My research develops novel theory and combines it with data from the field and the laboratory to understand strategic behavior in games and markets.
My work with Mark Walker pioneered the use of data from professional sports as a means of testing the empirical validity of game theory. We show that the serve-and-return behavior of professional tennis players is largely consistent with the theory of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. (See Walker and Wooders (2001), 120+ Google Scholar cites.) In contrast, the theory fares poorly in laboratory experiments. My work with Walker is routinely cited in undergraduate textbooks when introducing students to the notion of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Another fascinating area of current research is the economics of the Internet. I am an authority on Internet auctions, and was the first to investigate the effect of seller reputation on auction prices. (See Houser and Wooders (2006), 300+ Google Scholar cites.) My recent theoretical work studies the incentives of bidders to enter auctions. It also studies "Buy It Now" auctions, a new Internet auction format which combines the features of an auction and a posted price.
Some of my current experimental work investigates the effect of buy prices in laboratory auctions.
An ongoing line of research investigates the "mini-micro" foundations of competitive equilibrium, and develops game-theoretic models of market in which trade is decentralized. Work with Rabah Amir shows how one-way R&D spillovers naturally leads to asymmetric decisions by firms in a symmetric setting.
My entry on Mixed Strategy Equilibrium (with Mark Walker) for the New Palgrave Dictionary is here.
Published Papers
Game Theory
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium (with Mark Walker)
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan (2008).
Mentions: Price Theory and Applications, by Hirshleiffer, Glazer, and Hirschleiffer. An Introduction to Game Theory (pp. 374-375), by Osborne. Games and Strategy (pp. 215-216), by Dixit and Skeath.
