TRANSVALUATIONISM: A DIONYSIAN
APPROACH TO VAGUENESS
Terry
Horgan,
I advocate
a two-part view concerning vagueness. On
one hand I claim that vagueness is logically incoherent; but on the other hand
I claim that vagueness is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential
feature of human language and thought. I
will call this view transvaluationism, a name which seems to me
appropriate for several reasons. First,
the term suggests that we should move beyond the idea that the successive
statements in a sorites sequence can be assigned differing truth values in some
logically coherent way that fully respects the nature of vagueness--a way that
fully eschews any arbitrarily precise semantic transitions.[1] We should transcend this impossible goal by
accepting that vagueness harbors logical incoherence. Second, just as Nietzsche held that one can
overcome nihilism by embracing what he called the transvaluation of all values,
my position affirms vagueness, rather than despairing in the face of the
logical absurdity residing at its very core.
This affirmation amounts to a transvaluation of truth values, as far as
sorites sequences are concerned. Third,
the term 'transvaluationism' has a nice ring to it, especially since one of the
principal philosophical approaches to vagueness is called supervaluationism.
I will
call the first claim of transvaluationism, that vagueness is logically
incoherent, the incoherence thesis.
I will call the second claim, that vagueness is benign, beneficial, and
essential, the legitimacy thesis.
The legitimacy thesis, taken by itself, seems overwhelmingly plausible;
anyone who denies it assumes a heavy burden of proof. But prima facie, it seems dubious that the
legitimacy thesis can be maintained in conjunction with the incoherence
thesis. For, there is reason to doubt
whether there is any cogent way to embrace the incoherence thesis without
thereby becoming mired in what Williamson (1994) calls global nihilism
about vagueness--the view that vague terms are empty (i.e., they do not, and
cannot, apply to anything). Global
nihilism, Williamson argues, has such destructively negative consequences that
it does not deserve to be taken seriously--for instance, the consequence that
vastly many of our common sense beliefs are false, and the consequence that
these beliefs are not even useful (since the constituent terms in 'Common sense
beliefs are useful' are vague and hence this statement turns out, given the
incoherence thesis, to be false itself).[2] In short, the idea that one can adopt the
incoherence thesis and then somehow transcend nihilism might initially seem
hopelessly optimistic; transvaluationism would then be an unattainable,
chimerical, goal rather than an intelligible and conceptually stable position
concerning vagueness.
Given certain widely held philosophical views
about how language and thought must map onto the world in order for statements
and the beliefs they express to be true--views that fall appropriately under
the label 'referential semantics'--transvaluationism probably is a
chimerical goal. From the perspective of
referential semantics, if we attempt to combine Frege's view that vagueness is
logically incoherent with Wittgenstein's view that vagueness is a legitimate
and essential feature of language, we seem to produce a conceptual monster--a
Fregenstein monster.
But I
myself favor an alternative general theoretical framework concerning
language/world relations--an orientation I have been attempting to develop in a
series of papers, some co-authored with Mark Timmons.[3] Originally I called it "language-game
semantics," then "psychologistic semantics," but I no longer
like either label; Timmons and I now call the orientation contextual
semantics. I maintain that
contextual semantics has some important theoretical advantages over referential
semantics, and thus is independently credible quite apart from matters of
vagueness. But I also believe that the
incoherence thesis fits plausibly and naturally within contextual semantics, in
a way that renders transvaluationism not only intelligible but also quite
viable.
My
principal goal in the present paper is to articulate this package-deal version
of transvaluationism, and to argue that this position treats the logical,
semantical, and metaphysical aspects of vagueness in a very attractive way.[4] Although I do advocate a kind of Fregenstein
view, I think that the Fregenstein option concerning vagueness is not really a
conceptual monster at all; it is merely misunderstood.
1. Contextual
Semantics.
I begin by
describing the broad approach to language/world relations that Timmons and I
call contextual semantics.[5] This framework has been evolving and
developing in a series of papers; articulating and exploring it in further
detail is a large-scale, long-term, research project of mine. The overall framework includes theses not
only about truth and falsity per se, but also about meaning, ontology, thought,
and knowledge.
Contextual
semantics, as I think of it, is intermediate between two prevalent orientations
toward language, truth, and ontology in recent analytic philosophy--between (i)
a position viewing truth as direct correspondence between language and the
mind-independent, discourse-independent, world; and (ii) a position viewing truth
as radically epistemic (e.g., as warranted assertibility, or as ``ideal''
warranted assertibility (Putnam), or as "superassertibility"
(Wright)).[6] (Radically epistemic construals of truth
often are wedded to global metaphysical irrealism, according to which there is
no such thing as a discourse-independent, mind-independent, world at all.) These two perspectives might be called,
respectively, referential semantics and neo-pragmatist semantics
(or, referentialism and neo-pragmatism).
In
articulating the distinctive claims of contextual semantics, and for related
expository purposes throughout the paper, I will borrow from Hilary Putnam the
device of sometimes capitalizing terms and phrases like `object', `property',
and `the world'; this makes it unambiguously clear when I mean to be talking
about denizens of the mind-independent, discourse-independent,
world--the world whose existence is denied by global irrealists. (Global irrealists typically regard as
perfectly legitimate various everyday uses of the uncapitalized expressions,
and some of their philosophical uses as well.
The capitalization convention guarantees that claims which I intend to
be incompatible with global irrealism will be construed as I intend them,
rather than receiving a "compatibilist" reading.)
I will set
forth contextual semantics as a list of theses, interspersed with commentary:
(1) The semantic concepts of truth and falsity
are normative. Truth is correct
assertibility; falsity is correct deniability.
Since we deny statements by asserting their negations, a
statement is correctly deniable just in case its negation is correctly
assertible. So henceforth I will usually
speak only of "correct assertibility."
(2) Contrary to neo-pragmatism, truth is not
radically epistemic; for, correct assertibility is distinct from warranted
assertibility, and even from ``ideal'' warranted assertibility and from
"superassertibility."[7]
This thesis says, in effect, that the kind of semantic
normativity that makes for truth and falsity is not reducible to epistemic
normativity.
(3) Standards for correct assertibility are
not monolithic within a language; instead they vary somewhat from one context
to another, depending upon the specific purposes our discourse is serving at
the time.
Not only do assertibility standards often vary from one
mode of discourse to another, but they also often vary within a given mode of
discourse. For instance, what counts as flat
surface is subject to contextually variable parameters within a given
discourse. Similarly, what counts as the
contextually eligible referent of a definite description like 'that guy we were
talking with awhile ago', in a situation where several distinct entities in the
relevant domain of quantification are eligible referents, is subject to
contextually variable parameters. (Such
parameters determine what David Lewis (1979) calls "the score in the
language game.")
(4) Contrary to global metaphysical irrealism,
correct assertibility is normally a joint product of two factors: (i) the relevant
assertibility norms; and (ii) how things actually are in THE WORLD.
I will say
that the operative semantic standards in a given discourse context are maximally
strict provided they have this feature: under these norms a sentence counts
as correctly assertible (i.e., as true) only if there are OBJECTS and
PROPERTIES in THE WORLD answering to each of the sentence's constituent
singular terms, constituent assertoric existential quantifications, and
constituent predicates.[8] The next two theses employ this notion.
(5) Contrary to
referentialism, our discourse often employs standards of truth (i.e., correct
assertibility) that are not maximally strict.
I.e., even though truth does typically depend upon how
things are with THE WORLD, often this dependence is not a matter of direct
correspondence between the constituents of a true sentence and OBJECTS and
PROPERTIES. When the assertibility norms
are not maximally strict, the dependence is less direct.
Under
contextual semantics, there is a whole spectrum of ways that a sentence's
correct assertibility can depend upon THE WORLD.[9] At one end of the spectrum are sentences
governed by assertibility norms, in a given context of usage, that are
maximally strict (and thus coincide with those laid down by referentialism);
under these norms a sentence is true only if some unique constituent of THE
WORLD answers to each of its singular terms, and at least one such entity
answers to each of its unnegated existential-quantifier expressions. (Sentences asserted in order to make serious
ontological claims--like the sentence 'There exists an all-powerful,
all-knowing, perfectly good God', as asserted by a conventional theist--are
plausible candidates for this status.)
At the other end of the spectrum are sentences whose governing
assertibility norms, in a given context, are such that those sentences are
sanctioned as correctly assertible by the norms alone, independently of
how things are with THE WORLD.
(Sentences of pure mathematics are plausible candidates for this status.) Both ends of the spectrum are limit cases,
however. Various intermediate positions
are occupied by sentences whose correct assertibility, in a given context, does
depend in part on how things are with THE WORLD, but where this dependence does
not consist in direct correspondence between (i) the referential apparatus of
the sentence (its singular terms, quantifiers, and predicates), and (ii)
OBJECTS or PROPERTIES in THE WORLD.[10]
As a
plausible example of a statement that normally would be governed by semantic
norms falling at an intermediate point in the spectrum just described,
consider:
(B) Beethoven's fifth symphony has four
movements.
The correct assertibility of (B) probably does not
require that there be some ENTITY answering to the term `Beethoven's fifth
symphony', and also answering to the predicate `has four movements'. Rather, under the operative assertibility
norms, (B) is probably correctly assertible (i.e., true) by virtue of other,
more indirect, connections between the sentence and THE WORLD. Especially germane is the behavior by
Beethoven that we could call ``composing his fifth symphony.'' But a considerably wider range of goings-on
is relevant too: in particular, Beethoven's earlier behavior in virtue of which
his later behavior counts as composing his fifth symphony; and also a
broad range of human practices (including the use of handwritten or printed
scores to guide orchestral performances) in virtue of which such behavior by
Beethoven counts as ``composing a symphony'' in the first place. Further plausible examples of statements
governed by semantic norms that are not maximally strict include:
(a) The
(b) Mozart composed 27 piano concertos.
(c) There are more than 20 regulatory agencies
in the U.S. Federal Government.
(d) Quine's Word and Object is an
influential book.
Although
contextual semantics asserts that the operative semantic standards governing
truth (correct assertibility) can vary from one context to another, it also asserts
that contextually operative metalinguistic semantic standards normally
require truth ascriptions to obey Tarski's equivalence-schema T:
(6) Even in discourse contexts where the
operative semantic standards are not maximally strict, typically these standards
sanction as true (i.e., as correctly assertible) instances of Tarski's
equivalence-schema:
(T) "P" is true if and only if P.[11]
Thesis (6) says, in effect, that normally the
contextually operative semantic standards governing the truth predicate operate
"in tandem" with those governing first-order discourse; as I put it
in Horgan (1990 b), truth talk is assertorically consistent with
first-order talk.
If
contextual semantics is right, so that truth is intimately bound up with
assertibility norms, then meaning too is intimately bound up with these norms.[12] Intuitively and pre-theoretically, meaning is
what combines with how THE WORLD is to yield truth. Thus, if truth is correct assertibility under
operative assertibility norms, then the role of meaning is played by the
assertibility norms themselves. So
matters of meaning are, at least in large part, matters of operative
assertibility norms.[13] Contextual semantics makes the following
nonreductionist claim about matters of meaning:
(7) In general, if a statement S is correctly
assertible under certain frequently operative semantic standards, but S is not
correctly assertible under maximally strict semantic standards, then S is not
equivalent in meaning to--or approximately equivalent in meaning to, or
"intensionally isomorphic" to, or "regimentable" into--a
statement that is correctly assertible under maximally strict assertibility
standards.
Thesis (7) is one I came to believe after pursing for
some time the project of trying to systematically paraphrase
("regiment," in Quine's terminology) statements whose surface grammar
embodies an apparent commitment to ontologically dubious entities, into a more
austere idiom that eschews reference to such entities. Although the paraphrase strategy can sometimes
be carried through piecemeal for certain local segments of discourse, very
often it evidently will not work.
(Trying to implement the strategy for statements like (B) and (a)-(d)
caused me to lose faith in it.)
Under
contextual semantics the issue of ontological commitment becomes much more
subtle than it is under referential semantics, because whenever the
contextually operative assertibility standards are not maximally strict, the
so-called "referential apparatus" of our discourse need not connect
directly to OBJECTS and PROPERTIES in the world in order for our statements to
be true. Here then are several theses
concerning ontology:
(8) It is necessary to distinguish between regional
ontology, which concerns the range of putative entities overtly posited by
a given mode of discourse; and ultimate ontology, which concerns the
range of entities posited by statements which are correctly assertible under
maximally strict assertibility standards.
(9) Quine's well known criteria of
"ontological commitment" are directly relevant only to regional
ontology, not to ultimate ontology.
(10) Determining the ultimate ontological
commitments of our scientific and non-scientific discourse is a
methodologically subtle matter, in which we inquire what THE WORLD is like IN
ITSELF in order to be correctly describable, under various contextually
operative assertibility standards, by those statements that are true in
everyday life and in science.
Whatever exactly the right story is about ultimate
ontology, it seems quite plausible that a complete and accurate accounting of
what there really IS in the WORLD need not include entities like the State of
Tennessee, the U.S. Federal Government, Mozart's 27th piano concerto, or
Quine's book Word and Object. In
terms of ultimate ontology, such entities are artifacts of our conceptual
scheme; they are not mind-independently, discourse-independently, REAL. Although THE WORLD does normally contribute
to the truth or falsity of statements that are regionally ontologically
committed to such entities, it does so quite indirectly. As one might put it, such statements provide
a trace--a trace of THE DING as it is AN SICH.
Although
contextual semantics rejects the epistemic reductionism of neo-pragmatism, it
also acknowledges something importantly right that is reflected in that
approach, viz.:
(11) Contextually operative standards for correct
assertibility are typically intimately linked to prototypical evidential
conditions for statements.
We all know quite well, for instance, what sorts of
evidence are relevant to claims like (B) and (a)-(d); and the kind of evidence
we would look for has rather little to do with the philosophical question
whether ultimate ontology should include entities like SYMPHONIES, PIANO
CONCERTOS, BOOKS, or a FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Under the assertibility standards operative in ordinary discourse
contexts, it is quite appropriate that the relevant epistemic standards should
bypass the issue of ultimate ontology; for, the semantic standards themselves
are not maximally strict. There is a
comparatively small "conceptual gap" between the epistemic standards
for warranted assertibility and the semantic standards for correct
assertibility (even though semantic standards are not reducible to epistemic
ones). There is a gap though, in part
because of the holistic aspects of evidence:
(12) Our attributions of truth and falsity
usually are defeasible even under prototypical evidential conditions; for, the
correct assertibility of any given statement normally depends, in part, on the
correct assertibility of various other statements which are assumed, in a given
evidential situation, to be correctly assertible themselves.
As Quine and Duhem stressed long ago, our statements
really face the tribunal of empirical evidence jointly, not singly.
Contextual
semantics also includes a psychologistic dimension (which, as John Biro has
urged on me, might better be called psycho-social):
(13) Which assertibility standards are the
operative ones, in any given context of discourse, depends largely upon the
contextually attuned, socially coordinated, truth-judging and falsity-judging
dispositions of competent speakers.
The interconnections between the judgment dispositions of
competent speakers and the contextually operative assertibility norms are
typically fairly subtle; surely no crudely reductive account will work. (For one thing, even competent speakers often
exhibit linguistic performance errors.
For another, normally a competent speaker's judgement dispositions are
more directly indicative of what is warrantedly assertible given
available evidence; and sometimes this diverges from what is correctly
assertible under contextually operative semantic norms.) Nonetheless, such socially coordinated
psychological dispositions do figure importantly in determining the
contextually operative assertibility standards.
Contextual
semantics has various points of contact with the views of other philosophers on
language/world relations. It seems to me
a natural and plausible extension, for instance, of the treatment of
contextually variable discourse parameters in Lewis (1979). Likewise, it seems to me a natural further
step in a direction already taken by advocates of philosophical projects of
"regimentation": viz., the direction of denying that the surface
ontological commitments of true statements always constitute ultimate
ontological commitments. I have already
mentioned that it accommodates certain motivating ideas in neo-pragmatism (and
in verificationism), but without the mistake of embracing epistemic
reductionism. There are echoes of
Carnap's famous contention (Carnap 1950) that a "linguistic
framework" can automatically sanction existence claims concerning the
entities posited by the framework, and that such existence claims are ontologically
innocent. The approach is somewhat
similar to the treatment of truth and ontology in Sellars (1963, 1968).[14] Finally, contextual semantics seems to me
rather similar in spirit to the general approach to truth, and to philosophical
debates about realism and irrealism concerning various forms of discourse, in
Wright (1992).[15]
There are
further theses to be added to the 13 mentioned in this section: theses
concerning vagueness. But before turning
to those, let me briefly mention some considerations in favor of contextual
semantics as thusfar articulated.[16]
Among the
advantages of this general approach to semantics are the potential resources it
provides for accommodating various forms of discourse within a naturalistic
worldview. Take sentences like (B), for
example. Evidently, an adequate
semantics for sentences like (B) should be semantically nonreductionist; for,
no plausible-looking way of systematically paraphrasing such sentences into a
more austere idiom is even remotely in sight.
If the notion of truth works in the way just characterized, then even
though semantic reductionism evidently won't fly, we can still accommodate
symphony discourse as literally true, and can accommodate assertions like (B)
as knowable, without being forced to populate THE WORLD with SYMPHONY TYPES.
On the
other hand, if we try construing (B) in terms of referentialism, and also
accept that (B) is true, then we must try accommodating SYMPHONY TYPES,
tokenable by concrete performance-events, within a naturalistic metaphysics;
and we must face the correlative task of accommodating them in a manner that
allows for genuine knowledge about such ENTITIES. This is no small task, especially since there
will be strong theoretical pressure to consign these putative, abstract,
ENTITIES to Plato's non-spatio-temporal HEAVEN--which in turn will seriously
exacerbate the task of giving a naturalistically acceptable account of how
humans can know about them (and can refer to them).
2. Vagueness
and Contextual Semantics.
I turn now
to my proposed way of treating vagueness, within the framework of contextual
semantics. In principle, various
approaches to be vagueness could be situated within this framework, some
perhaps quite different from others.[17] But I will cut to the chase directly,
focusing only upon the kind of approach which seems to me the one that is most
plausible and most theoretically attractive.
Here is
the basic picture I advocate, in a nutshell: Vagueness harbors a certain sort
of logical incoherence. This logical
incoherence does have nihilistic consequences for discourse conducted under maximally
strict semantic standards (which means that there can be no vague OBJECTS
or PROPERTIES in THE WORLD). But this
does not amount to nihilism tout court.
For, contexts in which the operative semantic standards are maximally
strict are an extreme, and in fact highly unusual, limit case. Furthermore, in the vast majority of typical
contexts of usage, the operative semantic standards work in such a way that (1)
certain statements that make vague predications are true and others are false
(correctly assertible, correctly deniable); (2) the underlying logical
incoherence gets quarantined rather than exerting a malignant and destructive
effect on language and thought (as I put it below, vagueness-sanctioning
discourse is logically disciplined, even though it is not logically
coherent); (3) sorites arguments are effectively blockable; and (4) not only
are the benefits of vagueness in language and thought not undermined by the logical
incoherence, but (on the contrary) the very feature of vagueness that largely
generates its benefits--a feature I call robustness--is also the feature
that harbors incoherence.
2.1. Vagueness:
Robust, Discriminatory, and Logically Incoherent.
By robustness
I mean the idea that there is no precise fact of the matter about semantic
transitions among the respective statements in a sorites sequence. Robustness, I maintain, is an essential
feature of genuine vagueness; if there are semantic transitions at all in a
sorites sequence (as common sense supposes there is), then there is no precise
fact of the matter about what they are.
Furthermore, robustness does not simply mean that there is no precise
point of transition between truth and falsity; it means that there are no
precise semantic transition-points of any kind in a sorites
sequence. This rules out, for instance,
a precise transition point between truth and non-truth; a precise transition
point between non-falsity and falsity; and (if we suppose that truth comes in
degrees) precise transitions between specific degrees of truth. So I hold this thesis:
(14) Vagueness is robust--i.e., in a sorites
sequence that exhibits semantic transitions, there is no precise fact of the
matter about those transitions.[18]
When I say
that vague terms are discriminatory I mean that for typical sorites
sequences, if some of the statements in the sequence are true then others are
false.
(15) Vagueness is discriminatory--i.e., for
typical sorites sequences, if some of the statements in the sequence are true
then others are false.[19]
In ordinary discourse contexts, we use vague terms in a
way that purports to be discriminating (as I will put it)--i.e.,
non-vacuously discriminatory, so that some statements in a typical sorites
sequence are true and others are false.
Vagueness
is essentially robust. It is also
essentially discriminatory: vague predicates would lose their very point and
purpose if they applied to everything, both actual and merely possible,
to which they can be sensibly predicated.
But when
one considers carefully the robustness of vagueness, the notion "no
precise fact of the matter about semantic transitions," it turns out that
vagueness is logically incoherent, in the following sense: the robustness condition
and the discriminatoriness condition jointly generate semantic requirements,
for the respective statements in a sorites sequence, which cannot be
simultaneously satisfied if any of the statements in the sequence are true. (The only way to assign truth values to a
sorites sequence without violating either condition is a degenerate way: assign
falsity to every statement in the sequence.) Robustness is the real culprit in this
logical incoherence, as it turns out; the role played by discriminatoriness is
to rule out the degenerate assignment in which all the statements in the
sequence are assigned truth.
I will now
describe the structure of this incoherence.
The description I will give is also intended to work as an argument in
support of the incoherence thesis: I will be pointing to apparent features of
vagueness which are apparently essential to it, but which also appear to
jointly generate mutually unsatisfiable semantic requirements for statements in
a sorites sequence.
The notion
of robustness exhibits a certain conceptual bi-polarity, and its two poles are
in tension with one another whenever the contextually operative semantic
standards impose a discrimination requirement (as I'll put it)--i.e.,
whenever those standards render some of the statements in a sorites sequence
true (so that the discriminatoriness condition applies non-vacuously rather
than vacuously). One pole is individualistic:
it involves statements in a sorites sequence considered singly, in relation to
their immediate neighbors in the sequence.
The semantic requirements of the individualistic pole, and the fact that
these requirements are in conflict with the discrimination requirement, rise to
the surface in sorites reasoning, as follows.
Consider a typical sorites sequence of statements. By the discrimination condition, statements
early in the sequence are true and statements late in the sequence are
false. Consider any true statement Si. Given that Si is true, Si+1
must also be true; for otherwise there would be a precise semantic boundary
between Si and Si+1, contrary to the robustness of
vagueness. So Si+1 is
true. By iteration of this reasoning,
each subsequent statement in the sequence must be true too--a requirement
directly in conflict with the discrimination condition (since no statement in
the sequence can be both true and false).
The other
pole in the notion of robustness is collectivistic: it involves the
statements in a sorites sequence considered collectively, rather than
individually. This pole requires the repudiation
of the semantic requirements generated by the individualistic pole--and
likewise, requires the repudiation of sorites reasoning. The notion "no precise fact of the
matter about semantic transitions" is applied to a sorites sequence as
a whole, specifically with the purpose of rejecting the idea that there is
any determinate, correct, assignment of semantic statuses to the statements
considered individually.
So the
notion of robustness is at odds with itself: the individualistic and
collectivistic poles are both present, and are in conceptual tension with one
another whenever the discrimination condition is also operative (i.e., whenever
the discriminatoriness condition applies non-vacuously). On one hand, with respect to the statements
in the sequence taken collectively, it is required by robustness that there be
no correct, determinate, assignment of truth values to the statements. On the other hand, with respect to the
statements individually, it is required by robustness that each statement have
the same truth value as its immediate neighbors. Since the requirements of the individualistic
pole conflict with the discrimination requirement, but those of the
collectivistic pole do not, the two poles thereby conflict directly with one
another, given the discrimination requirement.
Thus,
(16) Vagueness is logically incoherent, in the
following way: it is not possible for the statements in a typical sorites
sequence to fully satisfy, in such a way that some of these statements are
true, the semantic requirements imposed by the robustness and the
discriminatoriness of vagueness.
2.2. Vagueness
and Dionysian Discourse.
If indeed
vagueness is logically incoherent in the manner just described, then in any
discourse for which the contextually operative semantic standards are logically
coherent, vague terms will be necessarily empty--i.e., the semantic standards
will guarantee that vague predications are never true (and are always
false). Conversely, in any discourse in
which vague predications are sometimes true, the contextually operative
semantic standards themselves must be logically incoherent, in that they
generate mutually unsatisfiable semantic requirements for the statements in
typical sorites sequences. Now, it seems
undeniable that much of our actual discourse is governed by semantic standards
that sanction vague predications; and I myself certainly think so:
(17) Much actual discourse is
vagueness-sanctioning: i.e., under the contextually operative semantic
standards, many vague predications are true.
Thus, I am also committed to claiming that much actual
discourse is logically incoherent:
(18) Vagueness-sanctioning discourse is logically
incoherent, in the following way: the contextually operative semantic standards
impose, on the statements in a typical sorites sequence, semantic requirements
that cannot be mutually satisfied.
I will call discourse that is logically incoherent in
this particular way, Dionysian discourse. By contrast, I will say that a discourse is Apollonian
when the contextually operative semantic standards are not logically
incoherent.[20] Given theses (18) and (19), I am committed to
the view that a workable, vagueness-sanctioning, discourse can (and must) be
Dionysian.[21] So the key task I face is to explain how this
could be--how, that is, Dionysian discourse can be efficacious rather than
nihilistically self-destructive.
Consider,
as a suggestive model, a kind of situation that sometimes arises in the sphere
of morals: a person finds himself with two conflicting moral obligations; both
obligations remain in force, even though they conflict; yet the person is
morally required to uphold one of these obligations specifically, and to
violate the other one specifically. Here
is a plausible example of this sort of moral conundrum, for concreteness. A philosopher promises to write a referee
letter for someone's tenure/promotion file.
The philosopher believes that the tenure candidate's philosophical work,
though sparse, is truly excellent; that the candidate fully deserves tenure;
that a carefully written letter by the philosopher himself will greatly enhance
the candidate's chances; and that without such a letter from the
philosopher himself, the candidate's chances of tenure are virtually nil. (The philosopher believes that the
candidate's department needs very strong persuasion, because of the sparsity of
the candidate's output; and that none of the candidate's other tenure referees
are likely to help the candidate's case.)
The philosopher also believes that preparing such a letter will require
quite a lot of time--including much time spent carefully reading through the
candidate's written work. Shortly
thereafter, the philosopher gets invited to give a paper at a very prestigious
philosophy conference, so prestigious that giving a paper there is bound to
enhance the philosopher's professional reputation substantially. So the philosopher accepts, promising to
prepare and present a paper at the conference.
The conference, some six months away, will occur at about the same time
that the tenure letter is due. Five
months pass by quickly, without the philosopher's attending to either
task. (As usual, the philosopher has
been playing catchup on prior commitments, and has been behind on
everything. Had he thought the matter
through six months ago, he would have realized then that he was likely to end
up in this dilemma.) Suddenly he finds
himself realizing that he can't possibly keep both promises. (He believes that compromise corner-cutting
just isn't possible here. Corner-cutting
on the letter writing will result in a letter that lacks the detailed
documentation necessary to make a persuasive case for the candidate's
tenure. Corner-cutting on the paper
preparation will result in a paper so poor that it does not meet an understood
condition involved in his promise to write that paper, viz., that produce a
paper that he himself considers intellectually respectable.)
In this
situation, I suggest, both obligations are still in force; the philosopher
faces a genuine moral dilemma. As I will
put it, neither obligation is defeated--where by defeated I mean that an
obligation has defeasibility conditions that are presently satisfied. In particular, neither obligation defeats the
other one. (Although each of the two
promises, like virtually any promise, does have certain implicit defeasibility
conditions, neither promise's defeasibility conditions are here satisfied; in
particular, neither's are here satisfied by the existence of the competing
promise-keeping obligation.) However,
given what is at stake, the philosopher is morally required to honor his
promise to prepare and write a tenure letter, and he is morally required to
violate his promise to prepare and present a paper at the conference. As I will put it, the former promise dominates
the latter one. Thus, the first promise
dominates the second without defeating it.[22]
This kind
of moral-dilemma situation, I suggest, is importantly similar to what happens
in Dionysian discourse when we are confronted with instances of the sorites
paradox.[23] In those situations, the conflicting semantic
requirements imposed by the contextually operative semantic standards come
right to the surface--hence the paradox.
In asking about the semantic status of the various individual pairs of adjacent
statements in a sorites sequence, considered as individual pairs, we
realize that there is a contextually operative semantic requirement that for
each pair, the two items must have the same semantic status, and therefore that
the universally quantified premise of the corresponding quantificational
sorites argument be true--and thus a requirement that all the conditional
premises in the corresponding conditional sorites argument be true. (I will call these individualistic
semantic requirements.) However, in
asking about the semantic status of the items in the sequence, considered collectively,
we realize that we are obliged--because of "no precise fact of the matter
about semantic transitions"--to reject a universally quantified sorites
premise as not true, and also to reject its classical-logic contradictory as
not true. Likewise, mutatis mutandis,
for the conjunction of conditional premises in a conditional sorites argument,
and the various classical-logic contradictories of this conjunction. (I will call these collectivistic
semantic requirements.) Both kinds of
requirements are present, applicable, and nondefeasible. Since neither is defeasible, neither is
defeated by the other (even though they conflict); i.e., neither has
defeasibility conditions that are satisfied by the presence of the competing
requirement. The paradox is quite real,
because there really are conflicting, nondefeasible, semantic requirements in
play.
Even so,
however, the competing semantic requirements are not on a par within Dionysian
discourse. Instead, the collectivistic
requirements semantically dominate the individualistic ones without
semantically defeating them, in much the same way that one moral obligation
sometimes morally dominates a competing one without morally defeating it. Truth (correct assertibility) is a matter of
what is semantically proper to assert according to the semantically dominant
requirements generated by the operative semantic standards:
(19) Truth is correct assertibility under semantically
dominant, contextually operative, semantic standards.
Therefore, some vague predications are indeed true,
within Dionysian discourse.
Pragmatic
factors are behind these dominance relations, factors involving the point and
purpose of vagueness in our language and thought. If the individualistic requirements were
semantically dominant, or if there were no semantic dominance relations at all,
then language and thought would evidently self-destruct under the pressure of
sorites arguments: numerous statements of the form "P and not P"
would turn out true, when P is a vague predication.
With
collectivistic semantic dominance relations in operation within the semantic
standards, this kind of radical logical self-destruction need not occur. Instead, Dionysian discourse can be logically
well behaved--or logically disciplined, as I will put it--despite being
logically incoherent:
(20) Dionysian discourse is semantically
disciplined, in the following way: there are semantic dominance relations among
nondefeasible, mutually unsatisfiable, semantic requirements.
(21) Dionysian discourse is logically
disciplined, by virtue of being semantically disciplined; i.e., truth conforms
to determinate logical principles.
So what we have with Dionysian discourse is sado-semantics
(as one might put it). The semantic
standards generate conflicting, nondefeasible, semantic requirements; but the
standards also generate semantic and logical discipline in the discourse. This discipline arises through dominance
relations: certain semantic requirements play the role of dominatrix, relative
to other incompatible semantic requirements.
The principles that systematize this kinky discipline comprise what I
will call transvaluationist logic.
I next turn briefly to that.
2.3. Dionysian
Logical Discipline: Transvaluationist Logic.
Consider a
familiar sorites argument like the following, where 'Bn' abbreviates the
statement 'a man with n hairs on his head is bald'.
(Q) (1) (n)(Bn
É Bn+1)
(2) B(0)
\ (3) B(107)
We want a logic of vagueness under which it is possible
to reject premise (1) without becoming committed to sharp semantic transitions
in the sequence of statements B(0), B(1),..., B(107). It is beyond doubt that the logic we seek
must somehow differ from classical logic.
For, this is a logical truth in classical logic:
(a) (n)(Bn É Bn+1) v ($n)(Bn & ~Bn+1).
Yet the left disjunct of (a),
(b) (n)(Bn É Bn+1),
is the major premise for the quantificational sorites
argument (Q), whereas the right disjunct of (a),
(c) ($n)(Bn & ~Bn+1),
asserts the existence of a sharp boundary between the
bald and the not-bald. Within Dionysian
discourse, statements (b) and (c) should both turn out to be not true. Yet under classical logic, one of the
disjuncts (and only one, since (b) and (c) are contradictories) must be
true. So transvaluationist logic has to
differ somewhat from classical logic.
In
principle, there are various potential systems of non-classical logic that
might be candidates for systematizing the logical discipline of Dionysian
discourse. The approach to vagueness I
am describing in this paper is not officially committed any specific
system. Officially, then, by
'transvaluationist logic' I mean whatever nonclassical logical principles
reflect truth-preserving inference within Dionysian discourse.[24] Thus,
(22) In Dionysian discourse, truth conforms to
the principles of transvaluationist logic.
In an earlier paper (Horgan 1994b) I did sketch a
particular approach to the logic of vagueness which seems to me along the right
general lines; Michael Tye (1990, 1994) has been working in a very similar
vein. Let me briefly mention a few key
features of this approach, with respect to how it handles sorites arguments
like (Q).
First, the
approach introduces two kinds of negation, strong and weak. Strong negation works in the manner of
negation within classical logic: The strong negation ~S of a statement S is
true (i.e., correctly assertible) iff S itself is false (i.e., correctly
deniable, in the strong way). The weak
negation ¬S of a statement S is true iff S itself is not true (i.e., not
correctly assertible). (I appropriate
the phrase 'it's not the case that' to express weak negation.) Some statements, for instance statements (b)
and (c) just above, are neither true nor false, i.e., neither correctly
assertible nor correctly deniable (in the strong way). Likewise, the strong negations of statements
(b) and (c) are also neither true nor false.
What are true, then, are the weak negations of each of these
statements:
(d) ¬(n)(Bn É Bn+1)
(I.e.,
it's not the case that for any n, if an n-haired person is bald then an
(n+1)-haired person is bald.)
(e) ¬($n)(Bn & ~Bn+1).
(It's
not the case that there is some n such that an n-haired person is bald but an
(n+1)-haired person is not bald.)
(f) ¬~(n)(Bn É Bn+1).
(It's
not the case that not every n is such that if an n-haired person is bald then
an (n+1)-haired person is bald.)
(g) ¬~($n)(Bn & ~Bn+1).
(It's
not the case that there is not an n such that an n-haired person is bald but an
(n+1)-haired person is not bald.)
Quantificational sorites arguments like (Q) thus get
blocked, without commitment to any sharp semantic transitions in a sorites
sequence. (Statement (a) gets the same
treatment as (b) and (c).)[25]
A Tarski-style
truth characterization can be given for a simple formal language with the two
kinds of negation. This truth
characterization yields the desired results for statements like (b) and (c), provided
that the metalanguage is governed by the same non-classical logic that is
operative in the object language. Truth
itself is vague (in a way that directly reflects vagueness in object-language
predictions); this means that metalinguistic discourse about object-language
statements is itself Dionysian, so that appropriate metalinguistic reasoning
conforms to the same logical principles that govern the object language. And so on ad infinitum, all the way up
the metalinguistic hierarchy.
A
transvaluationist logic along these lines blocks sorites reasoning: it allows
us to reject statement (b), and to do so without thereby becoming committed to
the truth of statement (c) (or to the truth of any other statement, at the
level of either object language or metalanguage, which posits some sharp
semantic boundary). The fact that truth
conforms to transvaluationist logic does not eliminate the sorites paradox,
however. For, although this logic
reflects the dominance of the collectivist aspect of robustness over the
individualist aspect, the individualist aspect is still present, generating
nondefeasible (though dominated) semantic requirements upon the statements in a
sorites sequence. It still makes
perfectly good sense to ask, of any true statement in a sorites sequence, what the
semantic status of its immediate successor could be; it's still the case that
the only allowable answer to each such question, given the robustness of
vagueness, is that the immediate successor itself must be true; and this
reasoning still seems to be iterable, across the entire sorites sequence.
To be
sure, the semantically correct thing to do, when queried about the
semantic status of the items in the sorites sequence considered individually
and successively, is to steadfastly refuse to play the game (cf. Tye 1994, pp.
205-6). Refuse to answer such questions
in the form they are posed. Refuse to
take up the challenge of explaining what specifically is wrong with
stepwise sorites-style reasoning that focuses individually and sequentially on
the successive statements in a sorites sequence. Resolutely fall back on the collectivist
aspect of robustness, saying "There is simply no fact of the matter about
semantic transitions in the sequence, and that's all there is to say." But although this obstinate head-in-the-sand
stance is indeed semantically correct (since it accords with the semantic
dominance of the collectivist aspect of robustness over the individualist
aspect, and thereby reflects the workings of truth itself), it is not, and
cannot be, fully satisfying intellectually.
The individualist aspect of robustness still asserts itself, generating
the nondefeasible requirement that all the statements in the sorites sequence
have the same semantic status.
This requirement persists, nondefeasible and therefore undefeated, even
though it is dominated by other semantic requirements with which it clearly
conflicts. There is no theoretically
acceptable account of how the requirement gets either satisfied or defeated by
contextually operative semantic standards, because it doesn't get
satisfied or defeated--but only dominated.
So although transvaluationist logic systematizes the semantic discipline
at work in Dionysian discourse, this kind of logic does not, and cannot,
exhibit full-fledged semantic coherence--because the contextually
operative semantic standards generate mutually unsatisfiable semantic
requirements. As one might put it,
transvaluationist logic has the feature of depthlessness; there is no
theoretically deep account that reveals coherent, non-conflicting, semantical
principles underlying this non-classical logic.
Dionysian
discourse works, though.
Vagueness is ubiquitous in our language and thought, even though it is
logically incoherent. Moreover,
vagueness in language and thought appears to be not only very useful but absolutely
essential, for creatures like ourselves with finite cognitive and
discriminatory capacities. Hence, to
insist upon complete logical coherence in the semantic standards governing
one's discourse is to make an unrealistic and unlivable demand; logical
discipline is enough. To realize this
fact and accept it, thereby taking a step toward becoming a philosophical
Ubermensch, is to embrace transvaluationism:
(23) Although vagueness is logically incoherent,
it is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential feature of human thought.
Let me
make a final point about logic and Dionysian discourse. Although the need to block sorites reasoning
without committing ourselves to sharp semantic boundaries effects a certain
de-centering of classical logic--i.e., it forces upon us the realization that
truth in Dionysian discourse does not fully conform to classical
logic--nevertheless the logical discipline exhibited by Dionysian discourse
does largely approximate conformity to classical logic. Most of the time when we are operating within
Dionysian discourse, vagueness does not directly intrude into our reasoning,
and can be safely ignored. Thus, most
the time we can and do make truth-preserving inferences, in Dionysian discourse,
by resorting to classical logic. This
being so, it remains appropriate for most purposes to insist upon
full-fledged logical coherence as a legitimate constraint upon inference,
belief fixation, and the like.
But the
fact remains that thoroughgoing logical coherence cannot always be had. When we come face-to-face with a sorites
argument, we find ourselves confronted by a genuine paradox, stemming directly
from the fact that mutually unsatisfiable semantic requirements apply to the
statements in the sorites sequence. The
paradox does more than just force us to abandon classical logic in favor of a
non-classical logic that allows us to reject the argument without incurring a
commitment to precise semantic boundaries.
The paradox also forces us to settle for logical discipline as a feature
of vagueness-sanctioning discourse, and to give up the hope of full-fledged
logical coherence. Complete logical
coherence is unattainable, because such discourse is Dionysian, not Apollonian.
2.4. Vagueness
and Apollonian Discourse.
Earlier I
defined Apollonian discourse as the kind of discourse in which the contextually
operative semantic standards are logically coherent, rather than merely being
logically disciplined. Given that
vagueness is logically incoherent, we get this result:
(24) In Apollonian discourse, vague terms are
necessarily empty; i.e., the contextually operative semantic standards
guarantee that vague predications are never true.
It seems quite clear that in the vast majority of actual
discourse contexts (scientific contexts included), the contextually operative
semantic standards are vagueness-sanctioning.
Thus, we are led to conclude that Apollonian discourse is highly
unusual:
(25) Apollonian discourse is quite rare, even in
contexts of scientific inquiry.
On the
other hand, as I stressed late in section 2.3, the logical discipline exhibited
in Dionysian discourse does largely approximate full-fledged logical
coherence. Vagueness normally does not
intrude directly into our reasoning, and hence normally our inferences are truth-preserving
when we employ classical logic. Logical
coherence is thus a regulative ideal within Dionysian discourse, even though
sorites arguments show that this ideal cannot be fully respected.
The only
way to fully respect it is to employ semantic standards under which
vague terms are necessarily empty. For
virtually all our purposes in language and thought, this is far too high a
price to pay--especially since logical discipline, in combination with approximate
logical coherence, suffices to render Dionysian discourse workable. No wonder, then, that Apollonian discourse
occurs so extremely rarely. Its
principal usage, evidently, is in certain philosophical contexts when ontology
is at issue. This brings us to ontology.
3. Vagueness
and Ontology.
As I
pointed out in section 1, within contextual semantics an important distinction
arises between regional ontology and ultimate ontology (cf. theses 8-10). Ultimate ontology concerns questions of what
OBJECTS, PROPERTIES, or other ENTITIES are denizens of THE WORLD. Regional ontology is a matter of (i) what
Quinean "ontological commitments" are incurred by various statements,
and (ii) which statements, which their associated regional ontological commitments,
are true (correctly assertible) under contextually operative semantic
standards. Maximally strict
semantic standards are those under which there is direct language/WORLD
correspondence. Thus, a statement
carries ultimate ontological commitments to certain entities if (a) it carries
regional ontological commitment to them, and (b) it is contextually governed by
maximally strict semantic standards.
THE WORLD
itself surely cannot be logically incoherent (although it could certainly turn
out to be unintelligible to humans). So,
since maximally strict semantic standards involve direct language/WORLD
correspondence for true statements, and direct language/WORLD
non-correspondence (as one might put it) for false statements, such semantic
standards are not logically incoherent either.
Thus, maximally strict semantic standards are Apollonian, not
Dionysian. The discourse of ultimate
ontology is Apollonian discourse. This
means, given the ubiquity of vagueness in most discourse (even scientific
discourse), that the discourse of ultimate ontology is quite unusual:
(26) Maximally strict semantic standards are
Apollonian, not Dionysian.
(27) Discourse governed by maximally strict
semantic standards is quite rare, even in contexts of scientific inquiry.
Let me now
consider in turn the two broad kinds of ontological issue about vagueness that
can be distinguished, within the framework of contextual semantics: issues
about regional ontology and about ultimate ontology, respectively.
3.1. Regional
Ontology: There is Vagueness in the World.
Dionysian
discourse is up to its neck in regional ontological commitments to vague
objects and properties. Mountains are
vague--with respect to their spatial boundaries, for instance. Most middle-sized dry goods (desks, tables,
coffee cups) are somewhat vague too, with respect to their precise
spatio-temporal boundaries, for instance, and with respect to their
microphysical composition. As Quine has
written:
Who can
aspire to a precise intermolecular demarcation of a desk? Countless minutely different aggregates of molecules
have equal claims to being my desk...
Vagueness of boundaries has sparked philosophical discussion in the case
of desks because of their false air of precision. Mountains meanwhile are taken in stride: the
thought of demarcating a mountain does not arise. At bottom the two cases really are alike: our
terms delimit the object to the degree relevant to our concerns.... [The] cases
differ only in degree. (Quine 1985, 167-8)
Similar remarks apply to the molecules that compose the
desk, and to virtually all other things we talk about in ordinary life and in
science. In particular, similar remarks
apply to persons: human beings too are vague with respect to their
spatio-temporal boundaries and their molecular composition.
These
kinds of regional ontological commitments are quite legitimate, according to
the view I have been developing here.
They occur within Dionysian discourse, and statements that bear such
ontological commitments are very frequently true within Dionysian
discourse--i.e., they are correctly assertible, under the contextually
operative assertibility standards. On
the other hand, I also maintain that the way the WORLD contributes to correct
assertibility, under Dionysian standards, is sufficiently indirect that these
regional ontological commitments to vague entities do not constitute ultimate
ontological commitments:
(28) Statements that are ontologically committed
to vague objects and properties are often true, under contextually operative
semantic standards (viz., Dionysian semantic standards).
(29) Under Dionysian semantic standards,
statements that posit vague objects, or that predicate vague properties, do not
carry ultimate ontological commitments to these entities; such ontological
commitments are only regional.
Is there vagueness in the world? Certainly.
There are mountains, tables, molecules, and persons, for instance, and
these are all vague objects. There are
properties like baldness, tallness, and heaphood, for instance, and these are
vague properties. But when I say these
things I am speaking under Dionysian semantic standards, and my remarks do not
carry ultimate ontological commitment.
3.2. Ultimate
Ontology: There is No Vagueness in THE WORLD.
The
language of ultimate ontology is language governed by maximally strict semantic
standards, and is Apollonian. Because
vagueness is logically incoherent, vague terms are necessarily empty under
Apollonian semantic standards. This
means that there are not, and cannot be, vague OBJECTS or vague PROPERTIES.
The same
conclusion can be reached by sorites reasoning, which works within Apollonian
discourse to yield reductios of claims about vagueness in THE WORLD. Here is an example: Suppose there are OBJECTS
that have vague spatio-temporal boundaries.
Consider some putative vague OBJECT S, and some distance-interval
measure that is very small--say, 10-100 centimeters. Let P1, P2, ..., Pn
be a sequence of space-time points with these features: (1) P1 falls
within S's spatio-temporal boundaries; (2) all the other points have the same
temporal coordinate at t; (3) they are all positioned in a straight line
emanating outward from P1 in some specific spatial direction; (4)
each point Pi in the sequence is
10-100 cm closer to P1 than is the successive
point Pi+1; and (5) Pn does not fall within S. Since S is spatio-temporally vague, there are
no successive points Pj and Pj+1 such that Pj
falls within S and Pj+1 does not.
So for each i, 1 £ i £ n, if Pi falls within S then so does Pi+1. Hence Pn falls within S,
contradicting (5). Therefore, no OBJECTS
are spatio-temporally vague. By
analogous reasoning, one can show argue that no OBJECTS are vague in any other
respect, that there are no vague PROPERTIES, and no vague ENTITIES of any kind.
So there
are no MOUNTAINS, TABLES, MOLECULES, or PEOPLE.
There are no such PROPERTIES as BALDNESS, TALLNESS, or HEAPHOOD. Whatever the correct ultimate ontology is, it
does not include any vague denizens of THE WORLD.
(30) Statements that are ontologically committed
to vague objects or properties are never true under maximally strict semantic
standards.
(31) There are no vague OBJECTS or PROPERTIES in
THE WORLD. I.e., the correct ultimate
ontology does not contain any vague entities.
3.3. Ontological
Double-Talk: The Dionysian/Apollonian Zig-Zag.
Needless
to say, it sounds enormously bizarre--even lunatic--to say that there are no
such things as mountains, tables, and people.
The capitalization convention does little to mitigate this bizarreness;
indeed, since this convention is not part of everyday discourse or of
scientific discourse, it seems quite bizarre itself.
But the
bizarreness is to be expected, given what I have been saying about vagueness
and about vagueness-sanctioning discourse.
Since humans employ vague terms ubiquitously, they almost always speak
within Dionysian discourse; they almost never speak within Apollonian
discourse, the discourse of ultimate ontology.
Moreover, even when one does deliberately speak under maximally strict
semantic standards, with the specific purpose of making claims about ultimate
ontology, the introduction of vague terms inevitably makes one feel the
"pull" of Dionysian, vagueness-legitimating, semantic standards. Thus, even though a statement like 'There are
no persons' is true when asserted as a claim about ultimate ontology, it
is bound to sound very peculiar anyway.
So
although we can, when we choose to, shift the score in the language game from
the ordinarily operative Dionysian standards into maximally strict standards,
this shift into Apollonian discourse of ultimate ontology is not a smooth
transition but a jarring zig-zag. When
we employ vague terms under Apollonian standards, we find ourselves speaking
and writing under erasure (as one might put it); i.e., we are speaking
and writing under semantic standards radically at odds with ordinary,
vagueness-legitimating, standards.[26] Our linguistic intuitions inevitably feel the
strain, since they are so strongly tethered to Dionysian,
vagueness-sanctioning, semantic standards.
It is bound to sound peculiar to claim that are no such entities as
desks or persons, even when this claim is deliberately intended as a remark
about ultimate ontology; for, as soon as the terms 'desk' and 'person' are
used, we feel strongly the tendency to slide back into the Dionysian semantic
standards in which these terms have their ordinary use.
Once the
zig-zag nature of discourse about ultimate ontology becomes thematized in this
way, I think it becomes clear that the extreme linguistic oddness of statements
like 'There are no desks or persons' does not necessarily provide good grounds
for questioning the truth of such statements, construed as claims about
ultimate ontology. Apollonian discourse
is very rarefied indeed.
My use of
Putnam's capitalization device is intended as a way of explicitly marking the
zigzag into Apollonian discourse.
Another such device is the ultimate-ontological use of the term
'really'. Once when Wilfrid Sellars had
just presented a philosophical lecture in which he resorted heavily to talk of
common roles played by intertranslatable terms in different languages, Michael
Tye pointed out to Sellars that although he seemed to be ontologically
committed to roles, his official ontology evidently did not include such
entities. Sellars replied to Tye with an
overt ontological zigzag. He said:
"Are there roles? Of course! Are there really roles? No!"
My own position about vagueness and ontology can be succinctly expressed
by employing the same linguistic device that Sellars used. Are there mountains, desks, molecules, and
persons? Of course! Are there really mountains, desks,
molecules, and persons. No!
4. The Virtues
of Transvaluationism.
Contextual
semantics, in my view, is quite attractive as a general theoretical approach to
language/world relations; I briefly rehearsed some of its attractions at the
end of section 1. Transvaluationism, as
situated within the framework of contextual semantics, likewise seems to have
important theoretical attractions. I
will conclude by mentioning three broad virtues.
First,
this approach evidently does quite well at theoretically accommodating many of
our strong pre-theoretic beliefs about matters involving vagueness, like the
following:
Many vague
predications are true.
Many
things in the world are vague in one way or another (e.g., vague with respect
to their spatio-temporal boundaries, and/or their physical composition.)
Vagueness
in thought and language is useful, legitimate, and essential.
Sorites
arguments are not sound.
Vagueness
is robust: there is no precise fact of the matter about semantic transitions in
a sorites sequence.
Vagueness
does not undermine logic or reasoning.
Second,
although transvaluationism does embrace certain intuitively odd-seeming claims
(as any philosophical approach to vagueness probably must do), this
approach has substantial explanatory resources for explaining why those
claims sound odd. Bullet-biting becomes
theoretically more palatable when the theory itself explains why the bullet
should feel difficult to bite.
Third,
transvaluationism exhibits a thorough theoretical respect for the sorites
paradox, by treating it as a genuine paradox. Instead of claiming that the paradox is only
apparent--perhaps the product of some kind of subtle intellectual confusion--transvaluationism
locates the source of the paradox directly within the semantic standards that
govern vagueness-sanctioning discourse: there are conflicting, nondefeasible,
semantic requirements for the statements in a sorites sequence, and hence the
paradox is quite real. Less respectful
approaches, which seek to dissolve the paradox as illusory or to resolve it as
though it were an intellectual puzzle that has some straightforward solution
waiting to be discovered, tend to be dissatisfying and unconvincing. Upon reflection, those approaches just don't
seem to give vagueness its due. The
ancient sorites paradox, which has been too much neglected in philosophy and in
logic, demands a deeper kind of philosophical respect.[27]
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[1]. By a sorites sequence I
mean a sequence of non-conditional statements of the sort that figure in a
sorites paradox, for instance: A person with 0 hairs on his head is bald; a
person with 1 hair on his head is bald; a person with 2 hairs on his head is bald;
...; a person with 107 hairs on his head is bald.
[2]. Although Williamson
appropriates the term 'nihilism' for the specific doctrine that vague terms are
empty, the pre-theoretic connotations of the term involve the more generic idea
of a position that is bleakly, extremely, negative. (For Williamson, the thesis he so labels
deserves that label largely because of its bleakly negative consequences.) In this paper I use the term primarily in the
more generic way.
[3]. See Horgan (1986a, 1986b,
1987, 1990, 1991, 1994a, forthcoming a, forthcoming b); Horgan and Timmons
(1993, forthcoming).
[4]. In Horgan (1990) I
described contextual semantics (as I now call it) and some of its apparent
advantages over referential semantics; I suggested that contextual semantics provides
conceptual space in which some new approach might develop that does proper
justice to the robustness of vagueness; but I did not propose such an approach
in any detail. In Horgan (1994b) I
defended the incoherence thesis; and I wedded it to a proposed non-classical
logic which appears to block sorites arguments while also respecting the
robustness of vagueness. But I did not
explain in any detail how I would situate the incoherence thesis (and the
accompanying nonclassical logic) within contextual semantics, or why I think
the incoherence thesis as so situated transcends nihilism.
[5]. What I have to say largely
applies, mutatis mutandis, to concept/world relations too. Parallel to talk below of semantic standards
governing correct assertibility, would be talk about conceptual standards
governing the proper application of concepts.
[6]. See Putnam (1981, 1983) and
Wright (1987, 1992). Superassertibility
is a notion whose expression Wright keeps working to refine. The core idea, as he puts it, is that the
truth of statements in a given discourse "consist[s] merely in their
durably meeting its standards of warranted assertion" (1992, p. 142).
[7]. I argue against
epistemically reductionist construals of truth like those of Putnam and Wright
in Horgan (1991, forthcoming a, forthcoming b).
One line of argument I use appeals to a brain-in-vat scenario in which
the brain was originally embodied and has only recently, unwittingly, become
envatted.
[8]. Nominalism, as an
ontological position about properties, is something I will pass over in this
paper in order not the complicate the discussion unnecessarily.
[9]. The metaphor of a spectrum
is really too simple and uni-dimensional, but it serves my present expository
purposes.
[10]. In Horgan (forthcoming a,
forthcoming b) and Horgan and Timmons (forthcoming), a distinction is drawn
between semantic standards that are tight and those that are not. Roughly, tightness means that contextually
operative semantic standards plus THE WORLD jointly determine correct assertibility,
without any room for further factors to enter.
Timmons and I maintain that in certain kinds of discourse, notably moral
discourse, the semantic norms are not tight, and an additional factor--viz.,
the speaker's normative stance--figures in semantically proper assertoric
practice. But I leave this aside here,
since it is not directly germane to matters of vagueness.
[11]. This leaves it open whether
or not contextually operative assertibility standards typically sanction as
true all instances of schema (T).
In connection with vagueness, doubts can be raised about instances of
(T) in which the statement replacing 'P' is a vague predication involving a
borderline case (e.g., a statement predicating 'bald' of someone who is a
borderline case of baldness). Vagueness-related doubts can also be raised
about instances of (T) in which 'P' is replaced by certain quantificational
statements (e.g., the statement 'For any n, if a person with n hairs on his
head is bald, then a person with n+1 hairs on his head is bald').
[12]. Contextual semantics, as it
has so far been worked out, focuses more on truth than on meaning.
[13]. However, variations in the
operative assertibility standards, from one context to another, generally do
not constitute differences in meaning.
It is more accurate to view matters of meaning in the following
way. (1) Generic semantic standards have
certain contextually variable parameters.
(2) Specific, contextually operative, semantic standards involve
particular values of those parameters; these parameter values determine the
current "score in the language game."
(3) The generic semantic standards hold trans-contextually, whereas the
specific parameter values differ from one context to another. (4) Meaning remains constant
trans-contextually, because of the constancy of generic semantic
standards. (5) Contextual variability in
parameter values constitutes a more subtle, more fine-grained, kind of semantic
change than does change in meaning. As
one might put it, changes in parameter values yield a differance--not a
difference--in meaning. (Moreover, as
Bill Throop has pointed out to me, the term 'meaning' itself is evidently
governed by assertibility standards with contextually variable parameters:
although the term is frequently used in the coarse-grained way just described,
it can sometimes be used in such a manner that the phrase 'change in meaning'
tracks more fine-grained semantic differences.)
[14]. See especially the essays
"Truth and 'Correspondence'," "Grammar and Existence: A Preface
to Ontology," and "Some Reflections on Language Games" in
Sellars (1963), and Chapter IV of Sellars (1968).
[15]. An important difference
between Wright and me is that I vigorously eschew epistemic reductionism,
whereas Wright (1992) remains officially neutral about it; furthermore, this
book can be read as supportive of the contention that truth, in any discourse,
is the epistemically characterizable attribute he calls
superassertibility. In Horgan
(forthcoming a, forthcoming b) I applaud Wright's generic position but argue
against an epistemically reductionist version of it.
[16]. These kinds of advantages are
elaborated more fully in various of the papers cited in note 3.
[17]. For instance, Diana Raffman's
approach (Raffman 1994, this volume), which places heavy emphasis on alleged
contextual shifts in the extensions of vague terms, appears to comport well
with the framework of contextual semantics.
[18]. Under the kinds of semantic
standards that typically govern vague discourse, sorites sequences certainly do
exhibit semantic transitions--with true ones at one end and false ones at the
other. But I couch the wording so that
discriminatoriness can hold vacuously under certain kinds of semantic
standards--viz., standards guaranteeing that vague predications are always false.
[19]. Again, the reason for the
hedged wording is to allow for certain kinds of semantic standards in which the
antecedent-condition is not met, in particular for standards under which all
the statements in a typical sorites sequence are false.
[20]. In principle, 'Dionysian'
could work as a genus term, with this kind of logical incoherence being just
one species. But that usage does not
serve my immediate purposes, since this kind of incoherence is the only kind I
am concerned with here.
[21]. The specific semantic
standards governing vague terms can vary somewhat from one context to another,
while still falling under the broad rubric of Dionysian, vagueness-sanctioning,
discourse. The context dependence of
vague language has been rightly urged on me by Murray Spindel, who also offered
a very nice example: someone who shaves his head. In some contexts, it is semantically proper
to call such a person bald. ("That
bald fellow plays center on the basketball team.") In other contexts, it is semantically proper
to deny that such a person is bald.
(That fellow with no hair isn't bald; he just shaves his head.")
[22]. Two questions are likely to
arise, phrased by employing certain terms which have tended to become
philosophical terms of art: (1) "Does the morally dominant obligation override
the morally dominated one?" (2)
"Is the morally dominated obligation an all-things-considered
obligation?" In each case, I would
say that it all depends on how we choose to deploy the italicized terms as
terms of art. Each term probably could
be precisified either way--so that the answer to the associated question could
turn out either yes or no, depending on the precisifying decision. In any event, the important distinction is
between cases where (i) the morally dominant obligation defeats the moral
obligation it dominates (i.e., it satisfies some defeasibility condition of the
dominated obligation), and (ii) the morally dominant obligation does not defeat
the dominated obligation.
[23]. Two points should be
stressed, though. First, the structural
features that give rise to incompatible semantic requirements, in the case of
vagueness, are in some ways more complex--since (as explained above) they
involve both (i) the individualistic/collectivistic tension within the notion
of robustness itself, and (ii) the conflict between the discrimination
requirement and the individualistic pole of robustness. Second, even if it should turn out that, as
some philosophers maintain, genuine moral dilemmas are not possible, this would
not necessarily undermine my position about the semantics of vagueness; for,
the reasons for the alleged impossibility would not necessarily carry over.
[24]. I do not rule out the
possibility that several incompatible sets of nonclassical principles are
equally good at systematizing truth-preserving inference within Dionysian
discourse, i.e., that Dionysian semantic standards underdetermine their own
logic. We want a logical system that (i)
blocks sorites arguments, (ii) respects the robustness of vagueness, and (iii)
otherwise differs minimally from classical logic. There may be equally good, mutually
incompatible, systems that meet these desiderata.
[25]. Things work similarly for
conditional sorites arguments, containing of a huge number of conditional
premises in place of a quantificational premise like statement (1) in argument
(Q). The conjunction of these
conditionals is neither true nor false; likewise, its classical negation is
neither true nor false. What are
true are the weak negation of that conjunction, and also the weak negation of
its strong negation:
¬{[B(0) É B(1)] & [B(1) É B(2)]
& ... & [B(107-1) É B(107)]}
¬~{[B(0) É B(1)] & [B(1) É B(2)]
& ... & [B(107-1) É B(107)]}
[26]. On the other hand, once we
realize that Dionysian discourse employs semantic standards that are not
maximally strict (and hence that it typically carries ontological commitments
that are only regional and not ultimate), in an important sense Dionysian
discourse too becomes a matter of speaking and writing "under
erasure": we realize, of certain statements we make under Dionysian
semantic standards, that we might well take them back--"erase"
them--when employing maximally strict Apollonian semantic standards. (See the final paragraph of this
section.) As John Tienson points out to
me, there is an asymmetry about this kind of erasability: we are not inclined
to take back Apollonian assertions once made; instead, we simply stop
using Apollonian semantic standards and revert back into Dionysian
discourse. (And as long as the
Apollonian way of talking remains in attention, Tienson observes, the
contextually operative standards governing metalinguistic discourse tend
not to revert to Dionysian, even after the reversion has occurred for
first-order discourse.)
[27]. I thank Mitch Haney, Diana
Raffman, Stephen Schwartz, John Tienson, and Mark Timmons for helpful
discussion and comments.