

#8.1

## MICROECONOMICS COMPREHENSIVE EXAM SOLUTIONS

#22

(1) An allocation  $(x, y_A, y_B)$  is Pareto optimal if and only if it satisfies (\*) and either (\*A) or (\*B):

$$(*) \quad x + y_A + y_B = 120$$

(\*A)  $2x = y_A$  AND  $x \geq y_B$ : To increase  $u_A$  requires increasing both  $x$  and  $y_A$ , thus reducing  $y_B$  and hence  $u_B$ . To increase  $u_B$  requires increasing  $y_B$ , thus reducing either  $x$  or  $y_A$  and hence  $u_A$ .

(\*B)  $2x \geq y_A$  AND  $x = y_B$ : ~~To increase  $u_A$~~   
Interchange A and B in the (\*A) argument.

(a1) Pareto optimal: satisfies (\*), (\*A), (\*B).

(a2) Satisfies (\*) but neither (\*A) nor (\*B). But at  $(45, 30, 45)$  we satisfy (\*) and (\*B), and both  $u_A$  and  $u_B$  are larger.


(a3) Violates (\*):  $x + y_A + y_B > 120$ , so not feasible.

(a4) Violates (\*):  $x + y_A + y_B < 120$ , so wasteful.

At  $(39, 42, 39)$  we satisfy (\*) and (\*B) and both  $u_A$  and  $u_B$  are larger.

(b) If (\*) & (A) SATISFIED:  $y_A = u_A, x = \frac{1}{2} u_A, u_B = y_B$ ;  
 $\therefore u_B = y_B = 120 - x - y_A = 120 - \frac{1}{2} u_A - u_A = 120 - \frac{3}{2} u_A$ .

If (\*) & (B) SATISFIED:  $y_B = u_B, x = u_B, u_A = y_A$ ;  
 $\therefore u_A = y_A = 120 - x - y_B = 120 - u_B - u_B = 120 - 2u_B$ ;  
 i.e.,  $u_B = 60 - \frac{1}{2} u_A$ .



(c1) LET  $m_A$  AND  $m_B$  DENOTE THE CONTRIBUTIONS. NOTICE THAT  $i$  WILL INCREASE  $m_i$  IF  $y_i > u_i$  (i.e., IF  $y_A > 2x$  FOR A; IF  $y_B > x$  FOR B), AND  $i$  WILL DECREASE  $m_i$  IF  $y_i < u_i$  (i.e., IF  $y_A < 2x$  FOR A; IF  $y_B < x$  FOR B).

IS THERE AN EQUILIBRIUM AT WHICH  $x = 30$ ? IF SO, THEN  $y_A = 2x$  (i.e.,  $60 - m_A = 60$ ; i.e.,  $m_A = 0$ ) AND  $y_B = x$  (i.e.,  $60 - m_B = 30$ ; i.e.,  $m_B = 30$ ). AT  $(m_A, m_B) = (0, 30)$  WE HAVE  $x = 30, y_A = 60 = 2x$ , AND  $y_B = 30 = x$ , SO NEITHER DESIRES TO CHANGE HIS  $m_i$  — IT IS AN EQUIL' M, AND THE ONLY EQUIL' M AT WHICH  $x = 30$ .

WHAT IF  $x > 30$ ? THEN EITHER  $y_A < 60$  (∴  $m_A \downarrow$ ) OR  $y_B < 30$  (∴  $m_B \downarrow$ ); ∴ NOT AN EQUIL' M. AND IF  $x < 30$ , THEN EITHER  $y_A > 60$  (∴  $m_A \uparrow$ ) OR  $y_B > 30$  (∴  $m_B \uparrow$ ); ∴ NOT AN EQUIL' M. THUS, THE ONLY EQUILIBRIUM IS  $m_A = 0, m_B = 30$ .

(22) LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM:

INDIVIDUAL PRICES  $P_A$  AND  $P_B$  THAT SATISFY  $P_A + P_B = 1$  (i.e., EQUAL TO MC); EACH  $i$  CHOOSES  $x$  AND  $y_i$  TO MAXIMIZE  $u_i$  S.T.  $y_i = 60 - P_i x$ .

For A:

$$y_A = 2x \text{ \& } y_A = 60 - P_A x;$$

$$\text{i.e., } 2x = 60 - P_A x; \text{ i.e., } x = \frac{60}{2 + P_A}.$$

For B:

$$y_B = x \text{ \& } y_B = 60 - P_B x;$$

$$\text{i.e., } x = 60 - P_B x; \text{ i.e., } x = \frac{60}{1 + P_B}.$$

$P_A + P_B = 1$ , AND THEY CHOOSE THE SAME  $x$  AT EQUILIBRIUM:

$$\frac{60}{2 + P_A} = \frac{60}{1 + (1 - P_A)};$$

$$\text{i.e., } 2 + P_A = 1 + (1 - P_A);$$

$$\text{i.e., } 2 + P_A = 2 - P_A; \text{ i.e., } \boxed{P_A = 0, P_B = 1}$$

$$\therefore x = 30, y_A = 60, y_B = 30.$$

THIS IS THE ONLY LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM.

