The Reality Behind Moral Experience
Lee Shepski
Short Abstract
I argue that our subjective moral experience suggests the following: (1) there are objectively correct answers to moral questions; (2) these answers have normative authority over moral agents; and (3) these answers do not depend on what any moral agent thinks of them. On the basis of parallels with perceptual experience and logical reasoning, I further argue that we should take the suggestions of our moral experience seriously. Insofar as alternative views cannot accommodate the above, we thus have reason to accept a ‘non-naturalist’ form of moral realism. I argue that relativist, subjectivist, expressivist, quasi-realist, and nihilist views falter in accommodating the first of the above claims; that naturalist forms of moral realism falter in accommodating the second; and that constructivist views falter in accommodating the third. I close by addressing typical objections to non-naturalist realism: the arguments from disagreement, queerness, and ontological parsimony.
Longer Abstract
Moral realism, as I conceive it, is the view that moral facts and properties are ‘real’ in the sense of being independent of what anyone thinks about them. I remain as neutral as possible on the metaphysical commitments of such a view, but insofar as many have thought it to depend on some form of platonism, I argue that platonism is more plausible than it is often thought to be. I further defend moral realism through an appeal to our first-personal moral experience, or ‘moral phenomenology’. Moral realists often assert that our moral phenomenology supports their view, but they do not usually explain how. I fill this explanatory gap through careful attention to individual cases and through exploration of the phenomenon of ‘moral felt demand’. I conclude that our moral experience suggests the following:
- There are objectively correct answers to moral questions (the Objectivity Thesis);
- These answers have normative authority over moral agents (the Normativity Thesis); and
- It is not the case that these answers or the authority they bear depends on what any moral agent, whether hypothetical or actual, thinks of them (the Independence Thesis).
One might question whether our moral phenomenology is veridical, but I argue that we have as good reason to trust our subjective moral experience as to trust our subjective perceptual and logical experience. I argue that with respect to positive defeasible justification, there is no significant difference between one kind of subjective experience and any other. Furthermore, potential ‘defeaters’ of epistemic justification grounded in subjective experience — in particular, personal bias, disagreement, and an inability to confirm observations when necessary — may apply in particular cases but do not apply with sufficient consistency to discredit moral experience generally.
I further argue that we have reason to accept moral realism insofar as its competitors are unable to accommodate the three theses above. Speaking broadly, moral realism is opposed by moral nihilism, relativism, subjectivism, constructivism, and expressivism. Nihilist views hold that there are no moral facts, while relativist and subjectivist views hold that moral facts are not objective. Constructivist views hold that moral facts are objective and are the product of some ‘constructive function’ (such as, for example, the decision-making procedure of a hypothetical, ideally rational, impartial observer). Expressivist views, traditionally, have held that moral language is used to express a speaker’s attitudes rather than to state facts, and these views have traditionally held that there are no moral facts. More recently, expressivist views have arisen that hold that moral language is fact-stating in some minimalist sense and grant that there are, in some minimalist sense, moral facts. I argue against all of these views. Nihilist, relativist, and subjectivist views run afoul of the Objectivity Thesis (essentially by definition). Constructivist views, in contrast, either run afoul of the Independence Thesis or fall prey to a Euthyphro-style dilemma. Expressivist views, in their turn, either run afoul of the Objectivity Thesis or fail to distinguish themselves adequately from realism.
I further address an intramural debate among moral realists, viz., the debate between naturalists and non-naturalists. Naturalists hold that all moral facts and properties are, in some sense, natural facts and properties, while non-naturalists deny this. After considering a variety of conceptions of ‘natural’ and a variety of ways in which moral facts might be construed as natural facts, I conclude that naturalists cannot both accommodate the Normativity Thesis and maintain a meaningful distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism such that there is a philosophical advantage in being a naturalist.
My dissertation concludes by responding to three traditional objections to non-naturalist moral realism: the arguments from disagreement, queerness, and ontological parsimony. In addition to facing traditional objections of its own, the argument from disagreement is problematic in that it applies to other fields of philosophical inquiry just as well (or poorly) as it does to ethics. (Here I follow recent work by Russ Shafer-Landau.) In particular, the argument from disagreement applies to metaethics as well as to ethics. If it shows that there is no fact of the matter in ethics, it also shows that there is no fact of the matter with respect to such metaethical questions as whether the argument from disagreement succeeds in showing anything. The argument thus undermines itself. Furthermore, if the argument were successful, it would ‘prove too much’, for proponents of the argument rarely intend to show that there is no fact of the matter in metaethics (or in other fields of philosophical inquiry). The argument from queerness, in contrast, proves too little. Upon close inspection, it either collapses into other forms of argument (and hence adds no additional weight to the antirealist’s or naturalist’s case), or it outright fails as a philosophical argument. Finally, arguments from ontological parsimony seem to suppose that ontologically more parsimonious views are more likely to be true than their competitors, but it is hard to see why this would be the case. (Here I follow recent work by Michael Huemer.) I argue that ontologically permissive views are not less likely to be true than their more parsimonious competitors except insofar they may be ad hoc. However, non-naturalist moral realism is not ad hoc and should not be criticized for being less parsimonious than its competitors.