Whatever dissolves your crystals

The Bible says that a Christian ought to avoid the appearance of evil; it appears the Supreme Court thinks American politicians should also, but with a little help from a law called the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2003, more commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act.

This act maintains limits on campaign contributions, which the Supreme Court, in Valeo vs. Buckley, realized regulated the freedom of speech and association. Nevertheless, it allowed the law to stand by justifying the impingement of the First Amendment on the premise that corruption and the appearance of corruption must be avoided at all costs--even the cost of American's dearly-loved First Amendment rights. In this week's ruling, the Supreme Court upheld this clear and present violation of the freedoms of speech and association based upon the same faulty reasoning as previous courts.

The reasoning is that money corrupts the legislative and electoral process, and if this phenomenon were true, then the sensical thing would be to limit the amount of money individuals or groups could contribute to a campaign. In response to charges of legislative corruption, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act maintains the individual contribution limits established by FECA but adjusts the $1000 limit to $2000 for inflation, which the Supreme Court upheld.

However, the charges of legislative corruption remain unsubstantiated; in fact, campaign contributions have very little influence over a candidate's voting record. Rather, party affiliation and ideology play a large role in determining a candidate's vote. For instance, in April 2000, the House of Representatives voted for permanent trade relations with China; although an organization claimed that those representatives who had received more money associated with a certain group voted in favor of the bill, evidence suggests that the members of Congress voted along party lines.

In addition, both individual and groups tend to give money to candidates they believe will represent them in various issues; as a result, candidates and contributors tend to vote similarly. Lifenews.com records that in 2003, Steven Spielberg, a well-known supporter of abortion rights, sent $2,000 each to Congressmen Tom Lantos and Rahm Emanuel, both of whom also support abortion rights. And like many Americans--although one with a lot more money than most--Spielberg donates money to those people and groups he believes can best represent his own interests and goals.

Similar to individuals, groups also tend to give more money to those candidates they believe will support their beliefs. Since at least 1984, labor unions that form political action committees consistently donate more funds to Democratic candidates, who many people and organizations consider the defenders of labor unions. And, Republican candidates receive more money from corporation PACs than Democratic candidates, partly due to the belief that Republicans support big business.

Moreover, groups that contribute large amounts of money often have large member bases; therefore, candidates will court these votes by voting in a manner favorable to the members' organization. For instance, the National Rifle Association, nationally, contributes the most funds to political campaigns; they also have a large member-base of approximately three million people. This large base of voters who often vote on sole NRA issues can swing a vote by close to five percent in several congressional districts.

Also, contrary to the popular shibboleth of the campaign finance reformers, money does not buy an election. Although most winning candidates receive more money in comparison with the losers, most winners of the elections are incumbents. As incumbents, the candidates have considerable advantages to the challengers, such as name-recognition, that allow them to have better chances at succeeding in an election; as a result, political interest groups and individuals who want their beliefs to be supported will contribute their moneys to candidates most likely to win, which results in statistics showing a disproportionate amount of money going to winning candidates. Thus, candidates, who are most likely already going to win, receive more funds. Hence, as illustrated, money does not contribute to a widely corrosive influence on either the electoral or legislative processes in the United States; rather, the ideologies and party lines of the candidates themselves and their constituents affect the voting patterns of the politicians.

Because money does not influence elections and legislature, the necessity for campaign finance reform does not exist and, in fact, has helped exacerbate the problem of interest group contributions and money's involvement in elections. In several states, including Texas and Virginia, no limitations on contributions in state elections exist. However, these states have not reported any increase in corruption among its elected officials in comparison with other states with limits on such donations, thus indicating the useless legislation campaign finance reform provides in combating corruption.

And when the Federal Elections Commission Act first began to limit contributions from individuals and interest groups, the formation and activity of political action committees significantly increased to the point where they have increased from 608 in 1974 to the current 4,500; their campaign contributions have also increased from approximately $20.5 million in 1976 to $189 million in 1994.

Understandably, a rise in congressional spending occurred concurrently with the increase in PACs and their contributions. Campaign spending for Congress increased by 347% between 1977 and 1992; and where, in 1976, House incumbents spent $1.50 for every dollar their challenger spent but currently spend approximately $4 for every dollar their opponent spends. The rise of PACs, their increased contributions, and rising campaign expenditures since the first federal finance reform act indicate that campaign finance reform not only is ineffective but also detrimental to the causes reform supposedly espouses.

In helping our elected officials maintain a safe distance from corruption, the Courts have decided that Americans can sacrifice their God-given rights of speech and association. The Court's decision, which is based on a false premise that money corrupts, will have lasting consequences to Americans; however, this has not been the first decision made by this Court that has undermined the Constitution in favor of some house built on sand nor will it be the last. As such, perhaps the Courts ought to leave mandating the avoidance of evil to God, instead of their own flawed decisions based on imperfect reasoning and faulty evidence.