

Small Numbers, Great Impact: Mexico and Its Immigrants, 1821–1973

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*“Mexico, mother of foreigners and stepmother
of Mexicans”*

Mexican saying from the Porfirian period
(1876–1911)

ON 2 JULY 2000, the son of Irish and Spanish immigrants stunned the world by winning election to the presidency of Mexico. This election ended the 71-year rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), a party that—in its powerful hold on state institutions and an official revolutionary mythology—had once seemed as invincible as the mighty Communist party of the former Soviet Union. Accompanied by a genuine cowboy grin, Vicente Fox Quesada’s triumph appeared to show that Mexico, like Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, was a nation of immigrants.¹

In fact, however, Fox’s meteoric rise to power highlights a peculiar paradox: in Mexico, a quantitatively insignificant foreign immigration had an enormous impact in qualitative terms. Whereas Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and the United States received millions of newcomers during the heyday of transatlantic migration in the late nineteenth century, only 0.6 percent of all European immigrants settled in Mexico. In 1930, the high point of Mexico’s foreign-born population in percentage terms as captured by a national census, immigrants made up less than 1 percent of the population.² Moreover, Mexico has proven a “salad bowl” rather than a “melting pot,” as most immigrant families sought to retain their native language and customs. Nonetheless, the relatively few immigrants who came to Mexico left an indelible mark on their host society. In the nineteenth century, European and United States investors came to dominate mining, oil, and cash crop agriculture. So successful were foreigners at exploiting Mexican natural resources that many of them returned to their native countries after a short stay in Mexico. In addition, European and Chinese immigrants seized control of banking and commerce, French and Spanish families pioneered the industrializa-

tion of Mexico, and immigrants from a variety of countries played important roles in academia, the arts, and national politics. This paradox raises the intriguing questions of why Mexico did not receive more immigrants, why the newcomers came to play such a large role, and why many of them refused assimilation.

This article seeks to answer these questions by examining immigration into post-colonial Mexico in historical perspective. While a flood of scholarly literature has analyzed Mexico as a source of migrants, far less has been written about the country as a target of immigrants. Hampered in part by sketchy census data, the few existing studies emphasize quantitative over qualitative research questions.³ The essay will focus on foreigners who actually lived in Mexico. Unlike multinational capitalists who administered their property in Mexico from the comfort of their faraway homes, the immigrants learned Spanish, came to terms with the host culture on an everyday basis, and confronted the peculiar mix of xenophilia and xenophobia that has always characterized Mexican attitudes toward outsiders.

This essay identifies three major phases in the history of Mexican immigration. During the first phase (1821–76), immigration remained limited in an age of political instability and economic stagnation. During the second phase (1876–1910), the Mexican government encouraged European immigration to “whiten” the population. Finally, the third phase (1910–73) witnessed a gradual closing of Mexico’s borders to further immigration, as well as the beginning of assimilation of the foreign diasporas in Mexico.

NOT A STREAM, BUT A TRICKLE

Mexico never became a “nation of immigrants” because it offered few of the advantages that attracted immigrants elsewhere in the Americas. In particular, farmers did not express interest in Mexico. Rugged and mountainous, the country possesses precious little farmland of the kind that encouraged European rural people to stream to the Americas.⁴ Instead, the mountain ranges, deserts, steppes, pine forests and tropical jungles that mark the country’s unparalleled natural beauty and diversity make up more than 85 percent of Mexico in its present-day boundaries. Even more importantly, nineteenth-century rural immigrants faced stiff competition for arable land. In central and southern Mexico, the best lands were in the hands of a small elite of creoles if not by the Catholic church. Large estates, or haciendas, dotted the landscape, exploiting a

significant indigenous and mestizo labor force. Unlike Argentina, southern Brazil, Chile, and the United States, Mexico also featured a significant number of Indian villages that coexisted uneasily with the haciendas and small ranchos. To make matters worse, the countryside remained undercapitalized, and banks existed only in the larger cities. To top it off, the Mexican government did not grant assistance to rural colonization projects, which doomed any but externally funded agrarian immigration schemes. A prospective immigrant therefore found himself in the predicament typical for a country without a class of yeoman farmers. In the absence of available land and credit, existence as a rural wage earner forced him to compete for jobs with the indigenous and mestizo peasantry—hardly the ideal for an immigrant seeking a better life. The situation was not much better in urban Mexico. Industrialization did not arrive in Mexico until the end of the century, and for artisans, low wages and a glut of skilled crafts people made a migration to Mexico unpalatable.⁶

For the first seventy years after independence, the country's political and economic problems did nothing to woo immigrants, either. A protracted conflict accompanied by social revolt, the Wars of Independence (1810–21) left the economy ruined and political authority severely weakened. In the succeeding decades, *caudillo* warlords successfully disputed central authority in Mexico, and the country experienced four major foreign invasions, including the United States-Mexican War that led to the loss of half of the nation's territory. Mexico also posed specific obstacles for immigrants, including a constantly changing legal framework as well as xenophobic reactions and discrimination against Protestants. In addition, various regimes experimented with outlawing foreign ownership of retail businesses, an idea that further discouraged immigration.⁷ The sparse foreign-born population of nineteenth-century Mexico—mostly Spaniards, United States farmers, Guatemalan refugees, and European “trade conquistadors”⁸—either came from neighboring countries or counted on effective protection by fortune and family networks. Even more strikingly, the presence of the first three of these groups markedly increased the anti-immigrant tendencies of the Mexican elites in the 1821–55 period.

The case of the Spaniards is particularly instructive in this regard. Immigrants from Spain had come to Mexico since the days of Hernán Cortés, and their descendants had formed the creole elite that owned New Spain's most precious land. Excluded from the high colonial offices, the creoles had grown to resent more recent arrivals, dubbed

peninsulares, or, pejoratively, *gachupines*. Nonetheless, the Bourbon Reforms of the late eighteenth century had ushered in the arrival of ten thousand Spaniards, many of whom took advantage of family ties to become merchants and landowners.⁹ Anti-Spanish sentiments, both creole and popular, served as one of the causes of the Wars of Independence, and they intensified during the 1810s as Spanish troops suppressed the uprisings of Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos. The achievement of independence signaled the hour of payback. In 1827, Mexico's creole government decreed the expulsion of the *peninsulares*, and two years later, Spain's attempt at a reconquest of Mexico led to the expulsion of more than seven thousand Spaniards—the lion's share of the merchants of early independent Mexico. Although many of them returned in the following decades, the exodus contributed to the deepening economic crisis.¹⁰

United States immigration proved even more ominous for Mexico. Recognizing the specter of United States territorial expansion, late colonial authorities had invited English-speaking Roman Catholic settlers to live in the sparsely populated northeastern province of T^ejas. In 1824, the national government of Guadalupe Victoria renewed this invitation, although signs already pointed to an unregulated influx of Protestant immigrants from the southern United States. By 1833, the situation had gotten out of hand. More than thirty thousand English speakers in Texas, a majority of whom did not respect Mexican law, confronted approximately nine thousand Spanish speakers. Not only did these settlers outnumber the Mexicans in Texas, but United States citizens also accounted for the majority of all foreign-born residents of Mexico. The Texas secession and the subsequent war with the United States demonstrated to the Mexican elites that the threat of United States landgrabbing outweighed any possible benefits of immigration as long as political instability continued. Ironically, the annexations also demonstrated the viability of immigration, as the United States soon succeeded where Mexico had failed. After the war, the United States funneled hundreds of thousands of people, many of them immigrants, into the old Mexican northwest. Unfortunately for Mexico, these areas (and particularly California and Texas) constituted the promising, exploitable frontier that could have invited widespread immigration.¹¹

The presence of a Guatemalan minority in the southeastern state of Chiapas constituted the mirror image of the Texas question. The westernmost province of the old Captaincy of Guatemala, Chiapas had not joined the United Provinces of the Center of America that had

emerged from the collapse of Spanish colonial authority. While the other provinces had joined Guatemala City in forming the new federation, the creoles in the highlands of Chiapas had requested annexation by Mexico. Encouraged by this show of support, the Mexican government incorporated Chiapas against the wishes of the state's largest city, Tuxtla Gutiérrez. While a slim majority among the elite favored annexation by Mexico, a considerable minority considered themselves Central Americans. After decades of complications, the Mexican government imposed its will with military force in 1842, several years after the disintegration of the United Provinces. For decades thereafter, thousands of Chiapanecos still thought of themselves as Guatemalans and remained a dissatisfied element on Mexico's southeastern border. Although the Mexican and Guatemalan governments signed a boundary treaty in 1882, the issue of the Guatemalans in Chiapas would not die: since the treaty, tens of thousands of Guatemalans have fled to southeastern Mexico to escape a succession of brutal military dictatorships.¹²

The fourth group of immigrants in Mexico deserves some detailed discussion, because the trade conquistadors soon acquired an influence disproportionate to their small numbers. Seeking to advance the economic interests of their families, most of the trade conquistadors came from the upper and middle classes of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain. Armed with considerable investment capital, they soon dominated mining, money lending, and wholesale trading. By 1850, a small group of British investors owned most of the privately held mines. Moreover, the Europeans took advantage of the prejudice of the Mexican upper classes against banking and commerce to seize control over those sectors as well. Whereas investors from London and Paris founded Mexico's first modern banks, French immigrants from the mountain town of Barcelonnette (whose humble origin made them an important exception) as well as Germans and Spaniards owned most of the warehouse stores that formed the hubs of an extensive wholesale network. These bankers, merchants, and miners far outnumbered the "traditional immigrants" who dominated the migrant flow elsewhere in the Americas: peasant farmers, industrial workers, and intellectuals fleeing the stifling political climate in early nineteenth-century Europe. Although no exact figures are available prior to the first national census of 1895, then, European immigration to Mexico resembled a trickle of entrepreneurs and middle-class fortune seekers rather than a stream of lower-class immigrants in search of jobs and land. Even though Mexico also received some poor and lower middle-class migrants, it never looked the

part of the “promised land” that would offer a chance to the persecuted and downtrodden to start over. Instead, it remained a forbidding place for most newcomers, one where opportunity only beckoned with money or (in the case of the Spaniards and the Barcelonnettes) fortuitous family ties.¹³

Largely an urban phenomenon, the immigration of trade conquistadors led to the creation of unassimilated expatriate communities.¹⁴ The trade conquistadors usually came as young, single males with a limited personal stake in the host society. With the exception of the Spaniards, most of the European immigrants considered themselves temporary residents rather than immigrants. Since most businessmen anticipated a stay in Mexico of relatively short duration, they sent their profits home rather than commit significant capital to the host society. They usually did not take families with them; instead, the typical merchant arrived as a bachelor in his early to mid-twenties, often following the call of a relative or friend who had already settled in Mexico. As a result, three out of four of the immigrants were male, and almost all of the women were married.¹⁵ The newcomers also did everything they could to retain their native culture. Sharing the predominant view that “whiter” was better, they consorted primarily with their compatriots and segregated themselves from the society around them in the process. Many of them even chose professionals from their own culture: for example, Adolfo Schmidlein, the personal physician of the unfortunate Emperor Maximilian, attended to the needs of the Germans and Austrians in Mexico City and Puebla.¹⁶ This self-segregation assumed three forms. Most importantly, foreign residents avoided private contact and intermarriage with Mexicans. While the Spaniards frequently married into the Mexican elite, the other Europeans usually waited until after their return to select a mate. Second, they stuck to people from their own social class, religious denomination, and profession. In the absence of associations such as schools, churches, athletic clubs and beneficent associations, the sojourner communities did not yet become diasporas in the true sense. Third, the trade conquistadors did nothing to make their stay in Mexico appear permanent. They did not invest in local manufacturing or real estate, and only a few hundred of them sought Mexican citizenship, a step that would have deprived them of the recourse of diplomatic protection.¹⁷

Linguistic conventions conspired with these factors to discourage acculturation, as the Spanish language does not lend itself easily to denote hyphenated identities such as the ones common in English, German, or

French.¹⁸ In Spanish, a woman may be either a “francesa” or a “mexicana,” but never a “francesa-mexicana,” and even the more graceful “franco-mexicana” sounds more cumbersome to Mexican ears than “franco-mexicaine” does to French ones. Likewise, the son of a German immigrant would refer to himself as a “Deutschmexikaner,” or German-Mexican, in German, but he would face the stark choice between “alemán” and “mexicano” in Spanish. When foreign immigrants came to Mexico, they thus faced a cultural divide difficult to overcome: one was either a Mexican or a foreigner, but not a hyphenated product of both worlds. This dichotomy between “Mexican” and “foreign” even extended to succeeding generations, so that most children of non-Spanish speaking parents still considered themselves foreign.

Moreover, creole efforts at maintaining their dominance in a multiethnic society established constructions of racial, ethnic, and national identity that were not conducive to the assimilation of immigrants. While a caste-like division between the Spanish and Indian worlds had marked early New Spain, miscegenation soon produced a growing group of mestizos who challenged the established division between the *república de españoles* and the *república de indios*. As the mestizos assumed their position in the middle of the Mexican social pyramid, class and cultural distinctions began to replace racial categories. In the process, race became a matter of money (as one of Mexico’s oldest adages goes, “money whitens”). In the absence of a rigid system of racial categories, the creoles asserted their superiority by imagining themselves as the representatives of a Spanish, Roman Catholic nation on Mexican soil as embodied in the Virgin of Guadalupe.¹⁹ Even as the creoles defied *peninsular* power in identifying themselves as “americanos” instead of Spaniards, they remained mindful of the social dangers of relinquishing the association with the Spanish heritage.²⁰ In this view, all those not of Spanish culture (“Indians” as well as foreigners) remained outsiders, while the mestizos gained acceptance as Mexicans by rising to economic and military significance during Mexico’s bloody history of the nineteenth century.

Finally, there were powerful reasons for foreigners not to seek assimilation into Mexican society. Most significantly, many of them enjoyed considerable power and wealth precisely due to their status as outsiders. In addition, popular xenophobia resulting from European and United States interventions in Mexico contrasted with a widespread xenophilia that allowed the trade conquistadors to feel comfortable in their cultural niches. Centuries of Spanish colonialism had imbued natives and mesti-

zos alike with an abject respect for Europeans and, later, white North Americans. For their part, many elite Mexicans self-deprecatingly thought of their country as inferior to Europe, the continent they regarded as representing the highest level of civilization. The Mexicans held the French and the Germans in particularly high regard: in the words of a United States novelist, the Mexicans “loath the Americans . . . hate the Spaniards, distrust the English, admire the French, and love the Germans.”²¹ As the nineteenth century progressed, the strong positivist orientation of the Mexican upper classes only accentuated this trend.²²

After 1855, the triumph of the Reforma Liberals brought this xenophilia to the fore. Ironically, the loss of land to the United States shifted the consensus within the Mexican government toward an acceptance of immigration. Seeking to emulate the United States economic success that the Liberals believed to be based on yeoman farming, the Ley Lerdo of 1856 disentailed the lands of the Church and invited Europeans to colonize these vast territories. A partial rejection of both the Spanish and the indigenous heritage, the ideology of reformers such as Benito Juárez emphasized immigration as a way of infusing the mestizo and indigenous population of Mexico with such Protestant virtues as thrift, the love of hard work, and dependability. At a time when the Know-Nothing movement revealed mounting xenophobia in the United States, the Liberals hoped to exploit this opportunity to invite more immigrants to come to rural Mexico. Nonetheless, they could not persuade more than a few thousand immigrants to make Mexico their new home, as civil war and foreign intervention once again ravaged the country in the following ten years.²³ Likewise, the Austrian emperor Maximilian, a tragic figure in Mexican history, only generated a short-lived interest in Mexico as an immigrant society.

Nineteenth-century immigration to Mexico therefore represented a special, but not unique case in the Americas. In the Southern Cone and the United States, most immigrants were migrants of need, as they fled persecution or poverty in their home country. The trade conquistadors who came to Mexico, on the other hand, were migrants of choice, because they desired to get rich quickly in order to return to a position in their father's business. Nevertheless, the Mexican case is not as peculiar as it seems, as most of the Andean and Central American countries followed a similar pattern of “qualitative” rather than “quantitative” immigration.²⁴ Moreover, as the example of one prominent family demonstrates, the quantitative impact of mass migration in other countries obscures the fact that a more qualitative elite and middle-class migration

targeted those places as well. When Robert Böker, the son of a hardware exporter from Remscheid, Germany, arrived in Mexico in November 1865, he came with a United States passport acquired during his association with his uncle's company in New York City. One of his brothers soon moved to Melbourne, Australia; and a few decades later, a cousin opened an import business in Buenos Aires.²⁵ As this example shows, nineteenth-century Mexico formed part of a global economy characterized by the existence of "trade diasporas" and family networks that often encompassed three or four continents.²⁶

THE ELUSIVE DREAM OF A "WHITER" MEXICO

If the Reforma Liberals had failed in their dream of a nation of immigrants, the long-lived dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) ushered in a new era in the history of Mexican immigration. During the Porfiriato, the Mexican government sponsored the influx of foreign capital and immigrants as the key to its project of state- and nation-building. Decades after Argentina's Juan Bautista Alberdi postulated that "to govern is to populate," Díaz and his charges aggressively advertised Mexico as a land of unlimited opportunities for immigrants.²⁷ The Porfirians hoped that immigrants and their descendants would play a key role in a program of modernization. In particular, immigration could help attract the foreign investment needed to build up Mexico's infrastructure. Moreover, the Díaz regime sought to settle what remained of the Mexican north, an underpopulated, mostly arid expanse with tenuous links to the capital. The Porfirians believed that they could best protect that region from United States annexation by economic development. Finally, Díaz joined his colleagues in Brazil and Argentina in viewing immigration as a way of "whitening" a heavily miscegenated population.²⁸

The idea of whitening held a different meaning for the Porfirian elite than for their counterparts north of the border. In the United States, whitening involved the biological "improvement" of the racial stock by adding western and northern European components. The Anglo-Saxon concept of whitening thus followed the social Darwinist thought of Herbert Spencer: the notion that race and sex, as determined by physical differences, determined an individual's fitness in the struggle for survival. In Mexico, on the other hand, whitening allowed the infusion of European money, education, and customs into a countryside populated by supposedly indolent and ignorant indigenous people. The Mexican

idea of whitening, then, involved the thought of French positivist Auguste Comte more so than that of Spencer: being white was a stage of civilization rather than a biological condition. Itself composed of a mix of mestizos and creoles, the *científico* faction that dominated the Porfirian inner circle could not embrace a philosophy that would have implied its own racial inferiority. Instead, to *científicos* such as the influential education undersecretary Justo Sierra, white immigration served as a civilizing influence, and ultimately as a step toward the eventual cultural and racial fusion of the creole, mestizo, and indigenous people.²⁹

The Porfirians therefore inaugurated a new way of looking at the world outside Mexico. Combining the Reforma precepts of free enterprise with ruthless repression of dissent, Porfirian modernization constituted a response to momentous changes in the global economy. The rapid expansion of industrial production and the construction of efficient patterns of global exchange assigned to Mexico the role of a raw material producer in the emerging global division of labor. Countries that fell into this category not only furnished the industrializing economies of the North Atlantic with metals, minerals, and foodstuffs; they also became targets for investment capital as well as important markets for surplus industrial products. Díaz and his allies believed that the surplus capital generated by such export-led development would eventually lead to the industrialization of Mexico.³⁰ Porfirian modernization also involved a change of elite political ideas. By linking economic progress with authoritarian rule, the Mexican elite modeled Mexico after the French Third Republic.³¹ Porfirian thought was a persuasion: a widespread notion that modernity had arrived with don Porfirio and his advisers, and the optimistic idea that Mexico would come to share the limelight with the world's most "advanced" nations.³²

Without a doubt, foreign residents of Mexico reached the high point of their presence in the Porfirian era.³³ Immigrants and their descendants were well represented in the Díaz cabinet: don Porfirio's long-time Secretary of Finance, José Y. Limantour, came from a Barcelonnette family, and Secretary of Foreign Relations Ignacio Mariscal was married to a woman from Baltimore. The *peninsulares*, who at thirty thousand individuals had completed their recovery from the expulsions of the 1820s at the time of the 1910 census, married into Mexico City's most distinguished creole families. Even more importantly, the trade conquistadors maintained and expanded their dominant position in Mexican commerce, and some of them even ventured into manufacturing. In particular, French textile manufacturers formed a powerful industrial

TABLE 1
Selected Foreign Nationals in the Mexican Censuses, 1895–1980 (in thousands)

	1895	1900	1910	1921	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
British	3	3	5	4	5	4	2	2	1	2
Canadians	—	—	—	—	8	*	6	5	3	3
Chinese	1	3	13	14	19	7	6	5	2	*
French	4	4	5	4	5	3	3	4	3	4
Germans	2	3	4	4	7	4	5	7	5	5
Guatemalans	14	5	22	14	17	8	8	9	7	4
Japanese	—	—	2	2	4	2	2	2	2	3
Lebanese	—	—	—	—	4	4	5	4	2	2
Spaniards	13	16	30	29	47	29	37	50	31	32
US citizens	12	15	21	11	12	19*	83	98	97	157

*misleading or missing census data

Source: Mexican Census Records

conglomerate in Orizaba, Veracruz, and Spanish merchants joined influential creole families in the northern city of Monterrey in setting up the beginnings of a steel industry.³⁴

Encouraged by the impact of the existing foreigners in Mexico, the Díaz regime pursued a three-pronged strategy in order to lure more immigrants. The first aspect of this strategy consisted in assistance to rural colonization projects. To encourage rural immigration, the Porfirians sent agents to Europe to promote a sanitized version of Mexican reality. The most important of these agents, German-born Heinrich Lemcke, traveled through Europe with a pamphlet that portrayed Mexico as a country with wide open spaces, abundant farmland, and a scarcity of people to work the land other than what Lemcke described as the somnolent, lazy, and superstitious “Indians.” It promised generous government subsidies to prospective settler colonies, including tax breaks and the provision of needed infrastructure. In 1882, much fanfare accompanied the launching of the most significant of these colonies, six settlements that totaled more than two thousand six hundred Italians. A few decades later, four of these colonies had disappeared, as most of the Italians had either returned home or moved to the United States.³⁵

The second strategy entailed the recruitment of foreign workers and professionals, an issue that dovetailed with the influx of foreign investments. When British and United States companies built the railroad lines that connected the United States border with Mexico City and the

major mining centers, a large number of Chinese and Italian coolies moved south from the United States or from their countries of origin to do the actual work. Moreover, foreign mining and oil companies brought their own engineers and overseers, individuals who were paid many times as much as the Mexicans working next to them.³⁶

Finally, a reform of immigration law that suited the needs of foreign capitalists and immigrant farmers alike constituted the third prong of Porfirian immigration policy. In 1883, the Mexican government passed legislation allowing foreigners the right to own land and subsoil resources. The infamous “Law of Fallow Land” permitted private investors to scoop up property declared “public,” much of it land taken from indigenous communities. Three years later, the “Law of Foreignness and Naturalization” established *ius sanguinis* as the guiding principle of Mexican citizenship for the children of foreign nationals. Although the Mexican Constitution of 1857 espoused the principle of *ius soli*—the idea that the place of birth determines one’s nationality—the 1886 law allowed Mexican-born children of foreigners to retain their father’s citizenship. In theory, the immigration code encouraged assimilation, as both those children and their father became Mexicans unless the father declared that he wanted to retain his original passport. In practice, however, most foreigners expressly declared against naturalization, and their children hence acquired the citizenship of their father.³⁷

What was thus curiously absent from all of these measures was a plan to assimilate foreign nationals, or at least to make them into what one Porfirian thinker called “the new creoles.”³⁸ Indeed, the sizable foreign communities in the capital became more rather than less isolated from Mexican society as the Porfiriato progressed. In the 1890s, these communities became permanent and large enough that they acquired a critical mass. The members of these mature diasporas soon began to establish institutions such as schools, churches, and social clubs that allowed them to raise their families in the host country. Correspondingly, the wall that had always separated these communities from Mexican society grew much higher. By 1900, the wealthiest and most conspicuous foreign diasporas in Mexico City—the “American,” the British, the French, the German, and the Spanish—had become enclaves, or “colonies.” In the words of a United States sociologist who grew up in the Mexican capital, a colony consisted of “those who seek to maintain their own racial and cultural integrity although living in an alien land which has an independent government.”³⁹ This effort involved a sense of superiority over the host society, the spirit of belonging to a close-knit community,

and a “territorial consciousness:”⁴⁰ the notion that the colony constitutes an integral part of the home country even though its members live in a different society.

If immigration thus resulted in unassimilated ethnic enclaves rather than the whitening of Mexico, the numbers were even more disappointing. While direct foreign investment into Mexico grew by a factor of twenty between 1880 and 1910, this flood of new capital did not presage immigration, as the owners of much of the money remained in Europe and the United States. According to the first Mexican censuses of 1895, 1900, and 1910, the number of foreign-born immigrants doubled during these fifteen years—a far cry from the exponential growth of foreign-born residents of Argentina, Canada, and the United States. Immigrants founded only thirty-seven rural colonies in the Díaz era, and most of them failed due to lack of government support, indigenous resistance, and results that did not satisfy the inhabitants.⁴¹ The failure of the rural colonies demonstrated once again that Mexico was not a nation of immigrants, but instead a country in which a select few well-connected newcomers could make a great impact.

Moreover, the crowd that chose Mexico as their destination during the Porfiriato proved to be more socially and ethnically diverse than their adventurous yet relatively prosperous predecessors who had arrived during Mexico’s time of troubles earlier in the nineteenth century. Most of the newcomers from Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain came not as trade conquistadors, but virtually penniless. Even poorer were the Guatemalans, refugees from the incessant warfare in Central America. Most importantly, however, Asians became Mexico’s fastest-growing immigrant group. While the number of Europeans grew from about twenty-six thousand to forty-seven thousand between the 1895 and 1910 censuses, an increase that matched the growth of the United States and Guatemalan populations during the same period, the number of Asians catapulted from fifteen hundred to twenty thousand.⁴² Seventy percent of this dramatic increase was due to Chinese arrivals diverted south in an age when the United States government adopted increasing strictures on Asian immigration. In particular, the Chinese played a pivotal role in the rural areas of the northwestern state of Sonora, where they came to dominate the retail and money lending sectors. Estimated at 4,486 individuals in 1910, they became the largest foreign colony in that state.⁴³ Meanwhile, Japanese immigrants settled in the Pacific port cities as well as in Chiapas.

The Porfirian experiment at “whitening” failed for a variety of rea-

sons. As land and work remained abundant in North America and the Southern Cone, newcomers continued to flock to these traditional targets of immigration, beckoned by relatives and friends who already lived in those areas. By contrast, anyone who had read traveler accounts of Mexico knew that Lemcke's notion of wide-open spaces of fertile farmland was a myth. Alexander von Humboldt's *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, Clément Bertie-Marriott's *Un Parisien au Mexique*, and Fanny Chambers Gooch's *Face to Face with the Mexicans* all portrayed Mexico as a land lacking in foreign expertise, but not manpower. Moreover, the Díaz regime often did not even fulfill its promise of assistance. The disentanglement of millions of acres of church and peasant land led not to the development of a rural middle class that would have proved inviting to foreign immigrants, but to the enrichment of wealthy hacienda owners and the impoverishment of the Mexican peasantry. In the overly dichotomous view of one historian, Porfirian policies produced a chasm between the "modern" city and the "traditional" countryside—an area that remained neglected and undercapitalized—and therefore a poor choice for a prospective immigrant.⁴⁴ Discouraged actively by the European governments as well as the press, the colonization schemes only attracted small groups of colonists to Mexico. For example, only a few hundred Germans followed the call for rural immigrants.⁴⁵ Finally, the Díaz regime itself became leery of foreign influence in Mexico: in the last years before his fall, don Porfirio nationalized the Mexican railroads, signed the first restrictive immigration legislation of his rule, and developed an anti-imperialist foreign policy.⁴⁶ In the end, the failure of the immigration project highlighted the deficiencies of the Porfirian economic model, a model that had vastly increased the foreign economic influence in Mexico without leading to a substantial growth in the immigrant population, or, indeed, to more prosperity for all.

REVOLUTION, NATIONALISM, AND NATURAL POPULATION GROWTH

The period since 1910 has witnessed the end of pro-immigration sentiment in Mexico and the beginning of an era in which the Mexican government has focused on the natural growth of the population. The Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), the Great Depression, and the two World Wars combined to discredit the notion that European immigration could solve the country's woes. In addition, the Asian communi-

ties—and particularly the Chinese—found themselves racialized and oppressed in an atmosphere of open xenophobia.

Accompanied by calls for land reform and an end to foreign privileges, the Revolution reminded the foreigners of their status as outsiders. As such, they became targets of a wide variety of social movements that agreed on limiting foreign influence in Mexico. In 1907, a serious economic crisis had highlighted the privileged position of foreign workers and professionals.⁴⁷ The recession spurred on two responses to the foreign presence that had long simmered in Porfirian Mexico: elite economic nationalism, and popular xenophobia.⁴⁸ While few historians concur with John M. Hart's claim that the Revolution was primarily a war of national liberation against the *gringos* and other outsiders,⁴⁹ most foreigners in Mexico feared conditions resembling those of the xenophobic Boxer rebellion in China.⁵⁰ Although these fears proved exaggerated, Chinese and Spanish immigrants in rural areas found themselves subject to lynching, robberies, and other reprisals by an angry populace that targeted lenders and petty traders. Well armed and well protected, the trade conquistadors in the cities emerged relatively unscathed, as did foreign agribusiness and mining interests. But immigration now gave way to an exodus of foreign residents: according to the 1921 census, the total number of foreigners dropped by 7 percent to 108,800, a figure that matched, percentage-wise, the population decline among all inhabitants of Mexico. Europeans and United States citizens led the way in the decline, while Asians, virtually excluded from immigration to the United States, continued to grow in number.⁵¹

Immigrants in Mexico soon realized that the xenophile rhetoric of the Porfiriato was a thing of the past. As early as April 1914, the United States occupation of the port of Veracruz produced shrill denunciations on the part of both the incumbent dictator, Victoriano Huerta, and one of his main opponents, Venustiano Carranza. More than two years later, when Carranza's victorious faction convened the Constitutional Convention after the defeat of both Huerta and Pancho Villa, the convention met in the shadow of the Punitive Expedition, United States President Woodrow Wilson's feeble attempt to punish Pancho Villa for his attack on Columbus, New Mexico. Not surprisingly, workers, professionals, and intellectuals with first-hand experience with the United States presence pursued a nationalist agenda designed to end the easy ride of foreign interests. This agenda led to the inclusion of three articles that made Mexico the first nation with a constitution that strove to protect its citizens from foreign exploitation. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution

declared land and mineral resources the patrimony of the nation. The article also required all foreign investors to forsake the diplomatic protection of their home country that had often resulted in significant advantages over Mexican companies. To give this provision more bite, Article 33 threatened recalcitrant foreigners with expulsion. Finally, Article 123 guaranteed labor the right to collective bargaining as well as the right to strike, and it outlawed preferential treatment of foreign workers.⁵² Nonetheless, foreign economic interests remained dominant in Mexico, and United States direct investment doubled between 1910 and 1920 despite the exodus of foreign-born residents.⁵³

In the twenties and thirties, the reform agenda of the postrevolutionary rulers posed new challenges to foreign immigrants. Although Mexico never deviated from a capitalist path of development, the governments of Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles paid lip service to the provisions of the new constitution—a rhetoric that often alarmed foreign governments and citizens alike.⁵⁴ In addition, foreign entrepreneurs and Mexicans alike feared the possibility of outright expropriation, and, secondarily, the prospect of debilitating strikes, protracted labor disputes, high taxation, and stifling government regulations.⁵⁵ Obregón's tenure witnessed the rapid growth of syndicalism in Mexico. In response to the perceived threat of an alliance between state and labor, foreign merchants began to found chambers of commerce along national lines that (unlike individual entrepreneurs) could appeal for diplomatic protection.⁵⁶ For his part, Calles allied himself even more firmly with urban labor, and his effort to regulate the foreign-owned oil industry provoked a grave crisis with Great Britain and the United States. Even as a more conservative *jefe máximo*, when he ruled Mexico from behind the scenes (1928–34), Calles pursued a campaign to eliminate the influence of the “foreign-controlled” Catholic church in Mexico. Finally, just as foreign entrepreneurs became convinced that the worst lay behind them, along came President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). The Cardenistas built a populist state with the support of workers' and peasant organizations, and they embarked on a reform program that ended with the distribution of forty-two million acres of former hacienda land to peasants and the expropriation of the oil industry. Despite these measures, the Mexican government steered clear of most foreign investments, and international investors continued to pour money into Mexico.

Equally ominous to immigrants were efforts of the postrevolutionary governments to promote a program of cultural and racial nationalism that could bring Mexico's rural population into allegiance with the state.

In particular, the concept of *indigenismo* sought to redeem and appreciate the heritage of Mexico's indigenous populations. The goal of the *indigenistas* was the incorporation of the "Indians" into Mexican society rather than their restoration of their lands at the expense of Mexican hacendados and privileged foreigners.⁵⁷ In the words of Manuel Gamio, a prominent member of the Mexican government, the postrevolutionary regimes were "forging a fatherland."⁵⁸ Another government figure, Secretary of Education José Vasconcelos, followed in Justo Sierra's footsteps when he talked about a "cosmic," mestizo race, a race superior to both its European and indigenous components.⁵⁹ Yet another intellectual close to the government, the famous muralist Diego Rivera, painted a Marxist interpretation of the Mexican Revolution on the walls of the Palacio Nacional. On the mural, brooding, angry peasants and workers threaten to jump out of the walls to attack the avaricious capitalists and Spanish conquistadors alike.

These efforts to redefine "mexicanidad," or Mexicanness, occurred against a backdrop of mounting xenophobia that, in its most extreme manifestations, led to a bloody anti-Chinese campaign in Baja California and Sonora, and anti-Semitic demonstrations in the capital. If Mexicans had invented the cosmic race to forge a nation-state that could lay claim to the creoles, the mestizos, and the indigenous people alike, they racialized the Asian and Middle Eastern minorities in the process, who became second-class immigrants. The cosmic race had proven to be not so cosmic, but rather Indo-European, after all.⁶⁰

This rhetoric aside, foreign immigration into Mexico continued at its fastest clip ever during the 1920s. As ever more stringent immigration restrictions diverted migrant flows away from the United States, Mexico became the new home of tens of thousands of mostly lower-class immigrants. Many of the new immigrants were of a new breed for Mexico, as East Europeans, Arabs, and Indians joined the traditional countries of origin. In addition, Obregón invited a group of German-speaking Mennonites disenchanted with their life in Canada to settle in a remote area of the northern state of Chihuahua, the home state of his archenemy Villa. By the late 1920s, almost 10,000 Mennonites had arrived in Chihuahua. All told, the 1930 census counted almost 160,000 foreigners in Mexico, up from barely above 100,000 nine years before.⁶¹

Soon thereafter, however, the Great Depression, which led to the involuntary repatriation of thousands of Mexican workers from the United States, ushered in measures to limit this surge in lower-class immigration. The repatriated Mexicans aggravated the effects of the depression

in Mexico and led to efforts by the postrevolutionary governments to limit the further growth of the foreign colonies. In demand because of their potential to enrich Mexico immediately, propertied Europeans and United States citizens continued to enjoy an open door in Mexico. By contrast, the new legislation sought to keep out indigent immigrants, and it closed the door on the Chinese and several other immigrant groups.⁶² The specter of totalitarianism prompted the Mexican government to include humanitarian concerns in this policy of selective immigration. Between 1937 and 1948, more than eighteen thousand Spanish Republicans arrived in Mexico on the run from the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. The decision to admit these left-leaning Spaniards paid dividends, as Mexico received a group of white and overwhelmingly educated immigrants, many of them scholars and artists. Although marginalized equally by the conservative Spanish colony and anti-*gachupín* Mexicans, this group achieved an important position in post-war Mexican society. Republican Spaniards founded the Colegio de México, the country's finest academic institution devoted to research and teaching in history, literature, and the social sciences, and others enriched the life of virtually every major Mexican university and cultural institution.⁶³ Less important in quantitative terms but equally active in Mexican cultural life was the group of Jewish immigrants who fled from Hitler's forces in continental Europe.⁶⁴

The Mexican government also made a half-hearted, but vain attempt to encourage the assimilation of the foreign residents. In 1933, a law imposed *ius soli* on the children of immigrants, and three years later, Cárdenas signed a law that promoted the miscegenation of the foreign communities by waiving immigration restrictions for those who married women of "Mexican origin."⁶⁵ These efforts at assimilation, however, ultimately failed. Despite the talk of *indigenismo* and a cosmic race, Mexico remained a land of unhyphenated identities, in which one was either "Mexican" or "Indian," and either "Mexican" or "foreign." Both the disadvantaged indigenous societies and the privileged foreign colonies remained separate from Spanish-speaking Mexico, and in the absence of a hyphen, the road to assimilation led only over the chasm defined by the dichotomy of *mexicano* and *extranjero*. Indeed, the revolutionary rhetoric widened rather than narrowed this chasm, and it encouraged many foreign immigrants with Mexican-born children to reinforce the structures of self-segregation.⁶⁶

While the Mexican government could not assimilate the foreign colonies, the internal cohesion of some of these colonies began to fray at the

edges. Already, the Barcelonnettes had seen their glory days slip away with the departure of the Francophile Porfirians, and the British colony had likewise faded into the background. Beginning in the twenties, other colonies confronted a different threat: the disunity brought about by social differentiation and political conflict. The conservative and elitist German and Spanish merchant families, most of whom lived in the glory of an imperial past and backed the Franco and Hitler regimes, soon found themselves threatened by the influx of left-leaning anti-Fascist refugees.⁶⁷

World War Two gave a further impetus to the dissolution of the foreign ethnic enclaves by leading to efforts to curtail the activities of the German, Italian, and Japanese in Mexico. During the thirties, the three Axis dictators had mobilized their citizens, and even many of the Mexicans of German, Italian, and Japanese descent. Due to Mexico's proximity to the United States, the United States government did not tolerate what it labeled "Fifth Column" activities. Even before Pearl Harbor, FBI agents were at work against Axis infiltration, the United States government issued a Black List of "enemy nationals" in Mexico and the rest of Latin America, and the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt pressured Mexican President Manuel Avila Camacho to join the Allied camp.⁶⁸ After the German sinking of two Mexican vessels resulted in the declaration of war on the Axis powers, the Mexican government seized all companies belonging to ethnic Germans, Italians, and Japanese, and the Avila Camacho regime also jailed hundreds of Axis sailors and presumed spies.⁶⁹

In the wake of this process, the only foreign community that continued alive and well was the so-called "American colony." In a larger sense, the Americanization of Mexico proved that the Revolution was in many ways just as receptive to foreign influences as the Porfiriato had been. During the thirties, United States citizens—already the largest group of foreign residents—replaced the Chinese as the fastest-growing immigrant community. As part of this migration, United States cultural pilgrims, fascinated by Mexico's Revolution and rich cultural heritage, came to complement their country's economic influence. In the interwar years, what Helen Delpar has called the "enormous vogue of things Mexican" stood juxtaposed with an equally enormous vogue of things "American," as returning workers, the radio and motion pictures brought United States culture closer to Mexico.⁷⁰ Even though Mexico had redefined its relationship with its immigrants during and after the Revolution, the upheaval had led to an increase rather than a decrease in the

United States role in Mexico. According to one estimate, the number of United States citizens in Mexico quadrupled to forty-eight thousand during the 1930s, a figure far higher than the census data of 1940, which failed to determine the national origin of more than seventy-two thousand immigrants, counted in the survey.⁷¹

By the forties, the Mexicans had learned that their country—unlike the vast neighbor to the north—was a net exporter rather than an importer of migrants. Every year, thousands of Mexicans packed up and moved north of the Rio Grande, an exodus that dwarfed the trifling number of newcomers. Moreover, the Depression-era repatriation of Mexicans had demonstrated that most United States citizens considered Mexican labor in the United States at best expedient, and at worst undesirable.⁷² Not surprisingly, many Mexicans came to the conclusion that their government needed to assist the native-born rather than the foreign-born population.

Such was the background of the 1947 “Ley General de Población,” which ushered in the final phase in the history of Mexico and its immigrants. Emphasizing the natural growth of the Mexican people, this law tore down the last vestiges of the “whitening” ideology. The law stipulated public health and literacy programs designed to reduce the steep mortality rates of Mexican children, and it made immigration a secondary priority. It also contained incentives for Mexican workers in the United States—often called “lost sons” in their home country—to return to Mexico.⁷³ The law highlighted Mexico’s predicament as a newly industrializing society. As elsewhere in Latin America, the scarcity of manufactured products during the world war had jumpstarted a national import-substitution program to offset the declining terms of trade for raw materials.⁷⁴ But Mexico remained a predominantly rural country, and the age of internal migration to Mexico City and the provincial capitals was still in its beginnings. The “Ley General de Población” therefore constituted an admission that Mexico could only find enough workers through natural growth, and not through immigration.

Just as importantly, the process of assimilation picked up steam amidst the process of industrialization. Particularly in the larger cities, where foreign colonies had lived a life of self-segregation, the postwar decades witnessed a blurring of the sharp lines between the colonies and Mexican society at large. To begin with, industrialization produced a formidable Mexican middle class, whose members did not accept the artificial barriers existing between foreign enclaves and Mexican society. Conversely, the descendants of the old trade conquistadors progressively

lost economic influence to multinational corporations and the Mexican bourgeoisie. As more Mexican families began to enjoy a higher income, many of them enrolled their children in the schools of the foreign colonies that enjoyed an excellent reputation for their stringent curriculum and their bilingual education. As the percentage of Mexicans in these schools increased, the use of Spanish among the students increased as well.⁷⁵ They also began to frequent the tennis and swim clubs of the foreign colonies, and the German club in particular has become so thoroughly Mexicanized that of fourteen current executive officers of the Club, only four speak German as their native language. In addition, following the lead of the United States, Mexico began to produce mass culture appealing to the children and grandchildren of foreign immigrants. When young Mexicans used the new mass media to articulate their own version of the wave of counterculture made in the United States, their peers from foreign families discovered that it was “hip” to be Mexican.⁷⁶ Finally, within the colonies, the arrival of employees of multinational concerns marginalized the old merchant families. As most of these newcomers planned a relatively brief stay in Mexico City, the new arrivals further fragmented an already divided community.

After 1973, a most restrictive immigration policy furthered this process of assimilation. The immigration reform of that year manifested the end of the nineteenth-century policy of open borders, and the conclusion of a series of immigration reforms that had sought to exclude first Asian, then poor, and finally almost all immigrants. Soon, the rapid growth of the Mexican population and the increasing clout of the middle sectors—the prime competition for foreign immigrants—made the government clamp down further on immigration. After the immigration reform of 1973, which responded to an acute economic crisis in Mexico accompanied by widespread unemployment, newcomers only qualified for temporary visas, and obtaining permanent work authorization in Mexico became more difficult than receiving a “green card” for the United States. By the late seventies, only refugees from the South and Central American military dictatorships were granted immigrant visas on a regular basis. United States retirees, tourists, and students received permits that did not authorize them to work, and most of the rest of the foreign population of Mexico consisted of employees of multinational corporations on temporary work permits, as well as those immigrants who had previously obtained permanent residency.⁷⁷

This restrictive immigration policy made the Mexican government an easy target for charges of hypocrisy. At a time when Mexico was clos-

ing its own borders, how could it expect the United States to continue to serve as a safety valve for its own demographic, economic and social problems? For this reason, the recent administrations of Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo revisited the issue of immigration, and President-elect Fox appears to favor a return to a more liberal immigration policy.⁷⁸

Not surprisingly, immigrants who followed the traditional patterns of migration outlined in this essay form a minority of Mexico's foreign-born population today. When multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola, Nissan, and Volkswagen began production in Mexico, the old merchant families lost in importance. Some, like the Tron family, the owners of the famous "El Palacio de Hierro" department stores and once one of the most illustrious of the Barcelonnette clans, were bought out by Mexican capitalists who made money in the postwar industrialization project. Others, like the aforementioned Bökers, still own their century-old business, but have seen their market share decline in the face of direct marketing, street vending, and United States-style malls.⁷⁹

By the time of the 1990 census, more than 340,000 foreign nationals lived in a country of eighty-five million people. Numbering almost 200,000, United States citizens amounted to 55 percent of the total, but most of them were either employees of multinational corporations, students, or retirees without an economic stake in Mexico. Including a sizable group of Guatemalans, most of whom had come to flee the Central American wars of the 1980s, more than two out of three immigrants came from Mexico's immediate neighbors.⁸⁰ More than ever before, then, Mexico has become truly integrated into a North American migratory system. Not only does a significant percentage of the population live and work in Canada and the United States, but the makeup of its immigrant population reflects its geographical location as well.

CONCLUSION

As a receiving country, Mexico has played a marginal role in the great migrations of the last two centuries. Although rich in natural resources and economic opportunities, it was poor in available land and jobs for lower-class immigrants. Not even the Porfirian propaganda—persuasive as it was in luring foreign investment—could convince more than a tiny fraction of all Europeans who embarked for the Americas to try their luck in Mexico. As a result, immigration tended to concentrate either in certain areas of the country (e.g., the Chinese in Baja California

and Sonora) or in selected sectors of the economy, like the Europeans in commerce.

Nonetheless, the few immigrants who came to Mexico left a significant impact. The trade conquistadors of the nineteenth century dominated banking, mining, and trade, and they later pioneered the industrialization of Mexico. In the twentieth century, revolutionaries challenged the economic advantages of Europeans and North Americans, without dislodging most of the foreigners from their positions of privilege. Only the Chinese found themselves virtually defenseless in the face of a xenophobia that targeted them more than any other national group. Only since the Great Depression has the national bourgeoisie, in part a product of recent immigration, made important inroads into the economic power of the immigrants.

In view of their economic position and the exclusive character of Mexican national identity, it is not surprising that most immigrants have shunned assimilation. Desperate for immigrants and capital, nineteenth-century and Porfirian Mexico tolerated the existence of foreign enclaves that floated like soap bubbles atop Mexican society. Unwittingly, the Mexican intellectuals and politicians of the postrevolutionary era encouraged this self-segregation by their poignant articulation of a more inclusive notion of “mexicanidad,” one that included the indigenous communities. It was only the recent urbanization and industrialization of Mexico that drastically changed this scenario. In the age of the Internet, TV, and mass popular culture, descendants of foreign immigrants have become increasingly assimilated into a Westernized elite.

In the process, the population growth of mestizo and indigenous Mexico has demonstrated the vitality of an essentially non-immigrant society. Despite his English last name, Vicente Fox will not be remembered as Mexico’s first president with immigrant parents. Instead, he is a part of the multichromatic cultural tapestry of Mexico; a tapestry rich in hues even in the absence of widespread immigration.

NOTES

1. For a study of Brazil as a nation of immigrants, see Jeffrey Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minority, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil* (Durham, N.C., 1999). For a comparative study of Argentina and the United States, consult Samuel L. Baily, *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1871–1914* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999).

2. *Quinto censo de población*, vol. 1: *Resumen General* (Mexico City, 1934), p. 8.

3. M.D. Mónica Palma Mora, “Inmigrantes extranjeros en México, 1950–1980,” (Ph.D. diss., Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1999); Delia Salazar Anaya, *La población extranjera en México (1895–1990): Un recuento con base en*

los Censos Generales de la Población (Mexico City, 1996); and Moisés González Navarro, *Los extranjeros en México y los mexicanos en el extranjero, 1821–1970*, 3 vols. (Mexico City, 1993).

4. The United States annexed the most promising and least populated regions between 1842 and 1848.

5. Dieter G. Berninger, *La inmigración en México: 1821–1857*, trans. Roberto Gómez Ciriza (Mexico City, 1974).

6. Walther L. Bernecker, *Die Handelskonquistadoren: Europäische Interessen und mexikanischer Staat, 1821–1867* (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 566–67.

7. David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 97–99.

8. The term comes from the title of Bernecker, *Die Handelskonquistadoren*.

9. Charles F. Nunn, *Foreign Immigrants in Early Bourbon Mexico, 1700–1760* (Cambridge, 1979).

10. Harold D. Sims, *The Expulsion of Mexico's Spaniards, 1821–1936* (Pittsburgh, 1990); Romeo Flores Caballero, *Counterrevolution: The Role of the Spaniards in the Independence of Mexico, 1804–1838*, trans. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Lincoln, Neb., 1974), pp. 14–40; Clara F. Lida, "Los españoles en México: población, cultura, y sociedad," *Simbiosis de culturas: Los inmigrantes en México y su cultura*, ed. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1993), p. 429.

11. Gene M. Brack, *Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821–1846: An Essay on the Origins of the Mexican War* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1975); Nettie Lee Benson, "Territorial Integrity in Mexican Politics, 1821–1833," in *The Independence of Mexico and the Creation of the New Nation*, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Los Angeles, 1989), pp. 275–307.

12. Thomas Benjamin, *A Rich Land, A Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1989), pp. 7–9; Luis G. Zorrilla, *Relaciones de México con la República de Centro América y con Guatemala* (Mexico, 1984), pp. 148–67; Jürgen Buchenau, *In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico's Central America Policy, 1876–1930* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1996), pp. 3–4 and *passim*; Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia moderna de México: El Porfiriato, Vida Política Exterior, Primera Parte* (Mexico City, 1955–74), pp. xii–xxii; Ralph L. Woodward, *Rafael Carrera and the Emergence of the Republic of Guatemala, 1821–1871* (Athens, 1993), pp. 154–55.

13. Bernecker, *Die Handelskonquistadoren*, *passim*; Brígida von Mentz et al., *Los pioneros del imperialismo alemán en México* (Mexico City, 1982); Jean Meyer, "Les français au Mexique au XIX^{ème} siècle," *Cahiers des Amériques Latines*, 9–10 (1974) : 52–60.

14. In rural Mexico, the few immigrants who came remained isolated from one another, and men often married Mexican women if they had not brought their families from Europe.

15. Walther L. Bernecker and Thomas Fischer, "Deutsche in Lateinamerika," *Deutsche im Ausland-Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Klaus J. Bade (Munich, 1992), pp. 200–10.

16. Adolfo Schmidtlein, *Cartas de un médico alemán a sus padres* (Mexico City, 1978), pp. 150–227.

17. von Mentz, *Los pioneros del imperialismo alemán*, pp. 333–62; Bernecker, *Handelskonquistadoren*, pp. 581–93.

18. For the issue of hyphenation in Argentina and the United States, see Donna Gabaccia, "Race, Nation, Hyphen: Italian-Americans in Comparative Perspective," unpublished paper.

19. David A. Brading, *Los orígenes del nacionalismo mexicano*, (Mexico City, 1979); and Jacques Lafaye, *Quetzalcóatl and Guadalupe: The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness, 1531–1813*, Benjamin Keen, trans. (Chicago, 1976).

20. Alan Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and *Indigenismo*: Mexico, 1910–1940," *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940*, ed. Richard Graham (Austin, Texas, 1990), pp. 72–73; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983).

21. Katherine Anne Porter, *Ship of Fools* (Boston, 1962).

22. Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853* (New Haven, 1968); idem, *The Transformation of Mexican Liberalism in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1989).

23. Donathon C. Olliff, *Reforma Mexico and the United States: The Search for Alternatives to Annexation* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1981), pp. 17–18; González Navarro, *Los extranjeros en México*, 1:230–353; David A. Brading, "Creole Nationalism and Mexican Liberalism," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 15 (1973): 139–90.

24. Lida, "Los españoles en México," pp. 435–36.

25. Robert Böker, "Lebenserinnerungen," Archivo Boker, S.A. de C.V., Mexico City, Fondo Memorias.

26. For this term, see Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in Global Perspective* (Cambridge, 1984); and William Schell, *Integral Outsiders: The American Colony in Mexico City, 1876–1910* (Wilmington, Del., 2001).

27. González Navarro, *Los extranjeros en México*, vol. 2.

28. For the cases of Argentina and Brazil, see Thomas Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980); and José C. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires* (Berkeley, Calif. 1998).

29. Hale, *The Transformation of Mexican Liberalism*; W. Dirk Raat, *El positivismo durante el porfiriato* (Mexico City, 1975) and "Ideas and Society in Don Porfirio's Mexico," *The Americas*, 30 (1973): 32–53.

30. Friedrich Katz, "Liberal Republic and Porfiriato," *Mexico Since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 57.

31. Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, *Mexico at the World's Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation* (Berkeley, Calif., 1996), p. 20.

32. The term "Porfirian persuasion" comes from William Beezley, *Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico* (Lincoln, Neb., 1987).

33. Foreign investors who lived outside Mexico were another matter, as the investments of large corporations continued to increase throughout the twentieth century.

34. Meyer, "Les Français au Mexique," pp. 62–64; Pedro Pérez Herrero, "Algunas hipótesis de trabajo sobre la inmigración española México: los comerciantes," in Manuel Miño Grijalva, Pedro Pérez Herrero, and María Teresa Jarquín, *Tres aspectos de la presencia española en México durante el porfiriato* (Mexico City, 1981), pp.103–44.

35. Moisés González Navarro, *Población y sociedad en México, 1900–1970* (Mexico City, 1974), vol. 2, p. 117.

36. Jonathan C. Brown, "Foreign and Native-Born Workers in Porfirian Mexico," *American Historical Review*, 98 (1993): 786–818. For the example of the oil industry, see idem, *Oil and Revolution in Mexico* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), ch. 1.

37. González Navarro, *Los extranjeros en México*, vol. 2, pp. 82–122.

38. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas nacionales* (Mexico City, 1909), p. 146.

39. Ethelyn C. Davis, "The American Colony in Mexico City," (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1942), p. ii.
40. Silke Nagel, "Integration oder nationalistische Abgrenzung? Deutsche Einwanderer in Mexiko-Stadt," (M.A. thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 1991), p. 5.
41. Delia Salazar Anaya, "Migration: To Mexico," *Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society, and Culture*, ed. Michael S. Werner (Chicago, 1997), pp. 883–4.
42. *Censo general de población*, 1910 (Mexico City: Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, 1904–20); and *Censo general de habitantes* (Mexico City: Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, 1925).
43. Evelyn Hu-DeHart, "Chinese," *Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society, and Culture*, ed. Michael S. Werner (Chicago, 1997), pp. 245–6.
44. François-Xavier Guerra, *Le Mexique de l'Ancien Regime à la Révolution* (Paris, 1986), vol. 1. Guerra's conceptualization cannot account for the highly commercialized and profitable agribusiness estates in Mexico.
45. Katz, "Liberal Republic and Porfiriato," pp. 74–75; Marianne Oeste de Bopp, "Die Deutschen in Mexico," *Die Deutschen in Lateinamerika: Schicksal und Leistung*, ed. Hartmut Fröschle (Tübingen, 1979), p. 486.
46. Buchenau, *In the Shadow of the Giant*, chs. 3–4.
47. Brown, "Native and Foreign-Born Workers," pp. 808–17.
48. For this distinction between elite economic nationalism and popular xenophobia, see Alan Knight, *U.S.-Mexican Relations: An Interpretation* (La Jolla, Calif. 1987), p. 55.
49. John M. Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, 1997). For a critique of Hart's views, see Alan Knight, "The United States and the Mexican Peasantry, c. 1880–1940" in *Rural Revolt in Mexico and U.S. Intervention*, ed. Daniel Nugent (La Jolla, Calif., 1988), pp. 25–60.
50. Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago, 1981), p. 75.
51. *Censo general de habitantes* (Mexico City: Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, 1925).
52. E. Victor Niemeyer, Jr., *Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916–1917* (Austin, Tex., 1979).
53. John Womack, "The Mexican Economy during the Revolution, 1910–1920: Historiography and Analysis" *Marxist Perspectives*, 1 (Winter 1978): 80–123.
54. John F. Smith, *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico* (Chicago, 1972); and Lorenzo Meyer, *Su majestad británica contra la revolución mexicana, 1900–1950: el fin de un imperio informal* (Mexico City, 1991).
55. María del Carmen Collado Herrera, *Empresarios y políticos: entre la Restauración y la Revolución* (Mexico City, 1996), pp. 18–26.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 124–25.
57. Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and *Indigenismo*," pp. 71–113.
58. Manuel Gamio, *Forjando Patria (pro nacionalismo)* (Mexico City, 1916).
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