Lettsce, Segemented Labor Markets, and the Immigration Discourse

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It would seem to be ridiculously obvious that industries in the South employed an African American labor force. However, the hegemony of the immigration discourse—"they take jobs that nobody wants"—indicates the need to reiterate some historical facts. Do immigrants take jobs that nobody wants? The author reviews the assumptions of media reports and advocacy groups regarding labor market niches of immigrants. They portray a labor force that is immutably segmented into a primary and secondary sector. This notion is inconsistent with (a) early work theorizing a shifting labor market frontier, (b) earlier empirical work analyzing fluctuating boundaries, and (c) the contemporary labor market that exhibits decreasing segmentation. The author examines the poultry industry in five Southeastern states from 1980 to 2000. Although those jobs fit the profile of the secondary sector (that "nobody wants"), a decade earlier they were occupied by African Americans. We must revise the immigration debate.

Keywords: immigrant workers; African American workers; labor substitution; South

On May 13, 2005, President Vicente Fox of Mexico complimented Mexican immigrants working in the United States. He praised them for their dignity, great contributions, and willingness and ability to work in jobs that "not even blacks were willing to do" (Orlandi, 2005, p. A7). President Fox unleashed an avalanche of commentary. His remarks were called shameful and racist. The Reverends Jessie Jackson and Al Sharpton both scheduled trips to Mexico in pursuit of an apology for the African American community. Fox, of course, was only repeating a phrase commonly heard in the contemporary debate on U.S. immigration: "They take jobs that nobody wants." He went one step further, emphasizing that even African Americans view

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these jobs with disdain. This article is divided into three parts. First, I attempt to reinsert the labor market discussion back into the immigration debate. In the second section, I review the literature on immigration and labor-market substitution. In the third section, I use the case of poultry in the southeastern United States to demonstrate that an immigrant displacement of African Americans has occurred.

The Current Immigration Debate

The debate that followed immediately after the introduction and passage (December 16, 2005, U.S. House) of the HR4437 immigration reform bill\(^1\) adhered to the somewhat familiar script of the contemporary immigration debate. Immigration advocates dwell mainly on first the humanitarian and second the labor force issue. And they charge those who favor immigration control with xenophobic or racist motives. Mexican President Vicente Fox was reported as saying (mirroring the charge leveled against him) that HR 4437 was shameful and the work of xenophobic politicians who want to fence in America, lock up illegal immigrants, and send them back where they came from (“Cheap Border Politics,” 2005). A flurry of English and Spanish Web sites and blog postings echoed the theme (Univision.com, for example, posts numerous opinions). One called the immigration proposals openly racist and anti-immigrant (abiertamente racista y antimmigrante) (Hernandez, 2005). Another called it the triumph of prejudice (el triunfo del prejuicio sobre la razón) (Avalos, 2005). In Arizona, where border issues are hotly debated, groups such as the Arizona State Legislature Latino Caucus (2005), Derechos Humanos, and The Arizona Coalition for Migrant Rights have organized forums, teach-ins, and press conferences. Their concerns are that the human and civil rights of the illegal immigrant population (as well as those who assist them) will be seriously affected by what they refer to as this “dangerous” legislation. This humanitarian justification has framed the response to the trial of two Colorado students. These No More Deaths volunteers faced charges of conspiracy and transporting undocumented immigrants. They were arrested in Arizona for transporting migrants who had illegally crossed the border. Their defense is that they were driving three undocumented immigrants to Tucson for medical aid. No More Deaths launched a campaign with the public relations slogan “Humanitarian aid is never a crime.”

“Labor need” is the second justification advanced by the immigrant advocacy groups. Citing jobs such as agriculture, construction, or hotel cleaning, advocacy groups characterize the labor niche as jobs rejected by American workers. This perspective is frequently found among Spanish-language reporters and bloggers—they take jobs that Americans don’t want (toman los trabajos que los estadounidenses no quieren) (Univision, 2006). This perspective is also presented by representatives of agro-business. Republican Idaho Senator Larry E. Craig promoted an immigration bill that would allow workers to stay. He justified his bill by saying that 72% to 78% of the agricultural force in Idaho was illegal and that the industry would collapse without these workers. Keith Esplin, executive director of the Potato Growers of Idaho, supported Craig’s position and defended the workers because they are “doing the jobs that no one else wants” (Egan, 2005, p. 11). Advocates point out that if immigrants were denied these secondary sector jobs, no native workers would fill them. Some advocates integrate the two perspectives citing the need for saving lives of those who are drawn to the United States because of the U.S. labor demand.

These assumptions, captured in Fox’s comments, permit a valorization of immigrant labor because illegal immigrants fill essential niches in the U.S. economy that would otherwise go unfilled. These assumptions also pinpoint the cause of migration as a “pull” rather than a “push” out of Mexico. Other commentators who felt that Fox had spoken the truth, such as an African American journalist in Milwaukee and a 72-year-old Mexican American living in Florida who has worked as a field hand, endorsed the notion of a labor market niche. The editorials/letters focused on the work that immigrants do in the agricultural sector: lettuce, fruit, and the like (Johnson-Elie, 2005; Zamora, 2005). In fact, lettuce pickers could be the poster-child for the “hard-working immigrant” who does the job that no native worker wants to do. The caption could easily be “do YOU want to pick lettuce?”

Do Immigrants Work in Segmented Labor Markets?

Do immigrants take jobs that nobody wants? The current debate presumes that the U.S. labor market is divided into segments—a primary and a secondary—that are impenetrable and immutable. Primary sector jobs (with high wages, better working conditions, stable employment, and substantial returns to human capital)\(^5\) are assumed to be unavailable to immigrant labor.\(^4\) Inversely, jobs in the secondary sector (low-wage, few benefits, and undesirable working conditions) are assumed to be of no interest to native workers, a disinterest that also is attributed to African Americans, despite the fact that
they remain disproportionately at the bottom of the U.S. occupational hierarchy. In media and immigrant-advocacy renditions of the segmented labor market, employment boundaries are assumed to be impenetrable. That is, there is no occupational mobility between native-labor jobs and immigrant-labor jobs, and therefore, there can be no job displacement. This conventional wisdom resembles the earlier theoretical work on dual labor markets, which was based on the nature of the firms. In contrast to the primary sector—with its oligopolistic corporations, bureaucratic hierarchy, internal labor market, and career paths for qualified employees—the secondary sector consists of industries that are more economically precarious, have lower profits, and have less advantageous working conditions (Edwards, 1973, p. 16). In media and immigrant-advocacy renditions, there seems to be an assumption that boundaries between the sectors are immutable. Certain industries that are located in one sector, such as agriculture, are fundamentally different from industries on the other side of the divide.

If the U.S. economy is truly segmented, then the boundary between primary and secondary industries is immutable and the boundaries between the primary and secondary labor markets are impenetrable. In short, there is little risk that immigrant labor will displace native labor. Because many immigrants have less skill and/or education levels than natives (Bean & Stevens, 2003, p. 207) or an illegal status that prevents them from practicing their own profession, they are not in competition. This question of a tradeoff is hardly new. For several decades, researchers have examined the question of an immigrant-native job tradeoff. And a good deal of the empirical work has focused on the lower skill level of the U.S. labor market, where displacement would be more likely.

**Literature Review:**

**The Effect of Immigration on Native Labor**

Are immigrants confined to the secondary sector of a segmented labor market and thus unlikely to affect native labor? Two bodies of scholarship speak to this issue. The first comes from the earlier theoretical discussions on the division of labor markets. The second comes from the body of empirical work that assesses the actual impact of immigrant labor on native labor.

The sociological approach to a segmented or dual labor market (as distinct from the earlier economic one) was a corollary of the analysis of the interaction between the rise of monopoly capital and internal labor markets. Edwards (1973) describes how the wage and unemployment distributions, which tended to vary on the basis of race, gender, or social class, could not fully be explained in terms of the economists’ model of human capital. By focusing instead on the production process, Edwards linked the macroeconomic dynamics to the specifics of labor markets. This contribution integrated the process of the rise of monopoly capital with the concept of internal labor markets. Two conceptual bridges linked the earlier descriptive and taxonomic work of economists on multiple labor markets with that of the production process. First, certain sectors were more likely to have jobs with certain characteristics, and second, they were more likely to attract workers with certain traits. Large bureaucratic organizations facilitated the growth of internal labor markets with compliant and rewarded workers. Firms outside of the monopolist sector—those that were smaller, more economically precarious, and with flatter bureaucracies—created niches for jobs with other reward structures and workers with other qualities (Edwards, 1973, pp. 3-6). During the phase of monopoly capitalism, these two sectors, with their corresponding labor markets, seemed relatively stable. Little mobility was observed across sectors for either industries (because of their differing systems of control) or for workers (because of factors that determine their employment stability). All industries didn’t move into a primary labor market because that sector was associated with monopoly capital. Internal markets were a consequence of the consolidation of monopoly power and the imposition of bureaucratic control in large enterprises. Industries in the secondary market continued the employment practices of an earlier, more competitive capitalism (Edwards, 1973, p. 21).

What about change? The theory offers an account of why there would be little mobility, under conditions of monopoly capitalism, either of industries or workers across the line that separates the primary from the secondary labor market. And because there had been both firm and worker stability within the primary and secondary sectors for some time, it is easy to see why it appeared to some that the labor markets were impenetrable for firms and impenetrable for workers. But Edwards’s paradigm—labor markets embedded within a theory of social relations of production and of phases of capitalist development—also contains the mechanism for change. Namely, the stability in labor market conditions under monopoly capitalism would change under post-Fordism.

The social and economic changes in industrial societies have altered these stable arrangements. Kallenberg (2003) summarizes the literature on the changes in industrial societies and characterizes the variety of transformations that firms underwent in pursuit of flexibility both in the production processes and in the employment systems. Although Kallenberg’s discussion
focuses on the many firms that reassign more and more of their employment to the nonstandard work arrangements of the organization’s periphery, it is easy to imagine that some firms might desire to locate their entire employment system within the realm of nonstandard work arrangements. To Kallenberg’s extensive list of nonstandard employment relations, I believe, we must add the use of undocumented immigrant labor. The analysis of the role of immigrant labor and of its framing in the contemporary immigration debate could be significantly amended and improved by considering it from the theoretical perspectives described in this literature (flexible firms, labor market segmentation, changes in industrial society because of growing international and price competition, etc.).

Certainly, immigrants are a growing component of the labor force (11.9% of the economically active and 9.9% of the population; Bean & Stevens, 2003, p. 199). Does an influx affect the employment chances of native workers? The research offers convincing evidence on both sides. One perspective argues that immigrants are not in competition with teenagers, women, or minorities. The corollary of this would be that any observed increase in impoverishment or income inequality (particularly of the latter two groups) cannot be attributed to immigrants. Such conclusions are based on the observation that the groups often fill different labor market streams. The garment industry, it is argued, could not fill its labor needs with teenagers and agriculture even less. Female poverty, it argued, is more likely to be the result of divorce rather than job displacement by immigrants. Immigrants are in different labor market streams for reasons having to do with the human capital (e.g., language and training), the nature of the work (often seasonal or temporary), and an acceptance of low-wage labor that is not shared by Anglo-Americans or African Americans. Thus, numerous scholars have concluded that the claim of job-displacement effects of immigration is overblown. The alternative perspective asserts that immigrants are part of a process of labor substitution and/or that immigrants contribute to the lowering of earnings of native workers. Two methodological approaches are commonly used to assess the impact of immigration on the native labor force. One uses U.S. Census/Current Population Survey (CPS) data and works to sort out the effect of immigration on the wages or income inequality of native workers. A second approach uses ethnographies to describe the labor displacement as it unfolds at the industry or firm level.

Many studies using U.S. Census or CPS data find no effect. Borjas (1987), in his analysis of the 1980 U.S. Census data, found “no evidence that black native-born men have been adversely affected by white or Asian immigrants, and only marginal evidence that black natives and black or Hispanic immigrants are substitutes” (p. 386). Enchautegui (1998) judges the immigrant effect to be artifactual. She offers a number of observations based on her analysis of those low-skilled immigrants who were included in the 1994 CPS. Low-skilled immigrants are an integral part of the U.S. labor market, among 39% of U.S. workers between 15 and 55 years of age without a high school diploma. Between 1980 and 1994, the number of immigrants in the United States without a high school diploma almost doubled. And these immigrants have a lower unemployment rate than native workers. But, she argues, this “apparent” labor substitution may not represent job displacement. First, the number of U.S.-born native workers who were high school dropouts declined from 20 million in 1980 to 13 million in 1994, leaving perhaps insufficient native low-skilled workers for the low-skilled jobs. Although the number of low-skilled jobs declined by 4.3 million between 1980 and 1994, the number of these workers among the U.S.-born population declined by 6.8 million. This gap, she concludes, indicates that the U.S. economy has the ability to absorb low-skilled immigrant labor (Enchautegui, 1998, pp. 814, 818). Second, the native population is aging, thus contributing to a growing labor market need. On the other hand, offering some support to the job displacement thesis, she mentions a third factor, namely, that employers may discriminate against native workers. When interviewed about their labor force needs and preferences, employers ranked immigrants above African Americans in terms of labor productivity.

Reed (2001) finds a positive effect of immigration on male overall income inequality (measured with the Gini index) but demonstrates a very complex path by which this occurs. It is this path complexity that leads me to include her work in the “no effect” category. Using the CPS, she revisits the findings of a good deal of economic research that concludes that immigration is not a major determinant of labor market outcomes for natives (National Research Council, 1997, as cited in Reed, 2001, p. 221). Her analysis demonstrates that the 1997 regional-level income inequality among "labor-force attached” males aged 25 to 55 is higher in those regions with higher percentages of foreign born and that the “growth in male’s earnings inequality between 1969 and 1997 is associated with greater recent immigration” (Reed, 2001, p. 364). But, she argues, these market adjustments are not a response to the influx of immigrants. Reed models two major factors. First, recent immigrants have much lower levels of education than native workers and thus are overrepresented among low-income earners. They may even increase the size of the low-income workforce. Their presence in the labor force explains 13% of the 1969-1997 growth in male income inequality, suggesting that part of the increased inequality is
an artifact of labor market shifts rather than direct downward pressure on native wages. The second factor that accounts for the inequality trend is an upward shift on natives' wage structure. The presence of low-skill wage earners might induce, she argues, interregional migration or alter the natives' incentives to invest in education or other skills. When immigration raises the returns to education for natives, it also increases inequality. She attributed another 13% to 16% to the second factor (Reed, 2001, p. 372). Thus, although Reed finds an increase in income inequality, she does not attribute it to direct displacement of native workers.

Other studies find that immigration can cause labor displacement. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996) investigate the immigration effect on native labor by comparing two approaches, and they find a positive (nonartifactual) effect. First, they consider an area analysis that contrasts the level or change in immigration with the level or change in earnings or employment of nonimmigrant workers. This 1990 research identified a positive effect in contrast to the 1980 cross-section analysis mentioned above that showed no effect (Borjas et al., 1996, p. 246). Nevertheless, they caution that a number of exogenous factors might explain the 1990 findings. Immigrants were more likely to go to gateway areas that were experiencing an economic boom in the 1980s. These boom areas (coastal regions) were experiencing a rise in labor demands at the same time as the rust belt was experiencing a decline (Borjas et al., 1996, p. 247). Furthermore, they point out that less-educated native workers may respond to immigrant competition by moving away. Also, it is possible that investment will seek out the supply of immigrants. This might partially offset the effects of immigration on native outcomes (Borjas et al., 1996, p. 249). However, the authors endorse an interpretation (derived from their factor-proportions approach) that treats immigrants as a source of increased national supply of workers of a relevant skill and treats trade as a source of chidage in the demand for skills. What the authors have in mind regarding trade is the extent to which the net import of manufactured goods changes the U.S. labor force demands. Their findings show that level of education for native workers matters in interpreting the immigration effect. They conclude the following: "Immigration has been important in reducing the pay of high-school dropouts, while immigration and trade have contributed modestly to the falling pay of high-school equivalent workers" (Borjas et al., 1996, p. 250). Thus, at the lower levels of the occupational scale, they find a displacement effect of immigrants.

Overall, the quantitative scholarship begins by documenting some statistical "immigrant effect" on native labor (e.g., unemployment, depressed earnings, and income inequality) and then proceeds to identify a number of general labor market mechanisms that "explain away" the findings. Borjas et al. (1996) is the exception presented here. Nevertheless, these empirical findings reveal the shortcomings of attributing negative labor market findings solely to immigration. And it is useful to recall the warning of Borjas et al. (1996): "The estimated effect of immigration on native-labor outcomes depends critically on the empirical experiment used to assess immigration" (p. 250). The virtue of these quantitative studies—their multivariate analysis of aggregate data sets—is also their limitation. They are less adequate for examining the dynamics over time in any given industry or firm that could lead to changes in the workforce. Waldinger (1997, p. 366), for one, thinks that these studies may, in fact, underestimate the potential for immigrant competition.

For two methodological reasons, the qualitative work is more likely to capture an over-time job displacement effect. First, it is easier to observe, and second, there is a sampling bias. Case studies and ethnographies make it easier to observe displacement and offer a chance to explore general market mechanisms that might produce the dual labor market and, on some occasions, intentional employer aversion of one group or preference for another. Studies with larger, randomly drawn samples (e.g., Waldinger's, 1997, study of 170 establishments) offer the chance to observe different levels of immigrant impact. And second, although ethnographies are often the work of journalists, ethnographers, labor leaders, and company officials, they have a probable sampling bias. They are more likely to examine cases when job dislocation is underway or has already happened and less likely to be undertaken with the stated goal of demonstrating that workers have not been displaced or that their pay has not suffered from competition with immigrants.

Native displacement has been captured in a number of studies. Aponte (1996), in a 1986-1987 survey of White, African American, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-origin workers in Chicago, found lower rates of unemployment among Mexican workers. He concludes that "spatial mismatch" cannot totally account for the higher rates of employment among Mexican immigrants; rather, it was their use of social networks. In the realm of journalism (here the above-mentioned sampling bias is clear), accounts of job displacement abound. In August 2004, federal prosecutors in Pennsylvania sent Wal-Mart a letter stating that it was the target of a grand jury investigation into use of illegal immigrants at its stores. On October 23, 2003, federal officials had rounded up 250 illegal immigrants at 60 Wal-Mart stores in 21 states. Wal-Mart denied knowing that its janitorial contractors were using illegal immigrants, but Raymond Drude, a vice president at Jani-King, claimed that his company lost contracts at several southern Wal-Mart stores to contractors who
used illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe (Greenhouse, 2004). Likewise, ethnographic projects have found clear evidence of labor displacement in the southeastern United States. The volume edited by Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill (2001) includes articles that describe displacement in carpets (Engstrom), poultry (Guthey), agriculture (Studstill), and agriculture and oil (Dale), to name a few.

Taken together, the quantitative ones, which “explain away” labor displacement, and the ethnographic ones, which confirm it, provide guidelines. The question is how immigrants come to occupy certain jobs in the first place. Waldinger’s (1997) conclusions, based on the cross-sectional surveys, are extremely suggestive of what should be included in a longitudinal analysis. He outlines a process that begins with African Americans being “excluded” (not displaced) from the labor market. Several mutually reinforcing processes—network hiring, employer preferences about differential productivity, and African Americans losing interest in those jobs—contribute to the “exclusion.” To understand when and why immigrants moved into certain jobs, we need to amend the templates of the above statistical and ethnographic studies in five ways. First, the bulk of the statistical research focuses on legal immigrants. Although some illegal immigrants may have been picked up in the CPS studies, they are less likely to be included in the census analysis. Second, the studies focus more attention on labor force–attached males. In some cases, the displaced population comprises African American females. Third, the dependent variables range from income inequality to overrepresentation of immigrants in certain occupations to level of native earnings. In addition, it may also be useful to consider others, such as a worsening of working conditions. Fourth, the research based on the 1980 U.S. Census identifies the trend as of 1980, but it may not capture the historical changes in labor legislation, economic restructuring, and immigrant flows that transpired after 1980 (Waldinger, 1997, p. 366). Many of the cross-sectional analyses do not capture the process over time. One can imagine how two cross-national studies would miss displacement. At time T1, the labor market is totally filled by African Americans, and at time T3, one observes that same labor market filled by immigrant labor. These two slices would have concealed the process by which job substitution unfolded at T2 and allow the “obvious” conclusion that immigrants fill occupational (secondary) niches that “nobody wanted.”

And fifth, the statistical models often invoke neutral market principles to understand the “immigrant effect.” Clearly, there are many exogenous processes, such as technological change, local labor market shifts, native labor out-migration, or skill upgrading, that affect the status of native labor.

These substitutions result from neutral market forces, not any purposive industry action. In contrast, some of the ethnographies point in a different direction. Although not ignoring market forces, they attribute labor substitution to factors such as employer preference for one group or a labor-management conflict that might actually contribute to the creation of a dual labor market (Piore, 1979). In summary, the aggregate data are extremely important. Equally important, however, are over-time analyses.

Putting Labor Studies Back Into the Immigration Debate

Regrettably, the immigration debate appears to be polarized between pro-immigrant humanitarians and liberals who stress the need for labor (along the lines of a segmented labor market) and anti-immigrant activists who are charged with racism. The immigration issue cannot be understood simply on the dimension of “racists” versus “humanitarians.” Both perspectives are myopic, especially regarding the issue of labor, where they accept the assumption of a “segmented labor market,” routinely citing jobs such as lettuce pickers.

I use the case of the poultry industry to illustrate the importance of putting labor studies back into the immigration debate. The degree to which the immigration dilemma is intimately tied to the changes in the labor market can be seen by tracing the relatively recent changes in the U.S. chicken-processing industry. This industry has adapted to the changing global economy in ways that parallel that of many American industries. First, a few of the poultry-processing plants have set up off-shore operations: Two U.S. producers (Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson) were the second and third largest producers in Mexico in 2002. Second, U.S. companies have undertaken mergers, and third, they have altered their labor force composition. African American workers are being replaced by Mexican and Central American workers. In some cases, the “invisible hand of the market” had assistance from not-so-invisible agents. Tyson (according to the 36-count federal indictment that prosecutors obtained against Tyson in December 2001) engaged in a 7-year scheme to recruit hundreds of illegal immigrants from Mexico and Guatemala, to transport them across the border, to assist them with illegal documents, and to distribute them to their chicken-processing factories in 12 states. The sting caught Tyson managers on audiotape and videotape plotting to recruit and hire illegal aliens for plants. None of the executives or plant managers were convicted (Rosenbloom, 2003).
Description of Data

To illustrate the substitution of African American labor by immigrant labor, I chose five states for this study: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina. These states have a concentration of poultry-processing plants and have experienced significant Hispanic inflows. In 1997, there were 472 poultry-processing plants registered in the United States (1997 U.S. Economic Census NAICS Code # 311615; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). Thirty-five percent of the enterprises and 52.34% of the paid employees were found in the five states chosen for study. Most of the excluded states had only a few plants, but Minnesota and Pennsylvania (each with 19 plants), California (29), and Missouri (24 plants with 12,215 paid employees) were important exceptions. Although Missouri captured 6.24% of the national sales in 1997 in contrast to Mississippi’s 5.25%, Mississippi had one more plant, a larger payroll, and 3,737 more employees (see Table 1). These five states, which were not traditional destinations for Hispanic populations, have experienced large increases from 1990 to 2000. Other southern states with traditionally large Hispanic populations, such as Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, had smaller concentrations of poultry-processing plants. In summary, the five states chosen have significant economic activity both in poultry processing and recent large increases in the Hispanic population. By spotlighting one industry in a limited geographic area, this analysis can focus on those that have been identified by researchers as more vulnerable to an immigrant effect, namely, unskilled African American workers. It also joins a more recent body of work that looks at the parts of the South that have recently entered into the immigration story (Bean & Stevens, 2003, p. 213).

The joint presence of factory density and Hispanic growth observed at the state level holds to some extent at the county level. The bivariate correlation between the presence of Hispanics in 2000 and of poultry firms for the 483 counties of the five states in 1999 is .385 (significant at the .01 level, one-tail). The maximum number of plants for any county is 10 (Hall County, Georgia FIPS 13139), which also recorded that 19.6% of the population was Hispanic, with 20% of the population speaking other than English at home (2000 U.S. Census). The discussion that follows draws on both U.S. Census data and ethnographic reports.

Speaking Spanish in the South

“If there weren’t Hispanic workers, nobody in America would be eating chicken,” a plant manager said (Guthey, 2001, p. 61). But Latinos are a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
<th>Number of Paid Employees (in Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (%)</td>
<td>168 (35.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>472 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from U.S. Economic Census 1997 using the NAICS Code 311615.

relatively new population, in the poultry-processing industries and in some Southern states. In 1980, more than 75% of the close to 15 million identified by the 1980 Census as Hispanic were concentrated in the four states of California, New York, Texas, and Florida (Portes & Truelove, 1987, p. 360). With the exceptions of Texas, Florida, and to a lesser extent Louisiana, the South had not been a typical destination for Hispanic migrants. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina and other states recorded a near 1% Hispanic population in the 1970s and even into the 1980s (Table 2). The measurable increases between 1990 and 2000 in these five states are 100% or greater (Table 3). And, as most commentators agree, the increases are larger. It is extremely difficult to estimate the size of a hidden population because many illegal immigrants, fearing deportation, will have avoided the U.S. Census canvass. Nevertheless, the measurable increase in these states outpaces that of the region and the nation as a whole.\(^4\) Anecdotal data (increases in the number of Hispanic grocery stores, English classes, public school enrollment, and Hispanics stopped for traffic violations with bogus drivers’ licenses, fake identification, or no vehicle insurance) corroborates the U.S. Census findings of the recent population increases. In 1998, two of the six elementary schools in the county of Dalton reached a 70% Hispanic student population, and the overall school district Hispanic attendance rose from 4% in 1989 to 42% in 1998 (as quoted from Georgia Department of Education, 1999, as cited in Engstrom,
Table 2
Percentage Hispanic in Selected Southern States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970a</th>
<th>1980b</th>
<th>1990c</th>
<th>2000d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 1970 data based on a 5% sample of households taken by U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population: 1970 Subject Reports. This was the first census to include a separate question specifically on “Spanish” origin.
d. 2000 data from U.S. Census Bureau (2001, p. 28).
e. Based on 17 states including Texas and Florida.

Table 3
Population Changes: 1990 to 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Change in Population Between 1990 and 2000</th>
<th>% Change in Hispanic Population Between 1990 and 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. population</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern population</td>
<td>71.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>207.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>337.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>299.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>148.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>394.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A fair amount of research has demonstrated that “the most important determinant of immigrants’ locational choices within the United States is the presence of earlier immigrants” (Zavodny, 1999, p. 1015). In her study of new recipients of legal permanent resident status and new refugees between 1989 and 1994, Zavodny (1999, p. 1028) also finds that economic conditions matter, and for refugees, the level of welfare benefits is a significant determinant. Immigrant movement to the southeastern United States represents a new era in locational choice. The Refugee Act of 1980 and the Refugee Resettlement Program identified the South as a place to settle refugees from Southeast Asia, former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa that were not being sponsored in other parts of the country (Dunton & Murphy, 2001, p. 1). Hispanics joined the flow. In a few industries, the shift to Mexican labor occurred earlier. Studtstill and Nieto-Studtstill (2001) studied the peach and pecan industries. They quote one grower who dated the changeover from African American to Hispanic workers to the early 1970s. He attributed it to the fact that African Americans left the seasonal farm work because they could make better money and earn benefits in nearby industries (Studtstill & Nieto-Studtstill, 2001, p. 79).

Much of the increase, however, dates to the middle 1980s and 1990s. Engstrom reports on Dalton, Georgia, where the general population, the Hispanic population, and the carpet industry have all grown since the 1980s. Dalton produces more than half of the carpets in the United States. Executives credit Mexican immigrants with helping the industry survive and grow by solving the labor shortage problem. When the carpet industry began to use a new tufted carpet technology, it led to a rise in specialized firms such as dyeing and finishing services, machinery, and wholesale services, which created a need for more workers. The first industry response was to increase wages. Overall, the 1987 manufacturing wage in Whitfield County was 83.5% of the national average, and unemployment was below Georgian rates (Engstrom, 2001, pp. 46-47). According to Engstrom (2001), the carpet industry didn’t move offshore as so many others have done because the area offered the advantages of a specialized industrial district, and moving offshore would have compromised production: Simultaneously, an immigrant-labor option became available. The poultry-processing industry in northern Georgia was attracting Mexican workers, and this provided a solution to the carpet industry labor shortage. Management also gave a “worker preference” explanation for the shift to immigrant labor. The industry executives praised the work ethic of the new immigrants, the “industriousness and tirelessness of Mexican immigrants” (Engstrom, 2001, p. 50). In response to the “job displacement” criticism, they claim that it was “labor shortage—Mexican immigrants were not taking jobs away from anyone but instead were taking jobs that would otherwise have remained unfilled” (Engstrom, 2001, p. 52). Numerous southern industries have turned to Hispanic labor. Dale, Andreatta, and Freeman (2001, p. 110) reports that in 1997, a shipbuilding firm in Morgan City, North Carolina, hired 200 immigrant workers who were housed in 15 trailers on commercial property owned by the firm.
There are external and internal migratory “pushes” to the southeastern United States. Externally, the Mexican debt crisis in the middle 1980s, the structural adjustment programs that followed the debt renegotiation, and the peso devaluation crisis of 1994 contributed significantly to the migration flow from Mexico. However, migration to the South began as “secondary migration,” a diaspora so to speak, of pushes internal to the United States. Some Hispanics moved into Georgia in the 1980s as the Texas construction boom was slowing down (Engstrom, 2001, p. 48). In the early years, some plants even used the Texas state employment agency to refer workers or paid Mexican workers $50 for every additional Hispanic brought to the company (Guthey, 2001, p. 64). With chain migration and the Mexican devaluation crisis of 1994, such recruitment mechanisms became unnecessary. Migration to the South has also involved “settling out” for those who first migrated into agriculture and then with the acquisition of some human capital skills (particularly English) moved into other sectors of the economy. Some immigrants arrived in the South fleeing California and other high saturation gateway states. The secondary migration also comes from the need for better pay and benefits—health care, housing, and education for children—as families join workers. Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) identify three reasons that led 30% of legal immigrants to avoid the “big three” destinations by 1998. They point out that the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act liberated 55% of those in California from the servitude of illegal status, giving them confidence and freedom to strike out in search of better opportunities. Second, they attribute this migration away from the traditional gateways to labor shortages that “appeared in the Northeast, the Midwest, and the Southeast in industries such as meatpacking, poultry processing, seafood canning, construction, and agribusiness” (Massey et al., 2002, p. 127). And third, they believe that the conditions in California—militarization of the border, an unusually deep recession, and an anti-immigrant mobilization in southern California—contributed to the shift.

**Speaking Spanish on the Chicken Line**

The U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (2005), in reporting on all meat and poultry plants nationwide, lists the race of workers in 2003 as 32% White, 20% African American, and 42% Hispanic (with 26% of those being foreign born). It is likely that Hispanics have an even higher representation in poultry in the southeast. They now form a majority of the workforce in some of the poultry-processing firms and a substantial portion in others. Although over-time data of the ethnic distribution of this labor force is not available, anecdotal accounts abound. Industry, union, and newspaper reports, as well as academic studies and court records, affirm that poultry workers are likely to be Hispanic: “The first trickle of Hispanic workers to Tyson’s Shelbyville plant dates from the late 1980s. Just a decade later, according to a court testimony, 600 to 700 Hispanics made up nearly 75% of the plant’s workers” (Rosenbloom, 2003, p. 29). By the late 1990s, the Tyson workforce was very heavily Hispanic—40% according to Tyson and 60% according to union officials (Stein, 2002). One Mexican worker, interviewed in an Immigration and Naturalization Service detention center, said that “after four years of living as an illegal immigrant in Maryland, working a succession of menial jobs with forged work permits and sending money home each month to his parents in Veracruz, [his] luck had run out.” He sat in the detention center still wearing the black rubber boots that normally protected him from chicken blood in the Showell processing plant. The 27 illegal immigrants picked up in the raid were from Mexico and Central America. In the previous 5 years (1990 to 1995), the reporter notes, Showell Farms has been fined $2,800 and another poultry plant $90,000 after illegal immigrants were discovered on their payrolls (Constable, 1995). Guthey (2001, p. 60) reports that in Gainesville, Georgia, which calls itself the poultry capital of the world, there is regular bus service between Gainesville and Mexico. Plants even changed vacation policy allowing a week of unpaid leave after a year so that workers could return to Mexico for 2 weeks and still keep their jobs. More recent accounts continue to describe Hispanic presence. On a July 2005 raid to the Petit Jean Poultry plant in Arkadelphia, Arkansas, federal officials arrested 119 workers, 115 of whom were Mexican. A former worker admitted that she unlawfully sold Social Security cards and other documents to the workers (“Cheap Border Politics,” 2005).

Ethnographic reports reiterate this. Striffler (2002, p. 307), who did ethnographic work in a plant in Springfield, Arkansas, in 2001, made two observations about the demographic profile of workers in this plant: (a) About three quarters of plant’s labor force was Latin American, with Southeast Asians and Marshallese accounting for a larger percentage of the remaining workers, and (b) two thirds of the workers in the plant were men. As Griffith (1990) points out, immigrant hiring varies by plants and regions. He cites the example where one employer was so confident of native labor supply that he rejected an influx of Mexican workers from the cucumber harvest. Less than 30 miles away, another plant personnel manager was recruiting Mexican populations who worked in the same nearby
harvests and was trying to encourage local contractors to build low-cost trailer parks to attract workers (Griffith, 1990, p. 165).

These ethnographic observations do not stray from the data provided by the U.S. Census of Populations and the U.S. Economic Census. Counties that experienced increases in Hispanic population were also counties with poultry-processing enterprises (although clearly they are working in many other industries). Hall County, for example, which includes Gainesville, that poultry capital (County Code 13139), had 10 poultry-processing establishments in 1997 (Economic Census Code 311615) and its Hispanic population rose from 4.2% in 1990 to 19.6% in 2000 (U.S. Census). Additional support comes from the county-level statistical associations. As mentioned above, the 2000 bivariate county correlation between percentage Hispanic and number of poultry-processing establishments, using the same U.S. data sources, is .385. This county correlation was .151 in 1990. Although statistically significant, the country-level correlations have two shortcomings: First, they measure Hispanic presence at the county, not the firm, level, and second, the U.S. Census undercounts illegal immigrants by about 10%. Still, overall there is sufficient evidence to conclude that “Spanish is spoken on the chicken line.”

The Archetypical Work for Immigrants?

Has immigrant labor displaced another population that was previously working in the secondary sector? Alternatively, has the presence of an immigrant labor force allowed some industries to shift from the primary to the secondary sector and fill its labor need with secondary labor jobs? It seems reasonable, using the conventional definitions (Dickens & Lang, 1988; Edwards, Reich, & Gordon, 1973), to classify poultry work as secondary labor market work. Poultry processing is, and always was, tough, dangerous, and poorly compensated. Journalists, anthropologists, union organizers, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and church organizations all cite the hardship, danger, health hazards, and poor compensation of the job. Workers complain about the “dizziness and fatigue” on the disassembly line. Workers complain of the heat and how, amid the spilled chicken guts, they have to breathe the malodorous gas that rises from the gashed stomachs (Robbins, 1987, p. 66, as cited from Mason & Singer, 1980, p. 5). In an article describing chicken “hangers,” Cobb (2004) wrote that

chicken processing is a dirty business, but no job in a poultry plant is more dreaded than “live hang.” Here, workers known as “chicken hangers” grab birds by their feet and sling them onto fast-moving metal hooks. This is the first—and dirtiest—stage of poultry processing. The birds, weighing approximately five pounds each, fight back by pecking, biting, and scratching the hangers, who wear plastic cones of their forearms to shield off chicken attacks. Then, as workers finally hoist the birds onto the hooks, the chickens urinate and defecate out of desperation, often hitting the workers below.

Aside from the unpleasant, unappealing, dirty, and difficult nature of the job, reporters and organizations have reported on the dangers of the job. In 1994, Horwitz reported that poultry processing ranked as the nation’s 11th most dangerous industry, with an annual injury and illness incidence rate of 23.2 per 100 full-time workers, almost double that of trades such as coal mining and construction. In 1996, reporting a lower number, OSHA said that workers in the poultry slaughtering and processing industry suffered 9.5 injuries and illnesses (for every 100 full-time workers) that caused lost workdays. U.S. workers as a whole experienced only 3.4 such injuries and illnesses for every 100 full-time workers. And the 2000 OSHA injury statistics indicate that one out of every seven poultry workers was injured on the job, more than double the average for all private industries (Stein, 2002). These are likely conservative estimates. Unions allege that workers are fearful that they will lose their jobs if they declare their injuries or lose work time owing to injuries. A GAO report of OSHA inspections between 1994 and 1998 also challenges the validity of OSHA citations. According to GAO, OSHA inspection rates averaged 8.6% for establishments with labor unrest, in contrast to 1.3% for establishments without labor unrest. To summarize their findings, OSHA inspections, a prerequisite to OSHA citations, have the highest incidence for those cases that are complaint driven, in unionized establishments with labor unrest (U.S. GAO, 2000). Nevertheless, the OSHA reports confirm the dangerousness of the job.

Finally, extremely low wages contribute to the unappealing nature of the job. Horwitz (1994), who had worked undercover in a plant, wrote that “wages . . . on the poultry line pay less than in any other manufacturing industry, except apparel” (p. A1). In 1980, poultry worker wages were 55% of red meat worker wages. In 1992, they had risen to 78% of red meat workers and 63% of manufacturing wages (Hetrick, 1994). And “virtually none of the workers receives pensions, and many of them receive no health benefits at all” (Miller, 1992, p. A19).

Hardship, danger, health, and low wages contribute to an unstable, unreliable labor force. Turnover at Tyson, for example, is between 40% and 100% annually, meaning each of the company’s 83 plants needs between 400 and 2,000 new workers every year. Such erratic work patterns are typical for secondary labor market jobs. Griffith (1990) attributes part of the
erratic work pattern to plant locations. By virtue of their location in rural areas, employers have had access to a lower priced labor force. Wages could be lower because they were supplemented by other informal economy income. Griffith found that many native workers employed in the plants also engaged in “domestic production and independent, small scale producer activities such as fishing, gardening, small-scale farming, artisan activities, and raising livestock” (p. 162). In addition to informal economy activities, native labor also had access to government aid programs. These all provided workers with a cushion, producing a workforce with high turnover.

An outsider, looking today at these undesirable, dangerous, and low-paying jobs, could reasonably conclude that there is an occupational boundary that native workers are less likely to cross. The labor force boundary looks “impenetrable.” First, they are preferred because they are willing to work those unpleasant, dangerous, low-paid jobs, and as sojourners or recent arrivals, they absorb the lower wages in the form of sharing housing and transportation. And immigrant networks provide a reliable and growing supply of workers to industries that otherwise suffer with high worker turnover and shortages. Second, because their alternates are limited, they take the jobs that Americans don’t want. Immigrants, especially illegal ones, lack equal access to supplemental income, be it the informal economy or government aid. As the detained poultry-processing worker opined “We Hispanics do all the hard, disgusting work other people don’t want. They ask for your papers, but they don’t look at them very hard.” (Constable, 1995, p. BO1)

But is the presence of Hispanics in poultry processing exactly as the conventional wisdom contends? Do they take jobs that “nobody wants”?

### Labor Force Replacement

The assumption that immigrant labor fills the “otherwise empty” secondary labor market ignores the earlier history. Dangerous, dirty, and underpaid as it was, there was a workforce before the Hispanics entered these jobs. In these southern plants, the workforce was predominantly Black and female. Long after king cotton fell from its southern throne, poultry, textiles, and furniture were the “royal” contenders, and the labor force continued to be African American. Two kinds of data demonstrate that a majority of the employees were African American in the pre-1990 period. The first is the census data that document the earlier (1980) virtual absence of a Latino population in these states. It means that the industries located there had to be operating with a non-Hispanic labor force. The county-level bivariate data also demonstrate that between 1990 and 2000, there was a rise in the correlation between Hispanics and counties with poultry plants (.150 and .385, respectively; Tables 4 and 5). The second confirmation—and here at the level of firms—comes from newspaper, academic, company, and union reports about the industry during the 1980s and early 1990s. They leave little doubt the labor force was predominately African American. It would seem to be ridiculously obvious that industries in the south employed an African American labor force. However, the apparent hegemony of one of the phrases of the immigration discourse—“they take jobs that nobody wants”—indicates a need to reiterate some historical facts. Several examples provide documentation.

In 1979, when workers received no response to their complaints about the working conditions at the Sanderson chicken processing plant in Laurel, Mississippi, some 200 workers—the report notes “mostly black women”—decided to strike (McCarthy, 1980). Many years later, Mike Cockrell, the chief financial officer of Mississippi’s largest poultry company, Sanderson Farms, reported that in the Laurel plant, “jobs in chicken processing have been traditionally filled by black women. Many of these women are single mothers without much education” (Cobb, 2004). Newspaper reports of the terrible Hamlet Fire in 1991 confirm that the labor force was African American. One reporter wrote: “Mostly black and more than three-quarters
women, the workforce of more than 200 people gathered each day to cut, bag, weigh, and fry chicken pieces for use in fast-food restaurants” (Tabor, 1991, p. A17). Published interviews with the 56 survivors and relatives of the 25 who died leave little doubt that the workforce was predominantly African American and female. In addition to an absence of Hispanic names (see Table 6), the biographies of the victims reflect the typical work history of rural southern African Americans. The Reverend Jesse Jackson could have cited Hamlet in 1992 (where he accused government officials of gross negligence and compared the fire to famous civil rights conflagrations; Hoodfires, 1992) as a rebuttal to President Fox rather than journeying to Mexico in search of an apology.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

My intent here is simply a demonstration that the popular assumption of a segmented system with immutable industries and impenetrable job boundaries is untenable. What appears as a secondary labor market only of interest to immigrant workers in 2000 (Time 3) was a labor market occupied by African Americans in 1980 (Time 1). This means that between these two periods, there was a replacement of Black workers by Hispanic workers. Descriptive projects like this raise more questions than I have answered here. The second step, the focus on my ongoing work, is to understand the reasons for this substitution.

Three hypotheses form the basis of this ongoing research agenda. First, as the conventional wisdom has it, Hispanics take jobs that are vacant because of a lack of interest on the part of the African Americans. That disinterest of native workers derives not from the unpleasant, dangerous, and poorly compensated nature of the work but from the simultaneous presence of alternatives for native workers. This argument is clearly false, as African Americans worked those jobs. Drawing from the earlier cited immigration literature, one might speculate that over time the native population acquired skills and moved up the occupational ladder or moved out of the region. Economic growth and presence of new industries in the area16 could have led Black workers to abandon the poultry sector. Thus, labor market vacuums were created when native labor experienced either job or geographic mobility.

A second hypothesis is that what appears as displacing was actually supplementing. As the quantity of chicken production has risen (both for domestic and export markets), so too has the need for labor. If the native labor force was insufficient, Hispanic workers could have been hired to supplement the workforce. By focusing on a specific industry and geographic location, it is
possible to exclude the explanation that the shift was due just to a tighter labor market, a flight from low-skilled manufacturing jobs, or the growth in service jobs that allowed immigrants to be absorbed (Bean & Stevens, 2003, pp. 211-212).

A third hypothesis is that the hiring labor substitution reflects a new employer strategy. One version of this is presented as employer preference for immigrant rather than African American workers because of the immigrant work ethic. Research confirms that there are cases of employer preferences. Kirschenman and Neckerman (as cited in Waldinger, 1997) find that “employers often take race and ethnicity quite explicitly into account in hiring decisions” (p. 366). These employer-preference arguments tend to focus on human capital traits: work ethic, readiness for work, discipline, and adherence to work schedules.

In addition to employer intentionality based on a work ethic, there is another employer intentionality that appears with less frequency in the literature. This hypothesis is that hiring immigrant labor was a response to a labor-management conflict that escalated in the 1980s. As unions directed their efforts toward southern industries (attempting to gain for workers those benefits typically associated with the primary sector), management responded by securing immigrants and guaranteeing that poultry work would remain in a secondary labor market. This version of an “intentionality” argument challenges the assumption that the labor market is segmented in a way that generates an immutable boundary, separating some economic activities from others. This labor displacement/replacement/addition took place in the context of an economic transition. The U.S. economy continues to crowd more and more industries onto the side typically referred to as the secondary sector. And second, those preexisting and new secondary sector industries grew more and more on a labor force that appears to be the domain of immigrants. As Piore (1979) described it, there is a struggle over the frontier of the primary and secondary sector.11

Regardless of the results of this ongoing research, my review of jobs associated with one economic sector in one part of the United States demonstrates the error in assuming that the labor market is segmented in a way that generates an impenetrable boundary separating immigrants from native labor. The debate on immigration must look beyond the archetypical lettuce worker. As the hiring of immigrant labor spreads from one economic sector to another, one must ask “how jobs become ones that nobody wants.” It is mandatory to incorporate a historical understanding of the labor markets into our current debate on immigration. Only in this way can we enlarge the immigration debate beyond the “humanitarians” versus “racists” camps.

Notes

1. The U.S. House Bill HR 4437 (Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005) required the Department of Homeland Security to build five fences along 698 miles of the U.S. border with Mexico (of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas) to block the flow of illegal immigrants and drugs into this country. The fence is to include two layers of reinforced fencing, cameras, lighting, and sensors, and it would also enlist soldiers and local police to help stop people crossing and oblige employers to check the legal status of their workers. It did not include a guest-worker program. As of July 2006 and after the passage of Senate Bill S2611, more than 50 congressional hearings on immigration had not brought the congress any closer to the passage of a bill.

2. Fussell (2004, p. 937) gives an historical account of why this might be the case. For most of the 20th century, she says, Mexico-U.S. migration flows were predominantly from rural areas of Mexico to agricultural areas of the United States. Although the migration stream has become more diversified in the past two decades, the public image seems unchanged.

3. Dickens and Lang (1988) describe characteristics of the dual (segmented) labor and conclude that workers are not able to choose their sector of employment.

4. This course of action does not refer to the approximately 200,000 skilled and high-tech temporary foreign workers that might enter under the H-1B visa category.

5. These are states with total population increases. In the Census ranking of percentage population growth between 1990 and 2000 of all U.S. 3,141 counties, 3 counties in Georgia ranked in the top 10 (second with a 123.2% increase, fourth with 103.2%, and seventh with 96.3%, Census 2000 lists).

6. Author interviewed Marisota in Birmingham, Alabama, in the summer of 2004. She, her husband, and two children migrated from Michoacan via California to Birmingham, Alabama. She said she left California because the wages were too low and that they could get better employment in Alabama. She works as a retail clerk at the Birmingham fruit and vegetable market and her husband, also undocumented, works in a lamp factory. The U.S. Census found that California and New Jersey were the major “exporters” of foreign born to other states between 1995 and 2000 (Perry & Schachtter, 2003).

7. Some of the immigrants from Mexico do not speak Spanish. In reference to a Tennessee court case of child neglect in which the judge ordered the immigrant mother before him to “learn English,” a journalist noted that in Lebanon,

8. The industry code used in the 1992 U.S. Economic Census was 2015.

9. On the “long form” (which was used to collect detailed information from approximately one sixth of the total U.S. population in the 2000 Census), the U.S. Census asks questions of birth, citizenship, and year of immigration. They give an estimate of net census undercount for unauthorized residents of 10% (Brewer & Suchan, 2001).

10. Griffith (1990) found that of those personnel managers who complained about an unreliable labor force, “77% blamed the local economic growth and new industries as the cause” (p. 163).

11. Piore’s 1979 Birds of Passage (especially chapter 6) provides a theoretical and empirical integration of the 1960s African American social movements and the search for immigrant labor.
References


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Nefer: The Aesthetic Ideal in Classical Egypt is a work by Willie Cannon-Brown in which she attempts to take a new look at the aesthetic ideal in classical Egypt. Brown hopes to operationalize the concept of nefer to encompass the physical and spiritual world of the ancient Egyptians. Brown employs the “Dogon” model of girä sō (foreword), bene sō (side-word), bolo sō (back-word), and so dayi (clear-word) as a paradigm to view ancient Egyptian aesthetics.

The text comprises six chapters. Chapter one is also the introduction, chapter two is “The Aesthetic Tradition: A Review,” chapter three is “Abydos: A Methodological Consideration,” chapter four is “The Divine, The Beautiful: An African Perspective,” chapter five is “Kemet Internal Framework,” and chapter six is “Beauty is Everywhere.” In chapter one Brown details the rationale, purpose, limitations, and scope of her work. According to Brown, “the aim of this work is to use an African methodology, to discover the aesthetic ideal in ancient Egypt” (p. 1). In chapter two “The Aesthetic Tradition: A Review” the author provides the reader with a short history and definition of aesthetics in Western culture. More important, she probes the subtle distinctions of art/beauty that emerge from Eurocentric and Afrocentric paradigms. Although both paradigms have useful definitions to offer in regards to beauty, Brown is however searching for a definition that connects the two major concepts in ancient Egypt: maat and nefer (p. 18). Brown argues that other works have not adequately addressed this issue of maat and nefer as purely an “aesthetic ideal.” Brown argues her work is new because most prior texts have narrowly focused on the role of maat, whereas she is attempting to demonstrate that maat and nefer should be seen as bound concepts in ancient Egyptian culture. Brown is attempting to elevate nefer to an essential component of maat and thereby bridging the gap between nature/divine, good/evil, and beautiful/perfection. In chapter three “Abydos: A Methodological Consideration,” Brown uses three aspects that Molefi Asante (p. 90) has laid forth that allows readers to discover and/or analyze certain aspects of African culture. The three elements are epistemic, scientific, and aesthetic. Brown states that these three elements are a part of an African cultural framework that interact in a harmonious way (pp. 19-28). Chapter four “The Divine, The Beautiful: An African Perspective” is the