“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: 
A Microfoundation for Applied Work*

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June 2017

Abstract

A “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains” has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms’ marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to “Nash-in-Nash prices”—i.e., each pair’s Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.

JEL Codes: C78, L13, L14

Keywords: bargaining, bilateral oligopoly, buyer-seller networks

*This paper was previously circulated under the title “Bargaining in Bilateral Oligopoly: An Alternating Offers Representation of the ‘Nash-in-Nash’ Solution.” We would like to thank Elliot Lipnowski, Sebastián Fleitas, and Eli Liebman for excellent research assistance; Attila Ambrus, John Asker, Catherine de Fontenay, Joshua Gans, Patrick Greenlee, Heski Bar-Isaac, Rachel Kranton, Volcker Nocke, Janine Miklos-Thal, Dan O’Brien, Alexander Raskovich, Stan Reynolds, Michael Riordan, Christopher Snyder, Mike Whinston, Tom Wiseman, Ali Yurukoglu, and numerous seminar audiences for useful discussion; and the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Gowrisankaran acknowledges funding from the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-1425063). Contact details: Collard-Wexler, collardwexler@gmail.com; Gowrisankaran, gautamg2@gmail.com; and Lee, robinlee@fas.harvard.edu. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction

Bilateral bargaining between pairs of agents is pervasive in many economic environments. Manufacturers bargain with retailers over wholesale prices, and firms negotiate with unions over wages paid to workers. As an example, in 2015, private insurers in the United States paid hospitals $403 billion and physicians and clinics $272 billion for their services.\footnote{See Exhibit 1 on p. 4 of “National Health Expenditure Accounts: Methodology Paper, 2015” at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/DSM-15.pdf accessed on May 2, 2017.} Private prices for medical services are determined neither by perfect competition, nor by take-it-or-leave-it offers (as is assumed in Bertrand competition). Instead, they are predominantly determined by bilateral negotiations between medical providers and insurers.

A substantial theoretical literature has sought to understand the equilibrium outcomes of bilateral bargaining in a variety of settings, including buyer-seller networks (e.g., Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Corominas-Bosch, 2004; Manea, 2011) and wage negotiations (e.g., Jun, 1989; Stole and Zwiebel, 1996). To derive meaningful predictions, many of these papers have focused on environments where a single agent is involved in all bargains, or where a transaction between two agents does not affect the value of trade for others. Concurrently, an applied literature—both empirical and theoretical—has focused on surplus division within bilateral oligopoly environments with the goal of evaluating a range of industrial organization questions, including: the welfare impact of horizontal mergers (Chipty and Snyder, 1999), bundling (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012), and vertical integration (Crawford, Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu, 2015) in cable television; the effects of price discrimination for medical devices (Grennan, 2013); and the price impact of hospital mergers (Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town, 2015) and health insurance competition (Ho and Lee, 2017). Increasingly, this applied literature is influencing antitrust and regulatory policy.\footnote{The Federal Communication Commission used a bargaining model similar to that analyzed in this paper in its analysis of the Comcast-NBC merger (Rogerson, 2013) and in recent hospital merger cases (Farrell, Balan, Brand, and Wendling, 2011). Also, in a recent ruling in a restraint of trade case in sports broadcasting, Judge Shira Scheindlin’s opinion heavily referenced the Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) bargaining framework as an appropriate way to consider competition in this sector (cf. Thomas Laumann v National Hockey League (J. Scheindlin, S.D.N.Y. 2015 12-cv-1817 Doc. 431)).} The applied literature has emphasized interdependencies and externalities across firms and agreements, because they are often fundamental to bilateral oligopoly environments.\footnote{For instance, negotiations between insurers and hospitals are typically interdependent: i.e., an insurer’s value from having one hospital in its network depends on the other hospitals are already in its network. Thus, hospital mergers may raise prices in a bargaining context because the loss to an insurance company from removing multiple hospitals is worse than the sum of the losses from removing individual hospitals (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite, 2003). A bargaining model that did not allow for such interdependencies would typically rule out a price increase following a merger.}

To tractably and feasibly analyze the division of surplus in bilateral oligopoly settings
with interdependent payoffs, the applied literature has leveraged the relatively simple solution concept proposed by Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) (which studied horizontal merger incentives in the presence of exclusive vertical relationships). This bargaining solution is a set of transfer prices between “upstream” and “downstream” firms where the price negotiated between any pair of firms is the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) for that pair given that all other pairs reach agreement. Because this solution can be cast as a “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains”—i.e., separate bilateral Nash bargaining problems within a Nash equilibrium to a game played among all pairs of firms—we refer to it as the “Nash-in-Nash” solution. The Nash-in-Nash solution provides easily computable payments for complicated environments with interdependencies. It is also based on marginal valuations, which fits well with classical price theory. Yet, the Nash-in-Nash solution has been criticized by some as an ad hoc solution that nests a cooperative game theory concept of Nash bargaining within a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Non-cooperative microfoundations for the Nash-in-Nash solution that have been previously developed generally have assumed that firms do not use all the information that may be at their disposal at any point in time: i.e., most use “delegated agent” models where firms involved in multiple bilateral bargains rely on separate agents for each negotiation, and agents (even those from the same firm) cannot communicate with one another during the course of bargaining.

The purpose of this paper is to provide support for the Nash-in-Nash solution as a viable surplus division rule in the applied analysis of bilateral oligopoly by specifying a non-cooperative microfoundation that does not require firms to behave independently (or “schizophrenically”) across bargains. We contribute to the “Nash program” of pairing non-cooperative and axiomatic approaches to strategic bargaining problems (cf. Binmore, 1987; Serrano, 2005), and share the same motivation as Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) who sought to “provide a more solid grounding for applications of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling.” We develop a simple extensive form bargaining game that extends their analysis and the classic Rubinstein (1982) model of alternating offers between two parties to the bilateral oligopoly case with multiple upstream and downstream firms. Focusing on environments where transfer prices between firms are lump-sum and where there

4Crucially, this solution assumes that each bilateral pair bargains as if the negotiated prices (or contracts) of all other pairs of firms do not adjust in response to a bargaining disagreement or breakdown. The Nash-in-Nash solution is a type of contract equilibrium as defined in Cremer and Riordan (1987), and has also been employed in several theoretical papers including Davidson (1988), Dobson (1994), Björnerstedt and Stenneck (2007), Dobson and Waterson (2007), and Inderst and Montez (2014).

5For instance, Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) sketch a non-cooperative extensive form game generating this solution, writing: “Each distributor and each conglomerate sends separate representatives to each meeting. Once negotiations start, representatives of the same firm do not coordinate with each other. We view this absence of informational asymmetries as a weakness of the bargaining model.” See also Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Björnerstedt and Stenneck (2007).
are gains from trade between every pair of firms that are allowed to contract, we prove two main sets of results.

The first set of results provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium—i.e., an equilibrium where all agreements are formed, with formation at prices that are arbitrarily close to the Nash-in-Nash solution when the time between offers is sufficiently short. Our conditions place limits on the extent to which the sum of a firm’s marginal gains from individual agreements within a set can exceed its marginal gains from the entire set of agreements. These conditions are satisfied in environments where firms on the same side of the market are substitutes for one another, and also in environments with limited complementarities.

Our second set of results concerns the uniqueness of equilibrium prices. We prove that any no-delay equilibrium—i.e., an equilibrium where all agreements (that have not yet been formed) form immediately following every history of play (as is the case for the equilibria that we construct for our existence results)—must have agreements that form at prices that are arbitrarily close to the Nash-in-Nash solution when the time between offers is sufficiently short. We also provide sufficient conditions for all equilibria to have this property without conditioning on no-delay equilibria. Our results do not restrict attention to stationary strategies, as is the case with refinements such as Markov perfect equilibrium.

We believe that our work has three general takeaways. First, by extending the Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) non-cooperative foundation for Nash bargaining to environments with multiple upstream and downstream firms, we provide a microfoundation for applied work using the the Nash-in-Nash solution as a surplus division rule in bilateral oligopoly. Second, our equilibrium existence results clarify when and provide conditions under which Nash-in-Nash may be an appropriate solution concept. Finally, our uniqueness results suggest that the Nash-in-Nash solution may be a relatively robust outcome across a variety of settings.

Overview. We now briefly discuss our model, results, and proofs.

We consider the class of bilateral oligopoly games where firm profits (net of negotiated transfers) depend only on the set of bilateral agreements that have been formed between upstream and downstream firms. We condition on the set of agreements that can be formed, and assume that there are gains from trade from each agreement within that set (given that all other agreements in that set form). Our extensive form game adapts the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining protocol to a setting with multiple agents. In odd periods, each downstream firm makes simultaneous private offers to each upstream firm with which it has not yet formed an agreement; each upstream firm then accepts or rejects any subset of its offers. In even
periods, roles are reversed, with upstream firms making private offers and downstream firms
accepting or rejecting them. If an offer is accepted, a fixed lump-sum payment (or “price”) is made and an agreement forms between the two firms. At the end of each period, the set
(or “network”) of agreements that has been formed is observed by all firms, and upstream
and downstream firms earn flow profits. These profits, assumed to be a primitive of the analysis, are a function only of the set of agreements formed up to that point, and allow for flexible interdependencies across agreements.\(^6\) Crucially, our model admits the possibility that a firm can engage in deviations across multiple negotiations, and also optimally respond to information acquired from one of its negotiations in others.

Our game has imperfect information since, within a period, firms do not see offers for agreements that do not involve them. We employ pure-strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs as our solution concept. Passive beliefs restricts firms to believe, upon receiving an off-the-equilibrium path offer, that all unobserved actions remain equilibrium actions. This solution concept has been widely used and employed in the vertical contracting literature to analyze similar types of problems (cf. Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).

We provide two sets of conditions that ensure the existence of a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium. The first set is a single assumption which we refer to as weak conditional decreasing marginal contributions (abbreviated as A.WCDMC, where “A.” refers to assumption). It requires that the marginal contribution from any set of agreements be no less than the sum of the marginal contributions from each individual agreement within that set for all firms when all other agreements have been formed. A.WCDMC is implied if firms on the same side of the market were viewed as at least weak substitutes by the other side. We show that A.WCDMC is necessary and sufficient for there to exist an equilibrium of our bargaining game where agreements form immediately at prices that correspond to the pairwise Rubinstein (1982) prices for each pair of firms (given that all other firms reach agreement). These prices converge to the Nash-in-Nash solution as the length of time between offers goes to zero (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986).

Our second set of conditions is a pair of assumptions that simultaneously weakens A.WCDMC for one side of the market (i.e., either upstream or downstream firms) and strengthens it for the other side, thereby extending the settings under which our results apply. The weaker assumption—feasibility (A.FEAS)—states that the marginal profits to each firm from any set of its agreements are weakly greater than the sum of the Nash-in-Nash prices that are made (or received) for those agreements.\(^7\) A.WCDMC implies A.FEAS. The

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\(^6\)This rules out, e.g., certain settings where agreements specify linear wholesale prices, and downstream firms then engage in price competition for consumers. See Section 5 for further discussion.

\(^7\)Since downstream firms pay upstream firms, these payments are the prices for downstream firms and
stronger assumption—strong conditional decreasing marginal contributions (A.SCDMC)—
states that the marginal contribution to each firm from an agreement are lower when all
other agreements have been formed than when certain subsets of agreements have been
formed. A.SCDMC implies A.WCDMC. We prove that A.FEAS is necessary for there to
exist a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium where all agreements form immediately, and is suf-
ficient when combined with A.SCDMC holding for one side of the market. We view our
existence results to be the most important from the point of view of applied work, as they
provide conditions under which the Nash-in-Nash solution may be viewed as a reasonable
surplus division rule.

We prove two results concerning the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes. The first result
is that, in any no-delay equilibrium, all agreements are formed at prices that are arbitrarily
close to the Nash-in-Nash solution when the time between offers is sufficiently short. The
bargaining literature has sometimes restricted attention to no-delay equilibria (e.g., Ray and
Vohra, 2015), and we believe that our first uniqueness result highlights the robustness of
the Nash-in-Nash solution in environments where delay is unlikely to occur. The second
result—proven without conditioning on immediate agreement—is that all equilibria involve
all agreements (that have not yet been formed) forming immediately at the pairwise Ru-
binstein (1982) prices, given a restriction on how firms break ties when indifferent over best
responses and two assumptions on profits that are stronger than those used to prove ex-
istence. In particular, we assume that both upstream and downstream firm profits satisfy
our stronger decreasing returns assumption used to establish existence (A.SCDMC), and
also satisfy a limited negative externalities assumption (A.LNEXT). We prove our second
uniqueness result via induction on the set of agreements formed at any point in time, and
leverage: (i) our timing assumptions that allow for multiple offers to be made and multiple
agreements formed at any period; (ii) the fact that our candidate equilibrium prices make
a firm indifferent between accepting an offer and rejecting it (and forming the agreement
in the next period); and (iii) our stronger assumptions on profits to rule out the possibility
that some agreements do not immediately form following any history of play.

**Related Literature.** Although our results complement a broader theoretical literature
that examines vertical contracting in industrial organization settings (e.g., Hart and Tirole
(1990); O’Brien and Shaffer (1992); McAfee and Schwartz (1994); Segal (1999); Rey and
Vergé (2004); cf., Whinston (2006)), our modeling approach is most similar to that adopted
by the literature on wage bargaining (e.g., Davidson, 1988; Horn and Wolinsky, 1988b; Jun,

the negative of the prices for upstream firms.
The wage bargaining literature typically examines extensive form bargaining games between a single firm and multiple workers (or a single union and multiple firms), and uses a payoff structure that is a special case of ours (i.e., multiple upstream firms, or workers, bargaining with a single downstream firm that accrues all profits). Part of this literature has analyzed games under which workers are paid according to the Nash-in-Nash solution as the period length between offers goes to zero; we generalize some of these results.\(^8\)

Other papers in the wage bargaining literature, including Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Brügemann, Gautier, and Menzio (2015), provide alternative games under which Shapley values emerge as the division of surplus; both of these papers adopt the assumption that following a breakdown in negotiation between a firm and any given worker, all other negotiations restart and begin anew with any worker previously involved in a breakdown no longer involved in bargaining. Similar to papers that have provided extensive form representations of the generalization of the Shapley value to networked or bilateral oligopoly settings—by relying on renegotiation following disagreement (Navarro and Perea, 2013), or contracts that are contingent on the set of realized agreements (Inderst and Wey, 2003; de Fontenay and Gans, 2014)—our paper extends the settings under which the Nash-in-Nash solution emerges as an equilibrium outcome.\(^9\) We further discuss the relationship between extensive form representations and surplus division rules in Section 5.

Our focus on environments where contracts are bilaterally negotiated and the network of agreements matter in determining profits distinguishes our analysis from a broader literature on multilateral and coalitional bargaining and contracting, both with and without externalities (e.g., Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta, 1993; Chae and Yang, 1994; Merlo and Wilson, 1995; Krishna and Serrano, 1996; Gomes, 2005; Ray and Vohra, 2015).\(^10\)

Finally, many of the assumptions that we use have analogs in the literatures previously mentioned as well as in the network formation literature. This literature examines conditions under which efficient or pairwise stable networks form but is not primarily concerned with the division of surplus (e.g., Bloch and Jackson, 2007; Hellmann, 2013).\(^11\)

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\(^8\)E.g., both Jun (1989) and Westermark (2003) analyze bargaining between a single firm and two workers. One of Jun (1989)’s settings is a special case of our model with one downstream firm, two upstream firms, equal discounting factors, and profits only on the downstream side. Our existence results in Theorem 3.4 generalize the equilibrium construction in Jun (1989) to multiple upstream and downstream firms, where profits for both sides can be non-zero. Westermark (2003)’s game form also uses an alternating offers framework, but, unlike our setting, assumes that offers are made sequentially with randomly determined proposers.

\(^9\)Also related to our paper is a literature that examines the trade of goods in fixed networks (e.g., Corominas-Bosch, 2004; Polanski, 2007; Manea, 2011; Elliott, 2015); most of this literature rules out externalities from trades that do not involve a given buyer or seller.

\(^10\)In many applied settings, side payments among firms on the same side of the market (or between firms without a contractual relationship) would generally violate antitrust laws.

\(^11\)For example, our A.WCDMC assumption is analogous to Bloch and Jackson’s “superadditive in own-
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our extensive form bargaining model and our equilibrium concept. Section 3 provides our assumptions and results for the existence of Nash-in-Nash limit equilibria. Section 4 provides our assumptions and results for the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes. Section 5 discusses connections between our results and the applied literature, as well as directions for future work. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

Consider the bipartite negotiations between $N$ upstream firms, $U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_N$, and $M$ downstream firms, $D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_M$. We only permit agreements to be formed between upstream and downstream firms and not between firms on the same “side” of the market.\footnote{In many market settings, contractual agreements between two firms on the same side of the market can be interpreted as collusion and hence may constitute \textit{per se} antitrust violations. Alternatively, agreements between two firms on the same side of the market can be viewed as a horizontal merger, in which case our analysis would treat those merged firms as one entity. We do not explicitly model the determination of such mergers in this paper. Additionally, vertical integration and price formation, as modeled in de Fontenay and Gans (2005), is also outside the scope of the paper.} Let $G$ represent the set of potential or feasible agreements; $G$ can be represented by a bipartite network between upstream and downstream firms.\footnote{Note that $G$ need not contain all agreements between all upstream and downstream firm pairs; some agreements may be infeasible or impossible to form. As in Lee and Fong (2013), there may be a prior network formation game that leads to a set of agreements $G$ being feasible before bargaining commences. A model that determines the realized set of agreements is outside the scope of this paper, as we focus on the determination of transfers \textit{given} the set of agreements $G$.} Denote a potential agreement between $U_i$ and $D_j$ as $ij$; the set of agreements that $U_i$ can form as $G_{i,U}$; and the set of agreements that $D_j$ can form as $G_{j,D}$. For any subset of agreements $A \subseteq G$, let $A_{j,D} \equiv A \cap G_{j,D}$ denote the set of agreements in $A$ that involve firm $D_j$, and let $A_{-j,D} \equiv A \setminus A_{j,D}$ denote the set of all agreements in $A$ that do not involve $D_j$. Define $A_{i,U}$ and $A_{-i,U}$ analogously.

We take as primitives profit functions $\{\pi_{i,U}(A)\}_{i=1,\ldots,N; A \subseteq G}$ and $\{\pi_{j,D}(A)\}_{j=1,\ldots,M; A \subseteq G}$, which represent the surpluses realized by upstream and downstream firms for a set or “network” of agreements that have been formed at any point in time; these do not include transfers. Importantly, profits from an agreement may depend on the set of other agreements formed; this allows for profit interdependencies and externalities across agreements. We assume that each upstream firm $U_i$ and downstream firm $D_j$ negotiate over a lump-sum payment (or “price”) $p_{ij}$ made from $D_j$ to $U_i$ in exchange for forming an agreement; this implies that profits (not including transfers) depend on the set of agreements formed but...
not on the negotiated prices.\textsuperscript{14}

We model a dynamic game with infinitely many discrete periods. Periods are indexed \( t = 1, 2, 3, \ldots \), and the time between periods is \( \Lambda > 0 \). Total payoffs (profits and prices) for each firm are discounted. The discount factors between periods for an upstream and a downstream firm are represented by \( \delta_{i,U} \equiv \exp(-r_{i,U}\Lambda) \) and \( \delta_{j,D} \equiv \exp(-r_{j,D}\Lambda) \) respectively.

The game begins in period \( t_0 \geq 1 \) with no agreements in \( G \) formed: i.e., all agreements in \( G \) are “open.” In odd periods, each downstream firm \( D_j \) simultaneously makes private offers \( \{p_{ij}\}_{i \in G_{j,D}} \) to each \( U_i \) with an offer in \( G_{j,D} \) with which it does not yet have an agreement; each upstream firm \( U_i \) then simultaneously accepts or rejects any offers it receives. In even periods, each \( U_i \) simultaneously makes private offers \( \{p_{ij}\}_{j \in G_{i,U}} \) to downstream firms with which it does not yet have an agreement; each \( D_j \) then simultaneously accepts or rejects any offers that it receives. If \( D_j \) accepts an offer from \( U_i \), or \( U_i \) accepts an offer from \( D_j \), then an agreement is formed between two firms, and that agreement remains “formed” for the rest of the game. Each \( U_i \) receives its payment of \( p_{ij} \) from \( D_j \) immediately in the period in which an agreement is formed.

We assume that within a period, a firm only observes the set of contracts that it offers, or that are offered to it. However, at the end of any period, all information—including the terms of every contract, accepted or not—is observed by every firm; this implies that at the beginning of each period, every firm observes and can condition their strategies on a common history of play.\textsuperscript{15} This history, denoted \( h^t \), is the set of all actions (price offers and acceptances or rejections) that have been made by every firm in all periods prior to \( t \). We denote by \( C(h^t) \) the set of open agreements at history \( h^t \).

At the end of each period (after lump-sum payments from new agreements have been made), each upstream firm \( U_i \) and downstream firm \( D_j \) receives a flow payment equal to \((1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}(A) \) or \((1 - \delta_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(A) \) (respectively), where \( A \) is the set of agreements that has been formed up to that point in time.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14}See Section 5 for further discussion on this point.

\textsuperscript{15}We make this assumption for tractability, as our approach would be difficult without being able to condition on a common history of play. Institutionally, the bilaterally contracted price between firms may not be observable to others (e.g., for competitive or antitrust concerns). The vertical contracting literature has considered how private offers may lead to commitment and opportunism (Hart and Tirole, 1990; O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). Using a delegated agent model, de Fontenay and Gans (2005) examine the impact of vertical integration on bargaining assuming that agents do not observe the terms of contracts that do not involve them.

\textsuperscript{16}Our model can also be recast without discounting but with an exogenous probability each period that negotiations end and with a lump-sum payment made based on the set of agreements that has been formed when negotiations end (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986). The reason for this is that, in our model, externalities across firms generate endogenous “inside options” rather than “outside options” (Muthoo, 1999) since flow payments depend on the set of agreements that has been formed.
Example. Figure 1 depicts a potential market with 3 upstream and 3 downstream firms. Assume that in period 1, the set of agreements $A^1 \equiv \{11, 22, 23\}$ form. This implies that in period 1, $U_1$ receives a payment $p_{11}$ from $D_1$, and $U_2$ receives $p_{22}$ from $D_2$ and $p_{23}$ from $D_3$; in the same period, each downstream firm $D_j$ receives flow profits $(1 - \delta_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(A^1)$ and each upstream firm $U_i$ receives flow profits $(1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}(A^1)$. If, in period 2, $D_1$ forms an agreement with $U_2$ at some price $p_{21}$ (and that is the only agreement that is formed), $D_1$ would pay $U_2$ a payment $p_{21}$ in period 2, and all firms would earn period 2 flow profits as a function of the new realized set of agreements, $A^2 \equiv A^1 \cup \{12\}$.

Two points about our model are worth noting. First, while the flow profits continue to accrue to all firms forever, no additional actions are made after the last agreement is formed. Thus, the game can also be formulated to end in the period of last agreement, with each upstream firm $U_i$ realizing a one-time payoff of $(1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}(G)/(1 - \delta_{i,U}) = \pi_{i,U}(G)$ (and analogously for each downstream firm). Second, if $M = N = 1$, our game is equivalent to the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model.

2.1 Equilibrium Concept

We use pure-strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium as our solution concept. This differs from Rubinstein (1982)—who considers subgame perfect equilibria—because our model has imperfect information within a period (i.e., a firm only observes offers that it makes or receives). Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not place restrictions on beliefs for information sets that are not reached in equilibrium, and hence may admit many equilibrium outcomes. To refine our predictions further, we follow the literature on vertical contracting (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990; O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Segal, 1999; de Fontenay and Gans, 2014) and restrict firms to hold passive beliefs:

Passive Beliefs. At any period $t$ information set with history $h^t$, each firm’s beliefs over actions that it does not observe are consistent with equilibrium play at $h^t$, even if its information set reflects actions that are not consistent with equilibrium play at $h^t$. 
The assumption of passive beliefs is a key ingredient in many of the results of the literature on vertical contracting and opportunism, and in our setting restricts how beliefs can change following an off-the-equilibrium path (henceforth, off-equilibrium) action. For example, this assumption implies that an upstream firm $U_i$, upon receiving an off-equilibrium price offer from some $D_j$ in period $t$ following history $h^t$, believes that all other offers made by $D_j$ and actions taken by other firms remain equilibrium actions. Henceforth, we use equilibrium to refer to a pure-strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs.

### 2.2 Nash-in-Nash and Rubinstein Prices

For exposition, it will be useful to define $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(A,B) \equiv \pi_{i,U}(A) - \pi_{i,U}(A \setminus B)$, for $B \subseteq A \subseteq G$. This term is the increase in profits to $U_i$ of adding agreements in $B$ to the set of agreements $A \setminus B$. We refer to $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(A,B)$ as the marginal contribution to $U_i$ of agreements $B$ at $A$. Correspondingly, let $\Delta \pi_{j,D}(A,B) \equiv \pi_{j,D}(A) - \pi_{j,D}(A \setminus B)$. Importantly, as in Bloch and Jackson (2007), we define the marginal contribution of a set of agreements $B$ as their value relative to removing them from the larger set $A$ that includes $B$.

For analysis, we assume that for any $ij \in G$, the joint surplus created by $U_i$ and $D_j$ coming to an agreement (given that all other agreements in $G$ have been formed) is positive:

**Assumption (A.GFT: Gains From Trade)**

$$\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G,\{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,\{ij\}) > 0 \quad \forall ij \in G.$$  

This assumption implies that each pair of firms that can form an agreement in $G$ has an incentive to keep that agreement given that all other agreements in $G$ form. We believe that it is natural in many settings of interest as without A.GFT, firms may prefer to drop any agreements in which there are losses from trade. Rubinstein (1982) implies A.GFT as his first assumption, naming it “[the] ‘pie’ is desirable.”

We now define “Nash-in-Nash” and “Rubinstein” prices for our game. Assume that A.GFT holds. For a given set of agreements $G$ and set of positive bargaining weights $\{b_{i,U}\}_{i}$
and \( \{b_{j,D}\}_j \), Nash-in-Nash prices are a vector of prices \( \{p_{ij}^{Nash}\}_{ij \in G} \) such that, \( \forall ij \in G \):

\[
p_{ij}^{Nash} = \arg \max_p [\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - p]^{b_{j,D}} \times [\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + p]^{b_{i,U}}
\]

\[
= \frac{b_{i,U} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - b_{j,D} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})}{b_{i,U} + b_{j,D}}.
\]

Each price \( p_{ij}^{Nash} \) corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution between \( D_j \) and \( U_i \) given that all other agreements in \( G \) are formed.

For a given set of agreements \( G \), Rubinstein prices are a vector of prices \( \{p_{ij,D}^R, p_{ij,U}^R\}_{ij \in G} \) such that, \( \forall ij \in G \):

\[
p_{ij,D}^R = \frac{\delta_{i,U}(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}},
\]

\[
p_{ij,U}^R = \frac{(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - \delta_{j,D}(1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}}.
\]

Each pair of prices \( \{p_{ij,D}^R, p_{ij,U}^R\} \) correspond to the offers made in odd or even periods when \( D_j \) and \( U_i \) engage in a Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers bargaining game given that all other agreements in \( G \) are formed.

Let the Nash bargaining weights be parameterized so that \( b_{j,D} = r_{i,U}/(r_{i,U} + r_{j,D}) \) and \( b_{i,U} = r_{j,D}/(r_{i,U} + r_{j,D}) \). Then, as noted in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), Rubinstein prices converge to the Nash-in-Nash prices as the time between offers becomes arbitrarily short:

**Lemma 2.1** \( \lim_{\Lambda \to 0} p_{ij,D}^R = \lim_{\Lambda \to 0} p_{ij,U}^R = p_{ij}^{Nash} \).

(All proofs are in the appendices.)

There are properties of Rubinstein and Nash-in-Nash prices that will prove crucial in our proofs. First, Rubinstein prices make the receiving agent indifferent between accepting its offer or waiting until the next period and having its counteroffer accepted given that all other agreements form. In our case, in an even (upstream-proposing) period, this implies that downstream firms are indifferent between accepting an offer and waiting until the next period (given that it believes that all agreements \( G \setminus \{ij\} \) have been or will be formed). Equivalently:

\[
\frac{(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\})}{\text{Loss in profit from waiting}} = \frac{p_{ij,U}^R - \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R}{\text{Decrease in transfer payment from waiting}} \quad \forall ij \in G.
\]
Correspondingly, for upstream firms in odd periods,
\[(1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) = \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R - p_{ij,D}^R \quad \forall ij \in G.\]  

(2)

Second, the value from agreement to each party is higher than prices paid or received, and Nash-in-Nash prices lie between the upstream and downstream proposing Rubinstein prices:

Lemma 2.2 Assume A.GFT. Then \(\forall ij \in G:\)

\[
\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) > p_{ij,U}^R > p_{ij,D}^R, \\
\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) > -p_{ij,D}^R > -p_{ij,U}^R, \\
p_{ij,U}^R > p_{ij}^{Nash} > p_{ij,D}^R.
\]  

(3)

2.3 A Delegated Agent Model for Nash-in-Nash Prices

Before proceeding, in this subsection we detail an alternative “delegated agents” extensive form that generates Nash-in-Nash prices as \(\Lambda \to 0\) (see also Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Björnerstedt and Stennek, 2007). In this model, firms appoint separate agents to conduct each bilateral bargain. Each bargain follows the alternating offers protocol based on Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986): there is no discounting, but each bargain breaks down with a fixed exogenous probability—that is independent across bargains—at the end of every period, if an agreement has not yet been formed. Agents do not know the outcome of other bilateral bargains until their own bargain has concluded (by either breaking down or forming). Payments are made based on the set of agreements that have been formed after all bargains have concluded.

In Appendix A, we prove that A.GFT is sufficient for there to exist an equilibrium where all agreements in \(G\) immediately form at prices that are arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices as the probability of a bilateral bargain breaking down in each period goes to 0. However, this alternative model may be viewed as unsatisfying: firms do not leverage information learned in one negotiation in another, and cannot coordinate actions across different concurrent negotiations.

3 Equilibrium Existence

Our paper is concerned with equilibrium outcomes of our bargaining game as the time between offers becomes arbitrarily short. For this purpose, we define the concept of a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium. We say that a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium exists if, for any \(\varepsilon > 0\) and \(t_0\), there exists a \(\bar{\Lambda} > 0\) such that for all \(\Lambda \in (0, \bar{\Lambda}]\), there is an equilibrium with
complete agreement (i.e., where all agreements in $G$ are formed), and where all agreements are formed at prices that are within $\varepsilon$ of Nash-in-Nash prices.

### 3.1 Equilibrium Existence at Rubinstein Prices

We first present a necessary and sufficient condition for there to exist an equilibrium of the bargaining game where, for any $\Lambda > 0$, all open agreements at any history of play immediately form at Rubinstein prices. Since Rubinstein prices converge to Nash-in-Nash prices as $\Lambda \to 0$ (by Lemma 2.1), this guarantees that a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium exists.

**Assumption (A.WCDMC: Weak Conditional Decreasing Marginal Contribution)**

*For upstream firms: for all $i = 1, \ldots, N$ and all $A \subseteq G_{i,U},$

$$\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A) \geq \sum_{ik \in A} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ik\}).$$

*For downstream firms: for all $j = 1, \ldots, M$ and all $A \subseteq G_{j,D},$

$$\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, A) \geq \sum_{hj \in A} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{hj\}).$$

This condition states that, for both upstream and downstream firms, the marginal contribution of any set of agreements to a firm is weakly greater than the sum of the marginal contributions of each individual agreement within the set when all other agreements in $G$ have formed. This condition will generally be satisfied if firms on the same side of the market are substitutes, rather than complements, for firms on the other side of the market. Similar conditions have been used in the network formation and wage bargaining literature (e.g., Stole and Zwiebel, 1996; Westermark, 2003; Bloch and Jackson, 2007; Hellmann, 2013). For example, using Bloch and Jackson (2007)’s terminology, A.WCDMC is equivalent to assuming that profit functions for all firms are superadditive in own-links at $G$.\(^\text{18}\)

We now state our first existence result:

**Theorem 3.1 (Existence at Rubinstein Prices)** Assume $A.GFT$. For any $\Lambda > 0$, there exists an equilibrium of the bargaining game where at every period $t$ and history $h^t$ all open agreements $ij \in C(h^t)$ immediately form at prices $p_{i,j,D}^R$ ($p_{i,j,U}^R$) if $t$ is odd (even) if and only if A.WCDMC holds.

\(^{18}\)Bloch and Jackson (2007) define superadditivity in own-links as a condition analogous to A.WCDMC holding at any network, and not just at $G$; Hellmann (2013) refers to this assumption as “convex in own current links.”
The proof of Theorem 3.1, contained in Appendix C, constructs candidate equilibrium strategies based on the above statement and then confirms that these strategies are robust to one-shot deviations by any firm. Furthermore, it demonstrates that if A.WCDMC does not hold for some firm and a subset of its agreements, then that firm—when deciding to accept or reject that set of offers at Rubinstein prices—would have a profitable deviation of rejecting those offers.

A.WCDMC rules out the possibility that any agent would wish to not form or delay forming any subset of its open agreements at Rubinstein prices. To see this, without loss of generality, consider any upstream firm $U_i$ in an odd (downstream-proposing) period and any subset of its agreements $\mathcal{A} \subseteq G_{i,U}$. A.WCDMC implies that the gain to $U_i$ from accepting the agreements in $\mathcal{A}$ (given that all other agreements are formed) is weakly greater than the gain from rejecting the offers in $\mathcal{A}$ and forming the agreements in $\mathcal{A}$ in the subsequent period at candidate equilibrium prices; i.e.,:

\[
\text{Change in } U_i \text{'s profits by forming agreements } \mathcal{A} \text{ in period } t \text{ as opposed to } t + 1 \geq \sum_{ik \in A} \left[ (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U} (G, \{ik\}) + p_{ik,D} - \delta_{i,U} p_{ik,U} \right] - \sum_{ik \in A} \left[ (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U} (G, \mathcal{A} \cup \{ik\}) + p_{ik,D} - \delta_{i,U} p_{ik,U} \right] = 0.
\]

where the inequality follows from A.WCDMC and the equality from (2). A similar inequality shows that each downstream firm $D_j$ in even (upstream-proposing) periods would not wish to reject any subset of offers that it receives at even-period Rubinstein prices.

We illustrate the necessity of A.WCDMC for the existence of an equilibrium with immediate agreement at Rubinstein prices with two counterexamples. Consider first a setting where there are large complementarities across agreements. Assume that: there are three upstream parts “suppliers” that each provide a necessary component to a downstream “manufacturer” for production of an automobile, which is then resold for some fixed surplus; there are zero marginal costs for all firms; the manufacturer can sell the product for a surplus of 1 if all agreements are reached, and 0 otherwise; and firms share a common discount factor $\delta$.

A.WCMDC does not hold here because the marginal contribution of a supplier to the manufacturer when not all agreements have been formed, at zero, is less than its marginal contribution of 1 when all agreements have been formed. The Nash-in-Nash prices here are

\[19\] Proposition 3 in Bloch and Jackson (2007) shows that the network $G$ is supportable as an equilibrium of a “direct transfer game” if superadditivity in own-links and a condition that implies A.GFT hold. Thus, Theorem 3.1 proves that the same assumptions on underlying payoffs as used in Bloch and Jackson (2007) are sufficient for there to exist an equilibrium of our alternating offers bargaining game in which agreements in $G$ are formed at Rubinstein prices.
a half of the marginal contributions when all agreements have been formed, or 0.5. At Nash-in-Nash prices, the downstream firm would realize a loss of 0.5 (with gross profits of 1 and supplier costs of 1.5), implying that the downstream firm would not wish to reach agreement at such prices with its suppliers. In this setting, it is implausible that transfers will be based on marginal contributions: either no agreements will be reached, or surplus division would be based on some other bargaining protocol or solution concept.20

Now consider a similar counterexample, but with two instead of three suppliers. We generalize the above example to assume that the manufacturer with one supplier earns profits \(a\), \(0 \leq a < 0.5\), so that the suppliers still exhibit complementarities from the perspective of the downstream firm. Note that the Rubinstein prices paid to each supplier \(U_i\) are \(p^R_{1,D} = \frac{\delta(1 - a)}{1 + \delta}\) and \(p^R_{1,U} = \frac{(1 - a)}{1 + \delta}\). Because profits to the manufacturer with one supplier are less than 0.5, A.WCDMC still does not hold here. Hence, by Theorem 3.1, there still is no equilibrium with immediate agreement at Rubinstein prices.

To understand why an equilibrium with immediate agreement at Rubinstein prices does not exist, consider any even (upstream-proposing) period where no agreements have yet been formed. By equation (1), the downstream firm will be exactly indifferent between (a) accepting both candidate equilibrium offers and (b) accepting one offer and rejecting the other (which will then be formed in the following period). In other words, the reduction in the present value of the payment from delaying an offer to the following (odd) period, \(p^R_{1,U} - \delta p^R_{1,D}\), is equal to the loss in profits from this delay, \((1 - \delta)(1 - a)\). But, the loss in profits from rejecting the second offer is only \((1 - \delta)a < (1 - \delta)(1 - a)\) (since \(a < 0.5\)), while the reduction in the present value of this payment remains \((1 - \delta)(1 - a)\). Thus, the downstream firm would strictly prefer rejecting both offers, implying that the strategy profile from Theorem 3.1 is not an equilibrium.

However, unlike in the three supplier example, the downstream firm here would strictly prefer agreement with both suppliers at any price below Nash-in-Nash to no agreement, as it would then obtain positive surplus instead of none (even in the limit case of perfect complements where \(a = 0\)). This suggests that a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium might exist here—though at different prices from Rubinstein. Our next results verify that this is the case.

### 3.2 Equilibrium Existence with Complementarities

We now provide an alternative set of conditions for the existence of a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium. Importantly, our conditions allow for limited complementarities and are not

---

20This example is mathematically equivalent to example 1 in Westermark (2003), who makes a similar point with an example of a firm bargaining over wages with three workers.
Our first condition ensures that all firms obtain value at the margin from all sets of its own agreements being formed at Nash-in-Nash prices:

**Assumption (A.FEAS: Feasibility)** For upstream firms: for all $i = 1, \ldots, N$ and all $A \subseteq G_{i,U},$

$$\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A) \geq - \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash}.$$ 

For downstream firms: for all $j = 1, \ldots, M$ and all $A \subseteq G_{j,D},$

$$\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, A) \geq \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash}.$$ 

In words, A.FEAS states that each firm would prefer maintaining all of its agreements at Nash-in-Nash prices to dropping any set of its agreements (holding all other agreements fixed). This is a strictly weaker condition than A.WCDMC when A.GFT holds, as Nash-in-Nash prices are then strictly less (greater) than the marginal contributions of each agreement at $G$ for downstream (upstream) firms (see Lemma 2.2). Similar conditions to A.FEAS have been used in other settings: e.g., in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), a feasibility condition ensures that each worker receives an equilibrium wage higher than her outside wage offer. In our setting, A.GFT alone is sufficient to ensure that this condition holds for all subsets involving a single agreement (see Lemma 2.2), but not for subsets that involve more than one agreement.

The following demonstrates the importance of A.FEAS.

**Theorem 3.2** Suppose that A.FEAS does not hold. Then a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium where all agreements in $G$ immediately form does not exist.

The proof of this theorem leverages the insight that if all agreements immediately form but A.FEAS is violated, then there exists a firm that would wish to reject (and never form) some set of its own agreements at prices that are arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices. For example, in our upstream supplier example with three suppliers, one can verify that A.FEAS does not hold for the downstream manufacturer when $A$ includes all three suppliers; thus, Theorem 3.2 confirms the intuition from Section 3.1 that there is no Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium for this three supplier game where all agreements immediately form. We discuss the role of equilibria with immediate agreement further in Section 4.

The second sufficient condition that we impose to establish existence is stronger than A.WCDMC (and hence A.FEAS) and, for existence, is only required to hold for either downstream or upstream firms:
**Assumption (A.SCDMC: Strong Conditional Decreasing Marginal Contribution)**

(a) For upstream firms: for all $ij \in G$, $\mathcal{B} \subseteq G_{-j,D}$, and $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A}' \subseteq G_{j,D}$ \{\{ij\}\},

$$
\pi_{i,U}(\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B} \cup \{ij\}) - \pi_{i,U}(\mathcal{A}' \cup \mathcal{B}) \geq \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}).
$$

(b) For downstream firms: for all $ij \in G$, $\mathcal{B} \subseteq G_{-i,U}$, and $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A}' \subseteq G_{i,U}$ \{\{ij\}\},

$$
\pi_{j,D}(\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B} \cup \{ij\}) - \pi_{j,D}(\mathcal{A}' \cup \mathcal{B}) \geq \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}).
$$

A.SCDMC(a) states that the marginal contribution to any upstream firm $U_i$ of agreement $ij$ at $G$—which is $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})$—is no greater than the marginal contribution to $U_i$ of that agreement at any subset of agreements $\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}$, even if $D_j$ were to change its agreements (from $\mathcal{A}$ to $\mathcal{A}'$) when making such a comparison. A.SCDMC(b) states a similar condition for downstream firms. Unless explicitly noted, when we assume A.SCDMC, we assume that both parts (a) and (b) hold.

We rely on A.SCDMC to ensure that, whenever there are open agreements, a proposing firm would wish to make an acceptable offer and form an agreement, even if the receiving firm were to change its actions with respect to its other open agreements in that period. This rules out the possibility that an off-equilibrium offer from a proposing firm leads the receiving firm to change its set of other accepted offers, which in turn harms the proposing firm. A.SCDMC strictly implies A.WCDMC, as it places more restrictions on the marginal values of individual agreements when a subset of other agreements in $G$ have formed than does A.WCDMC.

Similar to our use of A.SCDMC, the network formation literature has often restricted the marginal contribution of a link $ij$ to be lower than the marginal contribution of that link when certain other agreements are removed; see, for instance, Hellmann (2013)’s strategic substitutes property. However, A.SCDMC differs in the set of other agreements that can be removed, and also that it allows the counterparty to adjust its agreements when computing the marginal contribution of an agreement to a firm.\(^{21}\)

Before proceeding to our existence proof, we formalize the relationship of our three assumptions on marginal contributions:

\(^{21}\)An additional difference is that the pairwise stability condition often employed in the network formation literature implies that a link would be formed if the two agents involved in that link value its formation holding fixed the actions of other players. In contrast, in our setting, even if two firms would prefer to form an agreement holding fixed the actions of others, such an agreement may not form since other agreements may be affected.
Lemma 3.3 Assume that \( A.GFT \) holds. Then:

(a) \( A.SCDMC \Rightarrow A.WCDMC \Rightarrow A.FEAS. \)

(b) \( A.FEAS \not\Rightarrow A.WCDMC \not\Rightarrow A.SCDMC. \)

We now state our final existence result:

**Theorem 3.4 (Existence of a Nash-in-Nash Limit Equilibrium)** Assume \( A.GFT, \)
\( A.FEAS, \) and either \( A.SCDMC(a) \) or \( A.SCDMC(b). \) Then, there exists a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium where all agreements in \( G \) immediately form.

Our proof of existence in Theorem 3.4 is constructive, building on insights from Jun (1989). In the equilibrium that we construct, if \( A.SCDMC(a) \) holds, then downstream firms always propose Rubinstein prices in odd periods. In even periods, upstream firms propose offers that ensure that downstream firms do not want to reject a single offer or multiple offers, and also ensure that every downstream firm is indifferent between complete acceptance and rejecting some subset of its offers.

If \( A.WCMDC \) holds, then by Theorem 3.1 there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement at Rubinstein prices. However, if \( A.SCDMC(a) \) holds (for upstream firms) but \( A.WCDMC \) does not hold (for downstream firms), then some downstream firm in an even period would prefer to reject of some set of offers as opposed to accepting all offers at Rubinstein prices. To eliminate the incentive to reject multiple offers, the even-period equilibrium prices are then lower than even-period Rubinstein prices (though still higher than odd-period Rubinstein prices).

By not imposing \( A.WCDMC \) on one side of the market (but still requiring that \( A.FEAS \) hold for that side), Theorem 3.4 admits certain forms of complementarities, thereby extending the settings under which there exists a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium where all agreements in \( G \) immediately form, relative to Theorem 3.1. For example, consider again the two upstream supplier counterexample from Section 3.1. Although this example does not satisfy \( A.WCDMC \) since the suppliers produce complementary inputs, \( A.FEAS \) will be satisfied on the downstream side so long as the profits with one supplier are not negative \((a \geq 0)\). Moreover, \( A.SCDMC \) is trivially satisfied for the upstream suppliers (as they realize no flow profits). Thus, by Theorem 3.4, a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium exists (even in the limiting case of \( a = 0 \)). To ensure that the manufacturer does not want to reject both offers, our constructed equilibrium for this example has even-period prices that are lower than Rubinstein prices, and in some cases, lower than Nash-in-Nash prices.\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\)While we focus our discussion here on the case where \( A.SCMDC(a) \) holds, the case where \( A.SCDMC(b) \) holds is analogous.

\(^{23}\)Because the manufacturer strictly prefers accepting both even-period offers to rejecting one, we can
4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium Outcomes

Having established results on existence, we now turn to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes. We prove two results. Our first result is that all no-delay equilibria—defined to be equilibria in which at any history of play $h'$, all open agreements $C(h')$ immediately form—have agreements formed at prices that are arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices for sufficiently short time periods. Note that the equilibria constructed to establish existence in Section 3 are no-delay equilibria. This result does not require any assumptions on profits, highlighting the generality of the Nash-in-Nash solution when agreement is immediate.

Our second result is complementary to the first, and provides sufficient conditions for all equilibria to have agreements formed at Rubinstein prices (and hence at prices that are arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices for sufficiently short time periods). This second result uses the same A.SCDMC condition used to establish existence, a further assumption on profits that limits how severe negative externalities can be across agreements (A.LNEXT), and a restriction on strategies that governs how ties are broken when firms are indifferent over actions. It does not require any assumptions on equilibrium behavior (such as no-delay).

4.1 Uniqueness for No-Delay Equilibria

Our first theorem states that for sufficiently short time periods, any no-delay equilibrium has prices that are arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices:

**Theorem 4.1 (Uniqueness for No-Delay Equilibria)** For any $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\bar{\Lambda} > 0$ such that for any $\Lambda \in (0, \bar{\Lambda}]$, any no-delay equilibrium has prices at every period $t$ and history $h'$ that are within $\varepsilon$ of Nash-in-Nash prices.

Theorem 4.1 does not use any assumptions on underlying profits, but instead conditions on the immediate formation of all open agreements following all histories of play. Restricting attention to equilibria without delay is an assumption that has been used in the bargaining literature (e.g., Brügemann, Gautier, and Menzio, 2015; Ray and Vohra, 2015).

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24 Ray and Vohra (2015), in motivating such a restriction, note that delays in complete information bargaining models are “more artificial [than delays in bargaining with incomplete information] and stem from two possible sources. The first is a typical folk theorem-like reason in which history-dependent strategies are bootstrapped to generate inefficient outcomes... [The second] will only happen for protocols that are sensitive to the identity of previous rejectors,” which is not the case for the model in Rubinstein (1982) or in our model.
The intuition of the result is as follows. Given complete and immediate agreement at every period, we first show that a receiving firm cannot receive a worse offer than its Rubinstein price in that period. If it were to receive a worse offer, a deviation for this firm would be for it to reject this offer and, in the following period when only one agreement would remain open, form the agreement at the corresponding Rubinstein price (Rubinstein, 1982). Equations (1) and (2) ensure that such a deviation is profitable.

Next, we show that a proposing firm cannot make an offer that is accepted and significantly worse than its Nash-in-Nash price. Here, a no-delay equilibrium implies that a proposing firm anticipates that all open agreements will form in the next period, regardless of actions that are taken in the current period. If a proposing firm were to “withdraw” an offer that it is supposed to make (i.e., by making a sufficiently worse offer that would be rejected), that agreement—and potentially other agreements formed by the receiving firm—would be rejected and instead formed in the following period. Using the fact that prices in the subsequent period must be no worse for the proposing firm than Rubinstein prices (as noted above), we show that for a sufficiently short time period, a proposing firm would have a profitable deviation from withdrawing this agreement. Thus, the proposing firm would never form an agreement at a price significantly worse than the Nash-in-Nash price.

Consequently, in any no-delay equilibrium, prices must be arbitrary close to Nash-in-Nash prices as $\Lambda \rightarrow 0$. However, we have not addressed whether there exist equilibria with delay at some histories of play. We next provide sufficient conditions on primitives and strategies to rule out this possibility.

4.2 Uniqueness Without Conditioning on Immediate Agreement

Under stronger conditions than used to establish existence, we now prove that every equilibrium is a no-delay equilibrium where, for any history of play, all open agreements are formed at Rubinstein prices. Under these conditions, equilibrium outcomes will be unique. If there are multiple equilibria, they will only differ in their prescribed off-equilibrium play.

The first condition requires that A.SCDMC, introduced in Section 3.2 and used in establishing our second existence result, holds for both upstream and downstream firms. This condition, again, states that the marginal contribution to any firm forming an agreement when all other agreements have been formed can be no greater than that agreement’s contribution when certain subsets of agreements have been formed.

Our second condition is new:

Assumption (A.LNEXT: Limited Negative Externalities) For all non-empty $\mathcal{A} \subseteq$
There exists $ij \in A$ s.t.:

$$
\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A) \geq \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U}} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ik\}) \quad \text{and} \\
\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, A) \geq \sum_{hj \in A_{j,D}} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{hj\}).
$$

A.LNEXT states that for any nonempty subset of agreements $A$, there exists some agreement $ij \in A$ such that the marginal contribution to $U_i$ (and $D_j$) of agreements $A$ at $G$ is weakly greater than the sum of the individual marginal contributions of all agreements in $A$ that involve $U_i$ (and $D_j$) at $G$. This is also equivalent to imposing a lower bound on the value to $U_i$ of agreements in $A_{-i,U}$ (with a similar condition holding for some $D_j$ and agreements in $A_{-j,D}$). We refer to the assumption as “limited negative externalities” since, when paired with A.SCDMC, this lower bound is weakly negative.\(^{25}\) Importantly, for each different subset of agreements $A$, there can be a different pair $U_i$ and $D_j$ that satisfy this condition. We use A.LNEXT to help rule out equilibria with delay as it ensures that at any history of play, there is some pair of firms with an open agreement that would prefer all remaining open agreements to form. Given A.SCDMC, A.LNEXT is implied by Bloch and Jackson (2007)’s nonnegative externalities condition.

Finally, we also restrict attention to equilibria that satisfy common tie-breaking: at any history of play $h^t$, if there are two information sets in which any receiving firm has the same set of best responses, the firm chooses the same best response across both information sets.\(^{26}\) Similar types of restrictions—both informally and formally—have been used in the bargaining literature.\(^{27}\)

We now state our second uniqueness result:

\(^{25}\)To see why A.LNEXT and A.SCDMC admit weakly negative externalities, focus on the A.LNEXT condition for some $A$ and firm $U_i$, $ij \in A$: $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A) \geq \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U}} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ik\})$. The left-hand side of this inequality can be expressed as $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A) = \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A_{-i,U}) + \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus A_{-i,U}, A_{i,U})$. Substituting this expression into the A.LNEXT condition and re-arranging terms yields $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, A_{-i,U}) \geq \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U}} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ik\}) - \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus A_{-i,U}, A_{i,U})$. Applying A.SCDMC, the right side of the inequality is less than or equal to 0. Thus, the marginal value of $A_{-i,U}$ to $U_i$ at $G$ needs to be greater than a value that is weakly negative for $U_i$ to satisfy the conditions of A.LNEXT.

\(^{26}\)Common tie-breaking is substantively different than restricting strategies to be Markovian or stationary. Markov strategies require that firms follow the same actions across different even or odd histories of play $h^t$ that share the same set of open agreements $C(h^t)$. Common tie-breaking does not require this, but rather only restricts actions for receiving firms to be the same for a given history of play $h^t$ across different sets of price offers that induce the same set of best responses.

\(^{27}\)Ray and Vohra (2015) impose an equilibrium restriction that they call “compliance,” which requires that a receiver of a bargaining proposal, when indifferent over a set of actions, chooses the action that is most preferred by the proposer (given equilibrium play). Brügemann, Gautier, and Menzio (2015) note that a related tie-breaking assumption, which they describe as “reasonable,” is necessary to obtain uniqueness results under the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) union wage-bargaining model.
Theorem 4.2 (Uniqueness) Assume $A.GFT$, $A.SCDMC$, and $A.LNEXT$. For any $\Lambda > 0$, every common tie-breaking equilibrium has the following properties: at every period $t$ and history $h^t$, all open agreements $ij \in \mathcal{C}(h^t)$ immediately form at prices $p^R_{ij,D}$ ($p^R_{ij,U}$) if $t$ is odd (even).

As discussed in the previous section, when $A.SCDMC$ is violated, there may exist no-delay equilibria where prices are not Rubinstein but still arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices as $\Lambda \to 0$ (as in Theorem 3.4). It is an open research question whether, with weaker assumptions, all equilibria with complete (but not necessarily immediate) agreement have prices that are close to Nash-in-Nash prices as the time between periods becomes short.

We note that Theorem 4.2 also holds under an alternative set of assumptions: instead of assuming $A.LNEXT$ and restricting attention to common tie-breaking equilibria, it is sufficient to impose a “no externality” assumption (formally defined in Appendix E) alongside $A.SCDMC$. This assumption still allows for interdependencies across agreements for a given firm, but rules out externalities. We prove the statement of Theorem 4.2 for both our main and alternative set of assumptions.

Overview of Proof and Role of Assumptions. The proof for Theorem 4.2 proceeds by induction on the set of open agreements at any history of the game, $\mathcal{C}$. The proof establishes that if any subgame that begins with a strict subset of $\mathcal{C}$ agreements being open results in all open agreements forming immediately at Rubinstein prices (i.e., the inductive hypothesis), then any subgame beginning with $\mathcal{C}$ open agreements also must result in all open agreements forming immediately at Rubinstein prices (i.e., the inductive step). The base case follows from Rubinstein (1982), who establishes this result for any subgame with a single open agreement.

We start by proving the simultaneity of agreements—i.e., in any equilibrium, if any open agreements are formed at period $t$, all open agreements are formed at $t$—when $\mathcal{C}$ contains agreements that involve multiple “receiving” firms (e.g., if $t$ is odd, there are multiple upstream firms with open agreements). Here, $A.SCDMC$ allows us to rule out equilibria where only a strict subset of open agreements are formed in a given period. To illustrate, consider a subgame where there are $\mathcal{C}$ open agreements, and suppose that in an equilibrium, at least one agreement in $\mathcal{C}$ forms at period $t$, but not all agreements in $\mathcal{C}$ do. Consider some agreement $ij \in \mathcal{C}$ that does not form at $t$ and for which there exists another agreement that does form at $t$ where the receiving firm at $t$ differs from $ij$. We establish a contradiction by showing that the proposing firm involved in agreement $ij$ will find it profitable to make a deviant offer at $t$ that is slightly more generous than the Rubinstein price for this agreement. $A.SCDMC$ ensures that the marginal value of forming this agreement to the receiving firm
is weakly higher with open agreements than at $G$, and hence the receiving firm will find it optimal to accept this offer. A.SCDMC further ensures that the proposing firm finds this deviation profitable even if the receiving firm were to change its set of acceptances upon receiving this deviant offer.

We next prove that when all open agreements are formed in a period where there are multiple receiving firms, they are all formed at Rubinstein prices. We show that a receiving firm will reject an offer that is worse than the Rubinstein price by leveraging the fact that offers are simultaneous, and that Rubinstein prices make a receiving firm indifferent between accepting and waiting (where, upon waiting, the agreement will then be formed at the Rubinstein price in the next period when only one open agreement remains). We show that a proposing firm will choose to adjust an offer that is worse for it than the Rubinstein price by showing that, if it were to adjust its offer slightly towards the Rubinstein price, this deviant offer would still be accepted by the receiving firm. Our restriction to common tie-breaking equilibria ensures that the receiving firm will not change its set of other acceptances upon accepting this deviant offer, thus ensuring that the deviation is profitable for the proposing firm.

We then prove the simultaneity of agreements at Rubinstein prices when open agreements are formed in a period where there is only a single receiving firm with open agreements. With multiple receiving firms, we are able to leverage our inductive hypothesis to prove the previous results; with a single receiving firm, we can no longer always rely on induction: if the receiving firm rejects all offers in a given period, the set of open agreements will remain the same in the following period. To proceed, we employ arguments similar to those used in Shaked and Sutton (1984) to prove the uniqueness result in Rubinstein (1982). While the proof with a single receiving firm is more involved than with multiple receiving firms, the role of our assumptions is similar.

Finally, we prove that any equilibrium results in all open agreements being formed immediately. We leverage A.LNEXT to rule out delay, as it implies that, at any history, there is a pair of firms with an open agreement that benefits from all open agreements forming. Consequently, if there was not immediate agreement in a given period, there would be a profitable deviation for the proposer of this pair, whereby it would propose an offer to the receiver of this pair that would be accepted, resulting in the formation of all remaining open agreements by the next period at latest (by the inductive hypothesis). As with our proof of simultaneity, A.SCDMC ensures that if the proposer in this pair makes the offer at a price that is slightly more generous than Rubinstein, then the receiver would accept this offer and

\[28\] Relatedly, Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995) show that the presence of negative externalities can potentially lead to delay in negotiations in a finite horizon sequential bargaining game.
the deviation would be profitable for the proposer. This rules out equilibria with delayed agreement, and establishes our result.

To illustrate the possibility of an equilibrium with delay when A.LNEXT is violated, consider the following counterexample. Let there be two upstream firms, $U_1$ and $U_2$ and two downstream firms $D_1$ and $D_2$, and let firms share a common discount factor $\delta$. Assume that $\mathcal{G} = \{11, 22\}$, so that “1” firms cannot form agreements with “2” firms. Suppose that the marginal value of agreement $\{11\}$ is 1 to both $U_1$ and $D_1$. However, suppose that the establishment of agreement $\{22\}$ imposes a negative externality of $-10$ on both $D_1$ and $U_1$. Let the “2” firms’ payoffs be symmetric to these. Note that profits in this example satisfy A.GFT and A.SCDMC but not A.LNEXT (due to the large negative externalities imposed across pairs). There are (at least) two equilibria of this game. First, since this example satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, one equilibrium involves the immediate formation of all agreements in $\mathcal{G}$ at Rubinstein prices. Second, another equilibrium has the four firms always proposing unattractive offers so that no agreements ever form in equilibrium. No pair has an incentive to “break” this second equilibrium because even though it knows that the marginal gain from its own agreement would be positive, the formation of this agreement would result in the other agreement forming in the following period and thereby impose a (present value) negative externality of $-10\delta$.\footnote{Note that the equilibria in this counterexample are similar to defection and cooperative equilibria of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.}

5 Relation of our Model to the Applied Literature

In this section, we discuss the connections between our model and applied papers that have, either directly or indirectly, appealed to the Nash-in-Nash solution concept. We first explain the key assumptions used in our analysis and their relation to the literature. We then detail the use of Nash-in-Nash in two strands of applied work. Our goal in this section is to inform the application of Nash-in-Nash, and to highlight avenues for future research.

5.1 Key Assumptions

Contract Space. The applied literature has defined the Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution to be a set of bilateral contracts, such that each contract is the solution to a bilateral Nash bargaining problem holding fixed the contracts of all other bilateral pairs. We make two key assumptions. First, contracts are over lump-sum transfer payments that are finalized upon agreement. Second, although profit functions depend on the set of agreements that
have been formed, they do not depend on negotiated payments. Both restrictions hold in many models of wage negotiations between employers and workers (e.g., Horn and Wolinsky, 1988b; Jun, 1989; Westermark, 2003) and in some applied papers in industrial organization settings (e.g., Noton and Elberg, 2017).

Violations of these assumptions would significantly complicate our analysis: when profit functions are no longer only a function of the set of open agreements, strategies may also condition on additional information such as formed contract terms. Nevertheless, even in these more general settings, Nash-in-Nash solutions may still arise as an equilibrium outcome of a delegated agent model similar to the one provided in Section 2.3.

Many applied papers examine richer environments where, for instance firms agree on two-part or linear tariffs and then engage in further competition conditioning on these contracts (e.g., Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas, 2010; Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012). Our fundamental requirement is not specific to the contract space, per se, but rather that the terms of negotiated contracts have no effect on profit functions and that payments between firms are not affected by other actions. Thus, it may be possible to adapt our approach to such settings. For example, Villas-Boas (2007) analyzes a model with two-part tariffs where a single retailer negotiates with multiple upstream manufacturers. In their case, the firms may optimally set a linear fee equal to each upstream firm’s (constant) marginal costs; bargaining would then be essentially only over lump-sum payments, and manufacturer profits would not depend on the agreements formed by others.

Even with lump-sum transfers, payments may not be finalized once agreements are formed. This may occur if contracts are: renegotiated upon disagreement (e.g., Stole and Zwiebel, 1996; Navarro and Perea, 2013; Brügemann, Gautier, and Menzio, 2015); contingent on the set of agreements that have been formed (e.g., Inderst and Wey, 2003; de Fontenay and Gans, 2014); or have exogenously determined contingencies due to, for example, bankruptcy (e.g., Raskovich, 2003). Different results may hold in these settings. For example, consider again the automobile parts supplier example with three suppliers from Section 3.1, which violates A.FEAS and hence for which a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium of our alternating offers game does not exist. Now, modify the example so that the manufacturer pays suppliers

30 Extending the analysis would also raise similar issues to those studied in the vertical contracting literature on opportunism (Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Rey and Vergé, 2004).

31 The literature on two-party alternating-offers bargaining games has been extended to richer contract spaces (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986; Herrero, 1989). In such contract spaces, if delegated agents believe that all other bilateral agreements will immediately form with contracts that converge to the Nash-in-Nash solution, then their own agreements can be shown under certain conditions to also converge to the Nash-in-Nash solution.

32 A similar insight holds when linear fees are negotiated alongside fixed quantities (e.g., as in Beckert, Smith, and Takahashi, 2015).
only if all three agreements have been formed. The Nash-in-Nash solution here results in each supplier being paid 1/4 (and hence a viable outcome with production), as opposed to 1/2 in our original example.

Ultimately, characterizing outcomes in bilateral oligopoly environments with more general contract spaces remains an open research agenda. We view our current analysis as a step towards understanding the applicability of Nash-in-Nash to these environments.

**Network of Potential Agreements.** In applied work, the Nash-in-Nash solution has typically conditioned on the set of agreements that are formed, and focused on negotiated contracts given those agreements. Mirroring this practice, we have assumed that the set of agreements allowed to form, $\mathcal{G}$, is exogenous, and that all agreements in this set create bilateral gains from trade (A.GFT), thereby motivating our focus on equilibria in which all agreements in $\mathcal{G}$ form. Our paper thus focuses on surplus division for a given set of agreements, and does not provide an analysis of which network of agreements form.

As noted in Lee and Fong (2013), the equilibrium set of agreements that forms and the division of surplus for those agreements may be intertwined. For example, potential agreements that are not formed in equilibrium can be used as threats to improve bargaining outcomes. Combining insights from the bargaining literature with those from the network formation literature with transfers (cf. Jackson, 2004; Bloch and Jackson, 2007) continues to be a fruitful avenue for future research.

**Profit Assumptions.** Our results rely upon several assumptions on firm profits.

First, all our results rely upon A.GFT. In most applied settings, this assumption is often explicitly or implicitly maintained: it is unreasonable to expect that firms form bilateral agreements in equilibrium when doing so reduces their bilateral surplus.

We next focus on A.WCDMC, which (together with A.GFT) ensures the existence of a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium. A.WCDMC restricts the marginal contribution of any set of agreements to be weakly greater than the sum of the marginal contribution of each individual agreement within the set. An important setting in which A.WCDMC is satisfied is one where a single downstream firm negotiates with multiple upstream suppliers that are

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33 This can occur if the manufacturer is able to declare bankruptcy as in Raskovich (2003), or if linear fees are negotiated and a manufacturer only engages in production if all three agreements are formed.

34 This outcome coincides with the Myerson-Shapley value. See also Iozzi and Valletti (2014) who explore the importance of specifying whether or not disagreement is observable to rivals before a price competition stage between downstream firms.

35 For instance, a number of recent working papers including Ghili (2016); Ho and Lee (2016); Liebman (2016); Prager (2016) examine selective contracting by health insurance firms and hospitals and allow for firms to use potential agreements not contained in $\mathcal{G}$ as threats.
(imperfect) substitutes for one another, as the marginal contribution of any given supplier to the downstream firm is decreasing as the downstream firm forms additional agreements. This setting is common to applied theory papers that examine the impact of downstream “buyer power” on negotiated prices, upstream supplier incentives, and welfare (e.g., Inderst and Wey, 2007; Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Inderst and Valletti, 2011; O’Brien, 2014; Chen, 2015), and in certain empirical work in health care markets (e.g., Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite, 2003; Grennan, 2013; Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town, 2015).  

We have also shown that A.FEAS holding on one side of the market and A.SCDMC holding on the other side ensures the existence of a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium. These assumptions hold in Easterbrook, Gowrisankaran, Older Aguilar, and Wu (2017), which examines the impact of mergers of upstream firms providing complementary products. Finally, we have shown that A.SCDMC and A.LNEXT together ensure that the Nash-in-Nash solution is the unique equilibrium outcome. In more general settings, particularly with multiple upstream and downstream firms, these assumptions may be difficult to verify. However, these assumptions will be satisfied in settings where a single downstream firm negotiates with multiple upstream firms that are substitutes, and where upstream firm profits do not depend on the set of agreements that have been formed. Many of the buyer power, wage bargaining, and health care market papers noted above satisfy these assumptions. In addition, Möllers, Normann, and Snyder (2016) explicitly verify that A.SCDMC and A.LNEXT hold in their application.

5.2 Examples in Applied Literature

We now detail the use of Nash-in-Nash bargaining in two applied literatures, and describe how our results can provide a foundation for this solution concept in certain settings. In doing so, we show how one might verify when applied papers satisfy our assumptions.

First, Chipty and Snyder (1999) and a subsequent literature examine negotiations between a monopolist content supplier negotiating with multiple downstream cable distributors. Such an environment has also been studied in other papers (e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Crawford, Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu, 2015) and shares similarities to other content distribution and hardware-software industries (e.g., Lee, 2013). In Chipty and Snyder, downstream distributors are local monopolists that do not compete with one another, and negotiations are over both a quantity provided and a tariff. In their implementation of the

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36Some of these papers employ different contract spaces than ours. As noted above, when contracts represent richer objects than lump-sum transfers, it will often be the case that profits depend on both the set of agreements that have been formed and the terms of contracts that have been signed. In such cases, our profit assumptions can be evaluated with respect to a given set of contracts.
Nash-in-Nash solution, they assume that bilateral negotiations between the supplier and each distributor maximize joint surplus (resulting in the bilaterally efficient quantity being supplied) and use a lump-sum payment to equally split the bilateral gains-from-trade (computed under the assumption that the efficient quantities supplied to other distributors are fixed). Given the existence of bilateral gains from trade between the supplier and each distributor, if the supplier’s profit function is concave in the quantity supplied, then A.SCDMC and A.LNEXT hold.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, as long as the supplier’s profit function is not too convex, A.FEAS holds for the supplier (and A.SCDMC continues to hold for the distributors). Thus, under functional form assumptions regarding payoffs and the assumption that the quantities supplied are fixed at efficient levels, their solution is supportable as an equilibrium (and in certain cases the unique equilibrium) outcome of our non-cooperative extensive form.

Second, Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), together with Town and Vistnes (2001), provide an “option demand market” foundation for much of the recent applied literature on insurer-provider negotiations in health care markets (e.g., Ho, 2009; Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town, 2015; Ho and Lee, 2017). Although Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite do not explicitly apply the Nash-in-Nash bargaining framework, they note that their reduced form bargaining solution coincides with the cooperative, complete information Nash bargaining solution. Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) employ two key assumptions. First, the objective that an insurer maximizes is proportional to the consumer welfare generated from its hospital network. Together with their demand system, this assumption implies that A.SCDMC holds for each insurer.\textsuperscript{38} Second, each hospital’s total payoffs are a fixed proportion of the incremental gains that it generates to an insurer, which is consistent with hospitals being reimbursed at marginal costs and then bargaining over a lump-sum payment. These assumptions together imply that A.SCDMC and A.LNEXT hold. Consequently, the solution concept relied upon in Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) also emerges as the unique equilibrium outcome of our non-cooperative extensive form.

\textsuperscript{37}As Chipty and Snyder note, if the upstream firm’s profit function is given by $V(Q) = R(Q) - C(Q)$ where $Q$ is the total quantity that it supplies and $R(\cdot)$ and $C(\cdot)$ are revenue and cost functions, this condition holds if the supplier’s revenue function is concave and cost function is convex.

\textsuperscript{38}Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) assume that each insurer maximizes ex ante enrollee surplus. The surplus generated by a network $\mathcal{H}$ of hospitals can be expressed as $\sum_i \log \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{H}} u_{ij} \right)$ where $u_{ij}$ is the exponentiated utility (net of an i.i.d. Type I extreme value error) that patient $i$ receives from visiting hospital $j$ and the ‘$i$’ sum is over enrollees. The marginal contribution of some hospital $k \notin \mathcal{H}$ to the insurer’s network—referred to as “willingness-to-pay,” or WTP—can be expressed as $WTP = \sum_i \log \left( u_{ik} + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{H}} u_{ij} \right) - \sum_i \log \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{H}} u_{ij} \right)$. This term is decreasing as elements are added to $\mathcal{H}$, a property that holds more generally in random coefficients logit models (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995).
6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have provided a bargaining model that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers game to bilateral oligopoly. We establish two sets of results. Our first set of results proves that a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium exists if (i) there are gains from trade, (ii) a feasibility condition holds, and (iii) either a weak declining contribution condition holds, or a stronger declining contribution holds for one side of the market only. We also show that the feasibility condition is necessary for a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium to exist. Our second set of results proves that the Nash-in-Nash outcome is unique for any no-delay equilibrium. Under stronger conditions on profits, it is also unique for any common tie-breaking equilibrium.

Our results provide support for the Nash-in-Nash solution as a credible bargaining framework for use in certain areas of applied work. In addition to our assumptions on profits, we restrict the contract space (i.e., lump-sum payments that do not affect firm profits and are finalized upon agreement) and require a fixed network of potential agreements. We believe that these assumptions and our extensive form—which allows firms to coordinate across multiple negotiations unlike the prior literature that used delegated agents—reasonably capture aspects of firm competition and bargaining protocols in particular real-world industry settings. Moreover, our analysis may serve as a useful framework to better understand conditions under which this solution might emerge in other environments and settings, such as with richer contract spaces.

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A Formal Results for the Delegated Agent Model

In this section, we present formal results for the delegated agent model, discussed in Section 2.3. The extensive form for this representation involves separate bilateral negotiations between delegated agents, or representatives, of each firm.\(^\text{39}\) We develop this model and show that this representation also admits the Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution as an equilibrium outcome if A.GFT holds.

Our model is as follows. For every negotiation \(ij \in \mathcal{G}\), \(U_i\) and \(D_j\) send individual representatives, denoted as \(U^{ij}\) and \(D^{ij}\), who engage in the alternating-offers bargaining protocol of Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), where negotiation breakdowns are independent across negotiations and profits are realized once all negotiations have concluded or broken down. Each representative seeks to maximize her firm’s total expected profits across all bargains. However, she does not know the outcome of any other bilateral bargain until her own bargain has concluded or broken down. One interpretation is that each pair of agents for a negotiation are sequestered in separate bargaining rooms, and no one outside the room knows the status of the bargain until it has concluded or broken down.

Under these conditions, we show that a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium exists:

**Theorem A.1** Assume A.GFT and that every negotiation \(ij \in \mathcal{G}\) is conducted by delegated agents from \(U_i\) and \(D_j\). Then there exists an equilibrium of the delegated agent model where all agreements \(ij \in \mathcal{G}\) are immediately formed at prices \(p_{ij} = p_{ij,D}^R (p_{ij,U}^R)\) if \(t_0\) is odd (even).

**Proof.** Let the delegated agents employ the following candidate set of strategies: \(U^{ij}\) offers \(p_{ij,U}^R\) in even periods and only accepts offers equal to or above \(p_{ij,D}^R\) in odd periods; \(D^{ij}\) offers \(p_{ij,D}^R\) in odd periods, and accepts offers equal to or below \(p_{ij,U}^R\) in even periods.

Given passive beliefs, when an agent sees an off-equilibrium action by one party, it still perceives that the other parties are following their equilibrium actions.\(^\text{40}\) Thus, if a delegated agent—e.g., \(D^{ij}\)—sees a deviation from the above strategies by its rival—\(U^{ij}\) in this case—then it perceives that all other negotiations (which are all run by separate delegated agents) follow equilibrium strategies. Hence, both \(D^{ij}\) and \(U^{ij}\) assume that all other agreements immediately form regardless of what occurs in their respective bargain. By Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), the above strategies then comprise the unique equilibrium for each \(ij\) negotiation. \(\square\)

Note that this does not necessarily imply that there is a unique equilibrium for the delegated agent model. Indeed, consider our three supplier counterexample from Section 3.1. In this setting, if every negotiation is conducted by delegated agents by the downstream manufacturer, and each agent believes that all other agreements will form at Rubinstein prices (i.e., at prices \(\delta/(1 + \delta)\) it \(t_0\) odd), then their agreement will also form at this price. However, there exists another equilibrium in which no agreements are ever formed: e.g., if each delegated agent for the downstream manufacturer believes that no other agreements will form, then upstream suppliers always demanding \(p_{1,U} > 0\) in each even period (and the manufacturer rejecting any offer greater than 0), and the manufacturer offering a price of \(p_{1,D} < 0\) in each odd period (and suppliers rejecting any offer less than 0) comprise equilibrium strategies.

While we do not prove that there exists a unique equilibrium of the delegated agent model, the proof of Theorem A.1 nevertheless implies that conditional on all agreements in \(\mathcal{G}\) forming, the equilibrium outcome of agreements all forming at Rubinstein prices is unique. This result is the analog of Theorem 4.2.

B Proofs of Lemmas from Main Text

**Proof of Lemma 2.1** Using l'Hospital’s rule:

\[
\lim_{\lambda \to 0} \frac{\delta_{i,U} (1 - \delta_{j,D})}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}} = \lim_{\lambda \to 0} \frac{e^{-r_i,U} (1 - e^{-r_j,D})}{1 - e^{-(r_i,U + r_j,D)}} = \frac{r_j,D}{r_{1,U}} \frac{e^{r_i,U}}{1 + r_j,D},
\]

\(^\text{39}\) Chipty and Snyder (1999) (see footnote 10) provides a sketch of this argument in the context of a single supplier negotiating with multiple buyers; see also Björnerstedt and Stennek (2007).

\(^\text{40}\) This property holds for sequential equilibria (without public signals), and not just for perfect Bayesian equilibria with passive beliefs.
and
\[
\lim_{\Lambda \to 0} \frac{1 - \delta_{j,D}}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}} = \lim_{\Lambda \to 0} \frac{1 - e^{-r_{j,D} \Lambda}}{1 - e^{-(r_{i,U} + r_{j,D}) \Lambda}} = \frac{r_{j,D}}{r_{i,U} + r_{j,D}}.
\]

Similarly,
\[
\lim_{\Lambda \to 0} \frac{\delta_{j,D} (1 - \delta_{i,U})}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}} = \lim_{\Lambda \to 0} \frac{(1 - \delta_{i,U})}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}} = \frac{r_{i,U}}{r_{i,U} + r_{j,D}},
\]
which proves the lemma. \[\square\]

**Proof of Lemma 2.2** Assume A.GFT. For any \(ij \in G\), since \(0 < \delta_{i,U} < 1\) and \(0 < \delta_{j,D} < 1\), note:
\[
(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - p_{ij,D}^R) = \frac{(1 - \delta_{i,U})}{(1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D})} (\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})) > 0 \text{ by A.GFT}
\]
Thus \(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) > p_{ij,D}^R\). Also, note:
\[
(\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + p_{ij,U}^R) = \frac{(1 - \delta_{i,U})}{(1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D})} (\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})) > 0 \text{ by A.GFT}
\]
Thus \(\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) > -p_{ij,U}^R\). Adding the previous two inequalities and rearranging, we obtain:
\[
p_{ij,U}^R - p_{ij,D}^R = \left(\frac{1 - \delta_{i,U}}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}}\right) \left(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})\right) - 1
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{1 - \delta_{i,U} \delta_{j,D}} \left(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\})\right) \left(1 - \delta_{i,U} - \delta_{j,D} + \delta_{j,D} \delta_{i,U}\right).
\]
Again, all three terms on the second line are positive; thus \(p_{ij,U}^R > p_{ij,D}^R\). Finally, substituting in the definition of \(\delta_{i,U}\) and \(\delta_{j,D}\) into the definition of \(p_{ij,D}^R\), it is straightforward to show \(\partial p_{ij,D}^R(\Lambda) / \partial \Lambda < 0 \forall \Lambda > 0\); thus, as \(\lim_{\Lambda \to 0} p_{ij,D}^R = p_{ij}^Nash\) by Lemma 2.1, it follows that \(p_{ij,D}^Nash > p_{ij,D}^R\). A similar approach can be used to show that \(p_{ij}^Nash < p_{ij,U}^R\). \[\square\]

**Proof of Lemma 3.3** Assume A.GFT. We prove the lemma using the following four claims:

1. **A.SCDMC \(\Rightarrow\) A.WCDMC**
    
    We prove A.SCDMC(b) (for downstream firms) implies A.WCDMC holds for downstream firms; the proof that A.SCDMC(a) (for upstream firms) implies A.WCDMC holds for upstream firms is symmetric and omitted.

    A.SCDMC(b) states: \(\pi_{j,D}(A \cup B \cup \{ij\}) - \pi_{j,D}(A' \cup B) \geq \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\})\) for all \(ij \in G, B \subseteq G_{-i,U}\), and \(A, A' \subseteq G_{i,U} \setminus \{ij\}\). For the case where \(A = A'\), A.SCDMC implies:
    \[
    \Delta \pi_{j,D}(A \cup B, \{ij\}) \geq \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) \quad \forall \ ij \in G, B \subseteq G_{-i,U}, A \subseteq G_{i,U} \setminus \{ij\}.
    \]

    Index agreements in \(A\) from \(k = 1, \ldots, |A|\), and let \(a_k\) represent the kth agreement in \(A\). This allows us to create a sequence of sets of agreements, starting at \(B := G \setminus A\), in which we add in each agreement one at a time, given by \(D_0 \equiv B\), and \(D_k = D_{k-1} \cup \{a_k\}\) for \(k = 1, \ldots, |A|\). Then, note that for any \(A \subseteq G_{j,D}\):
    \[
    \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, A) = \Delta \pi_{j,D}(A \cup B, A) = \sum_{k=1}^{|A|} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(D_k, \{a_k\})
    \]
    \[
    \geq \sum_{k=1}^{|A|} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{a_k\}) = \sum_{kj \in A} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}),
    \]

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where the last equality on the first line follows from the index for agreements for \( A \), and the inequality on the second line follows from (5). This coincides with the statement of A.WCDMC for downstream firms.

2. A.WCDMC \( \Rightarrow \) A.FEAS
   For all \( ij \in G \) and \( A \subseteq G_{j,D} \):
   \[
   \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) - \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} \geq \sum_{kj \in A} \left( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,\{ij\}) - \frac{b_{i,U} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,\{ij\}) - b_{j,D} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G,\{ij\})}{b_{i,U} + b_{j,D}} \right) = \sum_{kj \in A} \left( \left( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,\{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G,\{ij\}) \right) \frac{b_{j,D}}{b_{i,U} + b_{j,D}} \right) > 0,
   \]
   where the first inequality follows from A.WCDMC (for downstream firms) and the definition of \( p_{ij}^{Nash} \), and the second line is positive by A.GFT. Thus \( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) > \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} \), and A.FEAS holds. The proof for upstream firms is symmetric and omitted.

3. A.WCDMC \( \neq \) A.SCDMC
   Consider a single downstream firm and three upstream suppliers. Suppose that the downstream firm profits are: 0 without any supplier, 0.25 with one supplier, 0.7 with two suppliers, and 1 with all three suppliers; assume supplier profits are always 0. This example violates A.SCDMC(b) given by (5) because the surplus to the downstream firm from having one supplier (0.25) is less than the surplus from adding the third supplier (0.3). But, it does not violate A.WCDMC, because removing two or three suppliers both result in a greater loss than the sum of the marginal values (0.75 versus 0.6 when removing two suppliers, and 1 versus 0.9 when removing all three).

4. A.FEAS \( \neq \) A.WCDMC
   The two automobile supplier example in the paper discussed in Section 3.1 satisfies A.FEAS but not A.WCDMC when \( 0 \leq a < 0.5 \).

\( \square \)

C Proof of Theorems on Existence

C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2

We proceed by contradiction: assume that a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium exists where all agreements form immediately, but A.FEAS does not hold, so that for some \( D_j \), there exists \( A \subseteq G_{j,D} \) such that \( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) < \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} \); the proof if A.FEAS is violated for some \( U_i \) is symmetric and omitted. Let \( \varepsilon = \frac{1}{|A|} \left( \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} - \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) \right) \), which is positive by assumption. By the contradictory assumption, for any \( t_0 \), there exists \( \Lambda > 0 \) such that for all \( \Lambda \in (0,\Lambda] \), there is an equilibrium where all agreements in \( G \) form at \( t_0 \) at prices \( \{p_{ij}^*\}_{ij \in G} \), where \( |p_{ij}^* - p_{ij}^{Nash}| < \varepsilon \) for all \( ij \in G \). Assume that \( t_0 \) is even, and fix \( \Lambda \in (0,\Lambda] \). Consider the following multi-period deviation: \( D_j \) rejects offers \( ij \in A \) at \( t_0 \) and every subsequent even period and proposes offers that are sufficiently low that they will be rejected in odd periods. By assumption, in this equilibrium, all agreements in \( G \setminus A \) will still form at \( t_0 \). Thus, this deviation (where agreements in \( A \) never form) will increase \( D_j \)'s payoffs by:

\[
\left( \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^* \right) - \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) > \left( \sum_{ij \in A} (p_{ij}^{Nash} - \varepsilon) \right) - \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) = \left( \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} - \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) \right) - |A| \times \varepsilon = \left( \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} - \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) \right) - \left( \sum_{ij \in A} p_{ij}^{Nash} - \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G,A) \right) = 0
\]
where the inequality on the first line follows from the definition of \( p_{ij}^* \), the second line rearranges terms, and the third line follows from substituting in the definition of \( \varepsilon \). Thus, this deviation is profitable, yielding a contradiction. \( \square \)

### C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Sufficiency Only) and Theorem 3.4

Assume A.GFT and either (i) A.WCDMC or (ii) A.FEAS and either A.SCDMC(a) or A.SCDMC(b). For condition set (ii), we detail the proof where A.SCDMC(a) (for upstream firms) holds; the proof when A.SCDMC(b) holds is symmetric and omitted.

We first detail our candidate equilibrium strategies:

- In every odd period, each \( D_j \) makes offers \( p_{ij,D}^R \) to all firms \( U_i \) with which it has not already formed an agreement. If all price offers that it receives are equal to \( p_{ij,D}^R \), \( U_i \) accepts all offers. If \( U_i \) receives exactly one non-equilibrium offer from some \( D_j \), it accepts all other offers and rejects \( D_j \)'s offer if and only if the offer is lower than \( p_{ij,D}^R \). Finally, if \( U_i \) receives multiple non-equilibrium offers, it plays an arbitrary best response in its acceptance decision, respecting passive beliefs.

- In every even period with open agreements given by \( C \), each \( U_i \) makes offers \( p_{ij,U}(C) \) (defined below) to all firms \( D_j \in C_{i,U} \). If all price offers that it receives are equal to \( p_{ij,U}(C) \), \( D_j \) accepts all offers. If \( D_j \) receives exactly one non-equilibrium offer from some \( U_i \) and that offer is lower than \( p_{ij,U}(C) \), then \( D_j \) still accepts all offers. If \( D_j \) receives exactly one non-equilibrium offer from some \( U_i \) and that offer is higher than \( p_{ij,U}(C) \), then: (i) under A.WCDMC, \( D_j \) rejects \( U_i \)'s offer and accepts all other offers; (ii) under A.FEAS and A.SCDMC, \( D_j \) rejects \( U_i \)'s offer and plays an arbitrary best response in its acceptance decision with other offers (respecting passive beliefs). If \( D_j \) receives multiple non-equilibrium offers, it plays an arbitrary best response in its acceptance decision, respecting passive beliefs.

The prescribed strategy profile dictates that every firm makes proposals that are Rubinstein prices in odd periods, and may differ from Rubinstein prices in even periods. On the equilibrium path, all offers are accepted regardless of whether the period is odd or even.

Note that our candidate equilibrium strategies do not completely specify a receiving firm’s best response upon receiving multiple non-equilibrium offers; indeed, at certain nodes, there may be multiple actions that satisfy our equilibrium construction. Generally, determining a receiving firm’s best response upon receiving multiple non-equilibrium offers may depend on actions taken in a subsequent subgame when another firm receives multiple non-equilibrium offers; in such circumstances, best responses may not be straightforward to determine or even well defined. However, this is not an issue in our setting; given our candidate equilibrium strategies, a receiving firm’s value from accepting any set of offers (regardless of whether any offers are non-equilibrium offers) in any period \( t \) does not depend on future actions taken at nodes with multiple non-equilibrium offers. The reason for this is that a receiving firm anticipates that all agreements that are not formed in period \( t \) (including any offers that it rejects) will be formed at candidate equilibrium prices in the next period \( t + 1 \). Hence, regardless of the receiving firm’s actions in a given period, it will never expect to reach another subgame where any firm receives multiple non-equilibrium offers. Consequently, our candidate equilibrium strategies are well defined; furthermore, in our proof below, we explicitly characterize a firm’s best response to receiving multiple non-equilibrium offers at any history of play.

**Construction of Even Period \( (p_{ij,U}(C)) \) Prices.** We now define candidate even-period equilibrium pricing strategies \( p_{ij,U}(C) \) iteratively as follows. For each set of open agreements \( C \subseteq \mathcal{G} \), consider the constraints:

\[
\sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,U}(C) \leq (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(\mathcal{G}, B) + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^R \quad \forall j \text{ s.t. } C_{j,D} \neq \emptyset, \forall B \subseteq C_{j,D}. \tag{6}
\]

where the constraint ensures that each downstream firm \( D_j \) with open agreements in \( C \) wishes to accept prices \( p_{ij,U}(C) \) for any subset of agreements \( B \subseteq C_{j,D} \) at an even period as opposed to forming those agreements in the next period at Rubinstein prices \( p_{ij,D}^R \).
Step 1. Initialize $p_{ij,U}(C) = p_{ij,D}^R$, $\forall ij$. At these values, the constraints specified by (6) are strictly satisfied:

$$(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta\pi_{j,D}(G, B) + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^R \geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^{Nash} + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^R$$

$$RS \geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^{Nash} + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^R = LS,$$

where the inequality on the first line follows from A.FEAS, and the second line from Lemma 2.2.

Step 2. Now, for each set of open agreements $C$, fix an arbitrary ordering over agreements within that set. Start with the first open agreement $ij \in C$, and increase $p_{ij,U}(C)$ until (at least) one of the constraints given by (6) binds. Move on to the second open agreement, and do the same. Continue through all the open agreements in $C$. Define the candidate set of equilibrium offers $p_{ij,U}(C)$ to be the offers resulting from this process. For these prices, all constraints (6) still hold. Moreover, by construction, at these prices each open agreement $ij \in C$ has at least one constraint (6) that binds.

Next, we prove the following supporting Lemma.

**Lemma C.1** Candidate equilibrium prices satisfy the following properties:

1. $p_{ij,U}(C) \geq p_{ij,D}^R$, $\forall ij \in C, C \subseteq G$.
2. $p_{ij,U}(C) \leq p_{ij,U}^{R}, \forall ij \in C, C \subseteq G$.
3. $p_{ij,U}(\{ij\}) = p_{ij,U}^R, \forall ij \in G$.
4. Assume A.WCDMC. Then $p_{ij,U}(C) = p_{ij,U}^R, \forall ij \in C, \forall C \subseteq G$.
5. All candidate equilibrium prices converge to Nash-in-Nash prices as $\Lambda \to 0$.

**Proof.** We prove that each property holds in turn.

1. This follows directly from the iterative procedure: we start with $p_{ij,D}^R$ and then weakly increase prices to arrive at $p_{ij,U}(C)$.
2. By (6), $p_{ij,U}(C) \leq (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta\pi_{j,D}(G, ij) + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R = p_{ij,U}^R$.
3. By construction, $p_{ij,U}(\{ij\}) = (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta\pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R = p_{ij,U}^R$, with the equality following again from (6).
4. Suppose, by contradiction, that A.WCDMC holds but $\exists C \subseteq G$ and $lm \in C$ such that $p_{lm,U}(C) < p_{lm,U}^R$ (Claim 2 rules out the inequality in the other direction). Then, by the construction of $p_{lm,U}(C)$ there must exist $B \subseteq C, lm \in B$ for which the constraint in (6) binds. Using this $B$, we arrive at a contradiction:

$$\sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,U}^R > \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,U}(C)$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta\pi_{j,D}(G, B) + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^R$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \sum_{ij \in B} \Delta\pi_{j,D}(G, ij) + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,D}^R = \sum_{ij \in B} p_{ij,U}^R,$$

where the first line follows from Claim 2 and the contradictory assumption, the second line from our choice of $B$, the third line inequality from A.WCDMC, and the final equality from (1).
Lemma C.2 The candidate strategies described above comprise an equilibrium.

Proof. We now prove that no unilateral deviation is profitable on the part of any firm. Consider any period \( t \) where there are \( C \subseteq G \) open agreements.

**Upstream firm, \( t \) odd.** Consider first an upstream firm \( U_i \)'s decision of which offers to accept at an odd period \( t \) given it receives offers \( \{\hat{p}_{ij}\}_{i \in C_{i,U}} \). If \( U_i \) engages in a one-shot deviation by rejecting a subset \( K \subseteq C_{i,U} \) of its open agreements, \( U_i \) expects that: (i) all other upstream firms will accept all of their open agreements at period \( t \); and (ii) all non-accepted agreements \( K \) will form at period \( t + 1 \) at prices \( p_{i,j,U}(K) \) (as we only consider one-shot deviations, and play is expected to follow the prescribed equilibrium strategies from \( t + 1 \) onwards). We define the increase in \( U_i \)'s payoffs from rejecting agreements \( K \subseteq C_{i,U} \) (and following equilibrium strategies thereafter) as:

\[
F(K) = -(1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, K) + \sum_{ij \in K} [\hat{p}_{ij} - \delta_{i,U} p_{i,j,U}(K)]
\]

where we omit the fact that \( F \) is implicitly a function of the firm \( U_i \), the set of open agreements \( C \), the set of candidate equilibrium strategies employed by other firms, and the set of prices that \( U_i \) receives. \( U_i \) chooses to reject agreements \( K = \arg \max_{K \subseteq C_{i,U}} F(K) \), as this set of rejections maximizes its payoffs.

Consider first the case where \( U_i \) receives candidate equilibrium offers \( \{p_{ij,D}^R\}_{i \in C_{i,U}} \). Substituting these prices into (7), we obtain:

\[
F(K) = -(1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, K) + \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{i,U} p_{i,j,U}(K)]
\]

where the second line uses Lemma C.1(2) \( (p_{ij,U}(K) \leq p_{ij,D}^R) \), the third line inequality follows from A.WCDMC or A.SCDMC (a), and the third line equality uses (2). Since \( F(\emptyset) = 0 \), \( F(K) \) is maximized for \( K = \emptyset \). This implies that at equilibrium prices, \( U_i \) maximizes surplus by rejecting no offer, or equivalently, accepting all offers. Thus, in this case, \( U_i \) cannot gain by deviating from its candidate equilibrium strategy.

Consider next the case where \( U_i \) receives exactly one non-equilibrium offer, \( \hat{p}_{ij} \neq p_{ij,D}^R \). In this case, the increase in \( U_i \)'s payoffs from rejecting agreements \( K \subseteq C_{i,U} \) can be expressed as:

\[
F(K) = -(1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, K) + \sum_{kj \in K} [p_{k,j,D}^R - \delta_{k,U} p_{k,j,U}(K)] + 1_K(\{ij\}) (p_{ij,D}^R - \hat{p}_{ij})
\]

\[
\leq 1_K(\{ij\}) (p_{ij,D}^R - \hat{p}_{ij})
\]

5. In odd periods, offers are \( p_{ij,D}^R \) which converge to Nash-in-Nash prices as \( \Lambda \to 0 \) by Lemma 2.1. In even periods, offers satisfy \( p_{ij,D}^R \leq p_{ij,U}(C) \leq p_{ij,U}^R \). Since the offers lie between two sets of offers that converge to Nash-in-Nash prices, by the sandwich theorem, they also converge to Nash-in-Nash prices. \( \square \)

We now prove the main result.

**Lemma C.2** The candidate strategies described above comprise an equilibrium.
where $1_{K}(\{ij\})$ is an indicator function for $ij \in K$. Note that the increase in $U_i$’s profits from rejecting only agreement $ij$ can be expressed as:

$$
F(\{ij\}) = -\left[(1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \hat{p}_{ij} - \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}(\{ij\})\right]
$$

$$
= -\left[(1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + p_{i,j,D}^R - \delta_{i,U}p_{i,j,D}^R\right] + (p_{i,j,D}^R - \hat{p}_{ij})
$$

$$
= (p_{i,j,D}^R - \hat{p}_{ij}),
$$

where the second line follows from an application of Lemma C.1(3) ($p_{ij,U}(\{ij\}) = p_{ij,D}^R$) and a re-arranging of terms. Thus, if $\hat{p}_{ij} \geq p_{i,j,D}^R$, $F(K)$ is again maximized for $K = \emptyset$ (accept all offers); if $\hat{p}_{ij} < p_{i,j,D}^R$, $F(K)$ is maximized for $K = \{ij\}$ (reject only $D_j$’s offer). Hence, upon receiving one non-equilibrium offer, $U_i$ does not have a profitable deviation from its prescribed equilibrium strategy.

Finally, in cases with multiple off-equilibrium offers, the strategy profile specified above states that $U_i$ picks an arbitrary $K$ that maximizes $F(K)$. By definition then, this is a best response and no unilateral deviation is profitable. Note that receiving multiple off-equilibrium offers is unreachable from candidate equilibrium play by any unilateral deviation.

**Downstream firm, $t$ even.** Next consider a downstream firm $D_j$’s decision of which offers to accept at an even period $t$ given it receives offers $\{\hat{p}_{ij}\}_{ij \in C_{j,D}}$. If $D_j$ engages in a one-shot deviation by rejecting a subset $K \subseteq C_{j,D}$ of its open agreements, $D_j$ expects that: (i) all other downstream firms will accept all of their open agreements at period $t$; and (ii) all non-accepted offers $K$ will form agreement at period $t + 1$ at Rubinstein prices $p_{i,j,D}^R$. We define the increase in $D_j$’s payoffs from rejecting agreements $K \subseteq C_{j,D}$ (and following equilibrium strategies thereafter) as:

$$
F(K) = -\left[(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, K) + \sum_{ij \in K} [-\hat{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}^R]\right],
$$

(9)

where we omit the fact that $F$ is implicitly a function of the firm $D_j$, the set of open agreements $C$, the set of candidate equilibrium strategies employed by other firms, and the set of prices that $D_j$ receives. $D_j$ chooses to reject agreements $K = \arg \max_{K \subseteq C_{j,D}} F(K)$, as this set of rejections maximizes its payoffs.

Consider first the case where $D_j$ receives candidate equilibrium offers $\{p_{ij,U}(C)\}_{ij \in C_{j,D}}$. Substituting these prices into (9) and then applying (6), we obtain:

$$
F(K) = -\left[(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, K) + \sum_{ij \in K} [-p_{ij,U}(C) + \delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}^R]\right] \leq 0.
$$

(10)

Since $F(\emptyset) = 0$, $F(K)$ is maximized for $K = \emptyset$. This implies that at equilibrium prices, $D_j$ maximizes surplus by rejecting no offer, or equivalently, accepting all offers. Thus, in this case, $D_j$ cannot gain by deviating from its candidate equilibrium strategy.

Consider next the case where $D_j$ receives exactly one non-equilibrium offer, $\hat{p}_{ij} \neq p_{ij,U}(C)$. In this case, the increase in $D_j$’s payoffs from rejecting agreements $K \subseteq C_{j,D}$ can be expressed as:

$$
F(K) = -\left[(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, K) + \sum_{ik \in K} [-p_{ik,U}(C) + \delta_{j,D}p_{ik,D}^R]\right] + 1_{K}(\{ij\})(-p_{ij,U}(C) + \hat{p}_{ij})
$$

$$
\leq 1_{K}(\{ij\})(-p_{ij,U}(C) + \hat{p}_{ij}).
$$

(11)

From (11), if $\hat{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,U}(C)$, then there is no profitable deviation from the candidate equilibrium strategy of accepting all offers (as $F(K)$ is maximized at $K = \emptyset$). If $\hat{p}_{ij} \geq p_{ij,U}(C)$, there are two cases to consider:

1. Under A.WCDMC, by Lemma C.1(4), $p_{ij,U}(C) = p_{ij,D}^R$. By substituting this in to (11) and then
applying (2), the inequality can be shown to be an equality for $K = \{ij\}$; thus, $F(K)$ is maximized for $K = \{ij\}$ ( reject only $U_i$’s offer).

2. Otherwise, note first that if $D_j$ rejects some set of offers $K$ that does not include $ij$, then $F(K) \leq 0$ from (11); if $D_j$ rejects no offers, $F(\emptyset) = 0$. By rejecting a set of offers $K$ that includes $ij$ and all other offers which are included in some constraint from (6) that binds, $F(K) = p_{ij,U}(C) - \tilde{p}_{ij} > 0$. Thus, $D_j$’s best response must include rejecting $U_i$’s offer, and potentially includes rejecting other offers.

Again, there are no profitable deviations from prescribed strategies.

Finally, in cases with multiple off-equilibrium offers, the strategy profile specified above states that $D_j$ picks an arbitrary $\hat{K}$ that maximizes $F(K)$. By definition, this is a best response and no unilateral deviation is profitable.

**Upstream firm, $t$ even.** Next, we consider the decision for an upstream firm $U_i$ of what offers to propose at an even period $t$. Consider the possibility that $U_i$ deviates from the candidate equilibrium strategies and offers prices $\tilde{p}_{ij} \neq p_{ij,U}(C)$ for all $ij$ in some $K \subseteq C_{i,U}$. By passive beliefs, each firm $D_j$ receiving $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ perceives that it is the only one to have received an off-equilibrium offer. Given the above discussion regarding $D$’s strategies in this case, if $\tilde{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,U}(C)$, then it will be accepted, while if $\tilde{p}_{ij} > p_{ij,U}(C)$, then it will be rejected, potentially along with some other offers $kj$. Clearly, $U_i$ will never choose to offer $\tilde{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,U}(C)$, since it can always offer $p_{ij,U}(C)$ instead, without affecting the set of acceptances.

Thus, the only possible profitable deviation left is for $U_i$ to offer $\tilde{p}_{ij} > p_{ij,U}(C)$ for all $ij$ in $K$. Given the candidate equilibrium strategies, these offers will be rejected at period $t$, and then accepted at $t+1$ at prices $p_{ij,D}^R$. Let $a_1, \ldots, a_{|K|}$ denote the downstream firms with offers in $K$ and let $C_k$ denote the set of offers rejected by $D_{ak}$ following its deviant offer from $U_i$. Given the downstream firms’ strategies, it will be the case each downstream firm $D_{ak}$ will reject $ia_k$, and $ia_k \in C_k$. Note that under A.WCDMC, given the prescribed equilibrium strategy profiles each downstream firm $D_{ak}$ will only reject $ia_k$, and $C_k = \{ia_k\}$; under A.FEAS, a downstream firm may also reject additional agreements.

Then, the decrease in $U_i$’s surplus from raising the price on some set of offers $K \subseteq C_{i,U}$ is:

$$\sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,U}(C) - \delta_{ij,U}p_{ij,D}^R] + (1 - \delta_{ij,U})\Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G, C_1 \cup \ldots \cup C_{|K|})$$ \tag{12}

$$= \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,U}(C) - \delta_{ij,U}p_{ij,D}^R] + (1 - \delta_{ij,U})\sum_{k=1}^{|K|} \Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G \setminus (C_{k+1} \cup \ldots \cup C_{|K|}), C_k)$$

$$\geq \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,U}(C) - \delta_{ij,U}p_{ij,D}^R] + (1 - \delta_{ij,U})\sum_{k=1}^{|K|} \Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G, \{ia_k\})$$

$$= \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,U}(C) - \delta_{ij,U}p_{ij,D}^R] + (1 - \delta_{ij,U})\Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G, \{ij\})$$

$$\geq \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{ij,U}p_{ij,U} + (1 - \delta_{ij,U})\Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G, \{ij\})] = 0,$$

implying that such a deviation is not profitable. In (12), the second term of the second line splits the change in surplus from the postponed agreements by downstream firms. The third line then either follows directly from A.WCDMC (as $C_k = \{ia_k\}$), or applies A.SCDMC to each element of the second term, which can be done since each element can be expressed as the difference in $U_i$’s profits between when $D_{ak}$ accepts all its offers and when it rejects both $U_i$’s offer and the other offers in $C_k$, holding constant the fact that all other agreements are formed except for $C_{k+1} \cup \ldots \cup C_{|K|}$.41 The fourth line rearranges terms. The final line inequality follows from Lemma C.1(1) and Lemma 2.2, and the last equality from (2).

**Downstream firm, $t$ odd.** Finally, we consider the decision for a downstream firm $D_j$ of what offers to propose at an odd period $t$. Consider the possibility that $D_j$ deviates from the candidate equilibrium

41Let $B \equiv G \setminus (C_{k+1} \cup \ldots \cup C_{|K|})$, $A \equiv C_k \setminus \{ia_k\}$, and $A' \equiv \emptyset$. As $A$ and $A'$ only differ in agreements formed by $D_{ak}$, $\Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G \setminus (C_{k+1} \cup \ldots \cup C_{|K|}), C_k) = \pi_{ij,U}(A \cup B \cup \{ia_k\}) - \pi_{ij,U}(A' \cup B) \geq \Delta\pi_{ij,U}(G, \{ia_k\})$, where the last inequality follows from A.SCDMC.
strategies and offers prices different from \( p_{ij} \neq p_{ij,D}^R \) for all \( ij \) in some \( K \subseteq C_{i,D} \). By passive beliefs, each firm \( U_i \) receiving \( p_{ij} \) perceives that it is the only one to have received an off-equilibrium offer. Given candidate equilibrium strategies, if \( p_{ij} > p_{ij,D}^R \), then it will be accepted, while if \( p_{ij} < p_{ij,D}^R \), then it will be rejected, with no other impact on the acceptance of offers not in \( K \). \( D_j \) will not deviate and offer \( p_{ij} > p_{ij,D}^R \) to any \( U_i \), as it can always offer \( p_{ij,D}^R \) instead and do strictly better (as no other agreements are affected). The only possible profitable deviation for \( D_j \) is to offer \( p_{ij} < p_{ij,D}^R \) for all \( ij \) in \( K \). Again, given the candidate equilibrium strategies, these offers will be rejected at period \( t \), and then accepted at \( t+1 \) at prices \( p_{ij,U}(K) \). The decrease in \( D_j \)'s payoffs from engaging in such a deviation is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, K) - \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{j,D} \pi_{ij,U}(K)]
\]

\[
\geq \sum_{ij \in K} [(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{ij,U}^Nash - \delta_{j,D} \pi_{ij,U}(K)]
\]

\[
> \sum_{ij \in K} [(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{j,D} \pi_{ij,U}(K)]
\]

\[
= \delta_{j,D} \sum_{ij \in K} [\pi_{ij,U}(K) - \pi_{ij,D}^R] \geq 0 ,
\]

where the second line of (13) follows from A.FEAS (and implied by A.WCDMC), the third line from Lemma 2.2, the final line equality from rearranging terms, and the final line inequality from Lemma C.1(2).

Thus, \( D_j \) has no profitable deviation.

Since there are no profitable one-shot deviations for any agent in both odd and even periods, the candidate set of strategies comprise an equilibrium. By Lemma C.1(5), prices at this equilibrium converge to Nash-in-Nash prices. \( \square \)

### C.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1 (Necessity)

We now prove that if A.WCDMC does not hold, there is no equilibrium where at every period \( t \) and history \( h^t \) all open agreements \( ij \in C(h^t) \) immediately form at prices \( p_{ij,D}^R \) (\( p_{ij,U}^R \)) if \( t \) is odd (even). We proceed by contradiction: assume that such an equilibrium exists, and that there exists an upstream firm \( U_i \) and a set of agreements \( K \subseteq G_{i,U} \) such that \( \Delta \pi_{ij,U}(G, K) < \sum_{ij \in K} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) \) (the proof is symmetric if A.WCDMC is violated for some downstream firm \( D_j \)). Consider again the gain in one-shot surplus from \( U_i \) rejecting all \( ij \in K \), denoted \( F(K) \), evaluated at period \( t_0 = 1 \). From the candidate equilibrium, we know that \( U_i \) has formed agreements at prices \( p_{ij,D}^R \) for all \( ij \in G_{i,U} \). \( F(K) \) is given by:

\[
F(K) \equiv - \left[ (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, K) + \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{i,U} p_{ij,U}^R] \right]
\]

\[
> - \left[ \sum_{ij \in K} (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \sum_{ij \in K} [p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{i,U} p_{ij,U}^R] \right] = 0 ,
\]

where the inequality follows from the assumption that A.WCDMC does not hold and the equality from (2). Hence, it is a profitable deviation for \( U_i \) to reject the offers in \( K \) at period 1, implying a contradiction. \( \square \)

### D Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Uniqueness for No-Delay Equilibria)

Consider any no-delay equilibrium. Theorem 4.1 follows from the following two claims.
Claim A: In every odd period $t$ with history $h^t$, each agreement $ij \in \mathcal{C}(h^t)$ has equilibrium price $p_{ij}(h^t) \geq p_{ij}^{R}(h^t)$. In every even period with history $h^t$, each agreement $ij \in \mathcal{C}(h^t)$ has equilibrium price $p_{ij}(h^t) \leq p_{ij}^{R}(h^t)$.

Proof of Claim A. We prove the claim by contradiction. First, suppose that there is an odd period $t$ with history of play $h^t$ for which $p_{ij}(h^t) < p_{ij}^{R}(h^t)$. Then, $U_i$ has a profitable one-shot deviation: reject $ij$ and accept all its other offers. In this case, at period $t + 1$, $ij$ will be the only open agreement (as all other agreements form at $t$ in a no-delay equilibrium). Thus, following this deviation, $ij$ will then form at price $p_{ij}^{R}$ at period $t + 1$ by Rubinstein (1982). The gains to $U_i$ from this deviant action will then be:

$$\delta_{i,U}p_{ij}^{R} - p_{ij}(h^t) - (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(\mathcal{G}, \{ij\}) > \delta_{i,U}p_{ij}^{R} - p_{ij}^{R} - (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(\mathcal{G}, \{ij\}) = 0,$$

where the inequality follows from the contradictory assumption and the equality follows from (2). Hence this deviation is profitable. The even period proof is symmetric and omitted.

Claim B: Fix $\varepsilon > 0$. For any odd (even) period history of play $h^t$, $\exists \bar{\Lambda} > 0$ such that if $\Lambda \leq \bar{\Lambda}$, then the equilibrium price $p_{ij}(h^t) \leq p_{ij}^{Nash} + \varepsilon$ (for even periods, $p_{ij}(h^t) \geq p_{ij}^{Nash} - \varepsilon$).

Proof of Claim B. Define $\bar{\Lambda}$ as any positive number that is small enough so that: (a) when $\Lambda \leq \bar{\Lambda}$, the maximum absolute value of profits to any firm for any subset of agreements over period length $\Lambda$ is less than $\varepsilon/2$; and (b) the maximum of the absolute value of the difference between $p_{ij}^{R}$ and $p_{ij}^{Nash}$ across all agreements in $\mathcal{G}$ is also less than $\varepsilon/2$.\footnote{Such a $\bar{\Lambda}$ exists, since profits are bounded and $\lim_{\Lambda \to 0} p_{ij}^{R} = p_{ij}^{Nash}$ by Lemma 2.1.}

We now prove our claim by contradiction. First, suppose that there is an odd period history of play $h^t$ for which, for some $\Lambda \leq \bar{\Lambda}$, there is an agreement $ij$ that is formed where $p_{ij}(h^t) > p_{ij}^{Nash} + \varepsilon$. Consider the following deviation by $D_j$: at $h^t$, $D_j$ makes a deviant offer $\bar{p}_{ij}$ sufficiently low that it is sure to be rejected by $U_i$. $D_j$ will expect that, at period $t$, $U_i$ will reject this deviant offer (and potentially some other offers), and that all offers that do not involve $U_i$ will be accepted. Let $K$ denote the set of offers that $U_i$ rejects following this deviant offer from $D_j$. At period $t + 1$, given that $h^{t+1}$ is the history following $D_j$’s period $t$ deviant action, $U_i$ will propose offers at equilibrium prices $\{p_{ik}(h^{t+1})\}_{i \in K}$; furthermore, $D_j$ expects that all agreements will be formed at the end of $t + 1$ (given no-delay equilibrium strategies). The gain to $D_j$ from this deviation is:

$$\frac{p_{ij}(h^t) - \delta_{j,D}p_{ij}(h^{t+1}) - (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(\mathcal{G}, K)}{\text{change in payments}} - \frac{\delta_{j,D}p_{ij}^{R} - (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(\mathcal{G}, K)}{\text{change in flow profits}} > \varepsilon - \varepsilon/2 - \varepsilon/2 = 0,$$

where the first line inequality follows from the contradictory assumption ($p_{ij}(h^t) > p_{ij}^{Nash} + \varepsilon$) and Claim A ($p_{ij}(h^t) \leq p_{ij}^{R}$), and the second line follows from the assumption that $\Lambda < \bar{\Lambda}$ (implying that $|p_{ij}^{Nash} - \delta_{j,D}p_{ij}^{R}| < \varepsilon/2$ and $(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(\mathcal{G}, K) < \varepsilon/2$). Thus, this deviation is profitable for $D_j$, implying a contradiction.

We have thus shown that, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, there is a $\bar{\Lambda}$ such that for any $\Lambda < \bar{\Lambda}$, equilibrium prices in odd periods are bounded above by Nash-in-Nash prices plus $\varepsilon$. The even period proof is symmetric and omitted. \qed

### E Proof of Theorem 4.2 (Uniqueness Without Assuming Immediate Agreement)

We prove Theorem 4.2 under two sets of conditions. The first set, as stated in the main text, comprises A.GFT, A.SCDMC, A.LNEXT, and restricts consideration to common tie-breaking equilibria. We also prove that our uniqueness result holds under A.GFT, A.SCDMC, and a “no-externalities” assumption (discussed informally in Section 4.2) without restricting attention to common tie-breaking equilibria. The no-externalities assumption states that any firm’s profits only depend on agreements that directly involve that firm:
Assumption E.1 (A.NEXT: No Externalities)
For upstream firms: for all $i = 1, \ldots, N$, $A \subseteq G_{i,U}$, and $B, B' \subseteq G_{i,U}$,

$$\pi_{i,U}(A \cup B) = \pi_{i,U}(A \cup B').$$

For downstream firms: for all $j = 1, \ldots, M$, $A \subseteq G_{j,D}$, and $B, B' \subseteq G_{j,D}$,

$$\pi_{j,D}(A \cup B) = \pi_{j,D}(A \cup B').$$

It is straightforward to prove that A.SCDMC and A.NEXT directly imply A.LNEXT.

Thus, in our subsequent proofs, we will assume that A.GFT, A.SCDMC, and A.LNEXT hold, and either restrict attention to common tie-breaking equilibria or assume A.NEXT. For the proofs in this section, we will use equilibrium to refer to common tie-breaking equilibrium when A.NEXT is not employed.

E.1 Inductive Structure and Base Case
For any history $h^t$ with open agreements $C$ at the start of period $t$, let $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ be the subgame starting at period $t$. We prove Theorem 4.2 by induction on the set of open agreements $C$ in any subgame $\Gamma_C(h^t)$. The base case is provided by analyzing $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ where $|C| = 1$: i.e., there is only one agreement that has not yet been formed at period $t$.

Lemma E.2 (Base Case) Consider any subgame $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ for which $|C| = 1$. Then $\Gamma_C(h^t)$, where $C = \{ij\}$, has a unique equilibrium involving immediate agreement at $t$ at prices $p_{ij,D}^R$ if $t$ is odd, and $p_{ij,U}^R$ if $t$ is even.

Proof. With only one open agreement $ij \in C$, $U_i$ and $D_j$ engage in a two-player Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game over joint surplus $\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\})$. The result directly follows from Rubinstein (1982). (Note that Rubinstein (1982) only requires A.GFT.) \(\square\)

We now state the inductive hypothesis and inductive step used to prove Theorem 4.2.

Inductive Hypothesis. Consider any $C \subseteq G$. For any subgame $\Gamma_B(h^t)$ for which $B \subseteq C$, every equilibrium results in immediate agreement for all $ij \in B$ at prices $p_{ij,D}^R$ if $t$ is odd, and $p_{ij,U}^R$ if $t$ is even.

The inductive hypothesis is that any subgame of $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ that begins with fewer open agreements than $|C|$ results in immediate agreement at the Rubinstein prices.

Lemma E.3 (Inductive Step) Consider any subgame $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ for which $|C| > 1$. Given the inductive hypothesis, every equilibrium of $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ has immediate agreement for all $ij \in C$ at prices $p_{ij,D}^R$ if $t$ is odd, and $p_{ij,U}^R$ if $t$ is even.

The inductive step states that if the inductive hypothesis holds for $\Gamma_C(h^t)$, then $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ also results in immediate agreement for all open agreements at Rubinstein prices. Note that Lemmas E.2 (Base Case) and E.3 (Inductive Step) imply Theorem 4.2 by induction: as we have established that the theorem holds when $|C| = 1$, the inductive step implies that the theorem will hold for any $C \subseteq G$ and history of play $h^t$.

To prove Lemma E.3 (and by consequence, Theorem 4.2), we first prove the simultaneity of agreements—i.e., if any open agreements are formed in a period, all open agreements are formed—at Rubinstein prices. We employ separate lemmas for two separate cases, depending on whether there are multiple receiving firms (Lemma E.5) or a single receiving firm (Lemma E.6) in a given period. Our proofs of simultaneity use A.SCDMC and restrict attention to common tie-breaking equilibria (or, alternatively, use A.NEXT). We then prove immediacy of agreement—i.e., that all open agreements form in the current period without delay—in Lemma E.7. This proof uses A.SCDMC and A.LNEXT. Establishing Lemmas E.5-E.7 proves our result.

Before proceeding, we state and prove the following lemma that we will use in our proofs:
Lemma E.4 Assume A.GFT and A.LNEXT. Then \( \forall C \subseteq G, \exists ij \in C \) such that:

\[
\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) > \sum_{hj \in C_j,D} p_{hj,U}, \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, C) > - \sum_{ik \in C_i,U} p_{ik,D}.
\]

Proof. By A.LNEXT, \( \forall C \subseteq G, \exists ij \in C \) such that:

\[
\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) \geq \sum_{hj \in C_j,D} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{hj\}), \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, C) \geq \sum_{ik \in C_i,U} \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ik\}).
\]

By A.GFT, \( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{hj\}) > p_{hj,U} \) and \( \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ik\}) > -p_{ik,D} \) for all agreements \( hj, ik \in G \) (see Lemma 2.2). The lemma immediately follows. \( \square \)

E.2 Simultaneity of Agreements

Lemma E.5 (Simultaneity of Agreements: Multiple Receiving Firms.) Assume that the inductive hypothesis holds.

1. Suppose that \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) is such that there are at least two upstream firms with open agreements in \( C \). In any equilibrium of \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) where the first open agreement in \( C \) is formed at an odd period \( t \geq \bar{t} \), all agreements \( ij \in C \) must form at \( t \) and at prices \( p_{ij,U}^R \).

2. Suppose that \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) is such that there are at least two downstream firms with open agreements in \( C \). In any equilibrium of \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) where the first open agreement in \( C \) is formed at an even period \( t \geq \bar{t} \), all agreements \( ij \in C \) must form at \( t \) and at prices \( p_{ij,U}^R \).

Proof. We prove case 1 using two claims (A and B); the proof of case 2 is symmetric and omitted.

Claim A: In any equilibrium of \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) where the first set of open agreements \( B \subseteq C, B \neq \emptyset \), are formed at an odd period \( t \geq \bar{t} \), then all open agreements in \( C \) also are formed at period \( t \).

Proof of Claim A. By contradiction, assume that there is an equilibrium of \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) where \( B \neq C \) so that a non-empty set of agreements does not form at period \( t \). By the inductive hypothesis, all agreements \( hk \in C \setminus B \) will form at period \( t + 1 \) at prices \( p_{hk,U}^R \). Consider some agreement \( ij \) that: (1) is formed at period \( t + 1 \) following equilibrium play under \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) and (2) \( \exists h \neq i \) such that \( U_h \) has an agreement which forms at period \( t \). Such an \( ij \) must exist since \( C \) includes agreements for more than one upstream firm and (by the contradictory assumption) not all agreements form at period \( t \).

Now consider the following deviation by \( D_j \) at period \( t \): \( D_j \) offers \( \tilde{p}_{ij} \equiv p_{ij,D}^R + \varepsilon \) to \( U_i \), where \( 0 < \varepsilon < p_{ij,D}^R \). By passive beliefs, \( U_i \) expects at least one agreement to form at period \( t \) (e.g., involving \( U_h \)) upon receiving this deviant offer from \( D_j \); by the inductive hypothesis, \( U_i \) therefore expects that all agreements that do not form at period \( t \) will form at period \( t + 1 \). Note that:

1. Such a deviant offer will be accepted by \( U_i \).

   By contradiction, suppose not, and \( U_i \) rejects \( D_j \)’s deviant offer and instead accepted some (potentially empty) set of offers \( A \subseteq (C_i \setminus \{ij\}) \) at period \( t \). The gain to \( U_i \) from adding \( ij \) to \( A \) is strictly positive:

\[
(1 - \delta_{i,U})(\pi_{i,U}(\{C_i \setminus \{j\}) \cup A \cup B_{-i,U} \cup \{ij\})) - (1 - \delta_{i,U})(\pi_{i,U}(\{C_i \setminus \{j\}) \cup A \cup B_{-i,U} \cup \{ij\})) + \tilde{p}_{ij} - \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R
\]

\[
= (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(\{C_i \setminus \{j\}) \cup A \cup B_{-i,U} \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\}) + p_{ij,D}^R + \varepsilon - \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R
\]

\[
\geq (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(\{C_i \setminus \{j\}) + p_{ij,D}^R + \varepsilon - \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R = \varepsilon.
\]

\[43\] By Lemma 2.2, \( p_{ij,U}^R > p_{ij,D}^R, \) so \( \varepsilon > 0.\)
where the second line is definitional, the third line inequality follows from A.SCDMC, and the last equality follows from (2). Hence, any best response to this deviant offer by $U_i$ must include accepting $ij$.

2. Such a deviation is profitable for $D_j$ if accepted by $U_i$.

If $U_i$ accepts the deviant offer in addition to some set of offers $A \subseteq (C_{i,U} \setminus ij)$, $D_j$'s gain from this deviant offer is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D}) [\pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) \cup A \cup B_{-i,U} \cup \{ij\}] - \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) \cup B_{i,U} \cup B_{-i,U})] - \tilde{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D}p_{ij,U} - \delta_{j,D}p_{ij,U} = p_{ij,U} - p_{ij,D} - \varepsilon > 0,
\]

where the second line follows from A.SCDMC, the third line inequality follows from Lemma 2.2, the last line equality follows from rearranging terms, and the final inequality follows from Lemma 2.2 and the choice of $\varepsilon$.

This is a profitable deviation for $D_j$, yielding a contradiction. Thus, if the first agreement forms in odd period $t$, all agreements must form at period $t$.

**Claim B:** In any equilibrium of $\Gamma_C(h^\ell)$ where all open agreements $C$ are formed at an odd period $t \geq \ell$, all agreements $ij \in C$ are formed at prices $\hat{p}_{ij} = p_{ij,D}^R$.

**Proof of Claim B.** By contradiction, assume that all open agreements $C$ are formed at period $t$, but $\hat{p}_{ij} \neq p_{ij,D}^R$ for some $ij \in C$. Consider the following two cases:

1. Suppose $\hat{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,D}^R$ for some $ij$.

   Consider the deviation where $U_i$ rejects only this offer $ij$ at $t$. Since all other agreements form at period $t$, from the inductive hypothesis, $U_i$ expects to form $ij$ at $t + 1$ at price $p_{ij,U}^R$. $U_i$'s gain from this deviation is positive:

   \[
   \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R - \hat{p}_{ij} - (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) > \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R - p_{ij,D}^R - (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) = 0,
   \]

   where the last equality follows from (2), implying a contradiction.

2. Suppose $\hat{p}_{ij} > p_{ij,D}^R$ for some $ij$.

   Consider the deviation where $D_j$ lowers its offer from $\hat{p}_{ij}$ to some $\tilde{p}_{ij} \in (p_{ij,D}^R, \hat{p}_{ij})$. We first show that, under either action, every best response for $U_i$ must include accepting offer $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ and forming agreement $ij$ at period $t$. Suppose, by contradiction, that a best response for $U_i$ at $t$ would be to form only agreements $A \subseteq C_{i,U} \setminus \{ij\}$. Similar to the logic used to derive (14), the gain to $U_i$ from also forming $ij$ in addition to $A$ is strictly positive:

   \[
   (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C_{i,U} \cup A \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\}) + \tilde{p}_{ij} - \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R - (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{i,U}p_{ij,U}^R = 0,
   \]

   where the last equality follows from (2), implying that forming only agreements in $A$ was not a best response. An analogous equation but with $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ replacing $\hat{p}_{ij}$ (not shown) also holds, thus implying that any best response for $U_i$ at $t$ given the candidate equilibrium strategies also must involve forming agreement $ij$.

   We now show that the set of best responses for $U_i$ at $t$ given candidate equilibrium prices coincides to the set of best responses for $U_i$ at $t$ given the deviation by $D_j$. Consider any best response set of acceptances to $D_j$'s deviation at $t$. Accepting $A \cup \{ij\}$, $A \subseteq C_{i,U} \setminus \{ij\}$, is a best response for $U_i$ if and only if the value to $U_i$ of accepting this set is weakly greater than the maximum value of accepting
any set $\mathcal{A'} \cup \{ij\}$, $\mathcal{A'} \subseteq \mathcal{C}_{i,U} \setminus \{ij\}$. This condition can be written as:

$$
(1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi((G \setminus \mathcal{C}_{i,U}) \cup \mathcal{A} \cup \{ij\}) + \sum_{ik \in \mathcal{A}} \tilde{p}_{ik} + \delta_{i,U} \sum_{ik \in \mathcal{C}_{i,U} \setminus (\mathcal{A} \cup \{ij\})} p^{R}_{ik,U} \\
\geq \max_{\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{C}_{i,U}} \left\{ (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi((G \setminus \mathcal{C}_{i,U}) \cup \mathcal{A'} \cup \{ij\}) + \sum_{ik \in \mathcal{A'}} \tilde{p}_{ik} + \delta_{i,U} \sum_{ik \in \mathcal{C}_{i,U} \setminus (\mathcal{A'} \cup \{ij\})} p^{R}_{ik,U} \right\},
$$

(where we omit the price paid for $ij$ since we have shown that any best response to the deviant offer requires this agreement to be formed at $t$). This condition is the same as the one determining whether a set $\mathcal{A} \cup \{ij\}$ is a best response for $U_i$ at $t$ under candidate equilibrium strategies (as we have shown earlier in Claim B of the lemma that any best response for $U_i$ under these strategies also must involve agreement $ij$ being formed), implying that the sets of best responses are the same. Because the sets of best responses are the same and we restrict attention to a common tie-breaking equilibrium, $U_i$ must accept the same set of offers—i.e., all offers in $\mathcal{C}_{i,U}$—upon receiving this deviant offer from $D_j$ as under the candidate equilibrium strategies. Thus, the deviant offer will increase profits to $D_j$ by $
\tilde{p}_{ij} - \hat{p}_{ij} > 0$, which leads to a contradiction.

If we assume A.NEXT instead of restricting attention to common tie-breaking equilibria, then having shown that $U_i$ accepts the deviant offer $\hat{p}_{ij}$ is sufficient for $D_j$ to have a profitable deviation, as under A.NEXT, $D_j$'s profits are unaffected by $U_i$'s other acceptances.

Thus, $\hat{p}_{ij} = p^{R}_{ij,U}$ $\forall ij \in \mathcal{C}$ if the first open agreement in $\mathcal{C}$ forms at an odd period. \hfill \Box

**Lemma E.6 (Simultaneity of Agreements: Single Receiving Firm.)** Assume that the inductive hypothesis holds.

1. Suppose that $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ is such that there is exactly one downstream firm, but more than one upstream firm, with open agreements in $\mathcal{C}$. In any equilibrium of $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ where the first agreement is formed at an even period $t \geq \hat{t}$, all agreements $ij \in \mathcal{C}$ must form at $t$ and at prices $p^{R}_{ij,U}$.

2. Suppose that $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ is such that there is exactly one upstream firm, but more than one downstream firm, with open agreements in $\mathcal{C}$. In any equilibrium of $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ where the first agreement is formed at an odd period $t \geq \hat{t}$, all agreements $ij \in \mathcal{C}$ must form at $t$ and at prices $p^{R}_{ij,D}$.

**Proof.** We prove case 1 of the lemma; the proof of case 2 is symmetric and omitted.

For this lemma, we cannot apply induction in the case where the single receiving firm rejects all of its offers as the subgame beginning in the following period will have the same set of open agreements. Analyzing this case is more involved and utilizes an argument similar to Rubinstein (1982) and Shaked and Sutton (1984), where bounds on equilibrium prices are obtained by showing that the receiving firm cannot credibly reject a sufficiently generous offer in any equilibrium without the expectation of an even more generous (and infeasible) offer in a future subgame.

We start with two definitions. For any subgame $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ and equilibrium where all agreements in $\mathcal{C}$ are eventually formed, let $\{p_{ij}(\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t))\}_{ij \in \mathcal{C}}$ be the equilibrium prices for this game (which need not all form at $t$), and define $\phi_{\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)} \equiv \sum_{ij \in \mathcal{C}} [p^{R}_{ij,D} - p_{ij}(\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t))]$ to be the total discount from prices $p^{R}_{ij,D}$ that $D_j$ obtains in this equilibrium of this subgame.

We prove the lemma with three claims.

**Claim A:** For any equilibrium and subgame $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ where all agreements in $\mathcal{C}$ are eventually formed, $\phi_{\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)} \leq 0$.

**Proof of Claim A.** By contradiction, assume that there is an equilibrium where in some subgame $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$, all agreements in $\mathcal{C}$ are eventually formed, and the total discount is strictly positive: $\phi_{\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)} > 0$. Without loss of generality (since all agreements eventually form), assume that at least one open agreement forms at $\hat{t}$ in this equilibrium.

Now consider all subgames $\{\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)\}$ of $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ (including $\Gamma_{\mathcal{C}}(h^t)$ itself) where $t \geq \hat{t}$, $t$ is even, there are $\mathcal{C}$ open agreements at $t$, $h^t$ is consistent with $h^\hat{t}$ (i.e., $h^t$ coincides with $h^\hat{t}$ for all periods $\hat{t}$ and earlier), and
the first open agreement in \( C \) is formed at \( t \) given equilibrium strategies. Such subgames, if \( t > t' \), can be reached from \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) if all agreements in \( C \) are rejected in periods \( t, \ldots, t-1 \). In any such subgame \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) where at least one agreement is formed at \( t \), by the inductive hypothesis all agreements will be formed at latest by \( t + 1 \). Let \( \bar{\phi} \) denote the supremum of the total discount over all subgames of \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) satisfying the criteria above.\(^{44}\)

Now choose subgame \( \Gamma_C(h^t) \) with at least one agreement forming at \( t \) that has a total discount very close to the supremum and strictly positive: i.e., for which \( \delta_{j,D}\bar{\phi} < \phi_{\Gamma_C(h^t)} \) and \( \phi_{\Gamma_C(h^t)} \geq \phi_{\Gamma_C(h^t)} > 0 \). At this subgame, fix some \( U_t \) for which (1) agreement \( ij \) forms at period \( t \) and (2) \( \tilde{p}_{ij} = p_{ij}(\Gamma_C(h^t)) < p_{ij,D}^R \). Such a \( U_t \) must exist by the fact that the agreements that do not form at period \( t \) form at period \( t+1 \) at odd-period Rubinstein prices (which have no discount) by the inductive hypothesis. Finally, denote the equilibrium play following this candidate best response:

We now show that any best response by \( D_j \) at \( t + 1 \) is not a best response in this case. Suppose, by contradiction, that at least one agreement is formed at period \( t \).

1. \( \mathcal{A} = \emptyset \), and no further agreements ever form (i.e., \( D_j \) rejects all offers in every subsequent even period, and makes sufficiently low offers for all open agreements in every subsequent odd period that all of its offers are rejected).

Consider an alternative action for \( D_j \) of accepting only agreement \( ij \) at price \( \tilde{p}_{ij} \) at period \( t \). If \( D_j \) accepts only \( ij \), then all other agreements will form at \( t+1 \) by the inductive hypothesis. The gain (in period \( t \) units) to \( D_j \) from accepting only \( ij \) as opposed to following the candidate action and rejecting all offers at \( t \) is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}((G \setminus C) \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\}) - \tilde{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D}\left(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \sum_{kj \in C, k \neq i} p_{kj,D}^R\right)
\]

\[
> (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - \tilde{p}_{ij,D} + \delta_{j,D}\left(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \sum_{kj \in C, k \neq i} p_{kj,D}^R\right)
\]

\[
= -\delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}^R + \delta_{j,D}\left(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \sum_{kj \in C, k \neq i} p_{kj,D}^R\right)
\]

(17)

where the second line follows from A.SCDMC and the definition of the deviant action (\( \tilde{p}_{ij} \equiv \tilde{p}_{ij} + \frac{\varepsilon}{p_{ij,D}^R} \)), the third line follows from (1), and the final line from Lemma 2.2 and A.FEAS. Thus, accepting no offers at \( t \) is not a best response in this case.

2. \( \mathcal{A} = \emptyset \), and the first agreement \( ij \in C \) to form does so at an odd period \( t + t' \), \( t' \geq 1 \).

In this case, by Lemma E.5, all agreements must form at time \( t + t' \) at Rubinstein prices \( p_{ij,D}^R \) (as there are multiple receiving (upstream) firms with open agreements). Consider an alternative action for \( D_j \) of accepting \( A \cup \{ij\} \) at period \( t \) (i.e., original equilibrium acceptances at \( t \)). Note that the gain from following this alternative action relative to forming all agreements in \( C \) at period \( t + 1 \) at
Consider an alternative action for Rubinstein prices. The odd-period Rubinstein prices is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}\left((G \setminus C) \cup (A \cup \{ij\}), \hat{A} \cup \{ij\}\right) - \hat{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}' - \sum_{kj \in \hat{A}} (\hat{p}_{kj} - \delta_{j,D}p_{kj,D}^R) \\
\geq (1 - \delta_{j,D})\left(\sum_{kj \in A \cup \{ij\}} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) - \hat{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}' - \sum_{kj \in \hat{A}} (\hat{p}_{kj} - \delta_{j,D}p_{kj,D}^R)\right) \\
\geq \left(\sum_{kj \in A \cup \{ij\}} (1 - \delta_{j,D})(\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) - p_{kj,U}^R + \delta_{j,D}p_{kj,D}^R)\right) + p_{ij,U}' - \hat{p}_{ij} + \sum_{kj \in \hat{A}} (p_{kj,U}^R - \hat{p}_{kj}) \\
> \delta_{j,D}\tilde{\phi} > 0, \tag{18}
\]

where the second line follows from A.SCDMC, the third line follows from rearranging terms, and the last line follows from (16) and the assumption that \(\tilde{\phi} > 0\). Thus, the alternative action yields \(D_j\) a payoff that is strictly higher than the payoff of forming all agreements at period \(t + 1\) at odd-period Rubinstein prices.

Next, the gain to \(D_j\) from forming all agreements in \(C\) at period \(t + 1\) at odd-period Rubinstein prices instead of forming all agreements in \(C\) in some odd period \(t + t', t' > 1\), in period \(t + 1\) units, is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D}'^{-1})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R + \delta_{j,D}'^{-1} \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R \\
\geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}'^{-1}) \sum_{kj \in C} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) - \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R + \delta_{j,D}'^{-1} \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R \\
= (1 - \delta_{j,D}'^{-1}) \sum_{kj \in C} (\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) - p_{kj,D}^R) > 0, \tag{19}
\]

where the second line follows from A.WCDMC, the third line equality follows by rearranging terms, and last inequality from Lemma 2.2. Thus, accepting no offers at \(t\) is not a best response in this case.

3. \(A = \emptyset\), and the first agreement \(ij \in C\) to form does so at an even period \(t + t', t' \geq 2\).

Let \(B\) denote the equilibrium set of agreements that forms at time \(t + t'\) following \(D_j\)'s rejection of all offers at \(t\). For any \(kj \in B\), let \(p_{kj}'\) denote the equilibrium price at which the agreement forms. By the inductive hypothesis, the remaining agreements, \(C \setminus B\) form at \(t + t' + 1\) (odd) at odd-period Rubinstein prices.

Consider an alternative action for \(D_j\) of accepting \(\hat{A} \cup \{ij\}\) at period \(t\). From (18), the gain to \(D_j\) from following this alternative action as opposed to forming all agreements in \(C\) at period \(t + 1\) at odd-period Rubinstein prices is strictly greater than \(\delta_{j,D}\tilde{\phi}\).

The gain to \(D_j\) from forming all agreements in \(C\) at period \(t + 1\) at odd-period Rubinstein prices
relative to forming agreements $B$ at $t'$ and $C \setminus B$ at $t' + 1$, is (in period $t + 1$ units):

$$(1 - \delta'_{j,D}^{-1}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) + \delta'_{j,D}^{-1} \left( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C \setminus B) + \sum_{k_j \in C \setminus B} \delta_{j,D} p_{k_j,D}^R + \sum_{k_j \in B} p_{k_j}^R \right) - \sum_{k_j \in C} p_{k_j,D}^R$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta'_{j,D}^{-1}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) + \delta'_{j,D}^{-1} \left( \sum_{k_j \in C \setminus B} (\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{k_j\}) + \delta_{j,D} p_{k_j,D}^R) + \sum_{k_j \in B} p_{k_j}^R \right) - \sum_{k_j \in C} p_{k_j,D}^R$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta'_{j,D}^{-1}) \sum_{k_j \in C} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{k_j\}) + \delta'_{j,D}^{-1} \left( \sum_{k_j \in C \setminus B} p_{k_j,D}^R + \sum_{k_j \in B} p_{k_j}^R \right) - \sum_{k_j \in C} p_{k_j,D}^R$$

$$> (1 - \delta'_{j,D}^{-1}) \sum_{k_j \in C} p_{k_j,D}^R + \delta'_{j,D}^{-1} \left( \sum_{k_j \in C \setminus B} p_{k_j,D}^R - \bar{\phi} \right) - \sum_{k_j \in C} p_{k_j,D}^R$$

$$> -\bar{\phi},$$

where the second line follows from $A.WCDMC$, the third line follows from $A.WCDMC$ and (1), the fourth line follows from Lemma 2.2 and the definition of $\bar{\phi}$, and the final line follows from the fact that $t' \geq 2$. Thus, the gain from the alternative action relative to the supposed equilibrium strategy—now in period $t$ units—is greater than $(\delta_{j,D} - \delta_{j,D}^\prime)\bar{\phi} = 0$. Thus, accepting no offers at $t$ is not a best response in this case.

4. $A \neq \emptyset$, and $D_j$ forms some agreements in $C \setminus \{ij\}$ at $t$.

By assumption, $ij \notin A$. By the inductive hypothesis, the remaining agreements $C \setminus A$ form at time $t + 1$ at odd-period Rubinstein prices. In this case, the gain to $D_j$ from adding $ij$ to the agreements in $A$ instead of forming only agreements in $A$, in period $t$ units, is:

$$(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}((G \setminus C) \cup A \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\}) - \hat{\pi}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R$$

$$> (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - p_{ij,U}^R + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R = 0,$$

(20)

where the inequality follows from $A.SCDMC$ and the definition of the deviant action ($\hat{\pi}_{ij} = \hat{\pi}_{ij} + \varepsilon < p_{ij,U}^R$), and the equality from (1). Thus, forming agreements $A$ where $ij \notin A$ is not a best response in this case.

Thus, any best response by $D_j$ must include accepting agreement $ij$ at price $\hat{\pi}_{ij}$.

Now consider any best response for $D_j$ to the deviant offer by $U_i$. Accepting offers $A \cup \{ij\}$, $A \subseteq C \setminus \{ij\}$ is a best response if and only if the value to $D_j$ of accepting this set is weakly greater than the maximum value of accepting any set $A' \cup \{ij\}$, $A' \subseteq C \setminus \{ij\}$. This condition can be written as:

$$(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi((G \setminus C) \cup A \cup \{ij\}) + \sum_{k_j \in A} \hat{\pi}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{k_j \in C \setminus (A \cup \{ij\})} p_{k_j,D}^R$$

$$\geq \max_{A' \subseteq C} \left\{ (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi((G \setminus C) \cup A' \cup \{ij\}) + \sum_{k_j \in A'} \hat{\pi}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D} \sum_{k_j \in C \setminus (A' \cup \{ij\})} p_{k_j,D}^R \right\},$$

where we excluded the price paid for $ij$ since this agreement always forms at period $t$, and we apply the inductive hypothesis to obtain period $t + 1$ prices. Using the same logic as in Lemma E.5, the condition is the same as for a set being a best response under the candidate equilibrium offers implying that the sets of best responses are the same.

Because the sets of best responses are the same and we consider a common tie-breaking equilibrium, $D_j$ accepts the same set of offers under the deviant offer from $U_i$. Moreover, in both cases, all other agreements will form at period $t + 1$. Thus, the deviant offer will increase profits to $U_i$ by $\hat{\pi}_{ij} - \hat{\pi}_{ij} > 0$, which leads to a contradiction.
Claim B: For any equilibrium and subgame $\Gamma_C(h^i)$ where the first agreement is formed at an even period $t \geq t$, all agreements $ij \in C$ form at $t$.

Proof of Claim B. By contradiction, assume that $\hat{t}$, where, at period $t\hat{t}$,

By contradiction, suppose not, and a best response for $A$.

1. Such a deviant offer will be accepted by $D_j$.

By contradiction, assume that $\hat{t}$, where, at period $t\hat{t}$, some $U_i, ij \in C \setminus A$, offers $\tilde{p}_{ij}$, for $p_{ij,D}^R < \tilde{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,U}^R$.

Consider an alternative action for $A_j$ of forming only agreement $ij$ at price $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ instead of rejecting all offers at $t$; the gain (in period $t$ units) from this alternative as opposed to the candidate action is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}( (G \setminus C) \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\} ) - \tilde{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \delta_{j,D} \sum_{k \in C, k \neq i} p_{kj,D}^R \]

\[
> (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\} ) - p_{ij,U}^R + \delta_{j,D} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \delta_{j,D} \sum_{k \in C, k \neq i} p_{kj,D}^R > 0,
\]

where the logic is identical to (17). Thus, accepting no offers at $t$ is not a best response in this case.

In this case, by Lemma E.5, all agreements form at time $t + t'$ at Rubinstein prices, as there are multiple upstream (receiving) firms in an odd period. Consider an alternative action for $D_j$ of forming only agreement $ij$ at price $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ instead of rejecting all offers at $t$; the gain from following this alternative action as opposed to forming all agreements in $C$ at period $t + 1$ at odd-period Rubinstein prices is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}( (G \setminus C) \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\} ) - \tilde{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R
\]

\[
> (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\} ) - p_{ij,U}^R + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R = 0,
\]

where the inequality follows from A.SCDMC and the definition of the deviant offer ($\tilde{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,U}^R$), and the equality from (1). By (19), the gain to $D_j$ from forming all agreements in $C$ at period $t + 1$ at odd-period Rubinstein prices as opposed to forming all agreements in any future odd period $t + t'$, $t' \geq 1$, is weakly positive. Thus, accepting no offers at $t$ is not a best response in this case.

Let $B$ denote the set of equilibrium agreements that form at time $t + t'$ following $D_j$’s rejection of all offers at $t$. For any $kj \in B$, let $p'_{kj}$ denote the equilibrium price at which the agreement forms. By the inductive hypothesis, the remaining agreements, $C \setminus B$ form at time $t + t' + 1$ (odd) at odd-period Rubinstein prices.

Consider an alternative action for $D_j$ of forming only agreement $ij$ at price $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ instead of rejecting all offers at $t$. From (21), the gain to $D_j$ from choosing this alternative action as opposed to forming all agreements in $C$ at period $t + 1$ at odd-period Rubinstein prices is strictly positive. The gain to $D_j$ from forming all agreements in $C$ at period $t + 1$ at odd-period Rubinstein prices
as opposed to forming agreements $B$ at $t'$ and $C \setminus B$ at $t' + 1$, in period $t + 1$ units, is:

$$(1 - \delta_{j,D}^t)\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) + \delta_{j,D}^t \left( \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C \setminus B) + \sum_{kj \in \mathcal{C}\setminus B} \delta_{j,D} p_{kj,D}^R + \sum_{kj \in B} p_{kj}^R \right) - \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}^t)\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) + \delta_{j,D}^t \left( \sum_{kj \in \mathcal{C}\setminus B} [\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) + \delta_{j,D} p_{kj,D}^R] + \sum_{kj \in B} p_{kj}^R \right) - \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}^t) \sum_{kj \in \mathcal{C}} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) + \delta_{j,D}^t \left( \sum_{kj \in \mathcal{C}\setminus B} p_{kj,D}^R + \sum_{kj \in B} p_{kj}^R \right) - \sum_{kj \in C} p_{kj,D}^R = 0,$$

where the second line follows from A.WCDMC, the third line follows from A.WCDMC and (1), the fourth line inequality follows from Lemma 2.2 and Claim A, and the final equality follows by rearranging terms. Thus, accepting no offers at $t$ is not a best response in this case.

(d) $A \neq \emptyset$, and $D_j$ forms some agreements in $C \setminus \{ij\}$ at $t$.

By assumption, $ij \notin A$. By the inductive hypothesis, the remaining agreements, $C \setminus A$ form at time $t + 1$ at odd-period Rubinstein prices. In this case, the gain to $D_j$ from accepting offers in $A \cup \{ij\}$ instead of accepting only offers in $A$ at $t$, in period $t$ units, is:

$$(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C \cup A \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\}) - \tilde{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R$$

$$> (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) - p_{ij,U} + \delta_{j,D} p_{ij,D}^R = 0,$$

where the logic is identical to (20). Thus, forming agreements $A$ where $ij \notin A$ is not a best response in this case.

Thus, any best response by $D_j$ must include accepting the deviant offer $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ from $U_i$.

2. Such a deviation is profitable for $U_i$ if accepted by $D_j$.

Suppose that, following this deviant offer, $D_j$ accepts agreements $A' \cup \{ij\}$ at period $t$, where $A' \subseteq C \setminus \{ij\}$. By the inductive hypothesis, all remaining agreements are formed at period $t + 1$ at Rubinstein prices.

The gain to $U_i$ from this deviation is then:

$$(1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup A' \cup \{ij\}) - (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup A) + \tilde{p}_{ij} - \delta_{i,U} p_{ij,D}^R$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \tilde{p}_{ij} - \delta_{i,U} p_{ij,D}^R$$

$$> (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + p_{ij,D}^R - \delta_{i,U} p_{ij,D}^R = 0,$$

where the second line follows from A.SCDMC, the third line inequality follows from Lemma 2.2 and the definition of the deviant action, and the last equality follows from (1). Hence, $U_i$ will find it profitable to make the deviation.

Thus $U_i$ has a profitable deviation, yielding a contradiction.

Claim C: For any equilibrium and subgame $\Gamma_C(h^t)$ where all agreements in $C$ are formed at an even period $t \geq t$, they are formed at prices $\hat{p}_{ij} = p_{ij,U}^R$ for all $ij \in C$.

Proof of Claim C. By contradiction, assume that all agreements in $C$ are formed at period $t$, but $\hat{p}_{ij} \neq p_{ij,U}^R$ for some $ij \in C$.
1. Suppose \( \hat{p}_{ij} > p_{ij,D}^R \) for some \( ij \).

Consider the deviation where \( D_j \) rejects only this offer. Since all other agreements form at period \( t \), by the inductive hypothesis, \( D_j \) forms this agreement at price \( p_{ij,D}^R \) at \( t + 1 \). Applying (1), \( D_j \)'s gain from this action is:

\[
-\delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}^R + \hat{p}_{ij} - (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) > -\delta_{j,D}p_{ij,D}^R + p_{ij,U}^R - (1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) = 0,
\]

implying a profitable deviation and hence a contradiction.

2. Suppose \( \hat{p}_{ij} < p_{ij,D}^R \) for some \( ij \).

Consider a deviation where \( U_i \) raises its offer from \( \hat{p}_{ij} \) to some \( \tilde{p}_{ij} \in (\hat{p}_{ij}, p_{ij,D}^R) \). We now show that any best response set of acceptances for \( D_j \) must include accepting \( ij \). Suppose, by contradiction, that \( D_j \) has a best response of accepting only agreements in \( A \subseteq C \setminus \{ij\} \) at \( t \) following this deviation. We consider three cases for equilibrium play following this best response:

(a) \( A = \emptyset \) and no further agreements form.

The gain to \( D_j \) from accepting only \( ij \) instead of choosing this action, in period \( t + 1 \) units, is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D})\Delta \pi_{j,D}((G \setminus C) \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\}) - \hat{p}_{ij} + \delta_{j,D}\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \delta_{j,D} \sum_{k \in C, k \neq i} p_{ij,D}^R > 0,
\]

where the logic is identical to (17). Thus accepting no offers at \( t \) is not a best response in this case.

(b) \( A = \emptyset \) and the first agreement \( ij \) to form does so at period \( t + t' \), \( t' \geq 1 \).

In this case, by Claim B, all agreements form at time \( t + t' \). For any \( k \in C \), let \( p'_{kj} \) denote the equilibrium price at which the agreement forms.

Consider the alternative action by \( D_j \) of accepting only \( ij \) instead of rejecting all offers at \( t \).

First note that (21) applies and so the gain from following this deviant action as opposed to forming all agreements in \( C \) at period \( t + 1 \) at odd-period Rubinstein prices is strictly positive.

Next, note that the gain to \( D_j \) from forming all agreements in \( C \) at period \( t + 1 \) at odd-period Rubinstein prices as opposed to forming all agreements in \( C \) at period \( t + t' \) (\( t' \geq 1 \), in period \( t + 1 \) units, is:

\[
(1 - \delta_{j,D}^{t'-1})\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, C) - \sum_{k \in C} p_{kj,D}^R + \delta_{j,D}^{t'-1} \sum_{k \in C} p'_{kj} \\
\geq (1 - \delta_{j,D}^{t'-1}) \sum_{k \in C} \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) - \sum_{k \in C} p_{kj,D}^R + \delta_{j,D}^{t'-1} \sum_{k \in C} p'_{kj,D} \\
= (1 - \delta_{j,D}^{t'-1}) \sum_{k \in C} [\Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{kj\}) - p_{kj,D}^R] \geq 0,
\]

(23)

where the second line follows from A.WCDMC and Lemma E.5 (if \( t' \) is odd) or Claim A (if \( t' \) is even), the third line equality follows by rearranging terms, and the last inequality from Lemma 2.2. Thus accepting no offers at \( t \) is not a best response in this case.

(c) \( A \neq \emptyset \).

By assumption, \( ij \notin A \). By the inductive hypothesis, all remaining agreements \( C \setminus A \) form at time \( t + 1 \) at odd-period Rubinstein prices. Applying (22), the gain to \( D_j \) from accepting offers in \( A \cup \{ij\} \) instead of accepting only offers in \( A \) at \( t \) is positive. Thus, forming agreements \( A \) where \( ij \notin A \) is not a best response in this case.

Thus, any best response by \( D_j \) must include accepting the deviant offer \( \check{p}_{ij} \) from \( U_i \). Now consider any best response set of acceptances, \( A \cup \{ij\} \), to the deviant prices. As in Claim A, the condition
is the same as for a set being a best response under the candidate equilibrium agreements implying that the sets of best responses are the same. Because the sets of best responses are the same and we consider a common tie-breaking equilibrium, $D_j$ accepts the same set of agreements—i.e., all agreements in $C$—under the deviant offer from $U_i$. Thus, the deviant offer will increase profits to $U_i$ by $\tilde{p}_{ij} - \tilde{p}_{ij} > 0$, which leads to a contradiction. Furthermore, as in Claim A, A.NEXT can be used instead of restricting attention to common tie-breaking equilibria in order to establish the claim.

Thus, $\tilde{p}_{ij} = p^R_{i,j} \forall ij \in C$ for agreements formed at any even period.

Claims A-C prove the lemma. \hfill\qed

### E.3 Immediacy of Agreements

Given the inductive hypothesis, Lemmas E.5–E.6 establish that in any equilibrium of any subgame $\Gamma_C^t$ where any agreement $ij \in C$ forms at period $t \geq t$, all agreements in $C$ form at $t$ Rubinstein prices. We now prove that, given the inductive hypothesis, there cannot be any delay: i.e., in any equilibrium, all agreements in $C$ form immediately.

**Lemma E.7 (Immediacy of all agreements.)** Assume that the inductive hypothesis holds. Then, any equilibrium of $\Gamma_C^t$ results in all agreements $ij \in C$ forming at period $t$.

**Proof.** We prove the case where $t$ is odd; the proof of the case where $t$ is even is symmetric and omitted.

By contradiction, consider a candidate equilibrium where no agreements are formed at period $t$ (as, by the previous results, if any agreement is formed at period $t$, all agreements are formed in that period). Let agreement $ij \in C$ satisfy the conditions of A.LNEXT. We consider a deviant action by $D_j$ from this candidate equilibrium and then verify that it is profitable for $D_j$. Suppose $D_j$ offers $\tilde{p}_{ij}$ satisfying $p^R_{i,j,D} < \tilde{p}_{ij} < p^R_{i,j,U}$ to $U_i$. We first show that $U_i$ will accept this offer and then show that it will increase $D_j$’s surplus relative to the candidate equilibrium.

Suppose that $U_i$ accepts the offer $\tilde{p}_{ij}$. Then, by passive beliefs, it believes that this is the only agreement to be formed at period $t$ and, by the inductive hypothesis, that the remaining agreements will form at period $t+1$. Hence, its payoffs—in period $t$ units—from accepting the offer are:

$$
\tilde{p}_{ij} + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup \{ij\}) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_i \setminus \{ij\}} p^R_{ik,U} \right)
$$

Payoff at $t$

$$
= \tilde{p}_{ij} + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C \cup \{ij\}) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \sum_{ik \in C_i \setminus \{ij\}} p^R_{ik,U} + \pi_{i,U}(G) \right) + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C)
$$

Payoff from $t+1$ on

$$
> p^R_{i,j,D} + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_i \setminus \{ij\}} p^R_{ik,U} \right) + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C)
$$

$$
= \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_i} p^R_{ik,U} \right) + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C),
$$

where the second line adds and subtracts the $(1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C)$ term, the third line follows from A.SCDMC and the definition of $\tilde{p}_{ij}$, and the final line uses (2) and then combines the $p^R_{ik,U}$ terms in the sum.

We next show that any best response for $U_i$ must include accepting $ij$. Suppose, by contradiction, that a best response for $U_i$ involves accepting only offers $B \subseteq C_i \setminus \{ij\}$ at $t$. We consider the following four cases of equilibrium play following this candidate best response:

1. $B = \emptyset$, and no agreements in $C$ are ever formed.
In this case, the payoffs to $U_i$ are:

$$\pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) = \delta_{i,U} \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C)$$

$$< \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right) + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C)$$

$$< \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right) + (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C),$$

where the second line follows from Lemma E.4 (which uses A.LNEXT) and the third line follows from Lemma 2.2. Since the payoffs to $U_i$ from rejection are less than from accepting $D_j$'s deviant offer, rejecting all offers is not a best response in this case.

2. $B = \emptyset$, and all agreements in $C$ are formed in some even period $t + t'$ for $t' = 1, 3, 5, \ldots$

If $U_i$ accepts no other offers at period $t$ (and by passive beliefs, $U_i$ believes that no agreements in $C_{-i,U}$ are formed at $t$), the payoffs to $U_i$ are:

$$\pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right)$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right)$$

$$< (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_{i,U} - \delta_{i,U}'') \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U}' \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right)$$

$$+ \delta_{i,U}' \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right)$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right),$$

where the second and fourth lines follow by rearranging terms and the third line follows from Lemma E.4. Since the payoffs to $U_i$ from rejecting all offers at $t$ are less than from accepting $D_j$'s deviant offer, rejecting all offers is not a best response in this case.

3. $B = \emptyset$, and all agreements in $C$ are formed in some odd period $t + t'$ for $t' = 2, 4, 6, \ldots$
In this case, the payoffs to $U_i$ are:

$$(1 - \delta_{i,U}'') \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U}' \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right)$$

$$< (1 - \delta_{i,U}'') \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U}' \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right)$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_{i,U} - \delta_{i,U}'') \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U}' \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right)$$

$$< (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_{i,U} - \delta_{i,U}') \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right)$$

$$+ \delta_{i,U}' \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right)$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in C_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right),$$

where the second line follows from Lemma 2.2 and the remaining logic is identical to case 2. Since the payoffs to $U_i$ from rejecting all offers at $t$ are less than from accepting $D_j$'s deviant offer, rejecting all offers is not a best response in this case.

4. $B \neq \emptyset$, and $U_i$ forms some agreements in $C_{i,U} \setminus \{ij\}$ at $t$.

In this case, by the inductive hypothesis, all remaining agreements $A \equiv C \setminus B$ form in the following (even) period $t + 1$ at Rubinstein prices. Thus, we can express the payoff to $U_i$ from this action as

$$(1 - \delta_{i,U}) \pi_{i,U}(G \setminus C) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik} + \delta_{i,U} \left( \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U}} p_{ik}^R \right),$$

where $\hat{p}_{ik} \forall ik \in B$ are the
period $t$ candidate equilibrium prices offered to $U_i$. But,

$$(1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik} + \delta_{i,U} \left[ \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U}} p_{ik,U}^R \right]$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik} + \delta_{i,U} \left[ \pi_{i,U}(G) + p_{ij,U}^R + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U \setminus \{ij\}}} p_{ik,U}^R \right]$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik}$$

$$+ p_{ij,D}^R + (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \delta_{i,U} \left[ \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U \setminus \{ij\}}} p_{ik,U}^R \right]$$

$$< (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik} + \delta_{ij} + (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}(G, \{ij\}) + \delta_{i,U} \left[ \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U \setminus \{ij\}}} p_{ik,U}^R \right]$$

$$\leq (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik} + \delta_{ij} + (1 - \delta_{i,U})\Delta \pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B \cup \{ij\}, \{ij\})$$

$$+ \delta_{i,U} \left[ \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U \setminus \{ij\}}} p_{ik,U}^R \right]$$

$$= (1 - \delta_{i,U})\pi_{i,U}((G \setminus C) \cup B \cup \{ij\}) + \sum_{ik \in B} \hat{p}_{ik} + \hat{p}_{ij} + \delta_{i,U} \left[ \pi_{i,U}(G) + \sum_{ik \in A_{i,U \setminus \{ij\}}} p_{ik,U}^R \right],$$

where the second and sixth lines follow by rearranging terms, the third line follows from (2), the fourth line follows from the definition of the deviant offer, and the fifth line follows from A.SCDMC.

Since the final line is the value of accepting $D_j$’s deviant offer and all agreements in $B$, the payoff to

$U_i$ from accepting $D_j$’s deviant offer and all agreements in $B$ is higher than the payoff from accepting just the offers in $B$. Thus, forming agreements $B$, where $ij \notin B$ is not a best response in this case.

Thus, any best response by $U_i$ must include accepting the deviant offer $\hat{p}_{ij}$ from $D_j$. Note that we have not ruled out the possibility that $U_i$ may also choose to accept additional offers in $C_{i,U}$ at period $t$ upon accepting deviant offer $\hat{p}_{ij}$; we return to this below.

Having verified that the $\hat{p}_{ij}$ offer will be accepted by $U_i$, we now check that the acceptance of this deviant offer will be profitable for $D_j$. $D_j$ knows that $U_i$ is the only firm that will form agreement(s) at period $t$ and, by the inductive hypothesis, that the remaining agreements will form at period $t + 1$. However, it is possible that upon receiving the deviant offer, $U_i$ will also accept some other offers $B \subseteq C_{i,U \setminus \{ij\}}$. Hence,
$D_j$’s payoff—in period $t$ units—from making the deviant offer satisfies:

\[
-\tilde{p}_{ij} + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D \setminus \{ij\}}} p^R_{k_j,U} \right) + \delta_{j,D} (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) \geq -\tilde{p}_{ij} + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}((\mathcal{G}, \{ij\})) + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D \setminus \{ij\}}} p^R_{k_j,U} \right) + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C)
\]

\[
> -p^R_{ij,U} + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \Delta \pi_{j,D}(G, \{ij\}) + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D \setminus \{ij\}}} p^R_{k_j,U} \right) + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C)
\]

\[
= -\delta_{j,D} p^R_{ij,U} + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D \setminus \{ij\}}} p^R_{k_j,U} \right) + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C)
\]

\[
> (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{k_j,U} \right),
\]

where the second line applies A.SCDMC, the third line follows from the definition of $\tilde{p}_{ij}$, the fourth line uses (1), and the final line uses Lemma 2.2 and then combines the $p^R_{k_j,U}$ terms in the sum.

Next, we show that the lower bound on payoffs from this deviant offer being accepted (given by the last line of the previous set of equations) is higher than the payoff from equilibrium play under the candidate equilibrium. If $D_j$ does not deviate from equilibrium play with the deviation $\tilde{p}_{ij}$, there are three possibilities for subsequent equilibrium play with no agreements formed at $t$:

1. **No further agreements are formed.**

   In this case, the payoffs to $D_j$ from the candidate equilibrium are:

   \[
   \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) = \delta_{j,D} \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C)
   \]

   \[
   < (1 - \delta_{j,D}) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{k_j,U} \right),
   \]

   where the inequality follows from Lemma E.4. Thus, the payoffs to $D_j$ from the candidate equilibrium are less than from accepting $U_i$’s deviant offer in this case.

2. **All open agreements are formed in some even period $t + t'$, for $t' = 1, 3, 5, \ldots$**
In this case, the payoffs to $D_j$ from the candidate equilibrium are:

\[
(1 - \delta_j t') \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_j t' \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D}} p_{kj,U}^R \right)
\]

\[
= (1 - \delta_j) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_j - \delta_j t') \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_j t' \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D}} p_{kj,U}^R \right)
\]

\[
< (1 - \delta_j) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_j - \delta_j t') \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,D}} p_{kj,U}^R \right)
\]

\[
+ \delta_j t' \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,U}} p_{kj,U}^R \right)
\]

\[
= (1 - \delta_j) \pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_j \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{k_j \in C_{j,U}} p_{kj,U}^R \right).
\]

where the second and fourth lines follow by rearranging terms and the third line follows from Lemma E.4. Thus, the payoffs to $D_j$ from the candidate equilibrium are less than from making the deviant offer in this case.

3. All open agreements are formed in some odd period $t + t'$, for $t' = 2, 4, 6, \ldots$. 

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In this case, the payoffs to $D_j$ from the candidate equilibrium are:

\[ (1 - \delta^t_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta^t_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,D} \right) \]

\[ = (1 - \delta^t_{j,D} - \delta^t_{j,D} - 1)\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta^t_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,D} \right) \]

\[ = (1 - \delta^t_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta^t_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} [\pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,D}] \right) \]

\[ < (1 - \delta^t_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta^t_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} [\pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,D}] \right) \]

\[ = (1 - \delta_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_{j,D} - \delta^t_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta^t_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,U} \right) \]

\[ < (1 - \delta_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + (\delta_{j,D} - \delta^t_{j,D}) \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,U} \right) \]

\[ + \delta^t_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,U} \right) \]

\[ = (1 - \delta_{j,D})\pi_{j,D}(G \setminus C) + \delta_{j,D} \left( \pi_{j,D}(G) - \sum_{kj \in C_{j,D}} p^R_{kj,U} \right) \]

where the second, third, and sixth lines follow by rearranging terms, the fourth line follows from A.WCDMC, the fifth line from (1), the seventh line from Lemma E.4, and the final line also by rearranging terms. Thus, the payoffs to $D_j$ from the deviant offer are greater than its equilibrium payoffs in this case.

Thus $D_j$ has a profitable deviation, leading to a contradiction. Hence, any equilibrium involves immediate agreement for all $ij \in C$ at $t$. $\Box$