Plato, Euthyphro (ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ)

translated by John Bauschatz, 2018,
from the Greek of the 1995 Oxford Classical Text edition of E.A. Duke, et al.

free to use and distribute for non-commercial purposes with acknowledgement of the translator

[2a]

Euthyphro: What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you, having left behind your haunts in the Lyceum, are now hanging around here, around the Stoa of the King? For it can’t be the case, I think, that you, too, happen to have some lawsuit before the King, like I do!

Socrates: In fact, the Athenians do not call it a lawsuit, but a criminal prosecution.

[2b]

E: What are you saying? Someone has brought a criminal prosecution against you, as it seems: for I will not observe to your prejudice that you would have indicted another.

S: Indeed, no.

E: But another man indicted you?

S: Yes, indeed.

E: Who is this man?

S: I myself do not completely know the man, Euthyphro, for he seems to me to be someone who is youthful and unknown. They call him Meletos, as I believe. He is Pitthean by deme, if you know a certain Pitthean Meletos, with somewhat long, straight hair, not at all well-bearded and somewhat hook-nosed.

E: I do not remember him, Socrates. But in fact, what indictment [2c] has he brought against you?

S: What kind? Not low-born, as it seems to me. For it is not a slight thing that he, being young, has perceived so great a matter. For that man, as he claims, knows in what way the youth are corrupted, and he knows who are corrupting them. He runs the risk of being a wise man, and perceiving my ignorance, he comes to accuse me to the state, as if to his mother, that I myself am corrupting his age-mates. And he seems to me, of the citizens, [2d] alone to begin correctly. For it is proper to take care of the youth first, so that they will be as good as possible, just as it is fitting for a good farmer to first take care of the new plants, and after this also the other ones. And what is more, Meletos, perhaps, is the first [3a] to clear us away, those who are corrupting the growth of the young, as he claims; and then, after this, it is clear that, taking care of the older ones, he will be responsible for the most and the greatest good things for the city—as is likely to happen for one beginning from such a beginning.

E: I would wish it, Socrates, but I am afraid that the opposite will happen: for he seems to me, really, to be beginning to harm the city from the hearth, in attempting to wrong you. And tell me, in doing what does he say that you corrupt the youth?

[3b]

S: Ridiculous things, my good man, to hear. For he says that I am a creator of gods, and, for creating new gods and not believing in the old ones, he indicted me on behalf of these same gods, as he claims.

E: I understand, Socrates: because you say that a divine voice comes to you frequently. So, therefore, he has brought this indictment against you, that you innovate concerning divine matters, and slandering you, in fact, he is coming to court, knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the many. For they also laugh at [3c] me, you know, whenever I say something in the assembly about divine matters, foretelling to them what will be, as though I am raving. And, in fact, I have spoken nothing untrue among the things that I have foretold, but all the same they bear ill-will against all of us men of this kind. But it is not necessary to be at all concerned about them, but to come to close quarters with them.

S: My dear Euthyphro, being laughed at is perhaps not a big deal. For to the Athenians, as it seems to me, it is not very much a concern if they think a man is clever, unless, that is, he teaches his own wisdom; but whomever they think makes [3d] others of his kind, they become angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

E: How in the world they feel about me concerning this, I do not at all wish to be tested.

S: For perhaps you seem to offer yourself rarely, and to not wish to teach your own wisdom. But I am afraid that because of my love of humanity it will seem to them that I am able to speak profusely to every man, not only without a wage, but even if someone wishes to hear me I would be able to pay gladly. But if, then, what I said just now, they should intend to laugh at me, just as [3e] you say they laugh at you, it would be nothing unpleasant to pass the time joking and laughing in the courtroom. But if they are eager, it is unclear how this will turn out, save to you soothsayers.

E: But perhaps it will be no big deal, Socrates, and you will contend your case in accordance with your liking. I think I will contend mine that way.

S: What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you the defense or the prosecution?

E: The prosecution.

S: Against whom?

[4a]

E: Against a man whom, for prosecuting him, I seem, in turn, to be crazy.

S: But why? Are you suing someone who can fly?

E: He is far from flying, this man. He happens to be very old.

S: Who is this man?

E: My father.

S: Your father, my good man?

E: Yes, indeed.

S: But what is the complaint, and what is the charge in the lawsuit?

E: Murder, Socrates.

S: By Herakles! Perhaps, Euthyphro, it is unknown to the many what the correct way to handle this is. For I, at least, do not think it is characteristic of just anyone [4b] to do this correctly, but of someone already more advanced in wisdom.

E: Further to be sure, by Zeus, Socrates.

S: Is the person killed by your father in fact among your kin? Or is this quite clear? For you would not be pursuing him for murder on behalf of a stranger.

E: It is laughable, Socrates, that you think it makes a difference whether the dead man is a stranger or a relative, but that it does not make a difference to watch out for this alone, whether the killer killed justly or not, and if he killed justly, to let him go, but if he did not, to pursue him at law, even if the killer shares a hearth [4c] with you, and a table. For equally does pollution occur if you are with such a man knowingly and do not purify yourself and him by pursuing him at law. The man who died was a certain dependent of mine, and when we were farming on Naxos, he was working there on our land. Getting drunk, then, and becoming angry with one of our household slaves, he slit his throat. My father, in turn, binding his feet and his hands, and casting him into a trench, sent a man here to find out from an interpreter what it was necessary [4d] to do. During this time, he was not taking heed of the bound man and was neglectful, thinking that he was a murderer, and thatit would not be a big deal if he should die, which thing he indeed did do: for because of hunger and cold and the bonds he died before the messenger from the interpreter arrived. Therefore my father and my other relatives are angry about this, because I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of the murderer, though he did not kill him, as they claim. Nor, if he had killed him, indeed, since the dead man was a murderer, they say that it is not necessary to care about such a man—for [4e] it is sacrilegious for a son to sue his own father for murder—but they understand the divine poorly, Socrates, how things holy and unholy truly are.

S: And you, by Zeus, Euthyphro, think that you understand so precisely about the divine, how it works, and concerning holy and unholy things, with the result that with these things having been done in the way in which you claim, you are not afraid, in suing your father, lest you in turn happen to be doing something unholy?

E: There would be no use in me, Socrates, nor [5a] in any way would Euthyphro differ from the many, if I should not know all such things precisely.

S: For me, then, marvelous Euthyphro, it is best to become your student, and before the lawsuit against Meletos to challenge him with respect to these same things, as he claims that I, at least, in the past was making a big deal out of knowing about divine things, and now, since that man claims that I am doing wrong, acting unadvisedly and innovating concerning divine matters, I have indeed become your student. “And if, Meletos,” I should say, “you agree that Euthyphro [5b] is wise about such things, consider, too, that I am believing correctly and do not take me to court. But if not, obtain leave to bring a suit against that teacher of mine, rather than against me, because he corrupted his elders, me and his own father, me by teaching and that man by correcting and chastising.” And if he does not obey me and release me from the lawsuit, or, instead of me, he indicts you, is it best for me to say in the courtroom the same things with which I was challenging him?

E: By Zeus, Socrates, if he should in fact attempt to indict [5c] me, I would find, I think, in what way he was unsound, and there would be much more talk in the courtroom about that man than there was about me.

S: And I, dear comrade, knowing these things, desire to become your student, knowing that doubtless any other man, and this Meletos, does not seem to see you, but he has perceived me just so sharply and easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now, then, by Zeus, tell me what you were just now affirming that you clearly know: what sort of a thing do you claim piety is, and impiety, [5d] both concerning murder and other things? Or is it not the same in every action, that holiness is the same with itself? And unholiness, in turn, is it not the opposite of every holy thing, and is it itself not the same as itself? And whatever thing, every thing, which is about to be unholy, does it not possess one certain form, in accordance with its unholiness?

E: Absolutely, Socrates.

S: Tell me, then: what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

E: I say then, that the holy is what I am doing now: pursuing at law the person who does wrong, either concerning murder, or concerning the theft of holy things, or who errs with regard to some other of such things, whether he happens [5e] to be your father or your mother or anyone else whatsoever; and I say that not pursuing such a person at law is unholy—since, Socrates, behold how great a proof I will show you of the law, that I am correct, which also to others already I have shown, that these things would be correctly coming into being this way, to not give in to a person who is impious, no matter who he happens to be. For men themselves happen to believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, [6a] and they agree that this same god bound his own father because he ate his own sons unjustly, and that he, in turn, castrated his own father on account of other such things. But they get mad at me because I am pursuing my father at law, since he did wrong, and in this fashion they are telling themselves the opposite things about the gods and me.

S: Euthyphro, is this the reason for which I am being indicted, because whenever someone says such things about the gods, I receive them with difficulty somehow? And so, for this reason, as it seems, someone will say that I am doing wrong. So now, if these things also seem good to you, a [6b] man who knows a lot about such things, it is necessary, as it seems, for me to give way, as well. For what will we say, we who ourselves agree that we know nothing about them? But tell me, by Zeus of friendship, do you really think that these things happened in this way?

E: And things yet more wondrous than these, which the many do not know.

S: And do you really think that there was war among the gods with each other, and terrible hatreds and battles and many other things of such a sort as are described by the poets, and such things as [6c] in the other temples have been created by the good artists for us, and especially, at the great Panathenaia, the robe full of such ornamentation carried up to the Acropolis? Are we to say that these things are true, Euthyphro?

E: Not only these, Socrates, but what I just said, also many other things will I describe for you concerning the gods, if you like, things which, when you hear them, I am convinced that you will be amazed.

S: I would not be surprised. But you will explain these things to me at another time, when we are at leisure. But now, the thing which I just asked you, attempt [6d] to explain more clearly. For, my friend, earlier you did not teach me sufficiently, having asked you what holiness was, but you told me that this thing happens to be holy, which you are now doing, going after your father in court for murder.

E: And I was telling you the truth, Socrates.

S: Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, as well.

E: Yes, that is so.

S: Do you recall, then, that I was not directing you to do this, to teach me some one or two of the things that are holy, but to teach me that very essence by which all holy things are holy? For you said, I think, that by one quality [6e] unholy things are unholy, and holy holy. Or do you not recall?

E: I recall.

S: Teach me, then, this same principle, what in the world it is, so that, by looking at it and making use of it as a model, whatever thing is of such a sort, of whatever things either you or another does, I may say that it is holy, and whatever thing is not of such a sort, I may say that it is not.

E: Well, if this is the way you want it, Socrates, I will explain it this way to you.

S: Indeed I do want it this way.

E: The thing that is dear to the gods, then, is holy, and [7a] the thing that is not dear to them is unholy.

S: Wonderfully, Euthyphro, and just as I was hoping you would respond, so did you now respond. If, however, you answered truthfully, this I do not yet know; but it is clear that you will teach me that the things which you are saying are true.

E: By all means.

S: Come, then, let's examine what we’re saying. The thing which is dear to the gods, and the man who is, are holy, but the thing which is hateful to the gods, and the man who is, are unholy—and these are not the same, but the complete opposite, the holy and the unholy. Is this not so?

E: It is so.

S: And this seems to have been articulated well?

[7b]

E: I think so, Socrates. It has been spoken.

S: Is it also not the case that the gods fight, Euthyphro, and they disagree with each other, and there are hatreds among them against each other? Has this also not been said?

E: Yes, this has been said.

S: My friend, what is the disagreement about that causes this hatred and these angers? Let’s investigate in this way. If I and you should disagree about number, specifically which of two is more, would the disagreement about these things make us inimical and get angry at each other, or, by turning to calculation concerning such things, would we swiftly [7c] be reconciled?

E: Yes, we would.

S: Therefore, if we should also disagree concerning the greater and the lesser, turning to measurement, would we not cease from our quarrel?

E: That’s true.

S: And turning to weighing, as I think, would we be adjudged concerning the heavier and the lighter?

E: How wouldn’t we?

S: Therefore, disagreeing about what, and not being able to arrive at what judgment, would we become inimical towards each other and get angry? Perhaps this is not ready at hand for you; but as I speak, [7d] consider whether they are the following things: the just and unjust, the noble and the shameful, and the good and the bad. Are these things not the things about which we become angry with each other, disagreeing about them and not being able to arrive at a sufficient yardstick for them, whenever we do become angry, both I and you and all other men?

E: Yes, Socrates, the disagreement is about these things.

S: And what about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree about something, would they not disagree on account of these same things?

E: That’s entirely necessary.

[7e]

S: And among the gods, noble Euthyphro, some believe that certain things are just and others are not, according to your argument, and some things are beautiful and shameful and good and bad: for they would not be fighting with each other, I think, unless they were disagreeing about these things. Is that so?

E: You’re correct.

S: OK. So whatever things each of them believes are beautiful and good and just, they also love these things, and they hate the opposites of these. Yes?

E: Of course.

S: But the same things, as you say, some believe are just, [8a] and others unjust; and being at odds about these things, they fight and make war with each other. Is this not so?

E: It is.

S: Therefore, the same things, as it seems, are hated by the gods, and are loved by them; and the same things would be god-hated and god-loved.

E: It seems so.

S: And the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, by this logic.

E: It looks like it.

S: Therefore you did not answer what I asked you, my good man. For I did not ask you this, what thing happens to be itself both holy and unholy; but whatever is god-loved is also god-hated, it seems, [8b] with the result, Euthyphro, that it is no wonder in doing the thing which you are now doing—punishing your father—you are doing something dear to Zeus, but hateful to Kronos and Ouranos, and dear to Hephaistos, but hateful to Hera, and if any other one of the gods disagrees with another about this, it is hateful or dear to them for the same reasons.

E: But I think, Socrates, that among the gods not one disagrees with another about this, at least: that it is necessary for that man to pay the penalty, whoever unjustly kills someone.

S: What’s this? Euthyphro, did you ever hear any man [8c] disputing that it is necessary for a man who has killed unjustly or does anything else unjustly to pay the penalty?

E: In fact they never cease disputing these things, both elsewhere and in the law courts. For those who commit wrongs of all sorts do and say anything in defending themselves against a penalty.

S: Do they, in fact, agree that they are doing wrong, Euthyphro, and, in agreeing, do they nevertheless say that it is not necessary for them to pay the penalty?

E: No, not that.

S: Therefore they do not do and say everything. For I do not think that they try to say this, and to argue about it, that the penalty [8d] must not be paid if they do wrong, but I think that they are saying that they are not doing wrong. Is that right?

E: You’re right.

S: They are not disagreeing about this, then, namely that it is not necessary for the wrongdoer to pay the penalty, but perhaps they are arguing about this: who the wrongdoer is, and what he did, and when.

E: Yes, you’re right.

S: Then have the gods not experienced these same things, if really they fight about just and unjust things, as you argue, and some say that others do wrong, while others say that they do not? Since that thing, I think, my good man, no one either of gods or [8e] of men endeavors to say, that the wrongdoer does not have to pay the penalty.

E: Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, for the most part.

S: But, Euthyphro, I think that those who disagree—both men and gods, if really the gods argue—disagree about each of the things that are done. So, disagreeing concerning a certain deed, some say that it was done justly, and others unjustly. Is this not so?

E: Absolutely.

[9a]

S: Come now, my dear Eutrhyphro, teach me, so that I may become wiser: what is your proof that all the gods believe that that man died unjustly, that man who, being a servant and becoming a murderer, bound by the master of the man who died, died on account of his bonds before the man who bound him found out from the religious authorities what it was necessary to do about him? And what is your proof that they believe that on behalf of such a man it is right for a son to prosecute his father and charge him with murder? Come. Concerning these things attempt to explain to [9b] me something clearly, that, more than anything, all the gods believe that this practice is correct. And if you demonstrate it sufficiently, I will never cease praising you for your wisdom.

E: But perhaps it is not a small task, Socrates—still, I would be able to explain it to you entirely clearly.

S: I know, because I seem to you to be slower to learn than the jurors, since it is clear that you will explain to them that these are unjust things, and that all the gods hate such things.

E: Completely clearly, Socrates—if, that is, they listen when I speak.

[9c]

S: But they will listen, if you seem to speak well. But I reflected about this while you were speaking, and I thought it over with myself: “If Euthyphro should teach me as much as possible that all the gods believe that such a death is unjust, have I learned any more from Euthyphro what in the world the holy and the unholy are? For this deed would be hated by the gods, as it seems. But just now, the holy and the unholy did not appear to have been marked off in this way: for the god-hated thing appeared to be god-loved.” The result is that I release you from this, Euthyphro. If you like, let all the gods [9d] consider it unjust, and let all of them hate it. But this thing, which we are now revising in our discussion—that whatever thing all the gods hate is unholy, and whatever they love, holy; and that whatever thing some love, and others hate, is neither or both—do you want this now, in this way, to have been defined for us concerning the holy and the unholy?

E: What prevents it, Socrates?

S: Nothing, with regards to me, Euthyphro; but consider, for your part, if, by adopting this position, in this way you will most easily teach me what you promised.

[9e]

E: But I, at least, would say that this is “the holy,” whatever thing all the gods love; and the opposite, whatever thing all the gods hate, is the unholy.

S: Therefore, are we to examine this again, Euthyphro, if it is well spoken, or are we to let it go, and thus accept from ourselves and from others, if someone says that something is true, agreeing that it is? Or must one examine what the speaker is saying?

E: It must be examined. However, I, at least, think that this thing was spoken well just now.

[10a]

S: We will know better soon, my good man. Think about the following thing: the holy, is it loved by the gods because it is holy, or, because it is loved, is it holy?

E: I don’t know what you are saying, Socrates.

S: I will attempt to explain more clearly. We say that something is carried, and carries; and is led, and leads; and is seen, and sees; and with regard to all such things, you understand that they are different from each other, and in what way they are different?

E: At least, I think I understand.

S: Therefore, being loved is something, and loving is different from this?

E: How not?

[10b]

S: Tell me, then, the thing being carried, is it “carried” because it is carried, or because of something else?

E: No, because of this reason.

S: And the thing being carried, because it is carried, and the thing being seen, because it is seen?

E: Absolutely.

S: Therefore, not because it is “seen” is it seen, but the opposite: because it is seen, it is “seen”; and not because it is “led” is it led, but because it is led, it is “led”; and not because it is “carried” is it carried, but because it is carried it is “carried.” Indeed, is it clear, Euthyphron, [10c] what I want to say? I want to say this, that if something comes into being, or experiences something, it does not become because it is “becoming,” but because it comes into being it is “becoming”; and not because it is “experiencing” does it experience, but because it experiences it is “experiencing.” Or do you not agree with this?

E: I do.

S: Therefore, also the thing being loved, it is either something coming into being, or something experiencing something at something’s hands?

E: Of course.

S: And this, in fact, holds in the same way as previously: not because it is “beloved” is it loved by those by whom it is loved, but because it is loved it is “beloved.”

E: Necessarily.

[10d]

S: Therefore, what are we saying about the holy, Euthyphro? Is it any other thing than something loved by all the gods, as your argument claims?

E: No.

S: And on account of this thing, because it is holy, or on account of something else?

E: No, but on account of this.

S: Therefore, because it is “holy” it is loved—not because it is loved is it “holy”?

E: It seems so.

S: But, in fact, because it is loved by the gods, it is both “beloved” and “god-loved.”

E: How not?

S: Therefore, the god-loved thing is not holy, Euthyphro, nor is the holy thing god-loved, as you claim, but the one is different from the other.

[10e]

E: How’s that, Socrates?

S: Because we agree that the holy thing is loved for this reason, because it is holy; but we do not agree that because it is loved it is holy. Is this so?

E: Yes.

S: And the god-loved thing, because it is loved by the gods, we agree that, by this very being-loved, it is god-loved; but we do not agree that the god-loved thing is loved for this reason.

E: You speak the truth.

S: But if they were the same thing, my dear Euthyphro, the god-loved thing and the holy thing, if, on account of being holy, the [11a] holy were loved, also, then, on account of being god-loved would the god-loved thing be loved; and if, on account of being loved by the gods, the god-loved thing were god-loved, also on account of being loved would the holy thing be holy; but now you see that the two are opposites, since they are different from each other in every respect. For the one, because it is loved, is a thing such as can be loved; but the other, because it is the kind of thing that can be loved, for this reason it is loved. And you run the risk, Euthyphro, in asking about the holy, namely what it is, of not wanting, on the one hand, to clarify its nature, but of addressing a certain experience of it, that the holy has experienced this thing, being loved by all [11b] the gods. But what it is, you did not yet say. If you please, then, don’t conceal it from me, but tell me again, from the beginning, what kind of thing the holy is, whether it is loved by the gods or whether it experiences something—for we will not disagree about this—but tell me forthrightly, what are the holy and the unholy?

E: But Socrates, I do not know how to tell you what I am thinking. For somehow, whatever we propose always runs about, and it does not wish to remain wherever we set it up.

S: They seem to belong to our ancestor Daidalos, [11c] Euthyphro, the things being said by you. And if I were speaking and proposing them, perhaps you would laugh at me, because, in fact, also for me, on account of my shared lineage with that man, the points in my arguments run away, and do not want to remain wherever somebody places them. But as it is, the proposals are yours. We need some other joke. For they do not wish to remain for you, as it also appears to you yourself.

E: It seems to me that the things being said need pretty much the same joke, Socrates. For I am not the one who is making them go around and not stay in the same place. [11d] But you seem to be the Daidalos to me, since for my sake, at least, these things would remain in place.

S: I am running the risk, then, my friend, of having become more clever in my skill than that man by so much, by how much that man was only making his own things not remain, whereas I, in addition to the things of myself, as it seems, I am also making the things of others move. And indeed, for me this is the most refined aspect of my skill, that I am wise, though unwilling. For I would wish that my arguments remain for me and be situated motionlessly rather than that in addition to the [11e] wisdom of Daidalos, the wealth of Tantalos come into being. But enough of these things. Since you seem to me to be hanging back, I myself will share in the desire to demonstrate, so that you may teach me about the holy. And don’t get tired before we’re done. Consider if it does not seem necessary for you that every holy thing is just.

E: It does.

S: Is every just thing holy, then? Or is every holy thing [12a] just, but as for a just thing, not every one is holy, but one aspect of it is holy, and the other aspect something else?

E: I don’t follow the things you are saying, Socrates.

S: And, in fact, you are younger than I am not less than by how much you are wiser. But as for what I am saying, you are holding back on account of the wealth of your wisdom. But, my good man, exert yourself: for it is not difficult to understand what I am saying. For I am saying the opposite of what the poet said, the one who said, “With Zeus the doer, and he who produced all of these things, [12b] He does not want to quarrel; since where there is fear, there is also reverence.” I, then, in this disagree with the poet. Am I to tell you in what way?

E: Yes, absolutely.

S: It does not seem to me to be the case that “where there is fear there is also reverence.” For many, fearing sicknesses and poverty and many other such things, seem to be to be afraid, but they seem to me to reverence not at all these things which they fear. Does it not also seem this way to you?

E: Yes, indeed.

S: But I think that where there is reverence there is also fear: since is there a person who, reverencing some deed, and feeling shame about it, does not at the same time fear [12c] and dread a reputation for worthlessness?

E: Indeed, he does fear it.

S: Therefore it is not correct to say, “where there is fear, there is also reverence,” but where there is reverence, there is also fear. However, it is not true that where there is fear, there is always reverence, for I think that fear is bigger than reverence. Reverence is a part of fear, just as odd is a part of number—so that it’s not necessarily the case that where there is number, there is also odd, but where there is odd, there there is also number. Perhaps you follow me now?

E: Yes, absolutely.

S: Such a thing, then, was I asking you when I was speaking then: where [12d] there is the just, is there also the holy? Or, where there is the holy, is there also the just, but where there is the just, there is not always the holy, for the holy is a part of the just? Should we say this, or does it seem different to you?

E: No, it doesn’t—I agree with you. For you seem to me to speak accurately.

S: Consider, then, the following thing. If the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary that we, as it seems, discover what part of the just the holy might be. If you were asking me about some one of the things we were just discussing, such as what part of number even is, and what kind of number this happens to be, I would have said that it is whatever number is not unequal, but is equally divisible. Or does this not seem right to you?

E: It seems right.

[12e]

S: Try, then, to teach me in this way what part of the just the holy is, so that we may tell Meletos to wrong us no longer nor bring a charge of impiety against us, since sufficiently already we have been educated by you about pious and holy things, and what are not.

E: This, then, seems to me, Socrates, the part of the just that is both pious and holy, the one concerning the tendance of the gods, while the one that concerns the tendance of men is the remaining part of the just.

S: And you seem to me, Euthyphron, to speak well; but [13a] I am still in need of some small thing: for by “tendance” I don’t yet understand what you mean. For perhaps you don’t mean that the kinds of tendances there are concerning other things, that this same thing applies concerning the gods. For we do speak about other tendances, I think, such as we say that not every man knows how to take care of horses, but the man with horse skills does. Is this so?

E: By all means.

S: For the tendance of horses is horsemanship?

E: Yes.

S: And not everyone knows how to take care of dogs, but the huntsman does?

E: Right.

S: For the skill of the huntsman is the tendance of dogs.

[13b]

E: Yes.

S: And the herdsman’s skill is the tendance of cattle?

E: Yes, absolutely.

S: And so holiness and piety are the tendance of the gods, Euthyphro? Is this what you mean?

E: I do.

S: Therefore, does every tendance accomplish the same thing? Such as the following: it is for the purpose of some good and assistance for the thing being taken care of, just as you see that horses, being taken care of a man with horsemanship skills, are helped and become better. Or do they not seem to you to be helped?

E: They do.

S: And dogs, I suppose, are helped by the huntsman’s skill, and [13c] cattle by the skill of the cattle herder, and all other things in the same way. Or do you think that tendance is intended to harm the thing being taken care of?

E: No, by Zeus, I don’t.

S: But it is intended to help it?

E: How would it not be?

S: Therefore holiness, being tendance of the gods, is a help for the gods and makes the gods better? And would you agree with this, that whenever you do something holy, you make some one of the gods better?

E: By Zeus, I would not.

S: I, Euthyphro, do not think that you are saying this—far from it—but because of this I asked you [13d] what in the world you thought the tendance of the gods was, not believing that you were meaning such a thing.

E: And correctly so, Socrates. For I don’t mean such a thing.

S: Well: What tendance of the gods would holiness be, then?

E: The kind which, Socrates, slaves provide to their masters.

S: I understand: it would be a kind of service to the gods, as it seems.

E: Entirely so.

S: Would you be able to say towards the completion of what task the skill serviceable to doctors happens to be serviceable? Do you not think it is serviceable for the completion of health?

E: I do.

[13e]

S: And what about the skill that serves shipbuilders? Towards the completion of what task is it serviceable?

E: It is clear, Socrates, that it is useful for building a ship.

S: And the skill that serves housebuilders, perhaps, is helpful for building a house?

E: Yes.

S: Tell me, then, my good man: the skill that serves the gods, towards the completion of what task would it be serviceable? For it is clear that you know, since you claim to understand divine matters most beautifully of men.

E: And I speak the truth, Socrates.

S: Tell me, then, by Zeus, what in the world is that entirely good task that the gods accomplish making use of us as their attendants?

E: There are many beautiful tasks, Socrates.

[14a]

S: Generals also bring about many beautiful things, my friend; but all the same, you could easily name the chief one of them, that they bring about victory in war. Or is this not true?

E: How could it not be?

S: And, I think, farmers also bring about many beautiful results. But, all the same, the chief product of their workmanship is food from the earth.

E: Yes, indeed.

S: But what about the many beautiful things the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?

E: I told you a little while ago, Socrates, that [14b] it is too great a task to be able to comprehend all of these things precisely. This, however, I say to you simply, that if someone knows how to say and do things pleasing to the gods in praying and sacrificing, then these are holy things, and such things preserve private households and the common property of states. But things which are the opposite of things pleasing to the gods are impious, and these things overturn all things and destroy them.

S: In fact, through much shorter means, Euthyphro, if you were wishing, you would have spoken the chief point of the things which I was asking you: but [14c] you are not willing to teach me, clearly. For even now, when you were right upon it, you turned yourself away. If you had responded to it, I would already have come to understand holiness from you sufficiently. But now—for it is necessary that the one questioning follow the one being questioned, wherever he leads—what do you say the holy and holiness are? Are they not a kind of knowledge about sacrificing and praying?

E: I would say so.

S: And sacrificing is giving gifts to the gods, and praying is asking the gods for something?

E: Yes indeed, Socrates.

[14d]

S: So holiness would be, according to this logic, a science of asking from and giving to the gods.

E: You understood what I meant perfectly well, Socrates.

S: For I desire your wisdom, my friend, and I am applying my mind to it, so that whatever you say does not fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? Are you saying that it is asking them for things and giving things to them?

E: I am.

S: Therefore, would it not be asking correctly to ask them for these things, of which we have need from them?

E: What else?

[14e]

S: And again, would giving correctly be giving in return to them these things which they happen to need from us? For, I suppose, it would not be technically correct for a giver to bring as gifts to someone things of which there is no need.

E: You speak the truth, Socrates.

S: Holiness, then, Euthyphro, would be a sort of exchange skill for gods and men between one another.

E: An exchange skill, if it is more pleasing for you to call it that.

S: But nothing is more pleasing to me, if it does not happen to be true. But explain to me, what benefit does there happen to be for the gods from the gifts which they receive from us? For what they give [15a] is clear to everyone. For we have nothing good which they do not give. But the things which they receive from us, in what way are they helped by them? Or do we get so much more than they do in the exchange, that we receive all the good things from them, but they receive nothing from us?

E: But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are helped by the things which they receive from us?

S: But what in the world would these gifts from us to the gods be, Euthyphro?

E: What else do you think, Socrates, but reverence and gifts of honor and, what I said just now, gratitude?

[15b]

S: Therefore, Euthyphro, the holy is pleasing to the gods, but neither helpful nor dear to them?

E: I think that it is most dear of all.

S: This, then, as it seems, is again the holy: the thing dear to the gods.

E: Absolutely.

S: Therefore will you be amazed, in saying these things, if your words appear to you to not be standing still, but moving about, and will you accuse me of being the Daidalos who makes them move, though you yourself are much more skillful than Daidalos and are making them go around in a circle? Or do you not perceive that our argument has arrived, going around again, [15c] at the same point? For you recall, perhaps, that previously the holy and the thing beloved by the gods did not seem to us to be the same thing, but were different from each other. Or do you not recall?

E: I recall.

S: But now do you not perceive that you are saying that the thing dear to the gods is holy? And is this anything other than the thing dear to the gods? Or not?

E: It certainly is.

S: Therefore, either previously we were not agreeing correctly, or if we were agreeing correctly then, now we are not assuming correctly.

E: It seems so.

S: Then again, from the beginning, we must investigate what the holy is, since I will not willingly give way before I learn. [15d] Don’t think me unworthy, but in every way, applying your mind as much as you can, now tell me the truth: for you know, if any other man does, and you are not to be let go, like Proteus, before you speak. For if you had not clearly known the holy and the unholy, it is not possible that you would have attempted, on behalf of a workman, to prosecute your father, an old man, on a charge of murder; but you would have feared to run the risk of the gods, lest you do it incorrectly, and you would have been ashamed before men. But now, I know well that [15e] you think that you know clearly what is holy and what is not. Tell me then, good Euthyphro, and do not conceal what you think it is.

E: At another time, Socrates. For now I am hastening somewhere, and it is time for me to go.

S: What are you doing, my friend? You are leaving, casting me down from the great hope which I had, that, learning from you what are holy things and what are not, I would also be released from the indictment from Meletos, demonstrating [16a] to him that I had already become wise from Euthyphro with regard to divine things, and that I was no longer acting inadvisedly through ignorance, nor making innovations with regard to them, and especially that I would live the rest of my life better.