Major Powers, Major Power Status and Status Inconsistency in International Politics

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Ever since Thucydides asserted in the Melian debate that international politics is shaped by the powerful, international relations scholars have been grappling with the notion of power and the way it shapes relations between states. The pervasiveness of this notion has translated into widespread theorizing and the empirical use of two closely intertwined concepts: *major powers* and their *status*. Combining the two, it appears that certain states stand out because of their unusual abilities and willingness to exercise influence in the international system, *and* because other states attribute to them the status of major powers. Great powers are seen as such because they are expected to be superior to others in having an impact on the course of international affairs. While we know much about the material capabilities of states, we appear to know far less about the determinants and nature of major power *status*, and that is the focus of this effort.

International relations scholars have made widespread use of the concept of major power status but have rarely been clear in their definition of the term, settling too often for Waltz’s idea that, in essence, we know a major power when we see one (Waltz, 1979: 131). Even fewer scholars have defined major power status in terms of the foreign policies major power states pursue in the context of a set of substantial military and economic capabilities. One of the exceptions is Levy (1983), who defines a major power as one with an extensive foreign policy agenda, a wide range of international interests, the ability to project power globally, and to be recognized for it. More recent efforts appear to have forgotten this definition, opting either conceptually or operationally for major power status as identified in the Correlates of War (COW) project.

This effort seeks to disentangle material, policy, and perceptual components associated with being a major power and the conditions under which other states attributed major power status to a few of their members. We are interested especially in changes in major power status, possible status
inconsistencies for major powers, and the implication of those phenomena for stability and change in international politics.

We define these terms in the following fashion. A major power is a state that a) has unusual capabilities with which to pursue its interests and to influence interstate relations; b) uses those capabilities to pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign policy interests beyond its immediate neighborhood; and c) seeks to influence the course of international affairs relatively independently from other major powers. Major power status is an attribute conferred on a state by other states whose foreign policy makers perceive that state as being a major power, and act toward it accordingly. Status inconsistency occurs either when the attribution of major power status is not in synch with the capabilities and foreign policy pursuits of the state in question (external status inconsistency); or, if states are inconsistent in awarding status to a major power (internal status inconsistency).

First, we briefly review the concept of major power status in IR theory and empirical analyses. Next, we employ event history analysis to examine the extent to which combinations of capabilities and foreign policy behavior can predict a state’s ascent to and loss of major power status over the last two centuries when using the standard identification of status in the literature. Third, we focus on the post-World War II time frame to take a closer look at the relationship between capabilities, behavior, the attribution of major power status, and some potential consequences of status inconsistency. Finally, we draw some implications from our findings and look as well at regional powers.

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1 We use the terms “major power” and “great power” interchangeably.

2 External status inconsistency would occur when a state is not awarded major power status when it acts as a major power and has the capacity to do so; or, if it has the status of a major power but has lost substantial capacity and/or the desire to act as one. Internal status inconsistency would occur if the state in question is awarded high status on one measure but not another measure of status.
Great Powers/Major Powers/“Elite” Powers and Status: A Very Brief Look at the Literature

Is there a need for one more study of major powers and their status? The idea of a rank order among states is as old as the Athenians’ statement that “... since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they want” (Thucydides, 1951: 331). Decades ago Morgenthau integrated the notion of status and ranking among nations into realism by noting that major powers shape international politics, create the rules by which international relations are played, and warned us that a state’s power status was defined in equal measure by material capabilities and less tangible factors (Morgenthau, 1985). The issues of major powers and their status also feature prominently in Waltz’s seminal work: “[t]he theory, like the story of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era” (Waltz, 1979: 72).

Inconsistency between status, foreign policy activity and (declining) material capabilities, is also central to power transition theory: global war becomes more likely as the dominant state’s capabilities decline in the presence of a rising, revisionist challenger. The conflict between dominant state and the challenger occurs over—among other things—status. For this reason, Kugler and Lemke (2000) stress the importance of the challenger being a non-status quo state for the theory to correctly predict major power war. Within this tradition, it is the confluence of capabilities and status to set the rules for a global or regional system and the threats to both status and capabilities for determining those rules that appear to underscore the conflict between dominant state and challenger.

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3 This review is meant to highlight the importance and use of the concepts of great power and great power status. Space limitations prohibit a more fundamental review. For an excellent review of the literature prior to 1983, see Levy, 1983.
4 Morgenthau understood the difference between great power attributes and status (Morgenthau, 1985: 360-361).
5 Although Waltz settled for ambiguity in definition (Waltz, 1979: 130-131) and was non-committal about how policies and reputations help to determine status (Waltz, 1986). Understandably, Waltz’s (1979) empirical enumeration of great powers differs from Morgenthau’s.
The issue of major power capabilities, behavior and their status has also been at the center of liberal institutionalist agendas. Keohane and Nye (1977), Keohane (1984), and Nye (2004) demonstrate an explicit interest in how various forms of power affect the solidification and preservation of the system leader’s status. Central especially in Keohane’s *After Hegemony*, is the notion that hegemonic decline need not be followed by conflict. To the extent that the hegemon successfully manages to shape the international system, a situation of mismatch between the hegemon’s “traditional” material capabilities and its status can be sustained over time. The hegemon’s “soft power” is expected to compensate for the inconsistency between its leadership position and its declining resources.

Most empirical analyses of interstate conflict that involve great powers use the Correlates of War (COW) project’s massive effort to conceptualize and operationalize the notions of great power status and material capabilities. The COW project has defined status and capabilities as two different explanatory factors in international politics. Emphasizing that status as a great power is a matter of reputation as much as it is a matter of capabilities, COW offers a unique operationalization procedure (Small and Singer 1982). International relations experts —mostly diplomatic historians— were surveyed and asked to identify the great powers in the international system since 1815 (Singer, 1988). The survey required experts to identify which nations were considered great powers by other states in the same era (Table 1). The COW classification has become the working, operational definition of major power status. Its operationalization of status was conducted with careful attention to the distinction between material capabilities versus the dynamics that lead to “…a rank or reputation attributed to an individual or group by others in the same social system (Singer and Small, 1966:238), including examples of discordance between capabilities and status (Singer, 1988). It is unclear
however if such discordance is a function of the foreign policy behaviors of major powers (e.g., Levy, 1983; Siverson and Starr, 1991; Fordham, 2006), or some other factors that are unspecified.

Table 1 about here

The COW identification of major power status has been widely employed in studies of international conflict and cooperation with myriad findings underscoring the salience of great power status. Major power status inconsistency has been found to be related to the frequency and intensity of conflict at the systemic level (Wallace 1971; Levy 1982). States designated as great powers are more likely to initiate and to become involved in militarized disputes (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991), more likely to drag one another into wars (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980), to generate rivalries (Lemke and Reed 2001b), to cause a conflict to expand (Corbetta 2006), to intervene in ongoing wars, disputes and crises (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Siverson and King 1980; Huth 1998), to join alliances, to have a larger number of allies, and to act multilaterally (Siverson and King 1980; Sullivan and Siverson 1984; Siverson and Emmons 1991; Corbetta and Dixon 2004). The sheer presence of a major power in a dyad increases the likelihood of both war and dispute occurrence (e.g., Bremer 1992), and as a consequence, many researchers have even elevated major power status to a significant selection criterion in sampling procedures (e.g., Maoz and Russett, 1993; Huth, 1998; Lemke and Reed, 2001b).

Despite such a wealth of findings, COW’s identification of states holding the status of major powers appears to warrant further investigation. The combination of time frames and states in Table 1 suggests either an enormous amount of stability in the major power club over two centuries of international politics, and/or some misspecification of major power status. Only one continuing state (Italy) loses its status permanently. Other major powers lose their status only to regain it immediately either after world wars, or after the end of the Cold War (Japan and Germany). China appears to be

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6 Austria Hungary disappears as a state after World War I.
the only “new” major power to join the club over the last hundred years and it joins paradoxically during a period of tremendous weakness in its economic and military capabilities.

It may be that such stability is a condition of international politics. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess such stability from the literature. While there appears to be broad agreement that the attribution of great power status is a function of demonstrating unusual material capabilities, certain types of foreign policy orientations and interests, research on great powers and their status fails to address systematically a number of key questions that would further our understanding of how status is generated and the implications of such status attribution for international politics. We are particularly interested in three questions: How much, what types, and what combination of capabilities and foreign policy activity are needed for the attribution of great power status for a state? Can we specify the attribution of major power status to states from the behavior of other states toward them? Finally, can we specify some effects when there is status inconsistency between capabilities, behavior, and attribution of great power rank?

Without answers to these questions, it is difficult to estimate whether or not COW measures an unusually high stability within the major power club, or, has misspecified club membership. One possible way of investigating the latter, however, is to designate the COW estimates of major power status as the dependent variable and look for consistent patterns of capabilities and foreign policy behaviors that in combination can account for the COW attribution of status to certain states. We turn to that task below.

**COW and Major Power Status: Looking Tough, Acting Tough, or Neither?**

We begin by accepting the basic premise that the relationship between the attribution of status and various forms of material capabilities and foreign policy behaviors is not straightforward. For example, Italy was recognized as a major power between 1860 and 1943 while its status “covered
some stupendous weaknesses” (Kennedy, 1987:206), despite it acting as a great power. The example, however, merely begs other questions: for instance, what kinds of capabilities and how much are needed to lift a state (and keep it) in the great power club? Neorealists underscore the need for unusual amounts of military capabilities while liberal scholars focus on economic capabilities and question the fungibility of military power (e.g., Ruggie, 1986). Meanwhile, and with rare exceptions (e.g. Fordham, 2006), the systematic investigation of the relationship between capabilities and status has been limited to a series of cross-sectional snapshots of the top ranking countries according to different types of capabilities (e.g., Wright, 1965; Stoll, 1989).

Yet the data on great power status are longitudinal in nature. It is possible to view the dynamics leading a state to enter and exit the restricted group of great powers as a continuous process through which, at any pre-defined time interval, a state achieves (or fails to achieve) major power status as a result of possessing certain levels of material capabilities and the undertaking of certain foreign policy actions. Using great power status as a dependent variable allows us to employ survival analysis, a method developed originally in the fields of epidemiology and biostatistics and has found widespread application in the field of political science due to the inherent temporal dimension of many political processes (see Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 1997; Box-Steppensmeier and Zorn 2001, 2002; Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 2004). We treat great power status as a “condition” that states may develop over time as a result of having some characteristics and/or engaging in certain actions. The “condition” persists for some states, as they remain major powers for long periods of time, while it terminates for others. At every time interval each state is at risk of contracting, preserving, or losing the “great power disease”.8

7 Fordham’s analysis focuses on attempting to uncover great power foreign policy behaviors through measures involving military capabilities.
8 Since some states experience a “relapse” as they transition in and out of the great power rank multiple times, event history models for repeated events could also be employed (Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 2004). However, models of
Survival (event history) analysis provides two approaches to test directly both capabilities and foreign policy actions as independent variables, while taking into account temporal dependence across observations. First, assuming that all states are at risk of becoming great powers, we can model the effects of capabilities and behavior on the time lapsing between a state’s entry into the international system and the “onset” of great power status (the “entry model”). Second, focusing on the risk of losing major power status at each time interval, “the exit model” explores the amount of time lapsing between a state’s entry into the group of major power states and its exit from it, in the context of changing material capabilities and behaviors.

The dependent variable of great power status for this exercise is drawn from the COW designation (Table 1): data on major power status are available from 1816 to 2001 with measurements taken at yearly intervals. The data set contains 13,020 country-year observations. Nations are added to the data set as they enter into the international system. We begin by using the COW index (CINC) of national capabilities. We then repeat the analysis by disaggregating the COW cumulative index into its six measures of state capabilities, measured at annual intervals, which include total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and number of personnel on active duty. The six measures reflect a combination of latent and actualized state capabilities. All indicators are lagged in order to allow for the time gap it may take a state to establish its reputation as a major power.

With respect to foreign policy activity consistent with the attribution of great power status, it is exceedingly difficult to find appropriate measures of such activities over a long time span. Great powers distinguish themselves by the scope of their foreign policy interests and their willingness to this kind require demanding assumptions about the dependence of observations across time periods and the parametric shape of the hazard function (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004); we have greater confidence in the results obtained from semi-parametric approaches.
pursue them assertively (Fordham, 2006). Major powers stand out as well for being centrally located with respect to other states, representing hubs of the international network (Singer and Small, 1966). We can estimate roughly over time these two notions by looking at interstate conflicts as measured by the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) project (see Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996; Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004), along with state centrality in the interstate system, assessed through alliance ties and memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The former indicator is obtained from the Alliance Treaty and Obligation Provisions (ATOP) database (Leeds, McLaughlin Mitchell and Long, 2000; Leeds et al., 2002); the latter is derived from the COW Intergovernmental Organizations (COW IGO) data set, version 2.0 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke, 2004). The number of disputes, alliances, and IGO membership are lagged at the same intervals as the capabilities indicators.

Table 2 about here

Table 2 illustrates the results showing all the models, with the independent variables lagged one year. As mentioned above, we use disaggregated capabilities first, and then COW's cumulative index of material capabilities. We employ absolute rather than relative values.9 The results are expressed in terms of coefficients rather than hazard ratios. Three sets of results emerge from Table 2. First, we note that COW cumulative index of national capabilities is an imperfect, although important, indicator of status. The CINC index effectively predicts when states enter the major power club, but it fails to predict when great powers cease to be recognized as such. Second, not all of the individual indicators of capabilities drive the dynamic of major powers' rise and fall. Notably, increases in military indicators of capabilities suggest the presence of a declining major power that is struggling to preserve its position in the system. Conversely, concomitant increases in “peaceful” indicators of capabilities and decreases in military indicators signal an established major power that is secure of its

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9 Other combinations using different lags and relative versus absolute capability values yield similar results
position in the international hierarchy. Clearly, the relationship between capabilities and status is mediated by the phenomenon of war. States lose their major power status after losing a war or become great powers in the aftermath of a victorious conflict. This second set of findings suggests to us that, while material indicators tell us a good portion of the “major power story,” major power status also depends on an external process of attribution —i.e., ascription— and that the COW major power status measurement can be improved if we explicitly incorporate such a process.

Finally, we note that the COW indicator of status neither clearly captures considerations about the centrality of great powers in the international system nor their peculiar foreign policy behavior. It is possible that methodological issues involved with the operationalization of key independent variables are flawed. From a theoretical standpoint, it is plausible that we know far too little about the conditions under which states are designated as great powers by other states, and therefore our models are not predicting well either status gained or status lost. As we have indicated earlier, we believe that not enough is known about the process of external attribution of major power status. For all of these reasons we turn toward a closer look at the relationship between capabilities, behavior and the attribution of status in the most recent era, covering the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

**A Framework for Status Attribution**

We assess again data on major power status by suggesting three criteria that should be salient for the attribution of major power status by states in the international system. First, states are likely to

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10 The measures available for large spans of time for gauging capabilities and foreign policy behavior may be insufficiently sensitive to the vast changes that have occurred in the international system between 1816 and the present. IGOs have changed and their numbers have grown dramatically; so have alliance obligations. Economic size in the 20th century may function better to measure economic capabilities than iron and steel production or energy consumption. Military reach—more important than simply military capabilities—may be a better measure of great power status than either military spending or size of the armed forces (Rasler and Thompson, 1994; Fordham, 2006). Alliance, IGO, and dispute involvement are limited foreign policy behavior measures compared to more rigorous specifications of foreign policy activity that are not available for the era prior to the start of the Cold War.

11 We note in Appendix B the COW specification for great power status after 1945, along with concerns raised flowing from Levy’s (1983) definition of major power status.
recognize in a handful of others unusual capabilities with which to influence the course of international affairs. This is recognition of major power opportunity, and it should be relatively unambiguous. Second, and equally unambiguous should be the recognition that some states are willing to act as major power by using their capabilities in a consistent and unusual manner to engage in international politics in order to effectuate the state of international affairs. We assume that the volume of capabilities and the extent of foreign policy actions are sufficiently different from “normal” capabilities and behaviors that they are easily monitored and detected by other states. Finally, to achieve recognition as a major power, a state needs to be perceived as engaging in efforts to influence the course of international affairs in a manner independent of other major powers. States may recognize that X has unusual capabilities and is very active, but if it is closely allied with Y, and follows Y’s direction, it does not constitute an independent force in international affairs, and may not be attributed the same rank as Y.

While these three conditions should be salient for identifying major power status, there may be a fourth dynamic at work. We assume that not all major powers are equal and the global conditions in which they conduct their affairs impact significantly on their relationships with each other. The strongest of them may successfully influence not only the course of international affairs in general, but as well have the capability and desire to influence the attribution of major power status by other states. At least two scenarios are likely, especially under conditions of high conflict or polarization in global politics. In one case, a very strong major power may work to create norms that pressure other states to privilege its major allies. Conversely, it may work to dissuade other states from privileging major powers that are in long-term conflict with its leadership. Likely, there are limits to its influence. Dissuasion strategies are unlikely to work against very strong states (e.g., the USSR) but may be more successful against less powerful states (PRC during the 1960s; East Germany through the Cold War).

Note the relationship between overall COW CINC scores and the COW designation of major power status.
Persuasive efforts may run afoul when allied states don’t perform as major powers (e.g., Japan through most of the Cold War). Nevertheless, it would be foolish to dismiss the potential impact that strong global powers may have on the attribution of status, and the distortions they may cause that could result in status inconsistencies.

**Capabilities**

We identify unusual amounts of state capabilities by focusing on both military and economic capacity. For military capabilities, we use a measure of military expenditures, and add a measure of military reach since we assume that military spending alone may not reflect the ability of major powers to reach outside of the neighborhood or the region. We operationalize military reach consistent with Fordham (2006), dividing military expenditures by military personnel. We believe that economic capabilities are better reflected in the modern era by the size of a state’s economy and we use GDP as that measure. Military data are from COW; GDP are from Penn World Tables.

**Foreign Policy Activity**

We assume that states that “earn” major power status act must act accordingly, extensively engaging in an unusually broad variety of foreign policy activities. Major, powerful states have the capability to entice and to coerce, to engage in both cooperation and in conflict. Therefore, we look at the extent to which states engage in an unusual amount of both cooperative and conflictual activities. We utilize three data bases for this task: COPDAB, WEIS, and IDEA, covering events data between states from 1948-78, from 1968-78, and from 1990-2004. Events are scaled into cooperation and conflict dimensions, and we use both dimensions to reflect unusual amounts of foreign policy activity. Unfortunately, the three data bases create a ten-year gap (1979-1989) in the time frame covered; we are not aware of another source to fill this hole in coverage.

**Foreign Policy Independence**

Where WEIS and COBDAP overlap, we use the higher figures to identify patterns of unusual behavior.
We assess the independence of foreign policy behavior by comparing states’ foreign policy profiles. A state’s foreign policy profile is comprised of all other states it interacts with, considering both the nature (conflict versus cooperation) and the intensity of that interaction. These foreign policy profiles are then compared to one another by assessing the structure of their foreign policy profile vis-à-vis all other states. We form a square matrix, where each cell represents the actions of one country towards another. We then assess the structural equivalence of a state’s foreign policy profile by performing row-wise correlations on the matrix. This produces a correlation coefficient, ranging from -1 to 1, representing the degree to which two states act in a similar manner towards all other states in the system. A value of 1 would indicate that two states have exactly the same foreign policy activity, while a value of -1 would suggest that states are acting towards the same set of states, but in opposite ways. Data on foreign policy behavior are drawn from the IDEA (Bond et al. 2003) and COPDAB (Azar, 1980) datasets. The IDEA data are weighted for intensity using the Goldstein Scale (Goldstein 1981); COPDAB has a built-in intensity scale. We compare the two time periods (Cold War and Post Cold War) using equal time intervals of fifteen years for the 1948-1978 and 1990-2004 time frames. The resulting foreign policy similarity (FPS) measure\(^\text{14}\) is transformed into Z-scores, relative to the annual global mean and standard deviation, in order to compensate for changing system size across the three time periods being analyzed. We expect to see policy similarity between major powers since they are likely to respond to similar events; we are searching for differences both in direction and emphasis in their foreign policy portfolios.

Figure 1 notes the foreign policy similarity scores for major powers during the three time frames. Note the high similarity scores for the Russia-China and the US-UK dyads, compared to other

\(^{14}\) This measure is calculated using UCInet v. 6.202 (Borgatti et al. 2002).
major power dyads in the post-Cold War period. The close relationship within the US-UK dyad is well illustrated across all three time frames.

Figure 1 about here

Attribute of Status

Perhaps most difficult is the task of uncovering appropriate behavioral indicators of states attributing major power status to other states. We assume that these indicators should reflect choices made by states to seek routinized contacts with those they believe to be major powers and likely influence both international affairs and their security and well being. We use two measures that may reflect such attribution of status. One is structural: the establishment of embassies and legations in the capitals of major powers. We assume that the creation of infrastructure in the home territory of the major power is an indication of the value and importance of that power to other states.\footnote{For an analysis of the variety of factors associated with diplomatic representation, see Neumayer, 2008.} Creation of such diplomatic structures is not unusual; we search however for an unusual number of such diplomatic contacts being created in certain states.\footnote{We recognize as well that there are reasons other than the ones we note that may lead to such diplomatic contacts (Neumayer, 2008), and there may be “noise” in this measure. For example, Belgium has an unusually high number of diplomatic contacts received since Brussels houses the EU and the added costs of establishing diplomatic missions with Belgium are quite low.} Second, we assume that state visits—directed at major powers by other states—are an indication of both the desire to consult with major powers, and also a reflection of the importance of the state to others. We excerpt from our events data all state visits received annually by each state; we are searching for unusual levels of such state visits being received by certain states.

We don’t expect that either measure is sufficient by itself to reflect status attribution. However, a combination of the two may yield more satisfactory results, and meet the test of face validity. Additionally, the extent to which there is congruence among the two measures may give us an
indication of inconsistent judgments made about a state’s major power status (internal status inconsistency).

Critical to our approach is the operational definition of “unusual”. In all three cases— attribution of status, foreign policy activity, and capabilities—we operationalize “unusual” as that value which exceeds the mean value for all states by at least one standard deviation. We collect and report standard deviation counts annually for all states on all measures, and report them cumulatively; it is the consistency of standard deviations that represent unusual major power capabilities, behavior and attribution of status. In this manner we minimize “noise” emanating temporarily from a region or neighborhood in conflict. We demonstrate as well change in these values over time: when the cumulative standard deviation scores flatten, we are detecting the diminution of unusual values on a particular indicator; when they continue to rise monotonically over time, we are observing stability in the unusual value of the particular attribute being documented.

Criteria and Cases of Major Power Status

We assume substantial variation in the composition of capabilities, behaviors, and status attribution within the classification of major powers. At the lower end, there should be a threshold level, where status attribution is conferred, but below which a state is no longer considered to be a major power by other states. At the same time, there should be a minimum threshold level on capabilities and foreign policy behavior, below which a state is no longer a major power, irrespective of whether or not it receives the attribute of being one. Making this distinction in particular allows us to make judgments about status inconsistency among potential and actual major powers (external status inconsistency). At the same time, internal status inconsistency occurs when states attribute status of one type (diplomatic infrastructure) but withhold status of another type (state visits). Thus, to make judgments about the attribution of status and its correlates, we need a series of markers that are consistent with face validity:
what we know about these states in the current era. But what can guide our markers when the correlations within or between different dimensions are less than perfect? We suggest a series of “rules” that identify different markers in the ladder of designation of major power and its status.

**Rule 1 (The maximum power rule):** When a state demonstrates consistently unusual capabilities and foreign policy behaviors, and seeks to exercise independent influence on the course of global affairs, it will be consistently attributed major power status by other states. The US since 1945 represents the one case where there should be little controversy over whether or not a state is a major power and is seen as such by other states. We should be able to show that it has had the opportunity and willingness to act as a major power, and in turn, is attributed major power status. Figures 2A and 2B demonstrate the US cumulative standard deviation scores for each of the three dimensions. The US meets or exceeds the criterion of one standard deviation on all of its capability, foreign policy activity, and status attribution measures for every observation available, demonstrating a perfect fit across the three dimensions. In terms of face validity, these observations represent the best case, with status attribution, capabilities, and foreign policy behavior mirroring expectations based on what we know of contemporary international relations.

**Figure 2A/2B about here**

**Rule 2 (The Minor Variation rule):** Some variation in unusual capabilities should be acceptable for maintaining major power status as long as most attributes remain unusually strong, and there is a consistent demonstration of unusual amounts of independent foreign policy activity on both dimensions of conflict and cooperation. The Russian case should illustrate this rule. Although not as strong as the US (Volgy and Bailin, 2003), it was widely accepted as one of two superpowers during the Cold War, reflecting high capabilities, unusual foreign policy activity, and attribution of status by
other states. As the USSR disintegrated into the Russian Federation, capabilities substantially diminished, and especially its military reach, but not sufficiently so that it would violate the conditions of this rule. Russia should continue to keep its major power status as long as its foreign policy activity remains unusually active and there isn’t a wholesale diminution of its capabilities.

Essentially, these are the patterns noted in Figures 3A through 3C. After 1989 Russia remains strong enough to continue to display standard deviation scores compared to most states in the system. It is only in military reach that we see diminution from past patterns as the military reach standard deviation scores flatten, but foreign policy activity continues unabated, and other states in the system continue to attribute to it the status of a major power after the end of the Cold War. In fact the status attribution scores of both the US and USSR/Russia, along with their foreign policy activities appears as identical, even after the Cold War.

**Rule 3 (The limited capabilities rule):** High economic capabilities are insufficient for status attribution; only in combination with military capabilities (expenditures and military reach) and multidimensional foreign policy activity will states consistently attribute major power status. This rule is illustrated by the case of Japan, as noted in Figures 3A through 3C. Despite substantial GDP scores that start in the late 1950s (Figure 4A), status attribution scores (Figure 4C) begin in the mid-1980s, evidence consistency by 1990, as they parallel increases in military capabilities and substantial cooperative and conflictual foreign policy behaviors (Figure 4B).

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17 The fact that it was excluded from the G7 club until after the end of the Cold War likely reflects a combination of US influence Cold War status norms along with some Soviet weaknesses in its economic capabilities.

18 According to Levy’s criteria of attribution, Japan’s record is mixed with membership in the G7 but not a permanent seat in the UNSC. COW attributes major status to Japan starting in 1990.
Japan, Russia, and the US illustrate cases of internal status consistency: measures of status attribution work in tandem when measures of foreign policy behavior and capabilities exhibit patterns consistent with the activities and resources associated with great powers. We now turn to two conditions when major power behavior will likely create status inconsistency.

**Rule 4 (Unidimensional foreign policy may be insufficient for status rule):** When major powers fail to consistently demonstrate both cooperative and conflictual foreign policy behaviors, they will generate inconsistent status attribution from other states. Given our definition, a state that has the capacity to act as a major power yet engages primarily in conflictual or cooperative behavior may not be meeting the expectations of other states in the international system, including whether or not it truly has the capability, or the willingness to engage in both types of behaviors consistently. Two states—Germany (Figures 5A-5C) and China (Figures 6A-6C)—demonstrate unusual amounts of foreign policy activity over time, but unlike the previous cases, one is primarily cooperative (Germany) while the other is primarily conflictual (China), until near the end of the Cold War. Whether these preferences for cooperative or conflictual behavior is one of opportunity or willingness is not demonstrable from the data, although assuming that very high levels of (and very diverse) capabilities are needed to exercise high volumes of both cooperation and conflict, we note that the capability indicators for both appear quite mixed.

Figures 5A/5B/5C about here

Consistent with rule #4, status attribution is mixed in both cases. China’s high conflict behavior until near the end of the Cold War results in unusual levels of state visits/consultation, but limited diplomatic contacts, while the opposite holds for Germany. However, once both cooperative and conflictual foreign policy activity begin to move in tandem for both states, the inconsistency in status attribution measures disappears. If the threshold of major power status attribution is set at requiring
the elimination of internal status inconsistency, then Germany may have qualified for major power status before the end of the Cold War but China would not have until the early 1990s. The designation of Germany would predate the COW status measure. The assessment of status attribution for China differs substantially from COW’s designation of the PRC as having major power status starting as early as 1950.19 Given that major powers need both military and economic reach, apparently neither Germany nor China achieve that threshold during the Cold War, and despite high levels of conflict behavior, the Chinese military reach measure fails to register even after the Cold War, reflecting significant (external) status inconsistency.

Figures 6A/6B/6C about here

It is plausible that the mixed signals received from the status attribution measures for these two states are only partly a function of their foreign policy behaviors and mixed capabilities. Clearly, both were caught in Cold War bipolar dynamics through 1989. The dominant state during that era was the US and its dominance influenced in significant part the attribution of a variety of factors, including the structure of diplomatic contacts between states. We would expect that Germany, as a critical US ally would receive an unusual amount of diplomatic contacts, compared to China, while China would receive more state visits since Germany was seen as a less- than-equal partner of the US in East-West relationships. This point suggests the following rule:

**Rule 5 (Major power autonomy rule):** Major power independence is more likely to be rewarded by consistent status attribution than foreign policy collaboration with other major powers. We assume that states attribute major power status to those that not only have the capability to act as one and demonstrate unusual involvement in global affairs, but in addition seek to exert influence on the course of international affairs, in a manner independent of other major powers in the system. For example,

19 See Feng (2008) who argues that Chinese foreign policy makers did not seek such status until the mid-1980s.
states seen as major powers in bipolar systems that also appear to be independent of the dominant polar leaders are likely to enjoy more status than states closely allied to dominant states.

The cases above are not very useful for illustrating this rule; a comparison of status attribution for France and the UK, with very similar capabilities and similar volumes of foreign policy activity, can highlight this issue better. The UK remained a close ally of the US while France distanced itself from US leadership in the Cold War. The foreign policy portfolio scores in Figure 1 demonstrate that the UK-US dyad is substantially more similar than any other major power dyad during the Cold War and remain substantially closer than the US-France dyad during and after the Cold War. While the COW status measure indicates that both qualify as major powers through most of the Cold War, our status attribution measures indicate consistency of status for France, but not for the UK (Figure 7C versus Figure 8C). This difference occurs, despite the fact that both states exhibit virtually behavioral and capabilities patterns during the Cold War (Figures 7A and B; 8A and 8B). Note that status inconsistency remains for the UK after the end of the Cold War, corresponding with its continued close relationship to the US after 1989.

Where is the threshold though, below which a state no longer qualifies as a major power and receives insubstantial major power status? We observed some partial “below the threshold” outcomes for Germany and Japan that were later “corrected” and the two joined the major power club. The following rule is suggested for those that don’t quite make it across the threshold:

**Rule 6 (The Insufficiency Rule):** States that fail to meet the minimum threshold to qualify as having major power status a) exhibit not only inconsistent attribution of status, but exhibit virtually no attribution consistently on at least one measure of status; and b) are characterized by inconsistent
capabilities (e.g., high economic capabilities but low military capabilities) or insufficient foreign policy activity (or both). To illustrate this rule, we focus on the one state that has been dropped from major power status (Italy), and two others that are part of the BRIC group (Brazil and India). None of the three are considered as having major power status globally, although regional major power status may be more appropriate for both India and Brazil.

The Italian case is presented in Figures 9A through 9C. Its status attribution scores are consistent with Rule #6: while it ranks consistently high on diplomatic infrastructure (Figure 9C), it does not meet a one standard deviation threshold on state visits and consultations at any point in the entire period of assessment.\(^\text{20}\) Italy also fails to act as a major power (Figure 9B), and its unusual capabilities are limited to economic size (Figure 9A), as it fails to register on any of the military measures. The Brazilian case is illustrated in Figures 10A-10C, and clearly shows that while Brazil may act as a regional power, it exhibits none of the status characteristics attributed to global major powers (10C), nor the foreign policy behaviors associated with them (10B). Only on its capability measures (10A) does it begin to approximate the early stages of a major power, but even here, the indication is based on the size of its economy and not on any of its military capabilities.

India presents a more intriguing and nuanced case of states falling below the threshold level defined by Rule #6. Its status attribution falls below the threshold levels specified for diplomatic structures established in India; its pattern exceeds the mean for states by one standard deviation (sd) only 20 percent of the time frame, and there is little consistent upward movement over the last decade. Its state visits attribution is more robust at 51 percent of sd’s for the time frame but this measure is

\(^{20}\) The consistent scores on diplomatic contacts for Italy are partly due to its history prior to WWII, but more so due to the location of the Vatican in Rome, allowing other states at very low cost to set up diplomatic infrastructure in one capital to address both entities. This is not dissimilar to the high diplomatic contact rate for Belgium as Brussels houses the EU.
both inconsistent over time, and inconsistent compared to its diplomatic contacts (Figure 11C). Rule #6 is also violated on the capability dimension (Figure 10A): while it has a large economy it fails to register either on military expenditures or military reach. It is only on its foreign policy measures (Figure 11B) where there is a suggestion of major power behavior, with both unusual amounts of cooperative and conflict behaviors until 1978 (but not after 1989).\(^{21}\)

So What? Implications for International Politics

Our exploration of the behavioral manifestations of status attribution, capabilities and foreign policy activity after World War II has yielded a different mix of membership in the major power club than indicated by the traditional COW measure of major power status. Table 3 suggests at least three types of differences between ours and the COW classification. The first is with respect to membership and time of entry into the club. COW indicates a Cold War membership of five major powers (China, France, USSR, UK, and US); we show one less (UK), and a much later timing for China than COW. Given how few major powers exist in any single time period, these differences are not insignificant (e.g., our membership is 40 percent lower than COW’s until at least the mid-1980s).

Second, we have some markers to indicate criteria of exclusion versus inclusion from the club. As Table 3 illustrates, for two states marked by COW as having major power status, we find internal status inconsistency (UK; China until at least 1984). The markers we propose should help account for why certain states don’t get accorded major power status at certain times but are given that attribution later. Note the cases of Germany and Japan: COW seems to indicate some automatic process by which they receive major power status as soon as the Cold War ends. Our data indicate that neither qualified

\(^{21}\text{We expect that the 1958-1978 foreign policy patterns are association with the Indian-Pakistani and Indian-Chinese rivalries, and contained primarily in the region rather than globally.}\)
as having such status until near the end of the Cold War, due to their capabilities and behavior, and it is changes in both that leads to the reestablishment of status rather than just the end of the Cold War or “forgiveness” of their loser status in WWII.

The markers also help in identifying the extent to which ongoing controversies about major power relationships may be about possible clashes between major powers versus potential future clashes. Note the case of China, which we label as having mixed major power capabilities, although it does receive major power status after the end of the Cold War. Its graph illustrates extensive Chinese military spending, while its military reach has yet to develop to the point where it registers on the graph in 2004 (and would barely register as of this writing). China appears to represent a case of a state receiving more major power status than its aggregate capabilities would warrant, a point underscored even by the nature of official hand-wringing in the US about its intentions.22

Finally, the markers help to distinguish between different types of major power status relationships. Not all major powers are equal, nor are they likely to have the same impact on international politics. Table 3 suggests a classification of major power type based on these markers; while we recognize the roughness of the classifications, we believe that they may have some consequences for how these states impact the nature of international politics.

Table 4 about here

We use the markers noted in Table 3 to delineate differences between major powers and especially regarding the attribution of status. If status and status inconsistency matter, then we should find traces of it in the ways that major powers respond to conflicts in international politics. We look at when major powers initiate militarized responses to interstate disputes (MIDS), and suggest two hypotheses. The first is that states receiving major power status from other states are able to resort to a

22 US assessments (Lague, 2008) about increased Chinese defense spending see the Chinese military “threat” in terms of having only enough reach to fight successfully over Taiwan and in East Asia (Shanker and Sanger, 2005), but not globally.
broader variety of means in addition to militarized options to achieve their objectives. This proposition finds some support in Table 4, showing that even controlling for capabilities, the relationship between our measure of major power status and the initiation of militarized interstate disputes by major powers is negative and significant.

Our second hypothesis explores further the consequences of status attribution: we expect that major powers that receive inconsistent status attribution are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes than major powers with consistent status attribution.\textsuperscript{23} Table 4 illustrates that status inconsistency is associated with a higher level of militarized dispute initiation than for status consistent major powers. Note that the COW measures of status in Table 4 are insignificant, presumably failing to distinguish between major power capabilities versus the actual attribution of status to these powers.\textsuperscript{24}

The relationship between status inconsistency and MID initiation appears even more robust when we consider the results obtained from our event history models in Table 2. Our analysis in that table demonstrated that a major power’s increases in its military expenditures is related to exiting the major power club. Initially we posited that increasing military expenditures is likely to be a symptom of a major power attempting to maintain its place within the international system. This initial hypothesis seems to be supported by the finding that status inconsistent major powers appear to initiate dyadic militarized conflict with a greater probability than normal for status consistent major powers. These attempts are likely to result in more forceful actions as other avenues of foreign policy are either less available or less effective. The two findings provide additional validity to our measures and conceptualizations of status consistent and status inconsistent major powers.

**Regional versus Global Powers and the Attribution of Status**

\textsuperscript{23} We measure status inconsistency using a dummy variable indicating whether a state meets some of the material or ascriptive requirements for major power status in accordance with rules #3 through #6 but excluding those meeting requirements of rules #1 and #2.

\textsuperscript{24} We suspect that this may be the case: when we pull capabilities from the model in Table 4, the COW measure of status becomes significant.
So far, we have addressed the issue of major power status in a global context: the extent to which certain states contest globally over the contours of international affairs and are accorded global major power status by other states. Yet, we know that while global powers seek to influence global affairs and regional affairs, at the regional level there are other powers contesting over the course of affairs and it is the more immediate environment of the region in which states function that is highly salient for their well being. For instance, despite the era of globalization, substantially more regional and sub-regional organizations are created than global or inter-regional organizations (Volgy et. al, 2008) and despite a strong global trading regime, most trading agreements are regional and local in character. Therefore, in this section we shift the analysis to delineating the nature of regional major power status.

We assume that the achievement of regional and global major power status are not necessarily the same. While a state that has capabilities to achieve global power status will also have sufficient capabilities for regional status, it is not necessarily the case that it will act as a regional major power, nor that other states in the region will attribute to it that status. Conversely, few regional powers can act also as global powers.

Figure 12A/12B/12C about here

We hope to identify eventually major regional power status in all regions of international relations for the period spanning the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; however, as a first step we restrict our analysis here to Asia.25 Our empirical approach to major regional power status is similar

25 We are well aware of the enormous controversies in the literature over what constitutes a region. Concerning Asia, for instance, a recent work on security relationships between regions and the US (Kolodziej and Kanet, 2008) separates the geographical entity of Asia into no fewer than four distinct “regions”. We assume that a region is defined by geography and a combination of other values that are driven by the nature of the research question(s) being asked. In this instance, since we are looking at major powers that are by definition able to span a continent, we focus primarily on the geographically determined, large regions.
to delineating global major power status in that we seek to identity states that possess unusual amounts of military and economic capabilities, demonstrate unusually active foreign policy behaviors, and receive attribution of status in return. Again, we measure military spending and military reach, along with economic size, but add a new variable, economic flexibility, which is the size of the economy multiplied by wealth.\textsuperscript{26} Foreign policy activity is measured as earlier, but applied only to interactions between states in the region. Our status attribution measures include state visits, diplomatic infrastructure, and in addition, we assess as well the centrality of regional alliance relationships, as an additional check on major power status.\textsuperscript{27}

Our analysis for the post-World War II period indicates that three states in Asia possess unusual attributes that may qualify them as major regional powers: China (PRC), India, and Japan. Of the three, Japan consistently demonstrates unusual capabilities across the entire period, indicating attributes that consistently rank it at least one standard deviation above the mean capability scores of Asian states on both economic and military dimensions (Figure 13A). China demonstrates a more mixed picture, with relatively high military spending but military reach that remains under the standard deviation radar, and while its GDP scores appear substantial, they are mitigated domestically.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure13a_13b_13c.png}
\caption{Figure 13A/13B/13C about here}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{26} We introduce this measure at the regional level since some regions contain as few as 25 states, and a few large economies may distort economic relationships, by simply reflecting large populations. The variable we create provides an indicator of economic flexibility, by multiplying size and wealth, assuming that a large economy that contains substantially large poverty is less amenable to foreign policy objectives than a large economy in a wealthy society. We gratefully acknowledge Chansuk Kang’s contribution in developing the capabilities data for Asia.

\textsuperscript{27} Measures of alliance centrality are calculated using the ATOP data. Here, we rely on the simplest measure of network centrality, degree centrality, which represents the extent to which a given actor is directly connected to another within the network (Wasserman & Faust 1994). These measures are calculated using Maoz’s Social Network Program \url{http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/networks/netsoftware.html}, which facilitates the calculation of various network measures for longitudinal data. Alliance centrality represents the extent to which a given state is involved is some form of alliance with other members of the regional system. We standardize centrality scores relative to system size. Those most central in the alliance systems are identified by comparing the average involvement and variability in the network, to each state’s individual centrality, identifying those with unusually elevated participation in military alliances.
by a very large population characterized by substantial poverty until well into the post-Cold War era (Figure 12A). India initially demonstrates higher economic capacity than China, and continues to have unusual economic capacity throughout the entire period, but its military spending barely registers over the threshold, and neither its economic nor military reach show up on the graph (Figure 14A).

The foreign policy activities of these three states show three different patterns. China engages in unusual foreign policy activity toward the region throughout the entire period, and (unlike at the global level during the Cold War) consistently so on both cooperative and conflict dimensions (Figure 12B). Japan appears to orient much of its activities outside of the region until the end of the Cold War, and does not demonstrate much of a consistently unusual degree of foreign policy involvement with Asia until after 1990 (Figure 13B). India behaves toward the region during the Cold War era in a pattern similar to China and in terms of what would be expected of a regional power. After the end of the Cold War, however, its unusual regional focus flattens through the first decade and doesn’t begin to exhibit again unusual levels of activity toward the region until the start of the 21st century (Figure 14B).

Asian status attribution measures indicate a diverse pattern of status granted to these three states. Least sensitive and most common is the attribution of formal status through diplomatic exchanges, showing consistently unusual amounts of diplomatic contacts for all three, with unusually high attribution to Japan and India starting in 1970 and to China starting roughly a decade and half later. For China (Figure 12C), there appears to be substantial internal status inconsistency during much of the Cold War period with high level state visits, unaccompanied by formal diplomatic contacts, but matched by a high level of regional alliance centrality. The post Cold-War era illustrates a much closer
pattern of both state visits and diplomatic relationships, although alliance centrality flattens until very late in the time frame. The latest data points suggest a clearer resolution of status relationships for China in the second half of the last decade.

The pattern of regional status recognition is quite different for Japan (Figure 13C). Apart from formal diplomatic recognition, its pattern displays virtually no unusual state visits until after the Cold War, when the two indicators finally march in tandem. Japan, however, exhibits none of the alliance centrality that would be normally expected of a major regional power.

The Indian status attribution measures (Figure 14C) suggest another pattern still. Although receiving substantial formal diplomatic contacts from the region through most of the period, its alliance centrality and state visit scores show the awarding of very limited status and the three dimensions do not exhibit consistently until again very late in the series. Given its pattern of very active involvement in the region during the Cold War, India’s pattern also exhibits considerable status inconsistency both internally and externally.

In general, the regional status attributes measures, in combination with foreign policy activity and capability scores for these major powers indicate a region of substantial status inconsistency for very strong states, until around the early to mid part of the first decade of the 21st century. This should come as no surprise. Apart from the major regional powers, both Russia/USSR and the US have actively participated in the region as major outside powers, and often through close proximity with Asian allies. Both Russian and American “boots” have consistently appeared on Asian soil, and at least one of these outside major powers have been involved with conflicts as diverse as Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea, and the survival of Taiwan. The US in particular had worked with Japan (and at times
against it) to veto regional arrangements not to its liking (e.g., Rapkin, 2001), and helped to create regional norms reflecting Cold War divisions and realities.

Meanwhile the region has been dominated by substantial major power rivalries, including Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian, Indian-Pakistani and Sino-American. While not solely attributable to this phenomenon, the extent of conflicts within Asia correspond well to the status inconsistencies noted for major powers, and consistent as well with our findings at the global level regarding the relationship between status inconsistency and the initiation of MIDs involvement by major powers.

It appears as well that the present decade should witness the elimination of status inconsistency for all three regional powers. The various measures of status attribution parallel not only each other but as well both capabilities and foreign policy behaviors in the region for both India and China. If any status inconsistency remains, it may be plausible in the case of Japan, which, although holding extensive capabilities, and now actively engaged in the region, continues to lag compared to India and China in regional alliance centrality. Whether this lag is a function of Japanese reluctance to commit its foreign policy orientation to the regional level, or as a result of the growing contestation for leadership with China in Asia (Nabers, 2008), still remains to be seen. In either case, the substantial reduction in status inconsistency within the region should augur well for reduced conflict between these states in the near future.
Table 1: Correlates of War (COW) Major Power Status Designation, 1816-2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>Austria-Hung.</td>
<td>Austria-Hung.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France (1940)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany(Prussia)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy (1943)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia (1917)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Russia re-enters club in 1922.
** China enters club in 1950.
Table 2: Multiple Event Estimates of Ascent to Great Power Status, 1816-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exit Cox Regression:</th>
<th>Entrance Cox Regression:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time to First Ascent</td>
<td>Time to First Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC score</td>
<td>-10.338</td>
<td>11.505**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.81)</td>
<td>(.312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>-0.00007**</td>
<td>1.65e-06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00023)</td>
<td>(1.81e-07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron/Steel</td>
<td>.00023*</td>
<td>-2.67e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(3.17e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil Expend</td>
<td>2.72e-07**</td>
<td>-1.27e-08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.16e-08)</td>
<td>(1.52e-09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Personnel</td>
<td>.0005*</td>
<td>-.00006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.00004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.00001</td>
<td>2.34e-06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00002)</td>
<td>(4.67e-07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Pop.</td>
<td>.00023</td>
<td>-.00001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(3.99e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Disputes</td>
<td>.254*</td>
<td>-.054**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.125)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Alliances</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.026**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N IGOs</td>
<td>-.121**</td>
<td>-.067**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi-square</td>
<td>18.93**</td>
<td>2840.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>12998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p >= .05; ** p <= .01; *** p <= .001
Table 3. Major Powers Status Club Membership, post World War II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>New Status</th>
<th>COW Status</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1950-83</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(internal status inconsistency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1984-present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1950-1990</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1950-1992</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(internal/external status inconsistency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1993-present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes (1991)</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1950-85(?)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>No (to 1990)</td>
<td>(mixed capabilities/no status)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1986(91)-present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes(1991)</td>
<td>Mixed capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>1950-1986</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>1987-present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maximum diminishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1950 to present</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(internal status inconsistency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1950 to present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (COW)</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Major Power Status</td>
<td>-0.541*</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>-2.286</td>
<td>0.022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status Inconsistency</td>
<td>1.174***</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>3.326</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>24.859**</td>
<td>3.087</td>
<td>8.080</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-2.232</td>
<td>0.027</td>
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<tr>
<td># of borders</td>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>10.463</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>-0.918***</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>-18.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-6.480</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>0.014***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>16.132</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.222***</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-2.860</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>7475</td>
<td>7475</td>
<td>7475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-3732.611</td>
<td>-3730.749</td>
<td>-3725.904</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: zScores for Dyadic Foreign Policy Similarity Among Major Powers during Cold War (1948-1963, 1964-1978) and Post Cold War (1990-2004) Eras.
Figure 7A: Cumulative Standard Deviations, France, Selected Capability Variables, 1950-2001.

Figure 7B: Cumulative Standard Deviations, France, Foreign Policy Measures, 1950-2004.

Figure 7C: Cumulative Standard Deviations, France, Status Attribution Variables, 1950-2004.
Figure 13A: Regional Cumulative Standard Deviations, Japan, Selected Capabilities, 1960-2005.

Figure 13B: Cumulative Standard Deviations, Japan, Regional Foreign Policy Measures, 1959-2004.

Figure 13C: Cumulative Standard Deviations, Japan, Regional Status Measures, 1959-2004.
## APPENDIX A: Conceptual and Operational Differences in Identifying Great Powers, Selected Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORS</th>
<th>CONCEPT/DEFINITION</th>
<th>OPERATIONALIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corbetta (2006)</td>
<td><strong>Major power STATUS</strong> = ascription of major power status on certain states, regardless of their material capabilities</td>
<td>Major power status as identified by COW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Fordham (2006)        | **Major power** = “foreign policy behaviors characteristic of major powers: the acquisition of a substantial share of systemic military power; and the development of power projection capability. (p.17)” | 1) military spending and military personnel components of the COW CINC scores; each state’s share of each constructs an index. Controlling for state’s involvement in civil and interstate wars  
2) Power projection capability is measured by capital intensity of state’s military forces = share of military spending divided by share of military personnel/ index of power projection capability is a product of the state’s overall military power index and its index of capital-intensity (p.20) |
| Lemke and Werner (1996)| **Global/Dominant power** = strongest state in global or local hierarchy  
**Dominant local power** = strongest state in local hierarchy  
**Contenders** = set of contenders with fewer capabilities than the dominant state | Cutoff for contenders: “largest unit drop” in capabilities between one set of contenders and the next.                                                                 |
| Levy (1983)           | **Great power** = distinguished by five definitional criteria: 1) possesses a high level of military capabilities allowing it self sufficiency to secure its border and to project military power beyond its border;  
2) interests are continental or global rather than local or regional;  
3)behaviors are different: defending interests more aggressively, with a wide range of instrumentalities, interacting |                                                                                                                                                  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mearsheimer (2001)</td>
<td><strong>Great powers</strong> = “…determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify,… a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state…” (p.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morton and Starr (2001)</td>
<td>“<strong>Elite Power</strong>” = “a state possessing a particularly large share of the overall military, economic, and political power of the great power system, but which also possesses adequate force projection to extend power and influence beyond its immediate region (p. 58)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasler and Thompson (1994)</td>
<td><strong>Global power</strong> = “states that have the demonstrated capacity to operate over long, transoceanic distances by assembling at least a minimal naval capability (10 percent of the global capability pool). They must also demonstrate an interest in actually using their sea power beyond their local region (p17)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small and Singer (1982)</td>
<td><strong>Great power</strong> = states that are recognized by other states as great powers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Superpowers** = an elite within a broader class of Great Powers (p.27)

---

**Global power**

Naval capability concentration (see Table 2.4, p. 27).

For regional power, using Levy’s guidelines for identifying great powers; using size of armies

---

Survey of experts to identify great powers, including perceptions of which powers were viewed by other states as great powers, based on...
intercoder agreement.  
http://pss.la.psu.edu/intsys.html
## APPENDIX B: Major Powers Between 1945 and the Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>COW Status</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Levy’s Conditions Violated?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1950 to present</td>
<td>isolated, barred from UN until early 1970s; not member of G7; capabilities severely limited until 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1945 to present</td>
<td>Limited capabilities until 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1945 to 1990</td>
<td>Stronger economically than France; large military; active independent role with USSR; no permanent UN seat but in G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1991 to present</td>
<td>Unification costly, foreign policy activities do not appear to expand greatly after 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1945 to 1990</td>
<td>G7 member; high level of defense spending; active global and regional involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1991 to present</td>
<td>G7 member but not UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1945 to present</td>
<td>weak militarily through 1950s; economy and military disintegrated after 1991;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not member of G7 until 21st century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1945 to present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1945 to present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


