Research Interests
Lee Shepski
My research is driven by the Socratic question, ‘How should one live?’ This question has recently led me to an investigation of the foundations of morality and hence to a dissertation in defense of both moral realism and the normative authority of moral claims. My dissertation also defends ‘non-naturalism’, at least insofar as it denies the possibility of drawing a meaningful natural/non-natural distinction that leaves room for the normative authority of morality (and of practical reason more generally) somewhere within the natural world. I plan to continue my defense of moral realism beyond my dissertation, primarily in three ways: (1) by further developing and defending my phenomenologically grounded moral epistemology; (2) by further developing the metaphysics related to my view; and (3) by further developing my arguments against philosophical naturalism. I am also interested in Sharon Street’s recent contention that Darwinian theory leaves little room for moral realism, and I expect to address that question in an expanded version of my dissertation.
My continuing interest in metaethics remains grounded, however, in my broader interest in moral philosophy. After completing my defense of moral realism (insofar as one may ever consider a philosophical project complete), I expect to engage in projects that fall more directly within the sphere of first-order, normative ethics. One large-scale project I might pursue, for example, is a defense of pluralist ethical theory. The drive to simplify and unify is an understandable one, but systematic theories of ethics, such as Kantian or Utilitarian views, notoriously run into difficulties with counter-examples. Given my moral epistemology, I think it questionable that we should revise our intuitions about specific cases in light of commitments to abstract, exceptionless principles. Ethical pluralism comes with its own difficulties, but if these can be surmounted, and if one can successfully challenge the legitimacy of the drive for simplification and unity in ethics in the first place, then a pluralist first-order view becomes a natural choice.
Concurrently with my work in metaethics, I also expect to engage in smaller projects that fall within the realm of moral philosophy. For example, I have a paper in progress on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a topic of general interest within moral and political philosophy. I argue that a satisfying treatment of the dilemma must respect various constraints and that, unless these constraints are relaxed, it is not rational to cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. However, I argue that this should not surprise us and need not entail an immoralist conclusion. I presented this paper at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in March 2006, and I plan to complete and publish it while continuing my work on moral realism.
Finally, I am and will remain active in the community of scholars of ancient Greek philosophy. I am especially interested in Plato, but also in the broader scope of ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in ancient views on freedom, philosophy of action, moral responsibility, and ethics. I actively study ancient Greek language, in which I am competent, and I aspire to the level of skill required of an artful translator. I have been a regular participant in the Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, and I currently have an interpretive paper in progress on Plato’s Protagoras, in which I argue that the protreptic context of the frame dialogue should lead us to take seriously the hedonism that Socrates endorses later in the dialogue. This is another paper that I plan to complete and publish while continuing my work on moral realism.