Two conceptions of citizenship

ABSTRACT

With the collapse of the Leninist project in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the fluid relations between market and state consequent upon the New Right project of the Reagan and Thatcher eras in the West, citizenship analysis has assumed a central place in the political sociology of democratic societies. However, such analysis is presently characterized by a variety of divergent and, on occasion, contradictory positions. This article proposes that the debates around citizenship can be clarified by recognizing the existence of two conceptions of citizenship. The first of these, state citizenship, involves the identification of citizenship with the elaboration of a formal legal status, co-terminous with the emergence of nation-states and their diverse lineages. The article discusses the two main forms in which this conception appears in the relevant literature: that of full formal membership of a nation-state and that of a distinctive welfare-rights version. Some limitations of the status conception of citizenship are considered and recent political developments in relation to its use in the British context are discussed.

A second conception, that of democratic citizenship, is then proposed which involves the elaboration of citizenship around shared membership of a political community, in which conception citizens are political actors constituting political spaces. Some implications of this alternative conception are discussed and exemplified with reference to the possibilities for a European political community.

The discussion of citizenship has become an increasingly important aspect of the political sociology of democratic societies (Turner 1986 and 1990; Brubaker 1989 and 1992; Bottomore 1992; Roche 1992.) The reasons for this development are doubtless complex but two seem of particular importance: the collapse of the Leninist project of
state-centred social change in the East, and a renewed focus upon the nature and conditions of political membership as a source of social integration in the context of changing state-market relations in the West.

Within the renewed discussion of citizenship there are inevitably a diversity of positions. Thus, for example, Mann has proposed that citizenship is most fruitfully viewed as offering a range of possibilities within a repertoire of ruling-class strategies, while Turner, although positively assessing Mann’s argument as a general advance upon the work of T.H. Marshall, nevertheless criticizes that argument as economically reductionist and analytically restricted. Seeking to negotiate these shortcomings, Turner outlines a theory of citizenship organized around a twofold matrix, public/private, active/passive (Mann 1987; Turner 1990). Alternatively, Roche has implicitly criticized both such positions as excessively state-centred and has argued for the necessity of disconnecting the discussion of circuits of citizenship from one particular political form (Roche 1992).

Even this small selection from the range of variations around the theme of citizenship becomes less problematic if one adopts the position advocated by van Gunsterson and Leca, that citizenship is a contestable concept, lacking a fixed meaning and requiring specification in terms of its use by ‘historical participants’ in varying historical contexts (van Gunsteren 1978; Leca 1991). Such a stance is strongly supported by Derek Heater’s extensive survey of the historically variable usages of the concept of citizenship, leading to the conclusion that

from very early in its history the term already contained a cluster of meanings related to a defined legal or social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of duties, an expectation of rights and a yardstick of good behaviour. . . . (Heater 1990: 163)

This argument leads to the further conclusion that we may reasonably question

the modern assumption that the status (of citizenship) necessarily adheres to the sovereign nation-state (Emphasis mine) [It] can be associated with any geographical unit from a small town to the whole globe itself. (p. 163)

The significance of this proposition will become clear in due course. As a contribution to clarifying the central issues at stake in the emerging body of citizenship analysis and to removing confusions which obstruct its development, I want to argue that there is a tension at the centre of the contemporary discussion of citizenship which on occasion amounts to a contradiction. This tension arises from the
juxtaposition of two different conceptions of citizenship, one state-centred and emanent, the other democratic, non-state-centred and imminent. The former conception involves the identification of citizenship with the elaboration of a distinctive, formal legal status, which elaboration is co-terminous with the emergence of nation-states and their diverse lineages. We may identify this as state citizenship. The second conception involves the elaboration of citizenship around shared membership of a political community and requires the non-identification of such political communities and states. In this conception, citizens are political actors constituting political communities as public spaces. We may identify this as democratic citizenship.

The first conception, state-centred modern national citizenship, was, as Brubaker notes,

an invention of the French Revolution. The formal delimitation of the citizenry; the establishment of civil equality, entailing shared rights and shared obligations; the institutionalisation of political rights; the legal rationalisation and ideological accentuation of the distinction between citizens and foreigners; the articulation of the doctrine of national sovereignty and of the link between citizenship and nationhood; the substitution of immediate, direct relations between the citizen and the state for the mediated, indirect relations characteristic of the ancient regime – the Revolution brought all these developments together on a national level for the first time. (Brubaker 1992: 35)

Central to this conception is the idea of citizenship as a general membership status. The definition of citizenship is abstract and formal, not concrete and substantive (Brubaker 1992: 40). The context of this definition is the diverse struggles whereby centralizing, rationalizing territorial monarchies gradually subordinated the liberties, immunities and privileges of feudal lords and corporate bodies (see Poggi 1978 and Bendix 1964). This status of citizen is thus ab initio the correlate of emerging modern state power, that is, of a distinct form of political administration and control and the legitimation thereof. As Brubaker argues further, pace the classical Weberian definition of the state, states are not only territorial but also membership organizations, in which the capacity to determine membership and to enforce the resultant decision has been fundamental to state power.

This is clearly the conception of citizenship which Mann utilizes in his discussion of ruling-class strategies. Here citizenship is merely one of a number of such regime strategies identified in the course of comparative analysis. In this overwhelmingly class-reductionist account, the possibilities for and the institutionalization of different dimensions of citizenship are essayed purely as the function of ruling-class power. In such an argument, any connection between
citizenship and power relations is severed and citizenship becomes merely a function of relations of domination. This leads to the treatment of the dubious concept of 'social citizenship' as if it were separable from any conception of civil and political freedom and thereby to the treatment of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as the exemplars of ruling-class strategies in which such social citizenship was maximized. The wisdom of hindsight always conveys an unfair advantage but one can not help but wonder if there is not some connection between Mann's unfortunate statement that authoritarian socialism 'appears no less stable than other enduring types of regime' (Mann 1987: 350) and the unproblematic treatment of welfare as social citizenship. T.H. Marshall was more accurate when he tellingly observed that the provision of welfare without civil and political citizenship stunted the growth of liberty (Marshall 1981: 170).

In contrast, Brubaker argues that much of the significance of citizenship in the modern world flows from its formal properties as a specification of membership (and non-membership) in a world which is universally divided into a system of bounded states, bounded both territorially and also in membership terms. He further proposes that, within this context, the politics of citizenship have been shaped around a number of 'distinctive traditions of nationhood – by deeply rooted understandings of what constitutes a nation' (Brubaker 1989: 7). Thus, in France, the politics of citizenship have historically reflected the fact that the nation has been conceived of mainly in relation to the institutional and territorial framework of the state. Political unity, and not shared culture, has been the basis of nationhood and the universalist, inclusive theory and practice of citizenship have depended on confidence in the assimilatory workings of the major institutions. By contrast, because national feeling developed in Germany before the nation-state, 'the German idea of the nation was not a political one, nor was it linked with the abstract idea of citizenship.' Over time, this produced a politics of formal citizenship which focused upon exclusion rather than inclusion.

Both these specific variants of national citizenship can be further contrasted with the case of Britain. Here, Brubaker argues, the absence of a clear conception of British nationhood has been paralleled until recently by the absence of a clear conception of citizenship.

The concept of citizenship as membership of a legal and political community was foreign to British thinking. Legal and political status were conceived instead in terms of allegiance – in terms of the vertical ties between individual subjects and the king. The ties of allegiance knit together the British empire, not the British nation. (Brubaker 1989: 10)
With the end of the empire, Britain had to redefine itself as a nation-state and seek to create a national citizenship. The absence of both of these has contributed to the confused and bitter politics of immigration and citizenship during the last quarter century. . . . While other countries were debating the citizenship status of immigrants, Britain was debating the immigration status of citizens. (Brubaker 1989: 11)

With this perspective, therefore, the institution of citizenship is inextricably bound up with the formation of the modern state and state system. But as Brubaker rightly points out, the converse is also true. The formation of the modern state and state system cannot be understood apart from the emergence and institutionalization of citizenship. As well as territorial organization, states are membership associations constituting themselves and delimiting the field of their jurisdiction by constituting their citizenry. The literature on citizenship has frequently emphasized universality and inclusiveness but Brubaker is clearly right to emphasize the inherent duality of modern nation-state citizenship,

a status at once universal and particularistic, internally inclusive and externally exclusive . . . (Such) citizenship is inherently bounded. Exclusion is essential both to the ideology of national citizenship . . . and to the legal institution. (Brubaker 1992: 72)

We should be quite clear that in the contemporary world this defining process of inclusion/exclusion is not an undifferentiated one. It is not the case that all those subject to the authority of a given state can be meaningfully thought of as occupying the same status, as being ‘included’ to the same extent. A simple distinction between Auslanders and Inlanders will not do. A more accurate and useful distinction is between foreign nationals, denizens and citizens: foreign nationals are those who are citizens of another state, who have not been granted full residential rights in the state in which they are domiciled and who therefore should be thought as occupying only a temporary status; denizens, in contrast, are those who, although they are not citizens of the country in which they have their domicile, nevertheless do have a legal and a permanent resident status (Hammar 1990: 12 seq.). Following the large-scale migration patterns consequent upon the recruitment of foreign labour, there were by the late 1980s some 12 million foreign citizens resident in the western industrialized states, some 50 per cent of whom have been estimated to be denizens (Hammar 1990: 19 and 23).

From a state-centred perspective, therefore, citizenship should be seen as the pinnacle of a hierarchy of legally defined statuses which together comprehend internal state-membership (Brubaker 1989). Such citizenship status confers full rights, privileges and obligations
upon some members, several rights upon denizens and virtually no rights upon short-term visitors. Within this perspective, citizenship questions concern the basic rules for decisions and judgments about who are citizens and who are not. Questions as to precisely what rights flow from being a citizen are on the whole not addressed and neither are questions regarding the relationship between such rights. The main qualification to this generalization concerns the matter of political rights which have usually been thought of as central to the idea of full citizenship. Hence, as Hammar proposes, two types of questions are generated within this perspective: those concerning the extent to which political rights should be given to those who are not formal citizens and those regarding the extent to which and the conditions upon which formal citizenship should be given to foreign residents with a long period of residence (Hammar 1992: 3). To these we may reasonably, and I would propose necessarily, add a third type of question: with the emergence of both supra-national and sub-national forms of political organization of actual or potential great significance, this third type of question concerns the relationship between citizenship as full formal membership of a nation-state and membership of other forms of political organization at the level of the international community or the region.

THE WELFARE-RIGHTS VERSION OF CITIZENSHIP

A seminal contribution to the discussion of citizenship was made by T.H. Marshall. In his initial exploration of the topic which has become a sociological classic, Marshall defines citizenship as follows

Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of the community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. (Marshall 1963: 87)

He further proposes that citizenship requires a particular kind of social bond involving

a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law. Its growth is stimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won. (Marshall 1963: 96)

As is well known, Marshall argues that the analysis of citizenship in the modern world would be greatly facilitated if we were to
differentiate citizenship rights into three types. These are civil, political and social rights respectively, each type being associated with a particular institutional sphere. Marshall uses this typology of rights to advance an account of the development of citizenship in Britain, focusing, in particular, upon the impact of the institutionalization of citizenship upon class inequality.

Having been absorbed into the conventional sociological wisdom concerning the institutionalization of class conflict, Marshall’s discussion was substantially neglected for some time but in the last decade has received an increasing amount of attention and critical analysis (Dahrendorf 1988; Giddens 1982 and 1985; Turner 1986 and 1990; Lockwood 1992). Part of such analysis (a relatively small part, it has to be said) concerns Marshall’s treatment of the role of the state in the development of modern citizenship. Giddens speaks of Marshall’s depiction of the evolutionary development of citizenship as being helped along by the ‘beneficent hand of the state’ (Giddens 1982: 171). Turner also sees Marshall as taking the British nation-state for granted, thereby neglecting the important question of the link between ‘the notion of national citizenship’ and ‘the constitution of the nation-state’ (Turner 1987: 46).

Such criticisms, however, have failed to identify the central deficiency in this area of Marshall’s discussion. As far as a state-centred discussion of citizenship is concerned, Marshall’s elaboration of his argument in relation to Britain was singularly inappropriate. As Brubaker makes clear in his instructive comparative analysis, the striking characteristic of the British case is the absence of a state-derived conception of citizenship. (See also Hammar 1990: 23.)\(^1\) Within this perspective, Marshall’s analysis in Citizenship and Social Class is most usefully thought of as contributing to our understanding of the changing relations between legally defined status and other dimensions of social structure, most notably class inequality (see Turner 1988). Such changing relations in the British case, however, must be seen as taking place alongside a high degree of continuity in the constitution of political actors as subjects of political sovereignty, first exclusively monarchical, then in the form of parliamentary sovereignty.

In spite of this limitation, Marshall does nevertheless have a real contribution to make to our understanding of differing conceptions of citizenship. In order to explicate this contribution, we have to take note of his account of the transition to market society in England which presents us with a fruitful paradox (Marshall 1963). On the one hand, it is central to that account that there is a fundamental incompatibility between citizenship as a universal status within a community of rights and a market society. On the other hand, citizenship (using the indices Marshall specifies) and market society did co-exist until the time of Marshall’s offering of his account in the
mid-twentieth century. Marshall's explanation of this apparent paradox is that 'the core of citizenship at this stage (that of market society) was composed of civil rights'. Such civil rights were an indispensable part of a competitive market economy, allowing each man to engage in economic struggle and denying him social protection on the grounds that he was able to protect himself.

The content of such legal citizenship in market society was extremely constrained. In practice the right to justice, to true equality before the law, did not exist due to the existence of obstacles between formal rights and possible remedies. Such obstacles were principally of two types: one subjective, that is, class prejudice, which Marshall considered to have been substantially eroded by cultural change and social mobility; the other, objective in the sense of material obstacles to legal equality. The latter Marshall considered to have been ameliorated by such measures as the Legal Aid provisions advanced by the Labour government in Britain after the Second World War. Contrasting a commitment to 'equal social worth' with that to 'equal natural rights', Marshall saw these post-war changes as stemming directly from the former. I propose that such a commitment to 'equal social worth' is fundamental to an emancipatory conception of democratic citizenship and that such a conception is distinct from, in tension with and frequently in contradiction with a state-centred conception of citizenship.

Implicit in Marshall's argument, therefore, are distinctive conceptions of citizenship. The first, elaborated around the concept of equal natural rights, is formal and individualistic and wholly compatible with the premises of market society. Such a conception, however, as Durkheim argued, is incapable of supplying an adequate basis for social integration. (See Lockwood 1992.) Marshall implicitly recognizes this when he invokes a second emancipatory conception of citizenship articulated around the concept of equal social worth as being necessary for social integration in an otherwise fissiparous market society.²

Given Marshall's concern with the impact of state intervention upon social inequality, the particular focus of his analysis was upon 'social citizenship', which, although viewed as distinctive, is nevertheless treated as both continuous with and complementary to civil and political citizenship. Further, the relationship between the provision through centralized state mechanisms of those welfare rights seen as definitive of social citizenship and the enhancement of individual and group autonomy is viewed unproblematically. Marshall does not consider the possibility that there may be at the very least a tension between a welfare-rights version of (social) citizenship and a conception of citizenship focusing on emancipation and autonomy.³ As Roche argues, Marshall 'implies that the citizen 'world' or community is a sphere in which rights-claiming citizens have their claims serviced by
the state-based institutions of the law, parliamentary democracy and the welfare state’ (Roche 1992: 21). The consequence of this institutionalization of the social citizen as mainly a rights-claimer has been to erode the distinction between citizen and client. Such erosion carries with it a dual danger: de-moralization and de-politicization (Roche 1992: 31–2; 34–7). In the case of the former, the moral character of social participation (for example, in the welfare state) involving notions of interactional reciprocity and a logical and practical connection between rights and duties is lost, with a consequent loss of freedom and more autonomy for dependent clients.4

These considerations have an obvious relevance to a second danger, that of depoliticization. As Roche notes

The status of citizen is essentially a legal and political status of membership in a civil and political community which both makes and also abides by its own laws. It thus implies political rights and duties. In the light of this the idea of social citizenship . . . is not at all clear and well grounded, whether in practice or in principle. (Roche 1992: 35)

Consequently, I would argue, a state-based operationalization of particular social rights requires a prior institutionalization of democratic political status to enable the effective maintenance of citizenship. ‘De-moralised individuals are unlikely to be able to see themselves as being credible bearers of the civil and political powers, the identity and status, of full citizenship’ (p. 35).5

CITIZENSHIP AS STATUS

Both the formal membership and the welfare-rights versions of citizenship are therefore state-centred. While institutionalizing rights in the form of passive claims, both tend equally to institutionalize hierarchy and dependency. These limitations significantly derive from the particular conception of citizenship which lies at the heart of both the foregoing versions: a conception of citizenship as status. As Oldfield argues, the emphasis on status in what is fundamentally an individualistic conception of citizenship ‘gives rise to a language of “needs” and “entitlements” which are required both for human dignity and for the possibility of individuals being effective agents in the world’ (Oldfield 1990a: 178). The status ‘citizen’ involves such entitlements as ‘rights’ defined by collective definition, i.e., the state, and supplied by collective provision. Parallel duties are strictly circumscribed to the payment of taxes and the possibility of military service in defence of the state. Within this conception, social relations are contractual. Consequently, activity in the public realm is a matter of choice for, in principle, autonomous individuals. Such a conception
'generates no social bond ... (and) neither creates nor sustains any social solidarity or cohesion, or any sense of common purpose' (Oldfield 1990a: 180).

Marshall and many others have charted the historical struggles which led to the establishment of such citizenship rights. A number of such accounts, including Marshall's own, have been criticized for casting their narrative in an evolutionary framework, thereby giving a strong sense of irreversibility to the institutionalization of rights, which recent developments in Britain and elsewhere have made highly questionable. Perhaps more fundamentally, there has been a continuous discussion as to the meaningfulness of particular combinations of citizenship rights in relation to the empowerment of equally autonomous individuals. The central thrust of much of the study of social stratification, for example, has been to demonstrate the manner in which patterns of social inequality in the form of class, sex and race serve to give many formal rights only a literal meaning.

From a very different standpoint, the re-affirmation by the New Right of the necessity of re-establishing the unregulated market as the central institution of capitalist societies has led to a direct challenge to Marshallian arguments regarding citizenship in general and social citizenship in its welfare-state rights version in particular. Thus, typically, Peter Saunders argues that only ... a liberal social order of market capitalism can generate the conditions for full citizenship (and) that (the) pursuit of egalitarianism and the construction of socialist political institutions tend necessarily to undermine it' (Saunders 1993: 57).

Such arguments form part of the framework within which one must view the recent incoherent, not to say contradictory, attempts on the part of successive Conservative administrations in Britain to appropriate the concept of citizenship. These attempts began in 1988 with a critique of Labour's commitment to a 'passive' interpretation of citizenship in the form of rights and entitlements from the state. Senior ministers (Douglas Hurd in particular) contrasted this interpretation with the Conservatives' advocacy of an active citizenship of altruistic community involvement, described by one commentator as *richesse oblige*. Central to the rhetorical flourishes of these initial attempts at appropriation was a linkage between citizenship and community. When subsequently an actual policy for citizenship was actually legislated by the Conservative administration in 1991, its form was distinctly at odds with such a linkage. Citizenship as status became once again the basis of what was proposed. But with the Citizen's Charter, the status enshrined in legislation was that of consumer: contractual market relations and not social or community bonds became the context of empowerment. As Colin Crouch has noted, the Charter 'proved to be entirely individual and non-political: a series of devices whereby individual complainants could seek redress against
public servants, not politicians, in cases of inadequate service delivery' (Crouch 1992: 71).

A quite distinctive conception of the status 'citizen' and of its formal implications is advanced by the organization Charter 88. The UK is alone among the members of the European Community in not having a formally written constitution and Bill of Rights. Although the common law has been argued to offer parallel safeguards to those embodied in written constitutions, the view has become increasingly widespread that there are inadequate means to control public power and to protect individual rights in the UK. (See, for example, Johnson 1977 and Harden and Lewis 1986.) Arguing therefore that the customary nature of Britain's constitutional arrangements no longer provides an adequate defence of civil and political liberties against the power of an 'elective dictatorship', Charter 88 promotes the necessity of embodying citizenship status in a formal Bill of Rights and a written constitution.

Whatever the merits of this particular proposal, it does have the potential limitation of securing political citizenship within a single political context, that of the nation-state, precisely at an historical moment when that context is seen to be of diminishing significance. (See Hall and Held 1989: 183.) Thus, for example, Elizabeth Meehan has persuasively argued that

a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple (emphasis mine) in the sense that the identities, rights and obligations associated . . . with citizenship . . . are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions. (Meehan 1993: 1)

DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY

The necessity of relating the possibilities for and the limitations upon citizenship to the context(s) which gave them meaning was identified in an early contribution to the contemporary discussion of citizenship in Britain. Writing of the reconstitution of status that had accompanied the rise of citizenship in Britain, A.H. Halsey noted how important it has been that the possibilities for citizenship have been defined in the context of the nation-state (Halsey 1986: 62). In pursuing the goal of creating a national political community, the Labour party found itself in a paradoxical situation. In its emergence as a serious political force, the Labour party was significantly dependent upon the solidarity of local class communities. To a very real extent, community was the resource base for the development of
particular forms of citizenship. However, the welfare-rights conception of citizenship which has been so central to Labour party thinking and institutionalization was crucially dependent upon continuing economic growth and change. Apart from the depoliticizing effects of the statist model, economic change also produced changes in the occupational structure which have steadily diminished the size of the traditional working class and eroded working-class communities. Recalling the argument advanced by Brubaker to which I referred earlier, it seems reasonable to conclude that with respect to both citizenship as formal membership and citizenship as a source of social solidarity through the delivery of formal and substantive rights, the task of constructing a national political community in Britain remains to be achieved.

AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION

One conclusion from the foregoing discussion of state-centred conceptions of citizenship of both the formal membership and welfare-rights versions seems inescapable, certainly as far Britain is concerned. The possibilities for the creation of political community (or communities) remain unfulfilled. Behind formal legalisms and political rhetoric, the sociological realities are those of subjects, clients and consumers, not those of citizens of equal social worth and decision-making capacity. The construction of political communities clearly requires an alternative conception of citizenship. Such an alternative conception of citizenship involves political actors, rights and duties and a conception of political forms as subordinate and adaptive to a variety of citizenries, rooted in the divisions and diverse purposes of civil society. Such democratic citizenships are created and reproduced through the constitution of substantive communities of reciprocity and balanced rights and duties, involving conceptions of 'equal social worth'.

In contradistinction, therefore, to conceptions and specifications of citizenship centred upon nation-states, the political communities which provide the contexts of democratic citizenship are, as Michael Walzer has argued, 'phenomenological and imminent' (Walzer 1983: 26). For this reason, such political communities are able to encompass group as well as individual citizenship and their social sites are potentially widespread, both subnational and transnational, the city and the region as well as the community and the federation. Such political communities need not, indeed should not, be thought of as embodying some anterior organic identity of territory or blood. Thus, for example, exploring the possibility for the emergence of a European political community, Tassin argues that just
as the institutionalised community cannot fall under the statist logic of the monopoly of legitimate violence, so its constituent parts cannot establish themselves against each other in a relationship of domination. What is required rather is a principle of ‘participation in government’ . . . which can only be guaranteed by a public space. . . . (Therefore, instead) of being the precondition for a public space, the European community is actually its result: it is a community resting not upon an amalgamation of interests, feelings and wills, but on the contrary upon a politically constituted public space in which the plurality of political initiatives stand face to face. (Tassin 1992: 188)

Tassin’s further explication of this conception of a non-state-centred citizenship demonstrates its implications for our earlier discussion of a formal membership approach to citizenship. Arguing the case for the development of a European fellow-citizenship, he notes that the nation-state principle of citizenship is based on a deliberate conflation of the concepts of general will and national will or on an amalgamation of nationality and citizenship. The construction of a European political community, however, requires citizenship to be broken away from nationality.

The right of foreign residents . . . to vote in local elections . . . is an essential and obligatory step in the formation of this new community citizenship. It indicates that participation in the life of public institutions takes precedence over nationality; that, whatever the citizen’s cultural or national identity, his or her insertion in public political space is elective and not ‘native’; that it derives from a political choice and not from birth (natio) or an identity passed on by history. . . . (Tassin 1992: 189)

Within the imminent conception of democratic citizenship, therefore, political communities are the product of citizenship practice. The distinctive characteristics of such a conception vis-à-vis the state-centred conception of citizenship may be further clarified by recognizing the divergent relationships between political interests and political contexts implied by each. Within the state-centred conception of citizenship, it is assumed that preferences, interests and identities are given exogenously in advance of public discourse and deliberation, whether by explicit state-specification or implicit state prioritization among the many competing possibilities contained within civil society. The conception of democratic citizenship does not make or require such an assumption. It ‘appreciates, rather, that preferences, interests, and identities are as much outcomes as antecedents of public deliberation; indeed, they discursively constituted in and through it’ (Fraser 1992: 130 emphasis mine).7

The crucial contextual referent of democratic citizenship is thus common membership of a shared and imminent community. In that
specific sense, such democratic citizenship requires us to acknowledge the other members as being of equal social worth. Within this context, ‘citizenship is an explicitly political activity, in which people who are equals address collective and general concerns’ (Phillips 1991: 82 emphasis mine). The case for the ‘absolute primacy of politics’ in the elaboration of a conception of democratic citizenship has been forcefully argued by Anne Phillips (Phillips 1991: 82–7). Drawing upon the contributions of two US feminists, Phillips elaborates the case that a democratic citizenship is necessarily implicated with the political, public sphere. Thus, such citizenship requires – if you will – a movement, certainly symbolic and phenomenological, frequently literal, from the private world of family and work to an involvement in more general, public concerns. Equally, however, democratic citizenship does not require a false dissociation from the reality of group identities. Rather, political organization in a democratic citizenry occurs around such group identities but is only fully realized through interaction with others, in which interaction we are necessarily reminded of others’ claims. Thus diversity and contingency are inbuilt conditions of genuinely democratic citizenship.

there is no way to know in advance whether the outcome of a deliberative process will be the discovery of a common good in which conflicts of interest evaporate as merely apparent or the discovery that conflicts of interest are real and the common good is chimerical. (Fraser 1992: 130)

The combination of the structural and organizational dimensions of globalization and the political uncertainties and possibilities characteristic of an emerging post-national era is certain to accelerate theoretical debate and practical conflict around the meaning and implementation of citizenship. I believe that both the terms of such debate and the nature of such conflict will be constructively clarified by recognizing the importance and distinctiveness of the two conceptions of citizenship identified here.

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NOTES

1. Turner potentially recognized this particularly in his 1990 article but failed to draw the appropriate conclusions:
A more important point is that the constitutional settlement of 1688 created the British citizen as the British subject (emphasis mine), that is a legal personality whose indelible social rights are constituted by a monarch sitting in parliament. The notion of citizen-as-subject indicates clearly the relative extensive notion of social rights but also the passive character of British civil institutions. (Turner 1990: 207) [emphasis mine]
2. It should be noted that Marshall further compounds the confusions and complexities surrounding these conflicting conceptions of citizenship by additionally invoking national consciousness as an additional source of social integration, placing at the centre of the integrative processes of citizenship 'a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession.' (Marshall 1963).

3. For an interesting attempt to consider the normative justification for treating welfare provision and citizenship as intrinsically linked, see King and Waldron 1988. The authors do not consider, however, the degree to which different dimensions of citizenship may be in tension with one another.

4. In addition to Roche’s illuminating discussion and the references therein, see also Habermas 1987.

5. For a parallel discussion of the depoliticizing effects of the welfare-state institutionalization of economic rights, see Sheldon Wolin 1992: 245–46. Thus, ‘Economic rights, or, . . . “entitlements” do empower people. There is a gain in dignity, autonomy and well-being, and no democrat should believe otherwise. But this must not blind one to the anti-political consequences resulting from the preoccupation with economic rights’

6. Adrian Oldfield has elaborated an alternative conception of citizenship to that embodied in the liberal-individualist conception of citizenship as status, the civic-republican conception. Thoughtful and stimulating though his discussion is, however, he does not address the contextual dimension which is central to the present article. For a consideration of the limitations of a communitarian approach to political practice, which I believe the present argument avoids, see the discussion by Michael Walzer. Oldfield 1990b and Walzer 1992: 89–107.

7. My argument here is an adaption of Nancy Fraser’s argument which is directly concerned with developing a contrast between competing views of the public arena. See Fraser 1992.

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