows how it is possible to make sense of a realist truthmaking relation
that does not presuppose that the object language cuts nature at the joints.
This approach, which is similar in spirit to contextual semantics, also appears
to lend support to the contention that metaphysical realism is compatible with
conceptual relativity.
[17] Putnam
appears to commit this fallacy in the third sentence of the passage we quoted
in the second paragraph of this paper.
[18] Even if
neither Carnap nor the Polish logician is employing semantic standards
requiring direct correspondence to OBJECTS and their PROPERTIES and RELATIONS,
one of them might happen to be employing mereological principles that are
actually obeyed by OBJECTS themselves. But this could only be so for one of
their mereological schemes at most—not for both.
[19] The
concept of truth is itself subject to conceptual relativity, according to
contextual semantics: it too is governed by implicit, contextually variable,
semantic parameters. Typically—but not invariably—the contextually operative
parameter-settings mesh with those governing first-order discourse in such a
way that the claim that statement S is true entails S, and conversely. One
important alternative way to employ the truth predicate is a non-categorical,
explicitly relativistic usage: one says of statement S that it is true under
(or, true relative to) such-and-such semantic standards (or mode of
usage, or conceptual scheme, etc.). The truth predicate is used in this
relativistic way in our formulation of the principle of mutual correctness in
section I.1, and also in our account of affirmatory conflict in the third
paragraph of section I.6. Such a non-categorical truth-attribution to a
statement S does not entail S.
[20] We do
acknowledge the worry that perhaps nothing could settle such ontological
issues, even in principle—and the fact that this worry potentially threatens
metaphysical realism. As is emphasized by Lynch (1998), one need not be a
verificationist about meaning to feel the grip of this line of thought. But
addressing it is a matter for another occasion.
[21] For a
discussion that construes their dispute as a genuine metaphysical conflict, and
argues that they are both wrong, see Van Inwagen (this volume).
[22] We thank
Elizabeth Giles, Michael Lynch, Michael Pendlebury, and John Tienson for
helpful comments and discussion.