Organizational Resources
and Repertoires of Collective Action

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August, 2003

* Please do not cite or quote without permission. Please direct correspondence to first author at Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Social Sciences Bldg. room 400, Tucson, AZ 85721. Email at jlarson@u.arizona.edu. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9709337, SBR-9709356, and SES 9874000) and from the University of Arizona Vice-President for Research Small Grants Program. We thank Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Susan Olzak for their role in collecting the data used for this project; Ron Breiger and Joe Galaskiewicz for comments on early drafts.
ABSTRACT

Despite a growing body of research on protest tactics, their effects on rates of collective action, and why they change, very little attention has been devoted to understanding why tactical repertoires remain stable. We first identify a gap in the literature on protest tactics between studies at the population level centered on repertoires of tactics (e.g., Tilly 1978) and those at the organizational level focused on individual tactics (e.g., Soule 1997), and argue that a resource-centered approach may help to bridge this gap. The empirical analysis uses event-level data collected from the New York Times to examine the life histories of tactics used by social movement organizations. Using a discrete time event history technique we find evidence that an organization’s resource base is positively related to the stability of its tactical repertoire—larger, wealthier organizations retain tactics longer than smaller, resource poor organizations. By extending the concept of tactical repertoires from the population to the organizational level, reconceptualizing tactics as resource-driven forms of action, and highlighting possible connections between repertoire size and the dynamics of collective action, we aim to bring together the divergent strands of research in this field.
INTRODUCTION

Charles Tilly (1978) drew our attention to two empirical regularities in the study of tactics. First, in any given period and place contentious actors (groups of people who act together to make claims on others) tend to engage in the same generalized and very limited set of tactics. While events of collective action may differ in their particulars—e.g., by the claim being made, the target of the claim, or the location of the event—the general forms that collective actors adopt are repeated often. So, for example, a factory sit-down strike looks a lot like a sit-in at a lunch counter—both involve a group of people sitting down to halt the routine operation of an organization. Street blockades and office blockades, consumer boycotts and trade embargos, flag burnings and cross burnings—the particulars may differ, but the general forms remain the same. What is puzzling about this observation is that in spite of the myriad imaginable tactics available groups nevertheless tend to adhere to a very limited set of tactics in any given period and place. Tilly calls this set of tactics the repertoire of contention.

His second finding is that repertoires change, typically very slowly. Groups may continually experiment with forms at the margins of the existing repertoire, but rarely do their innovations endure; rather, most novel tactics are abandoned nearly as quickly as they appear. In very rare instances an entire repertoire is replaced by a new set of tactics, as happened in France and England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Tilly 1986, 1995a). The tactics of the earlier repertoires in these countries, Tilly writes, were “parochial, particular, and bifurcated—mostly local in scope, adopting forms and symbols peculiar to the relationship between claimants and the objects of their claims, either acting directly on a local relationship or asking privileged intermediaries to convey claims to more distant

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1 Throughout this paper we use the terms “tactics” and “forms of action” interchangeably to refer to the forms of public display that collective actors enact during distinct and transitory events of contentious action.

2 In his own words: “Repertoires of contention: the established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each other’s interests” (Tilly 1995a, p. 43). Of repertoires more generally he writes that they are “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1995a, p. 42); and of contention: “the discontinuous making of claims that bear on other people’s interests. Continuous claim-making includes parliamentary representation, routine activities of trade unions, day-to-day operation of friendship networks, and similar unceasing
authorities” (Tilly 1995a, p. 346). Tactics, including seizing grain when food prices were high and destroying enclosures when land was scarce, were eventually replaced by a new set of tactics that was cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous. That is, its scope was broader, and tactics were modified for use in a wide variety of contexts and organized independently of other incidental events of collective action.

Of these two observations— the limited size and slowly changing content of tactical repertoires— Tilly directs the bulk of his attention to the latter, the comprehensive shifts in repertoires. But what of the other problem, the limited size of repertoires? In other words, how can we explain the size of repertoires of collective action?

Unfortunately, Tilly’s explanation is cursory and incomplete. Repertoires are limited in size, he argues, because humans have a limited capacity to learn and because groups are limited by the tactical repertoires of other groups (Tilly 1995a, p. 42). That people have a maximum learning capacity is a safe assumption, but if we accept that this capacity does not vary across time or contexts then this explanation cannot account for the variation in the size of repertoires. However, we could imagine that learning capacities do change, for example with new technologies, or that some tactics are easier to learn than others, but Tilly does not pursue this problem.3

A second component of his argument states that repertoires develop in a strategic interplay between challengers, authorities and allies (Tilly 1995a, 1995b; see also Doherty 1999; Koopmans 1993; McAdam 1983; Titarenko et al. 2001; Zhao 2000)— a process analogous to a language being developed between groups (Tilly 1995b, p. 30). Participants take cues from one another and draw upon shared meaning, fashioning new meanings and forms of action in a dialectal process of action and reaction.4 In this way a group’s choice of actions is limited by others’

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3 Studies of diffusion do however take such characteristics into account. See Rogers (1995).

4 We can imagine a situation in which some participants do not “play by the rules” (consider, for example, the breaching experiments of the early ethnomethodologists). Other participants are likely to be confused, surprised, and may even react defensively. Notably, this is exactly what some scholars of tactics argue is the modus operandi of much contentious action (Doherty 1999; Koopmans 1993; McAdam
ability to make sense of its actions. While this is a plausible explanation for the limited size of tactical repertoires it too does not speak to variations in repertoire size. It begs the question: do groups (or configurations of groups) differ in their ability to fashion new tactics?

Neoinstitutionalists argue that similar groups look to one another for examples of organizational forms and routines and tend to converge on common models (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Scott 1995). This perspective suggests that repertoires face a downward pressure toward fewer and fewer constituent forms and that the variation of tactics will decline over time. This is a sensible (and testable) hypothesis, but the shortcoming of this view lies in its treating all tactics the same and ignoring the fact that not all groups have equal access to the resources and technologies that make many forms of action possible. In sum, Tilly has identified an interesting empirical problem—that repertoires of collective action are strikingly limited in size—for which we do not yet have a satisfactory explanation.

TACTICS RESEARCH AND THE THEORETICAL GAP

Reflecting in 1993, Tilly quipped, “Judged by the response of other scholars, I cannot say that the notion of contentious repertoires has been a roaring success” (reprinted in Traugott 1995, p. 38). Indeed, aside from Tilly, collective action scholars have been slow to take up and develop the concept of tactical repertoires. As the literature on tactics has slowly grown over the last decade, the paucity of discussion on repertoires has led to the growth of a theoretical gap between Tilly’s observations and much of the current work on tactics. While Tilly’s work focuses on the relationship between long-term, macro-historical processes (e.g., state building and capitalism) and changes in repertoires of contention, the major current of tactics research focuses on the tactical dynamics that accompany the frenetic bursts and intermittent surges of collective action characteristic of cycles of protest. These approaches differ in their levels and units of analysis.

1983; Morris 1993). Tilly does not speak to the disruptiveness of tactics nor about such “rule-breaking”
Levels of Analysis

The literature on tactics is divided between studies with long time-horizons that seek to explain variation across populations and studies with much shorter horizons that seek to explain variation across organizations and events. In the first group, Tilly (1978, 1986, 1995a) eyes the rise and fall of tactics as they are developed and eventually discarded by collective actors in a given period and place—processes that may take hundreds of years. Tarrow (1993a; 1998) argues that new tactics arise, become modified, and diffuse within the recurring peaks of protest activity, or “cycles of contention,” in which overall levels of conflict increase, collective action expands, and new frames of meaning arise. Zhao (2000) shows a similarly slow shift in tactics that he attributes to changing state-society relations in his study of the 1989 Beijing Student Movement. He argues that this movement toed a more traditional and (at least early on) less confrontational line than did earlier movements in China. Because the more recent movement was weaker in the face of a greater potential for state repression, Zhao claims, groups strategically downplayed their challenge to the state. These studies all take a broad view of tactical variation across populations of collective actors and find that long-term, macro-historical processes at the population level play a role in shaping the actions of collective actors.

In contrast, the bulk of tactics research instead concentrates on much shorter-term fluctuations in tactics within time periods at the organizational and event levels. For example, Koopmans (1993) is concerned with the division that develops between social movement groups during protest cycles. Moderate groups tend to become institutionalized and shift toward more “conventional” political tactics such as lobbying or party formation, while radical groups become enmeshed in confrontations with authorities that lead to further radicalization of tactics and increasing violence. Bearman and Everett (1993) find that the structural relations of groups affect which tactics they will use. Tactics used by the most central groups in any given period tend to become the dominant tactics used by all groups,
except the most peripheral groups which tend to differentiate their tactics from those of central groups (moreover, some groups never change their tactics). Studies of the diffusion of tactics (e.g., Chabot 2000; Conell & Cohn 1995; Pitcher, Hamblin, & Miller 1978; Soule 1997, 1999) acknowledge that the timing of adoption of tactics varies and use this to chart and explain the paths that tactics take as they travel from group to group. Soule (1997) presents evidence that groups look to other similar groups for models of behavior; tactics then diffuse among them, are modified and refined, and eventually become institutionalized. Others argue that in order for tactics to diffuse they must be compatible with the existing repertoires of potential adopters and be perceived as successful (Chabot 2000; Soule 1999). What these studies have in common is an interest in the short-term dynamics of tactics as they vary from week-to-week, event-to-event, or group-to-group (see also Doherty 1999; Ennis 1987; Everett 1992; Morris 1993; Titarenko et al. 2001); and what they share with research by Tilly, Tarrow and Zhao is an attempt to explain why collective actions take the forms that they do. Nevertheless, the theoretical gap between these two approaches, each with a different level of analysis, is yet to be bridged. We do not yet understand how such long-term processes as the centralization of states and capital relate to the shifting social relations and the local repertoires of collective actors.

Units of Analysis

A second area of divergence in the tactics literature arises between theories of tactics and theories of tactical repertoires. This may be a heuristic rather than an empirical difference, but it seems to impede discussions between the two approaches. For research at the population level the concept of tactical repertoires is a useful one with which to examine long-term patterns of tactics use. As Tilly (1986, 1995a) has shown, when power concentrates in a centralized state and capitalism shifts work from the home to urban factories, tactics change—not just one tactic, but an entire repertoire of tactics. Clearly all tactics in the repertoire are subject to the effects of shifting social relations and centers of power characteristic of modern states and capitalism (even if they do not all change at the same rate). In contrast, if we are looking at tactics used by groups in the U.S. over the course
of a single year, the variation we would find either between groups or within groups over time—what would look like “noise” in the long-term approach—is not so easily explained by one or two general forces. At this level of analysis, tactics do not all change together, but instead, as Tilly has shown, tend to settle on a common set from which groups then draw at different times and in different circumstances. Using this tactic-by-tactic view, Ennis (1987) examines the strategic decision-making processes that groups engage in; Bearman and Everett (1993) distinguish between the tactics of central and peripheral groups; and Soule (1997) observes the diffusion of a protest tactic across college campuses. Their units of analysis are appropriate for their respective problems, but the question remains, how do patterns of tactics used by individual collective actors relate to the much slower shifts that we observe in repertoires of contention?

Tarrow’s Approach

The approach that has come closest to bridging this theoretical gap appears in the writings of Sidney Tarrow. Tarrow (1993a, 1998) stays close to the work of Tilly while developing explanations for shorter-range mechanisms of tactical dynamics. In particular, he champions the idea that cycles of protest are the context within which innovative tactics are tested, refined, diffused, and eventually become part of the repertoire of contention. The expansion of a cycle of protest is characterized by new groups appearing at the margins of the field of collective action and bringing with them innovative tactics. Most tactical forms disappear as quickly as they appear, but occasionally a tactic emerges that shows signs of success and is then adopted by other groups that adapt it to their own needs and hope to capitalize on its novelty. If and when a tactic makes its way to the most central groups it then rapidly spreads across the sector and is modified, refined, and legitimated in the course of action. Finally (and rarely), a tactic becomes institutionalized when new routines and laws form around it and it becomes widely used and understood. In this way the onset of a protest cycle leads to evolutionary changes in the repertoire of contention.

This approach takes up the concept of tactical repertoires as Tilly intends it—the set of means used by a population to make claims on others—and connects
it to variations in tactics used between groups within cycles of protest, a focus of much research on tactics. Yet it stops short of bridging the theoretical gap between these two bodies of work. It does take steps toward solving the unit of analysis problem by connecting the concept of tactical repertoires to the dynamics of single tactics. In Tarrow’s view, tactics are added to the population’s repertoire one at a time as they are innovated, become modular, diffuse broadly, and become institutionalized.

A problem with this theory is that it does not touch on the problem of how tactics are dropped from the repertoire. If the size of repertoires is limited as Tilly (1978) claims and new tactics occasionally make their way into the tactical repertoire, then clearly tactics must occasionally be discarded. In other words, we should expect an upper bound on the tactical repertoire of a population; as new tactics are added others must be dropped.

A more significant drawback to this approach is that the analysis remains confined to the population level and cannot speak to the disparate uses of tactics already in the repertoire. This is an important weakness since most collective action in a protest cycle exhibits tactical forms that entered the repertoire long ago. With this approach we still cannot connect the slowly changing repertoire of a population to the rapidly changing tactics that groups selectively employ within the period of a protest cycle. To connect what we know of macro-structural shifts and repertoires of contention to the shifting tactics of collective actors a new theory is needed.

A RESOURCE-CENTERED APPROACH

As argued above, a theoretical gap divides the literature of collective action tactics in two ways and a new theory should seek to bridge it and bring the insights of either side to bear on the other. A resource-centered approach, drawn from resource mobilization and population ecology approaches may be able to fill the gap. Resource mobilization theories emphasize the organized character of collective action as well as the range of resources that facilitate coordinated, collective action (Gamson 1975; Jenkins 1983; McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Collective action is said to rise and fall with the
ability of organizations to mobilize resources. This approach parallels a one
developed by organizational scholars in studies of populations of organizations that
also gives primacy to resources (Hannan & Freeman 1989; McPherson 1983;
liberally from the lexicon of ecology, population ecologists emphasize that
populations of organizations are in a continual struggle for resources which vary in
their distribution across the social environment and drive the dynamics of
organizational change and survival. Groups do not compete for all resources, but
rather primarily for those within and around their niche (McPherson 1983).
Competing groups are “selected” (i.e., they survive) if they can compete
successfully within a niche for available resources, or can shift to a less competitive
niche. The imagery is one of organisms searching the landscape for available
nourishment in the struggle to survive. These resource-centered perspectives draw
our attention to the limited supply of resources and the constraints that it places on
collective actors.

Observing, learning, organizing, and executing collective action require
resources. Therefore, because collective actors lack information about them and
because they have limited resources with which to execute them they cannot
possibly know all of the conceivable tactical forms.

Before going farther, we should define resources. Cress and Snow (1996)
develop a useful taxonomy of resources that encompasses four dimensions: moral,
material, informational and human. Moral resources are the endorsements of a group
that come from other organizations. They provide legitimacy and moral support to
groups. The tactics employed by collective actors may function, in a Durkheimian
sense, to bind them to other groups or to isolate them. The civil rights movement
in the U.S. was deeply divided along tactical lines, with debates raging over violent
versus nonviolent forms, and such a divide is likely to influence the acquisition of
moral resources for civil rights groups. The perceived legitimacy of a group by
potential donors may also affect the flow of material resources. These include not
only money, but also the things that money buys: supplies, meeting space, office
space, transportation, and paid positions. Without money most groups could not
hire attorneys to file lawsuits or print leaflets to distribute. Providing
transportation to events may enable tactics to flourish that are best carried out by large groups such as rallies and marches. Informational resources are those that bring knowledge and skills to a group (in a Simmelian sense), and therefore bear heavily on the forms of action that a group will take on. Access to information about how other groups act or about how to run an organization, for example, is a critical antecedent to following them. Chabot (2000), for example, traces the informational resources (i.e., social connections) that brought the Gandhian repertoire of nonviolent civil disobedience to the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s and helped fashion the civil rights movement. Finally, human resources are the people who populate groups, associations, organizations and movements. They are the leaders, constituents, and actively involved members, and they provide the labor, skills, and knowledge to coordinate and enact organizational functions, including tactics.

Assumptions of the Argument

We assume an upward pressure on repertoire size. Hypothetically, in a world of abundant resources (unlimited knowledge, group participants, and material resources) we expect that repertoires would grow without limit, that there is a tendency for groups to acquire new tactics. We believe this is a reasonable assumption for three reasons: (1) no tactic (or set of tactics) is one hundred percent effective one hundred percent of the time; (2) groups will always replace a tactic perceived to be less effective with one that might be more effective; and (3) the number of tactics that exists in the social environment at any given time is far greater than any group could possibly adopt. Even if groups adopt tactics that they believe are maximally effective, they may not have sufficient resources to enact them and so will be forced reduce the size of their repertoire or to find tactics with a lower “cost.” The limited availability of resources, we argue, is the most significant constraint on the size of repertoires.

Resources and Repertoire Size
The resource base of a group or population facilitates and constrains the growth of its tactical repertoire. This is true both at the organizational level, as we develop it here, and at the population level, to which Tilly’s work on repertoires of contention speaks. As a group’s ability to mobilize resources grows so too will its tactical repertoire. Yet, there comes a point at which resources are maximally extended and the size of repertoires reaches an upper limit. If tactics are resource-driven forms of action then each tactic that an organization learns to enact—i.e., each tactic in its repertoire—comes at a cost. Generally speaking, we expect that two tactics require more resources than one because each additional tactic entails new resources such as new knowledge, new or different supplies, and the means to transmit information about it to potential participants, allies, mass media, and targets. The argument is diagramed in Figure 3. As resources increase, groups become less likely to drop the tactics in their repertoires, which consequently tend to grow.

Cohen and Harris (Unpublished) argue to the contrary that a lack of resources may actually lead to larger repertoires. Specifically, they claim that because minority groups lack access to decision-makers and because they lack resources, they will choose to increase their strategic advantage by employing a wider variety of tactics than non-minority groups. In their view, tactics are alternatives to resources rather than dependent upon them as we argue. In contrast, we argue that if these authors are right and minority groups do have fewer resources, then by our theory these groups should be more likely to drop tactics than non-minority groups, and consequently will have smaller repertoires.

DATA AND METHODS

We test the theory repertoire size using newspaper reports from eleven years of collective action events in the United States. The reports are drawn from the New York Times, a newspaper with a national scope, and include all reports of collective action events that occur between 1965 and 1975. Events were coded if they met three criteria: 1) they were collective, that is, they included at least two

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5 Even when the array of available tactics is limited no one group adopts them all: “No actual group
participants; 2) they were public (no private meetings or other events); and 3) at least one claim was made (e.g., anti-segregation, pro-women’s rights, etc.). All said we coded more than 7,200 events that spanned this eleven-year period. Intercoder reliability was periodically measured and deemed sufficient (r > .90) throughout the process. For each event we recorded which, if any, organizations were reportedly present (e.g., Black Panthers, Students for a Democratic Society) and coded the form(s) of collective action that occurred (e.g., rally, civil disobedience, petition). A single event might have included multiple organizations and multiple tactics, so for our purposes here, rather than trying to distinguish which organization employed which tactic at an event, we will assume that any organization present at an event used all of the tactics reportedly used at that event. Because our interest is to follow the tactics that collective actors use over time we need a way to identify the same actors in newspaper reports across the period. For that reason we will limit our attention to the most easily identifiable collective actors, formal organizations with names. Therefore, we retain for this analysis only those events in which at least one organization and one tactic are mentioned.

**Tactical Repertoires and Rates of Dropping Tactics**

As conceptualized by Tilly (1978) repertoires are stable over time, but contentious action is discontinuous. Because these data are from discontinuous events we must find a way to capture repertoires over time. To this end we operationalize an organization’s tactical repertoire as the number of different tactics it uses throughout the course of a calendar year. When deciding upon appropriate interval lengths with which to measure repertoire size we have tried to strike a reasonable balance between a period long enough to allow an organization to use a sufficient number of tactics, and short enough to observe changes over time. For example, if we define repertoires by weekly or even monthly intervals we would be severely restricting our measure of repertoire size since organizations in these data typically appear at only one collective action event per year and use only one tactic. In contrast, if we define repertoires by an interval that spans the entire eleven-year

employed all the means of interaction within either of the repertoires…” (Tilly 1995a, p. 48).
period then it would make no sense to say that a tactic is ever dropped—repertoires must change over time. Yearly intervals we believe are a reasonable balance between these two extremes.

Existing studies of the dynamics of tactical repertoires (e.g., Tarrow 1993a, 1998) have much to say about how a tactic makes its way into repertoires but nothing about how tactics exit them. We are interested in this part of the process for its relevance in understanding the size limits of collective action repertoires. Furthermore, newspaper data are much better suited to studying processes of dropping rather than adding tactics because newspaper reports only appear when groups use at least one tactic. That is, we have no way to observe a repertoire as it grows from zero to one tactic, but we can observe the reverse.

Newspaper Data

Newspapers provide us with information of collective action events that is, if not exhaustive, certainly expansive. In fact, the breadth of these data, which are nationally representative over an eleven-year period, is unparalleled in collective action research. Most studies using newspaper data rely either on local newspapers and events that limit their generalizability, or to a sample of national editions (e.g., Monday editions, or the first Sunday of every month). Samples allow researchers to broaden the scope of their analyses, but because media coverage of collective action events varies by days of the week, these data also risk making invalid generalizations (Oliver & Myers 1999; Oliver & Maney 2000). The data used here are unique in that they include all reports of collective action events across the entire period and make use of a national news source.

However, we would be wise to heed the advice of several studies of media coverage of protest events. If coverage of events is sporadic then we may get an incomplete picture of an organization’s repertoire, and accurately measuring changes in repertoires becomes very difficult. For instance, the Times reports in 1974 that the Brownsville Community Action Association marched and rallied outside of City Hall to protest the police shooting of a 14 year-old black boy. Because the group from Brownsville is only reported to be involved with this one event we must assume that it had a repertoire of two tactics (march and rally) in
1974 and then dropped both tactics after one year. The Association may in fact have held a vigil the following day, or marched again in 1975, but because these events are not reported we must assume that this is the only time this organization engaged in collective action. Because the majority of collective action events are never reported in newspapers (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver & Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000), we should not be surprised if these data vastly underestimate the size of repertoires and overestimate the rate that organizations abandon tactics (particularly so for those organizations that are infrequently reported). Event selection bias may disproportionately privilege smaller repertoires and faster rates of tactic loss—contrary to the hypothesis tested here that larger repertoires lead to greater rates of tactic abandonment. Other factors may also complicate newspaper data. Not all events are reported with the same regularity by newspapers, and the timing of events may preclude them from coverage if other local or national issues out-compete them for limited newspaper space (Oliver & Maney 2000). We should expect, for example, that our data include a disproportionate number of large events and large organizations (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver & Maney 2000), events near to New York City (the source of the newspaper; Oliver & Maney 2000), events based on controversial issues, and more rallies than “unpermitted protests”6 (Oliver & Myers 1999). All of these potential biases point toward the same conclusion, that we risk underestimating the size of some or all repertoires and overestimating the rates that tactics are dropped. Because these biases work in the opposite direction of the hypothesized relationship, we do not believe that we run the risk of committing a type I error and mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis.

Clearly we have reason to worry about a possible type II error if the media selection bias is dramatic enough that we fail to reject the null because the bias overrides the predicted effect. Indeed, the data suggest that the odds may be stacked against us. Nearly eighty-five percent of the organizations we observe (1,769/2,086) across the eleven-year period appear for only one year, and roughly three-quarters of those (1,274) use only one tactic. These organizations probably

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6 “Includes unpermitted literature distributions that resulted in police complaints” (Oliver & Maney 2000, p. 53, Table 1.)
tend to be smaller, local, and therefore more underrepresented in the New York Times than larger, national groups. As a consequence, newspaper data are likely to present a misleading picture of repertoire dynamics among these smaller organizations. Because this is a very real possibility and could complicate interpretation of the results, we omit from the analysis those 1,274 organizations that appear for only one year and use only one tactic.7

Event History Analysis

We use the Cox proportional hazards method for discrete-time (Allison 1995) to model the timing of an organization dropping a tactic from its repertoire. This method is distinctively appropriate for this study because it estimates the timing of an event and allows for covariates that vary over time (in this case, repertoire size and resources). Due to the considerable size of the dataset, a technical limitation peculiar to this type of model, and the limits of available computer technology we have had to reduce the volume of data in the analysis to compute the model. Consequently, we have drawn a manageably-sized random sample of 489 tactic spells from the full dataset to overcome this problem (from 3,947 spells in all).8 The data discussed below are from this sample.

A tactic spell, the unit of analysis, is the number of consecutive years that a particular tactic is used by one organization. Each of the 133 organizations we observe (listed in Appendix A) may use as many as 18 different tactics (described in Appendix B), and each tactic may be used for a maximum of eleven consecutive years, the duration of the analysis. However, no organization in our sample uses all 18 tactics, nor do they retain a tactic for the full eleven years. All told, the analysis includes 590 separate observations. Each observation is an organization-tactic-year, or, the year in which a tactic is used by an organization. Repeated events—tactics that are dropped for a year or more and then picked up again by the same organization in subsequent years—are treated in this analysis as independent spells.

7 Omitting these cases from the analyses that follow does not change the substance of our results.
Variables

The dependent variable is the logged hazard rate for a tactic spell at a given duration interval, or the log of the odds that at tactic will be dropped during after a given number of years provided that it survived to that year. A tactic is said to be dropped after the last consecutive year that it is used by an organization. Tactics not dropped by the end of the observation period are distinguished and coded accordingly.

We hypothesize a positive relationship between the size of an organization’s repertoire and the odds that the organization will drop a tactic in a given year. As discussed above, for this analysis we measure repertoire size by the number of different tactics (of the eighteen listed in Appendix B) an organization uses during a calendar year. We expect repertoire size to be positively correlated with the odds of a tactic being dropped.

We also hypothesize a link between resources and the odds that an organization will discard a tactic. Because we cannot glean much about an organization’s resource base through reports of events in the New York Times, we utilize two indirect measures of resources. First, we went to the Encyclopedia of Associations, an annual listing of national not-for-profit organizations in the U.S., to collect what data we could about these 133 organizations. Because the Encyclopedia during this period lists only a fraction of these organizations, with a strong bias toward larger and older organizations that are national in scope, we recognized that being listed itself suggests that an organization is resource rich. To make this more clear, the typical membership size of those organizations in our sample that are listed is over half a million members. Several of the membership figures at the lower end of the scale actually represent member organizations, suggesting that this figure may even be understated. The staff sizes of these organizations were typically around two hundred and the number of local affiliate organizations for each was upwards of one thousand. Therefore, we created a dichotomous variable

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8 We began with a random sample of 800 spells selected prior to omitting those organizations that appear for one year and use only one tactic. This allowed us to compare the results of the analysis both
indicating whether or not an organization is listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations during the period of this study. Taken in conjunction with our second indicator of resource levels we hope to strengthen our hand. If resource mobilization theories are correct and the frequency of collective action does vary with resource levels, then we should expect that organizations that appear more frequently in these data have more resources than those that appear less frequently. Moreover, if studies of media coverage of protest events are any indication then the data here probably disproportionately represent larger, more established—i.e., resource rich—organizations (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver & Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000). Therefore we think a reasonable indicator of organizational resource levels is the number of events that the Times reports an organization to participate in each year.

Organizational ecologists argue that organizations compete within niches of limited resources. The “carrying capacity” of the social environment is the maximum number of organizations that the resource level of the niche can support. The volume of available resources is one major factor determining competition levels among organizations—fewer resources generates greater interorganizational competition, ceteris paribus. Typically, researchers do not measure carrying capacity and instead assume that this resource limit must be acquired inductively as a range of organizations appears to reach its empirical limit to growth. However, we believe that in some instances such an environmental characteristic might be approximated. Indeed, because the purpose of our analyses is to explain the limits on repertoire size it is imperative that we control for the varying availability of resources. Therefore, we approximate the yearly carrying capacity for social movement organizations using a measure derived from Jenkins’ (1993) research on philanthropic giving to SMOs among private foundations. This variable is the yearly sum of foundation grants to social movements and ranges from $1.9M in 1965 to $20.1M in 1975 with a mean of $11.3M.\footnote{\textsuperscript{9} This measure of philanthropic support includes grants to institutions (e.g. universities & churches) that were involved in movement work. Many thanks to Craig Jenkins for generously making these data available to us. We tried many other possible indicators of carrying capacity—GDP, GNP, per capita disposable income, percent below the poverty level, unemployment rate, etc. — and found that they were} Across the period under study

\footnote{\textsuperscript{9} This measure of philanthropic support includes grants to institutions (e.g. universities & churches) that were involved in movement work. Many thanks to Craig Jenkins for generously making these data available to us. We tried many other possible indicators of carrying capacity—GDP, GNP, per capita disposable income, percent below the poverty level, unemployment rate, etc. — and found that they were}
here foundation grants increased precipitously after more than a decade of relatively constant giving (see Jenkins 1998).

Finally, to control for the possibility suggested by Cohen and Harris (Unpublished) that minority groups are likely to have larger repertoires because they lack resources and social capital, we include a dummy variable for minority organizations. Our coding of this variable relies largely on our familiarity with many organizations in the data (e.g., National Urban League, Southern Christian Leadership Conference), on the tell-tale names of many lesser known organizations (e.g., Asian-American for Equal Employment, Fuerzas Armadas De Liberacion Nacional Puerto Rico), and information gleaned from listings in the Encyclopedia of Associations. Cohen and Harris predict that this variable will be negatively correlated while the resource-centered approach advocated here predicts the opposite, that minority groups will be more likely to drop tactics than will non-minority groups.

An example of what these data look like is given in Table 1. The first five rows of data represent five separate tactic spells that “survived” only one year, all from the same organization. Beginning with row six we see that the Black Panthers used tactic 15 (press conference; see Appendix B) for three consecutive years (observations 510, 511, and 512); this is represented as tactic spell number 15. Because the organization reportedly held a press conference in 1970 but not in 1971, we say that the tactic was dropped in 1970, as indicated in the “dropped” column. Throughout this three year period we can see that the Panthers’ repertoire size grew as did the reported number of events that they participated in. The last two columns report that the organization was not listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations and that it did represent a predominantly black constituency.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the key independent variables on each value of tactic-spell duration. The second column reports the distribution of tactic spells by duration. The first thing to note in this table is that the vast majority of tactics are only used for one “consecutive” year (93%), and all but a few have been dropped by the third year. To some degree this must be a function all highly correlated with one another. This strengthened our conviction that this is indeed a valid indicator of carrying capacity.
of incomplete newspaper coverage of collective action events, but the exceptionally lopsided distribution of spell durations suggests that organizations frequently vary their tactics rather than retain the same ones for several years on end.

Tactical repertoires are larger at the middle and high end of spell durations, contrary to what we expected. Tactics with the shortest lifespan are associated with the smallest repertoires. Perhaps because organizations with very small repertoires are also very small and young, they are subject to selection pressures that favor large, established organizations. This speculation is supported in columns four and five in which the two indicators of organizational resources suggest that greater resource levels tend to be associated with longer spell duration. As the first row indicates, twenty-nine percent of the tactics that survived at least one year (which is all of them) were used by organizations big enough and wealthy enough to be listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations, and which averaged approximately three events per year. By the second year, fifty-five percent of the surviving tactics were used by these established organizations, and the average number of events-per-year doubled. Of the organizations not listed in the Encyclopedia, none maintained a tactic for more than three years. The Events per year variable displays a similar strong pattern as it increases at each duration interval. So, as organizations participate in more events they also tend to retain tactics for longer periods of time. In these data only two tactic-spells survive longer than five years—both used by organizations listed in the Encyclopedia and that participated in an uncharacteristically small number of events. The other 487 tactic spells appear to support our hypothesis that as an organization’s resources increase, the likelihood that it will drop tactics sooner decreases. Finally, the last column in Table 2 appears to show that minority organizations are less likely to drop tactics in their first year of use than in their second or third years. Because this pattern runs counter to that seen in the Dropped column, it appears that minorities may be less likely to drop tactics in their early years than the bulk of the organizations in the sample. If true, and if these organizations also have fewer resources as Cohen and Harris (Unpublished) claim, then this finding runs counter to our prediction.

A graphical representation of the hazard rate for tactic survival is the given in Figure 1. This stepped curve shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function, the
conditional probability that a tactic spell will “survive” until next year (i.e., it will not be dropped after this year) given that it was at risk of being dropped this year (i.e., it was still in the repertoire). The dramatic drop in the first year reiterates what we have already seen: the probability is enormous that a tactic will be dropped in the same year it is first used. The survival function shows that there is only a 22.5% chance that a tactic will remain in an organization’s repertoire for two consecutive years, and by the third year that probability of survival is more than halved. The curve bottoms out in the fifth year at a 1.5% probability of survival. Clearly, this graph again suggests a short lifespan for all tactics in a repertoire. In the next section we present findings from the event history model of these data.

RESULTS

Figure 2 provides some evidence that resource levels do affect the variety of tactics an organization can maintain. In the top half of this figure we see that as repertoire size increases so too does the activity level of the organization. Those organizations that are more active also tend to maintain larger repertoires. In the bottom half of the figure we see a similar pattern using our other indicator of organizational resources. On average, those organizations that are listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations employ a markedly wider variety of tactics (mean=2.71) than do those not listed (mean=2.15).

The results from four Cox proportional hazards models for discrete time are presented in Table 3. Model 1 shows the first-order effect of repertoire size on the odds of dropping a tactic. Not surprisingly, repertoire size is statistically significant (P < .001), but contrary to our expectations, the coefficient is negative. By exponentiating the coefficient we obtain a hazard ratio, or the percent change in the odds that a tactic will be dropped: for each one-unit increase in repertoire size, the odds of dropping a tactic decrease by 12.9% \( (1 - e^{-1.38} = .129) \). That is, the larger and more varied the repertoire, the smaller the odds that a tactic will be dropped.

If we are correct and resource levels govern the size of tactical repertoires, then we should expect both resource variables to be negatively correlated with the odds of dropping a tactic at each interval of time, and that theirs will override the effects of repertoire size. As Model 2 shows, we are only partially correct. One
resource variable is significant while the other is not, and the effect of repertoire size is not changed. Those organizations that are listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations are two-thirds as likely to drop a tactic as those not listed, as we predicted, however, events per year is not a significant predictor of tactic duration—a surprising finding, especially in light of the apparent relationship we saw in Table 2. The negative effect of repertoire size implies a continuous tendency for repertoires to grow, since tactics are less and less likely to be dropped as each new tactic is added. This is certainly a puzzle when we observe no repertoires with more than thirteen tactics among any organizations in these data.

In Models 3 and 4 we introduce the minority variable and an interaction term for repertoire size and events per year, respectively. The coefficient for minority organizations is in the direction we predicted in both models but is not statistically significant. The interaction term is included because we expect organizations with greater resources to be less likely to drop tactics when their repertoires are large as compared to organizations with fewer resources. This variable borders on significance at the .10 level (p = .107) and only marginally reduces the effect of repertoire size. Furthermore, the main effect of events per year is now significant at the .10 level. Figure 2 visually represents Model 4 and helps to clarify the interaction effect. Among organizations with few resources (i.e., those that participated in a small number of events per year) increasing repertoire size has a negative effect or no effect at all on the odds of dropping tactics. Among organizations with many resources, repertoire size has a more noticeably positive effect on the odds of dropping tactics, however this events-per-year effect becomes less detectable as organizations’ repertoires increase in size. This means that organizations with few resources are much more likely to drop tactics when their repertoires are small than those with many resources, but rich and poor alike become more similarly prone to drop tactics as their repertoires grow.

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10 It is not the case that Encyclopedia overrides an effect of Events per year, as these two variables are only moderately correlated (r = .32), and Events per year does not noticeably change when we omit Encyclopedia from this model.
11 The interaction of repertoire size and Encyclopedia also does not have a significant effect, so because it does not change much the substance of our findings we have opted to present the more easily interpretable results here.
DISCUSSION

The tactics of contentious actors are resource-driven actions enabled and constrained by the resources available for their implementation. They are the forms that collective action takes and each new tactic requires additional resources, but resources are scarce, so the variety of tactics that collective actors can perform in any given period is limited. Charles Tilly reached a similar conclusion when he conceptualized the “repertoire of contention” twenty-five years ago (Tilly 1978). He noted that repertoires remain remarkably small despite a mountain of imaginable forms that collective action could take, yet collective action scholars have been slow to take up the problem of repertoire size.

One of the principal contributions of this paper lies in its extension of Tilly’s (1978) concept of repertoires of contention to new levels of analysis. As originally conceived the repertoire of contention is the array of means available to populations of collective actors in a given period and place for making claims that bear on the interests of others. Here we have applied the concept at the organization level to the forms of collective action that an organization has learned and may implement in a given period. Considered in this light the concept offers new possibilities for understanding cycles of protest, intergroup competition, rates of collective action, and may help to clarify the connections between macrostructural processes, such as state-building and capitalism, and the shifting landscape of contentious action.

In particular, we have focused on one aspect of organizational repertoires, their size. We provide evidence that repertoires at the organization level are limited to a relatively few number of tactics and that there is a good deal of size variation across organizations and over time. Earlier research on populations of collective actors and their tactical repertoires (Tilly 1978, 1986, 1995) shows that the limited size of repertoires is widespread, but has said little about why this is the case and nothing about why repertoires vary in size. In this paper we want to direct attention to these problems and urge others to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms that govern organizational repertoires at all levels of analysis. Studies of tactics at the population level have yielded valuable insights into the connections between social structures and tactics— for example, that state- and
capital-centralization lead to tactics that are more cosmopolitan, modular and autonomous (Tilly 1986, 1995)—but have not yet connected these findings to lower levels of analysis. In contrast, studies of tactics at the organizational and event levels have linked tactics used by groups to changing rates of collective action (McAdam 1983), the structural relations of groups (Bearman & Everett 1993), levels of intergroup competition (Olcak & Uhrig 2001), and the dynamics of protest cycles (Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1998), but they have not yet been applied to higher levels of analysis. Both bodies of work make impressive contributions to their own domains, but by not informing one another they may be missing an opportunity to build a more robust theory of collective action.

The perspective presented in this paper aims to bridge these two approaches and takes steps toward that end. At its core this perspective regards tactics as resource-driven action and acknowledges what any activist knows, that there will be no march without marchers, no motorcade without automobiles, no lawsuits without lawyers. Resources—e.g., participants, banners, specialized knowledge, automobiles, money, or lawyers—are absolutely necessary to enact concerted collective action. We also recognize that resources are scarce: no group can escape the limits of its resource base. The limited availability of resources constrains the number of tactics a group can adopt and maintain so that, assuming a tendency for repertoires to expand, a group will economize its use of tactics by learning and repeating existing forms of action. This leads to limits on the size of not only the tactical repertoires of organizations but also on the repertoires of populations.

One advantage of this approach for studying tactics is that it offers testable hypotheses about the size of tactical repertoires at any level of analysis: ecosystem, community, population, organization, or event. Shifting environmental conditions mean new distributions of resources, and consequently repertoires will vary in size proportional to the resources available for enacting them.

Our empirical analysis offers support for the approach developed here that links resources to tactical repertoires. We construct a dynamic event history model and use new national-level data to predict the odds that tactics will exit an organization’s repertoire. This breaks new ground for research on tactical
repertoires that have until now only focused on the mechanisms by which tactics enter repertoires, and offers new evidence for understanding the limited size of repertoires. Using two measures of resources, one distinguishing organizations that are large and prosperous enough to be listed in a national directory of non-profit organizations, and the other counting the number of events organizations reportedly participates in per year. Both indicators reveal that organizations with more resources are less likely to drop tactics. A counter hypothesis is offered by Cohen and Harris (Unpublished) who claim that minority organizations tend to maintain larger repertoires because they must strategically compensate for having fewer resources. Our findings do not support their claim, instead showing that limited resources place the same constraints on the size of tactical repertoires that belong to minority and non-minority organizations alike.

The unexpected finding in this analysis is that repertoire size has an effect on the rates of dropping tactics independent of our two measures of resources. Among organizations that reportedly participate in only a handful of events per year the repertoire size effect is negative. Among the more active organizations the effect is positive. In either instance, our measures of resources cannot entirely account for when a tactic will be dropped. On one hand, our resource measures may simply not be an adequate indicator of all of the resources that groups use to employ tactics or, on the other, something other than resources may be needed to explain when tactics are dropped. We must be content here to say that resources do matter for repertoire size, but it is unclear to what extent they matter.

CONCLUSION

In order to theoretically link the waves of organizational repertoires to the tide of repertoires of populations a new theory is needed. Over the past two and a half decades a theoretical gap has arisen in the literature on the tactics of collective actors, a gap characterized by research on different levels and units of analysis. If this gap is to be bridged we must make theoretical connections across levels of analysis and link repertoires of tactics to the dynamics of single forms of action. Bringing the concept of tactical repertoires to the organizational level we have sought to outline and test one possible approach which places resources at its
center. If we can better understand the mechanisms that govern organizational repertoires we may then illuminate mechanisms driving the tactical repertoires of populations.

The resource-centered approach advocated here (e.g., Hannan & Freeman 1989; McCarthy & Zald 1977; McPherson & Ranger-Moore 1991) stresses that macrostructural processes shape the distribution of resources across time and space which in turn bears on the ability of collective actors to adopt and enact multiple forms of action. Competition for these resources drives the organization and event level processes of tactics use and may in turn help us to understand varying rates of collective action. Recent work by Olzak and Uhrig (2001) finds that rates of collective action are a positive function of the degree of tactical overlap (i.e., the number of shared tactics) between the repertoires of protest groups. In a social context in which the available forms of action are limited (Tilly 1978) we should expect the degree of overlap between repertoires of organizations to increase as their repertoire sizes increase and a concomitant increase in their rates of collective action. Extending this line of reasoning, we should also expect that an increase in the average size of organizational repertoires will lead to a greater overall level of tactical overlap, and thus an increase in the overall level of collective action. This is one example of how bridging the theoretical gap in the tactics literature could bring macrosociological theories of collective action (e.g., political opportunity structures; McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978) to bear on our understanding of the changing rates of collective action, a theoretical problem long central to the field.
Figure 1. Path diagram of the resource-centered approach.
Table 1. Sample of the event-history data for tactic spells.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Organization name</th>
<th>Spell Na</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Dropped</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Repertoire Size</th>
<th>Events per Year</th>
<th>Encyclopedia</th>
<th>Minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>496</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>497</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>498</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>452</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>512</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516</td>
<td>Black Panthers</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522</td>
<td>Black Peoples Alliance</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>526</td>
<td>Black Peoples Union</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>530</td>
<td>Black Security Council</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>531</td>
<td>Black Security Council</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Observation number. The observations presented here are taken from a random sample of the reported collective action events for which we have data.
2 Tactic spell number.
3 Tactic code (see Appendix B).
4 Number of consecutive years the tactic is used.
5 1 if tactic is not used in the subsequent year; 0 otherwise.
6 Number of tactics the organization used during the year.
7 Number of events the organization appeared at during the year.
8 1 if the organization is listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations; 0 otherwise.
9 1 if the organization represents primarily a minority constituency; 0 otherwise.
### Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Freq.*</th>
<th>Dropped</th>
<th>Repertoire Size</th>
<th>Encyclopedia</th>
<th>Events per year</th>
<th>Minority Org</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>27.67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total/ Mean</td>
<td>n=489</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Frequency of tactic spells.

** Means are calculated for observations (organization-tactic-years). N=590.
Figure 2. Repertoire Size by Two Indicators of Organizational Resources, Events per Year* and Encyclopedia of Associations (N=1,453 organization-years).
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Function for Tactic Spells.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repertoire Size</td>
<td>-0.138*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.129* (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.127* (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.108* (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedia of Associations</td>
<td>-1.05*** (0.200)</td>
<td>-1.058*** (0.204)</td>
<td>-0.985*** (0.210)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Events per Year</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.075* (0.043)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Grants</td>
<td>-1.06e-07*** (1.48e-08)</td>
<td>-1.07e-07*** (1.49e-08)</td>
<td>-1.11e-07*** (1.54e-08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.007 (0.248)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoire Size * Events per Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.005 (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Chi²   | 21.45 | 105.32 | 105.39 | 107.94 |

† N=576 observations (organization-tactic-years)  
Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients.  
*** P < .001. ** P < .01. * P < .10
Figure 4. Number of Events Per Year and the Odds of Dropping a Tactic, by Repertoire Size (Model 4).
Appendix A. Organizations

426 Eastern Parkway Tenants Association
Action for Children's Television
Ad Hoc Committee to End Political Suppression
Affirmation Vietnam
Afro-American Society
Aliimony Limited
American Association on Mental Deficiency
American Civil Liberties Union
American Legion
American Veterans Movement
Americans for Democratic Action
Amnesty International
Ananda Marga Yoga Society
Asian-Americans for Peace
Audubon Society
Black Liberation Army
Black Liberators
Black Peoples Union
Black Student Action Committee of Holy Cross
Black Student Association
Black United Students
Blacks for Justice Committee
Bnai Brith
Brooklyn College Group
Catholic Committee
Catholic Priests Fellowship
Center for National Policy Review
Chicago Coalition for United Community Action
Chicago Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Christians United for Social Action
Citizens Committee for Children of New York
Citywide Council for Community Control
Coalition Black Construction
Coalition for Human Needs and Budget Priorities
Committee for a Wall of Separation between Church and State
Committee for Gay Civil Rights
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility
Committee of Rtrnd Vlntrs and Mvmt for Dmnt Society
Committee of Welfare Groups
Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Committee to Save Wallkill Township
Concerned Citizens of Canarsie
Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
Correction officers Benevolent Association
Council for Public Interest and Law
Disabled in Action
Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity
Federal Alliance of Land Grants
Federation of Organizations
Food Research and Action Center
Friends of Central Park
Gay Liberation Front
Guardians Association, Michigan
Haitian-American Civil Rights League
Hop Sing
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
Industrial Areas Foundation
Institute for Public Transportation
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
International Longshoremen’s Association
Interreligious Coalition of New York Clergy
Irish Republican Clubs of the Us and Canada
Italian-American Civil Rights League, Canarsie
Lawyers Committee to End the War
League of United Latin-American Citizens
Lesbian Feminist Liberation
Lithuanian-American Action Committee
Liturgical Conference
Long Island Committee for Soviet Jewry
Marquette Faculty Association for Interracial Justice
May Day Coalition
Metropolitan Association of the New York Conference of United Church of Christ
Metropolitan Fair Rent Committee
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
Morningside Tenants Committee
National Association of Laymen
National Community Relations Advisory Council
National Council for Senior Citizens
National Organization for Women
National Socialist White Peoples Party
National Welfare Rights Organization
National Women’s Political Caucus
Nationalists Party of Puerto Rico
Neighborhood Organizing Council - Youth Organizing Committee
New Jersey Youth Conference on Soviet Jewry
New York Civil Liberties Union
New York Lobby for the Blind
New York Urban Coalition
New Yorkers for Abortion Law Repeal
Office of Communications of the United Church
Parents Concerned About Education
Peace Action Coalition
Peace and Freedom Party
Peoples Board
Political Action for Clean Air
Professional Staff Congress
Progress in Education
Progressive Labor Party
Protestant Council of Churches
Right to Life Committee
SaveOurIsrael
Save Our Schools Committee
Scope (Anti-Poverty)
South fork Women’s Liberation Coalition
Spartacist
Speakers for Campus Americans for Democratic Action
St. Catherine's A.M.E. Zion Church
St. Catherine's Community Action Program
St. Francis Baptist Church
Stella Wright Tenants Association
Student Peace Union
Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry
Student-Faculty Coalition for Restructured University
Students for a Democratic Society
Students for a Restructured University
Teaching Assistant Association
Tennessee Council on Human Relations
Third World Coalition, CUNY
United African Appeal
United Federation of Teachers
United Parents Association
Us Committee to Aid the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
West Hudson Environmental Association
Western Ma Coalition to Fight Cutbacks
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
Women's Liberation Movement
Women's March for Equality Committee
Yonkers Community Action Program
Yoruba Temple
Young Lords
Young Republicans of Morristown
Appendix B. Forms of Collective Action.

1. Rally / Demonstration
   Demonstration, rally, etc. without reference to marching or walking in a picket line or standing in a vigil. Reference to speeches, speakers, singing, preaching, often verified by indication of sound equipment of PA and sometimes by a platform or stage. Ordinarily will include worship services, speeches, briefings.

2. March
   Reference to moving from one location to another; to be distinguished from rotating or walking in a circle with picket signs which by definition constitutes a picket.

3. Vigil
   These are almost always designated as such, although sometimes “silent witness,” and “meditation” are code words; also see candlelight vigil; hunger/fasting vigil; If you find no designations re: vigils, meditations, silent witness, etc., but also no reference to sound systems or to marches, it may well be a vigil. Most vigils have banners, placards, or leaflets so that people passing by, despite silence from participants, can ascertain for what the vigil stands.

4. Picket
   The modal activity is picketing; there may be references to picket line, to informational picketing; holding signs; “carrying signs and walking around in a circle”). Holding signs or placards or banners is not the defining criteria; rather it is holding or carrying those items and walking in a circular route, a phrase sometimes surprisingly found in the permit application.

5. Civil Disobedience
   Explicit protest that involves crossing barricade, sit-in of blacks where prohibited, use of “colored” bathrooms, voter registration drives, crossing barricades, tying up phone lines. Also, violence such as bombing.

6. Ceremony
   These celebrate or protest status transitions ranging from birth, death dates of individuals, organizations or nations, seasons, to re-enlistment or commissioning of military personnel, to the anniversaries of same. These are sometimes referenced by presenting flowers or wreaths commemorating or dedicating or celebrating status transitions or its anniversary; e.g., annual Merchant Marine memorial service; celebrate Chanukah, Easter, birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.).

7. Dramaturgical Demonstration
   Code ONLY if this is the modal activity; many demonstrations may contain some sequence of dramaturgical activity; these may be concerts, theatrical, dance, musical, artistic, or some combination of the performing arts.
8. Motorcade
   Electoral campaign and other issues.

9. Information Distribution
   Tabling / petition gathering, lobbying, letter-writing campaign, teach-ins.

10. Symbolic Display
    e.g., Menorah, Crèche Scene, graffiti, cross burnings, signs, standing displays

11. Attack, by Instigators
    e.g., ethnic group victim of physical attack, by collective group (not one-on-one assault, crime, rape). Boundary motivating attack is “other group’s identity,” as in gay-bashing, lynching. Can also include verbal attack and/or threats, too.

12. Riot, Melee, Mob Violence
    Large-scale (50+), use of violence by instigators against person, property, police, or buildings separately or in combination, lasting several hours.

13. Strike / Slow-Down / Sick-Ins
    Employee work protest of any kind. Regular strike through failure of negotiations, or wildcat strike.

14. Boycott
    Organized refusal to buy or use a product or service, rent strikes.

15. Press Conference
    If specifically named as such in report, and must be the predominant activity form. Could involve disclosure of information to “educate the public” or influence various decision-makers.

16. Organization Formation Announcement or Meeting
    Announcement, meeting or press conference to announce the formation of a new organization.

17. Conflict, No Instigator (distinct from codes 11 or 12)
    This includes any boundary conflicts in which no instigator can be identified, i.e., black/white conflicts, abortion/anti-abortion conflicts. Often, no claims will be discernable in the activity.

18. Lawsuit
    By social movement organization or group.
REFERENCES


