

This ethnography of blackjack dealing at a corporate casino in Nevada reveals that dealers, to make tips, regularly violate the house's directives for regulating their interactive labor. Although the emergent sociology of service work has highlighted novel dilemmas of autonomy (workers must be free to provide "authentic" emotional labor) and interests (workers may team up with clients) for management, it too narrowly focuses on the service labor process and, thus, cannot fully account for the genesis and functions of the casino's system of labor control. This regime is analyzed as a "hegemonic" regime. This entails, first, specifying the structural changes in the American gambling industry that have led to the contemporary competitive casino's tipped labor system; and second, elucidating the functions for management of ceding to workers a degree of freedom: lower labor costs and customized service provision.

The House Rules

Autonomy and Interests Among Service Workers in the Contemporary Casino Industry

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Dealers come on shift knowing that it is they who must face the hard intent of players to win and coolly stand in its way, consistently blocking skill, luck, and cheating, or lose the precarious reputation they have with management.

—Erving Goffman, aspiring croupier, 1967

Hell, if a player's tipping who cares if he's winning? It ain't my money I'm giving away!

—Maria, blackjack dealer, 1998

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It is 9 p.m. on a busy Friday night at “Jackpot,” a large corporate casino in Nevada.¹ I am a “break-in” blackjack dealer about to begin my first shift, squirming nervously in my “black and whites” (worker slang for their hot and uncomfortable tuxedo attire). Management has assigned Joanne—at 33 one of the oldest and most experienced of Jackpot’s young, primarily female and immigrant dealers—to watch over me. She stands at my side as I deal two cards to each of the three middle-aged, middle-class men at the table. The casino’s interior, with its opulent decor, dim lighting, and free cocktails, is designed to provide these players a fantasy realm of conspicuous consumption in which everyday worries and concerns do not hold. For me, however, the casino represents a critical if extreme research site for the sociology of service work. Not only are Nevada’s casinos notorious for their despotic labor control strategies (Frey, 1986; R. Smith, Preston, & Humphries, 1974), but the industry over the past decade has expanded throughout the United States and become highly competitive (Eadington, 1999; Marfels, 1999). Such developments, scholars of service work predict (Hochschild, 1983, p. 8; Leidner, 1999, p. 84; MacDonald & Sirianni, 1996, p. 9), should have increased the relevance of customer service to the individual casino and, thus, intensified managerial attempts to control workers’ “interactive labor” (Leidner, 1993).

A mere 10 minutes into my first night of fieldwork, however, a surprise comes. All three players are winning but not offering me any tips. I smile and make conversation anyway, as house procedure dictates. Joanne, though, whispers to me, “Listen kid, your attitude sucks. When they’re winning but not toking [tipping], you ain’t supposed to be nice. Dummy up and deal. Get them outta here.” I would soon discover that although dealers are required to simultaneously deal quickly, protect against cheating, and produce in customers a happy, carefree, emotional state, they regularly violate these “house rules” to increase their tip incomes.² Why do dealers refuse to identify with casino management? And considering the considerable resources the firm mobilizes to ensure compliance with its tripartite goals of *speed*, *security*, and *service*—intense work routinization, video surveillance, emotional labor requirements—how are workers able to break its shop-floor rules? Although the emergent sociology of service work has highlighted novel dilemmas of autonomy and interests for management, it too narrowly focuses on the service labor process and, thus, cannot fully account for the genesis and functions of the casino’s system of labor control.

THEORY: SITUATING THE SERVICE LABOR PROCESS

The proportion of U.S. workers employed in service industries has grown steadily throughout this century (from 30% in 1900, to 50% in 1950, to 75% today). Sociologists and scholars of the workplace, however, did not begin to theorize how this transition affected our traditional, manufacturing-based understandings of labor relations until the past few decades. Specifically, they have argued that the immediate presence of clients at the point of production complicates managerial strategies for organizing the labor process and monitoring/disciplining workers. These dilemmas have been described as being of two main types: those of worker autonomy and interests.

Regarding *autonomy*, researchers have pointed out the possibilities of increased worker surveillance and control offered by the presence of clients. Management may, for instance, surreptitiously monitor and evaluate service providers using electronic surveillance (Garson, 1988; MacDonald & Sirianni, 1996), “secret shoppers” (Benson, 1986), or customers themselves (Fuller & Smith, 1991). In general, though, service labor may offer workers greater autonomy than does manufacturing labor because they perform not just physical tasks but “emotional” or “interactive” labor as well (Hochschild, 1983; Leidner, 1993; Sutton, 1991). The product being “sold” by a service firm, that is, is often intangible, such as an experience or a feeling.³ And insofar as despotic control strategies produce standardized, “inauthentic” emotional expressions, they become inappropriate for organizing work (Frenkel, Korczynski, Shire, & Tam, 1999, p. 203; Gutek, 1995; Hochschild, 1983; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). Workers must therefore be granted a much wider degree of autonomy to customize their service offerings (Gottfried, 1991; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; V. Smith, 1996). In addition, the alignment of *interests* cannot be conceptualized as a simple dichotomy in which managers and workers clash against one another (Leidner, 1999; Troyer, Mueller, & Osinsky, 2000). Rather, the interests and resources of clients themselves must be considered, especially the extent to which two of these groups may form an alliance against the third. And whereas such alliances will continually shift within any one workplace, one pattern will dominate (Leidner, 1993).

I began ethnographic fieldwork in the casino equipped with two conceptual “tools”: the notions of “emotional labor” and “three-way interest alliance.” And whereas they worked well initially—management did ask us to smile, laugh, and provide players an overall gaming “experience,” though dealers often aligned themselves with clients versus the House—I soon

found them limited in two important ways. First, I began researching the history of casino dealing in Nevada and found that the current emotional labor demands and interest alliance on the gambling tables were of recent origin. As the structure of the casino industry had changed throughout the century, so had managerial strategies for organizing casino dealing. Yet the service work literature offers few tools for understanding how industrial and organizational change affect the fine details of the actual labor process. As Heimer and Stevens (1997) stated, these studies have neglected or ignored how “the content of [service and professional] work is altered by external demands placed on the organization in which it is embedded . . . organizational environments matter” (pp. 135-136). Second, whereas my fieldwork revealed why it was “rational” for workers to break the casino’s rules regarding service, I was initially unable to understand why management allowed this to happen (especially in a heavily monitored workplace such as the casino). Did workers’ infractions in fact serve some function for the firm beyond the immediate horizon of the labor process? “Do [workers’] ‘games’ or coping practices in the service sector . . . display contradictory impulses?” (McCammon & Griffin, 2000, p. 284).

To address these issues, I returned to the manufacturing literature, “mining” it for a means to address these issues. Specifically, I applied the concept of “hegemonic regime” to the casino’s system for regulating dealers’ interactive labor. This concept was first used by Burawoy (1979, 1988) to describe the “politics of production” he observed while working as a press operator in an engine factory.⁴ Such an analysis entails, first, situating the labor process within the structure of the firm as a whole and within the historical changes in the industry under study. Burawoy thus discovered that as American manufacturing industries had undergone a transition during the mid-20th Century from competitive to monopoly conditions, management had eschewed “despotic” labor control—in which workers are disciplined through a drive system (direct supervision, harsh punishments)—for a “hegemonic” regime—characterized by various concessions such as significant investment in employees (high wages and benefits) and shop-floor autonomy for workers to operate outside of official procedure (see also Edwards, 1979; Friedman, 1977; Jacoby, 1985; Roy, 1960).⁵ Second, in such an analysis, to view a system of labor control as hegemonic is to view workers’ shop-floor experiences as a “game”—that is, to specify the “goals” workers pursue as well as the rules and resources mobilized to attain them. Third, one specifies the effects/functions of this shop-floor phenomenology for the firm as a whole. For Burawoy, the beneficial if unintended consequences for the manufacturing enterprise of granting workers autonomy to “make out” were the obfuscation

of managerial power and mitigation of vertical conflict, both of which served to secure worker consent to the larger Fordist system (see also Ditton, 1977; Harvey, 1989; Katz, 1968).

In what follows, I attempt to synthesize the new empirical concepts of the service work literature with the methodological precepts of the labor process analysis proposed by Burawoy (1979, 1988). I begin with a historical analysis of how changes in the structure of the Nevada casino industry have affected managerial strategies for organizing dealing work, especially concerning emotional labor requirements and conflicts of interest among players, dealers, and the house. Second, I present my ethnography of contemporary casino croupiers, for whom work entails not a “game of making out” but one of “making tips,” whose logic entails, contra official managerial directives, selectively withholding emotional labor and helping players win. I conclude by elucidating the functions of this system for the firm as a whole: lower labor costs and flexible service customization, though it entails a loss of worker commitment. First, however, I give a brief overview of my data sources and how I gained entrée to my research site.

METHOD AND DATA

Considering that legal gambling has throughout the majority of U.S. history been confined to a single, sparsely populated state, a surprisingly large amount of primary and secondary source materials exist on the work experiences of Nevada’s casino dealers throughout the 20th Century. My historical analysis in this article is thus based on a series of oral histories of early Nevada casino workers collected by historians at the University of Nevada, several ethnographies of casino dealing, management publications, employee handbooks, and my own interviews with veteran casino workers.

The ethnographic portion of the article, in turn, is based on a 4-month stint as a casino dealer. In late spring, I moved to Nevada and, as must all aspiring croupiers today, enrolled in a state-licensed vocational school offering standardized courses in dealing. Completion of such a program constitutes a prerequisite for applying to dealing jobs.⁶ In June (a peak in the hiring season), I applied to the Jackpot Corporation as a blackjack dealer. I specifically chose Jackpot as a potential research site because of its current structural position in the U.S. casino industry. The prevailing image of the contemporary casino is still that of the glamorous, Disney-esque, megacasino on the Las Vegas Strip catering to a high-rolling, often international clientele. As the gambling industry has spread across the United States over the past decade, however (38 of the 50 U.S. states now allow casinos), the typical casino has become

smaller, less glitzy, and more geared toward a “locals market” (Bear, Stearns and Co., 2001; Eadington, 1999). Jackpot casino—located “off the strip” and catering to a competitive market of budget-conscious tourists and locals—is thus an ideal representative of the “new generation” of American casinos.

Through considerable good fortune I was hired by Jackpot as a swing-shift (9 p.m. to 5 a.m.) blackjack dealer (I also occasionally dealt craps and roulette—the details of my hiring are discussed in the following section). Though technically classified as part-time, I like all dealers regularly worked 10 to 12 hours per night and 50-plus hours per week. During my tenure as a croupier, I kept my status as researcher hidden from both management and co-workers. When asked about myself on job applications or by other workers in the casino, I would reply that I was between jobs or looking for a new line of work. Although aware of the ethical issues associated with covert ethnographic research, I decided before entering the field that such dissembling was not only safe for my subjects—my presence would pose no danger for my coworkers, whereas I would take all necessary steps to ensure anonymity—but necessary for two reasons. First, because of the illicit workplace behavior I might observe, I was worried that other dealers would not trust their secrets to one associated with management and/or academia. And second, I wanted to ensure that I received no special treatment from corporate or floor management. Indeed, throughout my fieldwork, I could discern no major differences in how I was treated by management or my coworkers. In fact, the process of gaining entrée and winning the trust of fellow dealers was easier than expected because of the worker solidarity induced by the industry’s shared tip structure, in which individual dealers’ tips are pooled together and split evenly among all workers. Because the most experienced dealer’s income was dependent on the tip-making ability of the greenest of dealers, new workers are quickly “taken under the wing” of veteran dealers and taught explicitly the work group’s multiple tip-making tactics.

FROM “DUMMY UP AND DEAL” TO “SERVICE WITH A SMILE”

Both Leidner (1999) and Hochschild (1983) have argued that as competition within service industries intensifies, customer service becomes an increasingly important mechanism of product differentiation. To attract and retain clients, management organizes the labor process to procure emotional labor from workers. This formulation, on the surface, fits the case of Nevada’s casino firms. As the industry has moved from a monopoly to a competitive structure, the labor process for dealers has become increasingly

geared toward service provision and now involves considerable worker autonomy. Yet the current configuration of worker and managerial practices on the casino floor is not explained through reference to new service demands alone. One must also consider both changes in the management structure of the firm—especially the decoupling of corporate and shop-floor management—and the full range of corporate responses to competition—both the technical “re-skilling” of workers and attempts to cut labor costs.

The history of legal gambling in Nevada has been one of a progression in the casinos’ primary profit strategy from security to speed to service. From 1931, the year Nevada legalized gambling, through the early 1960s, the handful of casinos in the state were small, flat organizations and the industry as a whole was in the hands of a few operators (Findlay, 1986, p. 114). The constricted size and structure of the industry during this period were due to two factors. First, demand was limited to a small pool of local servicemen and manual laborers because of both the moral disapprobation of gambling at the national level and state laws that precluded industry outreach to new consumer markets (Skolnik, 1978).⁷ Second, early casino operators had great difficulty raising capital to begin new or expand existing facilities. Nevada law prohibited corporations from owning casinos, and possible lending institutions were wary of investing because of the presence of organized crime in the industry (Eadington, 1984).

With limited demand and severe capital constraints, the individual casinos’ primary profit strategy was to ensure *security*—that is, to ensure the House won as many “hands” as possible, particularly high-stake ones—because a loss on any one large wager could bankrupt the casino (Harrah, 1978, p. 140). A casino owner from the era recalls, “There wasn’t that much play, and you couldn’t afford to [lose] fifty dollars or a hundred dollars, why that was a big score. . . . You just didn’t have the players to make it up” (Petricciani, 1982, p. 303). Speed of play was irrelevant because of the low overall player volume, whereas customer service was not expected by the male, working-class gamblers, who preferred a tense, serious table atmosphere (Findlay, 1986; Ring, 1972, p. 78). To maximize security, the house attempted *despotic* control. Owners themselves would walk the floor to monitor workers, and dealers caught cheating were fired on the spot (Binion, 1973; Nelson, 1978). Dealers whose infractions were particularly egregious risked more than job termination:

The [cheating] dealer was held by two goons, while his closed fists were placed on a table. Another goon wielded a baseball bat and brought it down on the dealer’s hands, smashing them beyond repair. The dealer was then dragged

through the casino, with the blood dripping from his crushed fingers. (Reid & Demaris, 1963, p. 52)

The social and technical organization of the labor process in this period, however, rendered total control impossible for the house to achieve. Dealing remained a craft whose secrets were carefully guarded by its White male practitioners (Ray, 1991), and the casino's surveillance capabilities were primitive (Nelson, 1978, pp. 17-20). Dealers regularly did cheat on the tables by, for instance, slyly pocketing money when supervisors were out of sight or using special shuffling techniques to "set the deck" for a confederate playing at the table (Nelson, 1978, p. 56; Ring, 1972, p. 79; Skolnik, 1978, p. 106).

During the 1970s and 1980s, rapid increases in both supply of and demand for gambling—coupled with the state's national monopoly on the product—led to a second, boom era in the Nevada casino industry's history. A growing California population possessing both disposable incomes and less puritanical attitudes toward gambling, along with improved transportation routes to Las Vegas and Reno, fueled demand for Nevada's casinos (Eadington, 1984). And on the supply side, the state, which by the late 1960s received close to half its annual revenue from gaming taxes, no longer viewed the industry as a moral eyesore (Greenlees, 1988, p. 65). Rather, the Nevada legislature passed policies to promote industry expansion, including the important 1969 Corporate Gaming Act that enabled corporations to invest in the industry (Skolnik, 1978, p. 142). Over the next two decades, the new casino firms—all privately held consortiums—built theme-park-like hotel-casinos to attract families and tourists who would play small amounts of money over long periods of time. The economic effect of this new clientele for the industry was staggering: In 1965, statewide gross gaming revenues totaled \$250 million; by 1980, they approached \$3 billion (Greenlees, 1988, p. 65).

Despite Nevada's new tourist image, however, dealers were not asked to perform emotional labor for players during this period (Eadington, 1998; Goffman, 1967; Horowitz, 1975; Solkey, 1980; Vinson, 1986). First, industry revenue remained concentrated in the hands of a few operators.⁸ Such monopolistic industrial structure, coupled with high demand, led casino operators to expect ever-increasing profits regardless of the customer service they offered patrons (Sheehan, 1997). In this era,

One lost customer was not considered a big deal by a [Nevada] casino. After all, there was always another customer where the first one came from. And besides, where was the disgruntled customer going to take his business anyway? . . . The casino next door was not making its profits because it was mas-saging players with a Dale Carnegie strategy. People wanted to gamble, and

Nevada was the only wide open gaming jurisdiction . . . profits would come with or without customer service. (Thompson & Comeau, 1992a, pp. 19-21)

Second, upper level management in the newly formed casino firms consisted of veterans from the industry's "frontier era" (Gottdiener, Collins, & Dickens, 1999; Macomber, 1984). Official organizational policy and shop-floor managerial practice thus continued to reflect the traditional perspective on casino customer service: Interpersonal interactions between dealers and players could signify only cheating confederations. Corporate policy in this period thus directed pit bosses to "watch for eye movements or smiles between dealer and player" (Jackpot Casino, 1978), whereas an employee manual instructed workers to "never display emotions while dealing" (Vinson, 1986). And Lee Solkey, an anthropologist who worked covertly as a blackjack dealer in the 1970s, verifies that for dealers, "The phrase '*dummy up and deal*' . . . is the best advice possible for survival on the table. Talking to players is risky at best and seldom necessary" (Solkey, 1980, p. 58).

If not service, the house did respond to the growth in player volume by seeking to maximize *speed* of play (Graves, 1978, p. 354; Horowitz, 1975; Petricianni, 1982, p. 198; Saiger, 1985, p. 52). And because of new capital investment in the industry, management was now able to fully impose despotic control over workers. By 1972, casinos industry-wide had thoroughly de-skilled dealing work (Braverman, 1974). Dealers no longer shuffled and dealt the cards manually; rather, shuffling machines and multideck shoes served to maximize both the speed and security of the dealing act by eliminating dealer skill and discretion (Vinson, 1986). Casinos industry-wide implemented sophisticated electronic surveillance technology with which management monitored workers closely and constantly. And as White men fled the newly routinized profession, management increasingly hired women and minorities (Enarson, 1993). Solkey (1980) provided a vivid example of life under a despotic pit boss intent on maintaining "the grind":

There was a man sitting on center base who clutched his chest, groaned, turned pale, started wobbling and tipped backwards, falling to the floor. I jumped, not knowing what to do and the floorman yelled at me, "keep dealing." . . . The man was dead of course, but I never missed a beat. I just kept on dealing. (p. 60)

The past decade has witnessed the onset of a third, competitive period in the history of the Nevada casino industry (Bear, Stearns and Co., 2001; Eadington, 1999; Marfels, 1995, 1999). On one hand, the industry's monopolistic structure was abruptly altered in the late 1980s when South Dakota and Iowa legalized casino gambling and Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (Eadington, 1990). All allowed casinos in non-Nevada

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics on the U.S. Gaming Industry

	1970	1979	1988	2000
States permitting casino gaming	1	2 ^a	2	38
Gaming companies in Nevada	NA	12	16	25
Casino-operating entities in United States (firms and tribes)	NA	13	17	152 (102 tribes, 50 firms)
Casinos in Nevada ^b	60	130	169	238
Nevada casino revenue	\$575 million	\$2.2 billion	\$4.3 billion	\$9 billion
Casinos in United States	60	133	181	534
National casino revenue	\$575 million	\$3 billion	\$7 billion	\$30 billion

SOURCE: Nevada Gaming Control Board (1970, 1979, 1988, 2000); International Gaming and Wagering Business (1999); Bear, Stearns and Co. (2001).

a. In 1978, New Jersey legalized casino gaming in Atlantic City.

b. Nonrestricted operations with gaming revenues in excess of \$1 million.

locales and were shortly followed by similar measures elsewhere. And although Nevada firms have successfully moved into many of these new jurisdictions, the nationalization of the casino industry has resulted in dramatic increases in the number of both casinos and casino-operating entities (gaming firms plus Native American tribes) in the United States (see Table 1).⁹ On the other hand, whereas gambling revenue within Nevada itself has continued to grow, the concentration of such revenue in the hands of the top few firms has decreased, as revealed by contemporary lead-firm and four-firm market shares within the state: 10.1% and 34.0%, respectively (Marfels, 1999, p. 33; see Note 8 for comparative data from the second period). In sum, the past decade for Nevada's casino industry has seen decentralization of industry structure within the state and heightened competition from without.

As expected, with this transformation in industry structure from monopoly to competitive conditions have come new attempts by firms to differentiate their "product" from other casinos' by marketing to consumers not just the opportunity to gamble but a unique "gaming experience" (Vogel, 1994). In addition to extravagant themes and amenities (art galleries, roller coasters, etc.), *personalized customer service* has emerged as an integral part of this experience. Since the early 1990s, the industry's trade journals and conferences have regularly offered tracts extolling the necessity of service on the part of dealers, waitresses, valets, and so on (e.g., Demos, 1991; DiBenedetto, 1996; Sanders & Knight, 1997). Industry analysts Thompson and Comeau (1992b) summarized the newly emergent sentiment: "Casinos are finding that in a competitive market the most distinguishing quality they can offer is outstanding service" (p. 20).

Yet to understand how customer service is (or in this case, is not) actually performed on the gaming tables, we must consider three additional aspects of increasing competition in the gaming industry. First, firms now market not only customer service but lower prices, which in the casino industry means offering “the best odds in town” (Cabot, 1996; Mello, 1997). Jackpot thus advertises not only “looser” (i.e., higher paying) slot machines but “single-deck blackjack,” in which shoes and shuffling machines are eliminated to improve the odds for players.¹⁰ By again making the shuffling and dealing of the cards by hand a part of procedure, however, this particular marketing ploy has resulted in a (of course partial) technical re-skilling of dealing labor. Second, casino firms have restructured their workforces in an attempt to reduce operating costs. At Jackpot over the past decade, corporate management has cut employee wages and benefits, often through forcing out full-time, veteran dealers and replacing them with young, usually immigrant, women. Of the 100 dealers who worked the swing shift with me, approximately 70 were women and 75 were non-White. The casino classifies these workers as part-time and pays the minimum wage with no benefits. As a result, although Solkey (1980, p. 79) estimated that during the 1970s, tipping at a casino the size and status of Jackpot would constitute 20% to 50% of a dealer’s income, over the length of my fieldwork, tipping constituted 75% to 85% of a dealer’s total income.¹¹ And third, the nationwide expansion of the casino industry has been accompanied by a transformation in firm structure from privately to publicly held corporations (Eadington, 1999, p. 176; Gottdiener et al., 1999, p. 30)—the Jackpot corporation itself went public in the early 1990s. With this new organizational form has come a growing gulf between corporate and floor management. The former today enter the industry direct from business or professional schools without having worked in the casinos themselves and are thus, unlike their predecessors, at a distance from day-to-day operations on the shop floor (Eadington, 1998, p. 27; Hashimoto, Kline, & Fenich, 1996).

In sum, whereas the industry’s monopoly era was characterized by the de-skilling of dealer labor, a living wage, and a unitary managerial perspective on the labor process, the changes of the past decade have resulted in a *re-skilling* of dealing labor, an *outsourcing* of workers’ wages to customers via a tipping system, and a *decoupling* of management structures. And whereas corporate management now officially organizes dealing to procure emotional labor from workers as a method of product differentiation, these policies are regularly reworked on the casino floor by pit bosses. It is to this conflict between corporate and floor managers’ schemas for regulating dealing labor that I now turn.

A HOUSE DIVIDED: CORPORATE VERSUS FLOOR MANAGEMENT SCHEMAS FOR ORGANIZING WORK

Although Jackpot targets budget-conscious locals and working-class tourists, like all casinos it must be prepared to handle high-roller action as well. Corporate management has thus officially organized dealing work—from initial “auditions” to the ubiquitous black globes above each table—to maximize speed, security, and service. Upon applying to Jackpot, I was first required to attend an eight-person group interview at which personnel specialists evaluated our interaction skills through conversation exercises and role-playing games. The next day, three of us were invited back for an audition on the casino floor itself. We took turns dealing at a dead table for Rick, a young corporate manager who informed us that

We’re looking for “people people.” Those who can carry on a conversation. We can always teach technical skill, but we need good personalities. As a matter of fact, we had a gentleman recently who didn’t even know how to deal, but was so outgoing and fun that we had to hire him. And we did and we trained him and now he’s the best dealer in the house.

The initial decision to hire is thus based as much on the applicant’s personality as her or his technical skill. Before starting work, though, the new dealer must pass both a drug test and a police background check of her or his criminal record. In sum, management uses the results of various prehire tests (friendly demeanor, no drug use, clean police record) as indicators of certain desirable traits (amiability, honesty, sobriety) to select workers they feel will readily perform service- and security-related directives.

The physical organization of the casino floor functions to maximize security by “creat[ing] conditions of regularity and visibility” (Skolnik, 1978, p. 71). Groups of 8 to 16 gaming tables are numbered and placed facing outward in oval-shaped patterns called *pits*. One or two supervisors monitor each pit.¹² The oval design lets them constantly keep multiple tables in their field of vision, while a black ceiling globe housing a video camera is mounted above each table and relays to a central control room staffed by surveillance specialists. Even dealers’ uniforms are designed to maximize security rather than comfort or aesthetics; long-sleeved shirts with tight cuffs ensure they do not slide chips up their sleeves, while aprons prevent them from accessing their pockets while on the tables. This sophisticated network of surveillance is intended to function as a panopticon, insofar as management can

potentially monitor workers at all times, whereas the individual dealer should have no knowledge of if or when she or he is under observation (Foucault, 1979).

The organization of the labor process itself is constrained by both the basic rules of blackjack and the structure of the tipping system. A blackjack table is a semicircle of green felt with betting circles for seven players. Once all bets are placed, the dealer gives each player, including herself or himself, two cards. The idea of the game

is for the player and dealer to get as close to a card count of 21 as possible, without "breaking" (going over that number). The most straightforward way to reach 21 is by drawing an ace (which counts for either 11 or 1) and a 10-card. The two-card 21 is called "blackjack" [and is paid 3 to 2; a regular winner is paid 1 to 1]. (Skolnik, 1978, pp. 56-57)

After the initial cards are dealt, each player decides whether to "hit" (take another card) or "stand." If a hit breaks the player, the dealer takes his or her cards and bet immediately. After all players have played their hands, the dealer exposes both her or his cards and plays out the hand. At this point,

the critical items are . . . dealers must draw on 16 and stand pat on 17, and ties are a standoff . . . the player is not playing against the other players but only against the dealer; and the dealer is totally lacking in discretion. (Skolnik, 1978, p. 57)

The standard method of tipping one's dealer is to offer a "toke bet." Here, the player places a smaller side bet "for the dealer" next to his or her bet before the hand begins. If the player loses, both bets are collected and go into the tray (to the house). If the player wins, the dealer pays both bets and collects for herself or himself both the original toke bet and its winnings. These tip earnings are then deposited in a common "toke box" and evenly distributed among all dealers at the end of the shift. Two important characteristics of this tipping system must be emphasized. First, the dealer is tipped only when the player wins; otherwise, both bets go the house. Second, the shared tip system encourages dealer cooperation to collectively maximize the tip income for all.

Although the basic rules of blackjack are simple enough and seemingly would allow dealers considerable latitude to perform their tasks, this is far from the case. The *noninteractive components* of dealing (how dealers handle cards, chips, etc.) have been routinized to maximize speed and security. "Procedure" consists of a series of brief actions that, taken together, constitute a "hand" and are repeated over and over. They are as follows:

1. holding the deck,
2. dealing two cards to each player (the “pitch”) and the dealer,
3. hitting each player’s hand,
4. exposing and playing the dealer’s hand,
5. collecting losing bets,
6. paying winning bets, and
7. shuffling the deck.

There is one precise way to perform each of these tasks, specified to such a degree of detail that the placement of every finger at every moment is predetermined.

The house also regulates seven aspects of the *interactive component* of dealing—how croupiers converse with customers and each other. First, to maximize speed, dealers must teach novice players the procedures of play so they do not unnecessarily hold up the game. This education, though, must involve only rules of play, not game strategy. Computer simulations have determined the “proper” blackjack strategy that maximizes the player’s win percentage.¹³ It allows the player to win nearly half (49%) of the time. The average player, though, plays around the 35% to 45% level (Vogel, 1994). Dealers of course know the basics of the proper strategy but are prohibited from advising players on how to play their hands to maximize security (i.e., the house advantage on individual hands and thus the overall house edge). Third, dealers must constantly monitor their tables for possible cheating and report any unusual player behavior to the floor supervisor. Fourth, all official game-related communication between dealer and players must be signaled visibly so both supervisors and cameras can monitor the action from afar. And fifth, on the casino floor, dealers cannot “carry on unnecessary conversations with other employees”; this is to prevent interemployee cheating schemes (Jackpot employee manual).

The remaining two areas of interactive regulation serve to ensure customer service. The Jackpot employee manual instructs dealers to create a fun table atmosphere in which each player feels like a guest: “Greet each player with a friendly ‘hello,’” “introduce yourself to each player,” “show a general interest in your players,” and “say ‘thank you’ when players leave your game.” Certain behaviors are prohibited: “Never display any body language that could be interpreted as negative or unfriendly” and “never ignore a player.” The final directive prevents dealers from “hustling tokes,” that is, aggressively pressuring players to tip, and thus creating an “unfun” table atmosphere:

- Never imply that a player should tip.
- Never say “let’s make some money.”

- No differential treatment of players who tip. (Jackpot employee manual)

Were the above policies to be enforced completely—a technically possible task—dealers would undoubtedly perform simultaneously speed, security, and service. Actual practices on the casino floor, however, diverge from the official organization of the labor process. As my fieldwork proceeded, I discovered a difference on the shop floor for dealers between the roles of pit bosses and those of corporate management. From the point of view of dealers, corporate management demands they provide speed, security, and service for all clients. Yet Jackpot’s pit bosses, although officially salaried representatives of the corporation, were all former dealers and acted as middlemen between dealers and corporate management.¹⁴ Through observations of and informal conversations with pit bosses, I found that they are evaluated according to their pit’s nightly “win” (overall profit), a function of both volume of play and the house’s win percentage on a given evening. Floor managers thus perform strategically within their own game by (a) maximizing speed for low-rollers by letting the tipping system regulate the labor process, even though this entails sacrificed security and service provision; and (b) maximizing security and service for high-rollers by imposing despotic control, even though speed is here sacrificed.

THE DAILY GRIND: AUTONOMY FOR LOW-ROLLERS

Low-rollers (those who play \$3 to \$20 hands) constituted around 90% of Jackpot’s clientele. During many shifts, in fact, a dealer would only encounter low-rollers. And although corporate management directs dealers to provide service to and ensure security for all players, pit bosses care only about maximizing speed for low-rollers. They thus here withdrew control, allowing the logic of the tipping system to regulate the labor process. For just as pit bosses seek to maximize the overall volume of low-rollers’ small-stake wagers, dealers understand that more hands dealt means more tipping opportunities and therefore spontaneously maximize their speed. Players would often complain about the pace at which we dealt or even ask us to slow down. Invariably a dealer would respond, “Sorry, but we have to deal this way” or “Can’t help it. The hand is quicker than the eye.” Consent was thus secured as well over the intense routinization of dealing work. At no point during my fieldwork did I hear workers complain about the severe standardization of their every move, for on the shop floor itself, dealing according to procedure

was understood as—and as far as I could tell *was*—the fastest way to deal and thus to make tips.

Yet the flip side of the maximum-speed performance generated by the tipping system is sacrificed security and service provision. The token bet system, that is, creates incentives both to assist players who are tipping and to treat nontippers rudely to force them off. And the autonomy to do so is granted by floor supervisors in three ways. First, surveillance is withdrawn when low-rollers are playing. Pit bosses pay close attention primarily to high-stakes games, whereas video surveillance too neglects “grind play.” As a new dealer, I soon discovered this fact of life on the casino floor: The vast majority of our work is not monitored.

Tonight I accidentally paid a woman on her \$5 bet when we both have 18 [ties in blackjack are a standoff]. Even worse, I paid and collected her \$1 tip bet too. At first I panicked. What if the cameras saw that? Will they fire me? But then I rationalized it, telling myself that this place is so packed tonight, while the players at my table were playing such small bets. What are the odds that one or two guys in surveillance, monitoring all the action on all the tables, saw one little mispay? And sure enough the night ended without anyone in management having noticed.

Second, pit bosses encourage dealers to break official norms of service to maintain a fast pace of play on their tables by disciplining slow—usually drunk—low-rollers. Whereas official procedure requires workers to treat all players as guests, floor management would here deflate player status and grant dealers the right to treat them with coldness:

Two middle-aged men are among the six players at my table. They are drinking Budweisers as fast as the waitress can bring them, and the guy on my far right is so drunk he keeps passing out at the table and spilling his beer. He somehow manages to keep putting up bets, though, so I must deal to him. But he is too drunk to read his cards or make the proper signals, so I must repeatedly ask, “Would you like to hit sir?” and then interpret his garbled response. The other players are getting annoyed, and Larry the pit boss is now standing permanently at my side. Larry nags him. “One hand on the cards.” “Keep your beer behind your bet.” “Sir, look up, it’s your turn.” Eventually the two drunk guys get the hint and stumble off. Larry says to me, “If they’re slowing you down like that, you gotta get on their case, bug ’em, get ’em outta there.”

Floor supervisors direct dealers to force off slow players by withholding service. Dealers comply and, in return, are able to withhold service from, and even openly antagonize, low-rolling nontippers.

Third, pit bosses ask dealers to operate outside of procedure regarding security to improve the house edge in key situations (for instance, when

dealing to suspected cheaters or a low-roller in the midst of a lucky winning streak). They here emphasize that dealers are not, as official rules proclaim, passive mediators between players and the house but can influence game outcomes:

Melissa, another new dealer, and I are sitting in the cafeteria waiting to clock out. Chuck, a pit boss, walks over and says, "You two are new, so there's something I want to tell you. When you're dealing, pay attention to how many 10s are out of your deck. If they ain't coming out [remember, the player's odds are improved in proportion to the number of 10-valued cards left in the deck], break your deck [shuffle sooner than procedure dictates] and we have the advantage again. Just something to think about."

Although requests such as these were honored when players were not tipping or workers were being directly monitored (i.e., when high-rollers were playing), dealers would use these same techniques in the opposite way when dealing to a tipping low-roller:

Melissa and I nod intently while Chuck is speaking and say, "Sure, sure." When he leaves, though, we both bust out laughing. "Whatever," says Melissa. "If he's tipping I ain't gonna push him off," I say. "Yeah. As long as no one's behind me [i.e., I'm not being watched] I'm gonna help the man out."

In sum, when low-rollers are on the table, pit bosses withdraw surveillance and allow workers to break routinized procedure and refuse to identify with the house. Workers in turn experience such autonomy as a highly complicated and serious game on the tables—one that, unlike the "official" games, involves three parties: players, the house, and dealers.

"A GAME OF MAKING TOKES"

Once I began work and collected my bearings,¹⁵ I learned that not only the act of dealing itself but practically all aspects of worker culture—break-room conversations, after-work gripe sessions, hints granted to break-ins by veterans—revolve around "making tokes." Jackpot dealers earn about \$20 each night in salary, \$60 to \$100 in tips. To maximize their tip incomes, they deploy a variety of tip-making tactics.

CLASSIFYING PLAYERS

Jackpot dealers categorize players into two broad types: tippers and nontippers ("georges" and "stiffs," respectively). When a new player sits

down, however, the dealer does not know whether he or she is a tipper and so immediately embarks upon a process of information gathering. A new player, for instance, can announce he is a tipper:

Win me a couple hands, buddy, and I'll be a generous fellow.

All right, pal, let's make *us both* some money!

In addition, an unspoken protocol of tipping exists on the tables. After a series of wins (approximately three to five) or a single big win (such as a blackjack), table norms dictate a tip. A blackjack, though, offered a special test of tipping status, because as part of such a win, players often receive a 50-cent piece (\$3 bet = \$4.50 payoff, \$5 bet = \$7.50 payoff, etc.). This coin, paid out after a large win and, literally, "small change" (both in terms of monetary denomination and its size relative to the larger plastic gaming chips), represented a perfect opportunity for even a moderate tipper to get on a dealer's good side. Too small for use as a cocktail waitress tip or slot machine token,¹⁵ it could easily be bet as a potential \$1 tip for the dealer. A player who pocketed the 50-cent piece or, far worse, used it as part of his or her next bet (referred to invidiously by dealers as "putting the silver on top") immediately betrayed his or her status as a nontipper.

Often, though, a new player will be "cold," losing game after game. Because even the most generous george does not tip during a losing streak, dealers can use jokes or stories to discern a player's true colors; that is, they can slyly "hustle" an initial tip:

While riding home from work with Claudia, a Chinese woman in her 40s, we talk about how to get players to start toking. She tells me that she doesn't wear her wedding ring at work because it gets dirty from handling money all night. "Once while I was dealing," she says, "a man asked me if I was married. 'Yes, yes,' I said. 'Well where's your ring?' 'Oh we can't afford one right now, but we are saving up to buy one.' 'Did you hear that?' he says to the table. 'C'mon, let's put some tips up for her.'" We both laugh.

EDUCATING NOVICES

The only customers who can escape—albeit briefly—an initial tipper/nontipper classification are true novices: players, usually tourists, who simply are not aware of the basic tipping procedure. When dealing with such a player, one must first draw attention to the tipping structure:

I tell Kim, a fellow dealer, that it seems like a lot of players are nice but don't know how to tip. She says, "Well wait until you have one player at the table who

does tip. When they do, make a big deal of it in front of the other players: ‘Thank *you*, sir!’” [in exaggerated tone, tapping the tip conspicuously].

Having made players aware of the toke system, dealers must make clear that tips are not mere gratuities or gifts but rather a fee for a service rendered. They will, for instance, whisper advice to players to emphasize that such hints are not only not a part of their job duties but against the rules as well. And when an initial tip is offered, a dealer’s demeanor changes dramatically from indifference to active engagement with the action on the table.

COMMUNICATING INFORMATION TO OTHER DEALERS

Information on player tipping behavior is not only collected but shared among workers as well. I discovered that during relief changes,¹⁶ dealers utilize a complex, though unformalized, code communicating customer tipping behavior—a veritable dealer semiotics. When relief arrives, a dealer must finish the current hand and inform the table that she or he is leaving. Through this act of saying goodbye to the players, though, the exiting dealer communicates to the incoming dealer vital information about tipping status—who is tipping, how much, how frequently.¹⁷ For example, a dealer in good spirits who thanks the table at large is a sure sign that multiple tippers are playing. And if the dealer singles out one player with a smile and “good luck to you, sir” upon leaving the table, then this player is obviously the only tipper. I did not become fully aware of the range of this code, though, until about a month into my fieldwork. While working relief one night, a veteran dealer offered me information concerning the miserly tipping behavior on his table:

I am relieving Juan [a veteran Filipino dealer] tonight. As I am finishing a relief shift, three new players—two men and a woman—come to the table with about \$100 each and begin playing \$5 hands. After their first hand, Juan comes back and I move on. When I return in an hour to relieve Juan again, the three players are now all laughing and have about \$200 each in front of them [signifying that they have been winning]. And yet there are no tips behind Juan’s tray. As Juan turns to leave he says nothing to the players but gives me an exasperated look and says, “Good luck, Jeff.” I’ve never had an exiting dealer wish *me* good luck, I think. It is not until I have already dealt out my first hand that I catch on. He wants these stiffes to lose!

HELPING TIPPERS WIN

Workers’ tactics for dealing with and to players they have labeled tippers fall into two broad categories: helping them win (“improving their luck”) and providing extra emotional labor (“treating them right”). When executed

successfully, they both enable (in terms of the first tactic) and encourage (in terms of the second) players to continue tipping. Blackjack dealers can help players win in two ways. First, they can offer advice on basic blackjack strategy. Splits¹⁸ are key opportunities to offer assistance.

Sam [an African American male in his 20s] and I are talking after work about helping out players who are tipping. Sam says, “if they try to split 10s,¹⁹ I’ll say, ‘Are you *sure* you want to do that?’”

More generally, dealers can advise players whether to hit their hand.

I tell Sam that I do this too, “Like when I can see that a person has 14 and my up-card is a 6²⁰ and they start to swipe [signal a hit], I’ll go, ‘Now be careful here’ and then wait for them to give the hit signal again.

To offer assistance, the dealer must deploy a minitactic to see the player’s cards. The dealer can crane her or his neck to catch a glimpse of the player’s hand; she or he can, with varying degrees of subtlety, ask the player for this information; or the player himself or herself can verbally or visually convey it:

It is late in the night and I am dealing to Troy, an outgoing salesman from Los Angeles. He is a tipper and puts me up frequently, referring to “*us* winning.” But I soon realize that he is not the smartest of players and so help him out as best I can. He begins turning his cards face up on the table when he receives them—so I will be able to see his hand—and giving me ambiguous hit signals. I respond by doing everything I can to assist him, practically playing the hands for him. “We’re good there,” I say. “That 13’s gonna need some help.” Eventually the pit boss notices, strolls over and tells Troy to stop exposing his cards, casting me a dirty look as well. While this reprimand would have scared me early in my fieldwork, I now merely tone down my assistance. The exchange of tips—dollar chips for helpful hints—continues, albeit more covertly.

The second way that dealers can help tippers is to pay attention to the cards that have been played from the deck and time their shuffle to increase the player’s odds of winning. Whereas official procedure dictates that the deck be shuffled only when exactly two thirds of the way through, if after the first hand the deck is disadvantageous to players (i.e., a disproportionately high number of 10s have been played), a dealer can shuffle early. Conversely, she or he can shuffle later than procedure dictates when the deck is favorable to players. If, however, despite all attempts to the contrary, a dealer is “hot” and unable to lose, she or he can still go to great lengths to emphasize that she or he is, in fact, on the player’s side and as much a victim of bad luck as they:

After work tonight I take \$50 of my tip money and go to play blackjack at a neighboring casino with a coworker. We immediately make our status as tippers known, and the dealer, a young Asian man, responds by cracking jokes and laughing with us. He keeps turning up blackjacks and 20s however, so our tip bets go into the chip tray [to the House]. I see that he is continually breaking the deck early, but to no avail. With each winning hand, he looks increasingly distraught and says apologetically, *"I'm trying! I'm trying!"*

EMOTIONAL LABOR FOR TIPPERS

The second type of tactic is the provision of extra emotional labor for the tipper, the most basic unit of which is the smile:

I am talking before work with Teresa, a rather shy dealer from Mexico. "To make tips," she tells me, "you have to please the customer." "Well, how do you do that?" I ask. "You smile at them."

In addition, dealers "read" players and offer appropriate emotional displays depending on their age, gender, general disposition, and so on. In general, female, young, and grind players were offered informal, relaxed, and "fun" forms of service. Experienced dealers would constantly offer me advice on procuring tips from such players. "Flirt!" many told me. "Bullshit with them." "Laugh at their jokes," Claudia once said, "even if they're totally dumb." Dealers can also make jokes and provide general entertainment on the tables. I for instance developed a working repertoire of funny comments for use during the games:

I begin my shift at a \$5 blackjack table. The players tip occasionally but are really sedate. I am in top form, though, and provide a humorous running commentary to the game. After calling for insurance and checking my hand when my up-card is an ace,²¹ I give the players a sorrowful expression so they will think I have a blackjack. When they all go, "Awww!" I say quickly, "Oh, calm down, I'm just pulling your legs." This gets lots of laughs. And after the game is briefly interrupted by a tray fill,²² I say to the players, "And now back to the regularly scheduled blackjack game." Soon the table is in an uproar and they are offering token bets practically every hand. In fact, when my shift ends, the woman at third base hands me a \$5 chip and tells me with a big, genuine smile, "You were fun!"

Dealers also personalize their interactions with tippers more than with nontippers. They ask and address them by their first names, inquire about where they are from and what they do, and so on. They refer to the tipper's play as a joint enterprise: "We almost got that one," "Where's that 5 when we

need it?" And they appear to be more emotionally invested in game outcomes than they actually are by smiling or laughing when players win and frowning when they lose.

Older players and men playing alone, in contrast, are more serious about their game play and expect reserved, deferential, and status-enhancing emotional labor. Maria, a Hispanic blackjack dealer in her 20s, explains one of her tactics for these players:

"You know how these old guys are. They like to be taken care of. So you pay attention to what he's drinking and when the cocktail waitress comes around, if I see he needs another drink, I'll go ahead and order his drink for him." This impresses him, she thinks, and encourages more tips.

More generally, the dealer calls these players by their last names. During the game, she or he "takes care of them" by watching and learning their basic game strategy to then assist them with it. And the dealer makes their play seem central to table outcomes. For instance, if there is only one such tipper at a table full of players, the dealer, on busting, can say to him or her, "Good play, sir. That'll get everyone paid," regardless of whether his or her play had been the deciding factor in breaking the dealer. At a table packed full of players, all of whom are following the game closely, the difference in a dealer's treatment of a tipper vis-à-vis others is both conspicuous to all and a sure source of additional token bets.

FORCING OFF NONTIPPERS

When dealing to stiffers, however, dealers conspire to force them off the table as quickly as possible to make room for players who tip. Dealers are landlords, I was told, and nontippers tenants who do not pay the rent:

You know how some players be sitting there for three or four hours at a time but never put down a bet for you? You go to break, come back and they're *still there*. No offense. Sit down and play a few hands, but don't be taking up that seat all night long if you ain't gonna pay some rent. (Hugo, a 23-year-old Hispanic man)

Dealers attempt to force out these players by making them lose. They can, for example, simply follow procedure by withholding assistance they would normally grant even the most modest tipper. They merely say nothing when the player splits 10s or does not split 8s. And they respond to requests for advice by saying, "That's a tough call" or "I don't know . . . are you feeling lucky?"

Dealers can also bend the house rules slightly by altering their shuffle (i.e., dealing sooner or later than procedure dictates) to change a bad run of the cards (here, one that is going well for the player). Joanne, my first-night “trainer,” introduced me to this technique of “shuffling your shuffle”:

It is late in the evening and the players at my table are winning big, but not tipping. Joanne tells me to change my shuffle, “Take a third from the top or shuffle an extra time. It doesn’t matter. Just do something different.” I’m not quite sure why she is saying this, but I assume it is because I am doing something wrong. On the next break, though, she explains, “They were winning but they weren’t tipping. You got to change the flow of the cards, try to break them up a bit.”

And once dealers do find a good run of cards (here, one that is going poorly for the player), they simply concentrate on dealing extremely rapidly, knowing that after all, the odds are in their (and the house’s) favor. In the words of Kim, a veteran dealer, “Just find a sweet spot in the deck and wipe ’em out.”

At the far extreme, dealers may directly, and with the pit bosses’ implicit approval, manipulate game outcomes. The following anecdote, involving the game roulette,²³ vividly illustrates this arrangement:

It is a slow night so they send me to help the dealer at a roulette table in the back of the casino. Cathy, a middle-aged White woman, is dealing. A group of three players has just joined the two already at the table. As the game is about to begin, she whispers to me, “Watch this. Time to make some money.” As she spins the ball, she announces to the table, “28 black, put your money on 28 black.” Three players do and, sure enough, the ball comes to rest on 28 black.²⁴ (I am in awe.) As she is paying out the winners, I softly ask her how she did it. “Honey, I’m a big fish in a little pond here at Jackpot. Twenty years at the Mint.”²⁵ As she finishes paying out, not a single player tips her or offers her a tip bet for the next spin. “Not one goddamn cent,” she hisses to me, “My checks are starting to bounce from all the smiles and thank-yous I’ve been depositing.” As she gets ready to spin the ball again, she says, “Now watch this. Let’s put it where they ain’t.” Sure enough on the next spin the 4 hits, one of the few numbers nobody is on. Several players leave the table. I ask her if she’s scared of getting caught. “No,” she replies, “there’s no way the cameras are watching this one little table in the back. And Mark (the pit boss) wouldn’t say anything ’cause last Saturday night I was on his roulette table and it was packed full of big bettors. I set it down on the only empty number and you should’ve seen the smile he flashed me.”

Here, Cathy exercised her autonomy to make tokens by manipulating the game to allow players to win their bets. When the players “failed the test” (did not tip), she knew they were nontippers and proceeded to force them off. Conscientious too of the lack of surveillance at “this one little table in the back,” she acknowledges her obligation to the pit boss to work the same technique to the

TABLE 2: House-Dealer Interest Alignment by House Goal and Type of Player

	<i>Speed</i>	<i>Security</i>	<i>Service</i>
Tipper	Maximize (in house's interest)	Help player win (against house's Interest)	Provide (in house's interest)
Nontipper	Maximize (in house's interest)	Make player lose (in house's interest)	Withhold (against house's interest)

NOTE: Cells in boldface indicate "hot spots" when high-rollers are on the table.

house's advantage in a high-action situation, regardless of the players' tipping status.

ANTAGONIZING STIFFS

Dealers also force off nontippers by withholding emotional labor. On one particularly bad tip night in early August, eight of us dealers gathered at a large table in the cafeteria during break to complain about our tables:

Helen brings up a Jackpot regular notorious for engaging dealers in endless conversations yet not tipping. "Just talk, talk, talk and no tip. I don't want to talk, mother. I am tired. Put up a dollar here and there and I will talk, but no money and I am tired." Phil launches into a diatribe against the most despised of players: those who look rich and are on a winning streak but don't tip. "I love to take those people's money. To dummy up and deal. I hate 'em."

Two of my coworkers went even further, explaining how they openly antagonize nontippers:

"Sometimes I'll piss them off on purpose, 'Oh, you lost again sir, too bad.'" [All laugh.] "Yeah! Or just smile a little when they lose. That usually gets to them."

So this is the cost to the house, at the level of the labor process, of making workers dependent on customers' tips. The toke bet system creates a pattern of alliances between dealers, players, and the house in which it is rational for workers to break official rules (see Table 2). The autonomy to do so, however, is granted and regulated by pit bosses as one part of a larger regime, the dual nature of which comes into full focus when we consider their strategies for handling potential "hot spots" (indicated in boldface in Table 2) when high-rollers are on the table.

TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: DESPOTIC CONTROL FOR HIGH-ROLLERS

About 10% of Jackpot's players were high-rollers (clients who regularly play at least \$25 hands), for whom floor managers seek to maximize security and provide personalized service. For such clients, pit bosses would impose despotic control (tight supervision, harsh penalties) over workers to ensure maximum security and proper service provision. For dealers, the passage from autonomy to despotism is audibly marked by the procedure for announcing the arrival of a high-roller. On seeing a player put down a "high-action" bet such as a brown \$100 chip, a dealer must yell, "Brown plays" and wait for a pit boss to come to the table before dealing the hand. Though this slows the action down considerably, the immediate presence of a supervisor not only ensures that dealers do not treat a (nontipping) high-roller rudely, it also allows the pit boss to perform customer service by personally thanking the player for his or her patronage or offering a complementary dinner. To further ensure that dealers do not assist a (tipping) high-roller, both floor supervisors and video surveillance carefully monitor high-action play:

The moment someone slaps down a \$100 bet, you can *feel* the cameras zooming in. (Joanne)

Punishments, too, are intensified; the only two dealers fired during my time at Jackpot were accused of assisting high-rollers.

Table 3 gives a sense of the overall effect of this dual regime by breaking down the micro-economy of speed, security, and service provision for the casino's clientele as a whole. About 10% of Jackpot's clientele are high-rollers. For them, management imposes despotism to ensure adequate security and service at the expense of speed, whereas for low-rollers, a tipping system guides the labor process. And on average, approximately 40% of Jackpot's low-rollers were tippers.²⁶ Thus, for every 90 low-rollers, 36 will be tippers and 54 nontippers. Speed is of course maximized for both. Yet tippers receive good service/poor security, whereas nontippers get bad service/maximum security. Overall, 90% of players receive adequate speed, 64% adequate security, and 46% adequate service. So although the onset of competition has led Jackpot to promote service as a method of product differentiation, the casino's system of labor control generates it for less than half of all players.

Having specified why worker autonomy and noncompliance are rational for both floor managers and dealers, one may ask, insofar as this labor regime neither fully unites workers' interests with management's (Table 2) nor

TABLE 3: Overall Effect of Dual System of Labor Control

Player type	10% high-rollers	90% low-rollers	
Regime	Despotic	Autonomy (tip system)	
Effects for three goals	Maximum security	Maximum speed for all	
	Adequate service	<i>36% tippers</i>	<i>54% nontippers</i>
	Moderate speed	Poor security	Maximum security
		Maximum service	Poor service

maximizes customer service (Table 3), why does it persist? Although my data do not allow claims concerning the extent to which corporate management was conscious of shop-floor practices, I can specify why this system is rational, or at least functional, for the firm as a whole. First, allowing a tipping system to regulate the labor process constituted a loss of labor control, insofar as the ability to distribute a primary workplace reward—monetary payment²⁷—is transferred to customers, whose interests are of course never fully aligned with the firm's. By doing so, however, the casino lowered labor costs: Under U.S. labor law, tipped employees can be paid one half the federal minimum wage with no benefits and laid off in response to seasonal fluctuations in demand (Harrison, 1994; Wessels, 1997).

Second, whereas the breadth of service was compromised—not all, and in fact less than half, of players received service—the depth of service was maximized. The tipping system, that is, by establishing a micro-economy in which dealers must continually produce the appropriate “emotional capital” to exchange for “financial capital,” served as a highly effective mechanism of product customization:

Kim, a young Vietnamese dealer of 2 years, understands immediately that the two businessmen who have just sat down at her table expect friendly smiles and entertaining small talk. She provides both and they fulfill their end of the bargain: the two men tip frequently and well. Soon, though, they both lose several large hands and become irritable. Now her smiles are inappropriate. “Why are you so happy? Do you like to see us lose like this?” She becomes quiet and serious, dealing quickly and without expression as the two men play their hands intently. Soon they have won their original money back and more. The cocktails take effect and they now are loud and boisterous. Kim laughs along with them, occasionally cracking jokes herself. The cycle repeats several times, as it does every night.

In addition, the distribution of tippers among all players was not random. Locals, regulars, and high-rollers tended to be “wise” to the tipping system,

whereas tourists and low-rollers were more apt to either not understand or refuse to participate in it. And insofar as the former groups constitute the contemporary casino's most desired target markets (Cabot, 1996), the tipping system ensured the provision of service to the firm's most highly prized clients.

CONCLUSION

I entered the casino equipped with the conceptual tools of the new service work literature, especially Hochschild's (1983) "emotional labor" and Leidner's (1999) "worker-client-management interest alliance." And although they were immensely helpful for describing the dynamics of the dealing labor process, I found them inadequate for situating the labor process within both the structure of the firm itself and historical changes in its organizational environment. I thus returned to the manufacturing literature. Specifically, I drew on Burawoy's (1998) notion of "hegemonic regime" to describe the historical genesis of Jackpot's method of labor control (a decoupling of management structures and technical re-skilling of dealing labor), how workers experience it (as a "game of making tips"), and its larger functions for the firm (customized service provision and lower labor costs). By so doing, my study achieves a broad generalizability by allowing the reconstruction of prevailing theories of the labor process in the contemporary service economy. In addition, however, I will conclude by addressing how the findings of this study may be directly applied to a more general category of service workers: tipped employees.

Blackjack dealing is an admittedly extreme occupation. Its practitioners work in an environment of potentially total surveillance, intense routinization of their labor, and no union protection. Precisely because of these factors, however, dealing offers a unique opportunity to refine the understanding of the labor process for tipped service workers. For if new service demands have *here* led to a hegemonic labor regime, then one should expect to find similar arrangements in less strictly regulated workplaces. In fact, since 1965, the number of U.S. employees who work for tips has tripled from approximately 1.9 million to 5.6 million (Jacobs, 2001; U.S. Department of Labor, 1965). Scholars of service work, however, have glossed over tipping, treating it as just one mechanism among many for inducing service provision from workers. This omission stems from a lack of attention to a second pressure generated by increased competition in service industries; while emotional labor demands arise, so do pressures to cut costs. And although the efficacy of new managerial strategies for inducing service from workers is

well documented, one must not forget that their costs (in terms of training, supervision, etc.) are high. Tipping, insofar as it simultaneously lowers labor costs and spontaneously generates customized service provision, thus represents an attractive system for organizing work, albeit one with costs to the firm.

Indeed, in certain, typically highly competitive, sectors of the service economy (such as restaurant and tourism industries), the labor process for practically all workers (food servers, bartenders, valets, cab drivers, etc.) is organized around a tipping system. And although the specificity of each will vary, certain characteristics are to be found in all, leading to hegemonic labor regimes. First, outsourcing the task of paying workers to clients generates immediate benefits to the firm. Labor costs are lowered and service customized as workers develop and share among themselves a typology of customer types and service expectations. Yet this outsourcing constitutes as well a loss of control. Workers' and management's interests may at times coincide—both restaurant management and food servers, for example, have an interest in ensuring that food arrives at tables hot and fresh. When their interests diverge, though, workers will act to increase their tips by either aligning with clients (such as when dealers help players win) or acting independently (as when dealers antagonize nontippers). Servers thus provide patrons free food and drinks to encourage larger tips (Paules, 1991), and cocktail waitresses treat rudely female patrons and other notoriously bad tippers (Spradley & Mann, 1975).

Yet management allows tipping systems to regulate the labor process only for certain categories of clients. They are generally appropriate for the organization's "low-rollers" insofar as they encourage maximum speed and at least moderate service provision. Consider the restaurant industry, where tips are relatively standardized (a moderately competent server expects to receive around 15% from every party). Whereas management requires servers to provide courteous service to all diners, the primary worker strategy for maximizing tips (especially at the lunch hour or in low-end diners) is to quickly cycle diners in and out, a tactic that requires at times treating customers rudely (Paules, 1991). Management here accepts noncompliance with the organization's display rules because it cares most about maximizing speed for such patrons anyway.

In turn, for the organization's "high-rollers," the firm, to ensure maximum service, should tighten control. A restaurant may thus reserve for well-known clients or wealthy "regulars" a special section of the dining area in which surveillance is tightened or managers serve patrons themselves. Workers in turn should accept as legitimate heightened control, the necessary cost of autonomy otherwise. In conclusion, as the U.S. service economy continues to

expand and become increasingly competitive, we would expect management, when possible, to allow tipping systems to regulate the labor process as a means of both lowering labor costs and inducing workers to perform service with a smile. The noncompliance that results will in turn be regulated in accordance with the financial or otherwise status of the “player,” thus constituting a hegemonic regime of service provision.

NOTES

1. Jackpot is a pseudonym, as are all proper names in this article.

2. I calculate that 90% of the time, dealers are violating a house rule concerning at least one of the three directives (see Table 3).

3. And even when the product is tangible—such as a McDonalds hamburger or the chance to win money in a casino—the mode in which it is delivered by service personnel is often considered part of the product itself.

4. The notion of “hegemonic regime” has since been applied by other researchers to a variety of research sites and in the process refined to take account of differences in the national, cultural, and gendered organization of work (e.g., Lee, 1998; Salzinger, 2000). To my knowledge, no one has yet attempted to apply the concept to the service sector.

5. Why did such regimes emerge at this time? First, only when firms became sufficiently large and “buffered” from the market could they afford to grant such concessions (Edwards, 1979; Noble, 1984, p. 31). Second, concessions were a response to the growing power of labor unions to strike and thus a way to ensure the smooth and uninterrupted flow of production (Jacoby, 1985). Third, crises engendered by competition had precipitated governmental intervention into the capitalist production process. The state, by proscribing despotic tactics and decreasing a worker’s economic reliance on the employer through social insurance legislation, created conditions in which “workers must be persuaded to cooperate with management”—hence concessions (Burawoy, 1985, p. 126).

6. Prior to the early 1970s, dealers learned their trade via informal training from an established dealer or from a dealing school run by the casino itself: “in-house” training. Since then, however, the cost of such training has been outsourced to private dealing schools and, in effect, to workers themselves, who must pay tuition fees of several thousand dollars for these 1- or 2-month courses.

7. Early Nevada legislation, for instance, prohibited casinos from advertising or even allowing their gaming equipment to be visible from the street (Skolnik, 1978, p. 105).

8. Although I ideally would have here provided some basic measures of industry concentration, such financial information is impossible to obtain for this period. Under Nevada statutes in this period, no financial information for individual casinos or casino companies could be published or released by the Nevada Gaming Control Board. A glimpse into the high degree of concentration in this era is provided by a successful 1970 antitrust suit filed by the U.S. attorney general, in which it was revealed that Howard Hughes personally controlled 30% of Las Vegas revenue (Sheehan, 1997, pp. 142-143).

9. One element of Table 1 that deserves extra attention is the 2000 passage of Proposition 1A in California, allowing Nevada-style casinos on Indian lands throughout the state. California residents contribute 35% of Nevada’s gaming revenues, and although the effects of California gaming will not be uniform throughout Nevada (the 10 or so megacasinos on the Las Vegas Strip,

which cater to a high-rolling international clientele, should remain relatively buffered from market pressures and continue to operate, I would argue, in line with the corporate strategies of the second period), the financial firm Bear, Stearns and Co. (2000, p. 65) has estimated that overall state gaming revenues will decline 6.9% by 2005.

10. Assuming true randomness of the cards, there is nothing inherently better about the odds for the player with a single deck versus an eight-deck shoe. Rather, a hand-shuffled single deck offers a moderately skilled player (and, as we will see, dealer) an easier opportunity to engage in basic card counting.

11. I arrived at this figure by simply keeping a tally of our nightly tips and weekly salary earnings.

12. Of the 11 supervisors who worked the swing, there were 5 White men, 1 White woman, 3 minority men (2 Asian, 1 Hispanic), and 2 minority women (both Asian).

13. The player's basic blackjack strategy assumes that any unseen card is a 10 or face card. The higher the proportion of such cards left in the deck, the more likely this assumption is to be true and, thus, the more the odds favor the player. (In fact, if a high enough proportion of remaining cards are 10-valued, the odds actually favor the player.)

14. In fact, on unexpectedly busy nights, it was not uncommon—and was an immense source of satisfaction among dealers—to find a pit boss dressed in “black and whites” rather than a suit and tie, that is, dealing rather than supervising.

15. The standard tip for a cocktail waitress was \$1, and most slot machines accept only quarters or dollars.

16. Dealers receive a 20-minute break after every 60 minutes of dealing. The relieving dealer approaches the table, stands at the dealer's side until the current hand is finished, and then takes over the dealing for 20 minutes while the regular dealer takes a break.

17. Such inter-performer/employee communication, audible to but uninterpretable by the audience/clients, Goffman (1959) labels “team collusion.”

18. As a player, if your first two cards have the same value (e.g., two 5s), you may split them, playing each card as its own hand. With certain combinations it is wise to do so. For instance, a player should always split 8s because the two card hand—16—is very bad (it is not high enough to win yet will probably bust if you hit it) whereas two hands of 8 played separately are good (you cannot bust when you hit them, and there is a good chance they will become 18s, a very strong hand). Yet you should never split two 5s, and for the same reasons. A 10 is a strong hand because it will not break and may become a 20, whereas each hand of 5 is likely to bust.

19. Never split 10s.

20. In this situation, the player should stay. If one assumes that all unseen cards are 10s, then the dealer has a 16, and an additional card—which she or he must take—will bust the dealer. The player who takes a card here risks busting himself or herself.

21. When the dealer's up-card is an ace, she or he must offer the players insurance. This means they can place a side bet to ensure their original bet in case the dealer's down-card is a 10 (i.e., the dealer has a blackjack). It is a bad bet, and the smart player does not take it (though of course it constitutes another opportunity to differentially offer advice to players).

22. When the dealer's tray runs low on certain denominations of chips, the supervisor will call a security guard to bring more over from the cashier's cage. The dealer must stop the game for a few minutes to count the new chips and sign a receipt for the amount received.

23. Roulette consists of a wheel with 42 spaces, numbered 0, 00, and 1 to 40. Players place bets on a numbered layout. The dealer spins a small ball around the turning wheel. Once the ball comes to rest in one of the numbered spaces, the dealer calls out the winning number, collects losing bets, and pays the winners.

24. Veteran roulette dealers can, with varying degrees of accuracy and consistency, “set the ball down” on particular numbers by coordinating their spinning of the ball with that of the wheel. Although this may at first seem an outrageous claim, consider this. One game of roulette lasts approximately 2 minutes. In an 8-hour shift, a dealer will spin the ball about 180 times. After 20 years, a dealer such as Cathy will have performed this mundane task about a million times (900 spins a week \times 50 weeks a year \times 20 years = 900,000 spins). Practice, as they say, makes perfect.

25. One of the oldest, most “high-class” casinos in town.

26. These percentages are based on my calculations during a month-long period of my fieldwork.

27. The other primary work reward is of course promotion. Yet for dealers, as for many service workers, aspirations for promotion are low because of the lower incomes earned in a supervisory position (Enarson, 1993; Paules, 1991).

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