Carolina Sartorio
Papers
Causation and Freedom
(pdf) Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy. I argue that the metaphysics of causation has a neglected but important role to play in the debate about freedom and determinism. In particular, the intransitivity of causation can support a better version of the alternative possibilities view of freedom (as well as a rival view that doesn't require alternative possibilities).Actuality and Responsibility
(pdf) Forthcoming in Mind. "Actual-sequence" views of responsibility are views according to which moral responsibility is a function of actual sequences. I argue that the best view of this kind is one that understands actual sequences in a non-traditional way and one that entails that unactualized possibilities of a certain kind are always relevant to responsibility.Resultant Luck
(pdf) Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. I give an account of the concept of resultant moral luck (moral luck about consequences), a concept that is, I argue, much more intricate and interesting than it has been recognized.Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination
(pdf) Forthcoming in Legal Theory. This is part of a symposium on Michael Moore's book Causation and Responsibility. I critically examine Moore's views on whether and how agents are responsible in overdetermination cases and then develop my own view on this issue.Moore on Doing versus Allowing Harm
(pdf) Forthcoming in Rutgers Law Journal. This is a critical discussion of Michael Moore's views on the doing/allowing distinction in his book Causation and Responsibility (Oxford, 2009).Failing to Do the Impossible
(pdf) In New Waves in the Philosophy of Action (Aguilar, Frankish and Buckareff, eds.), 2010. I discuss the relation between intentional omissions and alternative possibilities.
The Prince of Wales Problem for Counterfactual Theories of Causation
(pdf) New Waves in Metaphysics (Hazzlett, ed., 2010). I argue that counterfactual views of causation cannot accommodate causation by omission while remaining faithful to the motivation for accepting that kind of causation.
Omissions and Causalism
(pdf) Noûs 43 (2009). I argue that omissions make trouble for causal theories of agency.
Causation and Ethics
(pdf) Oxford Handbook of Causation (Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies, eds., 2009). I discuss the role of causation in consequentialism, the distinction between killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, and the concept of moral responsibility.
Moral Inertia
(pdf) Philosophical Studies 140 (2008). I argue that, according to commonsense morality, there is moral pressure to leave things "as is."
Causation and Responsibility
Philosophy Compass 2007. I discuss different views about the relation between moral responsibility and causation and I defend an unorthodox view.
Disjunctive Causes
(pdf) Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006). I argue that there is reason to believe in the existence of disjunctive causes.
Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity
(pdf) Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006). It might seem that, if I cause X and Y, I also cause their sum. I argue that this principle fails, at least for omissions, and I draw some implications of this failure for the problem of famine.
On Causing Something to Happen in a Certain Way without Causing It to Happen
(pdf) Philosophical Studies 129 (2006). I offer conditions under which causing an outcome to happen in a certain way is not sufficient for causing the outcome. The principle works as an argument against the transitivity of causation.
A New Asymmetry Between Actions and Omissions
(pdf) Noûs 39 (2005). I argue that there is a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions, which has its source in a causal asymmetry.
Causes as Difference-Makers
(pdf) Philosophical Studies 123 (2005). I defend a principle according to which causes are difference-makers with respect to their effects.
How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It
(pdf) Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004). I argue that being morally responsible doesn't entail being a cause, and I offer an alternative way of understanding the relationship between responsibility and causation.