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IDENTITY VERSUS CITIZENSHIP: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF CITIZENSHIP

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ABSTRACT

The recent surge of theoretical interest in citizenship has been shaped in important ways by a growing sensitivity to the politics of identity. Citizenship, conceived as a matrix of rights and obligations governing the members of a political community, exists in tension with the heterogeneity of social life and the multiple identities that arise from it. This tension expresses itself in the clash between the ‘universal’ citizen and numerous dispersed identities of which citizenship is but one. Citizens share the rights and obligations arising from that status, and the concept of ‘equality’ arising from this shared status has very real implications for the politics of identity, since citizenship has traditionally claimed priority over other identities. In practice this has often resulted in the relegation of alternative identities to an extra-political or even pre-political status. Today these alternative identities have become overtly politicized and as a result the stability of the identity of ‘citizen’ has itself been destabilized and contested. The ‘rise’ of identity politics has thus ushered in a number of challenges to, and transformations in, the discourses of citizenship. In this article we bring the resource of governmentality theory to bear upon the changing conditions of a modern complex citizenship that is not confined to the political arena, and a conception of politics not confined to the state. To this is added a neo-Gramscian consideration of counter-hegemony. This yields an agonistic vision of citizenship in which universal elements are not imposed from above, but are the outcome of projects in which social forces change themselves in constituting alliances with other political identities.

INTRODUCTION: THE TENSIONS AT THE CORE OF CITIZENSHIP

OVER THE PAST DECADE there has been an upsurge of interest in the topic of citizenship. After a prolonged post-war hiatus the subject is once again a matter of pressing concern across the political
spectrum. Who can legitimately lay claim to the rights and benefits arising from citizenship status, and who is subject to the obligations which that status entails? These questions have acquired a new salience in a world dominated by the profound inequities engendered by late-capitalism. Finding adequate responses has, however, been rendered all the more difficult by the apparent rise in recent years of ‘the politics of identity’. The latter has brought to the fore an age-old tension at the heart of the concept of citizenship: the tension arises from the actuality of a plurality of social identities and the singular identity implied by citizenship, that is, between the particularism of the former and the universalistic aspirations of the latter.

The apparent proliferation of identities and the rise of identity politics has raised the thorny issue of how the singular identification of social subjects as ‘citizens’ competes with the other identities thrown up by the profound structural and institutional changes typically characterized in terms of the ‘late-’ or ‘post-modern’ condition. The fragmented political identities and conflicting political loyalties and obligations associated with this condition pose important challenges to the pretensions of universality associated with citizenship. In turn, the rising intensity of identity politics presents formidable challenges to any efforts to theorize citizenship.

This article examines both the roots of, and the practical and theoretical implications arising from, the emergent tension between citizenship and identity. At the centre of our concerns is the question ‘How does (indeed, can) a concept which has at its core the principles of universality and of equality of status accommodate the politics of particularity and difference associated with the new wave of identity politics?’ We arrive at two conclusions. First, the tension between citizenship and identity politics is not as new as the recent ‘rise’ of identity politics might suggest. Second, while citizenship and the politics of identity might stand in tension with one another, this tension cannot be avoided by a simple rejection of either concept. Neither can it be resolved by reasserting some necessary transcendent priority of one over the other. Rather, we argue that this tension is a uniquely productive one, marking a crucial condition of possibility for sustaining democratic politics. Citizenship, we suggest, is best conceived as a project through which alternative identities vie for instantiation in the political institutions and discourses of society. This is a project which is never complete but remains open to contestation and supplementation, and the theoretical elaboration of which is crucial to the development of democratic responses to the problem of the constitution of political community.

Our exploration of these themes is located at the intersection of three broad sets of debates in contemporary social and political theory. The first of these is a still-nascent literature advocating an agonistic conception of democracy as central to the future vitality of democratic practice.1 Second, we draw upon the insights of neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony, counter-hegemony, and political strategy.2 But it is in the relation of these to a third literature that the novelty of the present article resides. In our effort to shed light upon the tensions between identity and citizenship we draw upon the
resource of governmentality theory in order to flesh out the implications of the ‘new-ethics of the self’ ushered in by the hegemony of the New Right.³ The addition of theories of governmentality into this fray offers insights into the broader techniques of rule at play in the transformations currently under way in the liberal democracies of the West, as well as a means whereby new light might be shed upon both the ethical limitations attending their present operations and their potential as touchstones for democratic transformation.

### The Shifting Foundations of the Politics of Citizenship

The transformations in the discourses and practices of citizenship to which our title alludes are closely related to pertinent features of contemporary life. Theoretical debate on citizenship has had to respond to a shift in the terrain upon which the practices of citizenship are played out, and this has shaken whatever complacency might, until recently, have dominated thinking on the subject. The unprecedented economic growth of the liberal democracies of the West in the post-war era had been regarded by many as holding out the possibility of not only taming the worst excesses of capitalism, but of progressively expanding participation in public life to include the great majority of the population as well. Yet the persistence of relations of domination and disadvantage in those societies has undermined the optimism of post-war discussions of citizenship. The rhetoric of universality and equality has strained against the persistent actuality of marginalized groups subordinated on the basis of their race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, nationality, sexuality, etc. This stubborn persistence of unequal social relations has been heightened with the subsequent retreat of the welfare state in virtually all of the advanced capitalist countries. This retreat, in turn, is closely related to the globalization of capital, the concomitant restructuring of the economies of the advanced capitalist countries along so-called ‘post-industrial’ or ‘post-fordist’ lines, and the ideological ascendancy of the New Right. Each of these features has combined to call into question the discourses of citizenship which dominated the post-war era.

The roots of change lay not only within the individual nation-states of the West. The subject of citizenship has also been tackled with renewed vigor in the wake of the collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe. The demise of the Soviet regimes and the push for political restructuring in their successor states has forced into stark relief the relationship between those states and their populations, with a pressing emphasis on the future of civil, political and social rights in those countries, and, more generally, on the relationship between the heterogeneity of civil society and the potentially oppressive unity of the state. The effects of events in the East have not, however, remained confined to its component states. Uneven economic development and social and political instability in the region have ushered in the prospect of mounting economic migration from these areas to the West, adding further fuel to debates on the subject of citizenship on both sides of the East/West divide.
The flight from economic and political insecurity is in no way limited to the countries of Eastern Europe. The increasing polarity which has manifested itself inside the countries of the West has been mirrored in important ways by the growing gap between the First and Third Worlds. The prospect of mounting migration from the latter once again poses the problem of citizenship in its starkest terms. The presumed convergence of nation, state, and population has been, if not shattered, certainly destabilized. Hence the question has become sharply posed as to who is entitled to partake of available economic and social resources. This question is all the more pressing because of the possibilities it opens up for the politics of xenophobia and racism. Finally, that citizenship has acquired new trans-national and international implications is poignantly highlighted by the nature and scope of contemporary environmental crises. A politics of citizenship which conceives of political communities whose lines of solidarity run only to the borders of nation-states seems increasingly ill-equipped to tackle the truly trans-national scope of so many contemporary environmental crises, and seems unlikely to assuage environmental insecurity.

If the changes sketched above have posed the problem of citizenship afresh, it is in good measure because they simultaneously throw up the problem of identity, and most particularly of political identity. And, identity is, in important respects, implicated in each of these transformations. The national, racial, ethnic, sexual, linguistic, and other minorities internal to the advanced liberal democracies all seek to secure recognition of their specificity. In some cases this quest for identity is manifest in minority struggles for integration in the political life of the communities in which they live, struggles epitomized by the civil rights movement in the United States. Such recognition has only been partially (if, in some cases, at all) forthcoming, constrained by the particular hegemonic ideal of universal citizenship prevailing in these societies. As a consequence other expressions of the struggle for identity have been either cautious or even explicitly hostile to projects of incorporation and assimilation.

An important dimension of the struggles around the welfare state and its apparent retreat has been the nature of the identities that compete for state services and resources. Are individuals to be clients or individual consumers of a minimal state and the services it provides (as the Right frequently insists)? Or are they to be active democratic participants in the production of services in ways that simultaneously secure the conditions for both individual autonomy and social solidarity (as voices on the Left argue)? Thus, the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, with its radical individualism and focus on the unencumbered consumer, raises the problem of identity. So too does the globalization of capital, challenging as it does the old loyalties invested in nation-states. The growing recognition of the heterogeneity of civil society has ushered in a reconsideration of that concept and its implications for social and political thought, calling into question the nature of political identity itself. And the growing Eastern European and Third World diaspora has been met on the Left by calls for a radical reconsideration of political identity along post-national
cosmopolitan lines (Habermas, 1996: 491–515; Held, 1996), and on the Right by the virulent anti-immigrant chauvinism of the likes of Le Pen in France. Finally, the new ‘environmental consciousness’ has been met with calls for a new environmental citizenship, one capable of transcending conceptions of citizenship locked within the confines of the nation-state (Falk, 1994).

Much conventional post-war theoretical reflection on citizenship in the West operated on the implicit assumption that sovereign states could provide the framework within which progress would proceed, and given the right footings – a combination of liberal democracy, capitalism, and the logic of the welfare state – the successes of the West would percolate to the developing countries. From theories of the ‘end of ideology’ to those of ‘the end of history’ there has been a sense that the model of liberal democratic nation-states revealed to the rest of the world the vision of their inexorable future. We, in the West who supposedly lived that future, could attest that it was indeed a good one, and one that held the promise of ever-greater things to come. The changes which we have sketched have, however, conspired to leave that vision rather more blurred than some of its proponents would have us believe. The bloom, it seems, is off the rose.

The new reality ushered in by these changes serves to highlight tensions inherent in the theoretical approaches to and practices of citizenship which dominated the post-war era. This new reality is one that is frequently described in terms of a ‘late-modern’ or ‘post-modern’ condition, a confluence of social transformations which have given rise to the proliferation and fragmentation of identities – the notion that as social and political agents our daily existence is mediated by numerous, often conflicting, spheres of action and interest. One of the hallmarks of analyses which stress this fragmentation has been the celebration of the heterogeneity of the social, the plurality of identities and interests, while maintaining a (sometimes radically) sceptical stance toward those discourses of identity and concepts of the social which would mask that plurality or sublimate its radical political potential. On one reading of the discourses of citizenship – one we wish to challenge – citizenship might be read as necessarily performing just such a masking or sublimation. Citizenship can indeed perform such a task, but a critical theory of citizenship quickly reveals that citizenship has always operated in tandem with assumptions about who are valid political actors and what are the appropriate boundaries of community.

The politics of citizenship have required us to place our universal identity as citizens ahead of those particular interests which arise from our daily lives. There is, thus, a distinct friction between citizenship and the identities that arise from other aspects of our lives. To citizenship has been allotted the job of transcending those complex differences that arise in the everyday world. But a concept of citizenship which occludes these identities and, in turn, the social relations through which they are constituted, reproduced, and potentially transformed, threatens to serve as a legitimating discourse for the maintenance of the oppressions premised upon those identities. If all are equal in the realm of the political, that is as citizens, does this not relegate these other...
inequalities and differences to the realm of the extra- or pre-political? The discourses of citizenship have frequently seemed singularly ill-equipped to contend with this challenge (Young, 1995). The problem here is not, we suggest, rooted so much in the concept of citizenship itself, but rather in a series of unduly restrictive conceptions of the political, particularly those which fail to take (adequate) account of the cultural dimensions of the political. It is a failure to understand the place of citizenship in hegemonic projects, and relatedly its complex articulation with other social and political concepts, an articulation too often assumed and too seldom problematized.

The implication that citizenship somehow stands in opposition to, or is juxtaposed with, identity requires some clarification, for citizenship itself implies an identity, but not, however, just any identity. Citizenship connotes a distinctly political identity, one which stipulates the conditions of membership in and exclusion from a political community. And it is much more than a mere nominal category. In a world in which the term ‘citizen’ is frequently deployed in everyday language to designate little more than the fact that a person carries a birth certificate and a passport issued by one state or another, it is easy to overlook the significant benefits attached to membership in some political communities and the deficits attending membership in others. In addition to stipulating membership, citizenship also implies a matrix of rights and duties to which citizens are, respectively, entitled and bound. It is this association with the rights and duties of membership that ensures that in struggles around citizenship the stakes are particularly high. However, it is in its relationship to other identities, its capacity or incapacity to recognize or accommodate other sources of identity, that citizenship comes into conflict with the broader politics of identity which has achieved such currency in recent years.

**Universal Citizenship: From Polis to Nation**

If, as we have suggested, features of the current political and economic conjuncture have been the catalyst for a renewed interest in the subject of citizenship, it must nevertheless be stressed that the tensions between citizenship and identity are not reducible to these characteristics. Citizenship’s conceptual lineage flows from the roots of Western political thought, and so too do the tensions between citizenship and identity. The status of citizenship has always strayed between universality and particularity, manifest in relations of inclusion and exclusion, identity and difference.

The discourses of citizenship have frequently prioritized ‘citizen’ as the pre-eminent political identity, with the practical effect of displacing, occluding or supplanting alternative identities, banishing them to the realm of the extra- or pre-political. This, however, is hardly a new feature of the discourses and practices of citizenship. Our purpose here is not to offer a general overview of the concept of citizenship, its origins and development, but to provide a brief look at the concepts of citizenship which prevailed in Western
antiquity to demonstrate that the universal pretensions of citizenship have always strained against the particularities of the social. The point we wish to stress is that from its earliest roots in the canons of Western political thought the concept of citizenship contained the seeds of many of the contradictions with which we still grapple today.

The classical Greek conception held citizenship to be the only political identity that members of the polis had. Citizens were presumed to enter the public sphere unencumbered by the affairs of mundane life, those particular interests arising from the sphere of the oikonomia. It was through participation in the dialog of the polis and by taking public office that true virtue and the actualization of the good life were to be realized. The burdens and prerogatives of citizenship fell equally upon the shoulders of all to whom that status applied. Citizens equally ruled and were ruled, and citizenship heralded the victory of universality over particularity, the priority of polis over oikos, and the realization of man’s true nature as a zoon politikon. At the centre of this theory of political community was the principle of equality of citizens, but given that wage earners, women, children, slaves, and aliens were deemed unfit for this exercise, it is an account of human equality which, as Pocock points out, ‘exclude[d] the greater part of the human species from access to it’ (1995: 31). The prerogatives and duties of citizenship may have applied universally to all citizens, but its scope of application implied a very truncated universe indeed. Political life was reserved for citizens, and identities other than that of the virtuous citizen were deemed to have no place in political life.

This, however, was not the only concept of citizenship bequeathed by antiquity. Roman jurisprudence yielded a variant. The citizen of Imperial Rome was quite unlike the virtuous citizen of Athens, with Roman citizenship being a significantly more passive status than the Athenians had contemplated. Citizenship entailed the ability to lay claim to a set of rights and protections to which all citizens were equally entitled. Here there was much less emphasis on the virtues of civic life or on the obligation to participate. Roman citizens, like their Athenian predecessors, were ruled, but unlike the virtuous citizens of Athens they did not rule themselves. As Walzer has pointed out, the dramatic increase in social scale from the Athenian city-state to Imperial Rome led to this more passive concept of citizenship. In short, as social scale increased, the affectual bonds that underpinned the virtuous community of active citizens were weakened. Social solidarity was more likely to be secured through the extension of a matrix of rights and protections equally to all citizens (Walzer, 1989: 214). But there was no space for alternative identities. Political identity and solidarity were secured through, and exhausted by, the extension of equal citizenship rights to all members at the expense of any recognition of difference.

In an important respect, much of the subsequent development of the concept of citizenship can be viewed in the light of the tension inherent in these two classical approaches to the issue: one emphasizing civic responsibility, the obligation individuals owe to the community of which they are a
member; the other, the prerogatives and protections to which citizens are entitled. The imperial conception would find resonances in the absolutist monarchies of early modern Europe, with ‘subjects’ the passive recipients of the rights and protections bestowed by a more or less beneficent Leviathan. Liberals, from Locke onward, would strive to return sovereignty to ‘the people’ by limiting the state’s role to that of guarantor of the relations of civil society along with a focus on freedom from unwarranted interventions by the state. The liberal concept of citizenship also sustained an overwhelming focus on the rights and privileges attaching to citizenship. The state was a necessary evil, and true virtue was to be found not in membership in political society but rather in industry and commerce. Citizenship was rooted in that collection of rights which would secure the conditions for the latter. This conception stood in stark contrast to the active citizen contemplated in the republican theories that emerged on the continent. The ideal of the virtuous citizen of Athens, actively and equally engaged in political life, was resuscitated and pressed into service as the cornerstone of the civic republican vision of citizenship. Citizenship has strained between these two poles ever since.

Citizenship has provided the identity which marks our common membership in a political community, but has performed this task in part by obscuring the persistence of other social relations and thereby undermining recognition of the alternative identities arising therefrom. It has done so in conjunction with other assumptions about what constitutes a ‘competent’ political actor and/or the ‘naturalness’ of the social community that the state is presumed to administer. This aporia of citizenship obtains not only in the liberal version of ‘passive’ citizenship, but in the republican tradition as well. Each version tends to rely heavily upon the assumption of a pre-political constitution of a natural community of social actors.

In their rejuvenation of the classical concept of citizenship, the bourgeois revolutions of Europe in the 18th and 19th century introduced a relatively new feature into the field of political discourse. The states that emerged from this period of revolutionary transformation laid claims to a rootedness in the nation, constructing themselves as nation-states, with each state actively engaged in the consolidation and institutionalization of its own national characteristics: language, territory, symbols, rituals, etc. The emerging liberal democratic state appealed to this primordial national community as the basis of social solidarity. In this discursive space was inscribed a new hegemonic project: the consolidation and integration of the nation. Citizenship would figure centrally in this project. In this era the concept of citizen became articulated with both the idea of the nation, and with the institutions of the modern state. This conceptual association has helped to lend to citizenship some of its ambiguity, not to mention some of its more unappealing practical manifestations.

The primacy of the nation-state was linked to the doctrine that every nation should form its own state, and every state its own nation. The self-determining nation became the social embodiment of the Athenian citizen: one who rules and is ruled. Interpretations of just what that implied for
political practice would vary from case to case: from the liberalism of Locke, Smith and Hume, through the civic republicanism of Rousseau, to the romanticism of Herder, Schelling, and Fichte, the latter finding resonances in Kant and Hegel. But the common thread running through them all was the notion that a nation – a nation of citizens – should govern itself. The root of the problem lay in the ambiguity surrounding the nation. The projects of nation building which were central to the process of state formation and the establishment of the legitimate capacity of states to regulate and govern their respective populations were founded upon a particularly ambiguous category of social organization, for as pervasive as the new discourse of nation was, its substantive content was anything but self-evident. The project of the nation would see the articulation of various features of sociality – history, language, culture, territory, memory, etc. – brought together in strategic combination, and, in turn, inscribed in institutional apparatuses and practices as states consolidated.

In an important respect the modern project of citizenship can be seen as an effort to bring the nation and the population into line with one another by extending the rights and obligations of citizenship to all members of the nation. The ambiguity surrounding the nation has meant that the substance of citizenship has varied from national case to national case. Two models of nationality are generally held up as constituting the poles within which actual nation formation has proceeded. One entails what is primarily a political concept of nation, the other an ethno-cultural concept. The former is conceived as a population combined in its shared dedication to a common political project and ‘open’ to new members. All who wish to become members of the nation are to be welcomed as fellow citizens, with citizenship entailing a dedication to a common civic-national political project, the *locus classicus* of this model being the cosmopolitan nationalism of the American Revolution. The ethno-cultural conception limits the granting of citizenship to a narrowly defined nation, with citizenship entitlements generally restricted to those who meet stringent criteria of some combination of language and blood. The German and Japanese cases exemplify this model. In both models, however, membership in the nation slipped easily into the discourse of citizenship, with the definition of national belonging operating to identify who was entitled to the benefits and obliged to fulfill the duties of citizenship.

In practice the discourses of citizenship and national identity have converged in different ways, with the span between these poles occupied by a variety of citizenship practices as numerous as the nation-states which give them institutional embodiment. The ethno-cultural model is perhaps the most explicit in its homogenizing imperatives, with eligibility for membership constrained from the outset, reserving citizenship status (and, in turn, its accompanying rights and obligations) to those who meet strict ethno-cultural criteria. In practice, however, the civic-national model, for all its talk of openness, is also generally shot through with assumptions about national culture and language. The problem is not so much with the expectation that immigrants assimilate to an extent that renders them capable of functioning with
some measure of political, cultural, and linguistic fluency. Rather, just what they are being assimilated to is problematic, with the homogeneity of the nation too frequently assumed and too seldom subjected to critical scrutiny.

The fact is that today our citizenship is generally associated with our ‘nationality’, with citizens frequently referred to as ‘nationals’ in everyday parlance, a more than innocuous semantic slippage. As Brubaker suggests:

Citizenship in a nation-state is inevitably bound up with nationhood and national identity, membership of the state with membership of the nation. . . .

The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nationhood. As such, it is a politics of identity, not a politics of interest (in the strict, materialist sense). It pivots more on self-understanding than on self-interest. The ‘interests’ informing the politics of citizenship are ‘ideal’ rather than material. The central question is not ‘who gets what?’ but rather ‘who is what?’ (Brubaker, 1992: 182, emphasis in original)

This is not to suggest that real material interests are not at stake in the politics of citizenship. On the contrary, as a politics of identity it is important to stress that citizenship entails both identification and recognition.11

An identity may be an active expression of group experience, and it may seek to secure recognition of that identity from others. For example, the ‘gay community’ existed as an identificatory referent long before the emergence of campaigns for political recognition (‘gay pride’, ‘gay rights’, etc.). It is only when some constituency is accorded ‘recognition’ and the form of that recognition is linked to citizenship that this becomes translated into a premise for determining the distribution of social benefits, entitlements, and protection, as when same sex couples are accorded mutual pension rights. But the conjoining of citizenship and nation has meant that the criteria of recognition have varied, sometimes dramatically, from case to case and across time. Too frequently nations have been:

conceived of as categories of like individuals rather than as webs of social relations. This places the emphasis on sameness, and often leads nationalism to be the enemy of diversity. It also provides the basis for arguments that national identity should take precedence over other competing identities – regional, familial, gender, interest-group, occupational and so on. Nationalism is particularly potent and problematic where diverse institutions of civil society are lacking or fail to provide for a diversity of public discourses and collective identities. (Calhoun, 1993: 387)

Unfortunately, the fluidity of the concept of nation has manifested a disturbing tendency to closure and constriction in times of crisis, with legitimate access to citizenship rights being preserved for those who meet new standards of stringency on the criteria of recognition. At its most chauvinistic, this logic clears the space for both xenophobic policing of the boundaries of the nation (protecting the nation from external others such as ‘illegal immigrants’) and governing the moral fabric of the citizenry (either normalizing or marginalizing the internal other). This potential for the very language of nation to slide
into more chauvinistic interpretations in times of conflict or crisis renders the
coupling of citizenship and nation inherently problematic. While we cannot
simply avoid ‘the nation’, this ever-present potential for semantic slippage
makes it a less than obvious foundation upon which to attempt to build social
solidarity and a politics of citizenship. There are, of course, innumerable
other identities which compete for our loyalties, many of which have impli-
cations for our political lives, often competing for recognition in political dis-
courses and practices. Insofar as they do, they are not somehow pre-political,
but stand rather in a constitutive relation with political discourses and prac-
tices. National homogeneity no longer seems an adequate foundation upon
which to construct a politics of citizenship that is sensitive to the plural iden-
tities arising from a heterogeneous civil society (Mouffe, 1992: 8). For, as
Calhoun has argued, ‘There is no single, definite and fixed “peoplehood”
which can be assumed in advance of political discussion’ (1993: 407). We turn
now to propose a historically contextualized framework in which to locate
an argument about the future of citizenship.

CRISIS OF WELFARISM AND THE DECLINE OF UNIVERSAL
CITIZENSHIP

In the return of the problem of citizenship to the contemporary agenda, the
principle touchstone against which discussion has proceeded has been pro-
vided by T. H. Marshall’s 1949 lecture ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (Mar-
shall, 1992). His formulations remain a powerful source of insight from
which a normative critique of the current conjuncture might proceed. But for
all its insight his account serves to highlight the limits of much post-war
thinking on the subject.

We need not dwell on the specifics of Marshall’s argument; that ground has
been well covered by others. However, a brief reflection upon Marshall’s
lecture provides a point of departure for the present discussion, not least
because of the optimistic chord it strikes with respect to the politics of citizen-
ship. While clearly cognizant of the antagonistic relationship prevailing
between the expansion of citizenship rights and the class structure of capital-
ism, Marshall (and many of those who followed him) viewed the post-war era
as promising a potential enrichment of the substantive content of citizenship,
a promise whose fulfilment might simultaneously provide a bulwark against
the worst excesses of capitalism while securing the basis for social integration.
For Marshall, the expansion and deepening of citizenship rights would provide
the foundations for a new equality which would counter (but not necessarily
eradicate) the inequalities inherent in the class structure of capitalist societies.
Expanding the substantive content of citizenship was seen as the basis upon
which might be built ‘a direct sense of community membership based on
loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession’ (Marshall, 1992: 24).
Today, while vestiges of such an incremental view of rights are still present, we
are generally more more cautious about the effectivity of rights.
For Marshall, the citizen who had acquired civil, political, and now social rights had to accept the ethical obligations that accompanied them. But there is an underside to Marshall’s argument which remains, at best, implicit in his formulation. His vision implied not only a citizen who was the bearer of both rights and duties, but one who was to be guided to his/her fulfilment through the intermediation of the array of professional expertise mobilized by the post-war welfare state. The 19th century had seen the rise of processes of individualization rooted in the discourses and practices of a nascent web of professions and techniques of social governance. As the 20th century unfolded, this complex of discourses and practices burgeoned, constructing the individual as citizen with social obligations quite different from the ‘obedience’ expected of the subject of the sovereign. A set of experts set about constructing the ‘normal citizen’, ‘normal mother’, ‘normal child’, ‘normal worker’ through education, counselling, and allied techniques that were monitored by doctors, social workers, and other experts. An expertise of normalization embraced the citizenry. The Marshallian ‘citizen’ was the embodiment of the period of the welfare state and thus of ‘the social’; a new social contract framed with a ‘balance’ of rights and duties administered by a powerful but benevolent state and supervised by an array of experts (social workers, psychologists, etc.).

The world has, of course, changed dramatically in the five decades since the publication of Marshall’s lecture. Today, just what that ‘civilization which is a common possession’ is has become less clear than it seemed in the optimistic post-war era. ‘Common’ for whom? ‘Civilized’ by whose standards? And ‘possessed’ by whom? Marshall’s vision of the gradual expansion and deepening of civil, political, and social rights mitigating the harsher face of capitalism now seems in serious jeopardy, challenged by shifting political and economic circumstances and tempered by a recognition of the ethical dilemmas inherent in the technologies of governance implicit in that model. Moreover, the project of deepening the substantive content of citizenship through the expansion of social rights often took a form which served to entrench social divisions of gender, race, sexuality, and culture, obscuring their persistence behind a rhetoric of universality. The diminishing scope and differential application of the rights of citizenship suggest that the development of the post-war vision has at least halted and is probably in retreat.

These changes invite a normative assessment of the condition of citizenship. The erosion of social rights presents a worrisome feature of late-modern life, not least because it bears directly upon the substantive content of civil and political rights. The capacity to be full and equal members of civil society, and to be active, knowledgeable political agents has come to require measures guaranteeing social security through social rights. As these become attenuated it no longer seems as clear as it once did precisely what equality entails. Equal to whom? What constitutes equality for people occupying different identities? Moreover, the history of social rights is, as we have suggested, not without its own ambiguities.
NEO-LIBERAL GOVERNANCE AND CITIZENSHIP

There is wide agreement that the weakening of citizenship is associated with the decline of the welfare state and that universalist citizenship has been undermined by the rise of identity politics. We want to insist that this association between the decline of the welfare state and the weakening of citizenship needs to be specified in more detail. We suggest that this process can be understood as a general shift in the mode of governance and we draw on the governmentality tradition to demonstrate the longer term processes at work. The focus of this work on identifying shifts in the techniques of rule is significant for our purposes. In the liberal democratic regimes of the West the dominant mode of governance throughout most of the 20th century has been a welfarist liberalism which constructed its object of governance as ‘the social’. The social found expression in the project of the expansion of the universal attributes of citizenship. The critical mechanism of the government of the social was through an advancing governance by experts orchestrated under the umbrella provided by the agencies of the welfare state.

In recent decades ‘the social’ has increasingly been contested, expertise has diversified, and its links to state apparatuses have been disaggregated. Clients of experts, narrativizing their dissatisfactions in the potent language of rights, engage in self-organization and contest the powers of expertise, and become consolidated in ‘identity politics’. A new formula for the relation between government, expertise, and subjectivity gradually formed via strategies of pluralization, autonomization, and responsibilization. Significantly these developments occurred under the political hegemony of the Right whose great success was that they managed to render this regime technical, that is they found ways to govern through the new ethics of the subject. In other words they succeeded in creating a distinct mode of governance whose key feature was a new regime operating through autonomy and choice ‘embodied in technologies that enable people to be governed, and to govern themselves, in terms of their of their identity’ (Rose, 1994: 385, emphasis in original).

The central question that these developments pose is: can such a system work through something other than ‘neo-liberalism’? Can a regime of autonomy and choice be made effective in a form that is compatible with the retention of the universalizing attractions of ‘citizenship’ and with democratic politics? What is significant is that there now exists a neo-liberal mode of governance which decenters the state. While a critical recognition of this turn of events has been misinterpreted by some as implying that the state is no longer important, that recognition has arisen from a polemical concern to distance the governmentality position from state-centered approaches. In keeping with the former, we see it as better to understand the role of the state within neo-liberalism as no longer being the conductor of the orchestra, but rather as providing the conditions for the exercise of rule by many other institutions and agents that operate by inciting and stimulating the active choices of enterprising individuals. The key technique is the linking of self-identity
to ‘lifestyle’ through techniques that involve governing through the self-governance of identities. It should be stressed that the objectives of neoliberal projects of rule continue to have many of the features established under welfare liberalism such as the production of effective workers, healthy bodies, functional families, and hygienic homes. These remain political objectives, but they are no longer the direct responsibility of the state bureaucratic agencies operating through inspection, instruction, and surveillance. Neoliberal rule is better conceived as a new alliance between the state, autonomous experts, and self-governing individuals.22 '[I]t has become possible to govern without governing society – to govern through the “responsibilized” and “educated” anxieties and aspirations of individuals and their families’ (Rose, 1994: 389, emphasis in original).

Lest it be thought we are rushing to embrace neo-liberalism, we should note that it is vulnerable to a general moral criticism. The preoccupation with self-identity and the burdens of responsibilized self-enterprise may encourage a defensive contraction of the self and a consequent lack of capacity to sustain social relations with others (Lasch, 1984). Alongside the pacific image of individuals as ‘free to choose’ their own identities and lifestyles, the neoliberal mode of governance is confronted by a profound contradiction. It has left an intractable remainder, the marginalized under-classes. One of its central modes of operation is by means of policing the dividing practices that have hardened the gap between the ‘responsible’ and the ‘irresponsible’, the former committed to self-governance, the latter subject to intensified coercive governance. No longer embraced within a politics of solidarity, the marginalized are, rather, in an important sense excluded from citizenship. Instead they are exposed to the expanding network of public and private policing, or are left in the care of a range of new para-governmental agencies – charities, advice bureaus, drop-in centres and other voluntary organizations (Rose, 1994: 389).23

Can neo-liberalism sustain the contradiction between the self-motivated world of enterprising individuals and the coercion of the marginalized? The least optimistic scenario (which Christopher Lasch bequeathed to us) is that the contented majority is, in the developed world, sufficiently large that it can exercise its political power so as to remain deaf to the fate of the marginalized (Lasch, 1995). The complacency of the comfortable may be rocked now and again by rioting in the inner cities that they deserted long ago; they may strengthen the increasingly fortified suburbs in which they now reside. However, this cynical scenario is undermined by the recent series of electoral defeats which neo-liberalism has suffered at the hands of the deeply paradoxical, and undoubtedly unstable, mix of economic liberalism and social democratic welfarism in the USA, UK, Italy, and France.24 It is not our intent to pursue futurology. It is sufficient to insist that the neo-liberal model of a truncated citizenship of self-governing individuals is likely to prove unstable and offers no satisfactory solution to the dilemmas of modern citizenship.

If the Left is to fruitfully address this strategic void its response must stand
in direct contradistinction to the resigned acceptance that neo-liberalism displays toward the deepening marginalization of a sizeable and growing underclass. This must entail a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand there must be an unwavering commitment to the deepening of democratic institutions and practices. Any adequate conception of citizenship under the complex conditions prevailing in contemporary liberal democracies must recognize that democratic citizenship is constituted in multiple sites in which citizens-as-actors ‘without intending it, [renew] the political by contesting the forms of unequal power which democratic liberty and equality have made possible and which democracy can eliminate only by betraying its own values’ (Wolin, 1996: 43–4). On the other hand, the very substance of citizenship must be reconceived as a negotiated compromise over the boundaries of the political. The citizenship identity must be reconceived as a terrain of active contestation which seeks to instantiate the boundaries of ethico-political life in the institutions of both state and civil society. As such it must also reflexively attend to the inter-relation between the public and the private, and the ways in which full citizenship must be pursued within a context that provides meaningful supports for the actualization of independence and autonomy for those marginalized by both the post-war and neo-liberal breeds of welfare security (Phillips, 1993; Young, 1997). A critical theory of citizenship must recognize the contingency of that identity, and the fact that any given resolution of the contests over the substance of citizenship represents an unstable equilibrium of compromise which is most open to transformative pressures at those moments when the ethical foundations of prevailing social relations are no longer adequate to secure social solidarity.

HEGEMONY AND CITIZENSHIP: REARTICULATING THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR

There can be no return to the idea that citizenship identity can or should take priority over all other identities; but neither can the recognition of identities through rights by itself provide grounds for constructing a new and vibrant social solidarity. The more optimistic variants of identity politics look to the formation of coalitions and alliances between different identities to provide the basis for collective action (e.g. ‘rainbow coalitions’) and the potential for generating enduring solidarity. This optimism tends to neglect the instability inherent in such ensembles of alliances. Without any stable core such alliances are always vulnerable to natural tensions, competition, and conflict between plural interests. For this reason we should not succumb to the post-modern variant of identity politics that celebrates all asserted identities equally; for to do so negates the possibility of achieving a form of shared identity capable of grounding social solidarity. As Anne Phillips has suggested with respect to feminist concerns with the limitations of citizenship politics, ‘Without careful attention to the ways in which particular identities end up masquerading as universal concerns, “the citizen” threatens to shut down the
awakening recognition of group identity and difference. So while there may be no necessary incompatibility between feminism and the language of citizens, a lot of hard work will have to go into assuring that this is so’ (Phillips, 1993: 87).

We suggest that the hard work Phillips proposes is vital to the future vitality of democratic practice, and that citizenship continues to offer a potentially valuable resource. Its great merit is precisely its capacity to shift our political discourse beyond the scope of what Gramsci termed ‘corporate’ interests. Gramsci argued that finding common ground between different groups and identities required specific changes in the forms of consciousness of those involved. This idea makes it possible to avoid the tendency to naivety in those approaches which focus only on communication and dialog between different identities. Gramsci directs us toward a more agonistic process in which participants have to change, rather than merely make tactical compromises. It is central to our argument to stress that projects directed toward handling clashing identities require deliberate strategies to overcome sectional interests. Any project which seeks to develop the capacity to integrate plural identities must cultivate a capacity to forego immediate interests in order to bind more closely to other social forces. Such hegemonic practices are illustrated by the need not only to challenge, but to overcome long-established practices that exclude or marginalize some identities, for example, female employees or an ethnic group. Gramsci used the concept of ‘national-popular’ to describe such projects (Gramsci, 1957). This term remains appropriate as a way of thinking through the relation between citizenship and plural identities; it refers both to a universal element and at the same time to the complex of popular elements that are at play. Since we are interested in decentring the nation and the state we take the liberty of renaming Gramsci’s concept ‘popular citizenship’.

A democratic theory of popular citizenship needs to be capable of engaging with disparate identities and to be open to negotiation and contestation with all identity claims. This implies that democratic citizenship cannot be committed to the recognition of all identity claims or to the same form of recognition for every identity. Here we encounter complex questions. For example, in what contexts is it appropriate to grant representative status to ethnic identities? In South Africa, where the struggle against racial categories was at the heart of the struggle against apartheid, it would seem inherently problematic to grant racial or ethnic representation, whereas in contexts where historically significant but small ethnic minorities exist, their direct political representation may be not only expedient, but essential, as for instance in the case of the Maori of New Zealand. Similar problems beset the question of the recognition of problematic identities. Where ethnic identities press for recognition, what should the response be to supremacist claims for the recognition of an Aryan identity? The solution to such a problem would vary with context, but needs to combine struggle against such a claim with caution about what forms of coercion or exclusion are exercised.
Additionally, we propose to make use of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony. However, it is first necessary to perform a somewhat violent act on the original form of the concept which, in Gramsci’s usage, always presumed a ruling class or class-led dominant bloc as the active subject that exercised hegemony and secured its benefits. There is some space in Gramsci’s treatment for an alternative that is implied in his idea of counter-hegemony; this he used to provide the possibility of the emergence of a social movement with the capacity to challenge the existing hegemonic bloc. There seems no reason in principle to accept Gramsci’s assumption that a counter-hegemonic movement should be formed around a social class. In principle, any constellation of social actors can potentially constitute a hegemonic alliance. The most basic requirement for a hegemonic project to become dominant is that it must address and incorporate, if only partially, some aspects of the aspirations, interests, and projects of not only its own constituents but also other groups whose alliance is possible. This variant of hegemony can usefully be referred to as an ‘incorporative hegemony’ in that it helps to focus attention on the constructive project that is at the core of hegemony, but it retains an emphasis on the agonistic nature of the project.25

A number of quite distinct mechanisms are involved in the processes whereby incorporative hegemony can install the presence of subordinate interests within the hegemonic project. First, a successful hegemony needs to incorporate values and norms which contribute to securing the minimum standards of social life. Second, it involves the means by which, as a result of actual struggle or the apprehension of it, a dominant bloc engages in a more or less self-conscious project of ‘compromise’ so as to incorporate some element of the interests of other groups. A third and more complex process is the requirement that a hegemonic project articulate values and norms in such a way that they acquire significant trans-cultural appeal. For example, it is important in asserting a freedom of religion, that this is short of the implication of providing advantages for some privileged religion. Yet it must at the same time remain capable of contesting doctrines and practices of those religions which are incompatible with other components of the value content of the hegemonic project.

It is now necessary to demonstrate the pertinence of the above discussion of hegemony to citizenship. Its potential is to make it possible to avoid the problem within those treatments of citizenship which imply the existence of some generalized consent to the ‘rules of the citizenship game’ such as underlie, for example, the positions developed recently by Habermas (1996) and Kymlicka (1995, 1996). The fact of contemporary pluralism is that minorities not only frequently do not share the assumptions about the legitimacy of existing norms and institutions but also in many cases these are seen as the problem rather than the cure.26 Thus while Habermas, for instance, seeks to ground legitimacy in the legislative process, it should be noted that it is often precisely the legislative apparatus which is viewed with suspicion and hostility by many minorities. In contrast to such positions we need an account of how citizenship can be reconstructed without assuming that all must first
accept the consensual liberal values on which it has previously been legitimated. This is not to suggest that the securing of consent to the ‘rules of the game’ is not a component of the project of reconstructed citizenship. For example, many minorities are deeply suspicious of free speech norms. How might those Muslims who would deny rights to Salman Rushdie come to recognize that conceding rights to Rushdie is a concomitant of their claim for self-governing Muslim schools or the strengthening of blasphemy laws? And, in turn, how might those who view Muslim schools and the return of blasphemy as antithetical to democratic citizenship come to accept that these projects may be necessary consequences of their abstract commitment to minority rights?

Invoking a near-Gramscian theory of counter-hegemony provides a more agonistic approach to the relationship between citizenship and identity. Political and ideological struggles frequently revolve around attempts to give priority to some subject positions and to marginalize others. To the extent that this process succeeds, achieving some measure of stable (albeit ultimately contingent) equilibrium in the institutions, discourses, and practices of a society, constituting a new ‘common sense’ of the day, hegemony has been achieved. Projects which seek to rearticulate the elements of hegemony, supplanting some, supplementing others, are in this sense counter-hegemonic. If some level of realism is to be achieved it is necessary to reject any suggestion that these battles can be resolved by purely consensual means. Not only the content of identities, but which identities are capable of securing recognition are the outcomes of social and cultural contestation. As Stuart Hall argues,

Far from coming from the still small point of truth inside us, identities actually come from outside, they are the way in which we are recognized and then come to step into the place of the recognitions which others give us. Without the others there is no self, there is no self-recognition. (Hall, 1995: 8)

Thus we are concerned to stress the contested nature of identities, both internally and externally. It follows that projects concerned to prescribe a normative framework to resolve the contested claims of a plethora of radically dissimilar identities runs the risk of presuming that some neutral standpoint outside the contest can be found. Kymlicka’s distinction between national and ethno-cultural communities, categories he views as qualitatively different and which, in turn, imply differential normative foundations in a politics of rights, represents precisely such an external criterion. However, we seek to avoid the simple alternative that the content of citizenship is nothing more than the resultant of naked power struggles between competing identities.

We suggest that the theme of incorporative hegemony allows us to argue that citizenship rights provide a framework – a framework that is stable, but never fixed – that establishes grounds for both the legitimation of some claims and, conversely, the exclusion of others. General citizenship rights provide criteria for the granting of differential rights, namely, that such differential rights
are only legitimate insofar as they serve to fulfil citizenship rights available to all. Thus to grant a linguistic community the right to court proceedings being conducted in their primary language serves to fulfil the access to justice that is available to all. These normative criteria provide periodic opportunities to secure greater stability by means of securing their constitutional embodiment, for example, in charters of rights and other rights creating legislation.

Thus citizenship provides criteria for the legitimation of differential treatment of different identities, but does not itself provide operative rules for application to concrete cases. Take, for example, the question of which communities are to be granted limited self-governance over the provision of education supported by public funds. One criterion might be the requirement that curricula incorporate minimum standards. Another might be that any self-governing curriculum must, consistent with constitutional equality, provide equal treatment for males and females such that a community which proposed to deny females instruction in science or physical recreation would be refused public funding. While this and many other controversies can only be determined in the context of struggles, citizenship is significant in providing a framework within which the discursive engagement can take place; it does so by providing grounds for asserting and disputing claims to differential treatment of social and cultural identities.

Central to these struggles is that each and every identity, in order to secure its group interests, must engage in political communication in order to expand the legitimacy of the particular claims they seek to assert. It follows that this must also involve the implication that if they fail in this communicative project, they may have to be prepared to alter or amend aspects of their norms and practices. The enemy is the illusion that any identity is fixed and its distinguishing marks etched in stone. The great enemy of any constructive engagement with the contested arena of welfare and citizenship is essentialist conceptions of identities. However, this does not resolve the issue of what changes in the content of particular identities the wider community is entitled to press or which demands so undermined the distinctiveness and vitality of a community that they are, objectively, challenges to the very existence of that identity.

CONCLUSION

As the 20th century unfolded, the gradual extension of citizenship status to all ‘nationals’ inhabiting the political communities of Western democracies proceeded. And this status was much more than a mere nominal one, for that same era also raised the promise of a deepening of citizenship’s substantive content, with citizenship status becoming closely associated with not only community membership but the provision of the means whereby citizens might be assured opportunity to participate actively in the social, political, and economic lives of their communities. That project, incomplete as it was, seems to have stalled, and in some cases, to have shifted into reverse.
The inequities and contradictions of late-modern life have provided fertile soil for the growth of identity politics, often articulated in problematically essentialist terms. The category of ‘citizen’, long considered to apply equally to all members of a political society, now strains under the burden of difference. As the status of citizenship expanded to include most of the inhabitants of a modern state’s territory it tended, simultaneously, to occlude substantive differences between members, differences articulated in terms of nation, class, race, gender, ethnicity, language, culture, sexuality, etc. This, of course, was no accident. It is precisely in its capacity to rise above these identificatory distinctions that the appeal of citizenship lies. The unity of political society is secured by placing the principle of citizenship above the fray of these alternative identities.

The universal pretensions of citizenship are forever destined to clash with the particular aspirations arising from the complex heterogeneity of civil society. This is a paradox to which there is no permanent solution. Nor should we seek such permanence, for it is precisely through the contest between these two that the boundaries of the political are contested and resolved. In this paradox – in the struggle to achieve an always contestable equilibrium of compromise between universality and particularity – resides the very precondition of democracy. If a solution to this paradox were to be found this would render democracy, indeed politics, redundant. 'If democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no necessary body and no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete between themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms a function of universal representation’ (Laclau, 1995: 107). Democratic negotiations of the substantive content of citizenship are played out precisely upon this terrain.

Thus the state, and particularly the form, degree, and extent of its welfare provisions will continue to figure centrally in both the politics of citizenship and, more broadly, identity:

Citizenship is special because admission to its prerogatives, within the very wide bounds set by international law, is entirely at the discretion of the state. The regulation of membership is an essential attribute of sovereignty; the principle of the liberty of the state in the attribution of citizenship is firmly established in international law . . . In the European setting citizenship is a last bastion of sovereignty; states continue to enjoy a freedom of action in this domain that they increasingly lack in others. (Brubaker, 1992: 180)

But as we have suggested, both our theories and practices of citizenship must move beyond the narrow strictures implied by much state-centric theorizing. And just as importantly we must endeavor to decenter the nation in our efforts to grasp the radical potential inherent in a revitalized democratic citizenship.

These are difficult issues that afford no ready resolutions, at least none that can avoid contestation. For it is precisely in the effort to work toward their contested and always contingent resolution that the virtue of democracy resides, but so too its ambiguity. The great myth of the political is the
perpetual quest for the negation of politics. Politics always seeks to resolve contradiction, but can never complete the project.

NOTES

1. The literature related to an agonistic vision of democracy is growing slowly, but of particular interest are contributions by Connolly (1991), Honig (1992, 1993), Mouffe (1993), and Wolin (1996).

2. This, of course, is a large and growing literature. Of particular importance to its development has been the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau, 1977, 1990, 1995; Mouffe, 1979, 1992, 1993; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), and that of Stuart Hall (1988a, 1988b). It is not our intention to offer a survey of the specific contributions each of these authors has made to these debates, or to engage these contributions in a sustained critical dialog here (a dialog we have commenced on other fronts; see Purvis and Hunt, 1993). But while we would stress that the position we are developing here is irreducible to those espoused by Laclau, Mouffe, and Hall, we nevertheless find ourselves sympathetic with the broad contours of their respective positions. See also Hunt (1990).


4. The individualism of neo-liberalism exists in tension with a universalism embodied in its nationalist rhetorics.


6. The revival of the civic-republican conception of the political has posed the question of the relationship between rights and obligations. See the earlier interventions by Arendt (1958) and Wolin (1961) and the growing communitarian literature which has fueled a vibrant set of debates (see Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1983; Taylor, 1990; Mouffe, 1993; Habermas, 1996).

7. The foundations for much of this process were, of course, laid prior to the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. For one of the most influential accounts of the role played by print capitalism and the administrative apparatuses of emergent modern states in paving the foundations for the modern nation, see Anderson (1991).

8. One significant manifestation of this interpenetration of state, nation, and citizenship was the conflation of ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ which survived the democratizing thrust of the modern period.

9. This version has been read in much theorizing on citizenship to imply a Whiggish view of history, with full citizenship being the end result of a teleological unfolding of necessary historical development. But the crucial point is that citizenship is always a project, one which is never completed, and whose substance is always open to contestation and revision.

10. In important respects the French Revolution provided a paradigm case of the political conception of the nation, but it never fully separated itself from an ethno-cultural vision of ‘Frenchness’ based on blood which has left the legacy that even common language has not been enough to ensure the smooth integration of incomers into French citizenship.

11. Indeed one of the most sustained sociological attempts to grapple with the shifting forms of modern sociality has displaced the notion of ‘identity’ as too narrowly hermeneutic in favor of ‘recognition’ as stipulating an appropriate relational context (Honneth, 1995).
12. This point has been made forcefully by Habermas (1996: 491–514). Not everyone would agree, however. Some conservatives have suggested just the opposite, arguing that what is needed is a much more forceful defence of the nation as the essential foundation of social solidarity (Scruton, 1990: 229–337).

13. Indeed, the literature spawned by Marshall's article has become a growth industry in recent years, although many of the treatments of his contribution have been quite (and sometimes unfairly) narrow in their reading. For useful recent treatments of Marshall's thinking on the subject, see Barbalet (1988), Bottomore (1992), Pateman (1988), and Turner (1992).

14. Marshall associated 'complete' citizenship with the development of the welfare state. Social rights were to afford citizens a modicum of economic security adequate to ensure their affective participation in the political system (1992: 8, 24).

15. The problematization of rights was articulated most sharply in 'critical legal studies' (Tushnet, 1984) and in feminist debates on law (Kingdom, 1991; Smart, 1989). But within both these traditions other voices pressed the continuing significance of rights discourses (Bartholomew and Hunt, 1990; Cornell, 1993; Minow, 1990; Schneider, 1986). Similar debates have also reverberated within race theory.

16. This concern with the social citizen generated a parallel concern to understand and to reform the anti-social citizen (juvenile delinquents, dysfunctional families, etc.).

17. A growing feminist literature has exposed the assumptions underpinning dominant conceptions of citizenship and the ways these have acted to relegate women to a marginal citizenship status. See, for instance, Gordon (1990), Pateman (1988), Phillips (1993), and Young (1997). Mink (1990) and Nelson (1990) extend these analyses to the articulation of race, gender, and citizenship in the American welfare state.

18. The suggestion that citizenship is in retreat should be distinguished from the claim that citizenship is less 'full' or 'complete' than it once was, or once seemed capable of becoming. Citizenship, as a project, is never complete. The subject of 'full citizenship' should be reserved for empirical analyses of the substantive content of particular citizenship regimes. To posit an ideal conception of citizenship as a normative standard against which to measure the moral and ethical implications of various regimes is undoubtedly a powerful political tool. But the practical content of citizenship (criteria of entitlement and the rights and duties that flow therefrom) will always be subject to contestation and subject to revision. Any suggestion of an end-point in the development of citizenship should, accordingly, be resisted.

19. An ambiguity poignantly captured by Cooper (1993) who traces the Major government's Citizen's Charter foray into the traditionally 'socialist' terrain of rights to welfare provision and public services. Cooper's article helps to illustrate the indeterminacy of rights discourse and its ambiguous articulation with the politics of citizenship.

20. The 'social' is that aggregate of activities and persons that are the proper object of government (Pasquino, 1991: 105).

21. See the exchange between Curtis (1995) and Miller and Rose (1995). We should, however, be careful to distinguish this acknowledgement of the actuality of the 'decentering' of the state and its analytical implications from another literature which seems more intent on 'decentering' the state precisely because it is of waning importance (Magnusson and Walker 1988; Magnusson 1996). We believe that the latter sorely underestimates the shifting yet continued importance of the state as a crucial site organizing modes of social regulation.

22. For example, the goal of healthy bodies is promoted by an alliance of state,
medicine, producers that act on the consumption choices of individuals, but nevertheless state regulation provides the product labeling and pharmaceutical testing so that the consumer can make 'informed' decisions.

23. One of the ironies of the ascendancy of the New Right has been its invocation of the “active citizen” as a necessary ingredient in social cohesion, and [its appeal] to a self-help tradition of voluntary service as an alternative to dependence on the state” (Phillips, 1993: 75). This new focus on the ‘obligations’ attending full social citizenship implies the simultaneous hardening of existing marginalizations, leaving those incapable of such active involvement seemingly further still from the status of ‘full’ citizenship.

24. The French case is much closer to a return to a post-war welfarism than the others.


26. This objection is elaborated on with respect to Kymlicka’s defence of differential rights for minorities by Parekh (1997).

27. It should be remembered that this process was slow to reach completion. Therborn has argued that it is not until the 1960s with the civil rights legislation in the USA that the enfranchisement of ‘nationals’ was completed (Therborn, 1977). It should also be borne in mind that some states held to narrow rules of entitlement that refused to grant citizenships to significant number of long-term residents as with the case of ‘guest workers’ in Germany and ex-colonials in France. Even today ominous rumbles in the USA portend the refusal of social benefits to non-citizens.

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