

POL 596a: AMERICAN POLITICS: INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Chad Westerland
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POL 596a: Th: 3:30-5:15 pm

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REQUIRED BOOKS:

- Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. *The Search for American Political Development*. Cambridge
- North, Douglas. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 2004. *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan*. Cambridge.
- Cameron, Charles. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. Cambridge.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge.
- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge.
- Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberative Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge.
- Langer, Laura. 2002. *Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study*. SUNY

COURSE OVERVIEW:

In this course, we will explore broadly the study of political institutions. While many of our topics will focus on examples from American politics, we will see that most of the course material will be generalizable across subfields. In fact, a fundamental point of the course is that the study of political institutions cannot be limited to a particular subfield within the discipline.

GRADING

Participation & Presentations – 40%
Research Paper – 40%
Short Papers 20%

You will be required to lead the class discussion one week this semester. You may request up to three weeks that you would like to lead by January 16th. As the discussion leader, you will set the agenda for our class that week. This involves preparing broad discussion points for the class. You will be evaluated on your weekly participation. A research paper for the course is also required. You must clear your topic with me by March 29th. Depending on the project, I am willing to accept research proposals for the final paper. The final paper is due May 4th. Finally, you are required to write 5 4-5 page summaries. You may not do a short paper the week you are the discussion leader, and you must do at least 2 short papers prior to Spring Break. Other than these two conditions, you are free to choose which weeks to do the summaries. The short papers

should critically summarize a theme for the readings that week. The summaries are due at 10 a.m. the day of class.

Course Schedule

January 11

Intro

January 18

Approaches to the Study of Institutions

Moe, Terry. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. *American Journal of Political Science*: 739-777.

Smith, Rogers. 1988. Political Jurisprudence, the “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law. *American Political Science Review*: 89-108.

Moe, Terry. 1990. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*: 213-253.

Gerber, Elisabeth, and John Jackson. 1993. Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions. *American Political Science Review*: 639-656.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*: 761-800. [note this entire issue of IO is a special issue on the design of institutions]

Crawford, Susan, and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. A Grammar of Institutions. *American Political Science Review*: 89: 582-600.

Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. Institutionalism as a Methodology. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*: 123-144.

Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. *The Search for American Political Development*. Cambridge

January 25

Institutional Stability and Change

Riker, William. 1980. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *American Political Science Review*: 432-446.

McKelvey, Richard. 1986. Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice. *American Journal of Political Science*: 283-314.

North, Douglas. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge.

Jenkins-Smith, Hank, Gilbert St. Clair, and Brian Woods. 1991. Explaining Change in Policy Subsystems: Analysis of Coalition Stability and Defection Over Time. *American Journal of Political Science*: 851-880.

Jones, Bryan, James True, and Frank Baumgartner. 1997. Does Incrementalism Stem from Political Consensus or from Institutional Gridlock? *American Journal of Political Science*: 1319-1339.

Lieberman, Robert. 2002. Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order. *American Political Science Review*: 697-712.

Greif, Avner and David Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. *American Political Science Review*: 633-652.

Thelen, Kathleen. 2004. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge.

Page, Scott. 2006. Path Dependence. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*: 87-115.

February 1

Institutional Stability and Change/Agenda Setting, cont.

Eavey, Cheryl, and Gary Miller. 1984. Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining? *American Political Science Review*: 719-733.

Bendor, Jonathon, and Terry Moe. 1986. Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics. *American Political Science Review*: 1187-1207.

Ferejohn, John, Morris Fiorina, and Richard McKelvey. 1987. Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting. *American Journal of Political Science*: 169-193.

Hammond, Thomas, and Gary Miller. 1987. The Core of the Constitution. *American Political Science Review*: 1155-1174.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1991. Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems. *Journal of Politics*: 1044-1074.

Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske. 1992. Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government. *American Political Science Review*: 737-747.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*: 183-201.

Epstein, Lee, and Olga Shvetsova. 2002. Heresthetical Maneuvering on the U.S. Supreme Court. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*: 93-122.

Sheingate, Adam. 2003. Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development. *Studies in American Political Development*: 185-203.

February 8

Legislative Institutions – Parties

Krehbiel, Keith, 1993. Where's the Party? *British Journal of Political Science*: 235-266.

Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge.

Jones, Mark, and Wonjae Hwang. 2005. Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress. *American Journal of Political Science*: 267-282.

Aldrich, John, and James Battista. 2002. Conditional Party Government in the States. *American Journal of Political Science*: 164-172.

Roberts, Jason, and Steven Smith. 2003. Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000. *American Journal of Political Science*: 305-317.

Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2003. When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics. *American Journal of Political Science*: 503-522.

Adams, James, and Samuel Merrill. 2006. Why Small, Centrist Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties. *American Political Science Review*: 403-417.

Desposato, Scott. 2006. Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. *American Journal of Political Science*: 62-80.

February 15

Legislative Institutions – Organization

Shepsle, Kenneth. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. *American Journal of Political Science*: 27-59.

Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. *American Political Science Review*: 85-104.

Baron, David and John Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*: 1181-1206.

Shipan, Charles. 1992. Individual Incentives and Institutional Imperatives: Committee Jurisdiction and Long-Term Health Care. *American Journal of Political Science*: 877-895.

Maltzman, Forrest. 1995. Meeting Competing Demands: Committee Performance in the Postreform House. *American Journal of Political Science*: 653-682.

Diermeier, Daniel, and Roger Myerson. 1999. Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures. *American Economic Review*: 1182-1196.

Carruba, Clifford and Craig Volden. 2000. Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*: 261-277.

Schickler, Eric. 2000. Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models. *American Political Science Review*: 269-288.

Wawro, Greg, and Eric Shickler. 2004. Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate. *American Journal of Political Science*: 758-774.

February 22

Executive Institutions

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew McCubbins. 1988. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions. *American Journal of Political Science*: 713-736.

Shugart, Matthew. 1995. The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government. *American Political Science Review*: 327-343.

McCarty, Nolan and Keith Poole. 1995. Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961-1986. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*: 282-312.

Cameron, Charles. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. The President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals. *American Journal of Political Science*: 313-329.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth Shotts. 2003. The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion. *American Journal of Political Science*: 690-706

McCarty, Nolan. 2000. Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics. *American Political Science Review*: 117-129.

Edwards, George, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media. *American Political Science Review*: 327-344.

March 1

Bureaucratic Institutions

Bendor, Jonathon and Terry Moe. 1985. An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics. *American Political Science Review*: 755-774.

Hammond, Thomas. 1986. Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science*: 379-420.

Bendor, Jonathon, and Thomas Hammond 1992. Rethinking Allison's Models. *American Political Science Review*: 301-322.

Bendor, Jonathon. 1995. A Model of Muddling Through. *American Political Science Review*: 819-840.

Carpenter, Daniel. 1996. Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation. *American Political Science Review*: . 283-302.

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberative Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge.

Bendor, Jonathon, Terry Moe, and Kenneth Shotts. 2001. Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program. *American Political Science Review*: 169-190.

Olsen, Johan. 2001. Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review*: 191-198.

Ting, Michael. 2003. A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy. *American Political Science Review*: 274-292.

March 8

Institutional Interactions – Congress-Bureaucracy

McCubbins, Mathew and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms. *American Journal of Political Science*: 165-179.

Moe, Terry. 1985. Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB. *American Political Science Review*: 1094-1116.

McNollgast. 1989. Structure and Process, Politics, and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. *Virginia Law Review*: 431-482.

Ferejohn, John, and Charles Shipan. 1990. Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*: 1-20.

Wood, B. Dan and Richard Waterman. 1991. The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review*: 801-828.

Balla, Steven. 1998. Administrative Procedures and Control of the Bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review*: 663-673.

Shipan, Charles. 2004. Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence. *American Political Science Review*: 467-480.

McCarty, Nolan. 2004. The Appointments Dilemma. *American Journal of Political Science*: 413-428.

Moe, Terry. 2006. Political Control and the Power of the Agent. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*: 1-29.

March 15 – No Class

March 22

Electoral Institutions

Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress? *American Political Science Review*: 794-812.

Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge.

Crisp, Brian and Rachael Ingall. 2002. Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Colombia. *American Journal of Political Science*: 733-748.

Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. 2003. Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States. *American Political Science Review*: 245-260.

Bendor, Jonathon, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting. 2003. A Behavioral Model of Turnout. *American Political Science Review*: 261-280.

Engstrom, Erik. 2006. Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting in the 19th Century. *American Political Science Review*: 419-427.

Carson, Jamie, Erik Engstrom, and Jason Roberts. 2006. Redistricting, Candidate Entry, and the Politics of Nineteenth Century US House Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*: 283-293.

Desposato, Scott. 2006. The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies. *Journal of Politics*: 1018-1030.

March 29

Preference Measurement

Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship. *American Journal of Political Science*: 212-227.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress. *American Political Science Review*: 673-687.

Clinton, Joshua, and Adam Meirowitz. 2001. Agenda Constrained Legislator Ideal Points and the Spatial Voting Model. *Political Analysis*: 242-259.

Bailey, Michael, and Kelly Chang. 2001. Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*: 477-506.

Cox, Gary, and Keith Poole. 2002. On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999. *American Journal of Political Science*: 477-489.

Martin, Andrew, and Kevin Quinn. 2002. Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court. *Political Analysis*: 134-153.

Desposato, Scott. 2003. Comparing Group and Subgroup Cohesion Scores: A Nonparametric Method with an Application to Brazil. *Political Analysis*: 275-288.

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Doug Rivers. 2004. The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data. *American Political Science Review*: 355-370.

Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland. 2006. Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament. *American Journal of Political Science*: 494-511.

Epstein, Lee, Andrew Martin, Jeffrey Segal, and Chad Westerland. Forthcoming. The Judicial Common Space. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*

April 5

Legal Institutions

Wahlbeck, Paul. 1997. The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change. *Journal of Politics*: 778-802.

Cameron, Charles, Jeffrey Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions. *American Political Science Review*: : 101-116.

Caldeira, Gregory, and Christopher Zorn. 1998. Of Time and Consensual Norms. *American Journal of Political Science*: 874-902.

Wahlbeck, Paul, James Spriggs, and Forrest Maltzman. 1998. Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court. *American Journal of Political Science*: 294-315.

Spriggs, James, and Thomas Hansford. 2001. Explaining the Overruling of Supreme Court Precedent. *Journal of Politics*: 1091-1111.

Richards, Mark, and Herbert Kritzer. 2002. Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making. *American Political Science Review*: 305-320.

Lax, Jeffrey. 2002. Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*: 61-86.

Gillman, Howard. 2002. How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891. *American Political Science Review*:

Lindquist, Stefanie, and David Klein. 2006. The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decision Making: A Study of Conflict Cases. *Law and Society Review*: 135-162.

Westerland, Chad, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and Charles Cameron. 2006. Strategic Defiance on the US Courts of Appeals. Manuscript.

April 12 – No Class

April 19

Legal Institutions – Judicial Review

Gely, Rafael, and Pablo Spiller. 1990. A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Decision Making with Applications to the *State Farm* and *Grove City* Cases. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*: 263-300.

Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1996. On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy. *Law and Society Review*: 87-120.

Meernik, James and Joseph Ignagni. 1997. Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the Constitution. *American Journal of Political Science*: 447-467.

Segal, Jeffrey. 1997. Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts. *American Political Science Review*: 28-44. (note the subsequent correction)

Rogers, James. 2001. Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction. *American Journal of Political Science*: 84-99.

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy. *American Political Science Review*: 291-303.

Iaryczower, Matias, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998. *American Journal of Political Science*: 699-716.

Whittington, Keith. 2005. "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Support for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court. *American Political Science Review*: 583-596.

Staton, Jeffrey. 2006. Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results. *American Journal of Political Science*: 98-112.

Lindquist, Stefanie, Jeffrey Segal, and Chad Westerland. 2007. Testing the Constitutional Separation of Powers Model. Manuscript.

April 26

Legal Institutions – Judicial Review, cont.

Rogers, James. 1999. Legislative Incentives and Two-Tiered Judicial Review: A Game Theoretic Reading of Carolene Products Footnote Four. *American Journal of Political Science*: 1096-1121.

Shipan, Charles. 2001. The Legislative Design of Judicial Review. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*: 269-304.

Martin, Andrew. 2001. Congressional Decision Making and Separation of Powers. *American Political Science Review*: 361-378.

Rogers, James, and Georg Vanberg. 2002. Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in Comparative Perspective. *American Journal of Political Science*: 379-397.

Howard, Robert, and David Nixon. 2002. Regional Court Influence over Bureaucratic Policymaking: Courts, Ideological Preferences, and the Internal Revenue Service. *Political Research Quarterly*: 907-922.

Iaryczower, Matias, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. 2006. Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. *American Political Science Review*: 85-97.

Stephenson, Matthew. 2006. Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice between Agencies and Courts. *Harvard Law Review*: 1039-1070.

Langer, Laura. 2002. Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study. SUNY.