Sector Level Dynamics and Collective Action in the United States, 1965-1975*

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Abstract

In an attempt to explain varying levels of collective action by social movement organizations in the United States during the height of the 1960s protest cycle, this paper examines social movement sector-level dynamics alongside indicators of resources and political opportunities. Drawing on hypotheses from neoinstitutional, organizational ecology, and embeddedness perspectives, the paper emphasizes the importance of understanding the sector-level dynamics of legitimacy, competition, and embeddedness when explaining levels of collective action. Results show strong support for neoinstitutional, organizational ecology, and embeddedness theories, but more mixed support for arguments about how political opportunities and resources affect levels of collective action by social movement organizations.
Most scholars of social movements agree that questions about the emergence of and fluctuation in movement activity have dominated the field of empirical inquiry since at least the 1970s (Wilson 1973; Marx and McAdam 1994; McCarthy, McAdam, and Zald 1996). Much of the recent work in this area focuses on developing and testing hypotheses associated with two leading perspectives: political opportunity structure (POS) and resource mobilization (RM). From this important body of research, we have learned that in most cases, social movement organizations (SMOs) require resources to mobilize collective action. While there are quibbles about the relative impact of various types of resources on SMO activity, most scholars agree that without some base level of resources, movement mobilization will be limited. As well, while the empirical findings have been more mixed, we know that external political conditions, embodied in the POS concept, can also affect levels of social movement activity.

As many have noted, the study of social movements that has yielded these important insights has been dominated by case studies of one (or a small number of) movements. We believe that this focus on particular movement issues (e.g., civil rights, nationalism, environment, peace) has led scholars to largely neglect dynamics that transcend the boundaries of social movements. Of those who have attempted to better understand inter-movement dynamics (e.g., Meyer and Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1995, 1997, 1999), there is a tendency to examine only a limited number of social movements.

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3 This has changed in recent years, as scholars have turned their attention to a number of other important research questions, such as movement consequences and recruitment to and participation in social movements.
Our interest in inter-movement dynamics led us to revisit McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) conceptualization of the social movement sector (SMS), which is defined as all active social movement organizations associated with all social movements in a particular location and time period. Rather than drawing the analytical boundary around some issue or movement, the SMS is bounded by action forms; that is, all organizations in the SMS – be they churches, interest groups, advocacy or social movement organizations – mobilize collective action and do so by drawing on the extant repertoire of contention (Tilly 1978, 2004) With few exceptions (Garner and Zald 1987; Everett 1992; Bearman and Everett 1993; Osa 2001, 2003) there is a paucity of research on the SMS, and, in particular, we know relatively little about how sector-level dynamics affect levels of SMO activity.

With our sights set on sector-level dynamics, we draw on organizational theories to lend insight into the question of how processes within the SMS might influence activities of organizations therein. Neoinstitutional, organizational ecology, and embeddedness theories are all sensitive to how inter-organizational processes impact organizational-level activities, and they point to three characteristics of organizations that are, at least in part, determined by sector-level dynamics – legitimacy, competition, and embeddedness – and likely to impact levels of collective action by movement organizations therein.

We examine a set of organizations active in the U.S. social movement sector during the peak years of the 1960s cycle of protest whose collective action events were reported in the New York Times. Acknowledging that this is a peculiar period and organizational subset of the SMS, we find it useful for examining the role of resources, political opportunities, and these three sector-level dynamics (legitimacy, embeddedness, and competition) in shaping levels of SMO activity. Our results show strong support for theories of sector-level dynamics and mixed support for resource mobilization and political opportunity theories. We conclude that the level
of activity of these organizations, during this cycle of protest, is a function of organizational resources, repression, legitimacy, embeddedness, and interorganizational competition. We urge social movement scholars to pay greater attention to characteristics of the SMS and its role in mobilizing resources, exploiting political opportunities, and determining other social movement processes.

EXPLAINING LEVELS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVITY

Over the past 25 years, most scholars interested in understanding the factors that influence social movement activity have turned to resource mobilization and political opportunity theories. The resource mobilization perspective argues that levels of activity depend on the availability of resources that can be channeled into movement mobilization and activity (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The extant literature on resource mobilization highlights the dichotomy between resources indigenous to the movement (e.g., Morris 1981) and resources that come from external sources (e.g., Cress and Snow 1996). As well, in recent years, scholars have debated the precise definition of what a resource is and have developed useful typologies of resources (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004). The premise is that collective action incurs costs related to recruiting participants, paying organizers, developing skills, printing signs, securing meeting space, building coalitions, obtain endorsements, and advertising. Organizations with a wealth of resources will be more active than those with fewer resources.

But, the usefulness of resources may not be fully realized without available political opportunities. A political opportunity may be defined as the “consistent…dimensions of the

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4 For reviews of these two perspectives, including excellent discussions of recent empirical work, see Meyer (2004), Edwards and McCarthy (2004), Meyer and Minkoff (2004), and Kriesi (2004).
political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 1994: 85). McAdam (1996: 26-29) identifies four “highly consensual” dimensions of a POS: (1) the degree to which a political system is open or closed to challengers; (2) the relative stability of the pattern of political alignments within a system; (3) the presence or absence of influential allies; and (4) the repressive capacity of the state or relevant political entity. The central hypothesis is that these dimensions of the POS affect levels of collective action because social movement participants are either encouraged or discouraged by their perceptions of the relative power of their movement vis-à-vis political power-holders.

Moving beyond these two familiar approaches to the question of movement emergence and activity, what can be said about how sector-level dynamics may influence movement activity? Examining sector-level dynamics requires that we consider both interorganizational dynamics and organizational environments, thus we draw on the theoretical frameworks of organizational ecology, neoinstitutional, and embeddedness theories. These theories suggest three sector-level dynamics that may influence levels of SMO activity: legitimacy, competition, and embeddedness.

Legitimacy, Competition, and Embeddedness

Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). If an organization fails to acquire this, it risks becoming unstable and incomprehensible to its audiences (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Therefore, legitimacy is of utmost importance, a highly desired resource that shapes organizational behavior (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Suchman 1995). For organizational scholars, legitimacy has occupied a central place in their theories. Neoinstitutional theories maintain that the search for (and maintenance of)
legitimacy can drive organizational behavior, such as when organizations imitate others in an attempt to obtain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). And, Organizational Ecology theories have demonstrated that legitimacy is a key factor for organizational survival (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Hannan and Carroll 1992). For organizations scholars, legitimacy may be derived from the growth in the size of the organizational population (Hannan and Freeman 1989) or can be signaled by endorsements, grants, or licenses from external sources, which indicate that an organization conforms to acceptable standards or models of behavior (Galaskiewicz 1985; Cress and Snow 1996). Both of these sources of legitimacy are external to any given organization but can profoundly impact organizational-level processes, such as persistence and activities.

Social movement scholars have recognized the importance of organizational legitimacy but few (with some notable exceptions) have made this an explicit subject of study. One exception is the classic statement of RM by McCarthy and Zald (1977), which lists legitimacy alongside money, facilities, and labor as a principle resource for SMOs, but does not define, describe, or discuss this concept in any depth. More recently, Cress and Snow (1996) have developed a more extensive typology of resources in which legitimacy (“moral resources,” in their terms) is one of four important types of resources for the homeless SMOs they study (see also Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Finally, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) place legitimacy at center stage as they scrutinize how two social movement organizations, ACT UP and Earth First!, attempt to maintain legitimacy even as they engage in what many perceive to be illegitimate actions (e.g.,

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5 External sources of legitimacy for social movement organizations may include charitable foundations, mass media, public opinion, politicians, or other reputable SMOs. Among the homeless SMOs studied by Cress and Snow (1996), endorsements by external organizations (e.g., churches) were found to be a necessary condition for SMO viability.
disruption, sabotage, blockades). Taken together, these studies suggest that legitimacy is a cultural asset that promotes SMO activity.

In addition to pressures to obtain and preserve legitimacy, organizations also face competition from other organizations in the SMS. Some scholars of social movements have examined competition, arguing that it can impact SMO specialization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and McCarthy 1980; Soule and King 2008; Olzak and Ryo 2007), survival (Soule and King 2008; Minkoff 1993; 1994; 1995; 1997; 1999) and protest rates (Olzak and Uhrig 2001). But, organizational scholars treat competition even more centrally. Organizational Ecology has emerged as a powerful theoretical framework to explain organizational birth and death based on the principle that the environment “selects” those organizations best adapted to their organizational niche, defined as the “region of a resource space in which an entity can persist” (Hannan, Carroll, and Pólos 2003: 309). Central to this perspective is density dependence theory (Hannan and Freeman 1989) that speaks directly to both legitimacy (which fosters organizational survival) and competition (which threatens it). A low-density niche implies a low level of legitimacy for organizations in that niche because they have evidently adopted an uncommon organizational form, setting themselves apart from the desirable and proper forms for their cultural environment. A high-density niche, on the other hand, implies that the organizational form is well suited for its environment and that competition is intense among a large number of organizations for a limited supply of resources. Empirically, the dual set of pressures – legitimacy and competition – take the form of a curvilinear relationship between the niche density and chances of survival (i.e., organizations will mobilize more resources in mid-density niches where a

\footnote{Competition, of course, need not imply conflict or antagonism – even cooperative organizations drawing on the same pool of resources must eventually recognize that a limited supply of resources can sustain only a limit number of organizations, \textit{ceteris paribus}.}
balance can be found between sufficient legitimacy and limited competition). Density dependence
t theory has stood up to empirical tests on an impressive range of organizational populations (e.g.,
McPherson 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Ruef 2000), including social movements (Minkoff
1997; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Soule and King 2008), and suggests that SMOs will be most active
in medium density niches.

Importantly for our purposes here, Olzak and Uhrig (2001: 704) provide an innovative
way to think about niche density as “the proportion of a movement’s protest events that fall in
the same tactical niche as those of other movements,” which they dub tactical overlap. The
fundamental insight here is that ecological pressures do not stop at the boundaries of issues or
individual social movements. Their results provide compelling evidence that issues are not the
only relevant dimension for understanding social movement activity; in particular, they show that
challengers that use the same tactics, irrespective of issue area, may have an impact on one
another’s levels of activity. In their case, the legitimacy of particular tactics depends on other
organizations having adopted them. Studies of protest cycles appear to support this claim:
initiator movements help to establish the legitimacy of protest tactics from which late-comers
may benefit (e.g., McAdam 1995; Minkoff 1997). Density Dependence theory might also help to
explain why more common protest tactics tend to attract less media attention than do less
common (e.g., disruptive or violent) ones (Snyder and Kelly 1977; Mueller 1997; Barranco and
Wisler 1999). That is, as the density of a given tactical niche increases (other things being equal),
the associated tactic is more likely to seem unexceptional, and therefore less newsworthy, to
editors. In light of these findings, we think that it is worthwhile to take Olzak and Uhrig’s (2001)
insight to its natural conclusion and examine all organizations that engage in collective action,
irrespective of issue domain.
In addition to legitimacy and competition, levels of collective action are apt to be shaped by an organization’s *embeddedness* in the network of relations between organizations that structures their interactions, shared resources, co-memberships in formal or informal groups, and collaborative work. Studies of organizational embeddedness, following Granovetter (1985), have found that interorganizational ties contribute to the diffusion of information, greater innovation, increased chances of survival, and higher levels of performance (Brass et al. 2004). Such interorganizational ties, which are often formed via coalitions, also lead to the sharing of ideological frames, models of organizing, tactical repertoires, and leaders – all of which may expand their resource base and make them more able to exploit expanding opportunities, resist impending threats (Staggenborg 1986), sponsor larger events (Jones et al. 2001), achieve greater rates of success (Steedly and Foley 1979), and, as we argue here, mobilize higher levels of collective action (Meyer and Whittier 1994).

In what follows, we examine levels of organizational activity among SMOs in the U.S. social movement sector, specifically, those organizations active between 1965 and 1975 whose events are reported in the *New York Times*. We test hypotheses derived from the RM and POS perspectives, but add to this an examination of how sector-level dynamics (i.e., legitimacy, competition, and embeddedness) affect levels of mobilization at the organizational level in the SMS. As such, we hope to contribute a more nuanced understanding of the factors impacting movement organizational activity – one that moves us beyond the standard resource mobilization and political opportunity accounts and forces us to think seriously about how the actions of organizations in the same SMS affect what organizations therein do.

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7 Embeddedness in one’s socio-political environment also reflects an implicit acceptance by a community of organizations, thereby signaling one’s legitimacy (Baum and Powell 1995; Hannan and Carroll 1992).
DATA AND METHODS

Data on collective action events come from daily editions of the *New York Times* (NYT) as part of a larger research project initiated by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak, and Sarah Soule (for descriptions of the larger project see McAdam and Su 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004; Soule and Earl 2005; Earl and Soule 2006; King and Soule 2007; King, Bentele, and Soule 2007; Soule and King 2008). We include all events reported to have occurred in the U.S. between the years of 1965 and 1975, a distinctive period for U.S. social movements that spans the peak years of a significant cycle of protest. In order to be included in our analysis, events also had to meet several other criteria: 1) more than one person had to participate in an event since our concern is with collective action; 2) participants must have articulated some claim or issue; 3) the event must have happened in the public sphere; and 4) the event must have had at least one organization named as present, since we are interested in assessing levels of *organizational* activity.8

In the social movement literature, some scholars have drawn (implicitly or explicitly) on the concept of the SMS, but the difficulties of obtaining such extensive data imply an important tradeoff that appears to have structured these studies. Essentially, when scholars expand their focus to include the entire sector, they limit the geographic boundaries of their study to make data collection plausible. For example, Everett (1992) and Bearman and Everett (1993) examine all SMOs active in Washington DC – an important, but limited, geographical area (during five discontinuous 3-year periods). In this paper, we borrow from them (see also Soule and King 2008) the strategy of using newspaper articles on collective action events to identify organizations

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8 The larger project excludes labor events since the dynamics of these are likely different than events associated with other social movements. The project also excludes events that took place in total institutions (e.g., prisons, mental institutions, etc).
that “do” collective action, but we attempt to do this at the national level (during one continuous 11-year period), arguing that in so doing, we get closer to the spirit of McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) meaning of the SMS. Thus, in this analysis we examine all organizations reported in the New York Times to have participated in at least one public, collective action event between 1965 and 1975, regardless of what social movement or issue area the event articulated.

There are three important issues to note about our operational definition of the SMS. First, inclusion is based on one key feature of social movements: participation in public, collective action events (see also Soule and King 2008). To be sure, movements often perform a myriad of other non-public functions (e.g., lobbying, litigation, counseling, teaching). But, consistent with Tilly (2004) who maintains that public, collective claims-making is a distinctive feature of social movements, we use this as our criterion for including an organization in the SMS. This is in keeping with our earlier suggestion that the analytical boundary around the SMS is based on organizational form rather than on issue.

Second, by defining the sector in this way we include organizations that are not what we might typically define as a “social movement organization.” For example, churches and their members often participate in public, collective action events, but we would not necessarily consider churches to be social movement organizations. However, by defining the sector as comprised of all organizations that participate in public, collective action, we release ourselves from the bounds of essentialist definitions.

Third, by relying on newspaper data we must be sensitive to the potential biases of the media that produce them. Recent review articles (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005) identify two main sources of bias in newspaper data: selection bias and description bias. Description bias refers to the veracity of the journalistic coverage of events that are selected. Whereas description of the “soft facts” of an event may be influenced by the opinions of the writer about the issue being
raised, the “hard facts” (e.g., type of event, location of event, and issue involved) are generally accurately covered by newspapers (Earl et al. 2004). Because for this paper we draw exclusively on “hard facts” of events (e.g., tactics, goals, organizations, policing), description bias is likely of lesser concern in our analysis than is selection bias. *Selection bias* refers to the fact that not all protest events will be covered by a given newspaper and the possibility that what is covered is likely not a representative sample of all events that took place.9 Studies of selection bias have taught us that more intense events (e.g., larger, more violent, injurious), those with conflict, those with significant actors (e.g., celebrities, those defined as powerful and/or culturally legitimate), and events proximate to the newspaper are more likely to be selected for coverage (Ortiz et al. 2005; Earl et al. 2004). While it can never be eliminated, we have tried to minimize selection bias via our research design and analysis. First, unlike prior studies that used an index of the *NYT* (or some other paper) to identify events, or that sampled days of the newspaper, our project team skimmed *all* editions of the daily newspaper. These procedures reduce the selection bias introduced by indexing and day-of-the-week rhythms in coverage (Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999).10 Second, we include in our analysis controls for other common sources of selection bias (e.g., disruptive tactics, event intensity, proximity to the news source) which we discuss further below. In the end, however, one would need a separate data source on the entire population of organizations and events in the SMS to adequately assess the extent of selection bias in these data, which at this time does not exist. Therefore, we urge readers to bear in mind that we are observing only a subset of activities and organizations in the U.S. social movement.

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9 As well, some (e.g., Mueller 1997) note that selection bias may vary over time.

10 Research assistants content coded these events, achieving inter-coder reliability rates consistently at or above 90% agreement.
sector, and that the results presented here should be interpreted in light of the known biases of newspaper data, which we will return to in our discussion below.

**Dependent Variable**

We are interested in explaining variation in SMO activity in the U.S. during the 1965-1975 period. Thus, our unit of analysis is the organization-year and the dependent variable is the *yearly number of collective action events associated with each organization in the SMS*, as reported in the *NYT*. We define a “collective action event” as a public, claims-making event, which includes rallies, demonstrations, marches, vigils, pickets, civil disobedience, dramaturgical demonstrations, motorcades, information distribution, symbolic displays, attacks/conflicts, riots, strikes, boycotts, press conferences, lawsuits, and announcements of organizational formation. When two or more organizations were reported to have participated in the same event, we counted one event for each organization. To be present in our dataset in a particular year, an organization must have been named *in that year* as participating in at least one collective action event. As a consequence, the set of organizations included in the sector changes each year. As such, we stay true to our operational definition of the SMS as all organizations that participated in at least one public collective action event in a given year. While the time period (year) is somewhat arbitrary, we argue that it is a good place to start. Figure 1 shows the number of organizations reported in the *NYT* to have participated in collective action each year, ranging from a low of 197 in 1974 to a high of 339 in 1969. Descriptive statistics for this and all independent variables are shown in Table 1.

[Figure 1 about here]

[Table 1 about here]
Independent Variables and Hypotheses

Empirical research in the resource mobilization tradition has generally examined the effects of resource availability on aggregate levels of collective action (e.g., yearly event counts associated with a movement or small set of movements) rather than on organizational levels. Consequently, this research has not been able to explain variation in organizational activity, despite the centrality of this claim to original statements of RM (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1221). In this spirit, we include measures of resources at both the organization and sector levels and expect that greater resources at both levels will lead to more frequent collective action.

The first indicator of organizational resources is a dichotomous variable intended to tap an organization’s overall wealth and prominence by distinguishing between those organizations that do, and those that do not, appear in the Encyclopedia of Associations between 1964 and 1975. Whereas previous research has been limited to organizations that are listed in the Encyclopedia (Minkoff 1993; 1994; 1995; 1997; 1999), we are struck by the fact that that nearly three-quarters of the organizations in our data do not appear in this source and that those that do appear seem to be disproportionately large, wealthy and national in scope.11 Specifically, organizations in our data that are listed in this source have a median size of 12,000 members, 12 staff, and over 100 local affiliates. Moreover, fully one-third of organizations that are listed have memberships over 50,000. While we obviously do not have this kind of data for our organizations not listed in the Encyclopedia, our examination of the non-listed organizations confirms that these were much less prominent, appeared to be local, and seemed unlikely to attract the attention of the Gale Research Company staff. Thus, we created a dummy variable for whether or not an organization appears

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11 Typical of the organizations listed in the Encyclopedia are Defenders of Wildlife, founded in 1947, boasting a membership of 10,000; War Resisters League (est. 1923), 10,000 members, 7 staff; American G.I. Forum (est. 1948), 20,000 members, 3 staff, 23 local affiliates.
in the *Encyclopedia*. The value remains constant for each organization across the entire study period (i.e., if a SMO appears in at least one edition of the *Encyclopedia* it will have a value of 1 for the entire period). Thus, following resource mobilization theory, we offer our first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1: Organizations listed in the Encyclopedia of Association will have higher levels of activity than those not listed.*

The second measure of organizational resources varies by year and captures the availability of a particular resource, participants. Participants are among the most visible resources that social movements may mobilize, and the number of participants at events is not only an indication of a movement’s strength (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 2004), but also the amount of human labor an organization is able to mobilize (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). From the NYT reports we computed the mean number of participants reported at all events in which each organization participated. Recall that a single event may involve multiple organizations, in which case we code the full number of participants for all organizations. As Soule and Earl (2005) have reported, collective action events in the U.S., on average, steadily increased in size between 1960 and 1980. During the eleven years of this study (1965-1975), the average event size fluctuated greatly between roughly 1,100 and 2,800 participants with a mean of 1,847. The years between 1970 and 1973 saw events that were notably smaller (mean=1,269) than the rest of the period (mean=1,847). Drawing on RM, we offer a second hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2: An organization’s average event size will be positively associated with its level of activity.*

Our third and final measure of resources taps the aggregate level of funding available to the entire sector. Borrowing data from Craig Jenkins’ research on foundations (1993; also see Jenkins 1998), we include a measure of the amount of foundation funding (in millions of dollars)
given to social movements.\textsuperscript{12} This figure varies by year but not by organization. Throughout the study period, grants increased steadily but dramatically from approximately $1.9M in 1965 to $20.1M in 1975 with a mean of $11.3M. As resource mobilization asserts, the greater availability of financial resources available to social movements is likely to increase the overall level of social movement activity, including collective action.

*Hypothesis 3: As the availability of foundation grants to the social movement sector increases, so too will the level of movement organizational activity.*

We include four measures of political opportunities designed to tap the four dimensions of the POS discussed above. These measures reflect a growing awareness in the literature that political opportunities may occur at multiple levels (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Kay 2005; Khagram et al. 2002). They may be SMO-specific (e.g., Cress and Snow 1996), movement-specific (e.g., McAdam 1999), or sector-wide (e.g., Tilly 1978). The first dimension of political opportunities is the repressive capacity of the state. Because research has found various and contradictory effects of repression on levels of protest (see review in Davenport 2007), we offer three competing hypotheses and two corresponding variables designed to tap organization-specific effects of the POS. We measure 1) the proportion of an organization’s reported events that are repressed in a given year and 2) the second-order effects of this measure. We code an event as “repressed” if the newspaper article reports that police used force and/or violence at the event.

\textsuperscript{12} Consistent with our operationalization of the SMS, this measure of philanthropic support includes grants to institutions (e.g., universities & churches) that were involved in movement work. We tried several other indicators of resources available to the sector – including per capita disposable income, per capita personal consumption expenditures, business failure rate, GDP, GNP, poverty rate, unemployment rate, U.S. population, and labor force participation rate. They did not change the substantive results presented here.
During this period repression declines markedly, peaking in 1967 at 20.3% of all reported events and dropping to a low of 2.5% in 1973 (for an extended analysis of changing levels of repression in the SMS see Soule and Earl 2005). Many have found that high levels of repression reflect contracting political opportunities, and thus have a direct negative effect on movement activity (e.g., Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; Opp and Roehl 1990; Churchill 1994; Fantasia 1988). This suggests:

**Hypothesis 4a:** An organization’s level of activity will be negatively correlated with the proportion of its events that are repressed.

However, considerable research also shows the contrary, that repression can also increase mobilization (e.g., Opp and Roehl 1990; Hirsch 1990). We therefore offer an alternate hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 4b:** An organization’s level of activity will be positively correlated with the proportion of its events that are repressed.

Finally, still others have found a non-monotonic relationship between repression and mobilization, some arguing for the familiar U-curve (Lichbach and Gurr 1981), and others suggesting support for an inverted U-curve (DeNardo 1985; Muller and Weede 1990). Thus we offer a third hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4c:** The influence of the proportion of events that are repressed on an organization’s level of activity will be curvilinear, differing between moderate and extreme levels of repression.

The second dimension of the POS is the presence of elite allies, which is argued to increase mobilization. Lacking direct evidence of elites working with each of the organizations in these data, we follow previous research by examining the ideological correspondence between each organization and of Congress and the President. To the extent that movements reflect a shared ideological position, our measures of elite allies measure movement-specific opportunities.
We first determined whether an organization was located on the “left” or “right” side of the ideological spectrum by examining the claims made at its events. This was accomplished by a two-step process. First, before looking at the actual claims articulated at an event by any of our organizations, we asked 5 coders to identify, from the list of 241 possible claims on our coding mechanism, whether or not a given claim was “right” or “left.”13 If at least 3 of the 5 coders coded a claim as fitting into one of these two categories, we labeled the claim as such. Of course, many claims were difficult to place into these (admittedly coarse) groupings, but in the end nearly three-quarters of the claims were assigned in roughly equal proportions to one of these two categories, left or right. The second step of the process involved using this information to construct a measure of the proportion of each organization’s yearly events that articulated “left-wing” and “right-wing” claims. If at least 75% of an organization’s events in a given year articulated left or right-wing claims, then we labeled the organization-year accordingly.14 Between 46% and 75% of all organizations (varying by year) fell into one of these categories. Not surprisingly, left-wing organizations dominated the sector during this period, making up between

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13 The original coding mechanism identified these 241 claims through an extensive pre-test involving the pre-coding of multiple months of events over the entire period and then re-coding these events, once the final code list was developed. These are roughly grouped by movement or issue area (e.g., Civil Rights, Gay Rights, Environmental) and the coding rules require that coders identify whether the protest event was in favor of the movement or against the movement (e.g., Anti-busing, Pro-Choice, Anti-Death penalty and so on).

14 Readers may wonder how an organization can articulate both left-wing and right wing claims, thus an example may be helpful. The Catholic Church has organized pro-immigrant rights, anti-death penalty, and pro-life collective action events, illustrating that the collection of issues around which an organization is active is not always consistently “left” or “right” wing. Note also that our procedures leave open the possibility for organizations to be coded “left” in one year and “right” in another.
38% and 65% of all SMOs (in 1968 and 1967 respectively), whereas right-wing organizations comprised between 3% (1967) and 16% (1965).

We then created two different measures of elite allies. First, we created a dummy variable that is coded “1” when the partisanship of the President is congruent with the ideological orientation of the organization in a given year. Left-oriented organizations had an ally in the White House when President Lyndon Johnson was in office, (1965-1968), and right-oriented organizations had an ally throughout the remaining years of the period (1969-1975) under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The second variable examines the legislative branch of the federal government, namely the proportion of Congress that is controlled by a political party that was congruent with the political ideology of the organization – Democrats on the left, Republicans on the right. The Democrats controlled 67.9% of the seats in Congress in 1965, slowly dropping to 55.8% in 1974 and then jumping up again to 63.4% in the eleventh year.

**Hypothesis 5:** Organizations whose ideological orientations are congruent with office-holding political elites (the President and Congress) will on average display higher levels of activity than those not listed.

Our final POS variable is a measure of divisions within the elite, an opportunity that should affect the entire SMS, and is a dummy variable coded “1” when different political parties controlled the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Because, as we note above, Democrats controlled Congress throughout this whole period, our measure of divided elite is only coded “1” during those years when a Republican held the presidency (1969-1975). According to POS, the presence of a divided elite should produce opportunities for collective action for all organizations in those years, left and right alike.

**Hypothesis 6:** When opposing political parties each control either Congress or the Presidency the level of organizational activity will increase across the social movement sector.
Turning now to sector-level dynamics, we examine how legitimacy, competition, and embeddedness impact organizational-level protest. We measure embeddedness by examining co-participation in collective action events. This is a dummy variable coded “1” when an organization reportedly participated in an event with another organization in a particular year.\textsuperscript{15} Organizations that are embedded in social networks with other organizations should have greater access to resources (including leadership, participants, frames, knowledge, and so on) and may also have greater opportunities to defend from threats and exploit political opportunities. Conversely, isolated organizations lack the expanded resource base and are more easily marginalized and ignored. Coalitions were more frequent at the beginning of the study period, peaking between 1967 and 1969 when 57\% of all organizations participated in coalitions and falling to a low of 40\% in 1975. Following embeddedness theories, we offer:

\textit{Hypothesis 7: Organizations that are part of coalitions will have higher levels of protest activity than those that are not.}

Next, we test for the curvilinear effect of niche density, which is predicted by organizational ecologists’ density dependence theory and gets at both legitimacy and competition. To do this, we follow Olzak and Uhrig (2001) by measuring density as a function of tactical overlap, or the number of events each year in the SMS that involve a tactic found in the focal

\textsuperscript{15} We settled upon a dichotomous version of this measure, rather than a continuous measure of coalition size or frequency, because it was clearly the most appropriate given the distribution of values in these data. Nearly all organizations had values at the extremes of these other measures – either all of an organization’s events involved coalitions or none of them did. While we ran models with the continuous measure, the dummy variable more accurately reflects the empirical patterns of coalitions observed in this SMS, thus we chose to present those models which include the dummy variable.
organization’s repertoire.16 For each tactic in an organization’s repertoire it received a value equal
to the total number of events (excluding its own) at which that tactic was reportedly used by any
organization. For example, if 300 “rallies” are reported in 1965, then an organization that rallies
ten times and uses no other tactics that year will receive a tactical overlap score of 300 - 10 = 290.
If it also conducts a boycott in 1965 when there were 30 boycotts, then we add to its score the
number of boycott events led by other organizations that year (290 + 30 - 1), and so on for each
tactic in its repertoire. If density dependence theory is right, if tactical overlap is a valid measure
of niche dynamics, and if we are indeed measuring the relevant niche (i.e., if all members of the
social movement sector affect the legitimacy and competition of all others), then we offer the
following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 8a: Tactical overlap will increase an organization’s level of protest.

Hypothesis 8b: The second order effects of tactical overlap will decrease an organization’s level of protest.

Finally, we include five control variables. First, we include a one-year lagged count of the
number of events in which an organization participated. Because organizations active in 1965,
the first year that we observe, have missing values for this lagged event-count variable, we replace
those missing values with their event-counts for the current year (1965) and created a second
control variable, a dummy coded “1” for 1965, to distinguish those cases.17 The third control
variable is a measure of the tactical repertoire size, which is the simple count of the number of
different tactics the organization used in a given year. By controlling for repertoire size, we are

16 The measure of tactical overlap we adopt differs slightly from that of Olzak and Uhrig (2001) because we believe
that the visibility of a protest tactic in the media is an important factor influencing organizational legitimacy and
competition. Therefore, as we explain, ours is sensitive to the volume of events that use the same tactics as the focal
organization.

17 We also ran models with dummies for each of the other ten years, but found no significant effects.
able to distinguish the effect of tactical overlap from the sheer number of tactics an organization uses. Not surprisingly, these two variables are highly correlated ($r = .73$). Our last two control variables are designed to control for some of the selection bias associated with newspaper reports of collective action. First is a measure of the proportion of events in a given year that were disruptive, which we define as events involving any of the following tactics: civil disobedience, attack, riot, strike, and conflict. We include this measure to control for the possibility that disruptive events are over-reported in the NYT. Finally, we include a measure for the percentage of a SMO’s events in a given year that took place in the New York region (i.e., New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) to control for the possibility of a regional bias in reporting on events the NYT.

**Estimation Technique**

In order to evaluate our hypotheses, we use negative binomial regression for zero-truncated data. Negative binomial regression (NBR) is a generalization of Poisson regression, a common method for analyzing data characterized by a disproportionate number of cases at the low end of the distribution (zeros and ones). Poisson Regression assumes that the mean and variance of the dependent variable are equal, a condition not met by these data, so we use NBR which corrects for over-dispersion (variance exceeds the mean). In particular, we use a modified version of NBR wherein estimates are conditional on the dependent variable being greater than zero (Grogger and Carson 1991; Long 1997). This zero-truncated modification is appropriate for our analysis because in order to be included in these data, organizations must appear in at least

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18 101 cases had missing values for this variable because the tactics used were either missing or coded “other.” In order to retain these cases in the analysis, we used mean substitution (by year) to impute a value for percent disruptive. In separate analyses, we found that dropping these cases had no substantive impact on our results.
one event. Thus, the yearly count of events for any given organization in our data is 1 or greater.

NBR combines the Poisson and gamma distributions and is represented as follows:

\[
Pr(y_i = y_i \mid y_i > 0, x_i) = \frac{\Gamma(y_i + \alpha^{-1}) (\frac{\alpha^{-1}}{\alpha^{-1} + \mu_i})^{\alpha^{-1}} \left( \frac{\mu_i}{\alpha^{-1} + \mu_i} \right)}{1 - (1 + \alpha \mu)^{-\alpha^{-1}}} \text{ for } y = 0, 1, 2, \ldots
\]

where \( \Gamma \) denotes the gamma function (see Long 1997: 232), \( \alpha \) is the dispersion parameter, and \( \mu \) is the expected value of \( y \) (Long 1997). NBR models have been used to study phenomena such as counts of organizational foundings in social movements (Minkoff 1994, 1995, 1997) as well as counts of protest events (Olzak and Uhrig 2001). Ordinary Least Squares regression is inappropriate for event count data because these data frequently violate distribution assumptions: counts are always non-negative and they are generally small. The coefficients presented below are estimated using Stata Version 10 (Statacorp 2008) and the TRNBIN0 command developed by Joseph Hilbe (1998).

**RESULTS**

The results of the negative binomial regression analysis are presented in Table 2. Model 1 is the baseline model with the annual event count per organization-year regressed on the five control variables. Not surprisingly, repertoire size is significant and positive, and remains so across all of the models presented in this table. It stands to reason that more active organizations (i.e., those whose events are reported more frequently in the NYT) will also appear to have larger tactical repertoires – probably a function of the data source rather than the repertoire. We find no indication of a media bias favoring either disruptive events or events close to the media source,
both are expectations derived from the literature on media coverage of protest (see Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005).

The second model adds to these control variables our three measures of resources. The two variables for organization-level resources provide contradictory evidence. Inclusion in the Encyclopedia of Associations is a strong predictor of an organization’s count of collective action events. As we note earlier, organizations included in this directory tend to be well established, have large staffs and/or memberships, and national in scope. The strong, positive effect of this variable supports our first resource mobilization hypothesis (hypothesis 1), which posits that resources controlled by an organization influence its ability to mobilize collective action. Conversely, the indicator of human resources – average event size – is significant and negative. This is contrary to RM and suggests that organizations that stage large events (measured by number of participants) are less active in this context. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not supported. Finally, foundation grants, our only measure of sector-level resources, has no significant effect on activity levels, contrary to hypothesis 3.\(^{19}\)

[Table 2 about here]

The third model in Table 2 examines the effects of political opportunities measured at three levels (organization, movement, and sector) on protest activity. It appears that political opportunities measured at the organization and movement level are more important than those measured at the sector-level. The repression variable, an effect of the POS that varies by organization, reveals a non-monotonic effect on levels of activity (providing support for hypothesis 4c) and paralleling some prior research (Lichbach and Gurr 1981; DeNardo 1985;\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) It is worth noting that the control for disruptive tactics is positive and statistically significant in this model; organizations that engage in proportionally more disruptive events also attract more attention from the media.
Muller and Weede 1990). At low levels, the proportion of an organization’s events that draw repression encourages collective action. However, among organizations that face repression at a large proportion of their events, protest levels actually decrease (the inflection point is approximately 0.4, indicating that when around 40% or more of an organization’s events are repressed, repression has the intended dampening effect of protest).

Our measure of elite allies in Congress (but not the presidency), a characteristic of the POS that varies by movement, has a significant negative effect, indicating that (contrary to hypothesis 5) elite allies decrease levels of collective action. This finding may be better understood when we consider that early versions of political opportunity theory (Tilly 1978) argued that protest is stimulated not only by opportunity, but also by threat. It could be that elite allies do not stimulate protest; instead, the lack of such allies could present a threat that stimulates protest (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). McAdam (1999), reflecting on two decades of empirical and theoretical work on the POS, agrees that the importance of threat as a stimulant to protest has been eclipsed by opportunity. He notes that, “…in politics where there is some expectation of state responsiveness and few formal barriers to mobilization, we should expect perceived threats to group interests to serve, along with expanded opportunities, as two distinct precipitants of collective action” (1999: xi).20 Alternatively, it may be the case that allies in Congress induce movements off of the streets and into the halls of government (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Moving now to the sector-level effects, Model 4 adds to the previous model our measures designed to test the effects of embeddedness, legitimacy, and competition. Embeddedness in the SMS (i.e., participation in coalitions) contributes to higher levels of collective action, as predicted in hypothesis 7. We attribute the embeddedness effect to access to shared resources (e.g., skills, information, participants, leaders) and to the legitimacy conferred upon organizations that are

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20 On this point, see also Van Dyke and Soule (2002) and Snow et al. (2005).
able to attract visible, public support from other organizations. By signaling to outsiders that “this organization is acting appropriately,” embeddedness in the SMS removes cultural barriers to resource mobilization and facilitates collective action.

The two tactical overlap variables perform exactly as predicted by density dependence theory (hypotheses 8a and 8b) – both are significant, the main effect is positive, and the squared term is negative. The main effect is what organizational ecologists attribute to the increasing legitimacy of an organization as its new (tactical) form becomes more widespread. The quadratic term is the effect of competition on organizational activity and indicates that in high density niches too many organizations are crowding the sector, competing for the same resources, which leads to a decline in organizational activity. Taken together, legitimacy and competition are opposing forces that shape protest levels, resulting in an inverted-U-shaped curve (Figure 2).

[Figure 2 about here]

DISCUSSION

The analysis presented in this paper represents an important advance in collective action research, which has largely confined itself to the issue-centered approach, in which a small number of SMOs or movements are compared. As McAdam and Scott (2005) have recently argued, this is a shortcoming of the social movements literature that organizational theories can help to correct by paying careful attention to organizational environments and interorganizational dynamics. Specifically, our findings reveal that the character of the social movement sector, which is comprised of all organizations engaging in public collective action events reported in the NYT, shapes the levels of protest of organizations therein. By testing hypotheses that are sensitive to inter-movement processes, we are able (perhaps for the first time) to test arguments about how
social movement sector-level dynamics impact an important organizational outcome: collective action events.

We find support for the density dependence hypothesis, but not in terms of the density of organizations working on the same issue, but rather the density of organizations using the same tactics (i.e., tactical overlap) (Olzak and Uhrig 2001). That is, at low levels of tactical overlap, an increasing number of collective action events using the same tactics has a positive effect on protest levels, attributable to the increasing legitimacy of these tactics. However, at high levels, the effect is reversed—increasing tactical overlap depresses levels of collective action—due to increasing levels of intra-sector competition. The significance of this effect is particularly striking when one considers that we are only observing a fraction of the events and organizations in the SMS (i.e., only those reported in the New York Times). If we were able to observe all collective events in the U.S. during this time and therefore develop a more accurate measure of niche density, we suspect that the competition and legitimacy effects would be even stronger due to the higher observed frequencies of all tactics. Admittedly, the reverse might also be true, that these effects would disappear in the larger population, suggesting that density dependence is only a factor for that subset of organizations and events that appear in a national newspaper.

Density dependence may be offered as an explanation for McAdam’s (1983) findings regarding tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency. Recall from that study that each time the Civil Rights movement experimented with a new, disruptive tactic (e.g., bus boycott, sit-in, Freedom Rides), the number of collective action events by other movement actors increased dramatically. McAdam explains this by saying that tactical innovation and the resulting crisis situation signal an opportunity to other organizations that authorities are vulnerable, which in turn increases collective action until authorities adapt and effectively diffuse the crisis. But, an ecologist’s interpretation of this pattern might hold that organizations that employ tactical
innovations help to increase the level of legitimacy of a particular tactic, thus triggering mimicry among similar organizations (e.g., Soule 1997). However, as the number of organizations using a particular tactic increases, tactical overlap increases, leading to interorganizational competition and, eventually, a decline in levels of collective action.

Our findings provide support for embeddedness theories that state that ties to other organizations (here measured as co-presence at events) influence organizational outcomes (Steedly and Foley 1979; Galaskiewicz 1985; Staggenborg 1986; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Jones et al. 2001; Brass et al. 2004): SMOs with ties to others have higher levels of collective action. Embeddedness provides organizations with greater access to resources, including leaders, cultural frames, participants, tactical repertoires, and participants. It also reflects an implicit endorsement of SMOs by the organizations to which they are tied, thus signaling its legitimacy to potential supporters.

We find mixed support for the resource mobilization and political opportunity perspectives that may point to necessary refinements for these theoretical frameworks. With respect to RM, we find that resources at the organizational level are more important for mobilizing collective action than are resources available to the entire sector – i.e., organizations that control more resources tend to stage more collective action events. However, our findings strike a note of caution. Of our two measures of organization-level resources, one (being listed in the Encyclopedia of Association) is positive, as predicted, and one (average event size) is negative. We acknowledge that our newspaper data might exaggerate the strength of the Encyclopedia effect because the NYT, like the directory, is likely to over-report significant or prominent organizations (Oliver and Myers 1999). However, given the tendency of newspapers to select larger events for coverage (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000), the negative effect of event size is especially surprising. Upon reflection, it is possible that this
finding indicates an important dilemma that organizations may face to either stage fewer, but large, events or many, but smaller, events (see also Soule and Earl 2005). Organizations staging larger events may not have the resources to stage many events.

Of our measures of the POS, opportunities measured at the organization and movement levels perform better than those measured at the sector-level. In particular, the effect of repression (measured as the proportion of an organization’s reported events that are repressed) is curvilinear such that organizations display lower levels of collective action when they face very low or very high levels of repression. Once again, in light of newspapers’ known tendencies to over-report more conflictual and intense events (Snyder and Kelly 1977; Mueller 1997; Ortiz et al. 2005), we might expect that the repression effect would be linear and positive. That it is not suggests to us that the curvilinear effect is fairly robust.

Elite allies in Congress (but not the presidency) are also significant for collective action, but not as we had expected. SMOs in these data appear to be more active when they have few ideologically aligned representatives in Congress, rather than when they have of many such representatives. The literature on political opportunities suggests two plausible explanations. An unfavorable Congress might be interpreted by movement actors as a threat to which they are compelled to respond (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Alternatively, the presence of allies in government could present opportunities not for collective action but for more routine avenues of political activity (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Political opportunities at the sector level, indicated by those years when control of the presidency and Congress was divided between opposing parties, have no effect in our analysis. It should be borne in mind that if our sample is indeed biased toward New York events, then we might find more robust effects of political opportunity and resource mobilization measures if they were measured at the NY (rather than national) level. Future research should follow our
lead here and examine more closely how resource mobilization and political opportunities operate at different levels of analysis (e.g., organizations, movements, sectors, states, nations, etc.).

One should consider how these results are affected by the somewhat unique period of study (1965-1975), one marked by unusually high levels of protest. The effects of legitimacy and competition may in fact be accentuated during the peaks of protest cycles. As the frequency and range of protest forms increases, organizations using familiar tactics may benefit from an increase in the overall legitimacy of social movements in marked contrast to those that adopt discredited forms (Haines 1984). At the same time, to the extent that SMS growth outpaces the growth of the resource base (e.g., if the news hole for protest does not keep pace with increasing levels of protest; or SMOs multiply faster than the supply of available participants), interorganizational competition will intensify. The eleven year period we have studied also may be too brief to allow time for political opportunities to take effect. 21 As McAdam (1999) has argued, political opportunities may unfold over decades rather than years, which may explain why some of our indicators of political opportunities are not statistically significant.

It seems reasonable to conclude with some suggestions for future research. First, we have shown here that resources at the organizational level (as measured by inclusion in the Encyclopedia of Associations) — but not the sector level (measured by overall levels of foundation support to movements) — increase collective action. As well, we have shown that cultural perceptions of legitimacy are a significant factor in promoting collective action. Future research should examine more closely the relationship between legitimacy and resource acquisition. While we have emphasized the direct effects of these two variables on an organization’s level of collective action, scholars should consider how legitimacy may also be an antecedent to resource

21 We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer who suggested this possibility.
acquisition. In other words, it is possible that organizational legitimacy affects organizational activity via the effects of legitimacy on the ability of an organization to acquire resources.

Second, we call on other researchers to devise alternative and creative ways to define and measure the social movement sector. Here, following Everett (1992; Bearman and Everett 1993), we have operationally defined the SMS as all organizations that took part in collective action events as reported in the New York Times. This, as we noted above, is somewhat of a departure from the standard practice of defining the subject of inquiry by an issue around which actors mobilize, and it is a peculiar subset of organizations and events that are selected by one prominent, national newspaper. However, there are likely many other ways to define the SMS and we call for researchers to think seriously about how this may be done in an effort to ascertain if our findings regarding the importance of sector-level dynamics hold when the sector is operationalized differently. For example, research could define the SMS as all organizations included in a directory, such as the Encyclopedia of Association (e.g., Minkoff 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999). Such a strategy would likely net a different picture of the SMS, nonetheless it would be illustrative to compare and contrast the organizations in our SMS with that from different conceptualizations.

Third, we call for research that considers how sector-level dynamics impact additional types of organizational outcomes (beyond the amount of collective action sponsored by an organization). For example, research could examine the specialization of organizations with respect to tactical use or claims-making, as Soule and King (2008) have recently done for three social movements. A casual observer of organizations engaging in collective action would see that some organizations seem to focus on a very narrow repertoire of claims and tactics, while other organizations tend to be far more general. Future research should consider how sector-level
dynamics (net of and in combination with resources and political opportunities) impact specialization of these sorts.

Finally, we conclude with a call for similar kinds of analysis on sector dynamics in different and longer time periods and in different countries. Because we were most interested in this well-studied protest cycle, we chose to limit our analysis to the 1965-1975 period. However, we expect that the importance of sector-level effects should be found in other periods and in other countries. And, we believe that some of the POS and RM variables might perform differently in different contexts. Thus, we conclude with a general call for research that takes more seriously the entire SMS.
REFERENCES


Earl, Jennifer, and Sarah A. Soule. 2006. “Seeing Blue: Going Behind the Baton to Explain


Statacorp. 2008. Stata Statistical Software: Release 10. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.


Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Events per year</td>
<td>Count of collective action events (per org. per year)</td>
<td>1 - 73</td>
<td>1.680</td>
<td>3.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events per year (t – 1)</td>
<td>Event count from the prior year (per org. per year)</td>
<td>0 - 73</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>3.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 dummy</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 for all organization-years observed in 1965</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoire size</td>
<td>Number of tactics used (per org. per year)‡</td>
<td>0 - 13</td>
<td>1.562</td>
<td>1.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruptiveness of tactics</td>
<td>Proportion of all tactics used that are disruptive‡‡</td>
<td>.06 - .20</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York region</td>
<td>Proportion of events in New York, New Jersey, or Connecticut (per org.)</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedia of Associations</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 if the organization is listed in the Encyclopedia between 1964 and 1975.</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. event size</td>
<td>Average number of participants present at events (per organization per year)</td>
<td>2 - 157,000</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>9,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation grants</td>
<td>Total grants from foundations to social movements (in $millions)</td>
<td>1.9 – 20.2</td>
<td>11.309</td>
<td>6.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of events w/repression</td>
<td>Proportion of events at which police used force (per org. per year)‡‡‡</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided elite</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 if Congress and the presidency are controlled by different parties (per year)</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite allies – President</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 if the political orientation of the org. and the President’s party are congruous (per year)‡‡‡</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite allies – Congress</td>
<td>Proportion of Congress controlled by the most politically congruent party to the org. (per year)‡‡‡‡</td>
<td>0 - 0.68</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical overlap</td>
<td>N of total events involving a tactic used by the focal organization (per org. per year)‡</td>
<td>0 - 493</td>
<td>80.76</td>
<td>78.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Dummy: 1 if the organization was involved in a coalition (per year)</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Source: New York Times, all articles reporting a public, collective, claims-making event.
‡ Tactics include rallies, demonstrations, marches, vigils, pickets, civil disobedience, dramaturgical demonstrations, motorcades, information distribution, symbolic displays, attacks/conflicts, riots, strikes, boycotts, press conferences, lawsuits, and announcements of organizational formation. A zero value implies that an organization used a tactic not listed here (101 cases had zero values).
‡‡ Disruptive tactics are civil disobedience, attacks, riot, strikes, and conflict.
‡‡‡ Events at which police restricted the movement of protestors (e.g., set up barricades), made arrests, or used force, violence, or weapons.
‡‡‡‡ Political orientation of organizations is determined by the percent of their events (must be 75% or more) advocating left- or right-wing claims; for political parties, Republicans are considered right-wing and Democrats are considered left-wing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>All Organizations (N = 2,900)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events Per Year (t – 1)</td>
<td>0.228*** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.076)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.012+ (0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.670** (0.247)</td>
<td>-0.329 (0.273)</td>
<td>-0.229 (0.222)</td>
<td>0.178 (0.191)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoire Size</td>
<td>1.205*** (0.063)</td>
<td>1.150*** (0.126)</td>
<td>0.813*** (0.065)</td>
<td>0.545*** (0.049)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Disruptive Tactics</td>
<td>0.090 (1.354)</td>
<td>0.929* (1.500)</td>
<td>-0.480 (1.482)</td>
<td>-2.457+ (1.341)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. New York Region Events</td>
<td>-0.086 (0.126)</td>
<td>0.054 (0.109)</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.094)</td>
<td>-0.190* (0.094)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
<td>Encyclopedia of Associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dummy)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.821*** (0.117)</td>
<td>0.751*** (0.101)</td>
<td>0.605*** (0.086)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Event Size</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.166* (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.149* (0.075)</td>
<td>-0.175** (0.067)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(divided by 1,000)†</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Grants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.007 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in Millions; divided by 100)†</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opportunities</td>
<td>Prop. Repressed Events</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.868*** (0.710)</td>
<td>5.053*** (0.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prop. Repressed Events²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-6.853*** (0.786)</td>
<td>-6.091*** (0.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divided Elite (dummy)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.030 (0.238)</td>
<td>0.066 (0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite Allies – President (dummy)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.123 (0.165)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite Allies – Congress (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.061*** (0.202)</td>
<td>-0.943*** (0.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector-level Effects</td>
<td>Tactical Overlap</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>119.391*** (13.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(divided by 10,000)†</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Overlap²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.288*** (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(divided by 10,000)†</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition (dummy)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.579*** (0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-18.487*** (0.232)</td>
<td>-6.094*** (2.404)</td>
<td>-3.138*** (0.459)</td>
<td>-2.894*** (0.318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi²</td>
<td>2099.8</td>
<td>2148.9</td>
<td>2279.1</td>
<td>2398.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** P < .001   ** P < .01   * P < .05   + P < .10; two-tailed test
Standard errors are shown in parentheses
† Variable is divided by a constant simply to aid in the presentation of very small coefficients. It has no substantive meaning or impact on the results.
Figure 1. The number of organizations in U.S. social movement sector as reported in the NYT, 1965-75.
Figure 2. Effects of tactical overlap on levels of protest, U.S. Social Movement Sector as reported in the NYT, 1965-1975.