Turf Wars: 
How Local Power Struggles Influence 
Latino Political Socialization and Voting Behavior

Benjamin G. Bishin
University of Miami

Karen M. Kaufmann
University of Maryland, College Park

Daniel P. Stevens
Hartwick College

Abstract

This paper looks to expand our knowledge about immigrant political socialization and Latino political behavior. While many studies of Latino politics focus on issue attitudes and nationality differences to explain partisan attachments and electoral choices, we argue that local context -- in particular, the unequal distribution of social and economic resources within a given community -- can be a powerful source of political socialization for Hispanic immigrants. Using data from an exit poll conducted in Miami-Dade County in 2004, we examine the voting behavior among non-Cuban Hispanics in the presidential contest, the Florida senate race, and the local mayoral election. Our theoretical framework predicts that anti-Cuban resentments will be salient and consequential to non-Cuban Hispanic voting in both the presidential and senate elections. Our findings confirm these expectations; non-Cuban Hispanic opinions regarding anti-Castro policies are significant predictors of voting behavior after controlling for traditionally powerful explanatory factors such as political party, economic optimism, opinion on the Iraq war, social issue attitudes, and socio-demographic characteristics. Our results also suggest that power relations in the local arena constitute an important agent of political socialization for new Latino immigrants, much as they were for the European immigrants at the turn of the century.

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Political parties and candidates are well aware that Latinos represent an important constituency as their numbers and political influence appear to grow with every election cycle.\(^1\) Latino immigrants, like the many generations of European immigrants that preceded them, come to the United States with little experience and knowledge about American politics; thus political socialization is an integral part of the immigrant acculturation process. Given the growing party competition over the immigrant vote and the fact that immigrant populations have burgeoned in recent years, social scientists have increasingly turned their attention to studies of immigrant political socialization.

Latinos constitute the majority of recent immigrants as well as the largest minority group in the nation. Hispanics living in the United States come from over twenty countries, yet given their shared status as immigrants and Spanish speakers, they are often perceived as a cohesive political entity (Garcia 2003). As Latino immigrants are typically designated as minorities and offered Constitutional protection as such, much of the Latino-centered scholarship follows in the spirit of the Black politics literature, presuming that Latino political solidarity, even if not fully realized, is desirable (DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Mindiola et al. 2003). In spite of many parallels that may exist between Black and Latino political objectives, however, Hispanic voters simply do not demonstrate the high levels of political cohesion typical of native-born African Americans. Aside from the common language spoken in most Latin countries, the bonds that tie these various nationality groups together are often tenuous. As has been illustrated time and again, most Hispanics exhibit weak levels of pan-ethnic identification, and this is particularly true of new immigrants (de la Garza 1992; DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Kaufmann 2003; Lopez and Espiritu 1990).

\(^1\) We use the terms Latin, Latino and Hispanic interchangeably throughout the text.
For Latinos, nationality-based affinities are usually stronger than pan-ethnic ties; furthermore, residential settlement patterns in ethnic enclaves serve to sustain the preeminence of nationality for many immigrant groups (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Cuban-Americans are the most notable outlier among the Latino collective; on average they are better educated, more affluent, and considerably more Republican than other Latino nationality groups. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Dominicans are predominantly Democrats, although, especially among newer immigrants, the numbers of self-identified independents are considerable (Hajnal and Lee 2003). Patterns of partisanship and voting among Hispanic populations suggest that, save the Cubans, most Latinos report relatively weak partisan sentiments; nonetheless, they have been reliable Democratic voters for the past two decades (Barreto and Woods 2003; Cain et al. 1991; Uhlaner and Garcia 2002; de la Garza et al. 1992).

Research on Latino political development places theoretical importance on nationality differences, but pays relatively little attention to contextual factors that also shape partisan allegiances.\textsuperscript{3} “Mexican-American”, for example, is a broad category that belies considerable internal diversity; there are good reasons to believe that Mexicans living in rural border towns may not necessarily share the same life experiences or political views as Mexicans living in dense, urban areas. Beyond the bonds of common national heritage, local context most certainly plays a role in the political socialization of immigrants.

In this paper we explore the importance of local context with an eye to how community power relationships shape the political behavior of Latino immigrants.

\textsuperscript{2} Nicaraguans, like Cubans are more Republican than other Latino nationality groups.

\textsuperscript{3} But see de la Garza (1996), and Skerry (1993).
Specifically we hypothesize that while pan-ethnicity may be a “pull factor” drawing some Latinos from diverse national backgrounds into ballot box coalitions, power struggles between Latino sub-groups – and the resentments that stem from these power disparities – can also act a “push factor” that potentially drives Latino voters apart from one another. We use new exit poll data from a survey conducted in Miami-Dade County, Florida during the presidential election in 2004 to explore the relative influence of intra-Latino resentments on voting behavior in the presidential and the senate races. Our findings point to the importance that anti-Cuban resentments play in the political calculus of non-Cuban Latinos living in Miami; the salience of anti-Cuban sentiments extends to both presidential and senate voting. Our analyses also suggest that power relations in the local arena constitute an important agent of political socialization that may very well extend beyond intra-Latino struggles to interracial battles between Hispanic immigrant and African American voters.

**Power Relations and Minority Politics**

The notion that power relations matter is not new to the study of minority politics. Much of the literature on Black partisanship and voting behavior tacitly or explicitly invokes the power differential between Black and white populations to explain the relative unanimity of Black support for the Democratic Party (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994). The fact that status measures such as income and education have little predictive power when it comes to Black voting and party affiliation is typically attributed to a sense of group consciousness (or linked fate) sustained by on-going Black subordination at the

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4 Use of an exit poll overcomes typical concerns regarding over-reporting the vote that is common in telephone surveys.
hands of dominant whites (Dawson 1994). The linked fate hypothesis is less prevalent in Latino-related scholarship because group consciousness is notably weaker among Latinos. In its stead, contemporary studies of Latinos often attribute partisan divisions to differences in political attitudes, or, in the case of Cuban-Americans, the unique circumstances of their immigration to the United States (Garcia 2003; Alvarez and Bedolla 2001; Uhlaner and Garcia 2002). The idea that perceived Latino subordination plays an important role in their political socialization is rarely broached as an explanation for Latino political behavior (but see Jankowski 1986; Kaufmann 2004).  

In the absence of ethnic political organizations that communicate elite partisan cues to new voters, it seems quite likely that the political preferences of new immigrants are shaped in part by the social and economic power relations that prevail in their communities. As argued by Jankowski (1992), “…politically, ethnic-racial group members are socialized first and foremost by their perceptions of, and interaction in, the social orders that exist in the cities where they reside.” While it is fully understandable that many native-born African Americans see whites as their primary oppressors, Latinos, especially new immigrants, do not necessarily come to this country holding these views. Indeed, in immigrant rich communities where whites are politically weak, entrenched Black regimes may be as disconcerting to Hispanic newcomers as conservative white regimes can be to Black electorates. To better understand the likely trajectory of Latino politics, it seems essential to explore contextual considerations in addition to the more conventional explanations of Latino behavior that focus on nationality, class, levels of assimilation, ideology and political attitudes.

5 Perceived discrimination among Latinos is often posed as a possible explanation for turnout, but much less discussed in the context of voting behavior. For a recent summary of this literature see de la Garza (2004).
**Defining Context**

There is a large literature on the context effects regarding racial attitudes, policy opinion, and voting behavior. In general, this literature defines context in terms of demography and racial composition. The racial threat (or power) thesis posits that high proportions of Blacks in a given community pose symbolic and/or material threats to whites. Perceived threat, so defined, translates into more hostile racial attitudes, less egalitarian public policy views among whites, and greater polarization in the vote (Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Lublin 1995; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998).

Contextual studies of racial attitudes and voting behavior have shed light on the political implications of interracial competition; nonetheless, context, when measured as racial proportionality, is a blunt instrument at best. In particular it fails to capture the asymmetries in group relations. To the extent that racial and ethnic hostilities are rooted in competition over power, the attitudes of dominant and subordinate minority groups may not necessarily mirror one another. Rather, “context” (especially in a multicultural setting) is better conceived as a matter of relative group position in the local social environment (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Jankowski 1992). In a social and political setting where some groups are clearly more privileged than others, we expect that the political orientations among subordinates may evolve in opposition to dominant groups (Olzak 1992).

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6 There is some dispute over context effects and whether increasing diversity and residential contact necessarily lead to negative intergroup relations. For competing perspectives on the racial threat hypothesis, see Ellison and Powers (1994); Hero and Tolbert (1996); Hood and Morris (1998); Forbes (1997); Stein et al. (2000); and Oliver and Wong (2003).
**Immigrant Socialization: It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again**

Seminal research on the political socialization of European immigrants presumed that the political importance of ethnicity would wane over time as immigrants became assimilated into the larger culture. Scholars such as Robert Dahl (1961) and Milton Gordon (1964) suggested that class cleavages would subsume ethnic divisions in political importance as European immigrants moved into the middle-class. The decline in ethnic solidarity among immigrant voters predicted by the assimilation hypothesis was slow in coming as white ethnics retained their political leanings even in the face of upward mobility (Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 1967). Ethnic political affinities have proven to be quite durable across multiple generations (Gimpel and Tam Cho 2004; Rice and Feldman 1997).

Turn of the century immigrant populations were often mobilized and socialized by the political machines that controlled immigrant rich cities, and coalitions across immigrant nationality groups were common. Nonetheless, immigrant allegiance to the Democratic Party was far from automatic. In cities with strong Irish machines, for example, it was not uncommon for Italians to break ranks with their Irish brethren – especially in those cities where the Republicans were savvy enough to capitalize on Irish-based resentments as a mobilizing tool. As Wolfinger (1965) notes in his study of New Haven, Italians were courted by the GOP with the promise of over-turning the Irish-controlled Democratic Machine. Italian receptivity to these Republican appeals resulted in the election of New Haven’s first Italian mayor, William Celentano, in 1945. The
history of immigrant politics at the turn of the 20th century is replete with stories of intra-immigrant battles for local dominance (Erie 1988).

The power struggles that animated these ethnic antagonisms are extraordinarily pertinent to contemporary immigrant politics. The kinds of patronage that local bosses controlled in the pre-reform era may be different than the currency of contemporary politics; nonetheless, given the prevalence of identity politics today, there is no reason to presume that power relationships are any less consequential as a source of political socialization than they were in previous eras. Just as the political allegiances of early immigrants were shaped by municipal power dynamics, we presume that contemporary immigrant groups will also be influenced by the social orders of their local environments.

**Testing the Group Position Hypothesis: A Miami-Dade County Case Study**

The group position hypothesis presumes that political and socioeconomic stratification shape political orientations, particularly when dominant groups are well-entrenched and when their control over local resources is perceived by subordinates as giving unfair advantage to those inside the governing coalition. When heightened intergroup conflict is pervasive, as it most certainly is in Miami, out-group social identities may evolve into political ones. Stratification, and the ensuing interracial competition that often accompanies inequality, can activate latent social identities (and make them salient) so that they gain primacy over more traditional political identities such as party identification (Turner et al. 1987, Green et al. 2002, Kaufmann 2004).  

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7 For accounts of the interracial and inter-ethnic conflicts that have plagued Miami in recent decades, see Grenier and Castro (1992), Grenier and Stepick (1992); Moreno (1996), Portes and Stepick (1993), and Stepick et al. (2003).
In order to explore the relative importance of social order and group-based resentments on political behavior among immigrants, this study uses new data from an exit poll conducted in Miami-Dade County in 2004. The survey, funded by the University of Miami, includes a diverse set of Hispanic immigrants. A description of the survey methodology is in Appendix A.

Miami-Dade County is a particularly apt locale for this analysis as it represents one of the nation’s most diverse metropolitan areas. As of the 2000 census, non-Hispanic whites represent 21% of Miami-Dade’s population, Blacks comprise approximately 20%, Cubans are about 29% of the total, non-Cuban Hispanics are slightly less numerous than Cubans at 28.5%, and Haitians represent slightly over 3%. The Cuban population dominates Miami both in numbers and political influence, and while the non-Cuban Hispanic population is quite large, it is also exceedingly diverse. Apart from Cubans, no Latino sub-group exceeds more than 5% of the total Hispanic community. Because few groups beyond the Cubans reach the critical mass typically necessary for civic organizing, nationality-based political institutions are generally scarce within the larger Hispanic community. Simply, there are relatively few elite organizations to inform the political views and behaviors of non-Cuban immigrants. The diversity of non-Cuban Hispanics likely works against collective action; this suggests that, to the extent that anti-Cuban resentments shape political behaviors, they do so largely without the assistance of political intermediaries.

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8 For instance, both the city and county mayors are Cuban-American as are three of the five members of Congress whose districts overlap the county.
9 One notable exception can be found among the Haitian community that has relatively rich civic institutions that are politically active.
Research Design

We evaluate the group position hypothesis by examining the degree to which attitudes toward Cuban-Americans in Miami-Dade affect the vote choice in the 2004 presidential and senate races. As Cuban-Americans are the politically dominant group in Miami, we pay particular attention to the voting behavior of non-Cuban immigrants. To the extent that perceived subordination is related to political choice, we expect anti-Cuban resentments to influence voting behavior among non-Cuban Hispanics in both the presidential and senate contests; furthermore, the absence of a Cuban candidate in the presidential race and the presence of one (Mel Martinez) in the senate contest allow us to assess the pervasiveness of intra-Latino resentment as a shaper of political preference.

The Republican incumbent, George W. Bush, is very popular in the Cuban community, in part, because of his strong anti-Communist sentiments and his advocacy of anti-Castro policy legislation. We expect his connection to the Cuban community to make attitudes about Cuba policy salient to political choices, especially among non-Cuban Latinos. The Florida senate race in 2004 offers an additional dimension to the analysis. Not only did this open-seat race pit a Cuban-America (Mel Martinez) against a non-Cuban (Betty Castor), but Martinez spent the early part of the campaign developing an image as a successful Cuban immigrant who came to the U.S. in “Operation Pedro Pan”. Cultivating this image was so important that Martinez was reported to have taken

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10 We also include a mayoral voting analysis as a control case; both candidates in mayor’s race were members of the Cuban community, thus the Cuban resentment measure should not be a significant predictor of voting behavior.

11 The Bush Administration further tightened regulations concerning travel, monetary remittances, and the provision of humanitarian goods to Cuba on July 1, 2004. He has also repeatedly promised to veto any legislation that eases the embargo or travel restrictions.
Spanish lessons in order to enhance his ability to appeal to this community. The presence of a Latino candidate in the senate contest allows us to explore the power of out-group resentment in a context where pan-ethnic attachments may also be at play. Additionally, comparing voting between the presidential and senate elections offers some leverage on the question of whether the presence of a Latino candidate on the ballot is necessary and/or sufficient to make out-group resentments salient to the vote.

_The Dependent and Independent Variables_

The dependent variable in all of the analyses is vote choice with the Democratic candidates coded “0” and the Republican candidates coded “1”. While our central analytical concern regards the importance of anti-Cuban resentments, our models also include a range of independent variables that traditionally predicts voting behavior such as socio-demographic characteristics, policy preferences, and political orientations.

We construct our anti-Cuban resentment measure by using questions regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba. _Cuba Policy_ combines the answers to two questions about whether the travel ban and trade embargo against Cuba should be eased. American foreign policy toward Cuba is exceptional in that the current travel ban and trade embargoes against Cuba are not part of a general foreign policy standard applied toward other communist countries or totalitarian regimes. Many non-Cubans see these anti-Castro policies as a form of preferential treatment extended to Cubans, but not to other immigrants who come from similar circumstances. United States’ favoritism toward

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12 Dario Moreno related this anecdote at a roundtable on the election at Florida International University in November 2004.
13 The Miami-Dade County mayor’s race is officially non-partisan, even though partisan affiliations are generally known among better informed voters.
14 Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for this scale is .8.
Cuban immigrants is a recurring complaint among non-Cubans in Miami; furthermore, local television news coverage that highlights the disparity between U.S. policy toward Cuban refugees that make it to American soil (and who are allowed to remain) versus policy toward Haitian refugees (who are subject to immediate extradition) serves as a continual reminder of the government’s apparent bias in favor of the Cubans.

Americans in general dislike policies targeted to particular minority groups as they are often perceived as unfair (Bobo and Kluegel 1993), and in the context of Miami, the travel ban and trade embargoes are frequently seen in this light. For this reason, we interpret opposition to these Cuba-specific policies as indicators of anti-Cuban resentment. Given the strong connection between the Bush administration and the recent tightening of these anti-Castro policies, we expect opponents of current Cuba policy to disproportionately support Kerry in the presidential race. As Martinez, the Republican Senate candidate, is both Cuban and a supporter of these policies, we expect opinion on these preferential Cuba-related policies to shape voting in the Senate race as well. The Cuba Policy measure is scaled from low to high, with higher scores corresponding with increased support for travel and trade restrictions. We predict positive and significant coefficients, even after controlling for other traditionally important factors such as partisanship.

Beyond our investigation of intra-Latino group resentments, we also explore the possibility that voting behavior for non-Cuban Hispanics is shaped by other salient issues in 2004. Much has been made of the growing political importance that religiosity and

For additional discussion of this measure and its appropriateness, see de la Garza et al. (1996) and Kaufmann (2003).
social issue attitudes play with regard to partisan allegiances and voting behaviors, and it is certainly possible that attitudes toward reproductive rights and gay marriage were pivotal in shaping electoral choices. To explore these possibilities we include two social issue measures. *Abortion* is coded into four categories with higher values corresponding to increasingly pro-life positions. As the dependent variables in all of the analyses are Republican votes, we expect abortion to be positively signed. *Gay Ban* refers to support for a Constitutional Amendment to ban gay marriage, and is coded with higher scores corresponding to increased support for the ban.

Apart from social issues, attitudes about the war in Iraq were unquestionably important to voters in this campaign season. Our *Iraq* measure is a single item indicator where higher scores correspond to increasingly positive attitudes toward the Iraq invasion. We expect support for the Iraq war to correspond with greater levels of Republican voting in the presidential and senate races, all else being equal.

Expectations about future of the national economy are important short-term forces in presidential elections, especially when incumbents run for re-election. (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). As such, we include an economic evaluation measure in the presidential election model. *Economic Optimism* asks respondents about their opinions on the economy in the upcoming twelve months. Higher scores correspond to increased optimism. We expect those with positive opinions about the future to support Bush in greater numbers than do those who are pessimistic.

Beyond the resentment measures and salient issue measures, we include a measure of political orientation and socio-demographic controls. Political orientation is
accounted for by the party identification variable. *Party ID* is measured on a five-point scale with higher scores corresponding to increased Republican identification.

Our socio-demographic variables include: respondent *Age*, measured in years; *Gender*, with women coded as “1”; *Education*, in five categories from low to high; and, *Income*, in six categories from low to high. *Nicaragua* is a binary variable scored “1” if the respondent’s family was from Nicaragua. Past research suggests that after Cubans, Nicaraguans are the most conservative ethnic group among the Hispanic population and the only other reliable Republican voting group. Given the presence of Nicaraguans in the non-Cuban Hispanic sub-group, we include this control.

Finally, as our focus is on immigrant voting, we include an acculturation variable. *Acculturation* is a composite measure combining nativity with language use. Foreign born respondents who speak only Spanish are at the low end of the acculturation scale and native born respondents who only speak English are at the highest point. In general we expect acculturation effects to be manifest in greater political knowledge and stronger partisan commitments (Wong 2000); nonetheless, we include this factor to test for any incremental contribution it might make above and beyond the factors already included in the model.

**Results**

Table 1 reports some of the political characteristics of the Non-Cuban Hispanic population in Miami. Given the diversity of the non-Cuban Latino population, and the relative absence of nationality-based political organizations, one would expect to find relatively weak partisan commitments within this immigrant collective. Indeed, self-
identified partisans are pretty evenly split between the Democrats (37%) and Republicans (38%) with more than a fifth of the sample identifying as independents (22%). A simple comparison of party identification and self-reported vote choice among non-Cuban Hispanics suggests that independent voting tilts in favor of the Democrats, as only 43% of this group voted for President Bush. The results in Table 1 also appear to indicate a rather modest pan-ethnic pull for the Martinez candidacy; support for Martinez among non-Cuban Hispanics is approximately four points higher than it is for Bush.

Our first set of multivariate analyses focus on the voting behavior of non-Cuban Hispanics in the 2004 presidential and Florida senate races. In order to gain a better understanding of these patterns in the vote we estimate regression analyses using probit, which is appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables. Our results for the presidential and senate races are presented in Tables 2 and 3.

**The Bush Vote**

Table 2 presents the findings from our analysis of presidential voting and provides strong support for the group position thesis.19 As one would expect, party identification represents the most powerful influence on presidential vote, with opinions regarding the Iraq war coming in a strong second. In addition to the powerful influence of partisanship and Iraq war attitudes, judgments regarding anti-Castro policy prove to be quite robust as

19 Cell entries in Tables 2 and 3 represent unstandardized probit coefficients with their standard errors in parentheses. We use CLARIFY to run a probability analysis for these results that measures the increased probability of a Bush or Martinez vote as one moves from the lowest to the highest value on the indicator, holding all other variables at their mean values. The CLARIFY results we discuss in the text are in Appendix B.
well; among non-Cubans, support for the travel and trade bans increase the probability of a Bush vote by almost 40 percentage points. The extent to which Cuba policy attitudes powerfully influence the behaviors of non-Cuban Hispanics is noteworthy because, other than their role as an ongoing reminder of the status privilege accorded to Cubans, these policies have very little day-to-day effect on the lives of non-Cuban Hispanics. Save their symbolic importance that, given these findings, appears to be considerable, they should not be any more consequential to the non-Cuban vote than are other more remote political issues. Yet, for non-Cuban Latinos, support for Cuba-related policies does more to increase the Bush vote than does having pro-life abortion attitudes, all else being equal. In all, we interpret our results to indicate a strong relationship between anti-Cuban resentment and the presidential choices of non-Cuban Hispanics. We also maintain that this relationship is most assuredly a function of power relations in the Miami-Dade context, as it is highly unlikely that Cuban policy attitudes in general influence Latino voting in areas where Cubans have less of a presence.

The Martinez Vote

The findings from our analysis of senate voting are in Table 3, and like the preceding results, they too provide support for the group position thesis. Consistent with most behavioral accounts of voting behavior, party identification is the most potent predictor of senate vote choice; nonetheless, party identification is a less robust predictor in the senate contest than it was is in the presidential race (.94 in the presidential vs. .77 in the senate). Lower levels of partisan voting in the Senate race indicate an increased number of Democratic defections than in the presidential race; furthermore, we presume
that these defections were motivated by pan-ethnic support coming from this non-Cuban Latino voting bloc. Without additional data individual-level data regarding the strength of pan-ethnic identification, however, we cannot make this case with any certainty.

Views about the Iraq war were also important to voters in the senate contest, although less than they were in the presidential race. Iraq war supporters were 72 percentage points more likely to vote for Bush, whereas they were only 42 percentage points more likely to support Martinez, all else being equal.

The influence of Cuba policy attitudes on the non-Cuban Hispanic vote is both statistically significant and considerable in the Martinez/Castor contest. Those respondents who oppose anti-Castro policies are 29 percentage points more likely to vote for Castor than their pro-Cuban counterparts. As we expected, the presence of a Cuban candidate in this race appears to have made issues of ethnicity and resentments over Cuban power salient to non-Cuban Hispanic voters. The Martinez campaign focused heavily on the candidate’s immigrant roots with numerous appeals targeted toward fellow immigrants. In spite of these pan-immigrant appeals, anti-Cuban antagonisms still retain some of their political force, although not as much as they did in the presidential contest.

The Mayoral Contest

We argue throughout the paper that attitudes regarding anti-Castro policies are a good measure of the underlying resentments that non-Cubans hold toward the Cuban community in Miami; this should be particularly true among non-Cuban Hispanic immigrants as they wield considerably less power in Miami than do the Cubans and are not privy to the special status accorded to Cuban immigrants by the U.S. government. In
order to provide further validation for this perspective, we conduct a voting analysis of
the Miami-Dade mayoral contest. The non-partisan mayor’s race pitted a Cuban
Republican (Alvarez) against a Cuban-Puerto Rican Democrat (Morales). As both
candidates in this race have ties to the Cuban community, anti-Cuban resentments (as
measured by anti-Castro policy attitudes) should not influence voting behavior. In this
sense, we use the mayoral race to bolster our confidence in the Cuban policy measure;
were Cuba policy attitudes significant predictors of mayoral voting, this would shed
considerable doubt on the validity of the Cuba policy variable as an appropriate measure
of anti-Cuban resentment.

The findings from our mayoral voting analysis are presented in Table 4 and serve
to further validate our anti-Cuban resentment measure. The regression results suggest
that social conservatives, Republicans and men were more likely to vote for Alvarez than
Morales. As anticipated, however, the Cuba Policy measure is statistically insignificant
and does not predict voting in this race with two Cuban candidates.

Discussion

Our central claim in this paper is that power relations in local communities
constitute an important agent of political socialization for Hispanic immigrants; inter-
ethnic antagonisms that result from status inequalities almost inevitably find their way
into the political realm. In the case of Miami-Dade County, United States’ policies that
favor Cuban immigrants create resentments among non-Cubans. The social, political and
economic successes of the Cuban community relative to other immigrant and native-born
groups constitute an additional source of status anxiety, especially for those relegated to the lower rungs of Miami society.

Our analyses of exit poll data from the 2004 presidential and senate elections confirm the pervasiveness of anti-Cuban resentments among non-Cuban Hispanics and also point to their political influence. Controlling for an array of issue attitudes, socio-economic traits and political characteristics – typically strong correlates to voting behavior in the mass public – anti-Cuban sentiments particular to the Miami-Dade context significantly shape voter behavior. At first blush one might minimize the importance of these findings, interpreting them to be little more than an idiosyncrasy of Miami politics, but we see them as indicative of a much broader phenomenon, and one that is particularly consequential to understanding the long-term political course of immigrant populations. As Latino newcomers come to live in an increasingly diverse set of locations across the United States, their political affinities will only be partially influenced by national forces. Local dynamics that pit Latino newcomers against other groups, especially those with historically entrenched power – whether they are other Latino nationality groups, African Americans, Asians, or Anglos – will also play a role in their political development. Just as the Italians who lived in certain towns were die-hard Democrats, while others (lured into anti-Irish coalitions) became Republicans for life, so too should we expect divergent outcomes from contemporary immigrant socialization experiences.

There are many “rational” reasons to expect non-Cuban Latino immigrants to affiliate with the Democratic Party. To the extent that many new Latin immigrants are economically disadvantaged, conventional wisdom dictates that they will flock to the
party that promises a more beneficent social welfare state. To date, much of this prophecy appears true. If past is prologue, then ongoing Republican efforts to woo Latino immigrants seem futile at best; however, the future of Latino politics may not perfectly mirror the past.

This most recent wave of Hispanic immigration – particularly during the 1980s and 1990s -- points to a proliferation of new Latino destinations (Suro and Singer 2000). During the earlier part of the past century, the vast majority of Hispanic immigrants settled in a relatively small number of gateway states: California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Florida, New York and Illinois. Recent immigration patterns, however, point to enormous Latino population growth in many states with little history of Hispanic immigration; nowhere is this truer than in the South (Durand et al. 2000; Suro and Singer 2000). Of the ten states with the fastest growing Latino populations, seven are located in the South or Border South (Kochar et al. 2005). Examples of Southern metropolitan regions that are experiencing triple-digit growth rates in their Hispanic populations include: Atlanta, Georgia; Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston Salem, and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee; and Greenville, South Carolina (McClain et al. 2005). These metropolitan areas have almost no history of Latino immigration; rather, race has always been the predominant political and social cleavage.

New research conducted by Paula McClain and others (2005) identify substantial conflict between new Latino immigrants and native-born African Americans in Southern communities. In their multiracial survey of Raleigh-Durham, they find that Latino respondents hold negative stereotypes about Blacks, and that, in general, they feel closer to whites living in the community. Given the recency of mass immigration to many
Southern cities, and the fact that many of these new migrants are not eligible to vote, we can only speculate as to the long-term political trajectory of Hispanic immigrants; nonetheless, to the extent that Latinos continue to identify with whites more than Blacks, especially in Black-controlled cities, Southern Hispanics may indeed lean more Republican than their earlier immigrant counterparts. This is particularly plausible given the relative absence of Latino political organizations in these Southern locales.

Immigration policy is a perennially contentious topic in American politics that creates fissures within and across political parties. Conventional wisdom tells us that ongoing Hispanic immigration will result in an abundance of new Democratic voters. The relative poverty of new Latino immigrants may indeed draw many into the ranks of the Democratic Party, yet new immigrants have little collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement or previous battles over the social welfare state – important factors that surely influenced earlier generations of immigrant voters. Furthermore, recent immigrants to the United States arrive at a time when class solidarity in American politics is waning, and where the salience of racial and religious issues is credited for the rising Republican tide. Context – at the national and the community level – will play an important role in the political socialization of new Hispanic immigrants, and studies of immigrant socialization should not proceed without taking both of these powerful contextual factors into account.
References


Table 1. Republican Voting and Party Identification among Non-Cuban Hispanics

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<tr>
<th>Non-Cuban Hispanic</th>
<th>Non-Cuban Hispanic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bush Vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martinez Vote</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>38%</td>
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</table>

Source: University of Miami, Miami-Dade County Exit Poll, November 2004

Table 2. Bush Vote (2004 Presidential Race)

<table>
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<th>Non-Cuban Hispanic</th>
<th>Non-Cuban Hispanic</th>
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<td>Abortion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gay Ban</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Optimism</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>1.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba Policy</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: University of Miami, Miami-Dade County Exit Poll, November 2004

Note: Cell entries represent probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the Bush Vote. All independent variables are scaled from liberal to conservative; in the cases of income, age and education, they are scaled from low to high. Party is scaled from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. *p < .05 (one-tailed test) **p < .025 (one-tailed test) ***p < .005 (one-tailed test).
Table 3. Martinez Vote (Florida Senate Race)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Cuban Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.04***</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>.77*</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay Ban</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.64***</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba Policy</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: University of Miami, Miami-Dade County Exit Poll, November 2004

Note: Cell entries represent probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the Martinez Vote. All independent variables are scaled from liberal to conservative; in the cases of income, age and education, they are scaled from low to high. Party is scaled from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. *p < .05 (one-tailed test) **p < .025 (one-tailed test) ***p < .005 (one-tailed test).
### Table 4. Alvarez Vote (Miami-Dade Mayoral Race)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>.39 (.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>.27*** (.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay Ban</td>
<td>-.35** (.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.08 (.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.07 (.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.19* (.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.75*** (.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>.023 (.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba Policy</td>
<td>.01 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 152

**Source:** University of Miami, Miami-Dade County Exit Poll, November 2004

**Note:** Cell entries represent probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the Martinez Vote. All independent variables are scaled from liberal to conservative; in the cases of income, age and education, they are scaled from low to high. Party is scaled from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. *p < .05 (one-tailed test) **p < .025 (one-tailed test) ***p < .005 (one-tailed test).
Appendix A: Exit Poll Survey Methodology

The Miami Exit Poll surveyed 1,456 voters in Miami Dade County Florida as they left their polling places between October 22, and “election day” November 2nd 2004. Surveys were administered in three languages: English, Spanish and Creole with the overwhelming majority completed in English and Spanish. On average, the surveys took respondents about 25 minutes to complete. Interviewers approached every third person who exited the polling place (i.e., after a refusal or interview they ignored the next two people) to ensure randomness in the selection of respondents.

Surveys were administered primarily by about 106 undergraduate political science students, about 90% of whom were enrolled in either a course on public opinion or a course on presidential elections. The response rate was about 46% which we attribute to the prominence with which students displayed their affiliation with the University, which has an extremely positive reputation in the community. Students were trained as interviewers with a 25 minute presentation made in class, followed by a 5 minute refresherer when they arrived to get their polling materials. Students were randomly assigned to teams of 2-3 and were given random polling locations through the county.

Three incentives were built in to the project to ensure that students faithfully administered surveys. First, cash prizes were awarded to the students whose samples most closely reflected the Presidential election result in their assigned precinct (measured using the mean squared error). Students were taught the statistical principle that as the number of responses increases, the variance around the true population parameter should decrease. Second, five students were employed as monitors to check up on interviewers to ensure they showed up at their assigned polling places. Third, students were given the
results of their surveys and required to use them as the basis for the course term paper, for which part of the assignment was to explain voting patterns in the precinct given the demographic characteristics of the area.

Polling locations were determined through two methods. Early voting in Miami-Dade County occurred at 20 sites, at which any voter in the county could cast a ballot. Since we had no previous experience on which to draw, we assumed voters at these sites to be uniformly distributed, and we randomly selected (with replacement) 16 different locations that were polled over about eight of the fourteen days on which early voting occurred. Early voters constituted 31% of the county electorate, but because of the extended period available for polling, 41.6% (606) of our sample. However, our sample does not include respondents who voted by absentee ballot (13.1%). So of the people who voted in person, early voters actually constituted 35.6% of the population of such voters.

To account for this difference we construct a set of weights for use in analyzing the overall election results. For the general election, polling places were randomly selected such that every registered voter in the county had an equal probability of selection. More specifically, polling locations were randomly selected after being assigned numbers (from a cumulative probability distribution) that corresponded to the proportion of the electorate that was eligible to vote at each location.

In regards to early voting, weights are employed to discount the value of each early voter in our survey such that they appropriately reflect their makeup in the entire voting electorate. This weight is calculated by creating a weight ‘x’ such that dividing the proportion of early voters in the county voting population by the proportion obtained
in our survey we can solve for ‘x’. Other weights for each category of each weighting variable are created in the same manner. Other weights used to create the variable “weight5” include party identification (weighted using party registration), race, sex, and age. These weights should be applied to all analyses because despite the random selection of respondents, the sample obtained was biased towards youth and Democratic identifiers. The weighting system is validated by the highly accurate results generated for the presidential, senate and especially the (non-partisan) mayoral race, for which weighted estimates provide results well within the margin of error.
Appendix B. Change in the Probability of Voting for the Republican Candidate among Non-Cuban Latinos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bush Vote</th>
<th>Martinez Vote</th>
<th>Alvarez Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>.51 (.26)</td>
<td>.29 (.16)</td>
<td>. ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>.29 (.15)</td>
<td>.30 (.13)</td>
<td>.31 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay Ban</td>
<td>. ..</td>
<td>. ..</td>
<td>-.27 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>. ..</td>
<td>. ..</td>
<td>-.29 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.94 (.09)</td>
<td>.77 (.12)</td>
<td>.28 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>.72 (.17)</td>
<td>.42 (.14)</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba Policy</td>
<td>.40 (.18)</td>
<td>.29 (.16)</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries were generated using CLARIFY and reflect the increased probability of a Republican Vote moving from the lowest to the highest value on each independent variable, holding all other variable values at their sample means. Results are shown only for significant coefficients. Cells denoted by a “.” indicate that the probit coefficient is not significant or that the variable was not included in that model.