PONDERING POSTINTERNATIONALISM

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Justified Jailbreaks and Paradigmatic Recidivism

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Reality, it seems, is not what it used to be in International Relations.
—Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics*

[T]heorizing must begin anew, and present premises and understandings of history's dynamics must be treated as conceptual jails from which an escape can be engineered only by allowing for the possibility that a breakpoint in human affairs is imminent, if not upon us, as the twentieth century comes to an end.
—James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*

We confront a world of complementary, conflictual, and contradictory systems of differential power: what Jim Rosenau has aptly characterized as "turbulence." There is no simple or "essential" relationship among an ever expanding global capitalism, centralization and decentralization of political orders, the hierarchies of gender, class, and race/ethnic oppression, and the threatened biosphere upon which all else ultimately depends. These interlocking systems of power develop differentially (they are not reducible to each other) yet inextricably (they are mutually constituted through historical process). In this turbulent context, international relations (IR) theory is contested terrain. As an exploration of that terrain, this chapter locates Rosenau's work in relation to gender-sensitive and feminist international relations theory.

CONSTITUTING JAILS . . .

Abandoning existing assumptions is no easy matter. . . . [S]tudents of world politics, like politicians, are prisoners of their paradigms, of world politics, unable to escape the premise of state predominance and unwilling or unable to escape the premise of state predominance and constantly tempted to cling to familiar assumptions about hierarchy, authority, and sovereignty.[1]

Chapter 2 of *Turbulence in World Politics* is titled "Justifying Jailbreaks" and, in Rosenau's words, "offers a justification for an unremitting effort to break out of the conceptual jails in which the study of world politics is deemed to be incarcerated."[2] Having delineated the limitations of conventional theories, in the same volume Rosenau presents a "new paradigm"[3] to address the anomalies and turbulence of contemporary life. He argues that it is the simultaneous interaction of changes in the main parameters of world politics (micro, macro, and mixed) that locates us in the most "thoroughgoing transformation since comparable shifts culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648."[4] To develop a paradigm able to accommodate the scale and complexity of this transformation, Rosenau attempts to rethink foundational categories, conventional assumptions, and theoretical frameworks. The sweep of this rethinking is elaborated in *Turbulence* and its specific contrast to realism is explored in *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*.[5]

From my perspective, the singularly most attractive and significant feature of Rosenau's work is his creative transgression of conventional boundaries. Especially in the past decade, Rosenau has been uniquely innovative as an IR theorist, producing a variety of works that chart new paths and celebrate new voices.[6] Given space restrictions, I cannot address this work in its entirety. Rather, I focus here on the role of dichotomies as a subtext both in Rosenau's critique of realism and in his construction of postinternational politics. On the one hand, Rosenau's subversion of givens—especially, either-or dichotomies—is one of the things I admire in his work and find most innovative, illuminating, and promising when assessing his recent contributions to IR theory. On the other hand, I am critical of how particular binaries—and their ontological and epistemological commitments—remain the basis for Rosenau's theory, which suggests that his rethinking is not in fact thorough enough. My argument, in brief, is that Rosenau breaks out of a jail cell, but not out of the paradigmatic prison of positivist and masculinist binaries.

The dichotomies that dominate conventional IR theory are a function of the discipline's self-definition (domestic politics versus international anarchy, war versus peace, us versus them) and its

commitment to positivist understanding. The latter entails categorical separations—dichotomies—of fact (objectivity) versus value (subjectivity), theory versus practice, and subject (knower) versus object (that which is known). Linked to these foundational binaries and played out with varying degrees of visibility and force in IR theorizing are a number of other now familiar dichotomies: agent-structure, politics-economics, reason-affect, direct-indirect violence, public-private, masculine-feminine.

But in what sense are these dichotomies a conceptual prison? Critiques of positivism and its binary framing have occupied philosophers of science and social theorists throughout this century. The complexity of argumentation and diversity of positions defy brief summary; I refer readers to the appropriate literature[7] and confine my remarks here to the role and significance of dichotomies in contemporary epistemological debates.

In spite of important distinctions among critical and postmodern theorists, they agree on rejecting positivist dichotomies in favor of relational thinking. As I argue at length in "Transgressing Boundaries,"[8] rather than oppositional (either-or) and hierarchical dualisms (privileging the first term over the second), "objects" and the boundaries identifying them must be understood in relation, as interactively constituted in historical context. This insistence on situating claims by reference to contingent, historical conditions reflects (in part) the "linguistic turn," understood as a shift from thinking of language as a neutral or transparent medium (simply "representing" reality) to language and world as mutually constituted, as interactive and *relational*. In Eloise Buker's words

> While acknowledging that words do point to things, a semiotic theory of language emphasizes how words *constitute* phenomena as certain types of things. Semiotics explains that meanings reside not in speakers, but in the language of a group of speakers. Thus, it locates meaning in a language system which is stabilized by a community.[9]

Hence, to communicate intelligibly, we "submit" ourselves to systems of cultural meaning; we are constrained by the rules and grammar of language systems. At the same time, speakers "even as they are constrained by the language system, can over time change it and so exercise power over language."[10] The important point here is that, once in place (stabilized in hegemonic discourse) oppositional dichotomies act as a filtering device that "imposes" ways of thinking that shape how we "know" reality, including how we act in ways that

effectively "produce" that reality—at the expense of alternative reali-
ties rendered visible/real through alternative linguistic filters. The point
is less to question, for example, whether weapons and nation-states
"really exist" but to ask how and why our discursive practices consti-
tute these objects in particular contingent ways (precluding alternative
constructions) and *what the effects of this particular constituting are*. It is
to deny what Jim George calls the "spectator" theory of knowledge,
where external "facts" impose themselves on subjects/observers, in-
dependent of the subject's meaning system, in favor of "theory *as*
practice," where subjects and objects are related (mutually constituted)
through stabilized linguistic/cultural meaning systems.

> Whatever else this alternative approach achieves, it problematizes
> the dominant modernist commitment to a world of given subjects
> and objects and all other dichotomized givens. In so doing, it refor-
> mulates basic *questions* of modernist understanding in emphasizing
> not the sovereign subject (e.g., author/independent state) or the object
> (e.g., independent world/text) but instead the historical, cultural, and
> linguistic practices in which subjects and objects (and theory and
> practice, facts and values) are constructed.[11]

In regard to dichotomies, suffice it to underscore two points: (1) that
either-or thinking misconceives the relational dynamic of all concepts,
understanding, and action, and (2) that binary constructions "promote
patterns of thought and action that are static (unable to acknowledge
or address change), stunted (unable to envision alternatives), and
dangerously oversimplified (unable to accommodate the complexities
of social reality)."[12]

(JAIL)BREAKING AWAY...

From a perspective critical of binary thought, Rosenau's postinter-
national politics is to be applauded for its many examples of post-
dichotomous thinking. This is perhaps most striking in his discussion
of micro-macro, where he rejects the conventional [read positivist]
juxtaposition of "versus" in favor of "and," which focuses on the *in-
teraction* of terms rather than their ostensible "conflict."[13] In short,
Rosenau insists on favoring neither one nor the other in isolation but
both and how they mutually affect each other. He specifically chal-
lenges the prevailing IR dichotomy that favors system explanation
while it denies agency and changing attributes to individuals.[14] Not
only does he alert us to the development of new skills and orienta-

tions among all of the world's people (the micro parameter), he argues
that these are currently "preeminent" sources of turbulence. That is,
the causal power of micro-level phenomena is accorded a *central* place
in his model;[15] indeed he suggests that it may "constitute the single
most important source of the turbulence that marks our time."[16]

Rosenau's commitment to relational thinking is also spelled out in
his characterization of authority and how to more adequately under-
stand "power". Without denying the significance of possessions (of
sovereignty, resources, military might), Rosenau insists that develop-
ments in the multicentric world challenge conventional accounts of
power, forcing us to more complicated understandings. As a guideline
for jail-breaking, he instructs us

> to recognize that what makes actors effective ... derives not from the
> sovereignty they possess or the legal privileges thereby accorded them,
> but rather lies in relational phenomena.[17]

Also consistent with a critique of either-or framing, Rosenau posits a
continuum of control: brute force constitutes one extreme and persua-
sion (via scientific proof and reason) the other.[18] Rather than the poles,
we need to focus on the more complex interactions between these
extremes. Similarly, responses to control extend along a continuum,
this time ranging from utter compliance to complete defiance, with the
more relevant cases of bargaining, conditional agreement, and apathy
falling between the extremes.

One can sight other examples of Rosenau's commitment to
nonoppositional constructions: he coins the term "habdaptive actors"
for those whose responses fall between the extremes of rote habit and
calculated rationality;[19] he characterizes action sequences as "cascades"
to emphasize their asymmetrical and multidirectional "flow";[20] and he
rejects the dichotomy of "domestic" versus "international" politics.
His boundary transgressions extend to: analyzing sovereignty as a
restraint on actions and effectiveness; according agency and power to
"all those who have authority to initiate and sustain actions" with
transnational repercussions; arguing that subnational and supranational
actors may be as relevant to world politics as states; denying the con-
ventional notion of systemic levels; demoting the role of force in glo-
bal politics; and proposing that "most important outcomes are produced
by so many diverse whole systems and subsystems as to result in their
effective control by none."[21]

In short, for those who are critical of the positivist and realist
commitment that dominate IR scholarship, Rosenau's boundary

transgressions are a welcome intervention. And not only did *Turbulence* present an elaborate alternative to realist orthodoxy, it was written by a highly respected senior theorist. Unlike dissident voices from the margin, one could hope that Rosenau's challenges would be engaged by those occupying the discipline's center. For those on the margins, Rosenau's profound challenge to realist adequacy in the face of contemporary reality marked new possibilities and a less constrained environment for alternative theories of IR.

CLARIFYING FEMINISMS . . .

I turn now to consider how Rosenau's work, and in particular, the role of dichotomies in his work, both opens up and also constrains spaces for feminist interventions in IR theory. My purpose here is twofold: to render visible some of the features of masculinism[22] at work in mainstream and in Rosenau's theorizing, and to illuminate feminist contributions to social and IR theorizing. In the process, I hope to suggest how gender is central to both contemporary global transformations and the development of IR theory capable of addressing those transformations. With other feminists, I am arguing that gender hierarchy is a constitutive, not coincidental, element of the interstate system and the global capitalist economy. On this view, gender relations *must* be examined to adequately apprehend how the world actually works, how "reality" is—every day and over centuries—constructed, reproduced, and transformed.[23]

Feminist scholarship is interdisciplinary, critical, and far from homogeneous. In early work, feminists sought to "correct" the gender-bias of knowledge claims by "adding women" to models and conceptual frameworks characterized as androcentric (assuming male experience as the norm). Adding women to conventional accounts is an important corrective: it documents women's agency in historical processes, exposes masculinist bias and error, and reframes our "picture" of social relations.[24]

By emphasizing individuals, the micro parameter, and the importance of nonstate actors, Rosenau's postinternational politics opens a space for "adding women." Rosenau does not, however, explore this opening. Had he done so, the gender of his micro actors (individuals, officials, leaders, private actors) would have been revealed as masculine, in the sense that his micro parameter presupposes only public-sphere actions and their political effects. That is, Rosenau fails to recognize and hence reproduces androcentric bias in his construction of micro agents.

Also typical of IR theorizing, Rosenau fails to attend to gender as an analytical category and systematic feature of social relations. In Terrell Carver's words, "gender is not a synonym for woman"[25] but a reference to the socially constructed (historical, contingent) dichotomy of masculine-feminine that shapes not only personal identities but also cognitive categories, language, stereotypical assumptions, social practices, and institutions (see note 22). The important point here is that, while the gender dichotomy is ostensibly derived from biological difference, cultural constructions of masculinities and femininities have little to do with biological phenomena. Indeed, feminists are critical of how putatively "biological" phenomena are deployed in social relations to naturalize, therefore depoliticize, gendered language, practices, and institutions that converge in reproducing masculinism as "ideology" and male dominance as practice.

At no point, however, does Rosenau address gender as an analytic category nor the power of gendered concepts, assumptions, frameworks, and worldviews. For example, it is the presumption of masculine agency in the definition of "citizen" that conceals how women (and feminized "Others") are effectively excluded from public sphere power. It is an androcentric understanding of "work" and "development" that ignores—even as it takes for granted—women's productive and reproductive labor in the "private sphere." And it is commitment to masculinist philosophy that privileges instrumental reason at the expense of more nuanced and complex theories of knowledge.

It is now a staple of feminist scholarship that conventional models of human nature, categories of social theory, and paradigms of knowledge construction are androcentric, taking male (especially elite, "Western" male) experience as the norm.[26] In particular, feminists argue that the binary logic of Western logocentric philosophy and the hierarchical dichotomies it generates are conceptually and empirically gendered.[27] This gendering is visible if we consider how the privileged first term of conventional dichotomies is associated with masculine qualities and the denigrated second term with feminine qualities: subject-object, autonomy-dependence, rational-irrational, order-anarchy, mind-body, culture-nature, public-private, freedom-necessity, hard-soft.

Whereas critical and postmodern theorists decry the reign of dichotomies in Western theory/practice, feminists go further and argue that these dichotomies are "rooted in" or dependent on the ostensibly "foundational" dichotomy of male/masculine-female/feminine. Stated simply, the gender dichotomy gains its "givenness" by (mistaken) association with biological ("natural") sex difference, and dichotomies more generally acquire the status of "givens" insofar as they readily

"map onto" the gender dichotomy. As a consequence, feminists argue that attempts to move beyond dichotomizing *cannot succeed* unless they challenge the underlying dichotomy of masculine-feminine that renders dualizing filters so "natural."

Gender is thus not only a variable that must be added to conventional accounts, but an analytic category with profound consequences for how we "see," understand, and "know" the world. Hence, while "adding women" (as an empirical category) is a crucial step, the systemically transformative force of feminist interventions lies in its critique of gendered language/meaning systems (gender as an analytic category) and their pervasive, diffuse effects. In short, rethinking theory thoroughly requires taking gender seriously, as both an empirical and analytical category. Failure to do so leaves gendered assumptions in place and generates theories that are inadequate because they neglect central and pervasive features of social life.

Although men as a group are privileged vis-à-vis gender hierarchy, we *all* act as its agents insofar as we internalize, reinforce, and reproduce the dichotomy of masculine over feminine—through personal identifications, linguistic habits, social practices, and institutional dynamics. Ideologically, and especially in relation to the study of IR, the importance of masculinism is that it naturalizes not only the subordination of women and the invisibility of women's ways of being and knowing, but it also naturalizes (depoliticizes) the "othering" objectification—and corollary domination—of that which is associated with femininity: nature, females, and nondominant males.[28] And objectification matters, perhaps especially in international relations. Perceptions of "the enemy," military engagements, economic exploitation, and ecological destruction (as well as processes of a less conflictual nature) that dominate the attention of IR theorists cannot be analyzed, anticipated, or transformed if we continue to neglect how objectification is promoted and naturalized in social relations.

In the discussion that follows, I bring a critical feminist perspective to bear on the topics of power politics, states, and global capitalism. I hope to suggest how various systems of power and their constitutive dichotomies interact, and how gender-sensitive analyses constitute more adequate theorizations of turbulence.[29]

Feminist Analyses of Power/Politics

It is now a commonplace among feminists that power needs to be redefined if the hierarchical effects of gender are to be rendered systematically visible.[30] For the most part, conventional accounts identify

power, in its direct expression, with coercion or violence and, in less direct expression, with the capacity to control or influence the behavior of others. Political scientists, of course, discipline their examination of power by focusing on its manifestations in the public sphere and rely on the dichotomy of public-private to distinguish their object of inquiry from personal, sex/affective, familial, household relations. In IR, by contrast, it is the dichotomy of domestic-international that disciplines our examination of power. Denying that politics in the classical sense can obtain under conditions of anarchy, IR theorists focus on "power politics" as the high-stakes game that nations play.

For those critical of dichotomized modes of thought, the categorical separation of public and private spheres, domestic and international "levels," and direct and indirect violence is incoherent—and for many, dangerously so. While Rosenau pushes us to abandon certain dichotomies, he retains several of singular importance to the reproduction of masculinism and its related social hierarchies. In particular, while he doubts the utility of separating domestic-international or micro-macro, he fails to question the assumption of power/politics as exclusively public-sphere activity. Even his relational authority does not address power relations associated with the private sphere, intimacy, families, and households. By neglecting the private sphere, Rosenau cannot account for prominent—even constitutive—features of all three parameters at the core of turbulence theory (e.g., how individuals, collectivities, authority, power, and social structures are gendered constructions).

Drawing on extensive, multifaceted interrogations of the public-private divide, feminists argue that when power is understood through a conventional dichotomizing lens, significant expressions of power—and specifically, the systemic relations of gender domination—are overlooked. A focus on public-sphere activities has precluded understanding how power in intimate relations and the family/household is linked, for example, to competition, violence, group identifications, and ideological allegiances. Power relations in the private sphere include not only domestic violence but the naturalization of inequalities promoted by conventional family forms (heterosexual, male-as-breadwinner, etc.) that reproduce dichotomized (and ethnicized/racialized) gender identities and gendered divisions of power, labor, and authority.

Consider, as Susan Okin does,[31] how structures of hierarchy and subordination (injustice) in the family affect understanding and expectations of justice in social relations more generally—including those at the interstate level. Or notice how patriarchal families/households are typically the *basis* of authority and power relations in fundamentalist

movements, the "religious right," social revolutions, and nationalist claims.[32] In relation to women's agency—as private- and public-sphere actors—Rosenau's multicentric world of sovereignty-free actors looks suspiciously like male-bonding practices familiar from conventional states, which to a significant extent are at the expense of women's interests qua women (while they may be in the interest of women as members of particular groups). In particular, the authority crisis prompting Rosenau's new paradigm might more adequately be analyzed as a crisis—indeed multiple crises—of masculinism.[33]

In IR, preoccupation with the power politics of interstate conflict has precluded the study of that power in relation to structures of indirect violence, which transcend political and territorial boundaries.[34] Rosenau has broken away from conventions here. He argues that previous sources of power in the state-centric world have now been fragmented; alternative expressions of power in the decentralized multicentric world necessarily complicate traditional assumptions regarding military capacity and elite wealth as definitive. Rosenau forces us to recognize greater complexity in expressions of power and authority, but fails to extend that complexity beyond a conventional understanding of "power" that presupposes, and thereby reproduces, the dichotomy of public and private. His paradigmatic recidivism leaves the power of and against women invisible.

In political theory, the binary of public-private is inextricable from the dichotomy of politics-economics, which continues to burden IR theorizing. I do not doubt that Rosenau understands politics and economics to be related, but economic power is a very muted thread in his depiction of postinternational *politics*. This neglect has multiple gendered consequences. Of particular relevance here is IR theory's failure to recognize and address the indirect violence wrought by systems of economic inequality, in which gender is a major factor. IR's narrow definition of security forestalls questions of "Whose security?" and "At what expense to alternative forms of social organization?"[35] Addressed in greater detail below, economic relations in the context of turbulence are powerfully gendered. For example, how restructuring affects individuals, families, and states, how dramatic increases in informal sector activities shape political-economic dynamics, and how privatization shapes crises of the welfare state—none of these can be analyzed adequately without attention to gendered divisions of labor and power.

In sum, feminists argue that neither power/politics nor turbulence can be adequately theorized until direct and indirect violence (like public-private, politics-economics, domestic politics-interstate

anarchy) are understood in terms of *relations*—being mutually constituted—not either-or dichotomies. If we remain incarcerated in the public-private binary, we cannot theorize power relations that permeate all social relations and shape contemporary turbulence. By turning to feminist analyses of the state as a masculinist project, we can begin to see the gendering of violence, in/security, and power.

Feminist Analyses of State Making

As many have noted, IR theories of the state are underdeveloped and markedly ahistorical. While Thucydides is often heralded as IR's founding father and our first realist, the context in which he wrote—early (rather than modern) state-making—is rarely investigated for insights on contemporary states and the historical intersection of objectivist metaphysics, the centralization of political authority, and realist political theory.[36] While political theorists acknowledge the canonical importance of Athenian texts, IR theorists—including Rosenau—tend to ignore how these texts established (often dichotomized) constructions of authority, identity, politics, security, and public-private spheres that continue to discipline the theory/practice of world politics.

What particularly drops out of sight in an ahistorical picture of states is the institutionalization of domination relations associated with early state making. It is here that the "human story" took a decisive turn, marked by the effective centralization of political authority and accumulation processes, military consolidation, a hierarchical division of labor by gender, age, and "class," the reconfiguration of individual and collective identities appropriate to that division of labor, and ideological legitimation of these transformations. Subsequent *normalization*—that is, depoliticization—of these arrangements effectively obscures how these particular power arrangements were *made* in historical process. The point here, which I believe Rosenau would endorse, is that coercive power alone tells us little about state making, as sociocultural, economic, and ideological dimensions are crucial to the success and especially the reproduction of centralized power. Unfortunately, although Rosenau urges us to move beyond state-centrism to recognize the contemporary importance of sovereignty-free actors, he does not interrogate conventional characterizations of the state, nor press us to seek more critical and historical understanding of states.

Feminists analyze the state from diverse perspectives.[37] In anthropological and historical studies, feminists theorize the institutionalization and ideological normalization of the patriarchal heterosexual family/household, dichotomized gender identities and gendered divisions of

labor, power, and authority, masculinist language systems, and the separation of public and private spheres. As the basic socioeconomic unit defined by the state, the patriarchal family/household marks citizenship claims and facilitates resource extraction, conscription, regulation of property (including women), and centralized (infrastructural) control more generally. But it also marks the site where intimate and reproductive sexual relations are expressed, physical and emotional needs are met, and culturally appropriate personal and collective identities are formed. It is where we learn to be who we are and to believe in what we are taught. This early learning and believing profoundly shapes the individuals that constitute Rosenau's micro parameter, but processes of identification and socialization are not areas addressed in his postinternational politics. This neglect of identification processes has particular relevance in IR—especially, turbulent IR—where limited comprehension of emotional investments, identification processes, and ideological allegiances seriously compromises our understanding of, for example, nationalisms and fundamentalisms, genocidal massacres, new social movements, or possibilities for transnational and global solidarities.

As Rosenau reminds us, micro-level effects are necessarily linked to macro phenomena. The state's ideological promotion of gendered identities in the household extends into the labor market, situating women in low-wage, low-profile "servicing" jobs. Moreover, states often promote a "family wage" model that elevates men's earnings, treats women's work as supplemental, and denies the extent of female-headed households (estimated at 30 percent worldwide).[38] In the context of global restructuring (discussed below), privatization and liberalization, which tend to weaken public programs and their delivery of social benefits, are feminist issues because poverty is a feminist issue. And these are citizenship (political identity) issues because in contemporary states the well-being of individuals is linked to citizenship claims that mark who is inside (and outside) of the state's responsibility for protecting rights and providing welfare.

In regard to security issues, state militarism produces and is produced by gendered identities and divisions of violence manifested both internally and externally. While men are socialized (in the family as well as in the military) to be aggressive, competitive, protectors of the nation, and even life takers, women are typically socialized to be passive, supportive, those in need of protection, and life givers. Moreover, the costs of militarism are not just direct violence but (gendered and global) structural violence entailed by loss of welfare provision (to military spending), distorted labor markets and economic maldevel-

opment (to suit military priorities), environmental degradation (from military actions), and increased traffic in women and sexually transmitted disease (as a corollary of military bases and impoverished local populations). These aspects of today's world cannot be adequately addressed by state theories that ignore gender.

In short, the state is a bearer of masculinist values—even when it is ostensibly "helping" women through welfare dependency and military protection. State theories like Rosenau's that fail to question the public-private divide and focus only on the public sphere render invisible far too much of how reality—including nation-states, wars, structural violence, and global capitalism—is *made* in everyday practice, in everyday lives, homes, and families.

Feminist Analyses of Global Capitalism

By privileging politics at the expense of economic analyses, Rosenau fails to offer adequate illumination of today's global capital dynamics and divisions of labor. Offering an alternative to realism, world-system theorists analyze the global economy as a single system best understood in terms of a global division of labor. Less familiar are feminist accounts that theorize the household[39] within the world system[40] and deploy "housewifization" as a metaphor for nonwaged labor—subsistence provision and social reproduction—essential to capitalist accumulation.[41] That is, feminists reject the conventional dichotomies of formal-informal economies and paid-unpaid work and insist on bringing productive and reproductive labor into *relation* to better analyze today's economic relations. For these theorists, understanding the global division of labor—and its transformations—requires taking seriously the gendered division of labor constituted within patriarchal households. The exploitation entailed in the latter is obscured by ideologies of (hetero)sexual difference that naturalize both women's systemic subordination and the dichotomy of labor-for-wages (paid, public-sphere production) versus labors-of-love (unpaid, private-sphere reproduction). Moreover, the naturalization of gender hierarchy and exploitation within the household is then extended to hierarchies—of class, race, and nation—and the exploitative dynamics everywhere imposed by capitalist relations.

Hence, feminists theorize linkages between the household and the modern state as "two of the universal institutionalized products of historical capitalism."[42] Whereas Rosenau and traditional accounts tend to ignore family/household relations as noneconomic (lacking waged, "productive" labor) and apolitical (lacking formal and coercive powers

associated with the state), theories of the household and "house-wifization" illuminate crucial relations: states structure the family/household to meet their reproductive and productive needs and do so in the context of a global economy that shapes those needs. Similarly, gender relations lived and learned within the household tend to support the state's legitimation project and capitalism's accumulation dynamic. Households are central to capitalism as the site of invisible, "primitive accumulation"[43] and socially necessary labor. As noted earlier, they are also sites of identity formation and cultural socialization that are key to the reproduction of domination ideologies. But the ensemble of linkages is not static. In particular, the household is a focal point not only of collaboration and reproduction but also resistance and transformation. Hence, gender dynamics have upward, downward, and lateral effects on topics of IR concern. While Rosenau's cascading metaphor may be apt in regard to these effects, he does not employ it to analyze gendered divisions of identification or labor.

In short, families/households have always been definitive sites of power. While patriarchs, states, and capitalists have dominated in controlling the greater part of that power, women (and subordinated others more generally) have not only colluded in but also resisted and reconfigured relations of domination.[44] Rosenau's attention to cross-cutting and asymmetrical "flows" of power is an important step in expanding how we think about power. When constrained, however, within the conventional dichotomies of production-reproduction, paid-unpaid labor, formal-informal sector activities, and public-private power, its analytical utility is undercut and we remain within a conventional framework—a prison!—that is not adequate for comprehending turbulence in either gender or global terms.

CONCLUSION

For the greater part of its history, the terrain of IR theory has been dominated by positivist commitments. Dichotomies have filtered our thinking, structured and limited the questions asked, and organized how answers were sought. In spite of disciplinary debates and the innovations of theorists like James Rosenau, there has been little "progress" beyond these constraining dichotomies and their unfortunate, even oppressive, effects. It is in this sense that the occasional jailbreak fails to rethink theory thoroughly enough and leads instead to paradigmatic recidivism.

In spite of its dominance, positivist-realism has been profoundly challenged, as much by "world events" as by intellectual develop-

ments. Surely the dichotomy of politics-economics has been laid to rest by the force of global capital relations that so profoundly alters (but does not eliminate) state-centric power. And binary oppositions of us-them, internal-external, micro-macro, state-nonstate, and domestic-international have just as surely been subverted by increasingly visible processes of interdependence and deterritorialization. At the same time, IR is gradually coming to terms with theoretical developments that challenge positivist premises and insist on a paradigmatic escape from dichotomizing theory/practice.

I have argued here that a paradigmatic break requires not simply the deconstruction of dichotomies—a project Rosenau ably and admirably begins—but the interrogation of masculine-feminine as the "foundational" dichotomy that normalizes positivism's and masculinism's binary mode. Jailbreaks require daring, courageous, and creative leaders. Jim Rosenau is all of these. His rethinking of realism broke boldly away from entrenched "givens" and opened new spaces for alternative theorizing as exemplified in this chapter! For this and more, I greatly admire Rosenau and deeply appreciate his work. My constructive criticisms here are meant to honor, not diminish, his pivotal contributions. Escaping from paradigmatic prisons, however, is clearly a more demanding (and even troubling) project, but one we postpone at great risk. As Rosenau fully appreciated, we live in "new times," in conditions of turbulence, or what others call postmodernity, and our theorizing *must* address the quality and scale of these changes. For this task, positivism's dichotomies are not only inadequate, they are actively misleading. We must abandon them, and to do so, we must rethink more thoroughly the power of gender.

NOTES

1. James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 244.

2. Ibid., p. 22.

3. Ibid., p. 241.

4. Ibid., p. 10.

5. James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995).

6. For example, James N. Rosenau, *Global Voices* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

7. George's *Discourses of Global Politics* is an accessible yet sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of the philosophical arguments as they pertain to IR. See also: special issues of *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (September 1989) and 34 (September 1990); V. Spike Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries:

Theories of Knowledge, Gender, and International Relations," *Millennium* 21 (Summer 1992): 183–206; Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox, eds., *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

8. Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries."

9. Eloise Buker, "Sex, Sign and Symbol: Politics and Feminist Semiotics," *Women and Politics* 16 (winter 1996): 34.

10. Ibid., p. 37.

11. George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, p. 192.

12. V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, *Global Gender Issues*, 2d. ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Press, 1999), p. 39.

13. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, p. 142.

14. Ibid., p. 25.

15. Ibid., p. 242.

16. Ibid., p. 103.

17. Ibid., p. 40.

18. Ibid., p. 185.

19. Ibid., p. 228.

20. Ibid., p. 293.

21. Ibid., p. 42.

22. For purposes of this essay, masculinism and gender hierarchy refer to systems of power that privilege that which is associated with (hegemonic) masculinity over that which is associated with femininity. As subsequently clarified in the text, gender refers not only to the empirical categories of male/men and female/women but also to conceptual categories, symbol systems, discourses, activities and institutions. Hence, the "privileging" of that which is associated with masculinity includes not only the appropriation of women's productive and reproductive labor, regulation of women's bodies/sexuality, and men's dominance in society's important institutions, but also the dominance of masculinism in symbol systems and discursive practices. Masculinism may refer to the system (masculine privileging) or to the ideology (naturalization) of gender hierarchy. Although I do not elaborate here, masculinities are not homogenous; in this essay I am referring to dominant or hegemonic constructions of masculinity. For further discussion, see R. W. Connell, *Masculinities: Knowledge, Power, and Social Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

23. Here I echo Sandra Whitworth's (*Feminism and International Relations* [London: Macmillan, 1994], p. x) demand that IR theorists move beyond pseudo-inclusion, where anthologies include a feminist chapter, "but most of the work that appears throughout the rest of those anthologies seems unfamiliar with, and unaffected by feminist scholarship." The literature in feminist-IR has expanded rapidly: a selected bibliography on "gender and IR" compiled by Kenneth Boultin (*Gender and International Relations: A Selected Historical*

Bibliography [Toronto: York Center for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 23]) totals 145 pages; Jacqui True ("Feminism," in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations* [London: Macmillan, 1996]) provides an excellent current review of feminist innovations and literature. Books that broadly address IR themes from feminist perspectives include Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Ann J. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); V. Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Press, 1992); Peterson and Runyan, *Global Gender Issues*; Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Peter Beckman and Francine D'Amico, eds., *Women, Gender, and World Politics* (Westport, Conn.: Bergin and Garvey, 1994); Jan Jindy Pettman, *Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics* (London: Routledge, 1996); Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, eds., *The 'Man' Question in International Relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998); Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Gillian Youngs, *International Relations in a Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

24. For example, Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Arlene Saxonhouse, *Women in the History of Political Thought: Ancient Greece to Machiavelli* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

25. Terrell Carver, *Gender is Not a Synonym for Woman* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Press, 1996).

26. For example, Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Ithaca University Press, 1986); Sandra Harding, ed., *Feminism and Methodology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Susan Heckman, *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of Postmodern Feminism* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990).

27. I cannot review the extensive argumentation here. It may be cast in anthropological, linguistic, philosophical psychoanalytical or historical-empirical terms. For an example relevant to IR theorists, I argue that the gender of binarism is an effect of the interaction of early state formation, accumulation dynamics, writing systems, instrumental reason, and patriarchal relations. See V. Spike Peterson, "The Gender of Rhetoric, Reason, and Realism," in Francis Beer and Robert Hariman, eds., *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996); V. Spike Peterson, "Whose Crisis? Early and Postmodern Masculinism," in Stephen G. and James H. Mittelman, eds., *Innovation and Transformation in International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

28. The scholarship in support of these claims is extensive. Masculinism justifies gender hierarchy by reference to ostensibly "natural" sex differences that effectively essentialize (dehistoricize) "woman" in narrow terms of sexuality and reproduction. The history and social construction of sex/gender difference (for example, Pat Caplan, ed., *The Cultural Construction of Sexuality*

[London: Tavistock, 1987]; Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. R. Hurley [New York: Vintage, 1980] is thus obscured and the naturalization of sex difference and gender hierarchy is then extended to justify other hierarchies of "difference." For example, racism associates people of color with undesirable (feminine) qualities: lack of reason, excessive sexuality, dependence, closeness to nature. Denied the status of reasoning agents and free subjects, subordinated peoples (or nature) become "objects." As objects, their exploitation is "naturalized" in the double sense that the subordinated group is "naturally" an object and that "man" (as agent and subject) "naturally" exploits objects.

29. I am not claiming, however, that it is only feminists who make some of the critiques to follow, nor that all feminists would agree with the arguments as I articulate them. Moreover, my very general remarks should be understood simply as a sketchy introduction to very complex arguments; they do not do justice to the nuance and sophistication of the research underpinning them.

30. Kathleen Jones and Anna Jonasdottir, *The Political Interests of Gender: Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face* (London: Sage, 1988).

31. Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

32. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, *Woman-Nation-State* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Nira Yuval-Davis, ed., *Unholy Orders: Women against Fundamentalism* (London: Virago, 1992); Mary Ann Tetreault, ed., *Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia and the New World* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); V. Spike Peterson, "The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism," in Laura Neack, Patrick Haney, and Jeane Hey, eds., *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995).

33. Peterson, "Whose Crisis," pp. 185–201.

34. J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*; Jan Jindy Pettman, *Worlding Women*.

35. J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*; V. Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?" in V. Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States*.

36. But see Peterson, "The Gender of Rhetoric"; G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason, and Experience: Studies in the Origins and Development of Greek Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1979). The appropriation of Thucydides in support of neorealism *has* been challenged in a number of recent works. See, for example, Hayward R. Alker, "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue," *American Political Science Review* 82 (September, 1988): 805–20; Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism," *International Studies Quarterly* 17 (March, 1989), but the relevance of Athenian state making for contemporary IR theory remains underdeveloped.

37. See, for example, Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed., *Women and the State: The Shifting Boundaries of Public and Private* (London: Macmillan, 1987); Linda Gordon, ed., *Women, the State, and Welfare* (Madison: University of Wisconsin

Press, 1990); Jane Parpart and Kathleen Staudt, eds., *Women and the State in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Press, 1990); Sophie Watson, ed., *Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions* (London: Verso, 1988); Deniz Kandiyoti, *Women, Islam, and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); V. Spike Peterson, *Gendered States*; Diane Sainsbury, ed., *Gendering Welfare States* (London: Sage, 1994); Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

38. United Nations, *The World's Women: 1970–1990 Trends and Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 1991), p. 18.

39. In this chapter, household refers broadly to multiple dimensions of social reproduction, including sex/affective familial relations and non-waged/informal sector activities. It thus may include activities outside of the family, narrowly defined, or the "house," spatially understood. My treatment of the household draws especially on the work of Joan Smith and Maria Mies, but differs from each. For a lengthier discussion, see V. Spike Peterson, "The Politics of Identification in the Context of Globalization," *Women's Studies International Forum* 19 (January–April, 1996): 5–15.

40. Joan Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *Creating and Transforming Households: The Constraints of the World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Kathryn Ward, *Women Workers and Global Restructuring* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Ithaca University Press, 1990); Joan Smith, "The Creation of the World as We Know It," in Valentine Moghadam, ed., *Identity Politics and Women* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

41. Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women and the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, and Claudia von Werlhof, *Women: The Last Colony* (London: Zed Books, 1988).

42. Joan Smith, "The Creation of the World," p. 36.

43. Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*.

44. Isabella Bakker, ed., *The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy* (London: Zed Books, 1994).