The Limits of Collective Action Repertoires

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Charles Tilly (1978) drew our attention to two empirical regularities in the study of tactics—he then set out to explain one of them. First, in any given period and place contentious actors (groups of people who act together to make claims on others) tend to engage in the same generalized and very limited set of tactics. While events of collective action may differ in their particulars—e.g., by the claim being made, the target of the claim, or the location of the event—the general forms that collective actors adopt are repeated often. So, for example, a factory sit-down strike looks a lot like a sit-in at a lunch counter—both involve a group of people sitting down to halt the routine operation of an organization. Street blockades and office blockades, consumer boycotts and trade embargos, flag burnings and cross burnings—the particulars may differ, but the general forms remain the same. What is puzzling about this observation is that in spite of the myriad imaginable tactics available groups nevertheless tend to adhere to a very limited set of tactics in any given period and place. Tilly calls this set of tactics the *repertoire of contention*.  

His second finding is that repertoires change, typically very slowly. Groups may continually experiment with forms at the margins of the existing repertoire, but rarely do their innovations endure; rather, most novel tactics are abandoned nearly as quickly as they appear. In very rare instances an entire repertoire is replaced by a new set of tactics,

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1 Throughout this paper we use the terms “tactics” and “forms of action” interchangeably to refer to the forms of public display that collective actors enact during distinct and transitory events of contentious action.

2 In his own words: “Repertoires of contention: the established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each other’s interests” (Tilly 1995a, p. 43). Of repertoires more generally he writes that they are “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1995a, p. 42); and of contention: “the discontinuous making of claims that bear on other people’s interests. *Continuous* claim-making includes parliamentary representation, routine activities of trade unions, day-to-day operation of friendship networks, and similar unceasing
as happened in France and England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Tilly 1986, 1995a). The tactics of the earlier repertoires in these countries, Tilly writes, were “parochial, particular, and bifurcated”—mostly local in scope, adopting forms and symbols peculiar to the relationship between claimants and the objects of their claims, either acting directly on a local relationship or asking privileged intermediaries to convey claims to more distant authorities” (Tilly 1995a, p. 346). Tactics, including seizing grain when food prices were high and destroying enclosures when land was scarce, were eventually replaced by a new set of tactics that was cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous. That is, its scope was broader, and tactics were modified for use in a wide variety of contexts and organized independently of other incidental events of collective action.

Of these two observations—the limited size and slowly changing content of tactical repertoires—Tilly directs the bulk of his attention to the latter, the comprehensive shifts in repertoires. But what of the other problem, the limited size of repertoires? In other words, how can we explain the size of repertoires of collective action?

Unfortunately, Tilly’s explanation is cursory and incomplete. Repertoires are limited in size, he argues, because humans have a limited capacity to learn and because groups are limited by the tactical repertoires of other groups (Tilly 1995a, p. 42). That people have a maximum learning capacity is a safe assumption, but if we accept that this capacity does not vary across time or contexts then this explanation cannot account for the variation in the size of repertoires. However, we could imagine that learning
capacities do change, for example with new technologies, or that some tactics are easier to learn than others, but Tilly does not pursue this problem.³

A second component of his argument states that repertoires develop in a strategic interplay between challengers, authorities and allies (Tilly 1995a, 1995b; see also Doherty 1999; Koopmans 1993; McAdam 1983; Titarenko et al. 2001; Zhao 2000)—a process analogous to a language being developed between groups (Tilly 1995b, p. 30). Participants take cues from one another and draw upon shared meaning, fashioning new meanings and forms of action in a dialectal process of action and reaction.⁴ In this way a group’s choice of actions is limited by others’ ability to make sense of its actions. While this is a plausible explanation for the limited size of tactical repertoires it too does not speak to variations in repertoire size. It begs the question: do groups (or configurations of groups) differ in their ability to fashion new tactics?

Neoinstitutionalists argue that similar groups look to one another for examples of organizational forms and routines and tend to converge on common models (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Scott 1995). This perspective suggests that repertoires face a downward pressure toward fewer and fewer constituent forms and that the variation of tactics will decline over time. This is a sensible (and testable) hypothesis, but the shortcoming of this view lies in its treating all tactics the same and ignoring the fact that not all groups have equal access to the resources and technologies that make many forms of action possible. In sum, Tilly has identified an interesting empirical problem—that repertoires

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³ Studies of diffusion do however take such characteristics into account. See Rogers (1995).

⁴ We can imagine a situation in which some participants do not “play by the rules” (consider, for example, the breaching experiments of the early ethnomethodologists). Other participants are likely to be confused, surprised, and may even react defensively. Notably, this is exactly what some scholars of tactics argue is
of collective action are strikingly limited in size—for which we do not yet have a satisfactory explanation.

TACTICS RESEARCH AND THE THEORETICAL GAP

Reflecting in 1993, Tilly quipped, “Judged by the response of other scholars, I cannot say that the notion of contentious repertoires has been a roaring success” (reprinted in Traugott 1995, p. 38). Indeed, aside from Tilly, collective action scholars have been slow to take up and develop the concept of tactical repertoires. As the literature on tactics has slowly grown over the last decade, the paucity of discussion on repertoires has led to the growth of a theoretical gap between Tilly’s observations and much of the current work on tactics. While Tilly’s work focuses on the relationship between long-term, macro-historical processes (e.g., state building and capitalism) and changes in repertoires of contention, the major current of tactics research focuses on the tactical dynamics that accompany the frenetic bursts and intermittent surges of collective action characteristic of cycles of protest. These approaches differ in their levels and units of analysis.

Levels of Analysis

The literature on tactics is divided between studies with long time-horizons that seek to explain variation across populations and studies with much shorter horizons that seek to explain variation across organizations and events. In the first group, Tilly (1978, 1986, 1995a) eyes the rise and fall of tactics as they are developed and eventually...
discarded by collective actors in a given period and place—processes that may take hundreds of years. Tarrow (1993a; 1998) argues that new tactics arise, become modified, and diffuse within the recurring peaks of protest activity, or “cycles of contention,” in which overall levels of conflict increase, collective action expands, and new frames of meaning arise. Zhao (2000) shows a similarly slow shift in tactics that he attributes to changing state-society relations in his study of the 1989 Beijing Student Movement. He argues that this movement toed a more traditional and (at least early on) less confrontational line than did earlier movements in China. Because the more recent movement was weaker in the face of a greater potential for state repression, Zhao claims, groups strategically downplayed their challenge to the state. These studies all take a broad view of tactical variation across populations of collective actors and find that long-term, macro-historical processes at the population level play a role in shaping the actions of collective actors.

In contrast, the bulk of tactics research instead concentrates on much shorter-term fluctuations in tactics within time periods at the organizational and event levels. For example, Koopmans (1993) is concerned with the division that develops between social movement groups during protest cycles. Moderate groups tend to become institutionalized and shift toward more “conventional” political tactics such as lobbying or party formation, while radical groups become enmeshed in confrontations with authorities that lead to further radicalization of tactics and increasing violence. Bearman and Everett (1993) find that the structural relations of groups affect which tactics they will use. Tactics used by the most central groups in any given period tend to become the

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1993). Tilly does not speak to the disruptiveness of tactics nor about such “rule-breaking” behavior.
dominant tactics used by all groups, except the most peripheral groups which tend to
differentiate their tactics from those of central groups (moreover, some groups never
change their tactics). Studies of the diffusion of tactics (e.g., Chabot 2000; Conell &
Cohn 1995; Pitcher, Hamblin, & Miller 1978; Soule 1997, 1999) acknowledge that the
timing of adoption of tactics varies and use this to chart and explain the paths that tactics
take as they travel from group to group. Soule (1997) presents evidence that groups look
to other similar groups for models of behavior; tactics then diffuse among them, are
modified and refined, and eventually become institutionalized. Others argue that in order
for tactics to diffuse they must be compatible with the existing repertoires of potential
adopters and be perceived as successful (Chabot 2000; Soule 1999). What these studies
have in common is an interest in the short-term dynamics of tactics as they vary from
week-to-week, event-to-event, or group-to-group (see also Doherty 1999; Ennis 1987;
Everett 1992; Morris 1993; Titarenko et al. 2001); and what they share with research by
Tilly, Tarrow and Zhao is an attempt to explain why collective actions take the forms that
they do. Nevertheless, the theoretical gap between these two approaches, each with a
different level of analysis, is yet to be bridged. We do not yet understand how such long-
term processes as the centralization of states and capital relate to the shifting social
relations and the local repertoires of collective actors.

Units of Analysis

A second area of divergence in the tactics literature arises between theories of
tactics and theories of tactical repertoires. This may be a heuristic rather than an
empirical difference, but it seems to impede discussions between the two approaches.
For research at the population level the concept of tactical repertoires is a useful one with which to examine long-term patterns of tactics use. As Tilly (1986, 1995a) has shown, when power concentrates in a centralized state and capitalism shifts work from the home to urban factories, tactics change—not just one tactic, but an entire repertoire of tactics. Clearly all tactics in the repertoire are subject to the effects of shifting social relations and centers of power characteristic of modern states and capitalism (even if they do not all change at the same rate). In contrast, if we are looking at tactics used by groups in the U.S. over the course of a single year, the variation we would find either between groups or within groups over time—what would look like “noise” in the long-term approach—is not so easily explained by one or two general forces. At this level of analysis, tactics do not all change together, but instead, as Tilly has shown, tend to settle on a common set from which groups then draw at different times and in different circumstances. Using this tactic-by-tactic view, Ennis (1987) examines the strategic decision-making processes that groups engage in; Bearman and Everett (1993) distinguish between the tactics of central and peripheral groups; and Soule (1997) observes the diffusion of a protest tactic across college campuses. Their units of analysis are appropriate for their respective problems, but the question remains, how do patterns of tactics used by individual collective actors relate to the much slower shifts that we observe in repertoires of contention?

Tarrow’s Approach

The approach that has come closest to bridging this theoretical gap appears in the writings of Sidney Tarrow. Tarrow (1993a, 1998) stays close to the work of Tilly while
developing explanations for shorter-range mechanisms of tactical dynamics. In particular, he champions the idea that cycles of protest are the context within which innovative tactics are tested, refined, diffused, and eventually become part of the repertoire of contention. The expansion of a cycle of protest is characterized by new groups appearing at the margins of the field of collective action and bringing with them innovative tactics. Most tactical forms disappear as quickly as they appear, but occasionally a tactic emerges that shows signs of success and is then adopted by other groups that adapt it to their own needs and hope to capitalize on its novelty. If and when a tactic makes its way to the most central groups it then rapidly spreads across the sector and is modified, refined, and legitimated in the course of action. Finally (and rarely), a tactic becomes institutionalized when new routines and laws form around it and it becomes widely used and understood. In this way the onset of a protest cycle leads to evolutionary changes in the repertoire of contention.

This approach takes up the concept of tactical repertoires as Tilly intends it—the set of means used by a population to make claims on others—and connects it to variations in tactics used between groups within cycles of protest, a focus of much research on tactics. Yet it stops short of bridging the theoretical gap between these two bodies of work. It does take steps toward solving the unit of analysis problem by connecting the concept of tactical repertoires to the dynamics of single tactics. In Tarrow’s view, tactics are added to the population’s repertoire one at a time as they are innovated, become modular, diffuse broadly, and become institutionalized.

A problem with this theory is that it does not touch on the problem of how tactics are dropped from the repertoire. If the size of repertoires is limited as Tilly (1978) claims
and new tactics occasionally make their way into the tactical repertoire, then clearly tactics must occasionally be discarded. In other words, we should expect an upper bound on the tactical repertoire of a population; as new tactics are added others must be dropped.

A more significant drawback to this approach is that the analysis remains confined to the population level and cannot speak to the disparate uses of tactics already in the repertoire. This is an important weakness since most collective action in a protest cycle exhibits tactical forms that entered the repertoire long ago. With this approach we still cannot connect the slowly changing repertoire of a population to the rapidly changing tactics that groups selectively employ within the period of a protest cycle. To connect what we know of macro-structural shifts and repertoires of contention to the shifting tactics of collective actors a new theory is needed.

A RESOURCE-CENTERED APPROACH

As argued above, a theoretical gap divides the literature of collective action tactics in two ways and a new theory should seek to bridge it and bring the insights of either side to bear on the other. A resource-centered approach, drawn from resource mobilization and population ecology approaches may be able to fill the gap. Resource mobilization theories emphasize the organized character of collective action as well as the range of resources that facilitate coordinated, collective action (Gamson 1975; Jenkins 1983; McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Collective action is said to rise and fall with the ability of organizations to mobilize resources. This approach parallels a one developed by organizational scholars in studies of populations of
organizations that also gives primacy to resources (Hannan & Freeman 1989; McPherson 1983; McPherson & Ranger-Moore 1991; Popielarz & McPherson 1995). Drawing liberally from the lexicon of ecology, population ecologists emphasize that populations of organizations are in a continual struggle for resources which vary in their distribution across the social environment and drive the dynamics of organizational change and survival. Groups do not compete for all resources, but rather primarily for those within and around their niche (McPherson 1983). Competing groups are “selected” (i.e., they survive) if they can compete successfully within a niche for available resources, or can shift to a less competitive niche. The imagery is one of organisms searching the landscape for available nourishment in the struggle to survive. These resource-centered perspectives draw our attention to the limited supply of resources and the constraints that it places on collective actors.

Observing, learning, organizing, and executing collective action require resources. Therefore, because collective actors lack information about them and because they have limited resources with which to execute them they cannot possibly know all of the conceivable tactical forms.

Before going farther, we should define resources. Cress and Snow (1996) develop a useful taxonomy of resources that encompasses four dimensions: moral, material, informational and human. Moral resources are the endorsements of a group that come from other organizations. They provide legitimacy and moral support to groups. The tactics employed by collective actors may function, in a Durkheimian sense, to bind them to other groups or to isolate them. The civil rights movement in the U.S. was deeply divided along tactical lines, with debates raging over violent versus
nonviolent forms, and such a divide is likely to influence the acquisition of moral resources for civil rights groups. The perceived legitimacy of a group by potential donors may also affect the flow of material resources. These include not only money, but also the things that money buys: supplies, meeting space, office space, transportation, and paid positions. Without money most groups could not hire attorneys to file lawsuits or print leaflets to distribute. Providing transportation to events may enable tactics to flourish that are best carried out by large groups such as rallies and marches.

Informational resources are those that bring knowledge and skills to a group (in a Simmelian sense), and therefore bear heavily on the forms of action that a group will take on. Access to information about how other groups act or about how to run an organization, for example, is a critical antecedent to following them. Chabot (2000), for example, traces the informational resources (i.e., social connections) that brought the Gandhian repertoire of nonviolent civil disobedience to the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s and helped fashion the civil rights movement. Finally, human resources are the people who populate groups, associations, organizations and movements. They are the leaders, constituents, and actively involved members, and they provide the labor, skills, and knowledge to coordinate and enact organizational functions, including tactics.

Assumptions of the Argument

We assume an upward pressure on repertoire size. Hypothetically, in a world of abundant resources (unlimited knowledge, group participants, and material resources) we expect that repertoires would grow without limit, that there is a tendency for groups to acquire new tactics. We believe this is a reasonable assumption for three reasons: (1) no
tactic (or set of tactics) is one hundred percent effective one hundred percent of the time; 
(2) groups will always replace a tactic perceived to be less effective with one that might 
be more effective; and (3) the number of tactics that exists in the social environment at 
any given time is far greater than any group could possibly adopt.\(^5\) Even if groups adopt 
tactics that they believe are maximally effective, they may not have sufficient resources 
to enact them and so will be forced reduce the size of their repertoire or to find tactics 
with a lower “cost.” The limited availability of resources, we argue, is the most 
significant constraint on the size of repertoires.

**Resources and Repertoire Size**

The resource base of a group or population facilitates and constrains the growth 
of its tactical repertoire. This is true both at the organizational level, as we develop it 
here, and at the population level, to which Tilly’s work on repertoires of contention 
speaks. As a group’s ability to mobilize resources grows so too will its tactical 
repertoire. Yet, there comes a point at which resources are maximally extended and the 
size of repertoires reaches an upper limit. If tactics are resource-driven forms of action 
then each tactic that an organization learns to enact—i.e., each tactic in its repertoire—
comes at a cost. Generally speaking, we expect that two tactics require more resources 
than one because each additional tactic entails new resources such as new knowledge, 
new or different supplies, and the means to transmit information about it to potential 
participants, allies, mass media, and targets. The argument is diagramed in Figure 3. As

\(^5\) Even when the array of available tactics is limited no one group adopts them all: “No actual group 
employed all the means of interaction within either of the repertoires…” (Tilly 1995a, p. 48).
resources increase, groups become less likely to drop the tactics in their repertoires, which consequently tend to grow.

Cohen and Harris (2002) argue to the contrary that a lack of resources may actually lead to larger repertoires. Specifically, they claim that because minority groups lack access to decision-makers and because they lack resources, they will choose to increase their strategic advantage by employing a wider variety of tactics than non-minority groups. In their view, tactics are alternatives to resources rather than dependent upon them as we argue. In contrast, we argue that if these authors are right and minority groups do have fewer resources, then by our theory these groups should be more likely to drop tactics than non-minority groups, and consequently will have smaller repertoires.

DATA AND METHODS

We test the theory repertoire size using newspaper reports from eleven years of collective action events in the United States. The reports are drawn from the New York Times, a newspaper with a national scope, and include all reports of collective action events that occur between 1965 and 1975. Events were coded if they met three criteria: 1) they were collective, that is, they included at least two participants; 2) they were public (no private meetings or other events); and 3) at least one claim was made (e.g., anti-segregation, pro-women’s rights, etc.). All said we coded more than 7,200 events that spanned this eleven-year period. Intercoder reliability was periodically measured and deemed sufficient (r > .90) throughout the process. For each event we recorded which, if

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6 The data presented here were collected as part of an ongoing research project of post-WWII collective action in the United States under the auspices of its primary investigators, Doug McAdam, Sarah Soule, John McCarthy, and Susan Olzak; NSF grant numbers:___. I am grateful for their generosity in making these data available to me.
any, organizations were reportedly present (e.g., Black Panthers, Students for a Democratic Society) and coded the form(s) of collective action that occurred (e.g., rally, civil disobedience, petition). A single event might have included multiple organizations and multiple tactics, so for our purposes here, rather than trying to distinguish which organization employed which tactic at an event, we will assume that any organization present at an event used all reported tactics associated with that event. Because our interest is to follow the tactics that collective actors use over time we need a way to identify the same actors in newspaper reports across the period. For that reason we will limit our attention to the most easily identifiable collective actors, formal organizations with names. Therefore, we retain for this analysis only those events in which at least one organization and one tactic are mentioned.

*Tactical Repertoires and Rates of Dropping Tactics*

As conceptualized by Tilly (1978) repertoires are stable over time, but contentious action is discontinuous. Because these data are from discontinuous events we must find a way to capture repertoires over time. To this end we operationalize an organization’s tactical repertoire as the number of different tactics it uses throughout the course of a calendar year. When deciding upon appropriate interval lengths with which to measure repertoire size we have tried to strike a reasonable balance between a period long enough to allow an organization to use a sufficient number of tactics, and short enough to observe changes over time. For example, if we define repertoires by weekly or even monthly intervals we would be severely restricting our measure of repertoire size since organizations in these data typically appear at only one collective action event per
year and use only one tactic. In contrast, if we define repertoires by an interval that spans
the entire eleven-year period then it would make no sense to say that a tactic is ever
dropped—repertoires must change over time. Yearly intervals are a reasonable balance
between these two extremes.

Existing studies of the dynamics of tactical repertoires (e.g., Tarrow 1993a, 1998)
have much to say about how a tactic makes its way into repertoires but nothing about
how tactics exit them. We are interested in this part of the process for its relevance in
understanding the size limits of collective action repertoires. Furthermore, newspaper
data are much better suited to studying processes of dropping rather than adding tactics
because newspaper reports only appear when groups use at least one tactic. We have no
way to observe a repertoire as it grows from zero to one tactic, but we can observe the
reverse.

Newspaper Data

Newspapers provide us with information of collective action events that is, if not
exhaustive, certainly expansive. In fact, the breadth of these data, which are nationally
representative over an eleven-year period, is unparalleled in collective action research.
Most studies using newspaper data rely either on local newspapers and events that limit
their generalizability, or to a sample of national editions (e.g., Monday editions, or the
first Sunday of every month). Samples allow researchers to broaden the scope of their
analyses, but because media coverage of collective action events varies by days of the
week, these data also risk making invalid generalizations (Oliver & Myers 1999; Oliver
& Maney 2000). The data used here are unique in that they include all reports of collective action events across the entire period and make use of a national news source.

However, we would be wise to heed the advice of several studies of media coverage of protest events. If coverage of events is sporadic then we may get an incomplete picture of an organization’s repertoire, and accurately measuring changes in repertoires becomes very difficult. For instance, the Times reports in 1974 that the Brownsville Community Action Association marched and rallied outside of City Hall to protest the police shooting of a 14 year-old black boy. Because the group from Brownsville is only reported to be involved with this one event we must assume that it had a repertoire of two tactics (march and rally) in 1974 and then dropped both tactics after one year. The Association may in fact have held a vigil the following day, or marched again in 1975, but because these events are not reported we must assume that this is the only time this organization engaged in collective action. Because the majority of collective action events are never reported in newspapers (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver & Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000), we should not be surprised if these data vastly underestimate the size of repertoires and overestimate the rate that organizations abandon tactics (particularly so for those organizations that are infrequently reported). Event selection bias may disproportionately privilege smaller repertoires and faster rates of tactic loss—contrary to the hypothesis tested here that larger repertoires lead to greater rates of tactic abandonment. Other factors may also complicate newspaper data. Not all events are reported with the same regularity by newspapers, and the timing of events may preclude them from coverage if other local or national issues out-compete them for limited newspaper space (Oliver & Maney 2000).
We should expect, for example, that our data include a disproportionate number of large events and large organizations (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver & Maney 2000), events near to New York City (the source of the newspaper; Oliver & Maney 2000), events based on controversial issues, and more rallies than “unpermitted protests”\(^7\) (Oliver & Myers 1999). All of these potential biases point toward the same conclusion, that we risk underestimating the size of some or all repertoires and overestimating the rates that tactics are dropped. Because these biases work in the opposite direction of the hypothesized relationship, we do not believe that we run the risk of committing a type I error and mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis.

Clearly we have reason to worry about a possible type II error if the media selection bias is dramatic enough that we fail to reject the null because the bias overrides the predicted effect. Indeed, the data suggest that the odds may be stacked against us. Over half of the organizations we observe (2,467/4,459) across the eleven-year period appear for only one year, and half of those (1,282) use only one tactic. These organizations probably tend to be smaller, local, and therefore more underrepresented in the *New York Times* than larger, national groups. As a consequence, newspaper data are likely to present a misleading picture of repertoire dynamics among these smaller organizations. Because this is a very real possibility and could complicate interpretation of the results, we omit from the analysis those 1,282 organizations that appear for only one year and use only one tactic.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) “Includes unpermitted literature distributions that resulted in police complaints” (Oliver & Maney 2000, p. 53, Table 1.

\(^8\) Running the analysis without omitting these cases does not change the substantive results.
Event History Analysis

We use the Cox proportional hazards method for discrete-time (Allison 1995) to model the timing of an organization dropping a tactic from its repertoire. This method is distinctively appropriate for this study because it estimates the timing of an event and allows for covariates that vary over time (in this case, repertoire size and resources). Due to the considerable size of the dataset, a technical limitation peculiar to this type of model, and the limits of available computer technology we have had to reduce the volume of data in the analysis to compute the model. Consequently, we have drawn a manageably-sized random sample of 542 tactic spells from the full dataset to overcome this problem (from 3,953 spells in all). The data discussed below are from this sample.

A tactic spell, the unit of analysis, is the number of consecutive years that a particular tactic is used by any one organization. Each of the 388 organizations we observe (listed in Appendix A) may use as many as 18 different tactics (described in Appendix B), and each tactic may be used for a maximum of eleven consecutive years, the duration of the analysis. However, no organization in our sample uses all 18 tactics, nor do they retain a tactic for the full eleven years. All told, the analysis includes 641 separate observations. Each observation is an organization-tactic-year, that is, the use of a particular tactic in a particular year by an organization. Repeated events—tactics that are dropped for a year or more and then picked up again by the same organization in subsequent years—are treated in this analysis as independent spells.

9 We began with a random sample of 800 spells selected prior to omitting those organizations that appear for one year and use only one tactic. This allowed us to compare the results of the analysis both with and without these cases. As already noted, we determined that omitting these cases made no substantive difference in our results, so we present here results based on the subset of 542 tactic spells.
**Variables**

The dependent variable is the logged hazard rate for a tactic spell at a given duration interval, or the log of the odds that a tactic will be dropped during after a given number of years provided that it survived to that year. A tactic is said to be dropped after the last consecutive year that it is used by an organization. When a tactic is dropped we code the variable DROP as one, and all other observations are coded zero; this distinguishes the tactic spells that are right-censored (i.e., they do not end in our observation period).

We hypothesize a relationship between the size of an organization’s repertoire and the odds that the organization will drop a tactic in a given year. As discussed above, for this analysis we measure repertoire size (REPSIZE) by the number of different tactics (of the eighteen listed in Appendix B) an organization uses during a calendar year. We expect repertoire size to be positively correlated with the odds of a tactic being dropped.

We also hypothesize a link between resources and the odds that an organization will discard a tactic. Because we cannot glean much about an organization’s resource base through reports of events in the *New York Times*, we utilize two indirect measures of resources. First, we went to the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, an annual listing of national not-for-profit organizations in the U.S., to collect what data we could about these 388 organizations. Because the *Encyclopedia* during this period lists only a fraction of these organizations, with a strong bias toward larger and older organizations that are national in scope, we recognized that being listed in itself suggests that an organization is resource rich. To illustrate this, the typical membership size of those organizations that we did find listed is over half a million members.
the lower end of the scale actually represent member *organizations*, suggesting that this figure may even be slightly understated. The staff sizes of these organizations were typically around two hundred and the number of local affiliate organizations for each was upwards of one thousand. ENCY is a dichotomous variable indicating a listing in the *Encyclopedia of Associations* during the period of this study. Taken in conjunction with our second indicator of resource levels we hope to strengthen our hand. If resource mobilization theories are correct and the frequency of collective action does vary with resource levels, then we should expect that organizations that appear more frequently in these data have more resources than those that appear less frequently. Moreover, if studies of media coverage of protest events are any indication then the data here probably disproportionately represent larger, more established—i.e., resource rich—organizations (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver & Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000).

Therefore we think a reasonable indicator of organizational resource levels is the number of events that the *Times* reports an organization to be at each year (EVENTSYR).

Finally, to control for the possibility suggested by Cohen and Harris (2002) that minority groups are likely to have larger repertoires because they lack resources and social capital, we include a dummy variable for minority organizations. Our coding of this variable relies largely our familiarity with many organizations in the data (e.g., National Urban League, Southern Christian Leadership Conference), on the tell-tale names of many lesser known organizations (e.g., Asian-American for Equal Employment, Fuerzas Armadas De Liberacion Nacional Puerto Rico), and information gleaned from listings in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*. Cohen and Harris predict that this variable will be negatively correlated and the resource-centered approach advocated...
here predicts the opposite, that minority groups will be more likely to drop tactics than
non-minority groups.

An example of the data for one organization is given in Table 1.\textsuperscript{10} Reading across
the first observation (first row), the OBS column shows that this is the 475th
organization-tactic-year in the dataset, and it is used by the Black Panthers. It begins the
431st tactic SPELL in the dataset, and the TACTIC is a rally or demonstration (see
Appendix B for codes). Because this is the first consecutive year that the organization
has held a rally, the duration (DUR) of the spell is one year. DROP is a dichotomous
variable that indicates whether or not this is the last consecutive year that the
organization uses this tactic (i.e., whether or not it is subsequently dropped from the
repertoire). YEAR indicates the year that the tactic is used and REPSIZE is the number
of tactics used by this organization during this particular year (i.e., repertoire size).
EVENTSYR is the number of collective action events the organization reportedly
participated in that year. In 1966 the Black Panthers used four different tactical forms
(which we can also see by looking down the YEAR column at the four instances of 1966)
at two collective action events. The final two columns are dichotomous variables
indicating whether or not this organization is listed in the \textit{Encyclopedia of Associations}
(ENCY) and if it is a minority group (MINORITY). The Black Panthers are not in the
\textit{Encyclopedia} but they are an organization of African-Americans.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the key independent variables for each
value of tactic-spell duration. The second column reports the distribution of tactic spells
by duration. The first thing to note is that the vast majority of tactics are only used for

\textsuperscript{10} Table 1 presents data as they look in the full dataset, \textit{before} the random sample.
one “consecutive” year, and all but a few are dropped by the third year. The third column shows the percent of observations at each duration interval in which a tactic is dropped. For example, in the first year eighty-three percent of tactic spells ended. In the second year, of those tactics that survived beyond the first year, fifty-two percent ended. Though not as dramatic as it appears in the frequency column, the same pattern is evident that tactics are most likely to be dropped early in their lifespan. To some degree this may be a function of incomplete newspaper coverage of collective action events, but the exceptionally lopsided distribution of spell durations suggests that organizations frequently vary their tactics rather than retaining the same ones for several years on end.

Repertoires appear to be larger at the high end of spell durations, contrary to what we expected. Tactics with the shortest lifespan are associated with the smallest repertoires. Perhaps because organizations with very small repertoires are also very small and new, they are subject to selection pressures that favor large, established organizations. This speculation is supported in columns four and five in which the two measures of resources indicate that resource levels tend to be greater at longer duration intervals. As the first row indicates, thirty-one percent of the tactics that survived at least one year (which is all of them) were used by organizations big enough and wealthy enough to be listed in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, and which averaged approximately four events per year. By the second year, sixty-two percent of the surviving tactics were used by these established organizations, and the average number of events-per-year jumped to nearly ten. Of the organizations not listed in the *Encyclopedia*, none maintained a tactic for more than three years. The events-per-year variable displays a similar pattern as it increases at each duration interval. As
organizations participate in more events they also tend to retain tactics for longer periods of time. In these data only two tactic-spells survive longer than five years—both used by organizations listed in the Encyclopedia and that participated in an uncharacteristically small number of events. The other 540 tactic spells appear to support our hypothesis that as an organization’s resources increase, the likelihood that it will drop tactics decreases.

Finally, the last column in Table 2 appears to show that minority organizations are less likely to drop tactics in their first year of use than in their second or third years. Because this pattern runs counter to that seen in the DROP column, it appears that minorities may be less likely to drop tactics in their early years than the bulk of the organizations in the sample. If true, and if these organizations also have fewer resources as Cohen and Harris (2002) claim, then this finding runs counter to our prediction.

A graphical representation of the probability tactic survival is the given in Figure 1. This stepped curve shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function, the conditional probability that a tactic spell will “survive” until next year (i.e., not be dropped after this year) given that it was at risk of being dropped this year (i.e., it was still in the repertoire). The dramatic drop in the first year reiterates what we have already seen: the probability is enormous that a tactic will be dropped in the same year it is first used. The survival function shows that there is only a 30% chance that a tactic will remain in an organization’s repertoire for two consecutive years, and by the third year the probability of survival is more than halved. The curve bottoms out in the fifth year at a nine percent probability of survival. Clearly, this graph again suggests a short lifespan for all tactics in a repertoire. In the next section we present findings from the event history model of these data.
RESULTS

The results of the Cox proportional hazards model for discrete time are presented in Table 3. Model 1 shows the first-order effect of repertoire size on the odds of dropping a tactic. Not surprisingly, REPSIZE is statistically significant (p<.0001), but contrary to our expectations, the coefficient is negative. By exponentiating the coefficient we obtain a hazard ratio, or the percent change in the odds that a tactic will be dropped: for each one-unit increase in repertoire size, the odds of dropping a tactic decrease by twenty-seven percent ($1 - e^{-0.266} = 0.234$). That is, the larger and more varied the repertoire, the smaller the odds that a tactic will be dropped.

If we are correct and resource levels govern the size of tactical repertoires, then we should expect both resource variables to be negatively correlated with the odds of dropping a tactic at each interval of time, and that theirs will override the effects of repertoire size. As Model 2 shows, we are only partially correct. One resource variable is significant while the other is not, and the effect of repertoire size, though diminished, remains significant in the negative direction. Those organizations that are listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations are one-third as likely to drop a tactic as those not listed, as we predicted, however, EVENTSYR is not a significant predictor of tactic duration—a surprising finding, especially in light of the relationship that seems apparent in Table 2.\(^{11}\) The negative effect of REPSIZE implies a continuous tendency for repertoires to grow, since tactics are less and less likely to be dropped as each new tactic is added. This is

\(^{11}\) It is not the case that ENCY overrides an effect of EVENTSYR, as these two variables are only moderately correlated ($r=0.32$), and the same model, omitting ENCY, does not display a significant improvement in fit over Model 1.
certainly a puzzle when we observe no repertoires with more than thirteen tactics among any organizations in these data.

In Models 3 and 4 we introduce the minority variable and an interaction term for repertoire size and events-per-year, respectively. The coefficient for MINORITY is in the predicted direction in both models but is not statistically significant. The interaction term is included because we expect organizations with greater resources to be less likely to drop tactics when their repertoires are large when compared to organizations with fewer resources.\textsuperscript{12} This variable is significant (p<.0001) and reduces somewhat the repertoire size effect. Furthermore, the main effect of EVENTSYR that was not significant in Models 1-3 is now highly significant (p<.0001). Figure 2 visually represents Model 4 and helps to clarify the interaction effect. Among organizations with few resources—i.e., they participated a small number of events per year (< 6)—increasing repertoire size has a negative effect, or no effect at all, on the odds of dropping tactics. Among organizations with many resources, repertoire size has a more noticeably positive effect on the odds of dropping tactics, however this events-per-year effect becomes less detectable as organizations’ repertoires increase in size. That means that organizations with few resources are much more likely to drop tactics when their repertoires are small than those with many resources, but rich and poor alike become more similarly prone to drop tactics as their repertoires grow.

DISCUSSION

\textsuperscript{12} Interacting repertoire size and encyclopedia does show a significant effect, but because it does not change much the substance of our findings we have opted to present the more easily interpretable results here.
The tactics of contentious actors are resource-driven actions enabled and constrained by the resources available for their implementation. They are the forms that collective action takes and each new tactic requires additional resources, but resources are scarce, so the variety of tactics that collective actors can perform in any given period is limited. Charles Tilly reached a similar conclusion when he conceptualized the “repertoire of contention” twenty-five years ago (Tilly 1978). He noted that repertoires remain remarkably small despite a mountain of imaginable forms that collective action could take, yet collective action scholars have been slow to take up the problem of repertoire size.

One of the principal contributions of this paper lies in its extension of Tilly’s (1978) concept of repertoires of contention to new levels of analysis. As originally conceived the repertoire of contention is the array of means available to populations of collective actors in a given period and place for making claims that bear on the interests of others. Here we have applied the concept at the organization level to the forms of collective action that an organization has learned and may implement in a given period. Considered in this light the concept offers new possibilities for understanding cycles of protest, intergroup competition, rates of collective action, and may help to clarify the connections between macrostructural processes, such as state-building and capitalism, and the shifting landscape of contentious action.

In particular, we have focused on one aspect of organizational repertoires, their size. We provide evidence that repertoires at the organization level are limited to a relatively few number of tactics and that there is a good deal of size variation across organizations and over time. Earlier research on populations of collective actors and
their tactical repertoires (Tilly 1978, 1986, 1995) shows that the limited size of
repertoires is widespread, but has said little about why this is the case and nothing about
why repertoires vary in size. In this paper we want to direct attention to these problems
and urge others to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms that govern
organizational repertoires at all levels of analysis. Studies of tactics at the population
level have yielded valuable insights into the connections between social structures and
tactics—for example, that state- and capital-centralization lead to tactics that are more
cosmopolitan, modular and autonomous (Tilly 1986, 1995)—but have not yet connected
these findings to lower levels of analysis. In contrast, studies of tactics at the
organizational and event levels have linked tactics used by groups to changing rates of
collective action (McAdam 1983), the structural relations of groups (Bearman & Everett
1993), levels of intergroup competition (Olzak & Uhrig 2001), and the dynamics of
protest cycles (Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1998), but they have not yet been applied to
higher levels of analysis. Both bodies of work make impressive contributions to their
own domains, but by not informing one another they may be missing an opportunity to
build a more robust theory of collective action.

The perspective presented in this paper aims to bridge these two approaches and
takes steps toward that end. At its core this perspective regards tactics as resource-driven
action and acknowledges what any activist knows, that there will be no march without
marchers, no motorcade without automobiles, no lawsuits without lawyers. Resources—
e.g., participants, banners, specialized knowledge, automobiles, money, or lawyers—are
absolutely necessary to enact concerted collective action. We also recognize that
resources are scarce: no group can escape the limits of its resource base. The limited
availability of resources constrains the number of tactics a group can adopt and maintain so that, assuming a tendency for repertoires to expand, a group will economize its use of tactics by learning and repeating existing forms of action. This leads to limits on the size of not only the tactical repertoires of organizations but also on the repertoires of populations.

One advantage of this approach for studying tactics is that it offers testable hypotheses about the size of tactical repertoires at any level of analysis: ecosystem, community, population, organization, or event. Shifting environmental conditions mean new distributions of resources, and consequently repertoires will vary in size proportional to the resources available for enacting them.

Our empirical analysis offers support for the approach developed here that links resources to tactical repertoires. We construct a dynamic event history model and use new, nationally representative data to predict the odds that tactics will exit an organization’s repertoire. This breaks new ground for research on tactical repertoires that have until now only focused on the mechanisms by which tactics enter repertoires, and offers new evidence for understanding the limited size of repertoires. Using two measures of resources, one distinguishing organizations that are large and prosperous enough to be listed in a national directory of non-profit organizations, and the other counting the number of events organizations reportedly participates in per year. Both indicators have reveal that organizations with more resources are less likely to drop tactics. A counter hypothesis is offered by Cohen and Harris (2002) who claim that minority organizations tend to maintain larger repertoires because they must strategically compensate for having fewer resources. Our findings do not support their claim, instead
showing that limited resources place the same constraints on the size of tactical repertoires that belong to minority and non-minority organizations alike.

The unexpected finding in this analysis is that repertoire size has an effect on the rates of dropping tactics independent of our two measures of resources. Among organizations that reportedly participate in only a handful of events per year the repertoire size effect is negative. Among the more active organizations the effect is positive. In either instance, our measures of resources cannot entirely account for when a tactic will be dropped. On one hand, our resource measures may simply not be an adequate indicator of all of the resources that groups use to employ tactics or, on the other, something other than resources may be needed to explain when tactics are dropped. We must be content here to say that resources do matter for repertoire size, but it is unclear to what extent they matter.

CONCLUSION

In order to theoretically link the waves of organizational repertoires to the tide of repertoires of populations a new theory is needed. Over the past two and a half decades a theoretical gap has arisen in the literature on the tactics of collective actors, a gap characterized by research on different levels and units of analysis. If this gap is to be bridged we must make theoretical connections across levels of analysis and link repertoires of tactics to the dynamics of single forms of action. Bringing the concept of tactical repertoires to the organizational level we have sought to outline and test one possible approach which places resources at its center. If we can better understand the
mechanisms that govern organizational repertoires we may then illuminate mechanisms driving the tactical repertoires of populations.

The resource-centered approach advocated here (e.g., Hannan & Freeman 1989; McCarthy & Zald 1977; McPherson & Ranger-Moore 1991) stresses that macrostructural processes shape the distribution of resources across time and space which in turn bears on the ability of collective actors to adopt and enact multiple forms of action. Competition for these resources drives the organization and event level processes of tactics use and may in turn help us to understand varying rates of collective action. Recent work by Olzak and Uhrig (2001) finds that rates of collective action are a positive function of the degree of tactical overlap (i.e., the number of shared tactics) between the repertoires of protest groups. In a social context in which the available forms of action are limited (Tilly 1978) we should expect the degree of overlap between repertoires of organizations to increase as their repertoire sizes increase and a concomitant increase in their rates of collective action. Extending this line of reasoning, we should also expect that an increase in the average size of organizational repertoires will lead to a greater overall level of tactical overlap, and thus an increase in the overall level of collective action. This is one example of how bridging the theoretical gap in the tactics literature could bring macrosociological theories of collective action (e.g., political opportunity structures; McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978) to bear on our understanding of the changing rates of collective action, a theoretical problem long central to the field.
Figure 1. Path diagram of the resource-centered approach.
# Table 1. An Example of Event-History Data for One Organization (19 Tactic Spells)*

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* The data shown here are from the complete dataset. The sample used in the analysis includes only a fraction of these observations.

OBS Observation number.
ORG Name of organization.
SPELL Tactic-spell number.
TACTIC Tactic code (see Appendix B for codes).
DUR Number of consecutive years the tactic is used.
DROP 1 if tactic is not used in the subsequent year; 0 otherwise.
YEAR Last consecutive year the tactic is used.
REPSIZE Number of tactics the organization used during the YEAR.
EVENTSYR Number of events the organization appeared at during the YEAR.
ENCY Was the organization listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations (0,1)?
MINORITY Did the organization represent primarily a minority constituency (0,1)?
### Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

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**Total/Mean †**

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<td>542</td>
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* Frequencies are counts of tactic spells. N=542.

** Means are calculated for observations (organization-tactic-years). N=641.

† Means in this row are for all observations in the sample (i.e., weighted by the distribution of observations; not shown here), rather than for the values shown in each column.
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<td>REPSIZE</td>
<td>-0.266 ***</td>
<td>-0.166 **</td>
<td>-0.170 **</td>
<td>-0.113 *</td>
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<td>ENCY</td>
<td>-1.076 ***</td>
<td>-1.054 ***</td>
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<td>EVENTSYR</td>
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<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.220 ***</td>
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<td>MINORITY</td>
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<tr>
<td>REPSIZE * EVENTSYR</td>
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<td>Chi^2</td>
<td>76.39</td>
<td>116.68</td>
<td>117.23</td>
<td>136.75</td>
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† N=641 observations (organization-tactic-years)

*** p<.0001
FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF EVENTS PER YEAR AND THE ODDS OF DROPPING A TACTIC, BY REPERTOIRE SIZE (MODEL 4).
APPENDIX A. ORGANIZATIONS

426 Eastern Parkway Tenants Association
5th Ave. Vietnam Peace Parade Committee
Abdala
Action Committee for Neighborhood Schools
Action Committee on Arab American Relations
Action for Children's Television
Ad Hoc Citizens Committee for Community Control
Ad Hoc Committee of Black Student Organizations
Ad Hoc Committee to End Political Suppression
Affirmation Vietnam
AFL-CIO
African-American Teachers Association
Afro-American Society
Alimony Limited
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
American Association on Mental Deficiency
American Civil Liberties Union
American Committee for Ulster Justice
American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive
American Economics Association
American Federation of Teachers
American Indian Movement
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
American Legion
American Patriots for Freedom
American Property Rights Association
American Servicemen's Union
American Veterans Movement
Americans for Democratic Action
Amnesty international
Ananda Marga Yoga Society
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith
Anti-imprisonment Coalition
Antioch Baptist Church
Asian-Americans for Equal Employment
Asian-Americans for Peace
Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana
Attica Brigade
Audubon Society
Aviation Consumer Action Project
Black Home and School Organization
Black Liberation Army
Black Liberators
Black Muslims
Black Panthers
Black Peoples Alliance
Black Peoples Union
Black Security Council
Black Student Action Committee of Holy Cross
Black Student Association
Black Student Union
Black Student Union of University of Florida
Black United Students
Black Women of Greater New Haven
Blacks for Justice Committee
B’nai Brith
Breakthrough
Bronx Irish American Action Association
Brooklyn College Group
Brothers and Sisters for Equality
Building and Construction Trades Council of NY
Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace
Catholic Committee
Catholic Interracial Council
Catholic Peace Fellowship
Catholic Priests Fellowship
Center for National Policy Review
Central Labor Council
Chicago Coalition for United Community Action
Chicago Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Chicano Moratorium Committee
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association
Christians United for Social Action
Citizens Committee for Children of New York
Citywide Committee for integrated Schools
Citywide Council for Community Control
Civil Liberties Union
Coalition Black Construction
Coalition for Human Needs and Budget Prior
Coalition for United Community Action
Coalition of Neighborhood Schools
Coalition to Stop ITT
Committee Against Rising Tuition
Committee for a Wall of Separation Between Church and State
Committee for Gay Civil Rights
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility
Committee of Rtrnd Vlntrs and Mvmt for Dmct Society
Committee of the Pharmaceutical Society of New York
Committee of the Professions to End the War in Vietnam
Committee of Welfare Groups
Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Committee to Save Wallkill township
Common Cause
Concerned Citizens of Canarsie
Concerned officers Movement
Councils Advisory Committee on Peace
Congress of Racial Equality
Conspiracy
Continue
Coordinating Council of Community Organizations
Cornell Committee for United States Policy on Vietnam
Correction officers Benevolent Association
Council for Public interest and Law
Council of Chiefs of the Onondaga Indian Nation
Council of Organizations for Civil Rights
Council of Presidents of Major American Jewish Orgs
Council of Supervisors and Administrators
Deacons for Defense and Justice
Disables in Action
Distributive Workers of America, District Council 65
East Pakistan League of America inc
Eastchester Right to Life
Eastern Queens Civic Council
Educational Opportunity Fund
El Comite
Environment
Episcopal Peace Fellowship
Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity
Federal Alliance of Land Grants
Federation of New York Tenant Organizations
Federation of Organizations
Fight Back
First World Congress of Free Ukrainians
Food Research and Action Center
Forest Hills Residents Association
Free Student Union
Freedom Encampment
Friends of Central Park
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puerto Rico
Gay Activists Alliance
Gay Liberation Front
Gay Liberation Movement
Group for Americas South fork Inc
Guardians Association, Michigan
Hale County Improvement Committee
Harlem Citizens Patrol
Haryou Act Community Corporation
Haitian-American Civil Rights League
Health Research Group
Health Revolutionary Unity Movement, Gouveneur Chapter
High School Students Mobilization Committee
Hillel Club
Honeywell Project
Hop Sing
Housing Action Team
Human Relation Commission
HUD Task force Against Racism
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
Independent Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Industrial Areas Foundation
Institute for Public Transportation
Institute for the Study of Nonviolence
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
International Longshoremen's Association
Interreligious Coalition of New York Clergy
Interreligious Committee on Vietnam
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization
Ira Vets District 1
Irish Republican Clubs of the US and Canada
Italian-American Civil Rights League
Italian-American Civil Rights League, Canarsie
Jesus Mobilization Committee of New York
Jewish Defense League
Jewish War Veterans of USA
Kentucky Christian Leadership Conference
Ku Klux Klan
Law Enforcement Group of NY
Lawrence Peace Action Coalition
Lawyers Committee to End the War
Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee
League of United Latin-American Citizens
League of Women Voters
Legal Aid Society
Lesbian Feminist Liberation
Lithuanian-American Action Committee
Liturgical Conference
Local 1199B
Long Island Committee for Soviet Jewry
Lower East Side Health Council
Mad Dogs
Manhattan Womens Political Caucus
Marquette Faculty Association for interracial Justice
Maryland Freedom Union
May 2nd Movement to End War in Vietnam
May Day Coalition
May Day Tribe
Mayday Tribe
Metropolitan Association of the New York Conference of United Church of Christ
Metropolitan Council on Housing
Metropolitan Fair Rent Committee
Mexican American Political Association
Mexican-American Youth Organization
Milwaukee United School integration Committee
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
Morningside Tenants Committee
Morningsiders United
Mothers for Adequate Welfare
Mothers for Central Park
Movement for Puerto Rican independence
NAACP Youth Council, Milwaukee
NAACP, Youth Council
National Action Group
National Association for Irish Freedom
National Association for Mental Health
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
National Association of Laymen
National Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy
National Committee of Black Churchmen
National Community Relations Advisory Council
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
National Conference on Black Power
National Coordinating Committee to End War in Vietnam
National Council for Senior Citizens
National Council of Churches
National Council of Jewish Women
National Council of Young Israel
National Education Association
National Gay Task force
National Liberation Front
National Mexican American Anti-Defamation Committee
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
National Organization for Women
National Peace Action Coalition
National Renaissance Party
National Right to Life Committee
National Socialist White People’s Party
National States Rights Party
National Student Association
National Urban League
National Welfare Rights Organization
National Womens Poltical Caucus
Nationalists Party of Puerto Rico
Natural Resources Defense Council
Negro
Neighborhood Organizing Council - Youth Organizing Committee
New England Committee for Nonviolent Action
New Jersey Citizens United for Life
New Jersey Council for A Sane Nuclear Policy
New Jersey Youth Conference on Soviet Jewry
New Orleans Citizens Council
New Women Lawyers
New York Civil Liberties Union
New York Conference on Soviet Jewry
New York Council for A Sane Nuclear Policy
New York High School Student Union
New York Lobby for the Blind
New York Medical Committee to End the War in Vietnam
New York Peace Action Coalition
New York Urban Coalition
New York Urban League
New Yorkers for Abortion Law Repeal
Newark Community Union
Nonviolent Action
North American Jewish Youth Council
North End Community Action Project
November Action Coalition
Nurses for Peace
Oberlin Hunger Strikers for Peace in Vietnam
Office of Communications of the United Church Chris
Ombudsmen
Operation Breadbasket
Organization of Organizations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third World Coalition, CUNY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third World Liberation Front</td>
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<td>Transcendental Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triangle Improvement Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two Bridges Neighborhood Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uniformed Firefighters Association</td>
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<td>Union of American Hebrew Congregations</td>
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<td>United African Appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Automobile Workers</td>
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<td>United Black Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Farm Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Federation of Teachers</td>
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<td>United Parents Association</td>
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<td>United Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States Committee to Aid the National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>US Committee to Aid the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>US Conference of Bishops</td>
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<td>Veterans for Peace in Vietnam</td>
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<td>Vietnam Day Committee</td>
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<td>Vietnam Moratorium Committee</td>
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<td>Vietnam Peace Parade Committee</td>
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<td>Vulcan Society</td>
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<td>War Resisters League</td>
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<td>Washington Lay Association</td>
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<td>Weathermen</td>
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<td>West Hudson Environmental Association</td>
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<td>West Side Peace Program</td>
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<td>Westerly Tenants Association</td>
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<td>Western Ma Coalition to Fight Cutbacks</td>
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<td>Wisconsin Student Association Senate</td>
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<td>Women United for Action</td>
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<td>Women’s Bail Fund</td>
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<td>Women’s international League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<td>Women’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>Women’s War on Prices</td>
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<td>Young Republicans of Morristown</td>
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<td>Young Socialist Alliance</td>
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<td>Youth Against War and Fascism</td>
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<td>Zippies</td>
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APPENDIX B. FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.

1. Rally / Demonstration
   Demonstration, rally, etc. without reference to marching or walking in a picket line or standing in a vigil. Reference to speeches, speakers, singing, preaching, often verified by indication of sound equipment of PA and sometimes by a platform or stage. Ordinarily will include worship services, speeches, briefings.

2. March
   Reference to moving from one location to another; to be distinguished from rotating or walking in a circle with picket signs which by definition constitutes a picket.

3. Vigil
   These are almost always designated as such, although sometimes “silent witness,” and “meditation” are codewords; also see candlelight vigil; hunger/fasting vigil; If you find no designations re: vigils, meditations, silent witness, etc., but also no reference to sound systems or to marches, it may well be a vigil. Most vigils have banners, placards, or leaflets so that people passing by, despite silence from participants, can ascertain for what the vigil stands.

4. Picket
   The modal activity is picketing; there may be references to picket line, to informational picketing; holding signs; “carrying signs and walking around in a circle”). Holding signs or placards or banners is not the defining criteria; rather it is holding or carrying those items and walking in a circular route, a phrase sometimes surprisingly found in the permit application.

5. Civil Disobedience
   Explicit protest that involves crossing barricade, sit-in of blacks where prohibited, use of “colored” bathrooms, voter registration drives, crossing barricades, tying up phone lines. Also, violence such as bombing.

6. Ceremony
   These celebrate or protest status transitions ranging from birth, death dates of individuals, organizations or nations, seasons, to re-enlistment or commissioning of military personnel, to the anniversaries of same. These are sometimes referenced by presenting flowers or wreaths commemorating or dedicating or celebrating status transitions or its anniversary; e.g., annual Merchant Marine memorial service; celebrate Chanukah, Easter, birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.).

7. Dramaturgical Demonstration
   Code ONLY if this is the modal activity; many demonstrations may contain some sequence of dramaturgical activity; these may be concerts, theatrical, dance, musical, artistic, or some combination of the performing arts.

8. Motorcade
   Electoral campaign and other issues.

9. Information Distribution
Tabling / petition gathering, lobbying, letter-writing campaign, teach-ins.

10. Symbolic Display
   e.g., Menorah, Crèche Scene, graffiti, cross burnings, signs, standing displays

11. Attack, by Instigators
   e.g., ethnic group victim of physical attack, by collective group (not one-on-one assault, crime, rape). Boundary motivating attack is “other group’s identity,” as in gay-bashing, lynching. Can also include verbal attack and/or threats, too.

12. Riot, Melee, Mob Violence
   Large-scale (50+), use of violence by instigators against person, property, police, or buildings separately or in combination, lasting several hours.

13. Strike / Slow-Down / Sick-Ins
   Employee work protest of any kind. Regular strike through failure of negotiations, or wildcat strike.

14. Boycott
   Organized refusal to buy or use a product or service, rent strikes.

15. Press Conference
   If specifically named as such in report, and must be the predominant activity form. Could involve disclosure of information to “educate the public” or influence various decision-makers.

16. Organization Formation Announcement or Meeting
   Announcement, meeting or press conference to announce the formation of a new organization.

17. Conflict, No Instigator (distinct from codes 11 or 12)
   This includes any boundary conflicts in which no instigator can be identified, i.e., black/white conflicts, abortion/anti-abortion conflicts. Often, no claims will be discernable in the activity.

18. Lawsuit
   By social movement organization or group
REFERENCES


