

approaches. The British school places greater emphasis upon systemic transformation and social development. The British school is far more normative with an eye toward addressing injustice and improving the world.

For Cohen neither the American or British approach is superior, but instead they are nice complements. I think Cohen is overly generous about their complementarity. Complementarity requires that the two schools actively engage each other, but such engagement has become increasingly scarce. In 1970, Susan Strange lamented the *mutual neglect* of international economics and international relations. To a great extent, this mutual neglect has been overcome, but another arose. As the American and British schools evolved they became increasingly distant from each other. Members of each school speak increasingly to their own audiences and less to each other—labeled elsewhere as a dialogue of the deaf.

As noted, this intellectual history is incomplete and constrained by the author's tastes. Cohen covers how the magnificent seven produced research programs and helped establish modern IPE, but he gives far less attention to the efforts of succeeding generations of investigators. Early in its evolution as a field many investigators, including Cohen's seven, fell short of incorporating the insights of complex interdependence and greater inclusion, which encouraged investigators to move beyond state-centric explanations. Later generations of scholars, many the intellectual off-spring of Cohen's seven, more successfully heed this guidance. Political scientists from comparative political economy began working at the intersection of comparative and international political economy, blurring the boundaries between fields. Some investigators brought analytic tools from game theory and the study of institutions to bear. Game theorists, institutionalists, and comparativists are naturally inclined to unbundle the state to consider the role of nonstate actors operating in a context defined by institutional rules of the game. Such contributions from outside IPE pushed those in IPE to be more inclusive and less state-centric. This has led to exciting contributions that have significantly advanced the field. Cohen notes some of these contributions toward the end of the book, but only briefly. While arguably not as pioneering as the efforts of Cohen's entrepreneurs in the 1970s, the contributions of later generations are now defining the research agendas in both the American and British schools. Perhaps this calls for a second volume.

Over the past 40 years, successive generations of investigators in IPE have generated fertile research

programs, which contribute to our understanding. IPE's relatively rapid emergence as a field and the diversity across its schools does create a dilemma in conveying the breadth and richness of our knowledge and methodologies, their evolution, and the connections across academic generations. Cohen's book helps address this dilemma by summarizing the efforts of early generations and showing their connections to today, but it also reveals our continuing limitations and challenges.

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*Responsibility and Justice*. By Matt Matravers. (Polity, 2007.)

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Responsibility plays a central role in our moral lives. Both in our judgments of ourselves and others, responsibility is generally a precondition for applying what P. F. Strawson called our reactive attitudes—resentment, praise, blame, and so on. In the last 30 years, responsibility has also become especially important in politics, figuring prominently in major party platforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. But at the same time, Matt Matravers points out, philosophers have shown that the idea of responsibility is “deeply problematic” (10) and is likely to be challenged further by “our increasingly naturalistic understanding of the world” (12–13). Nonetheless, Matravers thinks that responsibility can and should play a secondary role in our practices of justice, and the purpose of his book is to defend such a role.

Before saying what he thinks the concept of responsibility can do, Matravers argues that what it cannot do is play a foundational role in defending our practices of justice. It cannot do so because a necessary condition for holding agents responsible is never met. For an agent to be responsible for an action, her choice to perform that action must have been “‘genuine’ or ‘real’” (24)—that is, it must not have resulted from causal influences outside her own will. That this condition (which Matravers calls the regression requirement) does not obtain is plain. We are born with inherited characteristics, which collaborate with the environment in which we are raised to form our dispositions to act as we do. We cannot be held responsible for our genetic inheritance, nor for our environment, so the worry is that we also cannot be held responsible for what results from their conjunction: our actions. Matravers considers various

combatibilist theories (of which he gives admirably clear overviews) as attempts to circumvent this problem, but concludes that none satisfy the regression requirement. But if this is right, we are left without guidance for shaping our practices of distributive and retributive justice (or worse, with guidance that suggests those practices are bound to be incoherent). Matravers says we are not without options, though. Rather than try to develop the idea of responsibility abstractly and deduce the appropriate practices from it, he argues that we should use the method of reflective equilibrium, “a working back and forth . . . between the practices and the ideas of responsibility embedded within them” (62).

Matravers’s first application of this method is to the issue of distributive justice, where he intervenes in the expensive tastes debate between Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen. Dworkin argues that individuals should be compensated for misfortunes resulting from bad brute luck, but not for misfortunes caused by their own choices. Cohen counters that Dworkin’s choice/chance distinction suggests that people whose tastes become expensive through changes in the market should be compensated for the greater costs of maintaining the same level of welfare as those with cheaper tastes. Dworkin tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that the market conditions making one’s tastes expensive are not the kind of luck that can relieve one of responsibility for bearing burdens. But Matravers points out that Dworkin cannot defend this assertion with the choice/chance distinction, because market conditions are unchosen. Matravers proposes an additional distinction that he thinks can do the work needed: one between “fairness-threatening chance and non-fairness-threatening chance” (103). Bad luck threatens fairness, and therefore relieves affected parties of responsibility, when (a) “there is some feasible alternative set of arrangements that could mitigate [it]” (104), and (b) it conflicts with our considered judgments about the principles that should guide our social practices. So fairness is not threatened when a team loses after its star player is injured, because the practice of sports involves the restriction that teams must compete using the best group of players they can field at a set time. Fairness is threatened, however, when the team loses because the referee was paid off, since impartial judging is both possible and part of that practice. Similarly, unchosen expensive tastes do not threaten fairness because we would consider absurd any theory of justice that required giving additional resources to those with a taste for champagne and caviar (75). Once we apply this method to our overall practices of

distributive justice, we find an appealing alternative to abandoning responsibility. We can instead hold that giving greater rewards to (i.e., treating as responsible) those who are by chance more talented need not be unfair, because it attracts skilled people to more demanding offices, thus providing for important needs. Within such a practice, some role for responsibility is not fairness threatening (106).

Matravers next considers a role for responsibility within retributive justice. He wants to defend a liberal conception of the criminal law, where citizens are understood to be “responsible agents” eligible for punishment “in so far as they understand and have the capacity to be guided by reasons” (124). The challenge for this conception is that scientific evidence suggests that bad social background and personality disorders interfere with this capacity for some, and we might find that such problems are pervasive as we learn more about the human genome. Matravers considers the case of Smith, whose gene for violent tendencies is activated by abusive treatment as a child. How should our institutions respond to Smith’s violent behavior? Matravers applies the fairness-threatening/nonfairness-threatening distinction. For Smith’s case to be nonfairness threatening, there must be “no alternative system under which his life goes better, given society’s need to protect itself against aggressive and dangerous individuals” (138). Smith may not deserve to be more prone to violence than others, but our institutions should reflect the judgment that human actions are the result of choice rather than products of manipulable or diseased beings (123, 139).

The most interesting and original feature of Matravers’s book is his proposed distinction between fairness-threatening and nonfairness-threatening chance. It is not quite clear, however, what the conditions for unfairness are, or what role the distinction should play in assessing our practices. Let me propose an example to illustrate my worry. Suppose Jones suffers from an orphan disease—that is, one from which only a handful of people suffer (perhaps only one). It drastically reduces her well-being, but it can only be treated by sinking immense resources into nongeneralizable medical research. Jones’s bad luck could be fairness threatening. There is a feasible set of alternative arrangements that would mitigate its effects, and treating her is *prima facie* consistent with our considered judgments about the purpose of medical institutions. In principle, this could be the case for any number of people with different orphan diseases. But alleviating Jones’s (and others’) suffering would require diverting resources from other

valuable projects, or choosing between such hard cases. Thus, a lot hangs on how we understand condition (b) for fairness-threatening chance, which is, unfortunately, not clearly stated. What seems to be missing from the account is some principle for weighing each individual claim on society's resources against the whole of such claims. I should stress that Matravers is careful to say several times that he is not attempting to give the last word on anything, but this distinction is interesting and promising enough that it is disappointing that he did not develop it more fully here.

This book gives a clear account of the problem that growing doubts about responsibility present for some practices of justice to which we are deeply committed. It also suggests a novel way of approaching that problem without attempting to explain it away. I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in these issues.

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*Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region and Qualitative Analysis*. Edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater and Tuong Vu. (Stanford University Press, 2008.)

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*Southeast Asia in Political Science* addresses a key issue in political science: is there only one path, or are there several valid paths, towards building theory? This question was at the heart of two separate debates in the late 1990s: area studies versus political science and quantitative versus qualitative methods. Since then, numerous efforts have tried to address these issues. *Southeast Asia in Political Science* ties these separate strands together, resulting in an impressive volume of interest to scholars and students.

To the authors, the study of Southeast Asia has faced undeserved theoretical marginalization in political science and relative obscurity compared to Northeast Asia. They argue (some more enthusiastically than others) that Southeast Asian studies have yielded theoretical insights and "knowledge accumulation" over several decades and have the potential to contribute to the further development of qualitative methodologies. As the editors put it, there is a "synergy between region and discipline."

To support their argument, the authors provide a "systematic inventory and synthesis" of Southeast Asian studies, bringing coherence to this wide body of work and situate it within mainstream compara-

tive politics. This is not an easy task because many seminal works were made not only by political scientists but also by anthropologists, historians, and sociologists.

The authors trace the development of three broad research areas: governance (state processes, regime change, and parties and elections); social structures and forces (mass politics, peasant politics, civil society, religion and ethnicity); and political economy (globalization, development, and rural economy). Unlike other edited books, the chapters in *Southeast Asia in Political Science* hang well together providing an honest assessment of the field's strengths and limitations and identifying future research agendas such as political parties, elections, institutional engineering, state-religion relations, postsocialism, the role of labor, and agricultural transition. Even as they make this contribution, some of the authors are aware of, and the reader will sense, at least two challenges in this endeavor.

First, there are three kinds of contributions from Southeast Asian studies. In the first category are classic works by Benedict Anderson, Clifford Geertz, James Furnivall, Joel Migdal, Lucian Pye, and James C. Scott which have also influenced non-Southeast Asian studies. This is, however, the exception than the rule (Abrami and Doner; Davidson; Hamayotsu). In the second category are works which have disaggregated Western concepts and question their resulting generalizations. Some of these are post-neoclassical analyses of the political economy of the state, the role or nonrole of civil society in democratization, business and ethnic entrepreneurs, and local agency and illiberal adaptation to globalization. Third, most if not all of Southeast Asian studies have demonstrated "knowledge accumulation" by identifying causal processes, conceptual and typological analyses (most notably on state types such as administrative, patrimonial bureaucratic), and interpretivism. The authors show that the strength of Southeast Asian studies lay not only in rich empirical detail, but also in the development of middle-range theories or insights such as in processes of state-formation (internal war, bossism), reasons for the failure of democratic transition, the convergence of individual and organizational factors for democratic consolidation, and micro- and meso-levels in the organization genre of mass politics.

Yet to have wider appeal, the authors suggest that scholars connect their empirical work to theory and to take advantage of the natural diversity and compare Southeast Asian political, economic, religious and social systems. They also suggest cross-regional