

## Frege and Evans on Mock Proper Names

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### Introduction

Frege's notion of a 'mock proper name' (and with it 'mock assertions' and 'mock thoughts') seems to have been introduced in his "Logic" of 1897. Since these notions have received heavy-duty interpretation it will pay to attend carefully to the relevant text.

#### A. Frege on Mock Proper Names (Thoughts and Assertions)

Frege begins the crucial section by noting:

"In the cases which alone concern logic the sense of an assertoric sentence is either true or false, and then we have what we call a thought proper. But there remains a third case of which at least some mention must be made here." (1897, 129)

The "third kind of case" involves sentences such as:

- (1)
  - a. Scylla has six heads
  - b. Scylla does not have six heads

Frege continues:

"For [them] to be true the proper name 'Scylla' would have to designate something." (ibid, 129)

Names which fail to designate something he calls "mock proper names":

[S] "Names that fail to fulfill the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, may be called mock proper names" (ibid, 130)

Note: here proper names are 'mock'. He then (ibid, 130) considers the sentences:

- (2)
  - a. William Tell shot an apple off his son's head
  - b. William Tell did not shoot an apple off his son's head

And he comments:

"Although ... 'William Tell' is a mock proper name, we cannot deny it a sense ... I do not say, however, that

this sense is false either, but I characterize it as fictitious." (ibid, 130)

Note: here the sense of a mock proper name is 'fictitious'. Furthermore, Frege explicitly says that 'William Tell' has a sense, but lacks a reference and hence is a 'mock proper name', it is 'fictitious'. What does Frege mean by 'fictitious'? Here things get a bit unclear, but whatever 'fictitious' means exactly (though it looks like it means: does not have a reference), it is clear that for Frege, some proper names have a sense and lack a reference. Frege seems to take three approaches to the 'mock proper names' and the 'fictitious' nature of these names.

**Ideas** The first looks like a false start. He says:

"If the idealist theory of knowledge is correct then all the sciences would belong to the realm of fiction. (ibid, 130)

Here it begins to look like being fictitious has to do with being about the realm of 'ideas', and Frege continues:

"Indeed one might try to interpret all sentences in such a way that they are about ideas." (ibid)

Note: here sentences are fictitious if they are about ideas. Frege notes that, given his doctrine that sense determines reference, a change of reference involves a change of sense, hence:

"by doing this, however, their sense would be completely changed ... this new science would be a branch of psychology." (ibid, 130)

**Not True or False** Frege drops this line of thinking, and starts up again:

"Instead of speaking of 'fiction' we could speak of 'mock thoughts' [Scheingedanken]. Thus if the sense of an assertoric sentence is not true, it is either false or fictitious, and it will generally<sup>1</sup> be the latter if it contains a mock proper name." (ibid, 130)

Note: here the sense of an assertoric sentence (a thought) is fictitious. And notice two further things. First, it looks like Frege is offering an alternative terminology --he is offering to replace the 'fiction' label with the 'mock thought' label. Second, notice that there is no question here of sentences with mock ('fictitious') proper names not having a sense, they do, it is just that unlike sentences with non-mock proper names, the thoughts they express are not true or false, they are 'fictitious'. 'Fictitious' is beginning to look like it just means: does not have a reference, which for thoughts means: not true or false.

**Not to be Taken Seriously** Finally, Frege continues:

"Assertions in fiction are not to be taken seriously: they are only mock assertions. Even the thoughts are not meant to be taken seriously as in the sciences: they are only mock thoughts ... a work of fiction is not meant to be taken seriously." (ibid, 130)

Note: here both assertions and thoughts are 'mock'. Next Frege notes that:

[P] "Even the proper names in drama, though they correspond to names historical personages, are mock proper

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<sup>1</sup> Frege's qualification here involves the exception "where a mock proper name occurs within a clause in indirect speech." (ibid, 130) But given Frege's theory of indirect sense and reference, for the mock proper name within a true or false sentence of indirect quotation to have a reference, it must have a customary sense.

names; they are not meant to be taken seriously in the work." (ibid, 130)

Here Frege seems to be taking back his earlier characterization of 'mock' a referenceless, and replacing it with "not to be taken seriously" i.e. not being used to refer (to what they refer to). Finally, Frege returns to the opening theme, that logic, concerned with the laws of truth, does not have to concern itself with mock thoughts:

"The logician does not have to bother with mock thoughts, just as a physicist, who sets out to investigate thunder, will not pay attention to stage-thunder." (ibid, 130)

"When we speak of thoughts in what follows we mean thoughts proper, thoughts that are either true or false." (ibid, 130)

At this point we seem to be getting another terminological suggestion: thoughts can be subcategorized into:

'proper thoughts': have a truth value, are in the domain of logic

'mock thoughts': do not have a truth value; are not in the domain of logic

### B. What's 'Mock' about Mock Entities?

This still leaves us with the question of how to interpret these remarks. First, since Frege moves without comment between the following three notions, one might suppose that he takes them as equivalent:

1. x is mock (scheine: also 'pseudo') [so not real]
2. x is fictitious (e.g. occurs in literature or drama) [so not real]
3. x is not to be taken seriously (was not meant literally)

These are not equivalent notions, and there is no real justification for thinking Frege thought they were:

A thought can be from fiction (fictitious?) and meant to be taken seriously,  
A proper name can fail to have a (customary) reference and not be fictitious,  
A proper name can occur in fiction and have a (customary) reference

If these are distinct notions we can ask if there is an explanatory order to them --is one more basic than the other?

**1 & 2** If being a fictitious or mock F entails not really being an F, then it is implausible that referenceless names and truth valueless thoughts fail to be names or thoughts at all, given what Frege says in the text above (and remarks published elsewhere).

**3: Semantic** How about if 1 and 2 do not entail not being real? Frege develops the ideas in one order --from names to thoughts to assertions, and from 'mock' to 'fictitious' to 'not serious', and one might take this to be the explanatory order as well --an assertion is 'mock' because it manifests a judgment towards a 'mock' thought (one with no truth value), because the sentence expressing that thought contains a 'mock' proper name --one with no reference. This accords with quotation [S], but it conflicts with quotation [P] --where the 'mock proper name' has a referent, but it is not being used with that reference.

**3: Pragmatic** However, it is arguable that the order of explanation is the reverse --that what he says last is the explanatory root for what went on previously, and that the explanatory order is from 'not taken seriously' to 'fictitious' to 'mock'. This has the advantage of comporting with quotation [P]. So, we will take Frege as using the words 'mock' and 'fictitious' as covering terms for anything not to be taken seriously, and something is not to be taken seriously just when questions of truth and reference are not at issue. As he had already written in "On Sense and Reference":

"The thought loses value for us as soon as we recognize that the reference of one of its parts is missing." (ibid, 63)

"The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight [RMH: as in the case of fiction] for an attitude of scientific investigation." (ibid)

"It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from sense to reference." (ibid)

In sum, we reconstruct Frege's thinking here along the following lines: something is "to be taken seriously" only if truth is at issue (science); the truth value of a sentence is at issue if and only if its names are taken to have reference; so reference-less names are not "to be taken seriously" and are "mock" names. Thus, we interpret the "Logic" passages of 1897 as (infelicitous) terminological preferences for marking some thoughts names and assertions as serious and worthy of 'science'. This comports well with Frege's later c. 1914) comment:

"What really pertains to logic lies not in the word 'true' but in the asserting force with which a sentence is spoken." ("My Basic Logical Insights", 252)

### C. Evans on Frege on Mock Proper Names<sup>2</sup>

Evans (1982, chapter 1) interprets Frege differently. Here is his conclusion:

"Frege held, both before the distinction between sense and Meaning and, despite appearances, after it, a highly Russellian view of singular terms. Frege's later apparent willingness to ascribe sense to certain empty singular terms was equivocal, hedged around with qualifications, and dubiously consistent with the fundamentals of his philosophy of language." (ibid, 38)

Seemingly ignoring the many passages where Frege endorses referenceless names, he focuses instead on some early unpublished notes of Frege's, his informal commentary on his notation in the *Grundgesetze*, and the above paragraphs of Frege (1897). Evans interprets Frege generally as providing a theory of reference, with "another level" (ibid, 13) a theory of sense "grafted on" to cover puzzles of cognitive significance. But historically that is not the way Frege conceived of it. Frege viewed the sense-reference distinction as a distinction within the notion of content --judgments were subdivided into thought and truth-value, the thought was not added on to the truth value as another level. As Frege says:

"Formerly I distinguished two components in that whose external form is a declarative sentence: (1) the acknowledgment of truth, (2) the content that is acknowledged to be true. The content I called a 'possible content of judgment'. This last has now split for me into what I call 'thought' and 'truth-value', as a consequence of distinguishing between sense and denotation of a sign. In this case the sense of a sentence is a thought, and its denotation a truth-value. Over and above this is the acknowledgment that the truth-value is the True." (*Grundgesetze*, 6-7)

### The Early Single-Factor Theory

Evans gets his conclusion that:

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<sup>2</sup> Bell (1990) compellingly argues that Evans' interpretation of Frege is more appropriate to Russell and Wittgenstein, and involves serious textual omissions and distortions of interpretation (see also Salmon, 1990, footnote 23).

"Frege's theory of Meaning for the fragment of language he was concerned with after 1890 corresponds exactly to the theory that was implicit in the earlier works, the *Begriffsschrift*, and the *Grundlagen*." (ibid, 8)

in part by two maneuvers: (i) by importing features of the later theory into his description of the early one, and (ii) by exporting elements of the later theory to the fringes. To these he adds (iii) some historically dubious construals of text. Let's go through these one at a time.

## 1.2 Meaning Evans begins his discussion by saying that:

"Frege took as his starting point the idea that the significance of a complete sentence consisted in its being true or false." (ibid, 8)

"Frege was distinctive in supposing that the semantic power [power to affect truth value] of an expression was determined by that expression's being associated with some extra linguistic entity." (ibid, 8)

"Once the two anchors --the assignment of truth values to sentences, and the assignment of objects to singular terms --have been lowered, the kind of entity that constitutes the semantic value of an expression of any of the various other kinds is more or less determined by its grammatical category." (ibid, 9)

Does this characterize the early Frege, the single-factor theory? Let's review the basic devices on the *Begriffsschrift*:

- /- **A** (the judgment that A is a fact)
- A** (possible content of judgment) Excludes such constructions as: /- house.
- /- (judgment sign) Prefixes only to a possible content of judgment and is the common predicate of all judgments ("is a fact").
- / (judgment stroke) Acknowledges the content as true and expresses affirmation.
- (content stroke) Combines the signs that follow into a totality; relates any sign to the totality of signs that follow the stroke; is to be read as 'the circumstance or proposition that'.
- | (condition stroke) [i.e. A -->] B stands for the judgment that "the third of these possibilities [A is affirmed and B is denied] does not take place, but one of the three others does [A is affirmed and B is affirmed, A is denied and B is affirmed, A is denied and B is denied]".
- , (negation stroke) means 'A does not take place'.
- = (identity of content) the sign A and the sign B have the same conceptual content, so that we can everywhere put B for A and conversely.
- $\Phi(\mathbf{A})$  (function and one argument) A has the property  $\Phi$ .
- $\Psi(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$  (function and two arguments) B stands in the relation  $\Psi$  to A.
- **a** --  $\Phi(\mathbf{a})$ <sup>3</sup>  
(generality) [i.e. universal quantification] whatever we may take for the argument (a) of  $\Phi$ , the function is a fact.

(Frege's treatment of function-argument, identity, and quantification were all, in part, metalinguistic, and his treatment of conditional and negation was in terms of affirmation, denial, and what does not take place.) It is hard to see any particular 'semantics' here. It is hard to see these views as more than elucidatory comments on an interpreted notation -- more of a sketch of a translation manual than the giving of a 'semantics'. There is nothing here on 'word to world' connections, and in Frege's text, almost nothing on the role of truth. So right from the beginning it is difficult to see how Evans' characterization of early Frege in terms of 'semantic power', 'semantic values' and the 'two anchors' of truth

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<sup>3</sup> Frege's notation for the universal quantifier involves a "concavity" under the variable which we do not reproduce here.

and reference' are going to gain any textual purchase.

### 1.3 Empty Singular Terms: Preliminary Remarks

A good example of Evans' ambivalence in describing Frege (early theory vs later theory) occurs in his discussion of empty names. He begins by giving a 'later-Frege' analysis of e.g. 'John is wise':

"The Proper Name 'John' has the role of introducing an object, which is to be the argument of the function introduced by the concept expression '[x] is wise' --a function which maps all and only wise objects on to the value True." (ibid, 10)

Evans notes that sentences viewed as the bearers of truth value so determined will fail to have a truth value (true, False) if the Proper Name fails to "have an object as its Meaning". (ibid, 11) Evans then quotes passages from early Frege, plausibly dated before 1884, as evidence that Frege "explicitly endorsed the consequences as regards empty terms". (ibid, 12) One might think that the consequences embraced are that sentences with empty Proper Names are devoid of truth value. But Evans has larger game in his sights:

[A] "Frege ... at one time certainly embraced ... a view of singular terms which is commonly regarded as more Russellian than Fregean: namely the view that someone who uttered a sentence containing an empty singular term would fail to say anything in the sense that he would fail to express a thought." (ibid, 12)

[B] "This fact makes my use of the expression 'Russellian singular term' to mean a singular term whose significance depends upon its having a referent -- ... somewhat unhistorical." (ibid, 12)

Although in [B] Evans does not say Frege embraced 'Russellian Singular terms' during his early period, the implication is there (otherwise, what would be "unhistorical"?). Do the quotations support this reading? I want to argue that generally not.

The clearly earliest quote comes from Frege's unpublished "Dialogue with Punjer on Existence" (before 1884):

"If 'Sachse exists' is supposed to mean 'The word "Sachse" is not an empty sound, but designates something', then it is true that the condition 'Sachse exists' must be satisfied. But this is not a new premise, but the presupposition of all our words --a presupposition that goes without saying. The rules of logic always presuppose that the words are not empty, that our sentences express judgments, that one is not playing a mere game with words. Once 'Sachse is a man' expresses an actual judgment, the word 'Sachse' must designate something, and in that case I do not need a further premise in order to infer 'There are men' from it. The premise 'Sachse exists' is redundant, if it is to mean something different from the above-mentioned presupposition of all our thinking." (ibid, 60 emphasis added)

Notice the emphasized qualifications; the import of these qualifications is that for logic (the study of the laws of truth-preserving inference) to apply, the judgment expressed by a sentence must have its presupposition (that the singular terms designate something) satisfied. For only in this way will the sentence express a judgement suitable for logic. And even if one takes that last sentence to give the discussion wider application than logic, the above quotation does not, in and of itself, establish the view that Frege considered referenceless singular terms to be without significance; it says nothing beyond the requirement of reference for judgment.

The second passage quoted by Evans is a related passage in Frege's "Seventeen Key Sentences in Logic" which contains the same example, and so might reasonably be dated about the same time, but which might be dated later

(notice the newer 'thought' where the former passage had the older 'judgment'):<sup>4</sup>

"A sentence can be true or untrue only if it is an expression for a thought. The sentence 'Leo Sachse is a man' is the expression of a thought only if 'Leo Sachse' designates something. And too the sentence 'this table is round' is the expression of a thought only if the words 'this table' are not empty sounds but designate something specific for me." (ibid, 174)

Again, the context is the discussion in logic (see the title), where sentences must have a truth value, so the singular terms must have a reference. But Frege's use of 'thought' goes beyond this, even if it is the ordinary, rather than Frege's technical, notion. Still, Frege does not say that 'Leo Sachse' has no significance if it has no reference, only that the sentence containing it will not express a thought. However, this is a puzzling passage to fit into the whole, and does constitute some evidence for a Russellian interpretation. On the other hand, the brevity of the format (17 sentences) suggests that Frege may have simply left out the qualification found in the longer passage from the dialogue with Punjer.

### **The Later Two-Factor Theory**

Evans runs two general lines of argument: (i) one is a proposed interpretation of Frege's semantic project, (ii) the other is an interpretation of crucial texts. We will find serious problems with both lines of argument.

#### **1.4 Sense**

Evans brings his interpretation of Frege's notion of sense with Frege's late (1914) introduction of the notion in a letter to Jourdain, where two explorers unwittingly survey the same mountain, one from, say, the east (calling it 'Aphla'), and one from, say, the west (calling it 'Ateb'). They compare notes and discover that:

"both explorers saw the same mountain. Now the content of the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is far from being a mere consequence of the principle of identity, but contains a valuable piece of geographical knowledge ... I say accordingly that the sense of the name 'Ateb' is different from the sense of the name 'Aphla' ... An object can be determined in different ways, and every one of these ways of determining it can give rise to a special name, and these different names then have different senses; for it is not self-evident that it is the same object which is being determined in different ways." (LTJ, 80)

Evans takes this passage in a very specific way, one which is true of the case Frege presents, but is not obviously true of all of Frege's cases:

"Someone who hears and understands an utterance of a sentence containing a singular term, such as 'Aphla' is over 5000 meters high' must at least think of the mountain --in having, precisely this thought: that what the speaker is saying is true if and only if that mountain is over 5000 meters high. Now, it is not possible to think of a mountain save in some particular way. If you gave the way in which our subject was thinking of it, you would be giving what Frege calls the sense he attaches to the name 'Aphla'." (ibid, 16 emphasis added)

In this example there is a particular mountain that the two explorers are in fact thinking of, but Evans needs more than this to establish that it is a necessary feature of thoughts, because not every feature of the example is a necessary feature of sense, otherwise, since Frege only mentions objects in this passage, one would have to conclude that only singular terms as names of objects have a sense --which is false. Evans' official interpretation of Frege's notion of sense quite unjustifiably builds that feature into it:

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<sup>4</sup> See the editor's footnote on the problem of dating the piece.

"I suggest that we take Frege's ascription of a sense to a Proper Name to mean that not only must one think of an object --the referent of the term --in order to understand a sentence containing it, but anyone who is to understand the sentence must think of the referent in the same particular way." (ibid, 17)

## 1.5 Senses and Thought

Evans notes that Frege rarely discusses "particular ways of thinking of objects" (ibid, 18), but wants to deny that it must be descriptive, citing Frege's brief passage concerning the fact that we can think of ourselves in a primitive way available to no one else --features Evans says, but does not argue, are incompatible with 'descriptivism' (ibid, 18) (Evans does not consider the messy but real possibility that this is a unique exception) One thing Frege does seem to hold about senses, or at least thoughts, is what Evans calls 'the Intuitive Criterion of Difference':

**(ICD)** "The thought associated with one sentence S as its sense must be different from the thought associated with another sentence S' as its sense, iff it is possible for someone to understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes towards them i.e. accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting (accepting), or being agnostic about, the other." (ibid, 18-19)

Evans generalizes this to cognitive value in general:

**(CV)** "a sentence S has a different cognitive value from a sentence S' just in case it is possible to understand S and S' while taking different attitudes towards them." (ibid, 19)

So "ways of thinking of an object", if they are to be an explication of sense, must conform to these constraints.

## 1.6 Empty Singular Terms: Sense Without Meaning

Now Evans can deliver his punchline:

"It is really not clear how there can be a mode of presentation associated with some term when there is no object to be presented. On my interpretation of the metaphor the difficulty remains acute: it certainly does not appear that there can be a way of thinking about something unless there is something to be thought about that way." (ibid, 22)

Evans acknowledges that he may have "misinterpreted Frege's intentions" (ibid, 22), and thinks:

"Deeper difficulties emerge if we ask: what, on Frege's view, is the meaning of assigning an entity to an expression as its semantic value. (ibid, 22)

Right off we should be suspicious since Frege never ascends to the abstract level of 'semantic value'. Evans continues:

"Surely the choice of entities of a given type as appropriate semantic values for expressions of a given category must mean that the functioning of any member of that category as a viable element of language depends upon its being associated with such an entity." (ibid, 22)

But this does not seem to be Frege's perspective at all. For Frege, it was not a question of a "choice" of "entities" that are assigned to, or "associated with", words; it was a question of what the facts are about language, and he argued for each aspect of his theory (with varying success). Punch comes to shove with referenceless Proper Names and truth valueless sentences:

"What can it mean on Frege's, or on anyone's, principles, for there to be a perfectly determinate thought which simply has no truth value?" (ibid, 24)

It is not clear what is puzzling Evans here. On Evans' construal of Frege, things are supposed to be improved if we take a sense to be a way of thinking about a referent, so in the case of sentences it should help to take the thought to be a way of thinking of a truth value, but does that really help? Does having that reference make it any more intelligible? Evans seems to support his intuition that there are no truth-value gapped thoughts with an argument, though the text here (ibid, 24-5) is not totally clear. What Evans finds "incomprehensible" is:

"The idea that the thought that  $p$  and the thought that it is not the case that  $p$  can both fail to be true. Surely the thought that it is not true that  $p$  is true just when the thought that  $p$  is not true ... Where thoughts, or beliefs, are concerned, surely failing to have the value True just is having the value False." (ibid, 25)

But this argument assumes that the negation of a truth-valueless thought must be false, whereas Frege considers it to also be truth valueless (see the last sentence).

Evans endorses, to a point, Dummett's (1973) idea that:

"... even when Frege is purporting to give the sense of a word or symbol, what he actually states is what its reference is ... In a case in which we are concerned to convey, or stipulate, the sense of an expression, we shall choose that means of stating what the referent is which displays the sense: we might ....say that, for Frege, we say what the referent of a word is, and thereby show what its sense is." (1973, 227)

And from such a perspective, empty names are definitely an anomaly; Evans:

"So on this matter of the sense of empty singular terms Frege was inconsistent." (ibid, 27-8)

However, we only have Frege inconsistent with the Dummett-Evans interpretation, we do not yet have an inconsistency in Frege proper. Evans asks himself:

"Why did he not see the inconsistency? Why did he continue to adhere to a basically Russellian view of singular terms in all his serious theorizing, despite his willingness to contemplate empty singular terms with a sense? (ibid, 28)

One answer is of course that Frege did not "adhere to a basically Russellian view of Proper Names", but Evans' view is that:

"... Frege found a convenient mat under which he could sweep the problem posed for his theory by his assigning sense to empty singular terms, a mat we might label 'Fiction'." (ibid, 28)

According to Evans, Frege first:

"treats any use of an empty singular term as a fictional, or sometimes poetical, use of language ... at almost every place where Frege discusses empty singular terms, the idea of myth or fiction, sometimes even poetry, is close at hand." (ibid, 28)

Frege second restricts the doctrine that significant singular terms must refer, to utterances "outside the sphere of fiction" (ibid, 29) Evans' reaction is to cite the "mock" entities passage from Frege's "Logic" (1897), with the commentary:

"it is clear that Frege is prepared to speak of sentences containing Proper Names used fictionally (i.e. of

sentences containing any empty singular terms) as expressing mock thoughts, and so not real thoughts." (ibid, 29-30)

According to Evans:

"Frege pointed in the direction in which we should look for a way of understanding the case where a singular term is empty, namely as involving some sort of pretense or appearance of thought-expression rather than the real thing." (ibid, 30)

We argued, on the other hand, that the pretense is limited to the assertion --the thought can be the real thing.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, there is some support for Evans' approach in the *Grundgesetze*. In the *Grundgesetze* #29-#31, Frege argues that the five types of complex names in conceptscript denote if their constituent names denote, by arguing that the five ways of filling argument places in names with names preserves denotation. He argues, finally, that simple names do in fact have a denotation, hence all (properly formed) names do.<sup>6</sup> Frege concludes at the beginning of #32:

"In this way it is shown that our eight primitive names have denotation, and thereby that the same holds good for all names correctly compounded out of these. However, not only a denotation, but also a sense, appertains to all names correctly formed from out signs."

Sense here is sort of grafted on and does little work in the semantics so far. This is reasonable if one focuses on the fact that it is an essay in logic (in Frege's extended understanding), and Frege wrote in the introduction "I understand by 'laws of logic' ... laws of truth" and truth lies at the level of reference, not sense.<sup>7</sup> Rather than being centrally concerned with how language and thought hook up to the world, as was Evans himself, Frege was concerned with reducing arithmetic to logic, and so concerned with explicating the nature and domain of logic, the laws of truth, the bearers of truth value. It would be a mistake to extrapolate, from comments in the *Grundgesetze* to Frege's semantic descriptions of natural language.

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<sup>5</sup> Bell (1990, 273), on the other hand, challenges Evans by denying that 'mock' (with its entailment) is a good translation of Frege's 'schein', but we did not.

<sup>6</sup> See Resnick (1986) and references therein, that Frege's arguments are defective.

<sup>7</sup> It should not be forgotten that the primary bearers of truth value, though, are Thoughts, and these lie at the level of sense.

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