Graham Haydon's book, Teaching About Values:  A New Approach, isn't intended to be a theory of values.  Instead, he has offered for consideration ideas which provide us with a basis for thinking our own way through the issues. It's a primer for considering the issues of values and what we can and might teach our children.

He asks us to look at aims and values, to think about what it is we are trying to do.  In considering our aims, he points out that though we aim at things we value, not all of our values underpin our aims.  Haydon doesn't moralize this or any other fact, but simply dissects our considerations for us to examine in a clearer frame.  For example, some of the things which we value highly may be things which we are powerless to bring about.

He talks about the difference between 'education' (implying opening up someone's thinking and reasoning and extended outward  and 'indoctrination' (implying coersion, narrowing someone's thinking and extending inward).  The implication that can be drawn is that if one is proposing that something "ought" or "should" be aimed at, then we are no longer talking about education.  That doesn't mean there is anything wrong with the aim, but we need to distinguish our aims from "education".

He brings to light the variety of values.  There are moral values and non-moral values, and there are different ways of having moral values.   Living in a  pluralistic, multicultural society, one cannot hope to give adequate consideration to the issues of teaching our children values without looking at the basis for morality.  To understand your own thinking about morals (though he doesn't make that suggestion) he provides this kind of thought:

If you really thought that moral values were about nothing but personal preference, you could not argue with anyone about their values, and it would be difficult to see how you could disapprove of their actions.

But if you want to understand the essence of "moral value", you have to find something you really do consider wrong.  Perhaps sexual expression is an issue for which you can readily grant others their own opinion.  You may not be able to feel that way about racism, or even more difficult, child abuse.  His point is that "it is difficult, when contemplating something which seems to you quite clearly wrong, to think that this is just a preference you happen to have."

Throughout Haydon's book, you see that there are people who admit no exceptions to their values, who think in generalzed rules of behavior.  A person who sees the values they recognize as being both objectively and universally valid attaches a different significane to those values from someone who sees their values as the conventions of a society of which they happen to be a member.  The difference is not necessarily that one persona ttaches greater importance to their values than the other; the difference is qualitative rather than quantitative.  The person who sees their values as the values of their culture, rather than being universally valid, may still be very attached to those values, and may care greatly about them.  Conversely the person who sees their moral values as being universally valid may nevertheless in practice not care deeply about them.

Moral ideas are sometimes tied up with religious ones and for others they are not.  Religioius thinkers will attach the justification of their moral values to adherence to the divine order.  Secular thinkers may likewise attach significance, but will justify trhem in their own way

Values are a cause of conflict – not just within a society and between societies, but within individuals.   Honesty and kindness are values, but there is conflict when we deliberate about whether or not to tell someone an unpleasant truth.  To the extent that we think of a value as  important, are we inclined to think of the values as "moral".   Yet, there are things each of us hold as great value, as significantly important, that we don't think are important in and of themselves.  His example of a person who lives a life full of high risk and adventure demonstrates this well.  For this person it is very important to have life filled with these kinds of challenges, but he wouldn't advocate it is an important value for others.  So, to the point: There are matters we think of as very important to ourselves, that we don't consider "important" in the general scheme of things.

Rather than making a deliniation for the reader between moral education and values education, which seems to be the focus of much discontent, Haydon draws the reader's focus to seeing the differences and, and the corresponding problems, between "values education" and "transmission of values."  Haydon doesn't see the indoctrination aspect of values transmission as the main reason it is unsatisfactory.  It's easiest to see his point when you look at "transmission of values" and compare it with "transmission of information".  With transmission of information, you can be much clearer about what you're transmitting and what is being received than you can with transmission of values.

This book essentially primes you to do your own thinking, and encourages those in the teaching and political professions to do their own thinking.  As such, he could be accused of despotism by the unthinking.  But in my opinion, he is asking us to do more than adopt an attitude of moral relativism.  He's asking us to look seriously at the pros and cons of what we say we want, and understand the limitations we may be placing on ourselves with our own attachments to "importance".  With this knowledge, one can hope, we will embrace our values wisely and make considered decisions on that basis.

 Links that relate to Haydon's work:

Table of Contents
Citation

   Feedback