Terence Edward Horgan

University of Arizona

Department of Philosophy

Tucson, AZ 85721-0027

thorgan@email.arizona.edu

Education

  • Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1974
  • B.A., Philosophy, Stanford University, 1970

Employment

  • Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2002—.
  • Professor of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 1988–2002.
  • Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Memphis State University, 1985–6.
  • Associate Professor of Philosophy, Memphis State University, 1981–8.
  • Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Houston, 1980–1.
  • Associate Professor of Philosophy, Illinois State University, 1980–1.
  • Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 79–.
  • Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Illinois State University, 1978–80.
  • Assistant Professor of Philosophy, DePauw University, 1973–1978.

Areas of Special Interest

Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaethics

Areas of Competence

Philosophy of Science, Logic, Decision Theory

Publications

books

  • Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson), Bradford/M.I.T., 1996.
  • Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Miminal Ontology (with M. Potrc), MIT, forthcoming 2007.

edited collections

  • Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (with J. Tienson). Kluwer, 1991.
  • Metaethics after Moore (with M. Timmons). Oxford, 2006.
  • Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim (with M. Sabates and D. Sosa), in preparation.

articles

  1. Reduction and the Mind‑Body Problem, in M. Marx and F. Goodson, eds., Theories in Contemporary Psychology, 2nd edition (1976), 223-31.
  2. Lehrer on ‘Could’‑Statements, Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), 403-11.
  3. The Case Against Events, Philosophical Review 87 (1978), 28-47. Reprinted in R. Casati and A. Varzi, eds., The International Research Library of Philosophy: Events (Dartmouth, 1996).
  4. Supervenient Bridge Laws, Philosophy of Science 45 (1978), 227-49.
  5. ‘Could’, Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility, Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1979), 345-58.
  6. Humean Causation and Kim’s Theory of Events, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1980), 663-79.
  7. Nonrigid Event-Designators and the Modal Individuation of Events, Philosophical Studies 37 (1980), 341-51.
  8. Action Theory Without Actions, Mind 60 (1981), 406-14.
  9. Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s Problem, Journal of Philosophy (1981),331-56. Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 1981, and in R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (U. of British Columbia Press, 1985).
  10. Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics, Synthese 49 (1981), 395-413.
  11. Intentional and Unintentional Actions (with M. Gorr), Philosophical Studies 41 (1982), 251-62.
  12. Substitutivity and the Causal Connective, Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), 47-52.
  13. Supervenience and Microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982), 29-43. To be reprinted in J. Kim, ed., The International Research Library of Philosophy: Supervenience (Ashgate).
  14. Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1984), 453-69.
  15. Functionalism and Token Physicalism, Synthese 59 (1984), 321-38.
  16. Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia, Philos. Quarterly 34 (1984), 147-52. Reprinted in F. Jackson (ed.), International Research Library of Philosophy: Consciousness (Ashgate, 1998.) To appear in German translation in S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), Phänomenales Bewußtsein: Ausgewählte Beiträge zur Qualia-Debatte 1975-1998 (mentis-Publishers, Paderborn, Germany). To be reprinted in Neil Campbell, ed., Mental Causation & the Metaphysics of Mind (Broadview Press). Reprinted in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar, eds., Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (MIT Press, 2004).
  17. Science Nominalized, Philosophy of Science 51 (1984), 529-49.
  18. Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics, Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1984), Supplement Issue on Supervenience, 19-38.
  19. Against the Token Identity Theory (with Michael Tye), in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, eds., Act and Event: The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Basil Blackwell, 1985), 427-43.
  20. Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument, Phil. Studies 47 (1985), 339-56.
  21. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay (with James Woodward), Philosophical Review 94 (1985), 197-226. Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Blackwell, 1990); in J. Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, 1991); in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (Erlbuam, 1993); in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (Oxford, in press); and in J. Crumley, ed., Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Mayfield, 1999).
  22. Newcomb’s Problem: A Stalemate, in R. Campbell and L. Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (U. of British Columbia Press), 1985), 223-34.
  23. Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology, Nous 20 (1986), 21-31.
  24. Truth and Ontology, Philosophical Papers 15 (1986), 1-21.
  25. Cognition is Real, Behaviorism 15 (1987), 13-25.
  26. Psychologistic Semantics and Moral Truth, Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), 357-70.
  27. Science Nominalized Properly, Philosophy of Science 54 (1987), 281-82.
  28. Supervenient Qualia, Philosophical Review 96 (1987), 491-520. Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 1987.
  29. Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World (with Michael Tye), Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1988), 179-186.
  30. How to be Realistic About Folk Psychology (with G. Graham), Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988), 69-81.
  31. Settling into a New Paradigm (with J. Tienson), Spindel Conference 1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, Supplement (1988), 97-114. Reprinted in T. Horgan and J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (Kluwer, 1991).
  32. Attitudinatives, Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1989), 133-65.
  33. Mental Quausation, Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989), 47-76.
  34. Predecision Processes in Chess: Masters, Experts, and Novices, (3rd author, with D. Horgan, K. Millis, and R. Niemeyer), in D. Topping et. al., eds., Thinking Across Cultures (Erlbaum, 1989), 309-21.
  35. Representations without Rules (with J. Tienson), Phil. Topics 17 (1989), 27-43.
  36. Connectionism and the Kuhnian Crisis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), Acta Analytica 6 (1990), 5-17.
  37. Soft Laws (with J. Tienson), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1990), 256-79.
  38. Psychologistic Semantics, Robust Vagueness, and the Philosophy of Language, in S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Meanings and Prototypes: Studies in Linguistic Categorization (Routledge, 1990), 535-57.
  39. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content, in B. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics (Basil Blackwell, 1991), 73-101.
  40. In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism (with G. Graham), Philosophical Studies 62 (1991), 107-34. Reprinted in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (Erlbuam, 1993).
  41. Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics, Erkenntnis 34 (1991), 297-322.
  42. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons), Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991), 447-65; and in J. Heil (ed.), Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark C. Overvold (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).
  43. Cognitive Systems as Dynamical Systems (with J. Tienson), Topoi 11 (1992), 27-43.
  44. From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1992), 449-84. Review essay on books by J. Fodor, L. R. Baker, J. Garfield, and R. Cummins.
  45. Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? (with J. Tienson), in S. Davis., ed., Connectionism: Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1992), 195-228.
  46. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived (with M. Timmons), Synthese 92 (1992), 221-60.
  47. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Papers 21 (1992), 153-75. Reprinted in A. Fisher and S. Kirchin, Arguing About Metaethics (Routledge, 2006), 179-199.
  48. Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 51. Peer commentary on “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” by Alvin Goldman.
  49. The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (1993), 282-97. Forum on eliminativism in philosophy of mind.
  50. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World, Mind 102 (1993), 555-86. Invited “State of the Art” essay.
  51. Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), Philosophy 34 (1993), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 159-88. Reprinted in J. L. Bermudez, ed., Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 2006.
  52. Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 4 (1993), 180-203.
  53. Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology, in Wagner & Warner, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame, 1993), 295-320.
  54. On What There Isn’t, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1993), 693-700. Symposium essay on P. van Inwagen’s Material Beings.
  55. Computation and Cognition. In S. Stich and F. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation: A Reader (Blackwell, 1994), 302-311. Excerpted from item 44 above.
  56. Naturalism and Intentionality, Philosophical Studies 76 (1994), 301-26.
  57. Reply to Egan, Philosophical Studies 76 (1994), 339-47. Reply to F. Egan’s commentary on ‘Naturalism and Intentionality’.
  58. Nonreductive Materialism. In R. Warner and T. Szubka, eds., The Mind-Body Problem (Blackwell, 1994), 236-41. In Polish translation in Znack.
  59. Representations Don’t Need Rules: Reply to James Garson (with J. Tienson). Mind and Language 9 (1994), 38-55. Invited reply to Garson’s critique of item 35.
  60. Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox, Philosophical Perspectives 8, Logic and Language (1994), 159-88.
  61. Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy (with G. Graham), Philosophical Issues 5 (1994), 219-47. Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
  62. A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), Synthese 101 (1994), 305-345. Issue on philosophy and connectionism.
  63. Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology (with J. Tienson), Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995), 127-52.
  64. Let’s Make a Deal, Philosophical Papers 24 (1995), 209-22.
  65. Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness, Southern Journal Philosophy 33 (1995), Spindel Conference Supplement, 97-125.
  66. Kim on the Mind-Body Problem, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1996), 579-607.
  67. The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1996), 891-97. Symposium essay on C. Wright’s Truth & Objectivity.
  68. Troubles for Michael Smith’s Metaethical Rationalism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Papers 25 (1996), 203-231.
  69. From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step (with M. Timmons), Critica 28 (1996), 3-39.
  70. Brute Supervenience, Deep Ignorance, and the Problem of the Many, Philosophical Issues 8 (1997), 229-36.
  71. Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy 28 (1997), 1-30. Based on an invited overview talk, 1994 Eastern Division APA meeting. Reprinted in Chinese translation in L. Magnani and Li Ping, eds. Philosophical Investigations from a Perspective of Cognition. Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2006.
  72. Precis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson), Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997), 337-56. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press).
  73. Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch, Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997), 365-71. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press).
  74. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion, Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1998), 165-84.
  75. The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness, The Monist 81 (1998), 316-33.
  76. Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession, Philosophical Issues 9 (1998), 27-33. Symposium paper on J. Fodor’s “There are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED, Sociedad Filosofica Ibero Americana, 1997.
  77. Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998), 503-09. Invited reply to J. Tomberlin, “Actualism, Naturalism, and Ontology.”
  78. Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1998), 643. Invited commentary on T. van Gelder, “The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science.”
  79. Authors’ Replies (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 22 (1999), 275-87. Issue containing proceedings from the 1997 conference on Horgan and Tienson’s Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.
  80. Short Precis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 22 (1999): 9-21.
  81. Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence (with M. Potrc), Facta Philosophica, 2 (2000): 249-70.
  82. Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). Synthese 124 (2000), 139-52. Appears with D. Copp, “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth.”
  83. Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox. In A. Anamori (ed.), Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 6: Analytic Philosophy and Logic. Philosophy Documentation Center (2000), 99-111. Invited symposium paper for a session on Logic and Metaphysics.
  84. Iceberg Epistemology (with D. Henderson). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000), 497-535.
  85. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary (with G. Graham). Philosophical Studies 99 (2000), 59-87.
  86. Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 121-53.
  87. Simulation and Epistemic Competence (with David Henderson). In H. Kobler and K. Steuber, (eds), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview, 2000, 119-43.
  88. The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability, Nous 34 (2000), 578-602.
  89. What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For? (with D. Henderson), Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, Spindel Conference Supplement on the Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Philosophy (2000), 51-86.
  90. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (2001), 95-116. Issue on mental causation, edited by J. Corbi.
  91. Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence. Invited for M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. MIT Press (2001), 67-95.
  92. Deconstructing New Wave Materialism (with J. Tienson). In B. Loewer, ed., Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge University Press (2001), 307-18.
  93. Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. Invited for F. Siebelt and B. Preyer, eds., Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield (2001), 205-21.
  94. Practicing Safe Epistemology (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Studies 102 (2001), 227-58.
  95. The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory, in B. Brogaard and B. Smith, eds., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. öbv & hpt (2001), 172-91.
  96. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson). In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford (2002), 520-33.
  97. The Salem Witch Project (with S. Tammelleo), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002), 193-200. For a symposium on M. Lance and J. O’Leary-Hawthorne, The Grammar of Meaning.
  98. Sensations and Grain Processes (with G. Graham). In J. Fetzer and G. Mulhauser (ed.), Consciousness and the Algorithms of Evolution. J. Benjamin (2002), 63-86.
  99. Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism (with M. Potrc), Facta Philosophica 4 (2002), 311-22 .
  100. The A Priori Isn’t All That It’s Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Topics 29 (2002), 219-50. Issue honoring Alvin Goldman.
  101. Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 12 (2002), 74-96. Issue on realism and relativism.
  102. Themes in My Philosophical Work, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002), 1-26. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan.
  103. Replies to Papers, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002), 303-41. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan
  104. The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic (2003), 323-40.
  105. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter (2004), 297-317.
  106. Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day. Analysis 64 (2004), 10-20.
  107. Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In M. Reicher and J. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Obv & hpt, (2005), 191-207. Also in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (MIT, 2006), 41-61.
  108. Mary Mary, Au Contraire (with G. Graham), Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 203-212. Invited response to D. Raffman, “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan,” Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 189-202.
  109. Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 15 (2005), 56-77.
  110. The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency (with J. Tienson). In M. Saagua and F. de Ferro (eds.), A Explicacao da Interpretacao Humana: The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the Conference Mind and Action III—May 2001. Lisbon: Edicoes Colibri (2005), 415-23.
  111. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism (with D. Henderson), invited for C. Erneling and D. Johnson (eds.), Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press (2005), 211-24.
  112. Abundant Truth in an Austere World (with M. Potrc). In M. Lynch and P. Greenough (eds.), Truth and Realism: New Essays. Oxford (2006), 137-167.
  113. Introduction (with M. Timmons), T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metatethics After Moore. Oxford University Press (2006), 1-15.
  114. Cognition Needs Syntax But Not Rules (with J. Tienson). In R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell, 2006.
  115. Cognitivist Expressivism (with M. Timmons). In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metatethics After Moore. Oxford University Press (2006), 255-98.
  116. Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! (with M. Timmons). In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford (2006), 73-98.
  117. Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction, Philosophical Studies 131 (2006), 157-183.
  118. Morality without Moral Facts (with M. Timmons). In J. Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell (2006), 220-38.
  119. Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc). Acta Analytica 21 (2006), 45-61.
  120. Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection. Psyche, issue on phenomenology of agency guest-edited by Susanna Siegel, in press.
  121. Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Blackwell, in press.
  122. Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. For a festschrift for J. Kim, co-edited by M. Sabates, D. Sosa, and (nominally) me, in press.
  123. Consciousness and Intentionality (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In S. Schneider and M. Velmans (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell, in press.
  124. The Hairy Problem of Mental Causation and Contextualism to the Rescue (with C. Maslen and H. Habermann). In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, in press.
  125. Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis, papers from the 2005 Tuebingen Conference on Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge, in press.
  126. Moorean Moral Phenomenology (with M. Timmons). In S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford, in press.
  127. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Phenomenal Consciousness that We May Know it So Well? (with U. Kriegel). Philosophical Issues, issue on the metaphysics of epistemology, in press.
  128. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In A. Beckermann and B. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind Oxford, in press.
  129. Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism (with D. Henderson). In S. Goldberg, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, in press.
  130. Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis, in press.
  131. Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese, in press.
  132. Transglobal Reliabilism (with D. Henderson). Croatian Journal of Philosophy, in press.
  133. Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. Harvard Review of Philosophy, in press.
  134. Truth as Mediated Correspondence (with R. Barnard). The Monist, in press.

reviews

  • Review of I. Porn, Action Theory and Social Science, in Philosophical Review, 1979.
  • Review of J. Thompson, Acts and Other Events, in Philosophy of Science, 1979.
  • Review of A. O’Hear, Karl Popper, in Philosophical Review, 1983.
  • Review of T. Beauchamp and A. Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, in Philosophical Review, 1985.
  • Review of J. Trusted, Free Will and Responsibility, in Nous, 1987.
  • Review of M. Brand, Intending and Acting, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1987.
  • Review of Philosophical Perspectives I: Metaphysics, for Nous, 1990.
  • Review of F. Dretske, Explaining Behavior, for Mind and Language, 1990.
  • Review of A. Clark, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing, for Mind, 1991.
  • Critical study of Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity, Nous 29 (1995), 127-38.
  • Review of Paul Churchland, The Engine of Reason and the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain, for Acta Analytica 16 (2001), 157-60.
  • Critical Study of Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Nous, 2006.
  • Retreat from Non-Being: Critical Study of Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, in press.

dictionary & encylopedia entries

  • “Physicalism,” in S. Gluttenplan, A Companion to Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 1994), 471–79.
  • “Folk Psychology,” in R. Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philososophy (Cambridge, 1995), 268–70.
  • “Reduction/Reductionism,” in J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., A Companion to Metaphysics (Blackwell, 1995), 438–40.
  • “Supervenience,” in R. Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995), 778–79.
  • “Connectionism,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement (Macmillan, 1996), 95–96.
  • “Reduction, Reductionism,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement (Macmillan, 1996), 438–40.
  • “Rules (with J. Tienson),” A Companion to Cognitive Science (Blackwell, 1998), 660–70.
  • “Rules and Representations (with J. Tienson),” The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (MIT, 1999), 724–26.
  • “Supervenience,” The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, (MIT, 1999), 812–14.

Recent Presentations

  • Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat; Abundant Truth in an Austere World. Wake Forest Unversity Philosophy Department, February 2005.
  • Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism, presented by co-author Henderson at the University of Kentucky, conference on internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, April 2005.
  • Transglobal Reliabilism, presented by co-author Henderson at conference on metaphysics and epistemology, Dubrovnik (Croatia), June 2005.
  • Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc), co-presented with Potrc at conference on particularism, Bled (Slovenia), June 2005.
  • Epistemology at the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Cognitive Science Master Seminar, U. of Arizona. September 2005.
  • Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. Consciousness Center, U. of Arizona, October. Conference on mental causation, U. of Tuebingnen, October 2005.
  • Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. U. of Pamplona (Spain), and Arche Vagueness Workshop at U. of St. Andrews (Scotland), November 2005.
  • Cognitivist Expressivism. Institute of Philosophy, University of London. November 2005.
  • Epistemology at the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Cognitive Science Program, U. of Minnesota, December 2005.
  • Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. Philosophy Department, U. of Minnesota, December 2005.
  • The Hidden in Phenomenal Consciousness. Symposium on Consciousness and Introspection, APA Pacific Division, March 2006.
  • Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology, plus group discussion of several Horgan/Timmons metaethics papers. Bowling Green State University, April 2006.
  • Retreat from Non-Being. Author Meets Critic Session on G. Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, APA Central Division, April 2006.
  • Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. Conference on Freedom and Determinism, Bled, Slovenia, June 2006.

Fellowships & Awards

  • Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford.
  • B.A. with Great Distinction, Honors in Philosophy, Honors in Humanities.
  • NSF Graduate Traineeship, 1970–71 and 1971–72.
  • Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship, 1972–73.
  • DePauw University Faculty Research Award, 1978.
  • NEH Summer Stipend, 1978.
  • Illinois State University Summer Research Grant, 1979 and 1980.
  • Memphis State University Summer Research Grant, 1982.
  • NEH Summer Stipend, 1983.
  • Memphis State University Noninstructional Assignment, spring 1985.
  • Memphis State University SPUR Award for Superior Research, 1986.
  • NEH Summer Seminar, “Philosophical Problems About Truth and Reality,” directed by Hilary Putnam, 1986.
  • NEH Fellowship for College Teachers, 1988–89.
  • Memphis State University Noninstructional Assignment, 1988–89.
  • Memphis State University SPUR Award for Superior Research, 1992.
  • Memphis State University Distinguished Research Award, 1993.
  • College of Arts and Sciences Distinguished Research Award (with J. Tienson), U. of Memphis, 1997.
  • College of Arts and Sciences Eminent Faculty Award, University of Memphis, 1997.
  • Robert Dunavant University Professorship, 1998–2001.
  • University of Memphis Distinguished Research Award (with J. Tienson), spring 1999.

National & Regional Professional Positions

  • Nominating Committee, APA Central Division, 1986–87.
  • President, Tennessee Philosophical Association, 1986–87.
  • Editorial Board, Behavior and Philosophy, 1986—.
  • Chairman, Program Committee for 1989 meeting, APA Central Division.
  • Editorial Board, Philosophical Papers, 2001—.
  • Editorial Board, Philosophical Psychology, 1987—.
  • Editorial Board, Sorites, 1995—.
  • Secretary/Treasurer, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1991–94.
  • Advisory Committee to the Program Committee, APA Eastern Division, 1994–97.
  • Executive Council, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1996–99.
  • President, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1999–2000.
  • Executive Committee, APA Central Division, 2000–2003.
  • Editorial Board, Blackwell Philosophy Compass, 2006—.