

UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
School of Government and Public Policy

POL 596d: Research Seminar:
Comparative Democratization
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COURSE DESCRIPTION: Today, for the first time in history, a majority of the world's nation-states qualify, in some sense, as democracies. While all of these regimes are characterized by relatively free and open elections, the nature and extent of democracy vary substantially across these nations, as do their basic structures, their effectiveness, and their political stability. This research seminar uses comparative methods to explore the nature and extent of democracy and to assess competing theories advanced to explain the character, effectiveness, legitimacy and survival of democratic regimes.

Specifically, the seminar will attempt to define democracy and to explore competing theories that explain what democracies are and under what conditions they operate most effectively. During the first part of the semester we will read and discuss a broad selection of literature -- some old, some recent -- on the nature and operation of democracies paying attention not only the questions asked in this literature and the answers provided but also to the research methods and data employed in this research. During the second part of the semester, students will present and critique their own research on the structure and operation of democracy. The seminar also includes practical instruction on concept formation and measurement and on comparative research methods.

REQUIREMENTS	Percentage of Grade	Due Date
Bibliographic Essay	25	Wed. week of assigned class
Research Design	10	March 25
Research Paper	40	April 18(draft) May 15 (final)
Seminar Participation	25	Weekly

READINGS Required Readings are listed for each week, below, and should be completed before the class in which they are discussed. Most of the required articles are available on-line via electronic journals. The books listed are used extensively and are available from on-line booksellers. All of these are classic readings and would be valuable additions to your professional libraries.

1. Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, (Yale University Press, 1989), ISBN 0300049382
2. Anthony McGann, *The Logic of Democracy: Reconciling Equality, Deliberation and Minority Protection*, (University of Michigan Press, 2006), ISBN 0472069497
3. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge University Press, 2000). ISBN 0521793793

Outline: This syllabus is divided into ten topics with one topic to be covered in each meeting. All dates are tentative and subject to change.

Essential Readings should be read by everyone before the meeting in which they will be discussed. Items For Further Readings are NOT required (although we hope that discussion leaders for the week will sample this additional literature and incorporate it into the discussion).

January 17: Organizational Meeting: No Readings

January 24: Why Democracy? Natural Law v. Evidence of Best Outcome v. Logic of Least Bad

On what basis is democracy preferred to other forms of government? Traditionally there have been three approaches to the justification of democracy that have dominated: an intrinsic approach which emphasizes Natural Rights and Law ('Self-Evident Truths'), an extrinsic or instrumentalist approach which justifies democracy empirically based on its demonstrated benefits for human welfare, and a logical approach, which argues, a la Churchill, that democracy is simply the 'least bad' form of tyranny.

Essential Reading:

- a. Robert Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* Chapters 1-6.
- b. John Locke, "Of the State of Nature," *Second Treatise on Government*, Chapter II.
- c. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Democracy*, Chapter VII: "Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only."
- d. Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy*, 10: 2-17.
- e. Tom Christiano, "Democracy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed).

For Further Reading:

- a. Anthony Downs, *Economic Theory of Democracy*, part I.
- b. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, pp. 250-83.
- c. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson: *Economic Origins of Dictatorships and Democracies*.
- d. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson: *Why Nations Fail*
- e. Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy*, pp. 1-19.

January 31: Defining and Measuring Democracy

What does democracy mean in theory and practice? Different ‘Types’ of democracy and how to measure them. Electoral Democracy, Liberal Democracy, Elite Democracy, Illiberal Democracy, Consolidated Democracy, Democracy with Adjectives. Holistic v. Graduated v. Disaggregated measurement.

Essential Reading:

- a. Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Chapters 3-14.
- b. Anthony McGann, The Logic of Democracy, Chapters 1-5.
- c. Joseph, Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, pp. 250-83.
- d. Adam, Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*, pp. 13-77.
- e. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovations in Comparative research” *World Politics*. 49:3 (April, 1997).
- f. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1997), pp. 22-43.

For Further Reading

- a. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, “What Democracy is . . . and Is Not,” *Journal of Democracy*, 2:3 (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88
- b. Kenneth Bollen, “Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Democracy,” *American Sociological Review*, 45: 3 (Jun., 1980).
- c. Michael Coppedge, “Thickening Thin Concepts: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics,” *Comparative Politics*, 31: 4 (Jul., 1999) pp. 465-76.
- d. Zachary Elkins, "Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations." 2000. *American Journal of Political Science* 44: (2000), pp. 293-300.

February 7: Cultural Theories of Democracy, Modernization Theory and Growth

A prominent theory holds that the creation, survival and effective performance of Democracy depends on the existence of certain cultural “requisites” among them, an active, informed, rational and tolerant citizenry, a strong middle class, and a pluralist civil society. Empirical research provides mixed support. A variant of cultural theory, modernization theory holds that economic development is the key to democratization. Economic growth sets in motion profound social and political changes that together transform the political culture and result almost inexorably in democracy. Empirical research confirms a strong correlation between democracy and economic development but the causal direction of the relationship remains contested.

Essential Readings:

- a. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Chapters 1, 5, 7 and 8.
- b. Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review*, 82: 4 (Dec., 1988)
- c. Robert Jackman and Ross A. Miller. 1996. “A Renaissance of Political Culture?” *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (3): 632 – 59
- d. Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson, “Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 635-652
- e. Adam, Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization Theories and Facts,” *World Politics* 49:155-83
- f. Adam, Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*, pp. 78-186 (ignore the overlap with preceding article.
- g. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” *World Politics* 55: 517-549

For Further Reading:

- a. Harry Eckstein, “A Theory of Stable Democracy,” appendix in H. Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy*.
- b. Steven Finkel, 2003. “Can Democracy Be Taught?” *Journal of Democracy* 14(4)
- c. Robert Jackman and Ross Miller, “The Poverty of Political Culture,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 40 (1996), pp. 697-716.
- d. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*.
- e. Adam, Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development*.
- f. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared, “Income and Democracy” *American Economic Review* 98: 808-842
- g. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared, “Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 56: 1043- 58

February 14: Institutional Theories of Democracy

Institutional theories of democracy downplay the role of culture and emphasize instead the importance of both formal and informal institutions. 'Getting the institutions right' is considered critical to the establishment and effective functioning of democracy. Democracies that function well survive; those that don't – don't. Institutions, however, are 'endogenous;' they are creations of social, political and economic forces as much as they are shapers of these forces.

Essential Readings:

- a. Douglas North, "Institutions," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5:1 (1991), pp. 97–112.
- b. James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life", *American Political Science Review*, 78 (1984) 734-749.
- c. John Carey, Parchment, "Equilibria, and Institutions," *Comparative Political Studies* 33: 2 (September, 2000), pp. 735-761.
- d. Paul Pierson, "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins Change," *Governance*, 13:4 (October 2000), pp. 475-99.
- e. James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory and Society*, 29: 4 (Aug., 2000), pp. 507-548.
- f. Daniel Treisman, "Decentralization and the Quality of Government," Unpublished Paper November 2000
at:<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/treisman.pdf>
- g. Pranab Bardhan, "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16: 4 (2002), pp. 185-205

For Further Reading

- a. James March and Johann Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*.
- b. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*
- c. Robert Dahl, "What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 120L 2 (Summer, 2005) 187-97.
- d. Daniel Treisman, 2007. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

February 21

Other Influence on Democratization: Windfalls and Diffusion

The potential for democratization may be influenced by cultural requisites and institutional design, but it also is conditioned by that nature of a country's natural resources, its geographic 'neighborhood,' and the efforts of international organizations and donors.

Essential Reading:

- a. Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," *American Political Science Review*, (Feb., 2011).
- b. Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization* 60: (2006) 911-933.
- c. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth." *American Economic Review* 90:4 (2000): 847-868.
- d. Steven Knack, "Does foreign aid promote democracy? *International Studies Quarterly*, 48: 1 (2004), pp. 251-266
- e. Steven Finkel, Anibal Pérez Liñan and Mitchell Seligson, 'The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003.' *World Politics* 59: 3 (2007), pp. 404-440.

For Further Reading:

- a. Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53:3(April 2001), pp. 25-361
- b. Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, "The curse of aid," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 13:3 (2008), pp. 169-194.
- c. Barbara Wejnert, "Diffusion, Development and Democracy, 1800-1999, *American Sociological Review* 70: (2005) pp. 53-81.
- d. Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*, (2003)
- e. James Robinson and Daron Acemoglu, *The Economics Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship*, (2005)

February 28: Constitutional Design and its Consequences

The choice of political institutions not only can affect the quality of democracy, it also can have profound effects on a government's legitimacy, stability and ultimately its survival. Contrary to the conventional wisdom American style institutions which emphasize separation of power and federalism are, on average, less legitimate, less stable and shorter lived. American style single member district electoral systems also perform poorly compared to systems with multimember districts and proportional representation. PR systems, on average, produce greater public goods, greater gender equality, greater representation of ethnic, religious and racial minorities, and less pork-barrel and clientelistic politics.

Essential Readings:

- a. Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices For New Democracies, *Journal of Democracy*, 2: 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 72-84
- b. José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(June 2002) : 151-179
- c. Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism" *Journal of Democracy*, 1: 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 51-69
- d. Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," *Journal of Democracy*, 1: 4 (Fall, 1990).
- e. Matthew Shugart and John Carey, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas," *Electoral Studies*, 14: 4 (1995), pp. 417-439

For Further Reading:

- a. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*
- b. Andreas Schedler, "Conceptualizing Accountability" in A. Schedler et al, *The self-Restraining State*.
- c. Erica Moreno, Brian Crisp, Matthew Shugart, "The Accountability Deficit in Latin America" in *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, New York: Oxford University Press.
- d. Philippe Schmitter, "The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability," *Journal of Democracy*, Oct. 2004.
- e. Christopher Anderson & Christine Guillory, Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems, *American Political Science Review*, 91: 1 (Mar., 1997).

March 7: Corruption

Required:

- a. Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.10, 211-244.
- b. Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* vol 34, No 2, 381-404.
- c. Montinola, Gabriella R. and Robert W. Jackman. 2002. "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study." *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 147-170.
- d. Sandoltz, Wayne and William Koetzle. 2000. "Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 31-50
- e. Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., and Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter. *Economics & Politics*, 17(1), 1-35.
- f. g. Eric Chang and Miriam Golden. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption," *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2006), pp. 115-37.
- g. Potter, J. D., & Tavits, M. (2011). Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions. *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*, 2.

For Further Reading:

- a. Donchev, Dilyan Donchev and Ujhelyi, Gergely. 2007. Do Corruption Indices Measure Corruption? Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124066>.
- b. Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C., Moreno, C., & others. (2005). Centripetal democratic governance: A theory and global inquiry. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4), 567.
- c. You, Jong-Sung and Sanjeev Khagram. 2005. "A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 136-157. Aidt, T. S. (2009). Corruption, institutions, and economic development. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2), 271-291.
- d. Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. *Governance*, 21(2), 165-190.
- e. Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2011). Does democracy reduce corruption? *CMI Working Paper*. Retrieved from <http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?4315=does-democracy-reduce-corruption>
- f. Sun, Y., & Johnston, M. (2009). Does democracy check corruption? Insights from China and India. *Comparative Politics*, 42(1), 1-19.
- g. William Mishler and Richard Rose. 2008. "Seeing Is Not Always Believing: Measuring Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption Cross-Nationally" Paper presented at the 2008 conference on Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, Manchester University, UK.

March 14 and March 21 NO CLASS

March 28: Human Rights and Democracy

What rights do individuals and groups have in a Democracy? From whence do they derive? How they are best achieved and maintained. Philosophical work on human rights has a long history, the empirical study of human rights, by contrast, is in its infancy

Essential Readings:

- a. Herbert McClosky, "The Fallacy of Absolute Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics* 11: 04 (1949), pp. 637-654.
- b. Kendall and Carey, "The Intensity Problem and Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 62: 1 (Mar., 1968), pp. 5-24.
- c. Christian Davenport and Armstrong, "Democracy and Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science*, 48:3 (July 2004), pp. 538-554.
- d. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Feryal Cherif, George Downs, and Alastair Smith, "Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights," *International Studies Quarterly*, 49 (2005), pp. 439-57.
- e. M. Rodwan Abouhard and David Cingranelli, "The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006), pp. 233-262.
- f. David Cingranelli and Mikhail Filippov, "Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights," *Journal of Politics*, 72:1 (Jan. 2010), pp. 243-57.

For Further Reading:

- a. Herbert McClosky, "The Fallacy of Absolute Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics* 11: 04 (1949), pp. 637-654.
- b. M. Rodwan Abouhard and David Cingranelli, "The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006), pp. 233-262.
- c. Emilie Haefner-Burton, 2013, *Making Human Rights a Reality*, Princeton University Press
- d. Dara Cohen, "Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)" *American Political Science Review* 107: 3 (August 2013)
- e. K Kollman and M. Waites, "The global politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender human rights: an introduction" *Contemporary politics*, 15:1 (2009).

April 4: Mid-West Political Science Assn Meeting NO CLASS

April 11: Representation and Diversity, Women in Democracy

Women are a mathematical majority in most countries yet exercise far less political power, participate less in most activities, and hold fewer and less powerful political offices. The explanations offered include cultural and institutional biases, biology, and economic and social structures among others.

Required Readings:

- a. Michael Ross, "Oil, Islam and Women", *American Political Science Review*, 102: 1 (February 2008) pp. 107-23.
- b. Manon Tremblay, "Democracy, Representation, and Women: A Comparative Analysis" *Democratization*, 14: 4 (2007) pp. 533-53.
- c. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation," *Journal of Democracy*, 12: 3 (July 2001) pp. 126-40.
- d. Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler, "An Integrated Model of Political Representation," *The Journal of Politics*, 67: 2, (May, 2005), pp. 407-428.
- e. Miki Caul-Kittleson and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, "Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions" *The Journal of Politics*, 72:4 (2010), pp. 990-1102.
- f. Habyarimana, James et al. (2007) "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709-725.
- g. Baldwin, K, and John D Huber. 2010. "Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision." *American Political Science Review* 104(04): 644-662
- h. Hopkins, DJ. 2009. "The diversity discount: When increasing ethnic and racial diversity prevents tax increases." *The Journal of Politics* 71(1): 160-177.

For Further Reading:

- a. Michael Ross, "Oil, Islam and Women", *American Political Science Review*, 102: 1 (February 2008) pp. 107-23. Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, *Econometrica*, 72: 5 (September, 2004), 1409-1443.
- b. Kittilson, Miki Caul and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2012. *The Gendered Effects of Electoral Institutions: Political Engagement and Participation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- c. Mona Crook, 2009, *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. Oxford University Press
- d. Holden, M. (2006). "Exclusion, inclusion, and political institutions." In R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder, & B. A. Rockman (Eds.), *Political institutions* (pp. 163-190). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

April 18 The Benefits of Democracy: Economic Growth and Conflict Reduction

Democracy is assumed have a variety of positive benefits for human development including the promotion of economic growth, the reduction of economic inequality, the reduction of domestic conflict and the promotion of international peace. The evidence is mixed in all cases, although it is probably strongest with respect to the democratic peace.

Essential Readings:

- a. Michael Ross, 'Is Democracy Good for the Poor?' *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 4 (2006), pp. 860-874.
- b. Diego Comin, William Easterly, Erick Gong, "Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC?" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 2 (July 2010), pp. 65–97
- c. Kenneth Sokoloff and Stanley Engerman, "History Lessons History Lessons Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14: 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 217–232.
- d. Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David Spiro, and Michael Doyle, "Correspondence, The Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19: 4 (Spring 1995), pp.164-84.
- e. Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace: Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1816-1992." *The American Political Science Review*, 95: 1, (Mar., 2001), pp. 33-48.

For Further Reading:

- a. Robert Barro, 1997. *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study*. Cambridge: The MIT Press
- b. Zev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review*, 87: 624-638.
- c. Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder, "Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-conflict Stability", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57:5 pp. 822-853.
- d. Marcel Fafchamps and Pedro Vicente, "Political Violence and Social Networks: Experimental, Evidence from a Nigerian Election", *Journal of Development Economics*, 101: 27-48

April 25 and May 2: Class Presentations.