

CURRICULUM VITAE

Michael George Bruno

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Department of Philosophy
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Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Psychology
Experimental Philosophy

Areas of Competence

Metaphysics
Early Modern Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Moral Psychology

Published Articles

“Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study” (with Shaun Nichols), *Philosophical Psychology*, forthcoming.

“Locke’s Answer to Molyneux’s Thought Experiment” (with Eric Mandelbaum), *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, forthcoming: 27 (2), April 2010.

“What Does the Nation of China think about Phenomenal States?” (with Bryce Huebner and Hagop Sarkissian), *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, forthcoming: 1 (3-4), 2010.

Published Reviews

“Review of Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind, David Woodruff Smith and Amie Thomasson (eds.)” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84 (4), 640-642, December 2006.

“Review of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.)” *Psyche*, 11 (6), October 2005.

** Publications and syllabi from courses I’ve taught are posted on my website.

Teaching Experience

courses taught:

Experimental Philosophy (Fall 2009); History of Early Modern Philosophy (Summer 2004); Introduction to Main Problems in Philosophy (Fall 2006); Introduction to Philosophy of Language (Fall 2005); Introduction to Philosophy of Science (Summer 2006); Logic and Critical Thinking (Spring 2005 & Spring 2009); and Minds, Brains, and Computers (Summer 2005).

courses assisted:

Consciousness: the Webcourse (Spring 2007); Individual and Society (Spring 2004); Perspectives on the Individual (Fall 2008); Practical Ethics (Spring 2007); Research Methods in Psychology (Fall 2004); and Science and Inquiry (Fall 2003).

Graduate Education

University of Arizona
PhD in Philosophy
Minor in Cognitive Science
Degree expected: May 2010.

The Australia National University
Visiting fellow of the Philosophy
Program of the Research School of
Social Sciences and the Centre for
Consciousness during the 2005, 2006,
and 2008 northern summers 2005.

University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill
Visiting student of the Philosophy
Department during the 2006 – 2007.

Arizona Philosophy Department contact info:
business manager: Debbie Jackson
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Undergraduate Education

New York University
BA in Philosophy with honors
Minors in History and in Economics
magna cum laude
Degree awarded: May 2003.

Secondary Education

Glenbrook North High School
Degree awarded: May 1999.

Professional Service

Commentator for the *American Philosophical Association* (Pacific Divisional Meetings 2005 and 2010).

Coordinator for the University of Arizona
Consciousness Discussion Forum Series
(Spring 2006).

Lunch Coordinator for the University of
Arizona's Cognitive Science Program's Brown
Bag Series (2006 – 2007).

Referee for *Erkenntnis*, *The Monist*, *Psyche* and
the *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*.

Awards and Fellowships

Andrew W. Mellon Foundation / American
Council of Learned Societies (ACLS)
Postdoctoral Fellowship (2009 – 2010).

Center for Human Science Fellowship (2007).

Glenbrook North High School's Brown Book
Award (1998).

H.B. Earhart Foundation Fellowship (2007 -
2008).

Phi Beta Kappa – Beta of New York (2002).

University of Arizona's Cognitive Science
Program's Summer Stipend (2006).

University of Arizona's Graduate College
Fellowship (2003 and 2006).

University of Arizona's Philosophy
Department's Fink Award for outstanding
graduate student (2009).

University of Arizona's Philosophy
Department's Reisen Graduate Award for
outstanding paper written by a graduate
student (2006 and 2009).

Presentations

“Action and Visual Consciousness” – Perception, Action and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Dual Vision (7/2007); University of Arizona (9/2007); Towards a Science of Consciousness VIII (4/2008); Australia National University (6/2008).

“Active Externalism and Dynamic Systems Theory” – Cognition: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended (10/2007).

“Cultural Differences in Attribution of Conscious Mental States to Groups” (with Bryce Huebner and Hagop Sarkissian) – Center for Human Science (3/2007); Society for Philosophy and Psychology (6/2007).

“Dancing Qualia and A Priori Knowledge” – Towards a Science of Consciousness VI (4/2004).

“Divorcing Content and Attitude” – University of Sydney (8/2005); Australia National University (8/2005).

“Envatment and Extended Consciousness” – University of Arizona (12/2008).

“The Extended Conscious Mind” – University of Arizona (1/2009).

“Extended Consciousness” – Lewis & Clark College (11/2009).

“Intuitions about Personal Identity” (with Shaun Nichols) – University of Arizona (5/2009).

“Making Claims about Phenomenal Consciousness” (with Benjamin Kozuch) – Society for Philosophy and Psychology (6/2008).

“Minimal Enactivism” – Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (4/2009); Lewis & Clark College (4/2009); Northwest Philosophy Conference (10/2009).

“Monitoring Theories of Consciousness and Introspective Richness” – University of Arizona (12/2005); City University of New York (6/2005); Australasian Association of Philosophy (7/2005); Towards a Science of Consciousness VII (4/2006).

“Nonconceptual Content and Reasons for Action” – CUNY Graduate Conference in Philosophy (2/2005); University of Western Ontario Graduate Conference in Philosophy of Mind, Language, and Cognitive Science (4/2005).

“Offloading the Mind” – University of Memphis Graduate Conference on Philosophy and Technology (2/2006); Society for Philosophy and Psychology (6/2006).

“Phenomenal Externalism, Brains-in-Vats, and the Constitution / Causation Distinction” – Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference (7/2006).

“Referential Uses of Descriptions and Generalized Conversational Implicature” – Arizona Summer Workshop in Philosophy, (7/2004).

“Social Dimensions to the Philosophy of Science” – Center for Human Sciences (2/2007).

Dissertation

title: *The Extended Conscious Mind*

abstract: I defend the claim that visual consciousness is spatially and temporally extended in the following sense. Many visual experiences are constitutively dependent upon states of the world extrinsic to any individual's body. Insofar as individuals are conceived of as occupying the same regions as their bodies, the defended claim implies a form of *externalism* about conscious visual states. The overall view has less in common with *representationalism* or *disjunctivism* about conscious vision than it does with *enactivism* about perception. Alternatively, the main thesis can be characterized as form of *active externalism* or *vehicle externalism* about conscious visual states. I begin by familiarizing the reader with some points of background and sketch an account of the distinction between *causal* and *constitutive* relations. Critical discussions of active externalism and enactivism frequently involve disagreements over what is required for some explanatorily salient dependency relation to count as constitutive rather than causal in nature. The account I provide is intended to be neutral with respect to the contended issues in these discussions. I proceed to argue that some of our visual experiences constitutively depend on states of things, which occupy regions that: (i) have duration; (ii) are a part of some individual's central nervous system associated with the production and simulation of movement; (iii) are a part of some individual's body that is not a part of that individual's central nervous system; and (iv) are parts of the surrounding non-bodily environment. I conclude by considering some of the practical implications for future empirical inquiry into how minds work and future normative inquiry into how individuals should be, if it is true that visual consciousness typically extends beyond any body.

dissertation committee: David Chalmers, Terence Horgan, Uriah Kriegel and Shaun Nichols

Professional References

David Chalmers
Professor of Philosophy
The Australia National University
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Rebecca Copenhaver
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Lewis & Clark College
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Terence Horgan
Professor of Philosophy
University of Arizona
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Uriah Kriegel
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Arizona
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Shaun Nichols
Professor of Philosophy
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David Owen
Associate Professor of Philosophy
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