In characterizing the virtuous ideal, Epictetus departs from the traditional list of Stoic virtues. Often, instead of describing the virtuous person as ἀνδρείας (courageous), σκόρφον (temperate), φρόνιμος (prudent), or δίκαιος (just), Epictetus says that he is ἄλειψθερος (free), πιστός (trustworthy) and αἰδήμων (self-respecting, as I will argue below). This paper examines Epictetus' characterization of the ideal as being αἰδήμων and possessing αἰδός, and addresses some basic questions: What is it to be αἰδήμων or to have αἰδός? And what is the place of the αἰδός attitude and the αἰδήμων condition in Epictetus' philosophy?

I will argue that in Epictetus, αἰδός is a type of judgment of appropriateness that guides the actions and reactions of the Stoic in training and enables her to make progress. According to Epictetus our capacity for αἰδός is a natural and distinctively human capacity for self-evaluation, manifested in attitudes such as shame and self-respect. I begin my argument, in section 1, by discussing the treatment of αἰδός in the Stoic sources, and highlighting some problems with these accounts—problems that, I go on to show in section 2, are resolved by Epictetus. In section 2, I argue that

1. Diogenes Laertius 7.126, characterizes the Stoic ideal as φρόνιμος, ἀνδρείας, δίκαιος, and σκόρφον; cf. Plutarch De stoicorum repugnantis 1034c–e [= 61C in The Hellenistic Philosophers, ed. A. A. Long and D. Sedley (Cambridge, 1987), hereafter LS]; cf. also Cicero De Finibus 3.10, which describes good men as "fortes, iustos, moderatos." But Stobaeus' list (2.60, 9–24 [= 61H in LS, in part]) further subdivides these four virtues and gives αἰδήμως as a species of σωφροσύνη. In noting these differences, I do not mean to claim that Epictetus is asserting something denied by other Stoics, but merely to point out that he emphasizes different aspects of virtue than they do. However, Epictetus is not completely alone: as A. Long has pointed out to me, there is an affinity between Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in the emphasis on the element of self-scrutiny in αἰδός (see below, and in Marcus, e.g., Meditations 2.6, 3.6). A. O. Bonhoffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, tr. W. O. Stephens (New York, 1996), 30–32, notes but does not really explain Epictetus' avoidance of standard Stoic virtue-terms.

2. That the virtuous person is αἰδήμων: Discourses 1.4.18–19; 20; 1.16.7; 1.25.4; 1.28.20–21; 23; 2.1.11; 2.2.4; 2.4.3; 2.8.23; 27; 2.10.18; 29; 2.20.32; 2.22.20; 3.3.9; 3.7.27; 36; 3.13.4; 3.17.3. 5; 3.18.7; 3.23.18; 4.1.106; 4.1.162; 4.2.8; 4.4.6; 4.5.21; 22; 4.9.6; 17; 4.12.6; 4.13.13; 15; 19; 20; Encheiridion 24.3. 4. 5; 40.1; frag. 28B. That the virtuous person possesses αἰδός: 1.3.4; 2.22.30; 3.14.13; 3.22.15; 4.3.3; 7.9; 4.8.33; 4.9.9, 12; frag. 14; cf. "pudor" in frag. 10.3. Epictetus also says that the virtuous person is γεννάς, ἀνάρχος, εὐσταθὴς, εὐχάριστος, and μεγαλόφρον, but less often. The pairing of αἰδήμων with πιστός, which seems to mean something like "trustworthy" or "reliable," is interesting: both terms suggest an internalization of the point of view of another person on oneself.

3. Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon lists "respect," "self-respect," and "respect for one's own conscience" among the possible meanings of αἰδός, but "bashful," "modest," "ignominious," and "shameful" for αἰδήμων. I am not interested here in arguing for any particular translation of these terms, but only in drawing out their role in Epictetus' philosophy.

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Epictetus treats *αἴδως* as a self-evaluative judgment of appropriateness, and I show how *αἴδως* judgments can contribute to a trainee’s progress by relating her questions about what she should do to reflect on who she is. The final section, 3, focuses on the way in which Epictetus leads students to adopt an observer’s perspective on themselves while freeing them from concerns about how actual observers view them. My overall aim in this paper is to argue that in his treatment of *αἴδως*, Epictetus develops something like the notion of a conscience, an internal self-judging standard, which enables a Stoic to make progress and approach virtue by living according to her conscience.

I. The Stoics on *ΑΙΔΩΣ*

According to a report in Stobaeus, the Stoics regard *αἴδημοσύνη* as a virtue, a species of *σωφροσύνη* (temperance). A Stoic virtue is a disposition of the soul’s *ηγεμονικόν* (commanding faculty), brought about by or identical with reason, and consistent, firm, and unchangeable: in short, knowledge. Temperance is defined as ἐπιστήμη αἴρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (knowledge of what things are to-be-chosen, to-be-rejected, and neither). Stobaeus’ report restricts the sphere of temperance to a person’s ὀρμαί (impulses); an impulse succeeds assent to a presentation and is the necessary and sufficient condition of an action. To say that temperance concerns impulses is to contrast its jurisdiction with, say, φρόνησις (prudence), which concerns appropriate actions (καθήκοντα)—but this is an analytical distinction, consistent with the Stoics’ insistence that the virtues are unified and interentailing. Stobaeus goes on to define temperance’s species, αἴδημοσύνη, as ἐπιστήμη εὐλαβητική ὀρθὸς ψόγος (knowledge of how to watch out for right censure). Thus αἴδημοσύνη is the branch of knowledge that equips an agent with the correct impulses to guide her actions so that she avoids justified censure. Since the choiceworthiness or censurability of an action (and thus of an impulse) depends on the circumstances, rather than on anything intrinsic to the action, the knowledge that constitutes αἴδημοσύνη will have to be quite comprehensive and connected to other branches of knowledge. Diogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics consider *αἴδως* to be a kind of εὐπαθεία (good emotion), one of the rational and calm qualities that replace the πάθη (passions) in the virtuous person. Just as joy replaces pleasure, εὐλαβεία (watchfulness), a rational avoidance of bad things, replaces fear. *Αἴδως* is one species of watchfulness. Similarly, Andronicus reports that

4. Plutarch *De virtute morali* 441c (= LS 61B); cf. D. L. 7.89 (= LS 61A).
8. Stob. *Eclog.* 2.60, 9–24 (= *SVF* 3.264). The other species of temperance mentioned by Stobaeus are τυπάσια (discipline), κοσμομοίης (orderliness), and ἐγκράτεια (self-control).
the Stoics classify αἰδός among the good emotions and define it as εὐλάβεια ὁρθοῦ ψόγου (watchfulness about right censure). Combining these three reports, we may infer that the good emotion αἰδός, which is a rational avoidance of justified censure, is informed and undergirded by the virtue αἰδήμοσύνη, the knowledge of what justified censure is and the stable disposition to avoid it.10

The Stoic classification of αἰδός as a good emotion allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions. As a good emotion, αἰδός must be a true judgment about good and bad. According to the Stoics, passions or ordinary emotions are, or are attendant upon, false judgments about good and bad. The core of a passion is the false belief that something external to one’s moral character—for example, one’s wealth, health, or reputation—is either good or bad, that it could make a difference to one’s happiness. In the place of such false judgments, the wise person makes true judgments about good and bad that are, or give rise to, the good emotions. But since only the wise can make true judgments about good and bad, only they can have good emotions.11 Αἰδός is therefore the wise person’s response to the prospect of justified censure. Rather than fear censure, the wise person watches out for and avoids justified censure. Because she is able to pinpoint the genuinely bad features of justified censure (those deserving of censure), the wise person responds to them with rational watchfulness on the basis of her true judgment that they are bad. However, ordinary people, lacking knowledge of good and bad, pick out the wrong feature of justified censure as bad: they think that the bad reputation that often follows justified censure is an evil; they then try to avoid censure, which, since it is not in their control, they will be unable to do; consequently, they are unhappy. This response is fear or some variety of it.12 The difference between the wise and the ordinary person’s response is in the object judged bad: in itself, censure is neither

10. SVF 3.432. These sources all observe the same distinction between αἰδήμοσύνη and αἰδός, virtue and good emotion.

11. The wise alone have the knowledge of good and bad that makes true judgments of good and bad possible—and this is the knowledge that only virtue is good and only vice bad. To understand that only virtue is good one must understand virtue, which is wisdom, and that involves understanding nature and its laws, their application to particular cases of what is in accordance with or contrary to nature, and their goodness. Thus, although ordinary people may make correct choices, they do not do so on the basis of true judgments about good and bad: there is always something wrong with their judgments until they understand that only virtue is good and only vice bad. Cf. Cic., Fin. 3.58–59; cf. also Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 11.200–201, Philo Cherubim 14–15 (= LS 59G, H). On the restriction of good emotions to the wise, see the discussions in Inwood, Ethics, 173–75, and F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London, 1975), 67–68.

12. Notice that fear (a passion) is replaced not by courage (a virtue) but by watchfulness (a good emotion), and that the watchfulness which replaces fear of censure is grounded in the virtue of temperance, not courage (for αἰδήμοσύνη is a variety of temperance). This may seem surprising, since courage is the knowledge of what is fearful, not fearful, and neither διαφωνας δεινων και αδυνατων και αδικητων (in Stob. 2.59, 4 = SVF 3.262). But there is no one-to-one relationship between a passion and its corresponding good emotion on the one hand, and a virtue on the other. Perhaps this is why there can be four virtues but three good emotions: virtues are fields of knowledge that do not divide up along the lines of the particular judgments life and ordinary experience require us to make. A contemporary parallel might be with academic disciplines: consider the question, “How do bees make honey?” To answer this question, one would have to draw on insect biology, biochemistry, and genetics, for different sciences provide the foundational knowledge for different aspects of honey-making. Our questions arise out of our prescientific needs and interests, our answers, out of a scientific perspective that remaps the world.
good nor bad, whereas justified censure is intrinsically bad, insofar as it is justified or bound up with vice.\textsuperscript{13}

The classification of αἰδῶς as a good emotion also gives rise to a couple of difficulties. Suppose I am destitute, and will need to beg if I want to eat. But, an earnest student of Stoicism, I think to myself, “Begging deserves to be censured, for food is an indifferent, irrelevant to my happiness; if I beg, it is because I overvalue food.” I want to avoid justified censure, because I believe (correctly) that it is an evil for me. But in fact I am wrong to think that begging would earn me justified censure, or that it is morally wrong and bad to beg, for begging for food in my circumstances of destitution would actually be κατὰ φύσιν (in accordance with nature) and the Stoic goal is to live in accordance with nature, without, of course, desiring any of the things that are in accordance with nature.\textsuperscript{14} According to the classification criteria above, my judgment would seem to be a passion, since it is a false judgment about what is bad. But the passion corresponding to αἰδῶς in the Stoic catalogue is αἰσχύνη, which is defined as φόβος ἀδοξίας, fear of bad reputation,\textsuperscript{15} whereas my judgment that begging deserves censure is not simply fear of a bad reputation, which would involve the false judgment that a bad reputation is an evil for me. However, my concern is not about my reputation, but rather about the moral rightness or wrongness of my prospective action: I would make the same judgment even if no Stoic was likely to know about my begging, which is something that could not be said if my judgment was based on fear of a bad reputation. I have distinguished between reputation and the moral standard, and it is the moral standard that I want to do right by—but wanting to do right by the moral standard doesn’t ensure always knowing what the moral standard is or demands. It is clear that because I am mistaken in judging begging bad, my judgment cannot be a good emotion. On the other hand, it does not seem right to redescribe my motive as a desire for a good reputation just because my judgment of what counts as moral is incorrect.

The problem here is that the Stoic distinction between αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνη, a true versus a false judgment about good and bad, is superimposed upon a different—perhaps conventional—distinction between the sincere desire to live according to a given standard versus the desire to appear to be living according to that standard in order to win a good reputation. But it ought to be important to Stoic philosophers to distinguish sincere mistakes about what is moral from non-moral judgments, since the προκόπτων, the Stoic trainee who is making progress but not yet wise, must sometimes make faulty judgments. The trainee does not yet possess knowledge of what is good and bad in every situation and so has to rely on a more or less general sense of what is and isn’t choiceworthy. It is inevitable that what is generally choiceworthy will not always be right for the trainee’s situation—and

\textsuperscript{13} The Stoics qualify their claim that only virtue is good and only vice bad to accommodate the point that the virtuous person is also good. They explain that the virtuous person has virtue as a part, and is thereby good in the sense of being “not other than benefit.” Cf. Sext. Emp. \textit{Math.} 11.22–26 (= LS 60G).

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Cic. \textit{Fin.} 3.49–51; Stob. \textit{Ecl.} 2.79, 18–80; 82, 20–21 (= LS 58C).

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{SVF} 3.408, 409.
knowing no better, she will err. The relative difficulty of becoming a wise person is a further reason for Stoics to pay attention to such distinctions in the trainee’s judgments. Finally, the philosophical tradition upon which the Stoics draw considers incorrect as well as correct judgments to be cases of αἰδός, presumably because both involve the same sorts of considerations, and the Stoics need to address this commonsense assumption.

A second difficulty arising out of the classification of αἰδός as a good emotion is that thoughts about right censure seem to be intellectually and motivationally redundant for the wise person, who possesses knowledge of good and evil. The wise person’s knowledge that such-and-such an action would earn justified censure is derivative of her knowledge that the behavior is wrong. Her avoidance of the behavior would seem to follow from her desire to do the right thing combined with her knowledge of what is right in each circumstance. What could thinking in terms of censure add? For the less-than-wise, on the other hand, considerations of right censure might well be useful: I don’t always know what it is appropriate for me to do, so I look to the wise and virtuous person’s judgments to learn what sort of behavior is rightly censured; now I have a guide to performing καθήκοντα (appropriate actions). But even though my action may be appropriate, the Stoics seem to say that so long as I am not wise, and the judgment on which my action was based is not informed by knowledge, my avoidance of justifiably censurable behavior is not an instance of αἰδός. The classification of αἰδός as a εὐπάθεια rules it out of the trainee’s psychology, where it would have been useful.

One standard source for Stoic views, Nemesius, dispenses with the problematic classification of αἰδός as a good emotion. Instead, he classes αἰδός among the passions, as a species of fear (φόβος), along with δκόνος, αἰσχύνη, κατάπληξις, ἄγχος, ἐκπληξις (shaking, shame, consternation, anxiety, and terror). Nemesius goes on to define αἰδός as φόβος ἐπὶ προσδόκιμος ψόγος (the fear consequent upon the anticipation of censure), adding, κάλλιστον δὲ τούτο τὸ πάθος (this is the best passion). He then distinguishes αἰδός from αἰσχύνη, shame:

αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἐπ’ αἰσχρῷ πεπραμενέων αὐθά τούτο δὲ ἀνέλυπτον εἰς σωτηρίαν ταύτη δὲ διαφέρει αἰδός αἰσχύνης, ὅτι ὁ μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος ἐπὶ τὸν ἀὶ ἐπιτρέπει καταδύεται· ὁ δὲ αἰδοῦμενος φοβεῖται περιπετείαν ἀδόξη τινί· καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ πολλάκις καὶ τὴν αἰδό αἰσχύνην, καταχρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασι·

17. For example, in Plato’s Charmides, αἰδός is proposed as a candidate definition for εὐφορία (temperance) on the grounds that temperance makes a person ashamed (ἀἰσχύνεσθαι) and bashful (ἀἰσχυντῆναι). But it is immediately rejected because αἰδός can sometimes fail to be good: for the needy man, for instance, 160E–161A. Socrates quotes Homer’s line—αἰδός is not good for a needy man—suggesting that αἰδός is more than shyness, but involves thinking something beneath one’s dignity. Cf. also the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, where αἰδός is defined as τολμήματος ὑποχώρησις εἰς εὐστοχία διεκλείσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον φανείν, a voluntary retreat from rashness, according to what is just and apparently best (412C). The use of “apparently” here suggests that αἰδός is not infallible.
18. SVF 3.416.20.
19. Nemesius need not be mistaken in calling αἰδός κάλλιστον, because the superlative κάλλιστον does not entail the positive καλός. In calling αἰδός the best passion, he may mean that of the passions, it is the most corrigeable, or the closest to a good emotion.
Shame is the fear consequent upon having done something base; but it is not without hope for deliverance; αἰδώς differs from shame in this way, that the shameful one hides on account of what he has done, whereas the one who has αἰδώς fears that he will fall into some disrepute. The ancients often called αἰδώς shame, misapplying the terms.²⁰

Nemesius' report conflicts not only with other Stoic accounts of αἰδώς, but also with other enumerations of the Stoic species of fear, which do not mention αἰδώς.²¹ The conflict is practically significant because Nemesius' classification of αἰδώς as a passion rules out the possibility that a virtuous person could possess αἰδώς, or that a trainee should cultivate it. For the Stoic must extirpate her passions: they are false judgments about good and evil, leading one to desire things that are neither surely attainable nor truly good. Since the virtuous person has knowledge of good and evil, she makes no false judgments about them, and so has no passions.

It is possible that Nemesius is not reporting a Stoic view in this passage. Despite its inclusion among von Arnim's Stoic fragments, Nemesius' discussion of the passions is part of an explicitly Aristotelian discussion of the irrational part of the soul that is obedient to reason.²² Aristotle too calls αἰδώς a passion and defines it as a fear of ill-repute; and yet, he too attributes some—conditional—value to αἰδώς.²³ On the other hand, Nemesius may be trying to sort out the views of a Stoic like Epictetus, whose interest in progress leads him to develop a moral psychology capable of accounting for the transformation of a fool overwrought with passions into a wise person equipped with true judgments and good emotions.²⁴ Nemesius' intriguing claim that αἰδώς is the best of the passions seems to suggest that there is a progressive element in the passion, so that it can serve as the starting point for true judgments. Could the false belief that censure is bad nonetheless be trained (or restrained) into the true judgment that justified censure is bad? There is at least one clear instance of a passion serving as the starting point for progress in Epictetus: the person who suffers anxiety (ἀγωνία) that his desire will not be fulfilled earns Epictetus' congratulations for turning his attention to the realm where “he” is (4.10.4–6). Perhaps other species of fear, such as shame, can serve as a springboard for moral improvement, as well.

Stoic psychology does have the resources to account for intellectual progress: between true judgments based on knowledge and false judgments

20. The view that αἰσχύνη (shame) is consequent upon misdeeds recalls Aristotle's treatment of the topic at Rhetoric 2.6, where αἰσχύνη is characterized as a kind of λύπη (pain) felt at the thought of one's misdeeds, past, present, and future.


22. M. Morani, ed., Nemesius De Natura Hominis (Leipzig, 1987), 15.213–21.233 (pp. 72–82). See also Bonhöffer's argument that Nemesius cannot be describing true Stoic αἰδώς, because he does not sufficiently distinguish αἰδώς from αἰσχύνη: both are a kind of fear of censure, attendant upon unease about one's conduct and indicative of there being something wrong with it. A. F. Bonhöffer, Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart, 1890), 291–93.


24. It is also possible that some Stoics gave αἰδώς a double classification—as a passion when felt by the fool and a good emotion when felt by the sage. On double classifications, especially the double classification of ἔρως, see B. Inwood, "Why Do Fools Fall in Love?" forthcoming in Aristotle and After, ed. R. Sorabji.
made out of ignorance lies a class of judgments that the Stoics call καταλήψεις (cognitions), common to the wise person and the fool. A cognition is an assent to a φαντασία καταληπτική (a graspable impression) and to what it tells us about the external object that causes it. A cognition cannot be false, but it can be incomplete: Cicero reports that καταλήψεις are credible, not because they grasp all the properties of a thing (that is presumably the power of knowledge), but because they do not err within their ability. But a cognition may, in a fool, be the basis for false beliefs: for example, if one makes an incorrect generalization or application of her cognition. My mistaken judgment, that it is wrong to beg for food, was based on the cognition that food is an indifferent. Suppose I now grasp the cognition that it is in accordance with nature for me to beg in my circumstances. Although as a cognition, my belief must be true, it may not be systematically connected, in my mind, to other relevant cognitions—with the result that I may wrongly infer that it is never wrong to beg when one is hungry. The difference between my cognitions and the wise person’s is that hers are, in addition to being true, systematically connected to other cognitions, supported by them, and therefore unshakeable. We can understand Stoic progress as the acquisition and systematization of cognitions resulting, finally, in knowledge.

However, moral, emotional, and practical progress are more problematic. Judgments of good and bad, which is what passions and good emotions are, cannot be common to the wise and to fools: only the wise have knowledge of the good; judgments about good and bad are only true when made by the wise. If it were possible for a fool to have a cognition about good and bad, he would then have a good emotion, but we are told that only the wise have good emotions. But if judgments of good and bad are necessary to motivate our actions and reactions, all of the fool’s practical judgments would necessarily be false, and would continue to be false until, inexplicably, he became wise and all his judgments became true. This would be an odd view of progress.

I have argued in this section that the Stoic classification of αἰδώς as a good emotion, and its consequent restriction to the wise, gives rise to two problems: first, it requires that the judgments of fools who want to avoid justified censure, but are simply mistaken as to what censure would be justified, be mischaracterized as shame, the fear of a bad reputation. Second, it restricts αἰδώς judgments only to the wise, for whom they are entirely redundant, keeping them from the person making progress, for whom they would have been useful. These difficulties are peculiar to αἰδώς, but they point to a much more general concern for Stoic psychology, namely,
about how to explain—and direct—a trainee’s transition from the ignorant life of passion to the knowledgeable life of good emotion.

II. THE STOIC’S PROGRESS

Epictetus urges,

τὴν ὀρεξίν δὲ παντελῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἄνελε; ἂν τε γὰρ ὀρέγῃ τῶν οὐκ ἔφ’ ἡμῖν τινός, ἀτυχείν ἀνάγκη, τῶν τε ἔφ’ ἡμῖν, ὃσον ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἄν, οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε σοι πάρεστι. 
μόνον δὲ τῷ ὀρμαν καὶ ἀφορμὰν χρόνο, κούφως μέντοι καὶ μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως καὶ ἀνεμένος.

For the present, completely remove your desire; if you desire one of the things that are not up to us, you must needs be unfortunate; and what is up to us, which it would be right to desire, you don’t yet have. Instead, use only choice and rejection, and lightly, with reservation, without strain.29

There is something paradoxical about Epictetus’ recommendation that we not desire even what is “up to us,” on the grounds that we don’t yet have it—supposedly virtue is up to us, and surely we should desire virtue? And surely, there is no risk in desiring what is up to us? B. Inwood’s interpretation of this passage resolves the paradox. According to this interpretation, desire aims at the apparent good, so that as long as we do not have the correct conception of the good to guide our desire, we will go astray whenever we desire something. So Epictetus urges those making progress to refrain from using their faculty of desire entirely and instead to direct their faculty of choice, or impulses, toward the appropriate (καθήκον). If their impulses are restricted to what is appropriate, which is what is according to nature, they will have a reasonably reliable guide to action that will lead them neither into error in judging things good when they are not, as would the faculty of desire, nor into unhappiness when they fail to get what they desire.30 But by extending the range of their true judgments of appropriateness, they will expand their understanding of the world and their place in it, thereby approaching virtue and wisdom.

I will argue, below, that the correct exercise of choice and rejection for the performance of appropriate actions involves αἴδως. I will make my argument in three stages: first, I will show that αἴδως judgments are self-evaluative judgments, which bear on our performance of appropriate action not by deeming actions good or bad, but rather by making us evaluate actions in terms of what they reveal about our characters. In the second stage of the argument, I will show how the notion of one’s roles in life informs self-evaluation and thereby the evaluation of actions. When one considers an action, one should think about whether it is appropriate for one to act in that way, what kind of person should act in that way, and whether one is that kind of person. Epictetus both says and shows how αἴδως helps one make moral progress, so, in the last stage of my argument, I will discuss Epictetus’ use of αἴδως in teaching.

29. Encheiridion 2.2; cf. 2.14.8–13, 3.2.4; 3.12.4, 8, 13; 3.13.22; 4.12.16–17.
30. Inwood, Ethics, 116–26. Inwood argues that Epictetus treats ὀρέγη, desire (the judgment that something is good), and ὀρμῆ, impulse (the judgment that something is appropriate), as mutually exclusive categories, whereas older Stoics treated the former as a species of the latter.
Epictetus says that nature has given us αἰσθήσεις and our αἰδήμων character; for this reason, human excellence includes having αἰδός, and our greatest good and evil lie in its preservation and destruction (1.28.20–23; cf. 2.4.2–3; 2.9.2–12; 2.10.15–23; 3.14.13). By becoming αἰδήμων (as well as just, great-souled, temperate, free, etc.) we bring our human nature into its own (frag. 28b) (2.8.23):

παραδεδοκέοις σοι σεαυτόν καὶ λέγει “οὐκ εἶχον ἄλλον πιστότερόν σου· τούτον μοι φύλασσε τοιοῦτον ὄνος πέφυκεν, αἰδήμων, πιστόν, ὑψιλόν, ἀκατάπληκτον, ἀπαθῆ, ἀτάραχον.”

[god] has handed you over to yourself, saying, “I had no other more trustworthy than you; keep this one for me as he is by nature, αἰδήμων, trustworthy, high-minded, undismayed, impassive, tranquil.”

For Epictetus, αἰδός and our αἰδήμων nature enable us to make the judgment that something is shameful (3.7.27):

πεφύκαμεν δὲ πῶς; ὡς ἐλευθερία, ὡς γενναίοι, ὡς αἰδήμωνες, ποιον γὰρ ἄλλο ξύλον ἑρυθριά, ποιον αἰσχροῦ φαντασίαν λαμβάνει;

How are we born? As free, as noble, as αἰδήμων. For what other animal blushes, what other animal grasps the impression of the shameful?

They also influence our impulses to action: for example, they keep us from engaging in shameful or disgraceful behavior (frag. 14):

καὶ τοιὸν καὶ δέδοκε μοι ἡ φύσις αἰδός καὶ πολλὰ ὑπερυθρεῖ, ὅτι τι ὑπολάβη ἀἰσχρόν λέγειν. τούτῳ με τὸ κίνημα οὐκ ἔδω τὴν ἥδονθν ἥσθαι ἁγαθὸν καὶ τέλος τοῦ βίου.

Indeed, nature has given me αἰδός and I often blush when I think that I am saying something disgraceful. This movement does not permit me to set down pleasure as the good and end of life.

Thus αἰδός or that which is αἰδήμων in us is responsible for motivating progress or self-improvement, as in the following passage against the Academic Skeptics (1.5.3–5):

Ἀπολιθώσεις δ’ εἰσὶ διτταί· ἡ μὲν τοῦ νοητικοῦ ἀπολίθωσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐντρεπτικοῦ, ὅταν τις παραταταγμένος ἢ μὴ ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργείσι μηρ’ ἀπὸ τῶν μαχιμένων ἀφίστασθαι . . . καὶ νῦν Δία ἐπὶ αὐτὴς τῆς ψυχῆς ἁμέν ἢ μὴς διακινέσεως, ὡστε μηδὲν παρακολουθεῖν μηδὲν συνύναι μηδὲν, καὶ τοιοῦτον κακός ἔχειν ὀἰόμεθα· ἡ δὲ τινος τὸ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδήμοιν ἀπονεκροθή, τούτῳ ἐτὶ καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν.

Καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας: “οὖ,” φησίν: “οὐδὲ γὰρ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς φαντάζομαι, ὅτι ἐγρήγορα.” οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία ἐκείνης: “οὐδέν.” ἐπὶ τοῦτο διαλέγει· καὶ ποιον αὐτῷ πάρ ἢ ποιον σίδηρον προσαγάγω, ἵν αἴσθηται ὅτι γενέκριται· αἰσθαναόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται· ἐπὶ χεῖρον ἔστι τοῦ νεκροῦ. μάχην οὖς οὐ συνριζή· κακός ἔχει· συνεφοράς οὖς οὐ κινεῖται οὐδὲ προκόπτει· ἐπὶ ἀθλητέρων ἔχει· ἐκτέτμει τὸ αἰδήμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν οὕς ἀποτέτμεται, ἀλλ’ ἀποτεθηρίσεται.

There are two kinds of petrifaction: one is the petrifaction of the intellect, the other of the sense of shame, when one stands in battle formation, neither nodding to clear truths nor leaving the fighting . . . And by Zeus, if someone is so disposed in his very soul that he
can neither follow nor understand, we think that he is badly off; but should his sense of shame and αἰδήμον be deadened, we even call this an ability.

Do you grasp that you are awake? “No,” he says, “For I do not [grasp it], when in my dreams I have the impression that I am awake.” Then this impression does not differ from that? “Not at all.” Do I argue with him any further? And what fire or iron do I use on him, so that he perceives that he is deadened? Although he perceives, he makes as if he does not; he is worse off than a corpse. This one does not see the conflict: he is badly off. That one sees it but is not moved and does not make progress: he is still more wretched. His sense of shame and αἰδήμον has been cut off, and his reason has not been cut off, but brutalized.

Epictetus here faults the skeptic for recognizing a contradiction in his beliefs, but yet not being moved to revise them. On the one hand, the skeptic denies that there is any difference between his waking and dreaming judgments that he is awake; on the other, he acts on the basis of his waking impressions, not his dream-impressions. This passage suggests that the recognition of logical inconsistency or contradiction does not by itself lead one to revise one’s beliefs in the direction of consistency. Revision requires, in addition, the intervention of αἴδως or what is αἰδήμον in us. As we shall see, αἴδως enables improvement because it makes us see what we do—our actions or judgments—as a reflection of who we are.

There are some noteworthy similarities between Epictetus’ conception of that which is αἰδήμον in us and Plato’s conception of the θυμοειδές, or spirited part of the soul. Both faculties are involved in self-evaluative judgment, resulting in self-reproach when the self-evaluation is critical; both support and help to execute rational judgments. The θυμοειδές, however, has its own conception of the good—it values honor, and although it can be trained to value what reason determines to be good, it may also fail to do so. But the αἰδήμον does not make judgments of good and bad; it does not compete with ὁρεύς (desire); rather, as I will argue, it aims at the appropriate, which it estimates according to the agent’s conception of himself.

31. The ἐντερπτικόν or sense of shame may be just another name for the αἰδήμον; this is suggested by the division νοητικός versus ἐντερπτικός at the beginning of the passage, followed by the ἐντερπτικόν καὶ αἰδήμον, in which the καὶ is apparently epexegetical. Alternatively, since the etymology of ἐντερπτικόν (ἐντρέπω, literally, "turn in," and less literally, "make ashamed") suggests improvement or education, it might be that the αἰδήμον is responsible only for self-evaluation, while the ἐντερπτικόν is immediately responsible for improvement. The mention of such “faculties” need not indicate a renunciation of the Stoic doctrine of psychological monism, since the αἰδήμον καὶ ἐντερπτικόν are not said to be capable of opposing each other—the distinction between them may be merely analytical.

32. On the Stoic analysis, since every action requires a prior impulse, that is, a prior assent to some impression, the skeptic’s actions show that he judges that he is awake, while he verbally claims not to judge that he is awake. To the skeptic’s claim that he assents to waking impressions without any theoretical commitment to their truth, Epictetus’ point would be that even the skeptic’s noncommittal assent shows that he recognizes some difference between his dreaming and waking impressions.

33. But it is possible for someone to be so shameless as to contradict a preconception and say that momentary pleasure is something to be elated over—in which case, Epictetus can only say that such a person is not worthy of having a criterion of truth (2.11.22).

34. Resp. 439E-440E, 580D-581C.

35. If the αἰδήμον supports reason, in the sense of always submitting to reason’s authority, then perhaps one’s reason is “brutalized” when one’s ἐντερπτικόν καὶ αἰδήμον is cut off because, having lost its backing, it can no longer effectively regulate one’s impulses as it should in a human being.
Epictetus recommends αἰδώς and the αἰδήμων condition, but he never classifies them in terms of the Stoic categories available to him. We might conclude, from his recommendation of the αἰδήμων condition and his designations of it as good, that it is a virtuous condition: he says that to be αἰδήμων is the greatest of goods (4.9.17–18); he tells the man who wants friends that it is better to be αἰδήμων than to be considered pleasant by others (4.2.8); to the man who wants to help his friends and country, he says that an αἰδήμων man is the greatest contribution to a community (Ench. 24.4–5). When someone complains about how well-off a wicked man is, Epictetus replies that the wicked man has his wealth by flattering and being shameless—doing things his interlocutor considers too self-abasing to do—and bamboozles the poor interlocutor into agreeing that since he is better at being αἰδήμων, he is better off than the wicked man, and so it must be better to be αἰδήμων than rich (3.17.2–6; cf. Ench. 24.3). On the other hand, Epictetus says that if the man who has the ability to get along without worldly goods loses this ability, he loses his αἰδήμων state (4.9.6; cf. 2.4.3, 2.10.18, 3.18.7), suggesting that the αἰδήμων condition is not the unchangeable state Stoic virtue is usually taken to be.36 Αἰδώς, too, while it is preferable to many things, even a general’s appointment (4.3.3, 9), and while it is listed along with πίστες (trust) and δικαιοσύνη (justice) as a distinctively human excellence (3.14.13), is capable of being lost (2.10.15, 4.9.6, 9). Finally, Epictetus claims to have αἰδήμως himself even though he admits that he is not yet a wise man (4.3.9–10; cf. 1.8.15; 2.8.23–25, 27; 2.24.9–10; 3.1.23–24; 4.1.151), from which it would follow that αἰδώς is not a virtue or good emotion.

We can reconcile these conflicting designations of αἰδώς and the αἰδήμων condition by paying attention to Epictetus’ psychological account of habituation. Epictetus says that as woodworking preserves the carpenter, and grammar the grammarian, αἰδήμων acts preserve the αἰδήμων person, while shameless acts destroy him (2.9.2–12). He tells an adulterous scholar that by making designs on his neighbor’s wife, he destroys in himself the trustworthy, αἰδήμων, pious man that he is (2.4.2–3). In general, our dispositions and capabilities are secured and strengthened by our actions, and Epictetus recommends that we accustom ourselves to performing the actions that correspond to whatever character-trait we wish to have (2.18.1, 4–7). We may invoke this Aristotelian account of habituation to explain Epictetus’ use of the terms αἰδώς and αἰδήμων to designate both virtuous and less-than-virtuous judgments, actions, and states: if one’s acts are virtuous only when they flow from a settled disposition to perform acts of that type, but one acquires the settled disposition only by performing acts of that type, Epictetus may reasonably call an act αἰδήμων when it makes a person more αἰδήμων, and not only when it flows from a stably αἰδήμων character; he may say a person has or displays αἰδώς not only when she has the virtue, but also when her judgments are of the type that strengthen her αἰδώς, or bring about αἰδήμων acts and an αἰδήμων character.37

37. For the Aristotelian parallel, see Eth. Nic. 1105a18–1105b17.
If people who are not yet wise can have αἰσθήσεως, and be better off by having it, αἰσθήσεως is likely to be a cognition of some sort. We have seen, in this section, that Epictetus regards αἰσθήσεως judgments as self-evaluative, practical judgments that stimulate moral progress. Because of the restrictions on judgments of good and bad—false when made by ordinary people, true only when made by the wise—αἰσθήσεως judgments must be made in terms other than good and bad. So must the trainee’s exercise of choice and rejection, we recall, for the trainee is told to suspend desire and restrict herself to determining and performing appropriate actions (Ench. 2.2; 3.2.4; 4.12.16–17). It seems reasonable to suppose that αἰσθήσεως judgments are to be made in terms of appropriateness, and that they are among the judgments of appropriateness relevant to the correct exercise of choice and rejection.38

Epictetus’ reclassification of αἰσθήσεως as a cognition, made in terms of appropriateness, resolves the two difficulties raised by the Stoic sources’ classification of αἰσθήσεως as a good emotion. First, the trainee who feels inappropriate shame or sets herself the wrong standard is not saddled with the mere love of reputation. This is not to say that she has true αἰσθήσεως when her judgment is false, but that her false judgment need not be the passion that judges reputation a good and bad reputation an evil. Second, αἰσθήσεως is now available to the trainee, for whose progress it can be a guide. I suggested briefly above that αἰσθήσεως aids progress by placing our actions in a new evaluative context: in feeling αἰσθήσεως, we focus not on whether our actions, considered in themselves, are right or wrong, good or bad; rather, we consider our actions in light of how they reflect on us, their agents. I now turn to a detailed consideration of how this evaluative exercise works and how it stimulates progress.

AΙΔΩΣ AND ROLES

A trainee who is told to determine appropriate action by looking at actions in terms of what they reveal about their agent’s character is not given any specific directive as to which actions are appropriate for her: she needs to know also which actions are appropriate for different characters, and what her character is. Judgments of αἰσθήσεως or self-evaluation, require a standard.

Epictetus invokes a cluster of notions to provide such a standard for self-evaluation and guide for appropriate action: one’s πρόσωπον (role, 1.2; Ench. 17), one’s part in the cosmos (2.5.24–27, 2.6.10), one’s name (2.10, 4.12.16), one’s profession (2.10.4; cf. 3.15.1–13; Ench. 29–30; 3.22.1–12, 86–91), one’s natural and acquired relationships (3.2.4) and “who” or “what” one is (2.10; 3.1.24–26). A. A. Long has pointed out that Epictetus uses this type of invocation of one’s identity or “who one is” in a way that prescribes or proscribes an action and gives a reason for it at the same time: one should do X (for example, control how one deals with one’s impressions) in order to qualify as a Y (a human being), because Ys do X.39

38. The likelihood that αἰσθήσεως has to do with the second field of progress is increased by the fact that the remaining alternative, the third field, has to do with the security of judgment, and is reserved for those who have already progressed quite far (3.2.1–5).

Epictetus appeals to a variety of roles to prescribe or proscribe conduct: for example, if one is male, he ought not to pluck out his hair (3.1.27–35); one should only seek to become a wrestler if his body is strong enough (3.15.9–10); since one is rational, she should seek to perfect her rational functions (1.6.20–22, 2.5.24–27, 3.1.7–9); if fortune assigns one the role of beggar, she ought to play that well (Ench. 17). This normative use of a person's roles or natures seems to draw on the doctrine of Panaetius, known to us from Cicero's De Officiis, according to which each person has four roles: first, a universal role as rational creature, second, an individual role insofar as he is outfitted with particular physical and mental qualities, a third role given by his circumstances, and a fourth depending on his choice of profession.  

In his extensive discussion of the universal and individual roles, Cicero says that the former determines whether one's behavior is moral and appropriate. But he adds that for a smooth flow of one's life and actions, one cannot afford to ignore one's individual nature, but must act in a way that is also in keeping with one's own peculiar character-traits, abilities, and attitudes.  

The metaphor of roles for our various identities is very suggestive. First, roles specify what actions are appropriate for us—as the stage-actor's role in a play directs him as to how to act—and guide us as we make progress, when we are called upon to act and react appropriately, but without complete understanding. Although a perfectly wise person would be attuned to the whole system of nature and its requirements in every situation, sharing the mind and will of Zeus (2.5.24–27, 2.6.10), a less-than-perfect person can still use her understanding of her role(s) to set her expectations about what actions she should and shouldn't perform, of what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior for someone in her position. Further, if the trainee adopts the attitude to her actions that a stage-actor has towards his part, she will care only about how she plays the part, and not about the con-

40. Off. 1.107–21. See A. R. Dyck's A Commentary on Cicero, "De Officiis" (Michigan, 1996), introduction and comments ad loc., for thorough discussions of the personae-doctrine in Cicero and other writers including Epictetus, as well as for a full treatment of the doctrine's Panaetian source and its anticipations in Aristo of Chios and Bion of Borysthenes. As Dyck notes, the third and fourth personae fit oddly with the first and second; for example, "the choice of career involved in the fourth persona could have been described equally well as the result of the action of the second persona within limits imposed by universal human nature (the first persona) and external circumstances (necessitas or the third persona)." Dyck argues convincingly, however, that all four personae are likely to be from Panaetius (pp. 285–86).  

41. Off 1.107. "Appropriate" translates Cicero's decorum, which translates πρέπον (1.93). Decorum, according to Cicero, pertains especially to the group of virtues that includes verecundia, temperantia, modestia. The first of these terms, verecundia, would seem to translate either αἰσχος or αἰδημοσία.  

42. Off. 1.111, cf. 110, 113, 114. On the individual role, see C. Gill, "Peace of Mind and Being Yourself," ANRW 36.7 (1994): 4599–640, esp. 4603–8. See also C. Gill, "Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero De Officiis I," in OSAP 6 (1988): 169–99, esp. 180–82, on some of the different uses to which Cicero and Epictetus put the four-personae theory. I do not agree with Gill that for Cicero, the individual role is that which makes a person distinguished or successful in conventional terms, but I do not thereby accept the only alternative Gill considers, that the individual role is what distinguishes a person from others, or makes him unique. Rather, the individual role seems to me to constitute a person's "type" or particular nature—like the types in Plutarch's Lives or Theophrastus' Characters. There is no suggestion that a person's type would be unique or distinctive, but only that there are different types of people.  

sequences, which are in the playwright's control rather than hers, and which do not affect the quality of her performance (cf. *Ench.* 17). A trainee with this attitude will perform the appropriate actions, but with detachment.

Unlike Cicero, Epictetus reduces the variety of roles to the universal-individual pair, treating circumstance and professional choice under the rubric of the individual role (3.23.1, 3–6):

> Τίς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτῷ πρῶτον εἰπὲ· εἶθ' οὕτως ποιεῖ ὁ ποιεῖς . . . ἐκαστὸν γὰρ τῶν γι-
> νομένων ύψ' ἡμῶν ἄν μὲν ἐπὶ μηδὲν ἀναφέρομεν, εἰκῇ ποιήσαμεν· ἕδαν δ' ἐν' ὁ μῆ ἔδη, διεσφαλμένος. λοιπὸν ἢ μὲν τίς ἐστὶ κοινὴ ἀναφορά, ἡ δ' ἱδία. πρῶτον ἵν' ὡς ἄνθρωπος.
> ἐν τούτῳ τί περίεχεται; μὴ ὡς πρόβατον, εἰκῇ ἐπιεικῶς· μὴ βλαστικῶς ὡς θηρῖον. ἡ δ' ἱδία πρὸς τὸ ἐπιπήδευμα ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ κιθαριστὸς ὡς κιθαριστός, ὁ τέκτων ὡς τέκτων, ὁ φιλόσοφος ὡς φιλόσοφος, ὁ ῥήτωρ ὡς ῥήτωρ.

First tell yourself who you want to be; then, in that manner, do whatever you do. . . . For each of the events that are under our control, if we do not refer it to a standard, we will be acting purposelessly; but if we refer it to one we should not, [we will go] completely astray. Further, there is on the one hand a common standard, and on the other, an individual. First, in order that [one may act] as a human being. What is included in this? Not as a sheep, gently but purposelessly; nor destructively, as a wild animal. The individual standard has to do with each person's occupation and moral nature. The harpist is to act as a harpist, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the orator as an orator.

Despite the voluntarist note on which this passage begins, it quickly becomes clear that in the case of both the common and the individual standard, there is a choice that accords with one's nature and one that goes contrary to it. For the individual standard has to do with one's moral nature and occupation, and the latter, rather than being an open choice among several morally permissible options, is tantamount to the choice between virtue and vice (cf. 3.15.12–13).

In a famous passage, Epictetus compares the role of a human being to that of a foot. It is according to nature for the foot to be clean, but as part of a body, it is sometimes appropriate for it to be muddied, injured, or even amputated; likewise, it is according to nature for a human being, considered only as a detached individual, to grow to an old age and healthy. But considered as a part of a state, it may be appropriate for this person to take risks, fall sick, die young (2.5.24–27; cf. 13). So to do what is appropriate, in each case, one needs to further investigate nature—cosmic nature, one's own strengths and weaknesses, circumstances—to discover, rather than create, what is demanded by one's individual role. In another diatribe, Epictetus continues the analogy of the foot to say that if the foot were intelligent, it would choose to be covered with mud when necessary; likewise he, if he knew that it was fated for him to be ill, would choose this. But as long as he does not know what is fated for him, he chooses whatever is better for getting things that are in accordance with nature: for example, health (2.6.9–10). These passages shrink the contribution of choice to one's roles considerably: one may assent to what is fated if one knows what is

fated; absent this knowledge, one must make a substantive choice, and here it seems prudent to choose what is in accordance with nature generally, although this might not be fated. But of course, it is what is fated that comes about.

This tension between the treatment of one’s individual role as voluntary but given by nature, as to be chosen and yet to be discovered, is interestingly exploited in a diatribe entitled, Ὡς ἂν τις σφύζοι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐν παντὶ; (“How should one preserve what is in accordance with one’s role in everything?”) (1.2.5–11):

The reasonable and unreasonable turn out to be different for different persons, just as the good and bad, and the advantageous and disadvantageous, are different for different persons. It is for this reason especially that we need education, so as to learn how to harmonize our preconception of the reasonable and unreasonable with particular cases, in conformity with nature. But for determining the reasonable and the unreasonable, we use not only our assessments of externals, but also each one [uses his assessment] of what is in conformity with his own role. For to one person it is reasonable to hold a chamber-pot for another, since he looks only at this, that if he does not hold it he will receive blows and will not receive food, whereas if he does hold it, he will suffer nothing harsh or distressing; but to another, not only does it seem unbearable to hold it himself, but even another’s holding it seems intolerable. If you ask me, then, “Shall I hold the pot or not?” I will tell you that receiving food is of greater value than not receiving it, and being flayed is of greater disvalue than not being flayed; so that if you measure your affairs by these standards, go and hold the pot. “But it would not be worthy of me.” This you must bring to the question, not I. For you are the one that knows yourself. how much you are worth to yourself and for how much you sell yourself. For different people sell themselves at different prices.

This passage tells us what is the function of the individual role: it is to help one determine the reasonable and unreasonable for particular cases, since the reasonable and unreasonable are different for different persons. These would seem to be judgments of appropriateness, about the suitability of certain actions to certain roles, as well as the suitability of these roles to oneself—like the instances of αἰδός we have seen that involve the thought that certain types of behavior, such as flattery, are beneath one (e.g., 3.17.2–6; cf. Ἐν χ. 24.3).
Epictetus indicates that one determines the appropriateness of particular actions, and of one's individual role, by "how much you are worth to yourself and for how much you sell yourself." The diatribe goes on to say that people who contemplate such actions as contributing to Nero's festival value externals more than themselves, think of themselves as no better than other people, and have practically forgotten their ἰδιὸν πρόσωπον, their individual role (1.2.14–15). In these cases, the judgments people make as to how much they are worth are not simply right or wrong about what is appropriate for a role given them by nature. It is not as if one could choose to grovel before Nero but be entirely wrong about the appropriateness of one's doing so; rather, one's self-evaluative judgments themselves partly constitute who one is. Thus, grovelling before Nero shows one's nature to be abject—perhaps because grovelling before Nero makes one abject, and because one would have to be abject to be willing to grovel. In this passage, Epictetus complicates his moral psychology, according to which, as we have seen, judgments and actions shape as well as flow from character. For Epictetus points out that we judge and act in accordance with our self-image, our conception of who we are or what we are worth. By engaging self-image in the explanation of action, Epictetus points towards a non-mechanical account of character acquisition by habituation: character is not simply the disposition to perform actions of a particular type acquired by repeated performance of actions of that type; rather, because we act in accordance with what we think we are worth, our self-image is part of our character, and so to shape our characters, we will not only have to perform certain types of actions, but also to work on our self-image.

This suggests a reason why, when his interlocutor wants to know whether he should hold a chamber pot for someone else, Epictetus refuses to make any such evaluation on his behalf, saying, "You are the one who knows yourself." In other words, the judgment that something is appropriate for or beneath one must be made by oneself—else improvement cannot begin. There is another pedagogical point to Epictetus' insistence: as long as one leaves it to another person to judge one's worth, one can oscillate wildly between exaggerated hopes that one is great and exaggerated fears that one is nothing. By demanding a determinate judgment as to his own worth from his interlocutor, Epictetus puts an end to the oscillation and establishes a starting point for self-understanding and self-improvement. I will address this topic at greater length in the next section.

Epictetus' conception of a person as constituted by her roles and guided by them in her judgments of appropriate action resembles but also illuminates some contemporary analyses of self-respect. On these accounts,
a self-respecting person is not one who simply thinks highly of herself, but rather one who performs or avoids certain actions insofar as they are demanded or prohibited by her self-conception—because living up to this self-conception is a condition of her having self-respect; she would feel shame if she fell short of it. It is for these reasons, as G. Taylor has shown, that self-respect and shame are self-protective emotions: they maintain one's links to one's self-conception, protecting oneself, according to one's self-conception, from destruction. A person's self-conception includes, but need not be restricted to, the conception of herself as human, or rational. So one condition of self-respect would be behaving in a manner one would expect of any human being, but there might be further conditions: behaving as one thinks a philosopher ought to behave, for example, even though one would not expect others, diplomats or musicians, to conform to that standard. Epictetus himself says that he seeks to stand out as special, to live with dignity and regard for who he is, refusing to act beneath it even to avoid death (1.2.14–18). Of course, simply living up to one's self-conception does not suffice for true αἰσθανόμενος or make a person truly αἰσθητικός; for that, one's self-conception must be in accordance with one's nature, particularly one's human or rational nature. I turn now to the way in which Epictetus brings this about.

CONCEIT, DIFFIDENCE, AND SELF-RESPECT

Because Epictetus' views about αἰσθανόμενος come to us not in a treatise on the topic, but rather in protreptic diatribes addressed to his audience of students and visitors, we may also learn about how he understands the relationship between αἰσθανόμενος and moral progress from his pedagogical practice. Epictetus uses two main techniques to provoke αἰσθανόμενος in his audience: he reminds them of who they are potentially and what they are capable of, drawing their attention to the disparity between their potential and what they are actually like; and he shows them that they can be their own judges. This section discusses only the first technique; the second is taken up at length in section 3.

Since Epictetus is often addressing Stoic "insiders"—students who have some sort of Stoic self-conception, but want to master Stoic doctrine, express themselves eloquently, and argue skillfully, rather than live a Stoic life—he often provokes them by reminding them of their own standard

50. Although in Epictetus, self-respect involves an assessment of oneself as better than the run-of-the-mill person, a high self-assessment is not necessary for self-respect—one could set one's standard at what any human being should expect. On this point, see Taylor, Pride, 76–84.
51. On the identity of Epictetus' audience and the character of his interactions with them, see R. F. Hock, "'By the Gods, It's My One Desire to See an Actual Stoic': Epictetus' Relations with Students and Visitors in His Personal Network," Semeia 56 (1991): 121–42. Hock distinguishes two groups among Epictetus' Nicopolis audience: students, usually young and from an aristocratic background with worldly aspirations aplenty, and visitors, both from Nicopolis itself and Rome, also of an aristocratic background. Hock argues that Epictetus fails to compel his audience to adopt his ideal of a practical Stoicism because (1) he rebuffs most of his...
or role as Stoics, pointing out how far they are falling short of it. He accuses these students of doing Epicurean deeds and holding Epicurean opinions while reciting the words of Zeno and Socrates (3.24.38; cf. 3.7.17–18, frag. 10), and admonishes them for trying to study logic before ethics (3.2.1–7) and for taking pride in understanding and interpreting Chrysippus, rather than in putting Chrysippus’ precepts into practice (Ench. 49; cf. 1.7, 1.29.56–57, 2.17.29–37, 2.19, 2.23.44–45, 3.3.17, 3.5.15–16, 3.6.3–4, 3.13.22–23, 4.1.138–43, 4.4.8–18, 4.5.36–37, Ench. 51, 52).

Most often, when Epictetus reminds us of who we are, he focuses on our rational nature and common human role (2.10.1–3):

Consider who you are. First, a human being, that is, one who has nothing more sovereign than moral nature, but has other things subordinated to this, and this free from slavery and subjection. Consider, then, the things from which you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts, distinguished from sheep. In addition to these things, you are a citizen of the world and a part of it, not one of its inferiors, but one of its leaders. For you are able to understand the divine governance of the world and to reason about what follows.

One’s role as a human being, this passage tells us, makes one sovereign over everything else and absolutely free, a co-citizen of the world along with the gods, capable of adopting the viewpoint of Zeus with respect to what happens. These reminders of the divine kinship and sovereignty of human beings raise our self-image, make us think more highly of ourselves. They give us a self-conception to live up to in our actions: recall Socrates, whose knowledge of his kinship with the gods gave him the strength to stand by the post ordained for him, even to death (1.9.22–26). If we could only believe wholeheartedly in our divine kinship, we would never think anything ignoble about ourselves (1.3.1–2).

Epictetus’ pedagogic practice builds on but also differs from Socrates’. On the one hand, in order to stimulate his interlocutors’ desire for improvement, he tries to make them recognize their ignorance. For, like Socrates, he believes that, Άρη Φιλοσοφίας . . . συναισθήσεις τής αυτού άσθενείας καὶ άδυναμίας περί τά ἀνάγκαια (“The beginning of philosophy is an awareness of one’s own weakness and incapability concerning necessary things,” 2.11.1; cf. 1.26.15), and Τί πρῶτόν ἔστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος;

visitors, (2) his students want only to excel in Stoic doctrine, and are supported in this aspiration both by each other and by their families, outside audience, and others, and (3) the duration of Epictetus’ contact with his audience is limited, partly due to (1) and (2). As an objective assessment of the situation in Epictetus’ school this may be true, although I am skeptical about the extent to which his students’ goals are strictly at cross-purposes with Epictetus (why then not attend another school and spare themselves the insults of Epictetus?). However, my interest here is in what Epictetus thought and did intentionally, not in whether or how he failed.
What is the first job of the one who philosophizes? To reject conceit; for it is impossible for one to begin to learn things when he thinks he knows them,” 2.17.1; cf. *Ench.* 5). On the other hand, one can see a marked departure from Socratic teaching in Epictetus’ technique of reminding us of our potential. Epictetus differs from Socrates in his acknowledgement that striking down conceit is not sufficient for self-improvement, or even for its first step, self-blame. For diffidence is as great a danger to philosophy and moral improvement as smugness. An unfortunately incomplete passage begins (3.14.8–9):

“Two things must be taken out of people, conceit and diffidence. Conceit is thinking that one needs nothing more, and... among so many reversals [of fortune]. Now cross-examination removes conceit, and this is what Socrates does first..."

Epictetus combats diffidence on the one hand and conceit on the other by reminding us alternately of our god-like potential and our nearly worthless actual state, between who we are and how we are living (1.19.1, 6). The resulting self-knowledge, partial and approximate until it has been systematized, gives us a polarized sense of self-worth, and the difference between the two poles is supposed to goad us into self-improvement. On realizing that one is no ordinary animal, but a partly divine one, possessed of the power to evaluate and alter his beliefs, desires, conduct, and character, one institutes a new, higher standard by which to evaluate himself. Seeing how far short of the standard his conduct and character actually fall, one experiences first shame, and then a desire for improvement. This is the beginning of philosophy, or progress on the path towards virtue, which
culminates in self-respect once one brings his conduct and character up to this new standard.

III. FROM SHAME TO AUTONOMY

In this final section I argue that Epictetus’ teaching seeks to transform quite ordinary concerns about how other people judge one—even αἰσχύνη (shame), a passion and false judgment that it is bad to have a bad reputation—into αἰδώς. Concern for one’s reputation is transformed into αἰδώς when one replaces the actual others about whose judgments one cares by oneself, when one acknowledges oneself as one’s own judge. The process of transformation can be analysed into two aspects: an increase in independence made possible by the adoption of a critical attitude towards other people’s judgments, and the acquisition of an alternative standard of self-evaluation—that of the “god within”—which is perfected in the figure of the Cynic. This alternative standard, I suggest, corresponds to our notion of conscience.

From his repeated attempts to wrest their attention away from others’ opinions of them, it seems clear that Epictetus’ interlocutors are deeply concerned about their reputations, but this is not a concern with appearing, as opposed to being, praiseworthy. They would not want to have a reputation for virtue while secretly practicing vice;52 rather, as we shall see momentarily, the praise of others gives them self-esteem, presumably because they share their values. This is why Epictetus can tell the Rome-bound rhetorician to review his life εἰ ἐμὲ αἰσχύνη, αὐτὸς πρὸς σαυτόν (“before yourself, if you are ashamed in front of me,” 3.9.7–8): he is relying on their shared values leading to similar evaluations, whether it is the rhetorician or Epictetus himself who does the judging.

Epictetus encourages his students’ independence of other people’s opinions by telling them to be discriminating about whose opinions they take to heart. When an interlocutor objects to his advocating disregard for others’ judgments, θέλεις με καταφρονεῖσθα; (“Do you wish me to be despised?”), Epictetus replies (4.5.22–23; cf. 1.21.3–4, 2.13.15):

υπὸ τίνων; ὑπὸ εἰδότων; καὶ πῶς καταφρονήσουσιν εἰδότες τοῦ πράου, τοῦ αἰδήμου; ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄγνωστων; τί σοι μέλει; οὐ τινὰ γάρ ἄλλο τεχνίτη τῶν ἄτέχνων.

By whom? By those who know? And how will those who have knowledge despise the gentle and αἰδήμων person? Or by the ignorant? Why do you care about that? Neither you nor any other craftsman cares about the unskilled.

We may resist the judgments of others if we regard them as incompetent to judge—as ignorant or unskilled. In addition, the very possibility of our evaluating our judges shows that when we accept their verdict, it is because we ourselves have deemed them qualified, because we share or have confidence in their values. If we cease to share their values, we can cease to care about their opinions of us.

52. As Adeimantus describes the reasoning of the person who values virtue only for its rewards in Plato’s Republic (365CD).
To free his students' self-evaluations from others' evaluations of them, Epictetus also develops the Stoic assessment of reputation as neither good nor bad, but rather indifferent to one's happiness. He on the one hand undermines his listeners' enjoyment of others' favorable judgments of them, reminding them that these judgments are neither reliable nor good, and on the other hand, consoles them that undeserved censure is not an evil. He warns his students that they had better free themselves of the desire for admirers—for secretly, their audiences despise them (3.23.10)—and that any desire to please others will lead to anxiety, for the pleasure of others is not up to us (2.13). Depending on others' opinions for one’s sense of self-worth makes one’s self-worth vulnerable: witness the musician puffed up by his audience's praise and deflated by its laughter even though his skill suffices for confidence when the hall is empty (2.16.9–10; cf. 1.19). He compares people who take pride in things that are not under their control to a horse that prides itself on its greater quantities of fodder and embroidered saddle-cloths (frag. 18). He reminds a young man who is hesitating to do his duty on the grounds that it involves behavior he is ashamed to engage in or to fail at that “the good and excellent person” acts not for the sake of reputation, but to do the right thing (3.24.50). Those who fear poverty and think it disgraceful, because it shames them in the eyes of others, are told that the disgraceful (αἰσχρός) is the censurable, and one can only be rightly censured for what is under one’s control, which the judgments of others are not (3.26.8–10; cf. Ench. 24.1). And those who are upset because others pity their poverty are told they deserve pity if they care about the judgments of others (4.6). Finally, Epictetus reminds his students that they should not expect success in honor and office (Ench. 24–25), but should be content to appear to others to be foolish—regarding externals (Ench. 13; cf. 48.3; 2.14.24–29)—and not bother to defend their characters against ill-repute (Ench. 33.9), for devotion to one’s moral nature requires neglect of externals.

But rather than simply free us from all concern about how we appear to others, Epictetus urges us to take up the perspective of another on ourselves. In place of the actual observers he disqualifies, Epictetus introduces the idea of a “god within” us, who is always watching everything we do and think, and from whose gaze there is no hiding (1.14.12–14):  

53. Φηµή (reputation) falls among the things that are not one’s own (3.24.68–69); δόξα (‘[others’] opinions) are not up to us (Ench. 1.1). Epictetus endorses the saying of Diogenes that ill repute is the noise of madmen (1.24.6–7), and exclaims dramatically, “τὸ σωµὰτον λάβε, τὴν κηρύσσων λάβε, τὴν φήµην λάβε!” (Take my little body, take my property, take my reputation!) (1.29.10; cf. 1.24.6–7; cf. 1.29.48–49). However, he also seems to want to discourage irresponsible nonconformity and unconventionality; for example, in people who want to behave like Cynics by going about in rough cloaks, carrying wallets and insulting people (3.22.10–11, 50–51).

54. Cf. 2.8.11: ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου. By the “god within” or “part of god within,” Epictetus seems to mean our reason. Epictetus says that because each of us has within himself this μέρος (part) of god, each of us is an ἀξιόσωσμα (fragment) of god (2.8.11; cf. 1.14.6). On the “god within” in other Stoics, see E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (London, 1880), 216 and 351–52.

55. In Plato’s Symposium, Phaedrus says that αἰσχύνη before one’s beloved makes one want to hide disgraceful deeds from his sight, and so inclines one away from disgraceful deeds and towards noble ones (178C–179A). At the end of the dialogue, Alcibiades reports that Socrates alone of all men is able to make him feel αἰσχύνη (216B). In the presence of Socrates, he feels most lowly, as if his life is not worth living.
He has stationed by each person's side a guardian spirit, sleepless and undeceivable, and has entrusted him to guard over him. Remember, whenever you shut the doors and make it dark indoors never to say that you are alone: for you are not, but the god within is there and your spirit is there.

Epictetus uses the idea of this constantly watching god to provoke his listeners' shame (2.8.12–14; cf. 1.30.1):

"You are carrying god about with you, wretch, and do not know it! Do you think I am speaking of some external god of silver or gold? You bear him within yourself, and do not perceive that you are defiling him with impure thoughts and filthy actions. If a statue of god were present you would not dare to do the things which you are doing now. But when god himself is present within you and seeing and hearing everything, are you not ashamed to be planning and doing these things, you, insensible of your own nature and under god's wrath?"

This "god within" is nothing other than the best aspect of ourselves, our reason. Thus, Epictetus is able to move easily from the idea of being ashamed in front of god to that of being ashamed in front of oneself, and from failing to live up to god's standards to failing to live up to one's own. So he advises his audience (2.18.19–20):

"Wish that you will always be pleasing to yourself; wish that you will be seen to be beautiful by god. Desire that you will become pure before your pure self and before god."

Epictetus adds to this the example of Euphrates, who concealed the fact of his being a philosopher from others, in order to ensure himself that what he did, he did not for any spectators, but for himself and for god (4.8.17–18, Ench. 46).
Being one's own judge allows one two kinds of independence: not only can one set standards for oneself, but one can also satisfy one's own need for approval: ἀρκού ὦν ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἐννιαίῳ φιλόσοφος, εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλει, σαυτῷ φαίνων καὶ ἰκανός ἐστι (“Be content in all [matters] to be a philosopher, and if you also wish to be seen as one, show to yourself that you are one, and you will do well enough,” Ench. 23). By acknowledging this need for approval, on the one hand, and claiming that one can satisfy it by oneself, on the other—that one can be another to oneself—Epictetus insightfully combines a recognition of our vulnerability to others' judgments of us with a more self-reflexive account of the self-sufficiency of virtue.56

The culmination of Epictetus' ideal of self-sufficient self-evaluation is to be found in his treatment of the Cynic's αἰδώς.57 In antiquity, the Cynics' indifference to convention earned them the charge of ἀναδεία (shamelessness);58 paradoxically, Epictetus' Cynic turns out to be the exemplar of αἰδώς. On Epictetus' account, the true Cynic is not simply unfettered by convention, but is subject to a higher, god-given and self-imposed standard.59 The Cynic is independent of everything save his own, secure, judgments. This higher standard by which the Cynic lives is his αἰδώς. Beginning with the point that one who would be a Cynic should not only know what hardships this position involves but also not set too low a value on himself (3.22.12), Epictetus continues the list of requirements (3.22.13–16; cf. 4.8.33):

δεὶ . . . οὐκ ὃγγίην εἶπαι, μὴ μηνὶς, μὴ ἐλεόν, μὴ κοράσης καὶ φαίνω; ἐλάφως: ἐλάφως: ἐλάφως καὶ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν εἰδέναι σε δεὶ, ὅτι ἐφ' ἄλλον ἀνήθικον τοὺς τούτους προβλήματα καὶ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τοῦ σκότους, ὅταν τί τῶν τοιούτων ποιῶν, καὶ τὰ κρύσφοντα πολλά ἔχουσιν. κέκλεικε τὸν θηράν, ἐπιτήκας τοῦ κυρίων; ὧν τις ἐλθῇ, λέγει ὅτι ἐξω ἐστίν, οὐ σχολάσει.” ὁ Κύνικος δ' ἀντὶ πάντων τούτων ὁδειλε τὴν αἰδώς προβεβληθαί: εἰ δὲ μὴ, γυμνός καὶ ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ ἄσχημονει. τοῦτο εἰκόνα ἐστίν αὐτό, τοῦτο θύρα, τοῦτο οἱ ἔπι τοῦ κοιτᾶνος, τοῦτο σκότος, οὔτε γὰρ θέλειν τι δεῖ ἀποκρύπτει στο SYN λήτον εἰς ἐνοτοπίαν (εἰ δὲ μη, ἀπήλθεν, ἀπόλυσε τοῦ Κύνικον, τὸν ὑπαίθρον, τὸν ἐλεύθερον, ἤρκετα τί τῶν ἐκτός φοβεῖται, ἢρκετα ἐχειν τοῦ ἀποκρύψυς καὶ οὕτε ὅταν θέλη δύναται.

56. The ideas that one might be one's own judge, that shame before oneself might set standards for one's conduct and that self-approval might contribute to happiness go back at least to Democritus; see frags. 84, 174, 244, 264. On αἰδώς in Democritus, see D. L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, 1993), 363–70. On the contribution of consciousness of one's character to εὐθυμία (tranquility) in various Stoic and Epicurean writers, see Gill, “Peace of Mind,” 4628–29.


58. D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D. (London, 1937), 5. E.g., D. L. 6.32, 46, 69. But notice that Diogenes the Cynic is also shown provoking people by asking them, οὐκ εἰσεύθυ ("are you not ashamed?") about various aspects of their behavior (D. L. 6.65). Thanks to A. Long for calling this passage to my attention.

59. The Cynic departs from convention because he lives by the law of god or nature. This is why the true Cynic should not be expected to behave like everybody else. For example, unless he lives in a city of wise persons, he will not have a family, since that would distract him from performing his role as example and messenger to mankind (3.22.67–82), which involves caring for other people, teaching them where their good lies (3.1.22–23, 3.22.23–24), showing them that one can live serenely without possessions—if only one attends to one's character (3.22.47–48).
[Y]ou . . . must . . . not feel anger, nor wrath, nor envy, nor pity; [you must want] neither a little maid, nor a little reputation, nor a little boy, nor a little cake. For you must know that other people are protected by their walls and their houses and the darkness when they do one of these things [like getting angry, or going after the little maid], and they have many things to hide them. One closes his door, posts someone in front of his bedroom. “If anyone comes, say that I am out, that I am not free.” But the Cynic, instead of all these, uses his αἰδως to protect himself; if he does not, he will be disgracing himself naked and out in the open. This is his house, this his door, this the guards at his bedroom, this his darkness. For neither should he want to hide anything that is his (if he does, he is gone, he has destroyed the Cynic, the outdoor, free person; he has begun to fear something external; he has begun to have a need of something that will hide him)—nor when he wants to is he able to.

Where ordinary people are protected from the judgments of others by their privacy, the Cynic relies on his αἰδως. He can do this because, on the one hand, he has nothing to hide: he is perfectly virtuous, and having done no wrong, has none of the fear of censure that is attendant on wrongdoing. On the other hand, while he may expect unjustified censure (for most people are fools), he need not hide anything to avoid this unjustified censure either, for his αἰδως will protect him from being harmed by it. After all, he knows that the judgments of others are not in his control—only his own are—and that his happiness depends only on what is in his control. And as for what is in his control, he is secure in his judgments of what is right, and who he is; he is sure that what he does is right, and that the way he lives is virtuous. He can regard anyone who judges him impious as like the person who judges the true syllogism false: condemned by his own judgment (1.29.50–52). Unlike ordinary people, who might rely on the judgment of others to guide their search for right and wrong, the Cynic can dispense with the judgment of others since he knows right and wrong. But the Cynic’s self-sufficiency is not only a matter of having secure first-order judgments; he also makes the reflexive judgment that his own character is virtuous, and this, true αἰδως, is what qualifies him to live his whole life in the open, to be a messenger to the rest of humanity. Epictetus compares the Cynic’s self-awareness to the bodyguards of a king, who afford their king the privilege of censuring and punishing others, irrespective of his own vice. A king may censure others because of the power his bodyguards wield, but the Cynic’s authority to censure comes from his self-respect (3.22.94).

Epictetus recognizes that in order to live a virtuous life, one needs one’s own standard of conduct—not just for a model to follow, but also for a self-approving or self-criticizing judge. One’s own standard provides one protection from others’ judgments. For when one’s own judgments are secure, then one’s soul is like a city with strong walls: one can withstand a long siege (4.5.25–28). Thus, our αἰδως can protect us against the loss of self-respect that can come from others’ adverse judgments or ill-treatment of us, and, as we saw in section 2, from acting in a way that is beneath us as we conceive of ourselves.

Now that we have surveyed Epictetus’ views about and use of αἰδως, I wish to suggest in closing that in Epictetus, αἰδως plays the role of the
conscience: a self-evaluation that restricts conduct, "from within." In his
great study of Epictetus, A. Bonhöffer briefly considers whether the inter-
nal judge we have been discussing—which he identifies narrowly with the
daimon epistrópos mentioned in 1.14.12–14—is like what we call con-
sience. His verdict is "flatly in the negative, because Epictetus knows no
conflict between duty and inclination" and has no conception of "a spec-
cifically moral organ working beside reason and independently of it."60
Bonhöffer's reasons no longer seem compelling. While it is true that Epic-
tetus does not conceive of duty in Kantian terms, as a distinct motivational
source opposed to inclination, we have seen that his psychology does in-
clude an impulse other than desire: the impulse toward the appropriate. We
have seen, further, that in the determination of appropriate action, this
impulse operates independently of desire in informing and being informed
by one's self-conception or standard. The self-evaluative judgments that I
have argued are judgments of αἰδώς made from the perspective of this
standard, which serves both as model and judge for an agent. It is my hope
that the account of αἰδώς and its role in moral development I have given
provides some grounds for reconsidering the question of conscience in
Epictetus.61

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60. Bonhöffer, Ethics, 14–15. Bonhöffer notes the presence of the concept of αἰδώς—which he under-
stands as the natural sense of shame—in Epictetus but feels that this conception is overwhelmed by Epicte-
tetus' Stoic intellectualism, which exaggerates the contribution of theoretical training and underestimates that
of the immediate moral sense in the making of moral judgments (p. 205).
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