Political Citizenship and Democratization: The Gender Paradox
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Political Citizenship and Democratization: The Gender Paradox

EILEEN MCDONAGH  Northeastern University

This research challenges models of democratization that claim liberal principles affirming the equality of rights-bearing individuals equably enhance the political inclusion of groups marginalized by race, class, or gender. While such explanations may suffice for race and class, this study’s quantitative cross-national analysis of women’s contemporary officeholding patterns establishes that gender presents a counter case whereby women’s political citizenship is enhanced, first, by government institutions that paradoxically affirm both individual equality and kinship group difference and, second, by state policies that paradoxically affirm both individual equality and women’s group difference. These findings challenge assumptions about the relationship between political citizenship and democratization, demonstrate how women’s political inclusion as voters and officeholders is strengthened not by either a “sameness” principle (asserting women’s equality to men as individuals) or a “difference” principle (asserting women’s group difference from men) but rather by the paradoxical combination of both, and provide new views for assessing multiculturalism prospects within democratic states.

Political citizenship—the right to vote and hold office—is a cornerstone of democratic theory and practice (Joshua Cohen 1996, 95).1 Models of democratization focus on two key features critical for expanding political citizenship: governmental institutions and state polices. At the most basic level, the institutional shift from inherited monarchical structures of political rule to electoral ones expands the base of those eligible to participate in formal political power. From the standpoint of state polices, important work by Karen Orren (1991) and Rogers Smith (1997) argues that an ideological shift from the use of ascriptive group characteristics—such as race, class, and gender—to liberal principles of individual equality as the basis of state policies expands the political citizenship of subordinate groups.

However, these assumptions about the relationship of political citizenship and democratization break down when we examine gender in the American case. At the founding of the American state, for example, the structural substitution of an electoral democracy for an inherited monarchy, while increasing the political citizenship of some men, decreased the political citizenship of all women. Some women lost the right to be queens, but by 1807, all states explicitly excluded women from the franchise, giving no women the right to vote. Kerber, 1980, 1998; Keyssar 2000, 54).2 Similarly, in the nineteenth century, institutionalization of cultural commitments to liberal principles of individual equality, while expanding the voting rights of white and African-American men, failed to secure the same franchise for any women—whatever their class or race.3 Women did not obtain a federal guarantee of the right to vote until 1920, with the addition of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

More significant than this protracted period of time, however, is the way reformers achieved this goal. They retained liberal, individual equality claims that women should have the right to vote in spite of their group difference from men but also asserted ascriptive arguments that women should have the right to vote

1 All forms of citizenship—social, civil, and political—are crucial for political inclusion; see Tilly et al. 1997. This study focuses on political citizenship because, although democracy comes in many forms, as Joshua Cohen (1996, 95) notes, it entails the “fundamental idea. . . that the authorization to exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of the members of a society who are governed by that power. . . more precisely. . . as made within and expressed through social and political institutions designed to acknowledge their collective authority.” For this reason, exclusion from political citizenship—that is, from participation in the institutional decision-making process—constitutes a serious violation of the very definition of democracy. For the way “exclusion” and “inclusion” have shaped American political history, see Sklair 1991.

2 Ironically, the very country from which the United States rebelled—England—had, at the time of the founding of the American state, one of the most important and respected leaders that had been seen until that time, a woman, Queen Elizabeth I. With the founding of the American state, however, came a new ideology, republican motherhood, which assigned to women the political task of contributing to the public sphere by raising children to be good citizens rather than being voters or political office holders themselves; see Kerber, 1980. Though a number of states in the nineteenth century granted women voting rights in local school elections, no state established equal voting rights until as late as 1909.

3 In the nineteenth century, reformers’ successful use of liberal principles asserting the inherent equality of rights-bearing individuals resulted, at the state level, in dropping property requirements for white men by the midnineteenth century and, at the national level, in adding the Fifteenth Amendment to the federal constitution in 1870, guaranteeing voting rights for African-American men. Reformers’ same use of liberal principles to challenge ascriptive ideologies and institutional structures blocking women’s entry into the electorate, however, failed to achieve the right to vote for women either at the state level in the early nineteenth century or at the federal level in the late nineteenth century. For a discussion of how illiberal ideologies and institutional structures excluded women from political citizenship in the United States, see Kerber 1980. For an exceptionally thorough and critical analysis of the expansion of suffrage in the United States, see Keyssar 2000.
precisely because of their group difference. State policies in the Progressive era, such as protective labor legislation for women and mothers' pensions, affirmed the value of women's maternal group difference, and reformers drew upon the premise of such policies to argue that women's maternal group difference from men would prove to be a benefit to society, were women to have the right to vote. Thus, suffrage advocates invented a new, cultural justification for political inclusion, a paradoxical combination of liberal principles affirming the value of women's individual equality and ascriptive principles affirming the value of women's maternal group difference.

From an historical institutionalist perspective, the American case reveals the paradoxical foundation of women's political citizenship. Monarchies based on kinship group difference are political structures that can provide women with greater access to political rule than electoral democracies based on individual equality, and ascriptive arguments about women's group difference, combined with liberal arguments about individual equality, are cultural norms that can foster state policies that expand women's political citizenship more than liberal ones alone. This raises the question: Do these examples point merely to idiosyncratic attributes of an “exceptional” American state or to new explanations about the relationship between democratization and political citizenship in general?4

To answer that question, this research tests the hypothesis that structural and cultural paradoxical combinations affirming both individual equality and the value of women's group difference, when connected to government institutions and state policies, are key features of a political system that enhance women's election to national office. The results dramatically revise models of democratization and citizenship, sameness-difference debates in feminist theory, and multiculturalism perspectives.

GENDER AND OFFICEHOLDING

Most nations today extend voting rights to women, but women's election to national office, the other major component of full political citizenship, varies widely.5 Forty-two nations elected a woman as their head of state or government in the twentieth century. In the United States, however, no woman has even been a strong contender as the presidential nominee of a major political party, much less been elected to the office. Similarly, in the 200-year period between 1776 and 1976, there were 1,715 men, compared to only 11 women who had served in the United States Senate; there were 9,591 men and only 97 women during that period who had served in the House of Rep-resentatives; and 507 men had served in presidential cabinets, compared to only 5 women (Cantor, Bernay, and Stoess 1992, 6). What is more, when we turn to the percentage of women elected to national legislatures in the year 2000, we see that the United States lags far behind other major, industrial democracies: In the United States women constitute only 13.3% of the House of Representatives, in contrast to Sweden, where women constitute 42.7% of the lower house of the national legislature; The Netherlands, at 36.0%; Germany, at 30.9%; South Africa, at 30.0%; Switzerland, at 23.0%; Australia, at 22.4%; Spain, at 21.6%; and Canada, at 20.6%.6 That so few women are elected to national office in the United States is surprising, given the stature of the United States as a world industrial and political power, its strong feminist organizations, and its historic commitment to democratic values asserting the equality of all individuals. Most scholars explain this anomaly as a result of the power of political structures for setting opportunity parameters that enhance or depress women's recruitment to national office. In particular, researchers, such as Pippa Norris, have found that parliamentary systems benefit women, as do electoral systems that allow for proportional representation and multiple parties (Bystydzienski 1992, 204; Carroll 1990, 9; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Norris 1997; Welch and Studlar 1990). Researchers have also found the percentage of women in political office to be related to demographic characteristics. Women's educational rates, participation in the labor force, and percentage in professional occupations and a nation's urbanization, wealth, and population size all have been found to correlate positively with women's electoral success as national officeholders (Matland 1998; Norris 1987, 1996; Oakes and Almquist 1993, 71–81; Putnam 1976; Rule 1981, 1987). In addition, a national commitment to democratic practices ensuring individual rights and equality also fosters women's officeholding opportunities.7 The more rights and procedural safeguards there are, the more likely that women will be elected to national legislatures (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, 239–54).

In the American case, however, we noted additional features that enhance women's political incorporation into the public sphere as voters. At the founding of the United States, government institutions based on kinship group difference, such as the English monarchy from which the Americans rebelled, had provided more access to political rule for women than the new, electoral ones, based on individual equality alone. Similarly, in the Progressive era, the value of women's group difference, as expressed in maternity state policies, combined with arguments asserting women's individual equality, spearheaded the successful campaign for woman suffrage.

4 The literature on American exceptionalism is vast, but see Lipset 1996.

5 Jury duty and military service are additional components of political citizenship, though outside the scope of this study. For an excellent discussion of women's jury duty in the American context, see Ritter 2000.

6 These figures are for the year 2000 or the closest election year prior to the year 2000.

7 For an excellent cross-national expansion of indices and discussion of gender in relation to a diverse set of nations, see Nelson and Chowdhury 1994.
American Political Science Review
Vol. 96, No. 3

The question is: Do these paradoxical combinations—government institutions of electoral rule based on individual equality combined with monarchies based on kinship group difference, on the one hand, and state policies based on individual equality combined with the value of women’s maternalist group difference, on the other—establish a new model explaining women’s cross-national officeholding patterns? If so, how does their explanatory power compare with attributes found by other scholars to be important? To answer these questions, this research examines the relative impact of political structure, political policies, demographic variables, and paradoxical combinations of structure and policies on contemporary national officeholding patterns for women in 190 nations.

VARIABLES AND DATA

Unit of Analysis: The Nation-State

The unit of analysis is the nation-state. Every nation that could be identified was included in this project, including nations that are members of the United Nations and those included in world almanacs and reference books, for a total of 190 nations.

National Legislative Officeholding

The dependent variable measuring women’s political citizenship is the percentage of a nation’s legislature that is composed of women in the year 2000 or the prior year closest to it. This measure is obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Much scholarship directs attention to women’s distinct leadership styles, issue concerns, or voting patterns as voters or officeholders. This dependent variable, however, focuses on women’s political recruitment: how women get into positions of political power in the first place—that is, descriptive representation, or what Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 94) term demographic representation. Although some question the significance of descriptive representation, others aver its value. As Virginia Sapiro (1998) argues, in a democracy it does matter whether women vote, an argument made similarly by Jane Mansbridge (1990, 1999, 2001). Political scientist Barbara Burrell points to the symbolic, normative, and policy benefits that accrue to enhancing women’s descriptive representation, arguing that women’s election to positions in government provides a positive symbolic identification for all women; enhances the normative, democratic belief that politics is equally open to all, regardless of one’s gender; and bolsters the passage of policies benefiting women, such as federal funding for child care programs, family and medical leave legislation, and abortion rights (Burrell 1994, 151–52). More recently, Nancy Burns, Kay Schlozman, and Sidney Verba found that women’s descriptive representation has a positive effect on women’s knowledge and interest in politics, important factors leading to the increased mobilization of women as voters and active political participants (Verba and Schlozman 2000).

Government Institutions

We measure the impact on women’s officeholding of two major types of political structures: government institutions based on individual equality and government institutions based on kinship group difference. The individual equality of voters is the basic premise of liberal, democratic electoral systems. In some political systems, such as the United States, the equality of each individual voter, “one person, one vote,” is even deemed a constitutional right (Gray v. Sanders 1963, Mahan v. Howell 1973). Thus, this project uses electoral systems as a measure of government institutions based on individual equality. Electoral systems, however, can be constructed in a variety of ways, and scholars have found this to be a significant influence on women’s officeholding patterns. Specifically, women are more likely to be elected to national legislatures in parliamentary rather than in presidential systems and in competitive electoral structures characterized by multimember districts and multiple parties (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 1994, 1997; Norris and Lovenduski 1995).13

8 Data for the lower house in a bicameral legislative system are used. The literature is vast, but see Carroll 1985; Cook, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Duerst-Lahti and Johnson 1990; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Norris 1986; Reingold 1996; Thomas 1994; and Thomas and Welch 1991.
9 The focus of this analysis is not whether women vote differently than men do or whether women have different leadership styles or agendas but, rather, how women acquire the political representation and officeholding patterns; see Martin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999.
10 In lieu of formal political rights or descriptive representation, some focus on the power of social movements, informal political associations, and organizations to achieve political goals. Political scientist Theda Skocpol (2000), for example, has shown powerfully how informal networks of disenfranchised women used their position as outsiders to craft maternalist policies successful for establishing innovative welfare policies, such as the passage in the Progressive era of mothers’ pension legislation at the state level. Mary Katzenstein (1998) makes a compelling case for studying informal modes of political power.
11 Although some question the significance of descriptive representation, others aver its value. As Virginia Sapiro (1998) argues, in a democracy it does matter whether women vote, an argument made similarly by Jane Mansbridge (1990, 1999, 2001). Political scientist Barbara Burrell points to the symbolic, normative, and policy benefits that accrue to enhancing women’s descriptive representation, arguing that women’s election to positions in government provides a positive symbolic identification for all women; enhances the normative, democratic belief that politics is equally open to all, regardless of one’s gender; and bolsters the passage of policies benefiting women, such as federal funding for child care programs, family and medical leave legislation, and abortion rights (Burrell 1994, 151–52). More recently, Nancy Burns, Kay Schlozman, and Sidney Verba found that women’s descriptive representation has a positive effect on women’s knowledge and interest in politics, important factors leading to the increased mobilization of women as voters and active political participants (Verba and Schlozman 2000).
12 Also, scholars argue that processes of democratization are thwarted as long as women lack “access to social and political institutions and offices” (Bayes, Hawkesworth, and Kelly 2001). The presumption that all individuals in a group share a common characteristic, trait, or behavior invites the criticism of essentialism. As a vast, well-established literature argues, however, the category “woman” is a heterogeneous one inclusive of individuals for whom there is no one common denominator; see, for example, Spivak 1999. Others, such as Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000, 3), argue that even from a biological perspective, “male” and “female” are most appropriately envisioned as lying on a continuum of definition rather than forming two, bipolar, exclusive categories. Historically and politically, however, it is important to understand the representation of group difference, however flawed it may be. Hence, what is significant about the maternalist arguments about women’s group difference is not the validity of the views, but the political innovation of socially constructing a subordinate group’s difference to be a positive, rather than a negative or neutral, justification for their political inclusion.
13 Others point to the instrumental values of presidential or parliamentary systems for consolidating democratic processes; see Vanhanen 1992, 9.
This research uses variables developed in previous research to measure these structural attributes and to assess their impact on women's legislative officeholding (Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Dummy variables are used, based on whether a nation has a parliamentary or presidential system; the “other” category is the omitted category. Multiparty electoral systems are coded 2 if voters choose among party lists in multimember districts that average five or more seats per district; 1 if party lists used by districts average fewer than five seats, or a combination of party list and candidate voting is used, or voters choose among individual candidates but in multimember districts; 0 if voters choose among individual candidates in single-member districts; and −1 if the electoral system contains no competition between any parties.

This project measures government institutions based on kinship group difference as a component of a nation's political structure by assessing whether governance includes a monarchical principle of rule. In past centuries, monarchical political rule based on an inherited kinship group difference, when open to women, was a significant point of direct access to political leadership. While ordinarily giving preference to men, most monarchical structures of the past nevertheless placed less emphasis upon gender as a qualification for officeholding than did electoral democracies, such as the United States. Those who “throw away” women monarchs on the grounds that their entry to political power on the basis of their elitist group difference renders them irrelevant to an investigation of women’s electoral officeholding in electoral democracies miss a crucial structural lesson: Monarchies based on kinship group difference, when open to women, constitute a structural component of the state that can increase rather than decrease women's formal political power in the public sphere of governance, however symbolic that governance might be.

As Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) note, examples of gender-integrated politics provide a crucial psychological mechanism for women's knowledge and interest in politics, which in turn affects their participation in politics. In this respect, monarchies open to women are government institutions that provide an example of political rule as not only a “man's game,” but also a “woman's game” (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Thus, although we can eschew the association of monarchies with castelike systems of feudal hierarchies, we also might do well to consider how contemporary monarchies open to women provide a “gender-integrated” example of political rule that could enhance women's acquisition of democratic political citizenship, including their election to national office. To test this hypothesis, this research measures whether a designated monarchical kinship group is a component of the state's political structure, where its power can range from all but absolute to that which is primarily symbolic. Monarchies constitute two dummy variables, one indicating a monarchy open to women as well as men and the other indicating a monarchy open only to men.

State Policies

This project accepts the definition of political culture as the basic political attitudes, belief systems, or ideological perspectives of a nation (Diamond 1999; Marx 2002). Although political culture is difficult to measure and often neglected, political scientist Larry Diamond contends that it is “a central factor in the consolidation of democracy” (Diamond 1992, 1999, 62–192; Inglehart 1997, 161–67). This project assesses a nation's cultural affirmation of individual equality and ascriptive group difference in general and women's maternal group difference in particular by analyzing state policies. The cultural affirmation of individual equality is measured by rating scales ranking nation's on the degree to which state policies guarantee democratic rights to individuals “in spite of” their ascriptive group differences by adhering to human rights policies, due process, and basic liberty guarantees, such as the right to a fair trial, freedom from torture or cruel forms of punishment, and freedom of the press, speech, association, and religion. The U.S. government regularly provides updates on the level of civil rights and political rights operating within nations, as do human rights research organizations (Freedom House 1997). This project makes use of published rating scales, which rank nations from 1 to 7, where 1 is low commitment to individual rights and 7 is high (Freedom House 1997).

This project measures the cultural affirmation of group difference in general and women's maternal group difference in particular by assessing whether a nation constitutionalizes state policies providing protections, privileges, or protections to individuals “because of” their group difference. In so doing, this project draws upon the growing literature in public law claiming that constitutions define the central purposes and values of a polity as well as its institutional framework (Belz 1972, 640; Greenberg et al. 1993). As such, constitutions become a valuable source of information not only about the way nations structure their political institutions, but also about their political culture, that is, the basic ideological principles affirmed by a political system. Constitutions are relatively more permanent than legislation and court decisions (Jackson and Tushnet 1999). Thus, the inclusions of provisions in constitutions, or the laws of the land that serve in lieu of a constitution, represent more enduring values of a political system than passage of legislation or court decisions alone. In the United Kingdom, for example, the laws that serve in lieu of a written constitution provide for a monarchy. That is not to say, of course,

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14 Since the 1970s, Congress has linked the provision of foreign aid to human rights practices, which “implies that human rights can be measured, at least at the ordinal level, so that the human rights practices of other nations can be ranked from best to worst” (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540). Human Rights Reports, released by the United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are used to determine the level of democratic practice where there is missing information.

15 For the power of language in the context of law, see Feldman 2000; for the importance of constitutional text, see Tribe and Dorf 1991.
that there is no cultural discussion or political debate about the British monarchy but, rather, to say that its “constitutional acceptance” at the national level reflects a significant feature of British political culture and values.

This project’s documentation of the presence of a constitutional affirmation of benefits to individuals because of their group differences, not in spite of them, complements and supplements the massive cross-national analysis of constitutional texts launched by the University of Wuerzburg’s International Constitutional Law (ICL) Project, begun in 1996. The ICL Project is in the process of classifying all national constitutions on the basis of a common typology so that it is possible to compare the presence or absence of specific, textual provisions across constitutions worldwide. The ICL categories include type of government, support for minority rights, affirmative action protections, welfare benefits, and secularism. This project draws upon and expands those categories to include constitutional provisions affirming support to individuals because of their group difference in general and women’s maternal group difference in particular.

Welfare Group Difference. This project adopts the definition of women’s maternal group difference to be women’s disproportional association with “care-work” compared to men (Orloff 1993, 303–28). As Alva Myrdal (1941, 339-41) noted, prior to the advent of state social security policies, people were protected from disabilities resulting from illness, old age, and other affirmities by the care-work provided in the context of the family as an institution. Women within the family typically are identified as the primary performers of care-work in their roles as wives and mothers. Thus, in terms of political culture, women’s maternal group difference from men is defined in terms of care-work (Orloff 1993). However, as Myrdal (1941, 340) observes, in the development of a welfare state, the “protective tasks which earlier had been provided for within the family are … transferred to more expert public bodies … [to] a whole series of institutions … [forming] an interlocking system of social assistance.” Typically, it is women who perform more care-work in the public provision of social assistance as paid professionals who disproportionately choose service occupations, such as social workers, primary school, nurses, or unpaid social service volunteers. Hence, women’s disproportionate engagement in care-work—whether performed within or outside the home—culturally defines care-work, or welfare provision, to be “women’s work.”

All nations regulate marriage and family relations as a primary site for the provision of welfare. Many nations go further by legislating state policies for the provision of welfare, that is, care-work, as performed within or outside the home. Some go even further and constitutionalize care-work by making welfare provision an affirmative duty of the state. This project adopts the latter as a measure of a political system’s cultural affirmation of the value of care-work by coding whether a nation constitutionally mandates state benefits, protections, or privileges to individuals “because of” their need for care-work as administered either within or outside the home. Thus, the variable, welfare group difference, includes the constitutionalization of care-work benefits to the ill, the elderly, the disabled, and designated family members, such as mothers, children, and fathers. Nations that do so are coded 1; nations that do not are coded 0.

Additional Group Differences. Cultural group difference is measured as constitutionalized state protections, benefits, or privileges provided to individuals because of their cultural, racial, religious, ethnic, or linguistic group differences. This draws upon the work of scholars who define cultural minority groups in terms of aspiritive rather than behavioral characteristics (Fottrell and Bowring 1999, 45–51). Nations that constitutionally affirm at least one cultural group difference are given a score of 1; nations that do not are coded 0. Working-class group difference is measured as constitutionalized state protections, benefits, or privileges provided to individuals because of their status as workers; nations that do so are coded 1, and nations that do not are coded 0. Foreign group difference is measured as constitutionalized state protections, benefits, or privileges provided to individuals because of their status as foreigners within the political system; nations that do so are coded 1, and nations that do not are coded 0.

Demographic Variables

Scholars have found that demographic variables, such as women’s entry into the paid labor force, are positively related to women’s election to national office. This project examines the impact of demographic variables on women’s officeholding patterns by including the percentage of women in the paid labor force, in professional occupations, and in secondary education as well as the population of the nation, its gross domestic product (GDP), and its percentage urbanization.

Paradoxical Combinations: Individual Equality and Group Difference

From the standpoint of government institutions, attention is rarely focused on monarchical rule based on kinship group difference in relation to processes of...
much less the interaction effects combining monarchical structures and electoral political rule based on individual equality. This project, however, tests the hypothesis that political systems that paradoxically affirm the structural value of individual equality (electoral systems of political rule) and kinship group difference (monarchical systems of political rule) are ones that are more likely to have high percentages of women in their national legislatures. To measure the impact of these paradoxical structural combinations, two features of an electoral democracy—parliamentary system and electoral competition system—are each multiplied by the presence or absence of a monarchy open to women and by the presence or absence of a monarchy open only to men, producing four dummy interaction terms.

Similarly, from the standpoint of state policies, the unidimensional, linear assumption that traditionalism and liberalism are antithetical poles on a policy continuum underlies most assessments of how the “dominant norms and values” in a country influence women’s recruitment to political office (Norris 1997, 217). Thus, measurements are directed toward establishing whether a nation scores high on liberal policies supporting women’s equality or scores high on traditionalism, as measured, for example, by its degree of Catholicism (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 1997, 217). Such a premise, however, fails to consider the additional possibility that rather than either liberal or traditional values, it is the combination of both that facilitates women’s political citizenship. At the level of social movement activism, however, it was exactly such a combination in the early twentieth century that facilitated American women’s acquisition of the right to vote, a major component of political citizenship. As historian Nancy Cott (1987, 29) notes, by the 1910s the efforts of male and female reformers to establish new government policies for the “regulation of housing, factory conditions, and community health and safety” facilitated suffragists’ arguments that “modern conditions bridged the chasm between the realm of politics and woman’s conventional realm of the home.”

However, even mainstream reformers, often portrayed as “social feminists” who “believed in woman’s traditional role in society, that of mother and nurture” (Lunardini 1986, 150), nevertheless also conducted an equally vigorous development of individual rights arguments for woman suffrage (Kraditor 1965).

Thus, this research hypothesizes that the strongest cultural influence on women’s officeholding is the paradoxical combination of the value of individual equality and the value of women’s group difference. Thus, this study assesses the independent effects of individual equality and group difference upon women’s officeholding patterns and, more importantly, their interaction effects, that is, the paradoxical combination of both. Nations scoring above four on the seven-point democratic rights scale are scored as affirming individual equality. This dummy variable is then multiplied by the welfare, cultural, working class, and foreign group difference dummy variables to produce four dummy variables measuring the interaction effects of the affirmation of individual equality and the affirmation of welfare, cultural, working class, and foreign group difference, respectively.

**RESEARCH FINDINGS**

**Independent Effects Models: Institutions, Policies, and Demography**

Let us first consider the independent effects of structural (government institutions), cultural (state policies), and demographic characteristics of nations as variables explaining women’s cross-national officeholding patterns, as reported in Table 1. From the standpoint of structural variables defined in terms of government institutions, most electoral variables based on a premise of individual equality are statistically significant. As expected, party competition does have a positive impact upon women’s political recruitment; the positive regression coefficient indicates that more competitive electoral structures boost women’s percentage in the national legislature by more than 3% (3.115). Surprisingly, however, when all nations in the world are included, presidential systems have a greater positive impact on women’s election to national legislatures than do parliamentary systems, where the former increase women’s election to office by 3% (3.066) and the latter are statistically insignificant.

Most surprisingly of all, perhaps, is that monarchies based on kinship group difference (when open to women) are government institutions that enhance women’s election to national legislatures the most, increasing the percentage by nearly 7% (6.822), as indicated by the positive regression coefficient. The

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18 For an excellent discussion of the relevance of monarchical structures to processes of democratization, see Anderson 1991.

19 Consequently, in the Progressive era reformers contended that women should have “the right to vote in order to ensure domestic welfare . . . [which was] part of women’s duties as wives, mothers, and community members” (Cott 1987, 29). Of course, group characterizations of women included negative depictions intended to block their right to vote, similar to the way in which negative group characterizations of men marginalized by race and class were asserted to thwart the expansion of suffrage to include them. As a representative from Florida put it, “I am opposed to woman suffrage . . . [because] the place for the women is at home. That is where they belong . . . The real mothers—I do not mean all of them, but the great majority of them—do not want it [woman suffrage]” (Congressional Record 1919, 89).

20 Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), for example, in 27 speeches and articles dating from 1900 to 1920, cited “individual equality” arguments twice as often as “difference” arguments, 64 times compared to 32 times, respectively. As she stated, “Woman suffrage rests exactly upon the same basis as man suffrage. Women ask for it because it is the right of a citizen of a Republic to express a ballot’s share in the making of the law the citizen is expected to obey” (Catt 1903, 5). These documents constitute the collection of Catt’s papers housed at the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University.
TABLE 1. Percentage of Women in National Legislature Explained by Government Institutions, State Policies, and Demographic Characteristics, 2000

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<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tr>
<td>Government Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral sys.**</td>
<td>3.115 (0.324)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliamentary sys.</td>
<td>1.225 (0.070)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presidential sys.**</td>
<td>3.066 (0.144)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group difference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)***</td>
<td>6.822 (0.273)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>-3.425 (-0.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual equality</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.499 (0.389)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic rights***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group differencea</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.695 (0.221)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare grp. diff.**</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.911 (0.109)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural grp. diff.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.861 (-0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class grp. diff.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.173 (0.062)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign group diff.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor: women**</td>
<td>0.224 (0.251)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: women</td>
<td>-0.002 (-0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions: women*</td>
<td>0.133 (0.194)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.003 (0.084)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.003 (0.089)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP**</td>
<td>0.005 (0.293)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.000 (-0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.448***</td>
<td>-0.868</td>
<td>-3.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients in parentheses. *p=0.1. **p=0.05. ***p=0.001.

aConstitutionalized state policies providing protections, benefits, privileges to individuals "because of" designated group difference.

presence of a male monarchy, however, has a negative impact on women's election to national office, decreasing the percentage by −3.425 at a statistical significance level that barely falls short of .100.

When we turn to state policies, we find only two statistically significant variables: democratic policies based on a premise of individual equality and constitutionalized care-work policies based on welfare group difference. Of the two, the latter is much stronger. Affirmation of democratic policies based on individual equality increases women's election to national legislatures by about 1.5% (1.499), but the nations that constitutionalize the provision of state care-work to those in need of welfare assistance elect more than 4.5% more women to their national legislatures (4.695). Equally interesting, however, is the failure of constitutionalized provisions targeted at cultural, working-class, or foreign groups to boost women's election to national office. None of these has a statistically significant influence on women's election to national office. Thus, we find that it is not just the integration of any group difference into the constitutional definition of state action that positively increases women's election to national legislatures but, rather, the integration of welfare group difference that enhances women's officeholding percentages in national legislatures.

When we turn to demographic variables, we find three that have a positive influence on women's national officeholding patterns: the percentage of the labor force that is women, the percentage of women in the professions, and the nation's gross domestic product. Unexpectedly, urbanization and population size have no statistically significant impact.

Paradoxical Combinations: Individual Equality and Group Difference

The American political system is an example of a nation that structurally affirms the principle of individual equality in its electoral system but not group difference, particularly not kinship group difference as a basis for political rule, as in a monarchical system. Founders of the American state, for example, were proud to distance themselves from any association with what were viewed as necessarily tyrannical monarchies. Constitutionally, this aversion to inherited principles of rule based on kinship group difference finds expression in Article 1, Section 9, which states that "no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; And no person holding any Office of Profit or Trust... shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any... Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, [or] Prince." Hence, American political structures are constitutionally cut off from any connection with monarchical rule.

The same is not true, however, of many other political systems. In terms of political structure, as measured by government institutions, nearly a quarter of the world's nations (22.11%) feature some form of monarchical
rule, and of these monarchies, nearly 80% (78.57) paradoxically combine inherited rule based on kinship group difference with a democratic electoral system of rule based on the equality of individual voters. Scholars have found that competitive electoral systems enhance women’s election to national office, but monarchies as a political structure that might influence women’s political citizenship remain all but unexamined. If monarchies are insignificant, then we should find that a higher percentage of women elected in competitive electoral systems, whether or not those systems also have a monarchy open to women. On the other hand, if monarchies do have a positive impact on women’s election to national office, then we should find a higher percentage of women elected to national office in a political system that combines a competitive electoral system with a monarchy open to women. As Table 2 indicates, the latter proves correct. The mean percentage of women elected to national office for nations that have high electoral competition but no monarchy open to women is only 12.56, while the mean percentage for nations that have both soars to 28.06.\textsuperscript{21}

In terms of state policies, the American political system is an example of a nation that affirms the value of individual equality but remains light years away from constitutionally providing benefits, privileges, or protections to individuals “because of” their group difference. Although the Progressive era has been noted as the golden age of an American maternalist state (Skocpol 1991), it is important to remember that reformers’ success in establishing state policies for the provision of care-work was primarily focused on state legislatures, not the national Congress, and certainly not the federal constitution. In the early twentieth century, states passed mothers’ pensions legislation to protect the welfare of women and children, and the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state-level protective labor legislation for women in 1908 in \textit{Muller v. Oregon}. However, mothers’ pensions legislation was never seriously considered by Congress, nor did sweeping protective labor legislation for women get on the Congressional agenda. What is more, the Child Labor Amendment that Congress did pass was struck down by the Court as unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{22} Eventual passage of the Social Security Act in the New Deal Era did nationalize the provision of some welfare benefits,\textsuperscript{23} but Congressional support of even minimum care-work remains highly controversial to this day, as evidenced by the 10 years it took to pass the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which provides only for up to 12 weeks’ \textit{unpaid} leave to care for a child, ill family members, or one’s own health. It is safe to say, therefore, that although the American state does affirm individual rights, it is a long way away from constitutionalizing state policies based on group difference, including women’s care-work group difference, to be an affirmative duty of the state.\textsuperscript{24}

Many other nations, however, do constitutionalize state provision of care-work. For example, Sweden constitutionally defines the “fundamental aims of public activity [the state]” to be “economic and cultural . . .[and that] it shall be incumbent upon the public administration to secure the right to . . . housing and education, and to promote social care and social security and a good living environment.”\textsuperscript{25} In the world at large, 78.4% of the nations constitutionally specify that it is an affirmative duty of the state to provide welfare benefits, that is, care-work, to individuals because of

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Government Institutions: Combinations of Group Difference and Individual Equality by Percentage of Women in National Legislatures, 2000}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
\multicolumn{4}{c}{Group Difference: Kinship Group Difference}\tabularnewline
& No Kinship Grp. Diff. & Yes Kinship Grp. Diff. & Total	abularnewline
& (No Monarchy Open to Women) & (Yes Monarchy Open to Women) & & \\
\hline
Low electoral competition\textsuperscript{a} & 7.65 (107)\textsuperscript{b} & 12.75 (56) & 8.24 (127) & \\
High electoral competition & 11.39 (20) & 28.06 (7) & 14.45 (63) & \\
Total & 9.41 (163) & 15.71 (27) & 10.30 (190) & \\
\hline
\textsuperscript{a}Low electoral competition is multimember districts averaging fewer than five seats; high electoral competition is five seats or more. \\
\textsuperscript{b}Number of cases in parenthesis. \\
\textit{p} = 0.05.
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{21}The mean differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

\textsuperscript{22}See \textit{Hammer v. Dagenhart} 1918. Congress responded by passing the Child Labor Tax Law in 1919, levying a prohibitive tax of 10% on products manufactured in whole or in part by children, but the Court struck this down in \textit{Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company} 1922, declaring that Congress could not use its "taxing power to accomplish an unconstitutional regulation." See Link and Catton 1980, 198, 323.

\textsuperscript{23}When welfare legislation was finally nationalized by the Social Security Act in the New Deal era, it nevertheless failed to address women’s welfare needs adequately. See Mettler 1998.

\textsuperscript{24}What is more, many criticize Progressive-era maternalist policies for encoding in law restrictive roles and norms for women, which in effect limited, rather than expanded, women’s full incorporation into the American state. See Stone 1994. From the standpoint of this project, however, although the FMLA uses gender-neutral terms in contrast to the maternalist-specific language of women’s protective labor legislation and mothers’ pensions in the early twentieth century, what is similar about Progressive-era maternalist policies and the FMLA is the use of public authority and resources to affirm the provision of care-work to others at the level of state and national legislatures but not the federal Constitution. For an insightful path dependence model analyzing the continuing impact of historical legacies on contemporary institutions and policies, see Pierson 2001.

\textsuperscript{25}Swedish Constitution, 1975, Art. 2, Sec. 2.
their group identity as fathers, mothers, parents, children, the ill, the elderly, or the disabled. Of these nations, over half (53.02%) also paradoxically combine the constitutionalization of care-work, women’s group difference, with an affirmation of the value of democratic rights based on individual equality. Even more significant, however, is that it is these that have the highest percentage of women in their national legislatures. As indicated in Table 3, the mean percentage of women elected to national office in political systems that constitutionalize state welfare provisions but not democratic rights of individual equality is 7.94; the mean for nations that only affirm democratic rights of individual equality and do not constitutionalize state welfare provisions is only 7.29%; however, the mean for states that paradoxically affirm both rises to 14.92%.26

The Full Model: Independent and Interaction Effects

It is when we turn to an assessment not only of the independent effects of government institutions and state policies, but also of their interaction effects, that we see the power of paradoxical combinations for enhancing women’s election to national legislatures, as reported in Table 4. In this saturated full model containing both independent and interaction terms, the independent effects of all of the government institution variables and all of the state policy variables disappear; thus, there are no independent influences on women’s election to national legislatures from type of electoral system or governmental system (parliament or presidency) or from whether a nation has a monarchy open to women (kinship group difference) are expected to have national legislatures composed of 4.037% more women, as indicated in Table 4. Significantly, however, the same boost is not there for combinations of individual equality with constitutional benefits, protections, or privileges “because of” other group differences, such as cultural, worker, or foreign group differences. Thus, in the full model, the only group difference that has a positive impact on women’s election to national office is the constitutionalization of women’s maternalist group difference, care-work, to be a component of state action, and, then, only when paradoxically combined with affirmation of individual equality as measured by democratic practice.

Demographically, in the full model the percentage of the labor force composed of women and a nation’s GDP remain positive and statistically significant. This finding supports the work of others who argue that, along with welfare provisions, the most powerful catalyst for women’s economic and political emancipation is access to the paid labor force (Orloff 1993, 318–22).

Subsets. We see further confirmation of these results by applying the full model to subsets of nations used by researchers in other studies (Lijphart 1999; Vanhanen 1997), as reported in Table 5. The full model is applied to Subset I, which is composed of 172 nations and, thus, is large and similar to the 190 nations used in this research (Vanhanen 1997). On the other hand, Subset II is composed of only 36 nations, all of which are democracies (Lijphart 1999), thereby making for a subset very different in composition from the set of 190 nations used in this research. In addition, Subset II contains two added variables: Lijphart’s (1999, 312)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Difference: Constitutionalized Welfare Provision*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low democratic rightsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High democratic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aLow individual equality is a score of less than 5 on a seven-point scale measuring democratic rights; high individual equality is a score of 5 or more.

*bNumber of cases in parentheses.

*p = 0.05. Constitutional provisions for state assistance to families, The ill, The elderly, or the disabled.

26 The mean differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

monarchical principles of rule open to women (kinship group difference) are expected to have national legislatures composed of 4.037% more women, as indicated in Table 4. Significantly, however, the same boost is not there for combinations of individual equality with constitutional benefits, protections, or privileges “because of” other group differences, such as cultural, worker, or foreign group differences. Thus, in the full model, the only group difference that has a positive impact on women’s election to national office is the constitutionalization of women’s maternalist group difference, care-work, to be a component of state action, and, then, only when paradoxically combined with affirmation of individual equality as measured by democratic practice.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (Percentage Women in National Legislature)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>1.236 (0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td>0.954 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential system</td>
<td>2.716 (0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)</td>
<td>-0.110 (-0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>-3.581 (-0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic rights</td>
<td>-0.333 (-0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare grp. diff.</td>
<td>1.745 (0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural grp. diff.</td>
<td>-0.110 (-0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class grp. diff.</td>
<td>0.695 (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign grp. diff.</td>
<td>1.539 (0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional combinations: indiv. eq. * grp. diff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)</td>
<td>4.037 (0.176)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>0.880 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)</td>
<td>3.247 (0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. sys. * Kinship grp diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>-0.734 (-0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * welfare grp. diff.</td>
<td>6.728 (0.369)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * cultural grp. diff.</td>
<td>-0.319 (-0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * working class grp. diff.</td>
<td>-3.732 (-0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * foreign grp. diff.</td>
<td>-1.369 (-0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demography</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor: women</td>
<td>0.190 (0.213)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: women</td>
<td>0.006 (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions: women</td>
<td>0.003 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.001 (0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.004 (0.239)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.001 (-0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-3.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>190 nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standardized coefficients in parentheses. **\( p < 0.05 \).

The patterns found in this study are validated by both the similar Subset I and the dissimilar Subset II. In both the dissimilar and the similar subsets, the paradoxical combinations of individual equality and group difference remain positive influences on women's election to national legislature, and in both subsets, the strongest impact on women's election to national office of any variable is the state policy combination of democratic rights and constitutionalized state welfare provision. In addition, both subsets show the positive impact of combining government institutions based on individual equality and group difference in the government institutions of the state: a competitive electoral system and a monarchy open to women in the case of Subset I and a parliamentary system and a monarchy open to women in the case of Subset II.

The Double Paradox: Government Institutions and State Policies

We identified two axes of the state that are critical for women's political citizenship: political structure defining government institutions and cultural norms constitutionalized as state policies. We found that nations that paradoxically combine individual equality and group difference on either axis enhance the election of women to national office. Nations that combine individual equality and group difference on both axes, however, in effect, incorporate into the state a double paradox, as it were, and as such, do even better, as indicated in Figure 1. Considering only those nations that have high electoral competition and high democratic practice, we see in Figure 1 that those combining individual equality and group difference on both government institutions and the state policies axes have the highest mean executive-parties dimension and his federal-unitary dimension.

The patterns found in this study are validated by both the similar Subset I and the dissimilar Subset II. In both the dissimilar and the similar subsets, the paradoxical combinations of individual equality and group difference remain positive influences on women's election to national legislature, and in both subsets, the strongest impact on women's election to national office of any variable is the state policy combination of democratic rights and constitutionalized state welfare provision. In addition, both subsets show the positive impact of combining government institutions based on individual equality and group difference in the government institutions of the state: a competitive electoral system and a monarchy open to women in the case of Subset I and a parliamentary system and a monarchy open to women in the case of Subset II.
### TABLE 5. Full Model, Subsets, Explaining Percentage Women Elected to National Legislature, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Subset I</th>
<th>Subset II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>173(^p) Nations (Vanhanen 1997)</td>
<td>36 Democracies (Lijphart 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government institutions: indiv. equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>1.515 (0.157)*</td>
<td>5.131 (0.433)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td>0.680 (0.038)</td>
<td>9.154 (0.358)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential system</td>
<td>2.670 (0.117)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)</td>
<td>-0.411 (-0.016)</td>
<td>-9.119 (-0.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>-3.772 (-0.120)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State policies: indiv. equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic rights</td>
<td>-0.116 (-0.030)</td>
<td>17.668 (2.396)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare grp. diff.</td>
<td>1.417 (0.063)</td>
<td>46.915 (1.909)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural grp. diff.</td>
<td>0.406 (0.023)</td>
<td>91.469 (1.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class grp. diff.</td>
<td>0.434 (0.021)</td>
<td>-12.815 (-0.568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign grp. diff.</td>
<td>1.620 (0.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)</td>
<td>4.782 (0.212)**</td>
<td>3.264 (0.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>0.600 (0.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)</td>
<td>3.295 (0.123)</td>
<td>14.249 (0.653)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)</td>
<td>-0.542 (-0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * welfare grp. diff.</td>
<td>5.878 (0.324)**</td>
<td>56.156 (2.431)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * cultural grp. diff.</td>
<td>0.008 (0.004)</td>
<td>-90.405 (-1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * working-class grp. diff.</td>
<td>-4.068 (-0.222)**</td>
<td>7.656 (0.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. rights * foreign group diff.</td>
<td>-1.147 (-0.048)</td>
<td>7.321 (0.286)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor: women</td>
<td>0.170 (0.193)**</td>
<td>1.241 (0.827)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: women</td>
<td>0.110 (0.126)</td>
<td>-0.244 (-0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions: women</td>
<td>-0.0002 (.000)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.008 (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.030 (-0.413)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-0.003 (-0.008)</td>
<td>0.186 (0.36)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.037 (0.22)**</td>
<td>-0.204 (-0.72)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.001 (-0.005)</td>
<td>0.276 (0.973)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive–parties dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.578 (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal–unitary dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.924 (0.36)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.582</td>
<td>-158.445**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Unstandardized coefficients; standardized coefficients in parentheses. *\(p=0.1\). **\(p=0.05\). ***\(p=0.001\).

\(^p\)Variance insufficient for statistical analysis; \(^p\)Division of Czechoslovakia = 173 nations.

### FIGURE 1. Institutional and Policy Axes of the State: Mean Percentage Women Elected to National Office, 2000, Controlling for High Electoral Competition and High Democratic Practice

**Government Institutions:**
- Yes, Kinship Group Difference
  - (Monarchy open to women)

**State Policies:**
- No Constitutionalized Welfare Provision
  - 24.05
- Yes Constitutionalized Welfare Provision
  - 28.06

**Government Institutions:**
- No, Kinship Group Difference
  - (No Monarchy open to women)
percentage of women elected to their national legislatures, 28.06%.

**CONCLUSION: GENDER AND POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP**

**The Gender Paradox**

This project extends the analysis of women's political citizenship in relation to two major dimensions of state-building: What the state "is" in terms of its government institutions and what the state "does" in terms of its constitutionalized policies. First, from the standpoint of what the state "is," this research establishes that not only modern, government institutions based on a principle of individual equality benefit women's election to national office, but also traditional ones, such as monarchical systems of rule based on kinship group difference. Far from a meaningless symbolic attribute of a state, therefore, traditional monarchies to this day retain significant power for defining nationality and for enhancing political stability, as is evident in contemporary discussions of what are considered the more forward-looking monarchies in the Middle East, such as Morocco and Jordan (Jehl 1999, A3).

However, for monarchies to benefit women's political citizenship, they must be combined with the affirmation of individual equality and women must be eligible to rule as sovereign. The latter condition sheds light on Japan, one of the world's leading economic powers, centuries past, since 1889, Japan's monarchy has been open only to men. After Crown Princess Masako gave birth to a baby girl, however, Prime Minister Koizum and 83% of the Japanese people support amending the Japanese Constitution to allow a woman to succeed to the imperial throne (Hernandez 2001, A3), a policy this study found to enhance women's access to electoral office. In the words of Junko Kamikita, a homemaker, "It would be good to have a woman as the symbol of our state, just like Queen Elizabeth or Prime Minister Thatcher. If we have a female symbol of state, the Japanese people's notions [about women in politics] would change" (French 2001, A3)27.

Second, from the standpoint of what the state "does" this research supports previous scholarship establishing that state policies have an important impact on women and that welfare state policies, in particular, are "women-friendly." However, it goes beyond such findings by showing that it is not just the constitutionalization of women's group difference, care-work, in the form of state policies providing welfare to those in need, that boosts women's election to national office but, rather, the paradoxical combination of constitutionalized welfare policies and democratic state policies affirming individual equality. The significance of the latter is hidden in many studies that focus on western European nations where the presence of democratic rights affirming individual equality is a virtual constant, making it appear that it is the variation in the provision of state welfare benefits alone that makes a state women-friendly. This research alters that view by showing that affirmation of principles of individual equality also are women-friendly, when paradoxically combined with the constitutionalized affirmation of the value of women's group difference, that is, care-work.

**Models of Democratization: Paradoxical Combinations**

Our identification of the gender paradox as the basis of women's political citizenship dramatically revises models of democratization and citizenship. It has been usual to ignore monarchies as political structures relevant to democratization processes and to view ascriptive principles of group difference as antithetical, if not destructive, of liberal principles of individual equality for promoting the political inclusion of subordinate groups. Some understand political citizenship, therefore, as advancing only when the latter prevail over the former. As Rogers Smith (1997, 36–37) has argued, the Enlightenment idea of the equality of all rights-bearing individuals, when dominant, fosters an institutional commitment to greater political equality, which in turn generates public policies securing the political inclusivity of marginal groups. Liberal ideology, therefore, serves as the basis for evaluating "legal systems that automatically subordinate women, blacks, Native Americans, homosexuals, and non-Christians... [as] presumptively invalid"—a crucial mechanism for establishing alternative institutional structures and public policies for achieving greater political inclusivity." Thus, as Smith contends, in the context of the multiple traditions characterizing the American state, the dominant pattern for achieving the political inclusion of marginal groups is for the liberal tradition based on individual rights and equality to compete with and triumph over an American tradition based on ascriptive principles stressing group difference.28

Karen Orren (1991, 40, 95), in her pathbreaking analysis of labor in the United States, *Belated Feudalism*, also associates liberalism with the "art of demolition," that is, as an instrument for destroying feudal principles of obedience based on group difference so

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28 Rogers Smith notes that woman suffrage is a counterexample to a model positing the power of liberal principles to overcome political exclusion based on ascriptive characteristics. He recognizes "that women's voting rights were won through a combination of liberal, republican, and ascriptive arguments, with the latter more prominent in the era of final success." However, Smith also acknowledges that "he treats these combinations as ineradicably problematic," in contrast to the analysis here suggesting "that in many societies, these apparently paradoxical combinations work quite harmoniously" (personal correspondence, 2002).
as to replace them with liberal principles based on the concept of "voluntary and intentional" individuals.29

In her view, economic rights expand only when liberal precepts based on individual equality compete with and prevail over ascriptive ones based on master-servant group differences. Similarly, in her new and challenging framework for evaluating constitutional and political development, she argues that we must direct attention to the contest between "officers' rights" and "citizen rights." Officers' rights are a holdover from a feudal organization of political society honoring deference, as based on group difference hierarchies, in contrast to the location of rights in the citizenry at large. Democratic practices expand, not by combining the two, but only when the latter prevail over the former (Orren 2000).

Yet this study found that we must also view ascriptive and liberal principles in combination, not only in competition, with one another,30 such that the shift from ascriptive principles based on group difference to liberal principles based on individual equality need not be an "all or nothing" process. The expansion of woman suffrage in the United States, for example, was enhanced when reformers paradoxically combined liberal arguments based on individual equality with ascriptive arguments based on the value of women's maternal group difference. Far from an historical curiosity or an example of American exceptionalism, however, we also found that this paradoxical combination enhanced the election of women to national office in contemporary, cross-national contexts. In particular, it was not just any group difference that enhanced women's election to national office but, rather, a group difference that was specifically identified with welfare, or care-work, that is, with maternalism or "women's work. When combined with the affirmation of individual equality, the constitutionalization of welfare provisions was found to be the most positive influence on women's election to national office.

Similarly, although it is usual to write off monarchical structures as politically irrelevant to processes of democratization (Anderson 1991), this study found that monarchies open to women paradoxically combined with competitive electoral and parliamentary systems have a greater positive influence on women's election to national legislatures than do such electoral structures as politically irrelevant to processes of de-

Gender: From Nation to State

Scholars have long emphasized two crucial components of democratic consolidation: national unity of the people and stability of political institutions (Huntington 1968; Rustow 1999), that is, the nation and the state, respectively. It has been noted how gender figures prominently in the construction of the nation, that is, the way in which a political community is "imagined" (Anderson 1983) or "invented" (McClintock 1991). As scholars argue, women's group difference from men can be used as the very emblem of national identity. The veiling of women in Muslim communities, for example, can be viewed, rather than as a return to tradition, instead as a cultural symbol specifically constructed in contemporary times to signify national independence from the West (Ahmed 1992; Badran 1994). Similarly, historian Nancy Cott (2000) cogently argues that public policies regulating marriage as the institutional site of family and sexual relations provided the United States with a mechanism for developing and maintaining a cohesive national identity.

This study found, however, that what is crucial for women's political citizenship is the incorporation of gender difference into the construction of the state. Gender difference is defined by women's disproportionate association with biological and social reproductive labor. Biological reproductive labor refers to the generation of people, including kinship groups, by means of pregnancy and birth. This is a type of reproductive labor engaged in only by women; hence, women's disproportional association with it. Social reproductive labor is the nurturing and care of people once they are born.31 Not all women do more social reproductive work than all men, of course, but as a group, empirically, women do more, both within the family and in the paid labor force as social workers, nurses, elementary school teachers, and service volunteers; hence, women's disproportional association with nurturing and care.

Political scientist Jacqueline Stevens (1999) powerfully analyzes the way in which the state construct kinship rules, such as marriage regulations, to control membership in a political society. She thus focuses needed attention on the political relevance of biological reproductive labor in relation to the state. However,

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29 Orren analyzes how liberal principles based on individual equality are institutionally located in legislatures that draft positive law and how feudal principles based on hierarchical group difference are institutionally maintained by a judicial system drawing upon common law precepts as its reference for decision-making.

30 As Ira Katznelson (1999, 570) notes, there is a particular affinity between "illiberal impulses" stressing inherently unequal group differences and republicanism because republicanism is "characterized by a strong elective affinity for clear and deep principles of inclusion and thus of exclusion." Also, many fault liberalism for its incapacity for including subordinate groups. See Hirschmann 1989; Pateman, Hirschmann, and Powell 1992; Scalia 1998; and Sinopoli and Hirschmann 1991.

31 Social reproductive labor is "the activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintainance of life on a daily basis...how food, clothing and shelter are made available for immediate consumption, how the care and socialization of children is accomplished...[how the] care for elderly and infirm is organize" (Brenner and Laslett 1991).
she does not address the impact on women's political citizenship of reproductive labor as a constituent component of government institutions or constitutionalized state policies. Yet that is exactly what some political systems do. Political systems that institutionalize monarichies based on kinship group difference, for example, structurally make biological reproductive labor—women's group difference—a constituent component of the state's government. Other political systems constitutionalize care-work (welfare provision) to be an affirmative duty of the state, thereby making social reproductive labor—women's group difference—a constituent component of state policy. This study found that it is this use of gender—women's group difference—to construct the government institutions and constitutional policies of the state that enhances women's political citizenship.32

Yet another major finding of this study is that it is not solely the incorporation of women's group difference—biological and social reproductive labor—into state construction, but the paradoxical combination of women's reproductive labor group difference and the affirmation of women's individual equality that increases women's political citizenship. Significantly, the principle of individual equality in liberal theory and practice corresponds to an opposite type of labor: productive labor. As John Locke formulated the labor theory of value, all human beings are born equal by "virtue of their "self-ownership," that is, their capacity for productive labor. When an individual mixes her or his productive labor with raw material, the resulting product is that person's property. One of the major purposes of the liberal state is to protect property as generated by productive laborers presumed to be equal. This study confirms the work of others who found that women's incorporation into the paid labor force as productive workers also has a positive influence on women's political citizenship. So, too, does the affirmation of individual equality in the form of electoral competition and equal state treatment of individuals in spite of their group differences.

However, this study clarifies that the crucial issue for women's political citizenship is the construction of the state on the basis of not one, but the two essential work tasks 33 of every society, productive and reproductive labor, corresponding, respectively, to women's dual, if not paradoxical, identities as productive laborers who are the "same" as men and as reproductive laborers who are "different" than men. Without the state's affirmation of the liberal principle that all individuals are born free and equal—the liberal premise of productive labor—women lose the right to challenge state policies that stereotype and limit women's opportunities on the basis of their reproductive group identity. Equally significant, however, without the integration of women's reproductive group difference into the state's construction, as Seyla Benhabib (1987, 160; quoted in Nash 1998, 32) puts it, "[A]n entire domain of human activity, namely nurture, reproduction, love, and care...is excluded from moral and political considerations and confined to the realm of 'nature,'" thereby severing women, in terms of their group identity, from the state.

**Feminist Theory and Practice: Sameness and Difference**

The paradoxical combination of individual equality and women's group difference identified in this research and its association with productive and reproductive labor, respectively, also addresses the all but intractable debate among feminists and others striving to improve women's position in American society.34 The very definition of liberalism, which assumes the existence of "free and equal individuals," places women, according to Kate Nash (1998, 32-34) in a "catch-22" position. On the one hand, if women adapt to male norms by asserting their equality and sameness with men, they do so at the cost of negating the reproductive and nurturing roles disproportionately associated with women, thereby destroying their specificity as women. On the other hand, if women assert their difference from men, their very specificity as women categorizes them as deviant from the universalistic formulation of the liberal principle that all individuals are equal, in the sense of being the same. Thus, as Nash (1998, 1) notes, "Most contemporary feminist political theorists see liberalism as unequivocally incompatible with feminism...[because to use] the universal principles of liberalism to try to gain equality with men and liberty from subordination to men is doomed to failure. It will only contribute to the advancement of those women who mimic men and, since no women can do so beyond a certain point, ultimately it will fail them too." This conundrum has produced what legal scholar Robin West (1988, 1) identifies as a jurisprudence analysis polarized into a masculine "separation thesis" and a feminist "connection thesis."

This study finds, however, that sameness and difference need not be mutually exclusive approaches and, thus, need not form what Amy Gutmann (1985, 316-18) terms "the tyranny of dualism" or what Jean Cohen (1999, 252) defines as the ambiguity about whether "uniform equal rights and respect [are] owed to every citizen due to their individual status as legal persons or to their membership status as belonging to a particular political community." As this research establishes, it is not that liberal principles of individual equality "fail" women (Klausen and Maier 2001); indeed, we found that democratic rights affirming individual equality are crucial for advancing women's political incorporation as voters and officeholders. Rather, it is that individual equality is "not enough." As we discovered, women's political citizenship, rather than requiring an either/or

32 This finding supports important work by Robert Lieberman (2002) analyzing how racial distinctions affect welfare state development and political incorporation and also extends Joan Tronto's focus on the political significance of care-work (1993c).

33 For an excellent discussion of the primacy of labor in relation to processes of political development, see Orren 1995.

34 For an early, powerful analysis of the sameness–difference debate, see West 1988.
choice between individual equality and women’s group difference, advances on the paradoxical combination of both.\(^{35}\)

**Multiculturalism**

This study’s identification of the gender paradox, exemplifying the paradoxical combination of individual equality and the value of group difference, has an important relationship to multiculturalism debates, what some term the “politics of difference” or “identity politics.”\(^{36}\) Advocates of multicultural perspectives stress that claims based on rights should not be targeted at the individual alone as a unit of society but should also be established for groups (Bok 1995; Phillips 1999, 96). As Alan Wolfe and Jytte Klausen (2000) note, the multicultural substitution of the group for the individual can cast identity politics “as anti-liberal in tone and consequence.” They caution, along with others, such as Susan Okin, the need for combining both individual and group norms. Identity politics, Okin argues, can successfully combine with liberal principles, if and when groups allow individual members to enter and exit at will, avoid essentialism by recognizing individual diversity within ascriptive groups, and accept common standards of citizenship embodied in rules of law by the society at large (Okin 1999; Wolfe and Klausen 2000). In other words, multiculturalism works when based on a paradoxical combination of the affirmation of individual equality and group difference. This research demonstrates that such combinations not only are possible, but are advantageous to the political inclusion of subordinate groups, thereby adding significant theoretical and empirical validation for the advocacy of multicultural policies within electoral, democratic nation-states.

**APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES**

1. *Women’s share of parliamentary seats.* Percentage of women elected to the main national legislative body (lower house if bicameral), as of 2000 or the nearest prior year to 2000, from the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

2. *Welfare group difference.* Dummy variable: Presence or absence of at least one constitutional provision for state benefits, protections, or privileges (including political representative quotas) because of cultural identity, race, language, or religion. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldavia, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino and Princip, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

3. *Monarchical group difference (open to women).* Dummy variable: Presence or absence of constitutional provisions for a monarchy open to women. Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Dominica, Grenads, Jamaica, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom.

4. *Monarchical group difference (male only).* Dummy variable. Belgium, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland.

5. *Cultural group difference.* Example of clauses coded: “It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life.” Dummy variable: Presence or absence of at least one constitutional guarantee for state benefits, protections, or privileges (including political representative quotas) because of cultural identity, race, language, or religion. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Botswana, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Moldova, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

6. *Working-class group difference.* Examples of clauses coded: “The maximum duration of work for one day shall be eight hours,” “The maximum duration of nightwork shall..."
be seven hours," "The use of labor of minors under 14 years of age is prohibited." Dummy variable. Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino and Principe, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

(7) Foreign group difference. Dummy variable: Presence or absence of at least one constitutional protection because of foreign or alien status. Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Laos, Macedonia, Mali, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, The Netherlands, North Korea, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yugoslavia. All group difference data were coded from the national constitution in effect for the year used to measure the percentage of women elected to the country's national legislature.


(9) Parliamentary system. Dummy variable, coded by author. From Banks 1991 or the national constitution.

(10) Presidential system. Dummy variable, coded by author. From Banks 1991 or the national constitution.

(11) Electoral system. Structure of the electoral system. Coded 2 if voters choose among party lists in multimember districts that average five or more seats per district; 1 if party lists are used by district size averages of fewer than five seats, or a combination of party list and candidate voting is used, or voters choose among individual candidates but in multimember districts; 0 if voters choose among individual candidates in single-member districts; -1 if no party system at all. Adapted from Kenworthy and Malami, 1999.


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